

FIGHTING CORRUPTION AND TRANSPARENCY OF POLITICAL PARTIES FINANCES AS PREREQUISITES OF THE EU'S ACCESSION: THE CASE OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

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Abstract. *Corruption remains a major challenge to democratic governance in the Republic of Moldova, despite substantial efforts to strengthen prevention, investigation and sanctioning mechanisms. Political party financing represents an important dimension of this problem because opaque funding foster clientelism, oligarchic influence and state capture, while effective public oversight contribute to greater political accountability. This article examines the evolution of political party financing regulation in Moldova and assesses the progress and remaining challenges in ensuring transparency and compliance, particularly in the context of European Union accession. The study uses a qualitative case-study approach based on documentary analysis of legislation, official institutional reports and civil-society monitoring, complemented by descriptive analysis of party-financing data for 2016–2024. The article indicates both substantial progress and persisting problems and concludes that the consolidation of the gains of last decade depends on effective enforcement, improved verification systems and continued efforts to ensure that public financing strengthens the connection between parties and citizens.*

Keywords: *corruption; political finance; political parties; clientelism; state capture; European integration; Republic of Moldova.*

1. INTRODUCTION

Corruption represents one of the major challenges to democratic consolidation and effective governance in post-communist countries. Although corruption may take different forms and affect different areas of public life, its political dimension is particularly significant because it can undermine the autonomy of public institutions, distort political competition and weaken citizens' trust in democratic institutions. Political parties occupy a central position in this process. As the main organizations linking citizens to the state and competing for political power, they require financial resources to organize their activities, participate in elections, communicate with voters and maintain their organizational structures. At the same time, the sources and regulation of these resources can create opportunities for clientelism, political influence and the capture of public institutions.

The relationship between political parties, state resources and corruption is especially relevant in the post-communist context. The relatively weak social anchoring of many political parties, combined with their dependence on state resources, has contributed to patterns of patronage, clientelism and state capture. In such circumstances,

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political finance is not simply a technical or administrative issue but an important component of democratic governance. Lack of transparency regarding the origin and use of party resources can facilitate the influence of wealthy private actors and oligarchic networks, while inadequate oversight can make illegal or undeclared financing difficult to detect and sanction.

The Republic of Moldova provides a particularly relevant case for examining these dynamics. Since gaining independence in 1991, the country has experienced significant political and economic transformations, but these have also been accompanied by institutional instability, poverty, non-transparent privatizations, limited administrative capacity and the persistence of networks of political and economic influence. The concentration of economic and political power in the hands of oligarchic groups contributed to the phenomenon of state capture and affected citizens' confidence in public institutions. For many years, the financing of political parties and electoral campaigns in Moldova was characterized by limited transparency and weak control mechanisms. The absence of substantial public funding and effective independent oversight increased the dependence of political actors on private financial resources and created conditions for clientelism and oligarchic influence. More recently, the regulatory and institutional framework has undergone significant changes. Public financing has become increasingly important, restrictions on private donations have been strengthened, financial reporting requirements have been developed, and the powers of the Central Electoral Commission and other control institutions have been enhanced.

The article examines the taken steps to combat corruption and increase the transparency of political party financing in the context of the country's aspiration to become a member of the EU. It addresses two questions: (1) To what extent have recent reforms improved the transparency and control of political party financing in the Republic of Moldova? and (2) What challenges remain in preventing illegal financing, clientelism and excessive dependence on state resources?

The article argues that Moldova has made significant progress in strengthening the regulation and transparency of political finance, particularly through the expansion of public financing and the strengthening of institutional oversight. Nevertheless, persistent problems of non-reporting, illegal financing and unreported expenditure demonstrate that formal rules do not automatically guarantee effective compliance. Moreover, growing dependence on state subsidies raises additional concerns regarding party autonomy, competition and the possible cartelization of the party system.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Political parties, state resources and post-communist politics

A substantial body of literature on the evolution of political parties in the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe emphasize the fragile social roots of post-communist parties, taking into account a number of indicators, such as high levels of electoral volatility, low levels of party identification/affiliation or declining voter turnout (Mair, 1997; Rose and Mishler, 1998; De Waele, 2002; Van Biezen & Poguntke, 2014). While parties' relationships with citizens have often remained weak and unstable, their relationship with the state has developed in a markedly different direction. Many researchers show that, from the very beginning of the democratization process, political parties have "captured" the state (Grzymała-Busse, 2007; Smilov & Toplak, 2007; Roper & Istkens, 2008, Kopecký, 2008, Matiuța, 2021), and these close ties with the state are both a consequence and a cause of their

weak anchoring in society: "... a consequence because parties need the state for material resources in the absence of strong roots in the wider society and a cause because, once in possession of state resources, parties are significantly less obliged to engage in construction strategies based on popular mobilization and extensive organizational development" (Kopecký, 2008: 3).

