THE IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICT ON MIGRATION

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Abstract. In the present paper I will analyze the conflicting ideologies regarding immigration in Europe. I tried to define the contemporary historical context surrounding the issue of migration underlying the ideological rift between Western and Central-Eastern Europe. I analyzed the political, economic and cultural factors behind the ideological differences.

Keywords: ideology, migration, multiculturalism, secularism, globalism, national identity, economic nationalism

1. The problem of migration

There are two forms of migration that will have a major effect on the future of Europe: the “internal migration” which is made possible by the Union’s free movement agreement and the “external migration” which concerns the migratory movements towards Europe from the South and East, from demographically fast-growing areas that are characterized by economic, political and ecological turmoil.

In the present paper I would like to analyze the ideological context of the debate regarding external migration that brought up many issues including xenophobia, racism, economic nationalism, concepts that were considered pertaining to the past of Europe. From now on when I will refer to migration, I mean the external migration towards Europe.

The problem of non-European immigration is not recent, Western Europe received large numbers of migrants from outside Europe, mainly from Africa and the Middle East for many decades after the Second World War (Hansen, 2003). The issue was put to the forefront of the European debate by the events which occurred in 2015 at the border of Hungary where hundreds of thousands of migrants, mainly from Africa and the Middle East, tried to go through the Hungarian border illegally towards countries such as Germany or Sweden. These events determined the Hungarian government to close the country's southern border with a barbed wire fence, a decision that caused a lot of controversy throughout the European Union. The Hungarian government was condemned as xenophobic, Islam phobic, that breaches the international engagements regarding refugees and asylum law.

These events from 2015 set the debate on migration in a dichotomous choice: should Europe welcome more migrants from the South and the East becoming thus a multicultural and multiracial society or should limit drastically the influx of migrants, retaining the national and Christian identity of Europe.

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The public debate on the issue made it clear that it’s difficult to have an open and honest conversation about migration because of the political correctness that engulfs and distorts any argument. Accusations of xenophobia, racism, nativism are hurled far too easy by leftists and liberals towards national conservatives, who, in turn, accuses their opponents of anti-national policies or arguing with the replacement theory regarding the native populations of Europe.

2. Aspects of ideological analysis

Latent social phenomena produce changes in society that sociologists measure post-factum trying to construct and validate statistically various hypotheses which sometimes amount to an explanatory pattern. Quantitative models based on attitudinal measurements rarely offer a satisfactory predictability of social phenomena and are presenting a truncated model of causality because they don’t take in account the influence of ideological structures on social change.

Ideological analysis combines sociological measurements, document and discourse analysis to reveal the ideological structures and ideas that have an influence on society in a given historical context. In opposition to latent phenomena, ideologies have a more immediate influence on social change and are the determining factors in explaining social phenomena like migration which are creating a distinct awareness at political level.

The ideological landscape in Western Europe and in the USA points towards an unusual alliance between liberals, progressives and leftist political groups on the issue of migration. At a first glance it would be baffling to put in the same pot ideologies that seems incompatible as liberalism and various leftist (socialist) groups. Progressivism, which is a distinct American ideology, is more malleable and can be associated with both liberal and left-wing ideas (Eisenach, 2006).

The modern-day liberals are proposing an extreme form of individualism which is strangely in a convergence with some leftist views. An example in this regard is the liberal-leftist convergence regarding gender and sexual ideology. Liberals and progressives emphasize on leaving behind traditional social norms, the right of every person to define their own sexuality, considering non-heterosexual relationships or behavior as “normal” and equal in social value, describing them as “alternative lifestyles”. Leftist groups are close to these liberal views as they approach the same issues from the perspective of the “oppressed groups”: women, minority groups (racial, ethnic, sexual, religious etc.).

We can observe enough issues where the left and the liberals converge, forming, in many situations, a unified and functional ideological structure. One of the issues where these historically opposing groups are converging today is migration.

