

European Public Policies
Instruments, Models and Behaviour in the Public Space

European Public Policies
Instruments, Models and Behaviour in the Public Space

Mircea BRIE
Florentina CHIRODEA
Constantin – Vasile ȚOCA
(Coordinators)

References by
Luminița ȘOPRONI, Mircea BRIE,
István POLGÁR, Dorin DOLGHI, Dana PANTEA

Supplement of the Annals University of Oradea.
Series: International Relations and European Studies



Editura Universității din Oradea

Oradea
2013

This publication also contains the papers of the PhD Candidates, National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Bucharest, Romania, beneficiaries of the “Doctoral Scholarships for a Sustainable Society”, project co-financed by the European Union through the European Social Fund, Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources Development 2007-2013.

Descrierea CIP a Bibliotecii Naționale a României

Brie, Mircea

European public policies : instruments, models and behaviour in the public space / Mircea Brie, Florentina Chirodea, Constantin Vasile Țoca. - Oradea : Editura Universității din Oradea, 2013

Bibliogr.

ISBN 978-606-10-1159-9

I. Chirodea, Florentina

II. Țoca, Constantin Vasile

32(4)

© 2013 The Authors. All rights reserved.

Editing: Florentina CHIRODEA, Constantin-Vasile ȚOCA

The full responsibility for the content of the articles belongs solely to the author(s), and the point of view expressed is not always shared by the coordinators of this volume.

Address of the editorial office:

University of Oradea

Department of International Relations and European Studies

1 Universitatii Street, CP 114, OP 1, Oradea, Romania

Tel/Fax (004) 0259 408167. E-mail: briedri@hotmail.com

CONTENTS • SOMMAIRE

Mircea BRIE, Florentina CHIRODEA, Constantin-Vasile ȚOCA ◀ ▶ European PUBLIC POLICY. Tools, Models and Behaviour in Public Space - Introductory Study.....	7
I. European Public Policies. Economic, Geopolitical and Environmental Impact	17
Mihaela DĂRĂBAN (Airinei) ◀ ▶ The European Union Cohesion Policy – From Ideal To Policy.....	19
Vicenția Georgiana DUȚESCU ◀ ▶ The Cohesion Policy of The European Union In Romania’s Transport Sector	31
Cristinela-Ionela VELICU ◀ ▶ Health Care Financing and Health Policy Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe: an Expert Interviewing Perspective.....	51
Cristian BRANEA ◀ ▶ Dimensions of Environmental Justice in Anti-Gold Mining Environmental Movement in Romania. The Case of Save Roșia Montană Environmental Movement.....	71
Radu DUDĂU ◀ ▶ The Unconventional Hydrocarbons Upsurge: Economic, Environmental and Geopolitical Impact.....	87
Ioana CIUCANU ◀ ▶ Higher Education Financing Policies in CEE Countries. The Case of Romania, Hungary and Slovakia	111
II. Instruments and Models of Public Policies Implementation	133
Bogdan BERCEANU ◀ ▶ The Role of Public Marketing Instruments in Emerging Public Administration System.....	135
Mihaela CONSTANTINESCU ◀ ▶ Administrative Jurisdictions - Instruments of Settling Litigations in Public Administration	145
Cristina SANDU ◀ ▶ Marketing Instruments for Social Enterprise -Particularities in South Eastern Europe	159
Mihaela Violeta TUCĂ ◀ ▶ Specific Instruments for the Public Administration to Support Social Responsibility	173
Dragoș Lucian IVAN ◀ ▶ Innovation Through Local Welfare Culture: the Capacity of Inter-Generational Relations to Act Against Social and Economic Risks	185
III. Family, Feminism and Emancipation	203
Dragoș Lucian IVAN ◀ ▶ Changing European Families: Trends And Issues Not Since The Black Death Stalked Europe In The Middle Ages Have We Seen Population Collapse Like This	205
Ioana VLAD ◀ ▶ Organizational Development and Change in Romanian Women’s Rights Groups: in Between Personal, Inter-Personal and Contextual Factors	222
Andreea MOLOCEA ◀ ▶ Democracy and the Romanian Context in Early 90s. The First Feminist Attitudes	235
Florin DUMITRESCU ◀ ▶ The Frivolous Revolution Fair/Carnival Elements of Mărțișor in University Square Before and After 1990.....	247
Răzvan IONESCU-ȚUGUI ◀ ▶ Ethics and Political Activism in Anthropology	253
Ioana VLAD ◀ ▶ Coalition Building Inside and Outside the Romanian Women’s Rights Scene	259

IV. Leadership and Behaviour in the Public Space.....	277
Mihaela Ioana DANEȚIU, Jonathan KOBAN ◀ ▶ Populist Elites in Post-Communist Romania	279
Așer NICA ◀ ▶ Perceptions of Leadership in Public Sector Marketing of Romania	291
Ileana SĂDEAN ◀ ▶ Developers of Leader Rural Development Model.....	301
Andra-Maria ROESCU ◀ ▶ The Effects of The 2008 Romanian Electoral System on Candidate Behaviour. Evidence from the Lab	315
Diana-Luiza DUMITRIU ◀ ▶ Competition Between Sports on the Battlefield of Public Visibility.....	333
Adrian Paul APARASCHIVEI ◀ ▶ A Model of WEB Campaigning in Romania	343

EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY. TOOLS, MODELS AND BEHAVIOUR IN PUBLIC SPACE - INTRODUCTORY STUDY

*Mircea BRIE**
*Florentina CHIRODEA***
*Constantin-Vasile TOCA****

Abstract. *Public policy is a rules-based process that involves many actors, decision-making procedures and tools that ensure the achievement of goals and priorities at the political level. In the context of European construction this process becomes more complex due to the uneven manner in which the European integration has taken place. From one sector to another, there are areas where the EU has extensive powers and areas where its competences are limited. Moreover, in the case of foreign and security policy or the policy concerning justice and home affairs, the intergovernmental model is the one that seems best suited. From this point of view, the study of European political process or of the decision-making and implementation mechanisms are themes of research undertaken also by specialists in European studies and international relations, given certain theoretical foundations within the area of political science. Also, the economic, geopolitical and societal impact of the European policies is another area of interest for analysts and evaluators of public policies and programmes. In this context, our study has both a theoretical and applied approach on the European public policy.*

Keywords: *European policies, tools, applying and impact models and mechanisms*

The European Union is a family of liberal-democratic countries acting collectively through an institutional decision making system, a dynamic reality that responds to ideas of progress and change (Bărbulescu, 2005a: 41). The European construction process is based on the availability of national states to achieve some common goals all the while preserving their sovereignty. It is thus achieved a “union of sovereign states” where national structures remain intact, without, however, creating an integrated supranational level. The horizontal coexistence is doubled by the vertical dimension, the latter being achieved by means of a European supranational organization where the Community authorities are those which, while respecting identity and national characteristics, are leading the destiny of the citizens of Member States (Bărbulescu, 2005b: 24-25). In such

* Ph.D., Associate Professor, Department of International Relations and European Studies, Faculty of History International Relations, Political Sciences and Science of Communication, University of Oradea, Romania. E-mail: briedri@hotmail.com

** Ph.D. Lecturer, Department of International Relations and European Studies, Faculty of History, International Relations, Political Sciences and Science of Communication, University of Oradea, E-mail: fchirodea@uoradea.ro

*** Ph.D. Assistant, Department of International Relations and European Studies, Faculty of History, International Relations, Political Sciences and Science of Communication, University of Oradea, E-mail: ctv_i@yahoo.com

a structure, the policies are rational choices, resulting from a decision-making process of choosing objectives, the means and the resources allocated to achieve them in specific situations (Miroiu, 2001: 9).

To address public policy in general, Marius Constantin Profiroiu and Elena Iorga (2009: 15-16) propose the combination of key-concepts that we can use, particularly in defining the European policy making:

- a) Action under authority – the policy is an action implemented by a power structures that have legislative, political and financial authority to act;
- b) Response to the problems of society – the policy is trying to meet a concrete need / problem of society;
- c) Oriented towards a goal - the policy is aimed at achieving a set of specific objects in an attempt to solve a particular need of the community;
- d) Course of action – the policy is not a single decision (action or reaction), but an integrated approach / strategy;
- e) Decision to do / not to do something - the policy can be implemented in order to solve a problem or, based on the assumption that the problem can be solved within the existing policies, it may be decided that it is appropriate to no longer act;
- f) Carried out by an actor / a group of actors – the policy is generally implemented by an implementation structure composed of multiple actors or, in rare cases, by a single structure;
- g) Justification for action - any public policy should include motivation for action / non-action;
- h) Decision taken – the policy is a decision taken, neither a promise nor intention.

The process to formulate public policies is thus a technical and professional one that aims to provide comprehensive and structured arguments, namely a firm base for all information related to alternatives and decisions (Briggs, Petersone, Smits, 2006: 10). The specialised literature mentions two main approaches in the formulation of public policies:

- *policies focused on goals* - which relate to high-level strategic aspects or to policy areas in general. These policies relate to general and complex problems, establish a series of medium-term development objectives and require involvement of several institutions in the development and implementation of such;
- *policies focused on problems* – focus on solving specific problems or issues related to a specific area or aspects pertaining to a certain policy area.

In this context, it is not easy to summarize the process of European policy-making, because of the institutional system, of the principles involved in the functioning of the European Union, but also because of the economic human and territorial values held by each Member State. The complexity of the community processes supposes the rapport to many models of policy formulation. Helen Wallace (2005) identifies five ways of making decisions: the classical Community method; the EU Regulatory mode; the EU distributional mode; the policy coordination mode; the intensive transgovernmentalism. Therefore, the EU policies are the result of a joint decision-making process in which different actors and institutions interact: the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Union Council, national and supranational bodies, interest groups. Thus, while for Pillars II and III (the common foreign and security policy, namely that of justice and home affairs) the process is largely intergovernmental, the decisions

being taken through cooperation, for the first pillar (common policies), there is a supranational character, the community institutions play a central role (Cini, 2007: 38-39).

The main legislative procedure by which EU policies are made is the co-decision, based on the principle of parity stating that no European decision can be taken without the consent of both the EU Council and the European Parliament. Beside this, three practices are used in the process of community policies (Cini, 2007: 39): the consultation procedure – was the original EC decision-making procedure, as outlined in the Treaty of Rome. Consultation allows the European Parliament to give its opinion on Commission proposals, before the Council take a decision; the assent procedure – was introduced in the Single European Act. When this procedure is used, the Council has to get the agreement (or assent) of the European Parliament before policy decisions are taken; the cooperation procedure – was introduced in the Single European Act and was extended by the Maastricht Treaty, after Amsterdam, it is used only for Economic and Monetary Union decisions. Therefore, at the European level, common policies are made by the massive transfer of competences to the community level, thus highly integrated policies, while policies that make up Pillars II and III are still mostly made at the level of the Member States (Bîrzea, 2001: 78).

Cezar Bîrzea (2001: 78) proposes the following classification of policies within Pillar I:

I) *Solidarity policies*, which have in view the harmonization of the conditions and factors of production, as well as equalization of conditions of free movement of goods, services and capital within the European Union. To this category belong regional development and social policy. The two sectorial policies aim at achieving equal opportunities and equitable social and economic conditions in the Community;

II) *Joint action policies*, which relate to highly integrated sectors, such as the common agricultural policy, energy policy, transport policy, research and development, European environmental policy.

The process of making public policy consistently pursues the same pattern, regardless of the nature and the scope of the policy to be implemented. The specialised literature gives this type of construction as the public policy cycle. The sequence of stages of the cycle is useful in terms of understanding the procedures for the preparation and implementation of public policies, but the entire mechanism must be understood and implemented as a continuous process (Profiroiu, Iorga, 2009: 41). Implementation is the phase during which public policy papers and effects are generated from the regulatory framework of intentions, texts or political speeches. Also in this stage are chosen the instruments by which the policy is implemented (of legislative, institutional etc. nature), together with the implementing institution. When we consider the implementation of a certain given policy we must also evaluate which of the normative models for public policies could be used to achieve it, i.e. the choice of instrument or combination of adjustment instruments (Profiroiu, Iorga, 2009:65-66). Potuček and Vass (2003: 67) identify four theoretical models of public policy implementation, namely:

- Authoritarian model – emphasizes the instructions and orders of the governing body, namely planning, control, hierarchy and accountability;
- Participatory model - relates more to setting goals, spontaneity, training, adaptation, negotiation, cooperation and trust
- Coalition of actors model - resulting from the assumption of a plurality of actors involved in the updating of certain policies and communicate them, negotiate,

compromise, and at the same time share the same common set of values and strive to achieve the same objectives

- Lifelong learning model - in which those who legislate policies optimize the structure of objectives and the techniques used to achieve them.

Vertically, the implementation refers to the decisions approved by the governing bodies that coincide precisely with the results obtained by the lower levels, while from the horizontal perspective, the implementation is an exercise of collective bargaining, the focus moving to the objective pursued, to the process of achieving it, and to the actors involved in this process (Profiroiu, Iorga, 2009: 71-72).

Policy instruments are defined at the end of the twentieth century by experts in the field as a number of techniques available to the government to implement public policy objectives. Ten years later, the definition underwent a number of changes so that during the first decade of XXI century the policy instruments are governing techniques that in some way involve the use of authority or the conscious limiting of such authority. Marie-Louise Bemelmans –Videc (2010: 4) qualifies this definition, understanding by policy instruments an operational form of intervention, concrete and specific, of the public authorities. All definitions consider the policy instruments as techniques to achieve political objectives, but differ in the role assigned to actors in the political process. Each policy instrument has features specific to a particular historical period or political culture, which determines how the coordination and control of society is affected by the efficiency with which community issues are resolved, the ability of the authorities to implement the policy outcomes and the relative welfare of the recipients of such political approaches (Bähr, 2010: p.2).