Petr Kopecký analyzes three dimensions of the relationship of political parties with the state in the context of transition to democracy: 1). the extent to which parties depend on the state, expressed by public funding of parties, free access to the media, tax exemptions, as means of subsidizing or even surviving parties; 2). the extent to which parties are led/administered by the state, referring to the involvement of the state in the internal affairs of political parties by regulating their organization, activities and financing and 3). the extent to which parties colonize the state, expressed by the capture of the state apparatus through patronage, clientelism and corruption (Kopecký, 2008: 5-10). Party patronage involves the allocation of jobs and positions in the public sector, in state-owned companies, boards of directors, state agencies, even in schools, universities and research institutes. Access to state resources provides party leaders with the means to build and then maintain party organizations by distributing "selective incentives" to party activists and elites in exchange for their loyalty. Patronage thus becomes a resource for anchoring parties in the political system, compensating for poorly developed organizational networks and the lack of solid ties within society. Closely related to patronage, clientelism is an even more pervasive phenomenon, involving the selective transfer of parts of public material resources (contracts, subsidies, housing, sponsorships, etc.) to individuals or certain segments of society in order to secure electoral support. While in prosperous democracies both the scope and size of the public sector (and therefore the resources that parties could distribute to potential clients) and the number of marginalized people in society (who vote in exchange for material benefits) have decreased, in former communist states the demand for such benefits is high among the impoverished and isolated, disadvantaged rural communities.

2.2. Corruption, state capture and political finance

Both patronage and clientelism are corrupt practices, they are related to corruption, although they do not fully cover the concept. Corruption is most often defined as "the exploitation of public office for personal gain", of obtaining a personal benefit, directly or indirectly, for oneself or for someone else (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Transparency International¹, an international non-governmental organization aiming to prevent and combat corruption in the world, classifies corruption according to the amounts of money lost and the sector in which it occurs: *grand corruption* - understood as the abuse of power at a high level, which helps a few to the detriment of others, causes serious damage to individuals and society and, moreover, often remains unpunished; *petty corruption* - the daily abuse of entrusted power by public officials in their interactions with ordinary citizens trying to access basic services in places such as hospitals, schools, police departments or other agencies; and *political corruption* - referring to the manipulation of policies, institutions and procedures/rules in the allocation of resources by political decision-makers who abuse their position to support their power, status, wealth.

¹ <https://www.transparency.org/glossary/term/corruption> (accessed on January 6th, 2026)

Political parties and politicians occupy the first two positions in a ranking of the perception of corruption by European Union citizens, according to a recent Eurobarometer². When asked how widespread bribery and abuse of power for personal gain are in a range of public and private institutions and services, 51% of Europeans consider political parties as the most corrupt organizations, while 46% consider corruption as very widespread among politicians at national, regional and local level. There are significant variations between EU Member States, but overall, the vast majority of Europeans consider corruption as widespread in their country.

As for the Republic of Moldova, the country's experience illustrates the interaction between corruption, oligarchic networks and state capture (Volintiru, 2014; Ciobanu, 2020; Marandici, 2021). Weak institutional capacity, the survival of former elites and the concentration of economic resources facilitated the development of networks capable of influencing political parties and state institutions. Political finance is therefore relevant not only because of the legality of individual donations or expenditures, but also because it can shape the broader balance between private interests, political organizations and public institutions.