The ideological elites define the cleavages in society and are proposing political solutions that are largely responsible for social change. In ideological analysis, the elites play a greater role in explanation compared with the measurement of the attitudes in the general population.

After the Second World War, the “elite” in Western Europe was represented by the liberal-leftist establishment, the alternatives to the mainstream political thinking were classified as “fringe politics” and were simply drowned out by the media and the academia.

The liberal democracy of the West became a left-right political rotation with less and less relevance regarding the substance of policies because there were minimal differences between the rotating establishment parties. The “establishment” developed a set of “orthodox” policies that were maintained or minimally altered by the political parties that rotated in power. Often, these policies were developed based on social and
economic theories (Dequech, 2007, 2012) that were considered the correct way of thinking or scientifically grounded. Social theorists, especially economists, seemed to forget that every theory about society which goes beyond a banal quantitative assessment contains a certain amount of ideology. The establishment considered their own policies as the “optimal” solution based on the “social science” behind them. As a reminder, we had in Marx an economist who viewed the “thinking” of the proletariat not as an ideology but as a set of ideas that were substantiated scientifically in contrast with capitalist thinking which he considered pure ideology (Drucker, 1972; Wood, 2004), a theory that led to the forming of authoritarian socialist and communist governments in Europe. This is one of the most important shortcomings of the mainstream critique on alternative political thinking (populism), namely that the leftist-liberal establishment consider their position as inherently superior, scientifically validated, negating any substantive debate on the issues, often expressing authoritarian tendencies.

In conclusion, migration is a phenomenon that cannot be explained only by “objective” or latent social factors and if we want to understand the evolution of this phenomena, we need to understand the ideological framework of migration next to the objective factors that are determining it. The ideological analysis regarding the “cleavage” of migration is complicated as there are various nuances according to the specific political situation. As the scope of the present article demands simplification, we can identify two main sides in this ideological debate: the leftist-liberal establishment in Western Europe, which considers an increased immigration in Europe as a positive development, a solution to the demographic problem (Bijak, Kupiszewska şi Kupiszewski, 2008; Bouvier, 2001; Keely, 2001) which plagued Europe after the Second World War (Glass, 1968) and the national conservatives, who see immigration as a direct attack on national identity, the Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban considering it as an “invasion” which will slowly replace the indigenous populations of the European continent.

3. Europe divided: West vs. East

There’s a geographic separation that mirrors the ideological divide in Europe on migration: North-Western Europe is more immigration friendly compared with Eastern and Central Europe.

Many of the Western European countries were colonial powers that exploited for hundreds of years various societies including ones from Africa, Asia and the Middle East, the main territories where did the immigrants come from. This historical heritage made the former colonialists more open towards immigration from territories that were once their colonies but in the same time made them more vulnerable ideologically regarding the issue of migration.

After the Second World War, the North-Western part of Europe enjoyed a half a century of unprecedented prosperity creating welfare economies which combined with the need for human resources for the economic growth made them more willing to open their societies towards migrants from outside Europe (Hansen, 2003).

During the crisis of 2015 the Western European establishment made it clear that they are willing to receive large numbers of people from outside of Europe. The German chancellor Angela Merkel openly expressed the so called “Willkommenskultur”, which is

translated as “welcoming culture”, towards migrants that came mostly from the Middle-
East and Africa (Hamann şi Karakayali, 2016). Most of the migrants were Muslims that
were in part refugees from the civil war in Syria, but many were economic migrants from
countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan and other Middle Eastern or African countries. The
legal status of the migrants represented an early point of debate between those who
wanted to limit the numbers of the people received in Europe and those who argued that
only the migrants that can reasonably prove their status as refugees should have
permission to receive asylum in Europe.