The range of instruments that can be used in the implementation of public policies highly varied. The first category is represented by the voluntary instruments, which involve a minimum degree of involvement of the authorities, authorities that adopt a non-decisional position, considering that public issues can be better addressed by the community, voluntary organizations or by the market. At the opposite pole there are the mandatory instruments, which involve the highest degree of coercion, consisting in targeting the actions of physical or legal bodies within constitutional boundaries. Between these two categories there are the mixed instruments that combine features of both voluntary and mandatory instruments (Profiroiu, Iorga, 2009: 73-74). Going into particular, a classification of the European policy instruments would be: regulations, economic means and information. The choice of instruments is a search for the optimal combination of several tools that can give the measure of good governance by the effects they have in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, legality and democracy (Bemelmans-Videc, 2010: 9).

In this context, in the current state of the process of European integration, flexibility is one of the realities of deepening integration. The impact of European policies on existing realities in the Member States, especially those in Central and Eastern Europe is in fact the object of research detailed in the volume *European Public Policies. Instruments, Models and Behaviour in the Public Space*. The analyses presented are grouped around four issues of major interest for specialists in European studies, namely the economic, geopolitical and environmental impacts of European public policy; instruments and models of implementation; family, feminism and empowerment; leadership and behaviour in public space.

The first part of the volume addresses the issue of the impact of European public policies from the geopolitical and economic perspective and the environmental impact,

and as a target themes for research: EU Cohesion Policy and its action in the transport sector in Romania; financing of healthcare and reforms of health policies in the Central and Eastern Europe; the Roşia Montana gold mining; the impact of unconventional hydrocarbon exploitation on international actors. The basic component of the EU policies, i.e. the cohesion policy, is analysed from a historical perspective, reviewing the basic treaties and objectives related to reducing regional disparities. The study starts from the Treaty of Rome in 1957, and investigates the establishment of the European Social Fund, the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund - tools conducive to a harmonious development in Europe (Horga, 1998: 97). In 1987, The Single European Act considers The Community, in order to promote harmonious development; it pursues actions to lead to consolidation of economic and social cohesion and also to reduce disparities between regions. The year of 1988 brings the approach of the economic and social cohesion concept from two perspectives, i.e. the community and the multilevel governance (Horga, 2011: 159-165; Gal, Brie, 2011: 284-289).

The Treaty of Maastricht (the Treaty regarding the European Union), is seen as a further step in the consolidation process of the cohesion policy; the Treaty of Amsterdam brings a new strategic element in question, namely the environment. The Treaty of Nice dated 2001 brings new challenges in implementing European policies, with the enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe. The changes brought to the Cohesion Policy are highlighted by the Lisbon Treaty (the Treaty regarding the functioning of the European Union - the Reform Treaty) with the following objectives: the convergence objective, the regional competition and employment objective and the European Territorial Cooperation objective. For regional competition and employment objective, the freedom of movement for workers within border areas has been the subject of research for other specialists, as well. We recall here the case study undertaken on the Romanian - Hungarian border elaborated by Adrian Claudiu Popoviciu (Popoviciu, 2013: 25-39) or the research in the direction of regional cooperation in various fields of common interest at the level of the two communities of Debrecen and Oradea (Țoca, Horga, 2008: 73-82), as well as the proposal of a possible Debrecen - Oradea Territorial Grouping through the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation tool (Țoca, Popoviciu, 2010: 89-102).

Another specific approach to EU cohesion policy targets the transport sector, in particular its application in the field of transport in Romania for the period 2007-2013. An important element of interdisciplinary research is the SWOT analysis (identifying 8 strengths, 23 weaknesses, 17 opportunities and 11 threats), and the discussion of an example of good practice in Poland, the country with the highest degree of absorption of funds. Among the solutions proposed for efficient structural fundraising for transport infrastructure in Romania we highlight: an integrative approach to the evaluation and monitoring of projects; efficiency of civil servants' activity; quality management; strengthening links between SOPT, Managing Authority and beneficiaries etc.

European intervention in healthcare is analysed in a group of Central and Eastern European countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovak Republic and Romania), illustrating synthetically the inherited healthcare systems from the respective communist regimes and presenting variations in the organization and financing of public healthcare systems, occurring during the transition years. Healthcare has been in constant transformation and evolution, always trying to identify new niches to cover as much as possible in terms of population requirements. In this sense, the target group of Central and Eastern European countries showed examples of good practice for a niche of healthcare in an increasingly high demand, namely the health tourism. Moreover, we can narrow it

down to spa tourism that came to Europe in XIX century, being based on the spa culture of the Roman Empire (Várhelyi, 2008: 309-314), or we can recall the benefits of the geothermal water which can be a strong point for healthcare (Bántó, 2011: 167-173). The research undertaken in the Central and Eastern European countries highlights the problems of national healthcare systems, proposing solutions such as reforms of the public sector, the increase in efficiency of revenue collection and in the case of the Romanian healthcare system a separation of healthcare funds from the general fund collection, a more precise delimitation of basic care package, adapting to innovative technology and not least an increase in the efficiency of processes within the healthcare authorities.

Keeping to the area of European policies, the environment policy requires – given the magnitude of the actions undertaken and all possible implications - an approach on several dimensions: ecological, social, economic and healthcare, in order to find the optimal tools for implementation. Recent debates about gold mining in Roșia Montana, and actions taken at national level under the slogan *Save Roșia Montana*, which involved political actors, the private sector and the civil society, have generated many attitudes expressed in speeches in public media, demonstrations or organizing a referendum. From another angle, the economic, environmental and geopolitical impact of the importance of exploiting the natural resources is a topical issue for the Romanian political environment, which can cause a number of negative reactions from the public opinion.

The section dedicated to tools and models to implement public policies brings together studies that focus on: the role of public marketing instruments in emerging public administration system; Administrative Jurisdictions - Instruments of Settling Litigations in Public Administration; Marketing instruments for Social Enterprise- Particularities in South Eastern Europe; Specific instruments for the public administration to support social responsibility; Innovation through local welfare culture: the capacity of inter-generational relations to act against social and economic risks.

The study *The role of public marketing instruments in emerging public administration system* highlights the fact that after EU accession the Romanian government has tried to adapt to the new challenges. As a result, they have developed new tools to determine the adjustment to the European values, including the concept of public marketing. The approach to understanding the concept of public marketing and its applicability to public administration system is backed by a case study on the use of marketing in tourism analysis in Romania. From the same perspective, the study *Marketing instruments for Social Enterprise- Particularities in South Eastern Europe* focuses on identifying marketing tools that would provide competitive social enterprises on the market of goods and services. The qualitative research tries to find an answer to the problem of using marketing tools in promoting social enterprise and a modality to transform them in order to meet the social needs. This new approach to social responsibility is a concern for modern business, but with a gap between the public's expectations and the organizations' behaviour. The concept of social responsibility is incipient in Romania, private companies being increasingly more interested in developing a culture of social responsibility. In 2011 Romania launched the national strategy for the promotion of social responsibility, with reference to the implementation of ISO 26000 and the Belgian experience.

Social issues are addressed in the next section of the volume, with a particular focus on the family. Family has suffered a series of transformations over time, visible both at national and European level. From a historical perspective, the volume presents a series of studies that capture family especially in the Transylvanian area, its implications on

society in general, the social pressure exerted on them, both in key moments of life for the individual and for the major social events (Brie, 2008: 9). Like other academic studies conducted on this issue (see Brie, 2008, 2009), the Romanian family and the European family are analysed from the perspective of perpetual transformation, due to factors of influence: changing of the labour market, life expectancy, economic recession, historical influences, migration, ideological change, a decrease in the influence of religious beliefs and norms, the emergence of new contemporary societal values, a healthier education of society, the construction of the welfare state, the changing role of gender and not least the presence of the European Union. Today we can speak of a large emphasis put on the principle of gender equality, empowerment of women in Romania, the emergence of NGOs dealing with such aspects being parts of building a feminist wave within the Romanian society. The higher the degree of involvement, commitment and sharing organizational values and norms, the exponentially higher is the probability of continuity, recognition, opportunity to express views, to put solutions into practice. One such example is the celebration of March 1 (Lucky Charms), an opportunity to pay attention to women. The Lucky Charms or the traditions related to these celebrations are an element of Romanian culture heritage, with all the negative influences coming from the contemporary society, pushing toward grotesque or the unfortunate blending of traditional values with elements of subculture or counterculture.

Another topical issue for the public space, that of leadership, is addressed in the last part of the volume; specialists from various fields of research - historians, anthropologists, economists, sociologists – are trying to explain socio-political situations and to identify tools by which leadership manifests, so it can be sensed, analysed in time and brought closer to the public (Dogot, Perchoc, Tokes, 2011: 5-8). Starting from populist elites in the post-communist Romania and from the perception of leadership in the Romanian public marketing sector, this last section proposes more topics for discussion: developers of leader rural development model; the effects of the Romanian electoral system on the behaviour of candidates during the 2008 elections; competition between sports on the battlefield of public visibility; web campaigns in Romania.

To define the populist elite's authors use operational concepts such as populism and neo-populism, depending on the historical particularities and theories regarding the elites. The link between populism and democracy is analysed diachronically, the period after the Revolution of 1989 being one in which the democratic mechanism begins to be questioned. Thus the inefficiency of the political institutional discourse, the lack of Romanian policy coherence are two elements on which relations between public institutions, civil society and prominent elite imprint. Changes in this relationship are barely visible in Romania, the increasing transparency and participatory democracy are instruments used for this purpose by the political leadership. The human factor is another element that intervenes in shaping the relationship between rulers and the ruled. The Romanian electoral system, which is subject to ongoing debates about its efficiency or inefficiency, brought a series of changes in the Romanian political system. Leaders resulting from the election process are validated or not, depending on public behaviour, unlike those affirmed after a sports competition. The online environment is another area where tools used in election campaigns can influence voters in their voting.

On-line medium is but another area in which the instruments used by election campaigns can influence the electors' vote. Communicating the political discourse by using on-line media has taken shape lately and it has emphasized certain concepts such as interactivity, personalization and mobilization. Regarding the 2012 elections in Romania,

one could notice an active presence on the online media. The virtual social platforms had a higher visibility, thus the dissemination of information brought about a higher impact and the possibility of increasing the percentage in the elections.

As a conclusion, the studies collected in this volume address topics for debate both for the specialists in political sciences and for those interested in the analysis and evaluation of the public policies and programmes. The field of European public policies is a complex topic which needs an interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary approach. In this respect, the academic community makes its contribution to the achieving of the European integration process by analyzing the instruments, the methods and the models used to implement them.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Banto, Norbert (2011), "The Comparative research of Tourism in Hajduzoboslo (HU) and Baile Felix (RO)" in Kozma, Gabor, *New Results of Cross-Border Co-Operation*, Didakt Kft, Debrecen;
- Bähr, Holger (2010), *The Politics of Means and Ends. Policy Instruments in the European Union*, Ashgate Publishing;
- Bărbulescu, Iordan Gheorghe (2005a), *UE de la național la federal*, Editura Tritonic, București;
- Bărbulescu, Iordan Gheorghe (2005b), *Uniunea Europeană de la economic la politic*, Editura Tritonic, București;
- Bemelmans-Videc, Marie-Louise (2010), "Introduction: Policy Instrument Choise and Evaluation" in Bemelmans-Videc, Marie-Louise; Rist, Ray C.; Vedung, Evert (eds.), *Carrots, Sticks & Sermons: Policy Instruments and their Evaluation*, Transaction Publishers, New Jersey, USA;
- Bîrzea, Cezar (2001), *Politicile și instituțiile Uniunii Europene*, Editura Corint, București;
- Brie, Mircea (2008), *Familie și Societate în Nord-Vestul Transilvaniei (A Doua Jumătate a Secolului XIX – Începutul secolului XX)*, Editura Universității din Oradea, Oradea;
- Brie, Mircea (2009), "Căsătoria în Nord-Vestul Transilvaniei (A Doua Jumătate a Secolului XIX – Începutul secolului XX)", Editura Universității din Oradea, Oradea;
- Briggs, Sandra; Petersone, Baiba; Smits Karlis (2006), *Manual de metode folosite în planificarea politicilor publice și evaluarea impactului*, Secretariatul General al Guvernului României, București;
- Cini, Michelle (2007), "Introduction" in Cini, Michelle (eds.), *European Union Politics*, Oxford University Press;
- Dogot, Cristina; Perchoc, Philippe; Tökés, Tibor, "Leaders, Borders and Changes" in Dogot, Cristina; Perchoc, Philippe; Tökés, Tibor, *Leaders of the Borders, Borders of Leaders – Eurolimes, volIII*, Oradea University Press, Oradea
- Gal, Diana; Brie, Mircea (2011), "CoR's White Paper on Multilevel Governance – Advantages and Disadvantages" in Horga, Ioan; Bărbulescu, Iordan Gh.; Ivan, Adrian; Palinchak, Mykolia; Suli-Zakar, Istvan (eds.), *Regional and Cohesion Policy – Insights into Role of the Partnership Principle in the New Policy Design*, University of Debrecen Press, University of Oradea Press, Debrecen-Oradea;
- Horga, Ioan (2011), "Multilevel Governance (Mlg) and Subsidiary Principle in White Paper of Mlg of the Committee of the Region (CoR)" in Horga, Ioan; Bărbulescu, Iordan Gh.; Ivan, Adrian; Palinchak, Mykolia; Suli-Zakar, Istvan (eds.), *Regional*

- and Cohesion Policy – Insights into Role of the Partnership Principle in the New Policy Design*, University of Debrecen Press, University of Oradea Press, Debrecen-Oradea;
- Horga, Ioan (1998), *Construcție Europeană. Tradiție, Realitate, Perspectivă*, Editura Universităţii din Oradea, Oradea;
- Miroiu, Adrian (2001), *Introducere în analiza politicilor publice*, Editura Paideia, Bucureşti;
- Popoviciu, Adrian – Claudiu (2013), “The Frontier Worker. Romania – Hungary Study Case” in Popoviciu, Adrian – Claudiu; Cigan, Dana, *The Frontier Worker- New Perspectives On The Labor Market In The Border Regions*, Editura C.H. Beck, Bucharest;
- Potuček, M., Vass, L. (2003), ”Dimensions of Public Policy: Values, Processes, Implementation and Results” in *Public Policy CEE: Theories, Methods, Practices*, NISPACE, 2003;
- Profiroiu, Marius Cosntantin; Iorga, Elena (2009), *Manual de politici publice*, Institutul pentru Politici Publice, Editura Economică, Bucureşti;
- Toca, Constantin; Horga, Ioan (2008), “Sociological research. Thinking the future together the Debrecen – Oradea cross border agglomeration” in Suli – Zakar Istvan, *Neighbours And partners: On The Two SidesOf The Border*, Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiado, Debrecen;
- Toca, Constantin – Vasile; Popoviciu, Adrian – Claudiu (2010), “The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC), Instrument of Cross-border Cooperation. Case Study Romania - Hungary” in Dolghi, Dorin; Ilieş, Alexandru; Katsikides, Savvas; Suli-Zakar, Istvan, *The Geopolitics of the European Frontiers*, University of Oradea Press, University of Debrecen Press, Oradea-Debrecen;
- Varhely, T.; Muller, A. (2008) “Spa Tourism and Regional Development: It Can Be More Successful With Cross-Border Cooperation” in Suli – Zakar Istvan, *Neighbours And partners: On The Two SidesOf The Border*, Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiado, Debrecen;
- Wallace, H. (2005), „An institutional autonomy and five policy modes” in H. Wallace, W. Wallace, M.A. Pollack (eds.) *Policy-making in the European Union*, 5th edition, Oxford University Press).

I. EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICIES. ECONOMIC, GEOPOLITICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

Mihaela DĂRĂBAN (AIRINEI) ⇔ *The European Union Cohesion Policy – from Ideal to Policy*

Vicenția Georgiana DUȚESCU ⇔ *The Cohesion Policy of the European Union in Romania's Transport Sector*

Cristinela-Ionela VELICU ⇔ *Health Care Financing and Health Policy Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe: an Expert Interviewing Perspective*

Cristian BRANEA ⇔ *Dimensions of Environmental Justice in Anti-gold Mining Environmental Movement in Romania. The Case of Save Roșia Montană Environmental Movement*

Radu DUDĂU ⇔ *The Unconventional Hydrocarbons Upsurge: Economic, Environmental, and Geopolitical Impact*

Ioana CIUCANU ⇔ *Higher Education Financing Policies in CEE countries. The case of Romania, Hungary and Slovakia*

THE EUROPEAN UNION COHESION POLICY – FROM IDEAL TO POLICY

*Mihaela DĂRĂBAN (AIRINEI)**

Abstract. *The economic, social and territorial cohesion objective is one of the few ideals assumed by the founders of the European Union through which was possible to determine the Member States to cede some national sovereignty toward the EU institutions. In this paper we analyze the historical evolution of the cohesion policy of the European Union - from the ideal to the policy, using historical and analytical methods for demonstrating that this policy is one of the basic pillars of the European construction.*

Keywords: *regional disparities, the principle of financial solidarity, structural instruments, unity and diversity, convergence and competitiveness, shared competence*

1. Introduction

Cohesion policy is one of the most complex policies of the E.U., both in terms of allocated resources and implementing mechanism, which has a general objective *decrease of the existing discrepancies between different areas of Europe by using the financial resources redistribution mechanism.*

Through the cohesion policy, the E.U. pursues:

- To evenly spread the benefits of the integration into the the European space and,
- To ensure E.U. regions development as much as possible.

Cohesion policy was set up in 1987, by entering into force of the Single European Act, given the fact that economic and social discrepancies were deeper within the European construct due to Greece (1981), Portugal and Spain (1986) integration into the European Community. The policy was aimed at counter-balancing the effects generated by the European integration process and accomplishing the Single European Market, which were to bring economic growth to the member states and, for others, slackness, even decrease. Thus, the financial solidarity principle and the resources redistribution one were the basis for developing the policy implementation mechanism. According to the two principles: funds within the European Community budget realised by Member States contribution were redistributed to regions and social groups less developed with a lower degree of economic thrift.

Due to its objectives, cohesion policy has gradually evolved, changing from a series of economic principles into an authentic structural policy at present, being one of

* PhD student, National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Faculty of Communication and Public Relations, Bucharest, Romania, e-mail: elladaraban@yahoo.com. Beneficiary of the “Doctoral Scholarships for a Sustainable Society” project, co-financed by the European Union through the European Social Fund, Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources and Development 2007-2013.

the most important policies of the Union in terms of allocated resources. The importance it has within the European construction is reflected both in the E.U. budget, by increase of the amounts allocated through structural funds out of the overall budget of E.U. funds: from 24% in 1987, to 35.7% in 2013, as compared to the amounts allocated for Common Agricultural Policy which decreased from 80% in 1980 up to 44% in 2013, as well as in the amplitude it has gained over time.

Cohesion policy has developed around the ideal of „economic and social cohesion” which represents one of the fundamental values of the European integration process alongside mutual aid and solidarity, aspirations that structure the European society and determine European identity values.

2. The concept of „cohesion”

Starting from 1984-1985, the term of cohesion has been used on the European political scene, as representing, alongside efficiency, a new vision on Europe’s future. Jacques Delors, as one of the first European representatives who used the term cohesion in a public speech, stated that structural funds shall be changed into a structural policy which shall have as an objective social cohesion. Starting from 1989, Jacques Delors has seen the future of Europe as an outstanding balance between competition and cooperation (Inforegio Review, 2006: 28). In present, the two notions designate the objectives of cohesion policy: competitiveness and cooperation.

In order to understand what connotation the word cohesion has within public European policies, we shall try, first of all, to explain the meaning the term has in common language.

The term „cohesion” comes from the Latin „cohaesio”, being translated by: connection, union between parts, unitary character, consistency, unity. The Dictionary of Romanian Language offers, for the noun „cohesion” the following explanation: adherence, force that unifies molecules of the same body; attraction force exerted between particles of the same kind; inner tight bond. Oxford Dictionaries states that „cohesion” means: „the action or fact of forming a unitary whole” and „the force that binds particles of the same substance”. In Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary, cohesion is explained as being “the state or situation in which parts match so well so that they form a whole”. Furthermore, “cohesion” defines the property of constitutive elements of a system which ensures cohesion and unity of the whole and allows for functioning and perpetuation of the system (Drăgan, 2005: 247).

Within the E.U. setting up process, the term of cohesion has an economic, social and territorial character and it explains the tolerable degree, from social and political point of view, of discrepancies regarding economic and social wealth between different regions and groups within the European Community (Molle Michigan, 2001). Initially, the degree of cohesion between regions and member states of the E.U. was measured by GDP (Gross Domestic Product) per capita. But, along with the European Social and Economic Committee notification regarding „Contribution of community policies to economic and social cohesion”, in 2006, it was created a new cohesion indicator, more representative, which would include alongside GDP, other variables such as the percentage of employment and unemployment, size of social protection, degree of access to general interest services, etc.

In the first Report on Economic and Social Cohesion, issued by the European Commission in 1996 „economic and social cohesion” meant one of the political objectives of the E.U. which was aimed at economic growth and creation of new opportunities in

disadvantaged areas, without involving a decrease of economic growth in other areas. Within the report it was emphasised the fact that, by the cohesion objective, the E.U. does not pursue a harmonization or levelling effect in economic and social terms, but the equality of economic and social opportunities. In this sense, the term „cohesion”, as well as „diversity” are not presented as two excluding notions, but which support each other. The slogan „unity by diversity” comes to consolidate this idea within the European construction, in correlation with the meaning of „cohesion” coming from the Latin „cohaes” translated through the phrase „separately but together” (Oxford Dictionaries, 2013).

The ideal of economic and social cohesion among member states has represented one of the basic aspirations of the European construction, which has been described as an integration process through economic pattern of cooperation in order to allow the emphasis of independence and solidarity development (Duduială, Popescu, 2009: 15). In 2004, Michael Barniera stated that *as long as the E.U. has aspirations there should be a Cohesion Policy to help achieving them* (Inforegio Review, 2006:19).

3. Historic evolution – from ideal to policy

The history of cohesion policy started alongside the European project and has been build up around the ideal of „economic and social cohesion”.

The E.U. treaties have emphasised, from the very beginning, the intention of the member states of maintaining peace by economic unification to the use of all Community citizens¹. Thus, member states, in close cooperation with the Community institutions, had the obligation of coordinating their economic policies as a necessary measure to achieve common objectives established by treaties.

The Treaty of Rome (The Treaty establishing the European Economic Community)

In 1957, the treaty established the ambitious goal of „*reducing discrepancies among different regions and the delay of disadvantage done.*” By signing the treaty, the 6 founder states assumed the obligation of re-establishing the unity of their economies and of guaranteeing a harmonious development in order to reduce discrepancies among different regions and delay of the less favoured ones, thus, aiming at the ideal of economic and social cohesion.

In the Treaty of Rome, the term „cohesion” was not used as such, although the basis of cohesion policy were set up by stating the wish for reducing discrepancies among different regions and delay of the less favoured ones which, later on, has become the main objective of the policy. Furthermore, by the Treaty of Rome, the European Social Fund (ESF) was set up, fund which is one of the basic instruments of cohesion policy, alongside European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), created in 1975, and Cohesion Fund (CF), set up in 1991.

From the very beginning, there has been emphasised the importance of the idea of a financial mechanism to contribute to a balanced regional development within the European community; therefore, in 1968, a General Directorate for Regional Policy to support the measures taken in this field was set up.

¹Art. 2 of the Treaty of Rome: „The Community has as purpose, by instituting a common market and by gradual closeness of economic policies belonging to the member states, to promote in entire Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a durable and balanced growth, an increase stability, an accelerated growth of the living standard and closer relationships among the states”.

The Single European Act

In 1987, the ideal of economic and social cohesion fell into place through the Single European Act, in which, in art. 130A we find „The Community, in order to promote harmonious development, pursues actions to lead to consolidation of economic and social cohesion”. The Community, pursued especially the „reduction of discrepancies among different regions and delay of disadvantaged areas”. The ideas enforced by art. 130C, according to which the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)² is meant to contribute to correlation of the main regional disbalances within Community by participation to the development and structural adjustment of delayed areas and reconversion of industrially declining areas”.

When the Single European act entered into force, there were laid the bases of an authentic cohesion policy (InfoRegio Review, 2008:10) through section II of the Act „Dispositions regarding the Community Bases and Policy” consisting in „Economic and Social Cohesion subsection”. Thus, the economic and social cohesion idea stated by the European Community founders was changed into a real structural policy. Helen Wallace stated, in her paper „Overview: The European Union, Politics and Policy-Making”, that using the term of cohesion within European policies „marks the passing from random distribution of resources to a planned redistribution, by programmed transfer of resources.” Shortly after, the Regulation of the Council no. 2052/1988, regarding tasks of Structural Funds, was adopted, their efficacy and coordination of their activities as well as operations of the European Investment Bank and the other financial existing instruments and the Regulations of the Council no. 4253/88 from the 19th December 1988 which stated the provisions of implementing the Regulation no. 2052/1988 for detailing the cohesion policy functioning mechanism. The two regulations were to establish five objectives for the periode 1987-1993, the form of financial irredeemable assistance³ and implementing cohesion policies rules. By the two regulations entering into force, the first forms of judicial instruments, used in the issuing, implementation and control of cohesion policy, were set up: programmatic documents (the Plan, in present under the name of “The National Plan of Development”, Community Support Framework, in present under the name of the National Strategic Reference Framework and Operational Programme) as well as the standard procedures regarding the funds management, monitoring and control.

We have to notice that, during that period, there were stated four principles governing the financial instruments of cohesion policy: addition, partnership, programming and concentration. These principles give the Commission increased powers in the policy implementation process, especially by applying the partnership principle which states that “operations financed within the policy shall be established by close consultations between the **Commission**, the member state and competent authorities appointed at the national, regional, local or any other level, that shall act as partners in

²Fund set by the coming into force of the European Regulation no. 724/the 18th March 1975. See the Official Journal L73/75, of the European Community Commission.

³Regulation of the Council no.4253/1988 stipulates that irredeemable financial assistance shall consist in operational programmes which embraced: the list of programmes and the measures to be financed, the source of financing on each fund and detailed administrative structures at the national, regional and local level in order to administer them. This way of financing as Operational Programmes has been maintained until now.

achieving common goals”⁴. This partnership was going to cover the training, financing, monitoring and evaluation of the operations financed within the policy. Provisions of art. 7, correlated with those of art. 27 of the Council Regulations no. 2052/1988, provided the obligation of the Commission that in drawing up norms for applying the regulation to be assisted by three committees: *Consultative Committee for Regional Development and Reconversion, Committee for Agricultural Structures and Rural Development consisting in representatives of the state members and a Committee formed of two governmental representatives, two representatives of labour organisations and two representatives of employers’ organisations*, represented the legal origin for a new cooperation form („Partnership”) between the European Commission, national public, regional and local authorities, as well as representatives of the private sector within the E.U.

The importance that the economic and social cohesion objective was to have within the European community, in terms of allocated financial resources, was envisaged in the preamble of the Council Regulation no. 2052/1988, which states that „on the 11th and the 12th February 1988, the European Council, in order to enforce the structural measures within the Community, decided the doubling of the amounts allocated to cohesion policy starting with year 1992 as compared to those of the year 1987”. In percentage terms, the growth was from 16% out of the overall community budget, in 1988 to 31% in 1993. This measure appears as a consequence of the effort the European community proposed in order to assist less prosperous regions in the member states.

In European legislation, starting with year 1988, the concept of economic and social cohesion has designated, on the one hand, one of the community objectives ⁵, and on the other hand, one of the most important public policies which is the basis of an innovative form of governing within E.U., called „multilevel governance”.