3. METHODOLOGY

The article employs a qualitative case-study approach focused on the Republic of Moldova, with the aim to evaluate the development of the political-finance framework, its implementation and the main challenges that remain. The research is based on documentary and secondary-source analysis. The first category consists of legislation regulating political parties and elections, particularly the Law on Political Parties and the Electoral Code. The analysis focuses on sources of party income, limits on donations, prohibited donors, financial reporting requirements, public subsidies, permitted expenditure and sanctions for violations. The second category consists of official institutional information, including reports of the Central Electoral Commission and the European Commission's assessment of Moldova. These sources are used to examine institutional responsibilities, enforcement activity and progress in the fight against corruption. The analysis is complemented by reports from civil-society organizations, especially Promo-LEX, whose monitoring provides evidence concerning actual compliance with party-finance rules.

The study also uses descriptive analysis of available party-financing data for 2016–2024. Changes in the relative shares of public subsidies, donations and membership fees are examined to identify major trends in the structure of party income. Compliance indicators include late or incomplete reporting, donations exceeding legal ceilings, unreported expenditure and institutional sanctions.

The analysis triangulates three types of evidence—legal provisions, official institutional information and independent monitoring—in order to distinguish between formal regulatory change and practical implementation. A limitation is that reported party finances and monitored irregularities cannot capture every form of hidden or illegal financing. This limitation is itself relevant to the research problem because incomplete reporting and unreported expenditure constitute important dimensions of the transparency deficit under examination.

² Special Eurobarometer 561 *Citizens' Attitudes towards Corruption in the EU in 2025*, available at: <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3361> (accessed on January 6th, 2026)

4. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

4.1. The evolution of corruption and state capture in Moldova

Corruption remains a big issue in the Republic of Moldova, despite the authorities' efforts to combat it. After gaining its independence in 1991, the economic chaos created by the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy, non-transparent privatizations, endemic poverty, unstable legislation, and the limited administrative capacity of state institutions created fertile ground for corruption at all levels of public life (OSCE, 2005). As in other former communist countries, part of the communist nomenclature penetrated the state structures with the transition to democracy. Studies indicate a high survival rate of old elites in positions of power and the preservation of corrupt practices in the first two post-communist decades: "The average continuity of elites in the Moldovan Parliament, for the period 1990-2005, is 68.4% for former members of the Communist Party and 34.4% for members of the former nomenklatura" (Volintiru, 2014: 218).

The winners of the economic transition, the so-called oligarchs, came to control state institutions through their networks. "Theft of the Billion", the banking scandal of 2014, when over a billion US dollars, equivalent to 12% of the country's GDP, were stolen from Banca de Economii (Savings Bank), Banca Socială (Social Bank) and Unibank, is illustrative for the exploitation of the state by oligarchs. The sophisticated fraud, which involved state and private banks, hundreds of offshore companies, and dozens of politicians and bureaucrats, further undermined citizens' trust in institutions (Marandici, 2021). Moldova has come to be considered a "state captured by oligarchic interests, with a concentration of economic and political power in the hands of a small group of people who exercise influence over the parliament, government, political parties, state administration, police, judiciary, and media".³


While in the case of former communist countries that joined the European Union, the fight against corruption was strictly monitored both in the pre-accession and post-accession phases, in the case of the Republic of Moldova there were no direct constraints and pressures like those applied by the EU to candidate countries or to the Member States (through the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, for example). With the submission of the application for membership of the European Union (in March 2022) and the opening of accession negotiations (in June 2024), the Republic of Moldova has committed to strengthening the mechanisms for preventing and combating corruption and aligning with European standards. A Report⁴ published by the European Commission in 2025 notes the progress made in the fight against corruption and the strengthening of the competences of key institutions in preventing, investigating and sanctioning corruption (the National Integrity Authority, the National Anticorruption Center, and the Anticorruption Prosecutor's Office). However, significant challenges remain in terms of prosecuting high-level corruption cases, asset recovery or the independence of the judiciary.

3 European Parliament, 2018, Resolution on the Implementation of the EU Association Agreement with Moldova, disponibil la: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2018-0458_EN.html (Accessed on January 31, 2026).

4 European Commission, Republic of Moldova 2025 Report, available at: https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/23fa6af0-89b3-4532-a3d9-d1638727d14c_en?filename=moldova-report-2025.pdf (Accessed on January 31, 2026).