In opposition, Central and Eastern European countries joined the European Union
with a different historical background. These countries faced great economic hardships
during the communist era and in the transition period that followed the collapse of
communism. The Central and Eastern Europeans never sought colonial exploits and never
had imperial ambitions but instead struggled to maintain their sovereignty fighting various
empires such as the Ottoman, Hapsburg or the Soviet Union. In Central and Eastern
Europe there is little economic capability to integrate large numbers of migrants or
ideological openness towards immigration especially from societies outside of Europe.

From these opposing ideological standpoints are emerging different views about
the future of the European Union. The pro-immigration groups in Western Europe are
represented by the mainstream political establishment consisting of leftist, liberal and
some pseudo-conservative parties which have an ecosystem formed by various lobby
groups, the mainstream media and the humanities part of the academia. This ideological
ecosystem sustained the political establishment that governed Western Europe after the
Second World War, assuring, through the domination of the public discourse, the
prevalence of its ideology and policies. Some of the institutions of the European Union,
like the Commission or the European Parliament, which are influenced and controlled by
these Western European power centers are also pro-immigration (we have yet to evaluate
the changes of the position towards immigration in these structures after the European
elections from May 2019). The Franco-German establishment is favoring a European super
state which is multicultural and multi-racial, a sort of “United States of Europe” with high
internal and external mobility where the national identities are greatly weakened (Morgan,
2009). Opposing this view are those who are called "populists", represented by the current
regimes that are governing Hungary and Poland which are proposing a Europe of nations
with low internal and external mobility and strong national identities. There is also a
consistent opposition to mass-immigration in other Central European countries such as the
Czech Republic, Slovakia or Austria and recently from Southern Europe where Italy is
one of the most affected countries by illegal immigration.

3.1. Multiculturalism in Western Europe

If we take in account the ethnical and religious identity, we can distinguish
between three types of societies in Europe: societies with a strong ethnic and religious
identity which are mostly represented by Central and Eastern European countries, “open”
societies that lost their ethnic character and are deeply laicized which are situated mostly
in the North-Western part of Europe, and in the South we have countries which are in
transition between the aforementioned models (Greece, Italy, Spain).

The problem of national identity is at the center of the argument regarding
migration, which arises through the ideological conflict between multicultural and
ethnically homogeneous societies. Western Europe was transformed after the Second
World War from ethnically homogenous in multicultural societies with considerable non-European, especially Muslim, minorities (see Fig.1).

![Fig.1. Muslim population in Europe 2016.](image)


The Pew Research study underlines different scenarios for the countries of Europe regarding the proportion of the Muslim population. In a medium migration scenario, which I consider it realistic taken in account the migrational pressure from Muslim countries in the following decades, countries like Sweden, France or the UK will have close to 20% of the population Muslims. This data allows a reduction of the issues raised by multiculturalism to two core issues: the relationship between Islam and the Christian heritage of the Europe and the cohabitation between different races.

Statistical data suggests that Western societies, which are more diverse racially, are more open towards immigrants and more willing to integrate them (fig.2).

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This openness towards multiculturalism in Western Europe can be explained in part with the colonial past that created a complicated relationship towards the issues of race and national identity (Benjamin, 2007; Pojmann, 2008). As a way of reckoning with hundreds of years of exploitation and segregation, justified at the time with racist and white supremacist theories, we can observe in some western societies, especially in the UK and USA, the proliferation of the concept of “white guilt”. Despite an unparalleled access to political rights for racial and ethnic minorities in the West, it can be observed a surge in anti-racist attitudes, inside of the millennial generation in the USA and Europe, through aggressive groups like Antifa. These movements are fueled by an ideology, supported irresponsibly by some Western academic institutions, that considers “white privilege” (Kendall, 2012; McIntosh, 2018) as the main source for discrimination and inequality in society. The main argument of the leftist-liberal and progressive ideologues is that in the West we can still find “structural or systemic racism” which favors the white community. It is true that structural or systemic racism was an institutionalized form of oppression based on racist theories applied in the USA (Feagin, 2013) and in the former European colonies but it’s intellectually or morally irresponsible to equate the concern with preserving national identity in contemporary European societies to racism. I would point out that there is no significant non-biased research on the concept of race or race cohabitation: we ether have to deal with far-right ideologies about white supremacy or the modern condemnation of white privilege promoted by the liberals and progressives.