The Treaty of Maastrich (The Treaty regarding the European Union)

Signed on the 7th February 1992 and entered into force on the 1st November 1993, this treaty is considered a „new phase” in the process of cohesion policy consolidation. The states which signed it proposed to ensure a harmonious development by reducing existing discrepancies among different regions and a relaunch of the disadvantaged ones in such as to eliminate all barriers dividing Europe. Within the treaty, solidarity among the member states became the indispensable principle in defining the concept of economic and social cohesion, as it arises from provisions of art. 3 *the community promotes economic and social cohesion, such as solidarity among states*. From this perspective, cohesion policy is regarded as solidarity policy as it is based on financial resources redistribution principle, from wealthier states to disadvantaged ones, in order to reduce *discrepancies between levels of development of different areas and adjustment of the delayed ones, including rural areas*⁶.

⁴Art. 4 of the Council Regulation no. 2052/1988 on the 24th June 1988 regarding the tasks of Structural Funds and their efficacy and their coordination as well as the operations of the European Investment Bank and other existing financial instruments

⁵According to art. 130 B of the Single European Act “member states can promote their economic policies and coordinate them such as to fulfill the objectives established by art. 130 A, specifically: “strengthening the economic and social cohesion”. The Community supports achievement of these objectives by Structural Funds (the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund, “Orientation” Section, Social European Fund and the European Fund for Regional Development).

⁶Art. 130 A consolidated by the Treaty of Maastrich.

What the treaty brings new regarding the European Union in the field of cohesion policy is the foundation of a new financial instrument, alongside the Social European Fund and the European Regional Development Fund, which was the Cohesion Fund and a new institution: Committee of the Regions.

In 1992 Cohesion Fund⁷ was set up with the purpose to ensure, up to 85%, a co-financing of great investment projects in the field of environment and transport infrastructure⁸ submitted by the member states with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) lower with 90% than the average of the European Community. By financing this fund, structural instruments of cohesion policy were set up and they consisted in Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund.

The Committee of the Regions was set up as a consultative body of the Council and the European Commission,⁹ having attributes in the economic and social cohesion field as well, as a result of subsidiarity principle¹⁰ pursuing „the ascription of a certain degree of independence to authorities subordinate to a higher authority, especially the independence of a local authority towards the central power”¹¹ in order to give the local and regional authorities the possibility to involve themselves in the European decisional process. The role that the Committee of Regions has in the field of cohesion policy is provided in art. 130d of the treaty: *the Council, acting on the Commission proposal and after the European Parliament agreed, consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions, defines the tasks, foreground objectives and Structural Funds organisation* and in art. 130e, according to which, *implementing decisions regarding the European Fund for Regional Development is carried out by the Council which acts according to a procedure similar to the one described in art. 130d.*

The more and more increased importance which cohesion policy has gained during 1988-1992 has made that the economic and social cohesion process within community to become an essential factor in the European integration process, thus, in the Treaty of Maastrich there was provided the obligavity for the Commission to draw up reports regarding concrete results recorded after applying the cohesion policy in E.U. Starting with the year 1993, the Commission has the task of issuing and sending reports to the European Parliament, European Council, Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions, once at three years, in which has to be presented the progress achieved in reaching economic and social cohesion and the way in which financial instruments contributed to its achievement. In 1996, the first Report on Economic and Social Cohesion in the E.U. was published; the report analysed the level of initial development of the regions within the community and the impact of cohesion policy had on reducing regional discrepancies by using comparative data between 1983-1995.

The measures instituted by the Treaty of Maastrich, and reflected by amendments brought to European regulations starting from 1998, have led to the first reform of

⁷In 1994 The Council Regulation no. 1164 entered into force regarding the Cohesion Fund.

⁸Art. 130 D in the Treaty of Maastrich.

⁹According to provisions of art. 4 in the Treaty of Maastrich.

¹⁰The Treaty of Maastrich is regarded as the act which simultaneously launched the subsidiarity and proportionality principles in the legal European system and in the doctrine. The principle of subsidiarity is defined in art. 3 B „Except the fields under the exclusive competence of the European Community, the subsidiarity principle stipulates, on the one hand, the protection of decision taking capacity and acting one of the member states and, on the other hand, it legitimates the intervention of the Community in case the objectives of an action cannot be realised adequately by the member states „due to dimensions and effects of the foreseen action”.

¹¹http://circa.europa.eu/irc/opoce/fact_sheets/info/data/how/characteristics/article_7148_ro.htm

cohesion policy of the European Union. Thus, between 1994-1999, the legal provisions regarding financial instruments and implementing cohesion policy mechanism were improved; the process climaxed with enactment of Regulation no. 1260/99 on the 21st June 1999 regarding general provisions of Structural Funds, considered the key document in the policy implementation process as it defines the institutional framework established in 1988 and it introduces new instruments and means regarding the functioning of the Structural Funds. By regulation from 1999, was introduced the *Single Act of Programmes*, which reunited all the information within the Community Support Framework and Operational Programmes simplifying the procedure; thus, bureaucracy in the programme acts drawing up and approving process, as compared to the year 1988 was reduced. The „Partnership” evolution, as cooperation form, is remarkable as well; according to provisions of 1999 regulation, communitary actions were drawn up, in close consultation-called partnership, between the European Commission and the member state, alongside local and regional authorities, economic and social partners, as well as any body competitively relevant to this framework. Thus, the legislator extended the sphere of players involved in the cohesion policy, bringing to consultations partners from the private sector as well.

Furthermore, within the regulation, there are provided the necessary measures which member states should adopt in order to ensure that the Structural Funds are used according to the principles of a strict financial management. These measures appear as a consequence of doubling the amounts allocated to the cohesion policy during 1994-1999 as compared to 1988-1993.

The Treaty of Amsterdam

Entered into force in 1997, the treaty restates that the objective of economic and social cohesion within the E.U. still remains an essential one as it is provided by art. 2 „the community has as mission to promote harmonious and balanced development of economic activities all over the Community, a durable, non-inflationary growth aimed at respecting the environment, a high degree of economic performance convergence, a higher degree of employment and social protection, increase of the life standard and life quality, economic and social cohesion and solidarity among member states”. The treaty, by its content, approaches the theme of a balanced and durable development, which got the status of a fundamental principle of the Union, as a result of ample international deliberations generated by the new environmental trend. Thus, the environment becomes a new vector, with strategical importance, within cohesion policy rethought and redimensioned in order to carry on the process of reducing the discrepancy between levels of development of different areas and the delay of disadvantaged areas, including rural areas, having in view the natural resources protection.

The Treaty of Nice

In 2001, in the Treaty the importance of economic and social cohesion policy is reiterated for the functioning of the European Union, by emphasizing, once again, the essential role of this policy within the European integration process. The period 2001-2007 represented a challenge for the cohesion policy due to the transition from a Union with 15 member states to one with 27 members. This phenomenon generated an increase of discrepancies within E.U. and new issues in the cohesion policy implementation because the new states had to consolidate, in a short time, their management and control systems for the allocated funds. This situation was anticipated in 2001 in the second

Report on Economic and Social Cohesion which discussed the administrative capacity of the candidate countries, because applying cohesion policy represented a new task for administrative national public authorities. In 2004, the conclusions of the third Report on Economic and Social Cohesion proposed a new reform of cohesion policy in order to simplify the system of administering structural funds. As a result, on the 11th July 2006, European regulations of 1999 regarding the policy implementation rules were abolished and six new regulations were adopted. The latter clear up the responsibilities of the authorities involved in the funds administration process at the national level, specifically the management and payment authorities and simplify the financial management procedures, by introducing the rule of „automatic disengagement” or the „n+3”/„n+2” rule. This rule contributes to fluidization of financial fluxes, by accelerating the certification process and payment of European funds. The Management Authorities are forced that, within 3 years, respectively 2 years from engaging the amounts, as a result of concluding financing contracts, to certify the entire expense of the value of the commitment.

The Treaty of Lisbon (The Treaty regarding the functioning of the European Union –The Reform Treaty)

In 2010, once the Treaty regarding the functioning of the E.U. entered into force, the role of the economic and social cohesion within the European space is emphasized by the states’ decision of „setting up a closer union among European nations” to ensure „economic and social progress of the states by eliminating barriers dividing Europe” and their wish of consolidating „the unity of their economies and to ensure harmonious development by reducing discrepancies among regions and delay in the case of disadvantaged areas.” In the Treaty Preamble, the term „wish” is used in the case of achieving economic and social cohesion and not the term of decision as in the case of other objectives; thus, in this context, cohesion appears as an ideal, an aspiration of the Union. Within the Treaty of Lisbon, economic and social cohesion achieves a territorial character; thus, in present we are speaking about a cohesion policy with three dimensions: economic, social and territorial. According to provisions of art. 174 “in order to achieve harmonious development of the entire Union, it develops and carries out its activity to lead to a consolidation of its economic, social and territorial cohesion”. Member states achieve, implement and coordinate their economic policies in order to arrive at „economic, social and territorial cohesion objective” and the Union, by drawing up and applying its policies and actions as well as by achieving domestic market takes into consideration the same cohesion objective¹².

The cohesion policy still remains among the internal policies and actions of the E.U. which pursues a “reduction of discrepancies among levels of development of different areas and delay of disadvantaged areas”, especially „rural areas, areas affected by industrial transition, northern areas with low density of population as well as island, cross-border and mountainous areas”. Financial instruments of cohesion policy are mentioned in art. 175 of the Treaty as being, especially, structural funds (European Agricultural Guarantee Fund, “Orientation” Section; European Social Fund; the European Regional Development Fund), funds granted by European Investment Bank as well as other existing funds. Title XVII “Economic, social and territorial cohesion” includes, as well, an article which emphasizes the importance the European Regional Development Fund has in

¹²According to art. 175 of the Treaty regarding the functioning of the E.U.

reaching the cohesion purpose by the fact that it contributes to the correction of the main regional imbalances within the Union, by taking part and structural adjustment of the delayed areas and declining industrial areas reconversion. As compared to the Cohesion Fund, mentioned in art. 177, which is presented as a financial instrument for financing large projects in the field of environment and cross-European networks of transportation infrastructure submitted by member states.

Within Protocol no. 28 of the Treaty, member states reiterate their position of promoting economic, social and territorial cohesion as this is vital for overwhole development and for durable success of the Union and they state their intention of taking into consideration, to a larger extent, the capacity of different member states to contribute to their own resources system and to study the means of correction, for less prosperous member states, of the downfall elements within their current own resources system.

An important role is played by modification of protocol 2 as regards application of subsidiarity and proportionality principles which force the European Commission, before proposing a legislative act, to have in view the regional and local dimension in the consultation process. This fact boosts the partnership among supranational, national and regional players promoted within the cohesion policy.

Another important change that the Treaty of Lisbon brings in order to strengthen the role of sub-national players within the European Union, especially regarding cohesion policy, is emphasized by provisions of art. 8 of Protocol 2 through which the Committee of Regions achieves the right to apprise the E.U. Court of Justice regarding the breaching of subsidiarity principle by a legislative act on whose approval it was consulted.

In present, the general objective of cohesion policy consists in „reducing existing discrepancies among levels of development of different areas and delay of less developed ones or the islands, including rural areas”¹³ and it is achieved by the following three objectives:

- 1) The convergence objective which pursues the acceleration of the less developed member states and regions
By improving the economic growth and employment conditions through increase and improvement of quality of investment in physical and human capital, development of innovation and a knowledgeable society, adjustment to economic and social changes, environmental protection and its improvement of quality as well as efficacy of administration. This objective is the priority of funds;
- 2) Regional competition and employment objective which pursues, except the less developed areas, the consolidation of competition and activity of regions, as well as employment, anticipating economic and social changes, including those related to commercial opening, by increase and improvement of investment quality in human capital, innovation and promoting a knowledgeable society, enterprising spirit, environment protection and improvement, amelioration of accessibility, workers and enterprises adjustment as well as including labour markets development;
- 3) European territorial cooperation objective which pursues consolidation of cooperation at cross-border level, by local and regional common initiatives, consolidation of cross-border cooperation by measures favourable to integrating territorial development connected to the Community priorities and

¹³According to point (1) of the Regulation 1083/2006.

inter-regional cooperation development and experience exchange at adequate territorial level¹⁴.

4. Conclusions

Starting from its objectives, cohesion policy is one of the most important structural policies of the E.U., meaning that its application is aimed at elimination or attenuation of discrepancies among E.U. regions and citizens in order to have a balanced development. And, having in view the mechanism of implementation, cohesion policy is an eloquent example of common policy of the E.U. which proves the acceptance of submittal of the member states' sovereignty towards European institutions (Profiroiu, Popescu, 2003:1).

According to provisions of art. 2 C in the Treaty of Lisbon in the economic, social and territorial cohesion field, the E.U. competence is divided with the member states. Thus, the Union and the member states can legislate and adopt mandatory acts from the legal point of view in this field. Member states exert their competence to the extent to which the Union did not exert its competence or decided to cease exerting it¹⁵. This latter situation can occur when the E.U. competent institutions decide to abolish a legislative act, especially in order to guarantee a better observance of subsidiarity and proportionality principles¹⁶. Provisions of art. 2 C are completed with those of art. 117, according to which, in case of financial instruments belonging to cohesion policy, the European Parliament and the Council, according to ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions, decide by regulations on the mission, foreground objectives and structural funds organisation. The same procedure is applied to establishing the general rules applicable to funds as well as the necessary provisions in order to ensure the efficacy and coordination of funds among each other and with the other existing financial instruments¹⁷.