At the level of public perception, corruption remains an important issue, affecting the daily lives of citizens, as shown by opinion polls.⁵ The annual indicator developed by Transparency International to measure the perception of corruption in the public sector (on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 = very high corruption and 100 = very low corruption) nevertheless indicates a slow improvement in the perception of corruption in recent years and an improvement compared to previous years (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Evolution of the perception of corruption in the Republic of Moldova (2012-2024)



Source: Transparency International: <https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/moldova>

An important dimension of corruption, which has fueled citizens' distrust in state institutions, political parties and politicians, is the non-transparent financing of political parties and electoral campaigns. Political parties in the Republic of Moldova have long managed to keep their revenues away from public scrutiny through permissive and unclear rules. Unlike other post-communist regimes, here political parties gained access to direct public funding only 25 years after the country gained independence, suggesting that significant political actors faced deeper disagreements over the size, access, and rules for distributing public party funding than elsewhere (Lipcean & Prohntichi, 2024: 16). In the absence of public funding that would provide parties with minimal resources to participate in elections and of independent bodies to control funding and sanction irregularities, political parties worked more as electoral vehicles for oligarchs, dependent on their money, which fueled clientelism and state capture. Without limiting receipts above a certain threshold, strict control over the origin of funds and their spending, private funding can become a source of clientelism, and the Republic of Moldova is an illustrative example in this regard.

However, in recent years things have improved, both in terms of rules and actual practices. Public financing of political parties has gained ground, gradually becoming the main source of income for political parties, reducing their dependence on private donors. Private financing has been subject to stricter rules and control bodies have gained increased powers. The following section presents the regulations currently in force regarding the financing of political parties and the concrete situation of their financing

⁵ iData Barometer, August 2025, available at: <https://ipn.md/sondaj-coruptia-saracia-si-salariile-mici-principalele-probleme-ale-moldovenilor/> (Accessed on January 31, 2026).

based on the reports of the Central Electoral Commission⁶ and the monitoring of some non-governmental organizations.

4.2. Current regulations on the financing of political parties in the Republic of Moldova

*The Law on Political Parties*⁷, adopted by the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova in December 2007 and amended several times, regulates the establishment, activity and financing of political parties. Parties are considered essential organizations of the rule of law, which promote democratic values and political pluralism (art. 1), are organized on the administrative-territorial criterion (art. 2), respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, democratic values and the rule of law of the Republic of Moldova (art. 3) and have at least 1000 founding members (art. 8, paragraph d; requirement reduced from 4000 founding members, in the initial version of the law).

A section of the law (Chapter VI) contains provisions related to the financing of political parties. Thus, the sources of income of parties are (art. 25, paragraph. 1): membership fees, donations from individuals or legal entities, allocations from the state budget and income from their own activities (such as editorial or the management of goods and assets owned by the party). Therefore, the income of political parties is both private and public (subsidies from the state budget); both types of financing cannot have the purpose of limiting their independence (art. 25, paragraph. 6). The amount and method of payment of membership fees (by bank transfer or in cash) are established by each party and specified in the party statute, while donations made to a party can be both in money and in the form of free goods or services. The law stipulates that a party's annual income from contributions and donations may not exceed the equivalent of 0.1% of the state budget income for the respective year (art. 26, paragraph. 3). Donations made in a year by an individual to one or more political parties may not exceed 6 average salaries in the economy⁸, and those from a legal entity 12 average salaries (art. 25, paragraphs. 4 and 5). Donations from individuals whose income was gained outside the country, from foreign citizens and stateless persons, from public authorities and institutions or from any legal entity financed from the state budget, from legal entities that have debts to the state budget and those with foreign or mixed capital, from other states or international organizations, as well as from non-commercial, trade union, charitable or religious organizations are prohibited (art. 26, paragraph 6). Each political party is required to open a separate bank account to record contributions and donations and to communicate accounting data to the Central Electoral Commission, responsible for supervising and controlling the financing of political parties.