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Even if the West is more open toward multiculturalism than Central and Eastern Europe it would be incorrect to say that there is a clear majority that supports immigration from outside Europe. In some Western countries, there is a distinct disconnect between the attitudes in the general population toward migration and the positions of the mainstream political parties and their ecosystem. I mentioned above the “Willkommenskultur” policy promoted at the beginning of the 2015 crisis by the German government. Chancellor Merkel overestimated the support of the German public for receiving 1 million refugees, most of them fleeing the Syrian war, and was swiftly criticized by the AFD (Alternative for Germany) and by the CSU (Christian Social Union in Bavaria). If the position of AFD, a far-right, anti-immigration party is not surprising⁵, the CSU clearly felt that the moderately conservative German electorate is concerned about the migration friendly policies of the government so they tried to position themselves ahead of CDU (Christian Democratic Union of Germany) in Bavaria⁶. The pressure was effective, and the chancellor changed her position by cutting a deal with Turkey in March 2016 that would stop the migration route from the Turkish refugee camps towards Europe. The deal proved efficient in cutting drastically the number of migrants that came to Europe from Turkey⁷.

Fig. 3. Percentage of the population that picked immigration as the most important issue facing their country between 2002 and 2016 (Euro barometer)

Source: Attitudes towards immigration in Europe: myths and realities. Explaining variation in attitudes to immigration in Europe, James Dennison and Teresa Talò, (Page.9).

Alongside shifting attitudes toward migration, the Western politicians and thinkers are starting to critique the ideology of multiculturalism. At the end of 2015, when the political consequences of the wave of 1 million refugees who entered Germany were obvious, Angela Merkel was obliged by the political realities to change her position on multiculturalism and she came out with a more nuanced speech: “Multiculturalism leads

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⁵ Migration [online] Available at: https://www.afd.de/migrationspolitik/ [Accessed 3 Jul. 2019]
⁶ Bavarian CSU takes tough migration stance but rejects far-right [online] Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-politics-csu/bavarian-csu-takes-tough-migration-stance-but-rejects-far-right-idUSKCN1LV0K2 [Accessed 3 Jul. 2019]
to parallel societies" and represents a "lie of life" or "fiction," Merkel said, adding that Germany "can reach its limits by accepting more refugees", stating the idea of a significant reduction in the number of refugees.

3.2 Factors of multiculturalism: Secularism, Post nationalism and Globalism

The main catalysts of multiculturalism in Western Europe are secularism and globalism. One of the orthodox convictions of the leftist-liberal political ecosystem was the idea that the future of humanity lies in globalization and in supra-national structures. The old nation-state is almost dead in the West, they argued, because is becoming practically devoid of any traditional characteristics such as religious or ethnic identity(Hoffmann, 1966; Holton, 2011). One of the main issues raised by this paradigm was if democracy, as a functional governance system, is possible outside the nation-state(Zürn, 2000). Many establishment political thinkers advanced the idea of a European “super state”, which will take over several functions of the nation-state, while being less concerned by the issues regarding democratic oversight and emphasizing on the benefits: less nationalism, more mobility and free trade(Morgan, 2009).

The left had internationalist roots, which helped disseminating their politics, but they were historically more protectionist than favoring free trade. At end of the 20th century, the left in Western Europe turned towards the political center. The process was named by Giddens the “Third Way” (Giddens, 1998) and changed the leftist view on globalization and trade. As a consequence of their economic policies, the left was accused of betraying the interest of the working class whose jobs they shipped to low-wage countries putting an important pressure on the blue-collar middle class which played an important part in sustaining the postwar system (Giddens, 2013). Before the financial crisis of 2007-2008 there was a debate about the costs and benefits of outsourcing well-paying jobs which pro-globalist economists seemed to have won in first instance (Bhagwati, 2004) manipulating the public with “scientific” arguments, but the mainstream orthodoxy ultimately lost politically at the voting ballots to populists because the reality of globalization (loss of jobs, migration) kicked in. One of the winning issues of the Trump campaign in the Rust Belt was the deindustrialization of the USA made in the benefit of the Chinese economy which was managed by the democratic and republican globalist establishment.