On the ground of art. 322 of the Treaty, the European Parliament and the Council, according to the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the Court of Auditors, establishes by regulation the financial rules which define the procedure to be adopted in order to set up and execute the budget (...). In this situation, the European Commission exerts a management shared with the member states regarding the administration of the cohesion policy financial instruments¹⁸. The European Commission, within the shared management, delegates certain tasks of budgetary execution to the member states responsible for the funds management and control, at the national level, by maintaining in exerting its attributes regarding the general budget of the Union, the responsibility of

¹⁴Regulation (EC) no. 1083/2006 OF THE COUNCIL on the 11th July 2006 on establishing certain general provisions regarding the European Fund for Regional Development, Social European Fund and Cohesion Fund and of abolishing Regulation (EC) no. 1260/1999.

¹⁵Art. 2A (2) in the Treaty of Lisbon

¹⁶According to point 18 of the Declaration attached to the Final Act of the Inter-governmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on the 13th December 2007, published in the Official Journal of the E.U. on 30.03.2010

¹⁷Art. 177 in the Treaty of Lisbon

¹⁸The budget of the E.U. allocated to the Funds is implemented within the shared management between the member states and the Commission, according to Art. 53 (1) (b) of the Regulation (CE, Euroatom) no. 1605/2002 of the Council on the 25th June 2002 regarding the financial Regulation applicable to the overall budget of the E.U.

“verifying the existence and the good functioning of authorities with attributes of management and control of European funds in the member states”¹⁹.

From this perspective, the process of defining and implementing the cohesion policy is characterised, along history, by an ongoing fight for control between the European Commission, on the one hand, and national governments, on the other hand. The European Commission saw, from the very beginning, a policy with important redistributing effects and with a supra-national authentic control mechanism and the member states, in their turn, have recognised the need for regional financial support and have not considered as inopportune the control exerted by the Commission in this field (Bache, 1997: 3). Finding the best ratio of the interaction between the European Commission-member states-local/regional authorities still remains a key element in the cohesion policy success.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bache, Ian (1997), *The Extended Gatekeeper: Central government and the implementation of EU Regional Policy in the UK*, paper presented at the conference „European Community Studies Association”, Seattle, USA, 29 May-01 June 1997;
- Charron, Nicholas; Lapuente, Victor; Dijkstra Lewis (2012), *Regional Governance Matters*, Directorate-General for Regional Policy;
- Drăgan, Gabriela (2005), *European Union between federalism and intergovernmentalism. EU Common Policies*, ASE Publishing;
- Duduială Popescu Loredana, *European Economy*, Academic Publishing, Târgu Jiu;
- Knill, Christoph; Andrea Lenschow (2005), “Coercion, Competition and Communication: Different Approaches of European Governance and their Impact on National Institutions” in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 43, nr. 3;
- Marks, Gary (1992), *Structural Policy in the European Community*, Sbragia Publishing;
- Michigan, Molle (2001), *The Economics of European Integration*, Ashgate;
- Monfort, Philippe (2008), *Convergence of EU regions measures and evaluation*, Directorate-General for Regional Policy;
- Nicola, Fernanda (2010), *The false promise of decentralization in EU Cohesion Policy* paper presented at the conference “The state of the European Economic Union”;
- Profiroiu, Marius; Popescu, Irina (2003), *European Policies*, Economic Press, Bucharest.

¹⁹According to art. 14 of the Regulation (CE) no. 1083/2006 of the European Council.

THE COHESION POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN ROMANIA'S TRANSPORT SECTOR

*Vicenția Georgiana DUȚESCU**

Abstract. *In the context of Romania's accession to the European Union in 2007 it is necessary to have a comprehensive research of the transport sector in Romania, legally and institutionally, for the first operational programme of this kind in our country, namely the Sectoral Operational Programme Transport for 2007 - 2013. The undertaking of this paper is based on an interdisciplinary research, the objective of this paper being that of understanding the current phenomenon in the process of raising European funds in the field of transport and finding necessary factors to improve this process. This paper aims at a specific approach of the European Union's cohesion policy in the transport sector given that this policy has influenced our country since the programming period 2007-2013. By means of this undertaking, I also aim at conducting an analysis regarding the stage that Romania is in when it comes to the process of raising European funds in the field of transport.*

Keywords: *administering, Commission, funds, objective, responsibility*

1. Policy Cohesion. Structural Funds

The European cohesion policy aims to support disadvantaged regions at European level in order to reduce economic and social disparities. The reforms of the European cohesion policy focused their expenses on less developed regions and countries that had limited resources in order to create a more competitive Union, economically and socially. Along with its accession in 2007, Romania was one of these states.

Romania's accession to the European Union involved a proper administrative framework even before 2007. In this context, we can speak of a regeneration of concepts specific to government strongly connected to the EU's complex institutional mechanism. Government, by means of its institutions, comes in contact with new terms: managing authority, sectoral operational programme, budgeting of projects, financing application, structural and cohesion funds.

Achieving the objectives of Lisbon agenda - sustainable growth, stability and economic and social cohesion - obliges EU Member States and Romania to achieve performance through new policies and institutions. The capacity of public institutions to meet EU requirements is thus seen in terms of performance and the ability to create implementation systems and develop strategic plans.

We need to note that on a European level there is no single recipe for an implementation system of raising European funds. A government adapted to EU requirements and transparency imposed by the European Union lead to the creation of a system that wants to be able to support a policy in the transport sector.

* PhD student, National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Bucharest, Romania, e-mail: vicentia.dutescu@gmail.com. Beneficiary of the "Doctoral Scholarships for a Sustainable Society" project, co-financed by the European Union through the European Social Fund, Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources and Development, 2007-2013.

Romania's accession to the European Union in 2007 *has forced* our country to adapt quickly to the requirements of the cohesion policy and not only to these, both by establishing institutions capable of managing the programmes of the cohesion policy and by adopting a legislative framework capable of backing up the complexity of such an undertaking. The mobility of people and goods, economic and trade development are inconceivable without an adequate transport infrastructure. Financing transport infrastructure cannot be sustained by public budgets alone. Therefore, a simple and final conclusion could be given by the simple implementation of the cohesion policy in our country, for the respective sector. However, this paper aims to analyze the situation of the transport sector for this first operational programme 2007-2013, as well as the first development steps of the legislative and institutional framework, along with the organizational proposals that can stabilize development in this sector. Hence, I tried to highlight the problems that have emerged in the implementation system of the transport sector for absorption of structural and cohesion funds, and solutions that can be outlined in order to improve the institutional framework and achieve the objectives set for the Sectoral Operational Programme Transport. This programme sets priorities, objectives and allocation of funds for the development of the transport sector in Romania.

The scientific undertaking for this research is based on setting out questions and research hypotheses, as it follows:

Research questions:

1. How did the cohesion policy of the European Union influence the development of the transport sector?
2. What legislative framework was adopted and which institutions have been set up in Romania to support a sectoral operational programme for transport?
3. What impact did the cohesion policy have from an institutional point of view, in other EU Member States?

Problems to explore:

1. The cohesion policy of the European Union, through its influence, appears as a way to meet the needs of an EU Member State.
2. The Sectoral Operational Programme Transport can only be sustained by an appropriate legislative framework and by creating a complex and effective institution that can support the development of the transport sector.
3. The variety of the problems encountered at the institutional level had a significant effect on the development of the transport sector.

Research methodology is the interfusion of the qualitative method, by means of which a research of literature in journals, articles and specialized volumes was performed, and the quantitative method, through data collection and processing, which led to an analysis in the field.

Interdisciplinarity, as a transfer of concepts and methodology from one discipline to another, allows a more appropriate approach of the problems investigated. Characterized by two main guidelines: differentiation and integration, interdisciplinarity is based upon its interaction with social and political practice.

Research optimization comes from the interdisciplinarity that provides the necessary conditions by combining epistemic logic – a discipline of modern logic that incorporates the attempts to formalize the logical relationships between statements containing epistemic terms - with the analysis and synthesis and also the criterion applied, resulting in a promotion of results and a development of research itself.

It is important to understand for the beginning of this paper what the "administrative phenomenon" represents. The research objective of the administrative phenomenon is given by studying government as a whole, with all its implications, relationships and correlations with the other elements of the social system.

Lisbon Treaty can be seen as the result of a series of paradoxes (Luzárraga, Llorente: 2011, 252):

- recovering the European Constitution, but abandoning its constitutional form,
- withdrawing the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, but acknowledging its legal obligation,
- symbols of the Union disappear from the text of treaties, but these symbols continue to exist and are still used,
- one supports the affirmation of the principle that community law takes precedence in relation to national law, but this principle remains the basis of the European political-legal system.

Nowadays and given the economic crisis one is trying hard for the EU to have a more important profile on the international stage. Moreover, pessimism regarding the continuity of a united Europe with 27 members continues to stir up controversy, both politically and economically.

Therefore, the institutional system was heavily reformed to meet these requests as it follows:

- 1) permanent or coordinated presidencies have been provided for the European Council, respectively the councils,
- 2) the structure of the Commission was reduced,
- 3) the structure of the European Parliament was adapted,
- 4) the High Representative for the whole common foreign affairs policy was introduced.

We might say that the European Commission is the engine of the EU institutional system: - having the right of legislative initiative, it can revoke any legislative initiative that has not yet been finally adopted by the Council; - it ensures the enforcement of European legislation through directives and decisions and budget execution; - it verifies the compliance of community law along with the European Court of Justice and it has the right to negotiate trade treaties and international collaboration.

Along with the integration of ten new countries in 2004, then that of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, this harmonization effort had to be strengthened. The main beneficiaries of the Fund have been asked to contribute to the economic development of their new partners. Meanwhile, the entire Union faced the challenges resulting from the acceleration of economic restructuring due to globalization, opening of trades, the effects of the technological revolution, the development of knowledge-based economy, an aging population and an increase in immigration.

To meet these different challenges a new legislative apparatus proved necessary.

For the programming period 2007-2013, this consists of the following elements:

- a general regulation. It establishes common rules applicable to the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Cohesion Fund. Based on the principle of shared management between the Union, Member States and regions, this regulation sets out a new programming process and new rules for financial management, control and evaluation of projects. The cohesion policy is reorganized around three new priority objectives: convergence, regional competitiveness and employment and European territorial cooperation;

- a regulation for each of the funding sources European Regional Development Fund, European Social Fund, Cohesion Fund and Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance;

- a new regulation creates a cross-border authority to implement cooperation programmes.

For the period 2007-2013, the Cohesion Policy has been awarded a budget of 347 billion € (in current prices), namely over one third of the total European budget. But it doesn't stop at a simple financial aid. Improving competitiveness and growth potential at a local, regional and national level are at stake. Competitiveness of economies helps all territories of the Union, including convergence regions.

In a critical and slightly radical perspective, the author Marin Voicu (Voicu, 2009: 20-24) reveals that the purpose of forming a Commission is none other than to take the reins of government from the states and peoples who still believed they were in the democratic stage of human development, need to be deceived with a façade of democratic legitimacy: "With respect to the administrative plan, nothing proves more clearly the Commission's ambitions in the early years of the new century, but its maneuvers to take control of all sectors of the Member States administrations, one after another, forming their own *European agencies*, who could still form backstage, with the Commission, national officials to directly apply their provisions without having the bill sent directly over to the Commission".

Skepticism over a *united Europe* is constantly expanding, given the current economic crisis and rumors that certain countries will retreat from the European Union.

A critical perspective on the European Union is found in the paper "Europe versus Europe" (Ferrand, 2009: 198), where one presents skepticism regarding Europe's actions who acts on itself, through excessive technocracy, liberal drift and a too rapid expansion, the failure of the Constitutional Treaty completing the struggle itself. The scenario targeted by author O. Ferrand, remains a political or federal Europe, as a last chance: "the Commission should become political, democratic governance designated by parliamentary majority. The parliament, the most democratic institution of the system has means to strengthen itself. It already has power over commissioners and the Commission's president".

In the paper „Governmentality: Power and Rule in modern society”, Mitchell Dean (Dean, 2002:154) aligns the concept of cohesion with that of competitiveness and economic growth. To the concept of cohesion we can add redistribution in the sense of creating mechanisms in order to stimulate economic and social development. If we start from the objectives stipulated in the Lisbon Agenda, we notice an evolution of the theory through the incorporation of structural funds as tools related to boosting competitiveness, environment and social sustainability. Dirk Ahner supported this idea and said that „regional policy is not only oriented towards solidarity, but also towards economic development, which is why it should be extended throughout the entire Union and not only in poor areas” (Dirk, Ahner, Conference Debates Future of European Cohesion Policy).

Currently, the key to the cohesion policy reform is determined by the total concentration of resources in Member States and poorest regions, by the inclusion of all regions in funding, by changing priorities for employment and innovation and for stimulating economic growth (Șaguna, Drosu, Dan, Nicolae, Găinușă, Raluca, 2011:12) The European Union faces more and more economic and social disparities. This in turn brings about social and political issues. In order to address these issues the European Union has developed a cohesion policy. The cohesion policy is implemented by

thousands of development projects. I could say that this cohesion policy influences thousands of people involved in producing the effects of this policy.

The admirers of the cohesion policy state that this is the "cement" that supports the entire European construction. Without this foundation the whole EU structure would collapse. In the view of Willem Molle the cost of the cohesion policy is the price we pay to gain some benefits of EU integration.

The implementation system as a key factor for implementing the Structural and the Cohesion Funds determines strategic decisions related to the allocation of resources during the implementation period of a programme, as well as its inputs and outputs.

Because we cannot yet speak of a history with respect to the implementation of structural and cohesion funds for our country, over the years, for other EU countries, the implementation system of these funds has become increasingly decentralized, involving in some areas the private sector and NGOs, thus marking the evolution of the implementation of the Structural and Cohesion Funds.

In the article „*Cohesion and Structural Funds. Multiple pressures towards reform*”, (Allen, David, 2005: 74) David Allen identifies four principles related to the implementation system of structural and cohesion funds:

- focusing measures around priority objectives,
- programming by offering the guarantee of stability and impact of operational programmes,
- additionality in the sense that each country benefiting from structural and cohesion funds supplement these funds through co-financing from the national budget,
- partnership by encouraging certain cooperation mechanisms between actors in order to implement the multiannual or multiregional programmes. Important in this context, says the author, is the transparency of decisions in the implementation of operational programmes along with the legitimacy and justification for government intervention.