Public financing of political parties consists of annual subsidies from the state budget, transferred through the Central Electoral Commission. Their amount, approved

⁶ Available at: <https://a.cec.md/ro/rapoartele-privind-gestionarea-financiara-ale-partidelor-politice-15316.html> (Accessed on February 5, 2026)

⁷ Law No. 294 of 21-12-2007 on political parties, published on 29-02-2008 in the Official Gazette No. 42-44, art. 119, with subsequent amendments and additions, available at: https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=148792&lang=ro# (accessed on February 3rd, 2026)

⁸ According to the National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, in the third quarter of 2025 the average gross salary in the economy was 15,487 Moldovan lei, the equivalent of approx. 780 euros. See: https://statistica.gov.md/ro/statistic_indicator_details/2 (accessed on February 3rd, 2026).

in the annual budget law, represents 0.1% of the state budget revenues for the respective year (in the previous version of the law the ceiling had been set at 0.2% of the state budget revenues) and is distributed as follows: 30% - to political parties proportionally to their performances in the parliamentary elections; 30% - to political parties proportionally to their performances in the local elections; 15% - to political parties proportionally to their performances in the presidential elections; 7.5% - to political parties proportionally to the women actually elected in the parliamentary elections; 7.5% - to political parties proportionally to the women actually elected in the local elections; 5% - to political parties proportionally to the young people actually elected in the parliamentary elections; 5% - to political parties in proportion to the youth actually elected in the local elections (art. 27, paragraph 1). Financial incentives granted to parties that promote women and youth in eligible positions have been introduced into the legislation in recent years in order to support the promotion of women and youth in politics.

The law specifically stipulates the destination of money from the state budget, from the maintenance of offices and personnel expenses or for political consultancy, to trips abroad and expenses for the press and promotional materials or the organization of political activities (art. 28). The use of the amounts received from the state budget will be reflected separately in the accounting records of political parties, and the Court of Auditors controls the legality of the use of these funds. At the same time, the Central Electoral Commission, whose attributions, stipulated in the Electoral Code, have been clarified and increased over time, is the body authorized to supervise and control the financing of political parties. Failure to comply with the provisions of the law (failure to submit financial reports within the deadlines provided for by law or incomplete submission, use of money for purposes other than those specified in the law, exceeding the ceilings established for contributions and donations, etc.) leads to the loss of the right to subsidies from the state budget (art. 31).

Parties also benefit from mechanisms for indirect financing of electoral campaigns, established by the Electoral Code⁹ (Chapter V), consisting of interest-free loans and free broadcast time. Public media grant political parties, electoral alliances and independent candidates competing in elections free broadcast, 5 minutes per day on television and 10 minutes on radio, in the first 15 days from the start of the electoral campaign and one minute per day for electoral advertising (Electoral Code, art. 90). In addition, public radio and televisions organize electoral debates, thus increasing free broadcast and giving candidates the opportunity to become better known.

4.3. Between formal rules and actual compliance

A real problem remains the degree of compliance of political parties with legal norms. A monitoring carried out by the Promo-LEX Association¹⁰, specialized in the analysis of party financing and electoral processes, shows that between June 2024 and May 2025, the Central Electoral Commission ordered the initiation of legal actions against 17 political parties that did not submit financial reports within the deadline and/or in the format required by law. Also, 12 legal actions were initiated against donors who made donations exceeding the ceilings and/or legal norms. The Court of Accounts was


⁹ Available at: https://www.legis.md/cautare/getResults?doc_id=148963&lang=ro# (accessed on February 3rd, 2026).

¹⁰ Available at: <https://promolex.md/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/raport-finantare-partide-politice-2024-1.pdf>.

notified to verify the way in which subsidies from the state budget were spent by 4 political parties and the Ministry of Justice was notified and has limited the activity of 6 political parties for violating the rules on financing. Also, during the monitored period (June 2024 - May 2025) the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office opened 16 criminal cases for illegal financing of political parties. All these data demonstrate that cases of evasion of the law are still numerous and that fiscal discipline is hard to learn.

If we turn the attention to the sources of financing of political parties in the Republic of Moldova, we find that subsidies from the state budget have constantly increased; from 39% of their total income in 2016 to 84% in 2023 and 75% in 2024 (see Figure 2). At the same time, the share of private financing in party budgets has decreased, both in donations (from 50% in 2016 to 20% in 2024) and in membership fees (from 11% in 2016 to only 2% in 2024). Since state budget allocations are distributed, according to the law, proportionally to electoral performance, large parties are the main beneficiaries. In 2024, 29 political parties received public subsidies (totaling 51,832,324 lei), but 74% of the total was transferred to 3 parties: the Party of Action and Solidarity - PAS (50% of total state subsidies), the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova - PSRM (17%) and the Our Party - PN (7%).¹¹ The remaining 26% was transferred to the other 26 parties, for 9 of them the budget allocations represented the only source of income, and for another 9 parties they represented over 80% of the total reported income. Therefore, over half of the political parties in the Republic of Moldova that reported income in 2024 are overwhelmingly dependent (over 80%) on state subsidies.