If the economy is the endgame of globalism, a prerequisite is creating a social acceptance through promoting multiculturalism and simultaneously weakening national identity. The West undermined the national identity starting with The Enlightenment. This statement may seem an exaggeration because many national identities in Western Europe were in full development and transformation reaching their peak during the two major cataclysms of the 20th century. My argument regards the application of the principle of separation between church and state, formulated as a clear political principle in the Age of Enlightenment, which was interpreted in an anti-religious or, to be more specific, in an anti-Christian manner by the progressive Western elites. This antagonistic attitude towards

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religion determined the overwhelming secularization of the West towards the end of the 20th century (Fig.4).

After the Second World War, the marginalization of Christianity in Western Europe was continued relentlessly by the liberal and leftist establishment which eventually integrated the so-called “Christian Democrat” parties that slowly abandoned their Christian roots and steered toward the center-left (Hanley, 1996). For example, in Italy, where Christianity was still an important part of society and politics after the War, we witnessed a strong secular shift towards the end of the 20th century caused by the compromise made by the Second Vatican Council with the secular establishment that greatly diminished the influence of the Church in society (Pollard, 2008) and the implosion of the Italian Christian Democracy Party under the evidence of ties with the Mafia (Gehler şi Kaiser, 2004). At the end of the 20th century, it can be stated without exaggerating, that Christianity ceased to remain a living force in people’s life in the West (fig.4) becoming practically a cultural relic.

Secularization go hand in hand with the weakening of national identity. Religion is one of the defining elements of national identity which interweaves with ethnic elements such as language or traditions. We can talk about Polish, Italian or German Catholicism and Serb, Bulgarian or Romanian orthodoxy. There are similarities between those national iterations of religions but there are a lot of differences that contributes to a unique national culture and identity.

The loss of religiosity, the liaison that underlies national identity, not only deprived Western European societies of a strong moral basis, a role that humanism could never assume, but made those societies incapable to respond to aggressive religious minorities, with a strong sense of identity like the Muslims (Fetzer şi Soper, 2005). Some will argue that the secular West is stable, less corrupt than the more religious Central and
Eastern European nations. The order and stability that the West enjoyed after the Second World War it’s less the result of a flimsy secular moral philosophy elaborated by the liberal and progressivist elites but it’s more the result of the inertia of a fundamentally Christian moral system that was developed for centuries, which slowly transformed in a sort of utilitarianism checked and guided by humanist (pseudo-Christian) values that worked in the boundaries of a generous welfare state that the West was able to build after the war. We can imagine a scenario where, in scarce economic conditions, Western democracies would crumble similarly to the Central and Eastern European societies under communism because the secular morality system have little capability of guiding and limiting human behavior without an authoritarian regime.

3.3. The economic argument for immigration

The ideology of multiculturalism it’s a catalyst for the acceptance of immigration by the native populations but it’s not the root cause that initiated the process. The gates of Western societies were opened to immigration for two main reasons:

- The economic motive of supplying workers to a growing economy with an aging population.
- The historical motive of responding with openness towards people that were soliciting asylum from countries that were former colonies of European powers (Hansen, 2003).

If multiculturalism and “the historical guilt” of former colonial powers are pure ideological aspects of migration, the economic argument seems to be, at least on the surface, an objective, measurable argument for encouraging migration. The economic argument is intertwined with the demographic problem that Europe’s aging societies are facing for some time. We can separate three aspects of the economic argument:

- An expanding economy needs more workers who are willing to do jobs that the natives are avoiding.
- The innovation and entrepreneurial enthusiasm that some of the immigrants bring.
- The social security issue of paying the checks for the pensioners in a rapidly aging society.