Regulations and documents governing the EU cohesion policy set mandatory requirements on the implementation system of structural and cohesion funds starting from programming, including identifying problems, formulating solutions, financing decisions, and up to the implementation system, monitoring procedures, evaluation and control.

When it comes to the implementation system of structural and cohesion funds we must take into account:

- 1) the legislative framework located at EU and national level,
- 2) community and national institutional framework regarding the implementation of Structural and Cohesion Funds,
- 3) national strategies for identifying priorities regarding the centralization of structural funds,
- 4) operational programmes,
- 5) monitoring and assessment mechanisms.

The implementation system of structural and cohesion funds is intertwined with the principles and rules of intervention of the Structural and Cohesion Funds that need to be observed in order to ensure transparency in the management of Structural Funds and their efficiency when using them.

These various systems of approaching the construction of the implementation systems of structural funds come from the legal and institutional specifics of each Member State. Although all Member States use these funds and have as legal framework

the same regulations, the implementation mechanisms of structural funds vary from state to state.

The classical approach (Guidelines for the ex post evaluation of objective 5 B programmes 1994-1999 programming period) regarding the implementation of structural and cohesion funds takes into account the following principles:

- *Relevance* or association of the programme's, project's priorities' needs;
- *Efficiency* or association between results obtained and costs paid to obtain such results;
- *Effectiveness* or achieving the objectives of operational programmes;
- *Utility* or the response to the economic-social needs and improving the quality of life through such interventions;
- *Sustainability* and the possibility to continue interventions after cessation of funding.

In her article, Maria – Angela Diez (Diez, 2010) addresses the need to review the theoretical methods to assess the implementation of Structural and Cohesion Funds. One argument that the author brings up is the nature of programmes' objectives financed from these funds, that seek to introduce changes at the level of regions, not only economical, but also behavioral ones. Another argument, from a holistic perspective, which should be taken into account is that the implementation of a programme affects the society as a whole from an economic, social, educational, institutional point of view.

The author brings up the impact of the global economic crisis that would require the need to revise forecasts and objectives of operational programmes and national strategies.

Of course, these arguments could be supplemented by the idea that the evaluation of the implementation of structural and cohesion funds should take into account the impact caused in the regions, the decentralization of cohesion policy implementation proving this.

In Romania each operational programme is implemented at national level, the degree of decentralization of the system is reduced, although for some programmes some powers have been delegated to regional bodies. I could argue that this decentralization is reflected by the distribution of powers at regional, local, national level by political interests, the existing administrative structures and their organization.

The decentralization degree of the implementation system of structural and cohesion funds must take into account the provisions of the Lisbon Agenda which supports the involvement of social partners not only in advisory bodies, but also as active participants in the implementation of operational programmes.

The Sectoral Operational Programme "Transport" 2007-2013 is a strategic tool developed based on the objectives of the National Strategic Reference Framework which sets out the priorities, the objectives and the financial allocation for the development of the transport sector in Romania with community aid in the period 2007-2013. The objective of the Sectoral Operational Programme Transport (SOPT) is to promote in Romania a sustainable transport system that allows fast, efficient and safe transport for people and goods, with services of appropriate European standards, at national level, within Europe, between and within regions of Romania. Specific objectives:

- Modernization and development of priority axis TEN-T²⁰, with the implementation of necessary measures for environmental protection,

²⁰ Trans-European Transport Networks

- Modernization and development of national transport networks in accordance with the principles of sustainable development,
- Promotion of railroad, naval and intermodal transport,
- Supporting sustainable transport development by minimizing the adverse effects of transport on the environment and improving traffic safety and human health.

The total SOP-T budget for the programming period 2007 - 2013 is about 5.7 billion €, which represents approximately 23% of the overall budget of structural operations for Romania for the period in question²¹. Out of this amount, 4.57 billion € represents the Community's financial aid, while national co-financing will reach the amount of about 1.09 billion €. Community funding is provided by the Cohesion Fund and the European Regional Development Fund.

The development of transport infrastructure aims at significantly increasing the impact of economic competitiveness, facilitating economic integration in the EU, internal market development and the development of the Romanian economy. This programme aims to create conditions for increased investment, to promote sustainable transport and spatial cohesion.

By means of SOP-T one aims to encourage capital investment, optimize transport services, improve logistics, develop cooperation between producers and manufacturers and increase the potential for access and entrance on new markets. In order to achieve SOP-T objectives the allocation of EU and state funds are used to implement the objectives of the priority axis. Each SOP-T priority axis can be funded by either the CF or ERDF, but not by both, and it will be supported by one or more operations. For each priority axis the key areas of intervention were identified.

Romania is crossed by three TEN-T priority axes (www.ampost.ro):

- TEN-T axis no. 7 regarding road infrastructure with two branches:
 1. Northern branch: Nădlac - Lugoj – Sibiu – Bucharest – Constanța
 2. Southern Branch: Lugoj – Drobeta Turnu Severin – Craiova – Calafat
- TEN-T axis no. 22 regarding railway infrastructure:
 1. Northern branch: Curtici – Arad – Braşov – Bucharest – Constanța
 2. Southern Branch: Arad – Drobeta Turnu Severin – Craiova – Calafat
- TEN-T axis no. 18 regarding naval infrastructure:

1. The Danube

The Managing Authority for the Sectoral Operational Programme - Transport (MA SOPT) was established within the Ministry of Transport and was responsible for management, administration and implementation of financial assistance allocated to the SOPT as the General Directorate for Foreign Funds Management (GDFFM). In other words, this directorate has as main objective the development, management, technical and financial monitoring and evaluation during the implementation of the Sectoral Operational Programme Transport.

Functions of the Managing Authority with respect to the management and monitoring of operations financed by the EU through SOPT shall be determined by Article 60 of Council Regulation (EC) no. 1083/2006 regarding the European Regional Development Fund, European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and at national level, the GD 497/2004 regarding the establishment of the institutional framework for the

²¹ Information taken from the official website www.ampost.ro

coordination, implementation and management of structural instruments, as amended and supplemented.

General Directorate for External Funds Management has hierarchical relationships, functional and representation ones in the Ministry of Transport. Therefore, hierarchical relationships refer to the subordination to the Ministry of Transport, to the Secretary of State who coordinates the activity of the directorate and to the Secretary General / Deputy Secretary General of the Ministry and the subordination of the executive staff to heads of department, of these to directors and directors to the general manager / deputy general manager.

The main functional relationships are related to:

1. submitting to the minister or, if applicable, the coordinating Secretary of State with the works made according to legal provisions;
2. submitting to hierarchical superiors all documents and information that, under legal provisions and competences are likely to allow them to adopt correct decisions;
3. submitting to the ministry management all the documents and information at the deadlines laid down;
4. collaboration with general directorates, directorates and departments within the structure of organization of the MT and with the corresponding ones from other ministries and other state administration bodies, aiming at a good development of the direction's activity;
5. collaboration with the General Directorate for Legal Affairs and Human Resources who provides legal support to GDEFM, according to section 16 of Article 2 paragraph 1 GD. 595/2009 for the enforcement of Law no. 490/2004 regarding financial inducement of staff managing Community funds;
6. collaboration with the Directorate of European Affairs and International Relations in European affairs.

Representation relations as indicated by their name refer to the representation of the Ministry of Transport, within the competence or the mandate given by the Minister, in relation to other ministries, other central or local state administration bodies, bodies or agencies in the country and abroad.

The organizational structure of GDEFM is as follows²²:

1. Preventive and financial control department
2. Procurement methodology department
3. Irregularities Officer department
4. Programming Directorate
 - 4.1 Programming Service;
 - 4.2 Project selection Service;
 - 4.3 Evaluation and Communication department.
5. Monitoring Directorate
 - 5.1 ERDF monitoring service;
 - 5.2 Cohesion Fund Monitoring Service;
 - 5.3 Procurement procedures evaluation service.
6. Financial Management Directorate
 - 6.1 Financial Management Service;
 - 6.2 Risk management service and administrative capacity;

²² Information taken from the Organizing and Functioning Regulations of the GDEFM, March 2013

- 6.3 Control department of administrative capacity.
- 7. Directorate of Detecting and Establishing Irregularities in European Funds
 - 7.1. Department of detecting and sanctioning irregularities;
 - 7.2. Department of establishing debtor;
 - 7.3. Department of settling appeals;
 - 7.4. Department of tracking and capitalizing debits.
- 8. Tender Support and Contract Management Service
 - 8.1. Department of procurement procedures;
 - 8.2. Department of financial operations;
 - 8.3. Department of accountancy.

Lack of administrative capacity and experience have made Romania hold an absorption rate of European funds of only 7.4% (according to <http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2012/06/eu-funds-absorption-romania>), meaning the lowest rate of absorption in the European Union.

Priority no. 1 for Romania was the development of transport infrastructure with allocations up to 23.70% of the total of funds for our country, the total amount allocated for the period 2007-2013 being 19.668 billion euro (Drosu Saguna, Gainusa Nicolae, 2011: p. 72).

A considerable level of work in preparing these infrastructure projects was represented by another obstacle in the entire process. Lack of well-trained specialists or the selection of specialists considering the lowest price, represented the cause of delay in the implementation of infrastructure projects with a minimum of 5 years. Given these aspects, major projects that entered the European Commission's analysis have hit a "wall", yet one flexible and open to cooperation. Infrastructure projects that had poorly prepared studies have delayed their effective implementation.

The Managing Authority as administrative apparatus was in a constant change that has generated both positive and negative aspects. Any organization is more competitive, as it is able to continuously develop on multiple plans and knowing the process of change to its effective management is one of the factors that can ensure the competitiveness of organizations.

Organizational change targets making essential changes of the organization as a whole, which opposes small changes that involve unessential changes in the organizational structure. Organizational change involves changing the mission and vision of an organization, introducing new technologies with new types of activities, introducing a system of evaluating performance, essential changes in the organizational structure. Organizational change corresponds to new guidelines on how the organization is to conduct its activity, having key implications on the behaviour of all components of an organization.

The question is: what are the main reasons for low absorption of European funds in the field of transport? Political analysts point to corruption, lack of staff motivation, lack of information, inadequate administrative capacity and major gaps in understanding the functioning of European Union institutions.

If we talk about low absorption of European funds in the field of transport, we can talk about people's satisfaction regarding quality of infrastructure, as we can see in the figure below:

Satisfaction with infrastructure quality, 2011



Data source: World Economic Forum, *The Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012*. Scale from 1 [extremely underdeveloped] to 7 [extensive and efficient by international standards].

The European transport sector provides ample growth opportunities, which could be seized by addressing a number of horizontal challenges that are common to most Member States. First, the transport sector gives rise to a series of negative externalities which result in economic and social costs to society. The most relevant external costs are those linked to congestion, greenhouse gas emissions, local pollution, accidents and noise. Internalising external costs would help reduce distortions and provide correct monetary incentives to users, consumers and business. It could also be a source of additional revenues. The introduction of schemes to internalise the external cost of transport, such as broader application of the 'user pays' and 'polluter pays' principles, should therefore be promoted and encouraged in all Member States (http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/themes/11_transport.pdf).

Road traffic in Romania has increased from an average AADT (Annual Average Daily Traffic) of 3,200 in 1990 to 4,500 in 2005. There was a steep rise immediately after 1990 when restrictions on the use of road for freight transport of over 50 km were lifted, while fuel and cars became more readily available. A limited decline in average road traffic was observed between 1995 and 2000, resulting from the combination of two opposite trends (GDP decline and change in the modal pattern), while a significant average growth has occurred in the next period (2000 to 2005), based on high GDP increase. The road traffic share of heavy vehicles has fallen from about 30% in 1990 to 23% in 2005. According to Romanian statistics, the number of serious road accidents has declined from around 9,000 per year in the early 1990s to 6900 in 2003. However, recent data (the Road Policy) demonstrates that the number of serious accidents has risen again by 5.3% between 2004 and 2005, and the number of people killed has risen during the same period by 8.2%. Road traffic has grown at 2.3% per year on average since 1990, and at 3.7% per year since 2000. It is forecasted to grow at a similar rate to 6,800 AADT in 2015.