Figure 2. Income sources of political parties (2016-2024)



Source: Promo-LEX Report, p .25

The Promo-LEX report also reveals, based on data collected by monitors, a large volume of unreported expenses by political parties (over 20 million lei in 2024, representing almost a third of the total reported expenses), mostly for advertising on social networks (37%), organizing political events (21%) and offices maintenance and telecommunications (12%).¹² The most unreported expenses (81% of the total) were estimated for BP Victory, a pro-Russian political alliance, without legal status because the Central Electoral Commission rejected its registration, established in Moscow by

¹¹ Data source: Promo-LEX Report, pp. 26-27

¹² *Ibidem*, pp. 53-54.

fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, and consisting of 4 political parties registered in the Republic of Moldova (Renaissance Party- PR, Chance Party, Alternative and Salvation Force of Moldova -FASM and Victory Party -PPV). Despite the multiple and expensive activities carried out during 2024, the member parties of BP Victory declared no financial income and expenses, which indicates defiance of the rules and the persistence of illegal sources of financing.

5. CONCLUSIONS

It can be seen from this short description of the legal framework for political party financing that the Republic of Moldova has made significant progress in aligning its legislation on the matter with international practices. The autonomy of the Central Electoral Commission has increased as an institution with general competence in electoral matters and with responsibilities clarified and enhanced over time through successive normative acts. The transparency of the accounting activities of parties has increased by imposing the conduct of financial operations through bank accounts. Donations have been drastically capped (if we consider that in the initial version of the law, donations made in a year by an individual could reach up to 200 average salaries in the economy, and those from a legal entity up to 400 salaries), in order to reduce the dependence of parties on large private donors. Sanctions for illegal financing of parties have been tightened, going as far as imprisonment and confiscation of money from illegal financing. A new methodology for the financial audit of political parties has been developed, with the support of the Council of Europe, which establishes clear criteria for controlling financial reports, in line with international standards¹³. All these are obvious gains.

As part of the strategy to prevent and combat corruption, to reduce the dependence of political parties on oligarchs, interest groups, illegal sources of financing (domestic or foreign), the Republic of Moldova has allocated increasingly generous public subsidies to political parties in the last ten years. Budgetary allocations take into account the electoral performance of parties and inclusive criteria for the representation of women and youth. Their impact has generally been positive, allowing large parties to develop and small ones to subsist. However, the gradual increase in the dependence of parties on subsidies from the state budget entails the risk of their transformation into bureaucratic structures less connected to the electoral base and less concerned with attracting new paying members. Furthermore, the fact that the vast majority of the money goes to the major parties represented in Parliament and only a small part to the non-parliamentary ones remind us the theory of party system cartelization, according to which parties, being themselves responsible for the development, voting and implementation of the legislation in question and the amount of the allocated money, will impose rules that benefit them, using state resources to ensure their survival and to obtain a privileged position in relation to the newly created parties. In this way, the state becomes a structure supporting the parties in the legislative body and excluding the others (Katz & Mair, 1995). Therefore, correlating budget allocations with the capacity of political parties to

¹³ See: <https://www.coe.int/ro/web/chisinau/-/moldovan-s-electoral-administration-strengthened-with-new-political-parties-auditing-methodology> (accessed on February 3rd, 2026).

attract money from dues and donations could lead to a more efficient use of public money, to strengthening the parties' ties with citizens and their fundraising capacity.

Other challenges are to fix deficiencies of reporting and verification information systems, increasing discipline in recording and reporting expenses, and limiting illegal financing practices (donations above the limits established by law, using the cover entities for financing from abroad, unreported expenses, advertising on social networks paid by third parties, corrupting voters by offering money or social assistance, etc.). Only through a collective effort of state institutions, political parties, and citizens the notable progress of recent years can be consolidated.

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