The first two above mentioned aspects are classic economic growth issues. Economists often push in the mainstream media for increased immigration to solve Europe’s economic growth problems\(^\text{10}\). Their analysis show the net positive outcome of integrating migrants on the medium to long term (Kancs şi Lecca, 2018). But these measurements regarding economic growth are “guided” by the basic ideological positions these economists are coming from. There is a banal quantitative relationship between economic growth, growth sustainability and population size (structure) but the crux of the growth issue is ideologic in nature: would I want to live in a country with high growth rates and high immigration, which becomes more crowded, changes culturally beyond recognition and would undermine my reference group’s social status?

The idea of continuous “economic growth” as a must follow principle for economic and political decisions is an ideological position that stems from the unspoken principle of the orthodox economic view that “people are here for the economy”. If we reverse the aforementioned principle to “the economy is for the people” the growth issue is becoming more nuanced, it’s less easy to evaluate compared with the constant growth necessity of the orthodox view. These types of growth analysis ignores an entire shift in

\(^{10}\) Immigration is vital to boost economic growth, Ian Goldin [online] Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/f1ca7b14-b1d6-11e8-87e0-d84e0d934341[Accessed 1 Jul. 2019]
Western culture that is masked by the solution of immigration: the processes that are changing the social fabric of Western societies such as the weakening of the heterosexual family, the altering of gender roles and sexual behavior that directly affects the demographic parameters and, by consequence, economic growth.

3.4. Central and Eastern Europe: The Rebirth of Nationalism

The debate regarding multiculturalism raised the issue of the meaning of nationality. If there are no more distinct and unifying cultural elements besides language, which is by the way undermined by the internet and the omnipresent English language, what is the purpose of the concept of nation? We can further ask ourselves: is the loss of national identity a good or a bad development, what will be the effects on society (Cesarani şi Fulbrook, 1996)?

Some thinkers are arguing that the dissolution of nations is a good process because strong national identity it’s leading to nationalism and ultimately to conflicts (Hoffmann, 1966). These views simply dismiss the role played by national identity in social cohesion, sustainable development and democratic governance, role that a supra-state structure cannot take over. Multiculturalism it’s not capable of shaping an identity for a group, it’s only diluting the national identity, pushing the culture towards cosmopolitanism that melts in a limited set of abstract ideas that formed what we call today “correct political thinking” which dominates the Western public discourse. Multiculturalism is not enriching culturally the world, on the contrary, it’s destroying vibrant cultures replacing them with an uniformized culture. This manipulative environment created by the leftist-liberal establishment in the West contributed to the strong populist response that we see in Europe, in the USA and in many other parts of the world.

One of the most important voices against multiculturalism and immigration in Europe is the Hungarian prime-minister Viktor Orban. He is constantly criticized by the pro-immigration forces in Western Europe for his stance on migration which included sealing off Hungary’s southern border and rejecting the proposed quota system regarding the redistribution of migrants from other European Union countries. Orban expressed his opposition to multiculturalism favoring an ethnically and religiously homogenous society. The Hungarian leader affirmed that he wants to build an “illiberal” state which was interpreted by his opponents that he wants to create in Hungary an authoritarian political system such as Putin’s regime in Russia or Erdogan’s in Turkey. Orban clarified that by illiberal state he means a society based on national-conservative and Christian values that is opposed ideologically to the liberal open societies of Western Europe. In Orban’s vision everything is negotiable in a democratic system besides national identity. This position was dubbed by the leftist and liberal establishment and media as a far-right, outright fascist ideology which is in opposition with the European values.