Table 1. *Evolution and forecast of road traffic 1990-2015 (AADT)*

	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015
Total	3,077	3,767	3,709	4,105	4,957	5,917
Heavy vehicles (vehicle over 3.5 tonnes)	850	799	698	917	1.110	1.256

Source: NCMNR 2005 Traffic survey

2. Transport Sector SWAT ANALYSIS

According with Sectoral Operational Transport Programme we will take into account the SWAT for the entire transport sector:

Strengths	Weaknesses
<p>Romania is located at an important point of entrance to the EU and has good potential for new multimodal transport links to neighbouring countries and to the Black Sea for international trade.</p> <p>Low cost skilled labour force with good basic education to meet transport infrastructure development demands.</p> <p>Prime location along key axes on TEN-T and on Corridor IX that provides good accessibility to neighbouring countries.</p> <p>Well established and competitive, privately operated road freight and passenger services are available in most key locations.</p> <p>Extensive railway network with innovative private operators providing local services. Danube and other inland navigation waterways are well connected to provide new potential for low cost bulk freight, development of intermodal container traffic and leisure use.</p> <p>Constanta Port (the largest on the Black Sea) is on TEN-T and has adequate space for expansion and increased throughput with sufficient draught for the largest ships and shipping lines which are expanding their operations and trade routes.</p> <p>Extensive water transport resources are developed that are suitable to low cost bulk transportation of low value commodities in an environmentally friendly mode, that require relatively little network development and maintenance and can provide a cost effective link in the development of new higher value intermodal transport systems.</p>	<p>Lack of the General Transport Master Plan study.</p> <p>Road network is underdeveloped throughout country and poorly maintained, creating high accident risk.</p> <p>There are few motorways with almost no links to EU, development regions or neighbouring countries. Good private freight and passenger services on the road network do not operate in most rural locations.</p> <p>Low maintenance investment of rail infrastructure resulting in speed restrictions and level-crossings are in poor condition.</p> <p>Existing rail wagons and locomotives do not meet current customer demand and for freight, the few block train operations limit the effectiveness of intermodal operations. There is no coordinated contact with rail customers, no mode champion, inflexible pricing and excessive documentation.</p> <p>Rail passenger numbers and freight volume by rail is in decline.</p> <p>Low investment in new construction and maintenance of fluvial and maritime ports infrastructure, including handling facilities.</p> <p>Danube navigation for large vessels limited by depth and width of canals and river and with few bridges and ferries for transit by road transport, creates a natural</p>

<p>Multimodal transport (road/rail) is an environmentally friendly mode and has a high share of the current Romanian inland container transport that provides a cost effective alternative to road transport.</p>	<p>barrier to trade.</p> <p>Lack of investment in river management and services reduces the value of the waterways and leads to traffic loss to other modes.</p> <p>Multimodal transport initiatives are lacking for future development.</p> <p>A disproportion existed between the establishment of road and rail infrastructure in favour of rail.</p> <p>Safety issues in all modes but air transport. Lack of strategy for development of multi-modal transport, as well as of a well-functioning and integrated transport system.</p> <p>Insufficient coordination between the transport modes.</p> <p>Growing share of long-distance transport (transport of goods, raw materials, spare parts etc).</p> <p>Reduced usage of public transport. High contribution of transport to the air pollution. Exceeding noise limits in the cities.</p> <p>Transport infrastructure design and construction quality was not at EU standards so that significant investment is needed for rehabilitation to the EU standards.</p> <p>Lack of experiences in PPP in transport infrastructure.</p> <p>Insufficient institutional capacity for the management and implementation of the SOPT. It is proposed that improvement in institutional capacity should be addressed through technical assistance.</p> <p>Complicated regulation tools (often applied bureaucratically).</p>
<p>Opportunities</p>	<p>Threats</p>
<p>Sustained economic growth will lead to greater</p>	<p>International transit flows could choose to</p>

<p>international trade.</p> <p>New opportunities to use EU funds for development of transport infrastructure, in all transport modes and further modernization of transport infrastructure and implementation of new technologies.</p> <p>The privatization process will continue to attract investments in transport infrastructure and transport operations.</p> <p>The increased mobility within Europe will create the potential for economic growth in all economic regions.</p> <p>The strengthening of the business climate will result in improvements in manufacturing, agricultural and industrial sectors, leading to greater transport demand.</p> <p>The speeding-up the processes of transport sector's restructuring through privatization, legal promotion of competition</p> <p>Potential to develop new cost effective and environmentally friendly bulk freight and container traffic by waterborne means, in addition to leisure traffic on the Danube River.</p> <p>Development of business travel and tourism through the increasing of customer demand for low cost air travel, to Bucharest and regional airports for trade development throughout the country.</p> <p>Restructuring rail operational services (more block trains) for increasing the use of the cost effective multimodal transport modes for transit, international and domestic container traffic.</p> <p>The potential to provide greater access to Europe from the Black Sea countries and to create a cost effective transshipment point between the maritime network and the road, rail and inland waterway networks of Romania.</p> <p>Development of multi-/inter-modal corridors and logistic chains.</p> <p>Supporting the less polluting transport modes (by developing sustainable transport</p>	<p>avoid Romania.</p> <p>Delays in implementation of reforms, restructuring and modernization of transport sector and sub sectors.</p> <p>Delays in carrying out priority projects.</p> <p>Projects preparation and feasibility studies as well as land acquisition issues, carried out during long periods of time.</p> <p>Higher costs because of the shortage of skilled resources and of experienced contractors and suppliers in Romania.</p> <p>Further decline of rail transport if rail service, cost and efficiency for both passengers and freight are not improved.</p> <p>There is a risk that if there is insufficient response to customer demand at Constanta for improved services then both rail and waterways transport will be deprived of opportunities to expand.</p> <p>Increased efficiency of road transport operations through the building of new motorways would make the intermodal transport less attractive.</p> <p>Growing fleet of vehicles causing high greenhouse gas emissions.</p> <p>Construction of roads in green areas causing biodiversity degradation and increased usage of raw materials.</p> <p>Further development of transport causing significant adverse environmental effects (habitant fragmentation, landscape degradation).</p>
---	--

<p>infrastructures) will contribute to the human health, the environmental improvement, and, at the same time, the economic competitiveness.</p> <p>Growing individual transport costs</p> <p>Plans and actions to phase-out vehicles without exhaust emission control.</p> <p>Further development of public transport systems.</p> <p>Plans and actions to phase-out sales of unleaded petrol.</p> <p>Adopting global environmental standards (ISO). New engines and techniques leading to improved energy efficiency and reduced air pollution.</p>	
---	--

Given the weaknesses and threats in the above analysis I was wondering "What does the future' in transport mean taking into account the White Paper on Transport?" The White Paper on Transport (White Paper Document, 2011) reveals a vision for a sustainable and a competitive transport system:

1. Increasing transport and supporting mobility while achieving the goal of reducing emissions by 60%;
2. An efficient primary network for multimodal intercity travel and transport;
3. Reasonable conditions for long distance travel and intercontinental freight transport on a global level;
4. Good urban transport and commuting;
5. Developing and implementing fuels and sustainable propulsion systems;
6. Optimizing performance of multimodal logistic chains, including by the wider use;
7. Of more energy efficient transport means;
8. Increase of transport efficiency and use of infrastructure, by using information systems and market-based incentives.

Transport is fundamental to our economy and society. Mobility is vital to the internal market and quality of citizens' life, given that they enjoy the freedom to travel. In our country and not only here, transport allows economic growth and employment, their sustainability being necessary. Given the European Commission's vision both through the cohesion policy and other tools, what steps should our country take given the current situation?

If we talk about the administrative apparatus we must talk about an integrated approach to managing the elements that form the activity of project evaluation and monitoring. Division of labour and setting tasks for each civil servant contribute to their consistent and efficient achievement. At a management level, decisions must be consistent and stable, avoiding a temporary approach of the problem. A global and integrated approach of decisions unequivocally leads to effective decisions. Strengthening the connection between the SOPT Managing Authority and its beneficiary's results in facilitating the understanding of the absorption mechanism.

Another problem on a general level is failure to complete in time the General Transport Master Plan, which was a great impediment for both the administrative

apparatus, and the whole circuit of transport development. Without a global view reinforced by this document, how can we speak of a clear and safe vision of the management and lower hierarchical execution level?

It is worth keeping in mind that during the implementation process of a project, absorption can be influenced by the vulnerabilities arising from Romania's macroeconomic framework both internal and external. Not attracting European funds can be detrimental in the recovery of development gaps and real convergence with EU countries. Vulnerability at the level of European fund management is recognized and becomes a real help in identifying problems in this respect. Hiring "artificial" staff can be a real impediment in developing an absorption capacity of management authorities, making more difficult the assessment, management and control process of these authorities.

3. Example of good practice. Poland

The collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1989 - 1991 naturally led to a complete reorientation of international politics in Poland. When former anti-communist dissident from the bloc took over political power after 1989, the Polish government's new policy was based on the symbolic notion of "return to Europe" backed up by the idea that Poland always belonged spiritually and culturally to Western Europe. The integration of Poland to the European Union is undoubtedly linked to the broader process of economic and social transformations after the fall of the communist bloc. Poland's economic development after accessing European Union funds is very slightly outlined, thus: between May 2004 and December 2008, Poland has contributed with 12.5 million € to the EU budget and received funds amounting to 26.5 million € (Szczepiński, 2012: 34).

The European Union's enlargement from 15 to 25 members on May 1st 2004 and to 27 members on January 1st 2007 has and will have significant effects in terms of regional disparities, given the level of development of Member States. Thus, although the territory increased by 33% and its population by 30%, the GDP of the expanded Europe will grow by only 5-6%. In 2002, GDP per capita in the 10 new member states (at the time, candidate countries) represented only 39% of the average EU 15. Nationally, more than a third of the population lived in countries with an income per capita below 90% of the EU average (the current eligibility criteria for the aid provided through the Cohesion Fund) compared to 1/6 in EU15. According to data from 1999, the increase from 15 to 27 members will result in an 18% decrease of average GDP / capita in the EU 25 (Study European Institute of Romania).

The problem of planning in developing policies that supported the cohesion policy has had negative connotations after a long period of inefficient centralized planning. Publicly funded programmes were mainly based on annual financial perspectives, which caused uncertainty in terms of budgets. The first long-term strategies designed in the early 2000s, didn't meet the requirements of a programming cycle. No logical links were created between objectives and monitoring / evaluation of indicators. With the start of preparations for accession, the administration focused primarily on the legal and financial control of public programme implementation. However, the evaluation requirements had to be introduced - they have been incorporated into public policy and subsequently into Operational programmes.

In May 2004, when Poland joined the EU, the evaluation system in the Polish government was virtually inexistent. The first task was to build an adequate evaluation capacity in institutions and start the first evaluations.

The next evaluation model of Structural Funds was implemented in Poland:

- 1) all evaluations have been outsourced to external independent evaluators selected in accordance with the Public Procurement Law,
- 2) evaluations of the NDP / CSF 2004-2006 were carried out at two levels: NDP / CSF level and at the level of operational programmes (NDP / CSF evaluations being the responsibility of the National Evaluation Unit (neu), while evaluations within operational programmes have been ordered by evaluation units located in MAs structures)
- 3) the results of the evaluations were discussed (in terms of accuracy and usefulness) with respect to coordination group meetings for the evaluation and they were then handed over to the decision makers for their use,
- 4) all evaluation reports have been made available on a website for the purpose of evaluation.

All research evaluation planned for the programming period 2004-2006 were included in the "Evaluation Plan of the National Development Plan for 2004-2006" - a document which aimed to provide an effective management of the evaluation process in Poland. Methodological guidance for evaluating Structural Funds were formulated, namely "Evaluation of the National Development Plan and the Operational Programmes in Poland - Guide". (The Guide was made by the National Evaluation Unit in 2005). External evaluation of the ex-ante evaluation of the National Strategic Reference Framework and 22 operational programmes, including 16 regional programmes. The actual evaluation process was supported by the forecast on macroeconomic impact and the strategic evaluation on environmental impact. Ex-ante evaluation of the National Strategic Reference Framework 2007-2013 and operational programmes have had a significant impact in establishing the guidelines. The main determinative factors of the ex-ante evaluation process have been the scale and complexity of the research process, time pressure, and the Polish administration's low ability to evaluate (insufficient, especially at regional level). After taking into consideration the above-mentioned aspects, the decision to centralize the evaluation process at the level of the Ministry of Regional Development was made. The competence for ex-ante evaluation has been concentrated into the hands of the Management Authorities for operational programmes administered by central institutions and within the National Evaluation Unit – for Regional Operational Programmes.

The experience acquired during the ex-ante evaluation, which has been a great organizational challenge for the Polish administration, allowed the re-organization of the Polish evaluation system and the re-establishment of its major principles. The Polish evaluation system, which was created in 2007, is strongly de-centralized. The competence for evaluation research has been granted to institutions interested in the conclusions and recommendations that originate from the evaluation that can adequately be put into practice. This organization allows for the evaluation to be closest to real issues and, at the same time, through the involvement of a large group of interested parties (from the implementation system), it allows for the adequate identification of evaluation studies and consequently the use of detections.

The most important players in cohesion policy evaluation system are: the National Evaluation Unit (NEU), the evaluation units situated in the management authorities/ implementation bodies, and the Coordination Committee for the evaluation process of NDS and NSRF. The effort of the institutions is being stimulated through the involvement of the interested parties of the evaluation process, by means of the activities

of the leading groups and, in many cases, having an important role of monitoring committees. For 2007-2013, approximately 67 BN Euro have been allocated to Poland, which means that Poland is the biggest European beneficiary of funds governed by the Cohesion Policy. Thus, Poland administered one of the largest operational programmes in the history of EU21²³.

The largest operational programme at the level of Poland is represented just like in Romania by the "Infrastructure and Environment" programme (28 BN Euro), followed by the "Human Resources" programme (10 BN Euro) and "Innovative Economy" (8 BN Euro). In addition, 16 operational programmes are developed and implemented at the level of the 16 regions. The Regional Operational Programmes are largely based on existing regional strategies; for instance: a developed strategy in which every region establishes the long term strategic perspective. Within the Ministry of Regional Development strategies for operational programmes have been elaborated, allowing for every region to have the flexibility and independence to develop its own regional operational programme.

A supra-regional programme meant to develop five eastern regions of Poland has been created during the scheduling period between 2007 and 2013, being co-financed by national funds. For this programme, an additional 2.2 BN Euro budget was allotted by the European Commission. This is the first supra-regional programme of the kind in the European Union and it is led by the Ministry of Regional Development. This programme has the following priorities: the development of economy, transport infrastructure, city development, tourism and technical support – and its purpose is to develop the respective territories by integrating sectoral policies.

4. Conclusions

Transport is fundamental to our economy and society. Mobility is vital to the internal market and to the quality of citizens' life, given that they enjoy the freedom to travel. In our country and not only here, transport allows economic growth and employment, their sustainability being required. Taking into account the European Commission's vision through its cohesion policy and other tools as well, what steps should our country take given the current situation?

If we talk about the administrative apparatus we need to talk about an integrated approach of managing elements that compose the assessment and monitoring activity of projects. Division of labor and the establishment of precise tasks for each civil servant contribute to their consistent and effective achievement. At management level, decisions must be consistent and stable, avoiding a temporary approach of the problem. A global and integrated approach of the decisions unequivocally leads to efficiency. Strengthening ties between the SOPT Managing Authority and its beneficiaries facilitates the understanding of the absorption mechanism.