Societies in Central and Eastern Europe have never claimed to be universal cultures as opposed to some national cultures of Western Europe. Always worried about their sovereignty, Central and Eastern European societies cherished their heritage, traditions and kept their ethnic identity. So, while a Moroccan can become French in a

11 Hungary will never accept mandatory quota system for migrants (interview with Péter Szijjártó Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Hungary) [online] Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d-Kw8kZtejc [Accessed 1 Jul. 2019]
cultural sense because of the perception of French culture as a universal culture that can embed different ethnicities and religions, he will never become a Romanian or a Hungarian unless he renounces his traditions and religion. Nationality means more ethnicity than citizenship in Central and Eastern Europe, with a clear distinction between political and cultural identity. This makes integration of people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds more difficult. A revealing example in this regard is the failure to integrate the Roma community in Eastern and Central Europe even after hundreds of years of cohabitation.

Secularization in Central and Eastern Europe, led by the principle of separating church and state, never had the anti-religious and anti-Christian fervor of the process in the West. The individualism generated by Protestantism was much less present in Central and Eastern Europe. Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy, which are prevalent in the region, is emphasizing more on the religious communities than on the individual, religion being more embedded in society and in politics comparatively with the West. Central and Eastern European countries are more religious than Western societies, Romania and Poland being one of the most religious countries in the European Union\textsuperscript{13}. The fact that religious identity is stronger in Central and Eastern Europe makes very difficult the acceptance of a large number of migrants with a different religious background.

This idea of cultural incompatibility between a culture with Christian roots and large Muslim immigrant communities was formulated clearly by the Hungarian prime-minister Viktor Orban, the undisputed ideologue of the anti-migrant forces in Europe\textsuperscript{14}. In Orban’s vision "Christian culture determines the morals of our daily lives" and “The essence is not how many people go to church, or how many pray with true devotion. Culture is the reality of everyday life: how we speak and behave towards one another; the distance we keep from one another and how we approach one another; how we enter this world, and how we leave it”. It’s clear from his words that he sees Christianity not as a transcendental or theological presence in modern European societies but more as an ethical and political foundation or a way of life, position which is congruent with the revival of Christian Democracy in Hungary one of the most secularized countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

Orban’s position on Christianity and migration it’s at odds with the Pope’s vision and that is raising several issues not only because Hungary is a majority Catholic country but because the Pope’s vision seems to be more congruent with the teachings of the Bible and especially with the New Testament. The position of the Pope on migration is well known, he advocates for the receiving and integration of migrants, criticizing the actions of the Hungarian government by saying that: “Builders of walls, be they made of razor wire or bricks, will end up becoming prisoners of the walls they build.”\textsuperscript{15}. On the other hand, Orban’s ideological oeuvre is not shying away from theological arguments. He used Christ’s second commandment “Love your neighbor as yourself” from the Gospel of Saint Mark, emphasizing that love of another is not possible if you don’t love yourself which is


\textsuperscript{14} We must defend Christian culture. Orban Viktor [online] Available at: http://www.miniszterelnok.hu/we-must-defend-christian-culture/ [Accessed 25 Jun. 2019]

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primordial. Transposing the argument from the individual level to a nation, in Orban’s view if you don’t love your culture, if you don’t have a strong national identity you cannot appreciate another’s culture or identity. In this framework of thinking, limited immigration that is not affecting a nation’s identity is possible but mass immigration that could deeply affect a society’s culture and identity is not acceptable.

The critics of this nationalist ideological construction are arguing that in some parts has an eerie resemblance with the nationalist ideologies of the 20th century. It’s still vivid in the memory of Europeans the shameful conflict that ravaged the former Yugoslavia at the end of the 20th century that stemmed from unchecked ethnic and religious hatred. Viktor Orban pleads his version of nationalism mostly from a cultural-conservative point of view but the critics are pointing out that the Hungarian prime-minister and his party (FIDESZ) often raises the issue of the Treaty of Trianon, with irredentist undertones, which is deeply unsettling for Hungary's neighboring countries.

3.5 Economic nationalism and migration

The revival of nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe is raising the issue of the nationalist alternative for the liberal way of organizing the political and, subsequently, the economic system. Many former communist countries, that are members of the European Union, are accused of corruption, of misusing European funds for creating national oligarchies that are contrary to the European free market principle and, in general, to the principles of a democratic society (Fazekas et al., 2014).

To understand this problem, we must go back at the beginning of the transition towards democracy and a free market economy. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe were deprived of capital and know-how and received large investments from mostly Western European companies. Entire economic sectors that were very profitable like telecommunications, banking, retail etc. were privatized and fell in the hands of Western European owners. The profits were taken out from these countries and, for most of the people, the living standards remained, even after 30 years from the beginning of the economic transition, at a level that represented only a fraction of the living standards from Western Europe. This situation created a rift between a part of the population that is more urban and cosmopolite and benefited the most from the transition alongside the Western investors and those who are living in rural areas or in smaller cities which are more conservative and felt left behind.

The economic crisis deepened this rift and made possible the populist advance in Hungary and Poland that was led by a distinct national-conservative ideology. In Hungary, the FIDESZ government took economic measures that ensured that the burden of the crisis is shared by the multi-national corporations with the Hungarian people. They ensured that the Hungarian economy becomes more independent from international institutions like the I.M.F. and limited the in debtedness of Hungary towards foreign lenders. These measures were criticized by the Western liberal media as interventionist and contrary to free trade principles16.

The Hungarian government implemented policies that are closely related with their staunch anti-immigration stance. Hungary has a long-standing problem with demographic growth, being among the countries with the lowest birth rates in Europe. To

tackle this issue, they created a consistent policy to encourage demographic growth that was swiftly criticized by the leftist-liberal media in the West of being nativist, misogynistic and ineffective. The immediate labor shortage was addressed with a controversial labor law that permitted the companies and workers to negotiate supplementary work hours. This measure was also scrutinized by the liberal media in the West and was criticized in comparison with the anti-immigration policies of the Hungarian government.

Economic nationalisms represented by tendencies such as discrimination between foreign and national investors and exaggerated state intervention in the economy. There is a pernicious idea of the “autochthonous” or the “patriotic” investor that should be favored comparatively with foreign investors for the benefit of the national economy. From a democratic point of view, there should be a clear distinction between democratic policies, such as creating a legal system that is protecting the national economy and that is equal to all the actors in the economy, and favorizing certain individuals because they constitute a “national economic elite”, an oligarchy that sustain a nationalistic ideology and political system. Of course, the foreign investors are not migrants, but this mindset is generating xenophobia which encourages a negative and dangerous take on nationalism.

4. Conclusions

The ideological conflict on migration continues and the parties involved have diametrically opposed views without the possibility of a compromise any time soon.

The national conservatives struggle to create a coherent ideology mainly because they have weakened elites, conservative views being marginalized in the academia and in the media. There is a real danger in a revival of ananationalist extremist ideology that could undermine the goal of preserving the national cultures and identities. Central and Eastern European countries can only defend their national identities and cultures if they act together on the issues that undermine them, including migration.

The liberal, progressist and leftist continuum still argues from an arrogant and politically irresponsible position by considering their ideas about migration as implicitly the right ones, refuting any substantive debate on the issue. Their ideas and policies are sometimes just irrational, pseudo-scientific and politically bankrupt, such as the open borders proposal for migrants that come from progressives, alienating many people who want stability and security for their countries, thereby facilitating a populist and nationalist resurgence.

We witnessed a considerable decrease in the number of migrants after 2015 which is the result of strong anti-migration measures such as the EU-Turkey migration agreement, the Hungarian border fence and Italy's intransigence on maritime migration. In the coming decades, even if the Middle East and North-Africa somehow stabilizes politically, which is highly unlikely, climate change and demographic trends will determine an increased migratory pressure towards Europe leaving the European Union with two options: either it will find a compromise between the two opposite factions on migration, or it will break apart.


BIBLIOGRAPHY