Another overall problem is a failure to complete on time the General Transport Master Plan, which was a great impediment for both the administrative apparatus and the entire circuit of transport development. Without a global view strengthened by this document, how can we speak of a clear and safe vision of the managing and execution level hierarchically inferior?

²³ Document "Regional Development Policies in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development" 2010.

Romania's current situation regarding the status of structural and cohesion funds absorption in the transport field reveals the existence of some problems that hinder a balanced development of the Sectoral Operational Programme Transport implementation. Lack of strategic vision, clear objectives, low administrative capacity, lack of proper work procedures, converge to an administrative system that cannot efficiently coordinate the "huge block" of the cohesion policy.

For absorption of structural funds strong institutional structures are needed, capable of ensuring the formulation and implementation of public policies, unwinding of inter-ministerial coordination processes, implementation of operational programmes, increasing enforcement capacity of partnerships between local government, the sector of private entrepreneurs and non-governmental organizations (Marinov Vasil, Bahloul, Hachemi, Ben Sla, 2006:5).

The contribution of the cohesion policy to the economic recovery package of the European Commission includes measures meant to accelerate payments to Member States and to facilitate access to finance. The issue of structural funds absorption that Romania is dealing with reflects the absence of effective national policy frameworks, low implementation capacity and lack of experience in the public management.

Partnerships between system links and correlation with other priorities in other operational programmes will lead to reducing disparities between regions. Romania however resumes the experience of Member States that joined EU in 2004, endorsing a centralized system rather than one of implementation structural and cohesion funds, except for the Regional Operational Programme. This centralization is even stronger as according to EU regulations funds management responsibility with the European Commission belongs to the management authorities certified in this regard, but established in the central state institutions.

Platon's principle of *oikeiopraxia*, according to which every part of society must do its job in order to function at its optimal level, does not apply to this central institutional system of the state and thus the wheels of the mechanism get locked. Judit Kálmán operationalized the concept of *administrative capacity* through the lack of managerial skills in turning all external funds in productive capital for investment, through unrealistic planning and inadequate institutional framework, through the unclear definition of sectoral policies (Kálmán, Judit).

How could we outline efficient institutions in the absorption of structural and cohesion funds? The answer is known, but only on paper: strong institutional structures capable of ensuring the formulation and implementation of public policies by conducting inter-ministerial coordination processes, implementation of national programmes, increasing the capacity to implement partnerships between local government, the sector of private entrepreneurs and non-governmental organizations.

Another solution to increase the efficiency of managing authorities and therefore public institutions can be represented by the delegation of authority regarding the evaluation, selection and contracting of projects to the private sector. This solution can be successful only if the criteria for selection of these private consultancy companies would not be respected on paper only, actually doubling the activity of the entire assessment and implementation process of projects with the activity in the public sector and deepening in fact other long-term budget deficits.

In this context, we cannot only talk about the administrative capacity of institutions to manage structural and cohesion funds; this should be complemented by the ability of beneficiaries to generate eligible projects and implement them correctly.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Allen, David (2005), "Cohesion and Structural Funds. Multiple pressures towards reform" in Helen Wallace, William Wallace, Mark Pollack, *Developing policies in the European Union*, (5th edition), Publishing House of the European Institute of Romania, Bucharest;
- Ahner, Dirk, "Conference Debates Future of European Cohesion Policy", www.ukom.gov.si/eng/slovenia/publications/slovenia-news/6265/6268/;
- Czelcalla, Sven, *European Cohesion and Funding Policies*, Seminar Paper, Auflage 2010, Norderstedt, Germany;
- Dean, M., apud. Rumford Cris (2002), *The European Union. A political Sociology*, Blackwell Publishing, Malden, MA;
- Diez, Maria-Angela (2010), "Evaluating New Regional Policies: Reviewing the Theory and Practice, Evaluation, www.evi.sagepub.com;
- Ferrand, Oliver (2009), *L'Europe contra l'Europe*, Ed. Hachette Littérature, Paris;
- Kálmán, Judit, "Possible Structural Funds Absorption Problems. The Political Economy View with Application to the Hungarian Regional Development Institutions and Financial System", lgi.osi.hu/publications-2002-105-Marcou-Hungary.pdf;
- Szcezerbiak, Aleks, (2012), *Poland within the European Union: New Awkward Partner or New Heart of Europe*, Routledge;
- Șaguna Drosu, Dan; Nicolae Găinușă, Raluca (2011), *European Union's Structural Funds*, Universul Juridic;
- Zlătescu Moroianu, Irina (2012), *Drept European*, Pro Universitaria Publishing, Bucharest;
- Zlătescu Moroianu, Irina; Radu C. Demetrescu (1999), *Drept instituțional European*, Olimp Press, Bucharest;
- Zlătescu Moroianu, Irina; Demetrescu, Radu C. (2005), *Drept instituțional comunitar și drepturile omului*, IRDO, Bucharest;
- Vasil, Marinov; Hachemi Bahloul, Ben Slay (2006), *Structural funds and the new member states: lessons learned*, UNDP Bratislava;
- Voicu, Marin (2009), "Uniunea Europeană înainte și după Tratatul de la Lisabona" in *Universul Juridic*, Bucharest;

Legislation:

- Regulamentul Consiliului nr. 1083/2006 privind stabilirea cadrului general pentru Fondul european de dezvoltare regională, Fondul social european și Fondul de coeziune și abrogarea Regulamentului Consiliului nr. 1260/1999, cu modificările și completările ulterioare;
- Regulamentul Comisiei nr. 1828/2006 privind stabilirea regulilor de implementare a Regulamentului Consiliului nr. 1083/2006 și pentru implementarea Regulamentului (CE) nr. 1080/2006 al Parlamentului European și al Consiliului, cu modificările și completările ulterioare;
- Regulamentul Comisiei (CE) nr. 1681/1994 privind neregulile și recuperarea sumelor plătite necuvenit în cadrul finanțărilor prin Fondul de Coeziune, precum și organizarea unui sistem de informare în acest domeniu, modificat și completat de Regulamentul Comisiei (CE) nr. 2035/2005, cu modificările și completările ulterioare;

- Regulamentul Consiliului nr. 1605/2002 privind regulamentul financiar aplicabil bugetului Comunității Europene, cu modificările și completările ulterioare;
- Legea nr. 500/2002 privind finanțele publice, cu modificările și completările ulterioare;
- HG nr. 457/2008 privind cadrul instituțional de coordonare și de gestionare a instrumentelor structurale, cu modificările și completările ulterioare;
- OUG nr. 64/2009 privind gestionarea financiară a instrumentelor structurale și utilizarea acestora pentru obiectivul convergentă, aprobată cu modificările prin Legea nr. 362/2009 cu modificările și completările ulterioare;
- HG 218/2012 din 23/03/2012 de aplicare a prevederilor Ordonanței de urgență a Guvernului nr. 64/2009 privind gestionarea financiară a instrumentelor structurale și utilizarea acestora pentru obiectivul convergentă;
- HG nr. 759/2007 privind regulile de eligibilitate a cheltuielilor efectuate în cadrul operațiunilor finanțate prin programele operaționale, cu modificările și completările ulterioare;
- OUG nr. 66/2011 privind prevenirea, constatarea și sancționarea neregulilor apărute în obținerea și utilizarea fondurilor europene și/sau a fondurilor publice naționale aferente acestora, cu modificările și completările ulterioare;
- Ordonanța de urgență nr. 34/2006 privind atribuirea contractelor de achiziție publică, a contractelor de concesiune de lucrări publice și a contractelor de concesiune de servicii cu modificările și completările ulterioare;
- Hotărârea Guvernului nr. 875/2011 pentru aprobarea Normelor metodologice de aplicare a prevederilor Ordonanței de urgență a Guvernului nr. 66/2011 privind prevenirea, constatarea și sancționarea neregulilor apărute în obținerea și utilizarea fondurilor europene și/sau a fondurilor publice naționale aferente acestora cu modificările și completările ulterioare;
- Decizia CE nr. 3469/2007 de adoptare a Programului Operațional Sectorial – Transport, cu modificările și completările ulterioare;
- Ordinul comun MT - MEF nr. 92/274/2008 privind aprobarea Documentului Cadru de Implementare a Programului Operațional Sectorial ”Transport”, 2007 – 2013, cu modificările și completările ulterioare;
- Guidelines for the ex post evaluation of objective 5 B programmes 1994-1999 programming period”, European Commission, ec.europa.eu/agriculture/eval/ben.pdf;

Sites / Documents

- Procedura de Selecția a Proiectelor COD: POST-AM-DP-SEP-;
www.ec.europa.eu;
<http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=101&langId=ro>;
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/fonds/index_ro.htm;
http://www.ampost.ro/file/POS_Transport_final_RO_c.pdf;
 Study European Institute of Romania, *The impact of the social cohesion policy on social-economic development at a regional level in Romania*, <http://www.ier.ro/PAIS/PAIS1/RO/Studiul9/Studiul9.pdf>.
www.ampost.ro;
 Study European Institute of Romania, *The impact of the social cohesion policy on social-economic development at a regional level in Romania*, <http://www.ier.ro/PAIS/PAIS1/RO/Studiul9/Studiul9.pdf>;
www.ewaluacja.gov.pl.

HEALTH CARE FINANCING AND HEALTH POLICY REFORMS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: AN EXPERT INTERVIEWING PERSPECTIVE

*Cristinela-Ionela VELICU**

Abstract. *This paper provides an overview of past and current issues in health care financing in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). It illustrates a synthetic picture of the health systems inherited from the communist regimes and it presents the variations in health public systems' organisation, health expenditure, private funding, that occurred over the transition years. This paper analyses the key aspects in the health care financing reforms in the CEE region. After 1989, all countries in the region implemented large-scale health care reforms, but were these reforms effective? In order to answer the research inquiries I used the expert interviewing methodology and data provided by international organisations.*

Keywords: *transition, resource allocation, health reforms, financing trends*

1. Introduction

This article discusses, first, the need for shared learning of health care financing reform experiences and the role of comparative research in this effort. This article will provide an overview of six countries - Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovak Republic and Romania. These countries have been chosen either as cases that are especially representative of CEE health systems' specific strengths and weaknesses, or because they represent polar cases of a particular reform trajectory. Despite the diversity found amongst these countries I framed a number of health care "themes" that have underpinned reform efforts. Therefore, this article takes up the question of how institutionally-oriented analyses can account for policy success and failure and considers how they can assess efforts to launch new policy health approaches.

A key contribution of this case study is to provide an empirical characterisation of the evolution of health spending in the CEEC. I will analyse the period between 1990 and 2011 (latest available data) and I will identify i) how total public health spending varied across the six countries; ii) how much of the spending on health was public and how it was financed. For the share funded through social insurance contributions, how well revenues matched planned health spending; iii) how much of the spending on health was financed through private out-of-pocket payments, including private payments, or voluntary insurance.

The health policy environment (decision making and agenda setting development) makes my analysis challenging. There are conceptual and practical problems which should be taken into account. First, policy can be defined in different ways, with consequent

* PhD. student, National School of Political Science and Administration, e-mail: velicucristina@gmail.com. Beneficiary of the „Doctoral Scholarships for a Sustainable Society” project, co-financed by the European Union through the European Social Fund, Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources and Development 2007-2013.

implications for this study. It can be useful to analyse health policy as embracing courses of action (and inaction) that affect the set of institutions, organizations, services and funding arrangements of the health system. Second, policy is not developed in a vacuum, health policies and national health care systems respond to a series of stimuli, social, political and economic processes and structures which condition, to differing degrees, the policy system. I argue that the process health sector reform is not concerned only with defining priorities and refining policies, but also with the restructuring the institutions through which health policies are implemented.

The context for health reform was influenced by pressures from outside the health sector such as the macroeconomic reality after the fall of communist regimes and the centrality of values and norms. Especially at the early phases of the post-Soviet reforms CEE countries were strongly attracted by the idea of “westernization” and were open to close collaboration with international (predominantly Western funded and Western influenced) organizations (Shakarashvili, 2005: 13-14). However, in Western societies the radical market-orientated thinking of the 1980s, health care is perceived as a commodity to be bought and sold on the open market. However this concept does not apply in the CEE countries. Is health care a commodity or a public right? In the Western states health care is perceived as a commodity exchanged between distinct parties whose relationship is created by the exchange. First, when discussing about commodity the instrumental value to the parties involved. The provider is interested only in the relationship with the consumer insofar as the consumer has something of value to the provider (usually money). The consumer is interested in the relationship only because it means gaining access to the commodity or health care services. Secondly, the notion of a commodity in the Western countries carries with it the notion of private consumption. In the CEE region private sector in the CEE countries was inexistent at the beginning of the 90s.

The 1990s health care reforms in the CEE region can be generally located within the broader context of the general dismantling of the welfare state (Deacon, 1997). Post-communist health reforms should be located within the context of fundamental reorientation towards a market-based economy (De la Porte and Deacon 2002). Empirical data accumulated on the regional health reform experience reveals that the health care policies of the 1990s have been successful mainly in those countries that managed quick reversals of the economic collapse that occurred in the early years of the transition and were able to maintain stable economic growth throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. Authors compare the implementation of market mechanisms reform in the old Semashko systems to giving penicillin to a patient who has a known allergy to it but will die without it. The health care principles upon which the Soviet health care system was based were government financing, central planning, rigid management and a state monopoly over health services.

Along with economic motivations, health reforms in Central and Eastern Europe responded also to political processes, post-communist countries represent the most dramatic examples of the way in which sweeping political transformations are reflected in the health sector. Genuinely related to political processes are the ideological reasons for reform, as recent doubts about the effectiveness of state intervention and a belief in the superiority of markets have led former communist countries to reconsider the optimal public/private mix in health care. Concerning Central Eastern Europe, these theories would point out that they had “premature welfare states”, they spent more on health care than other states at similar income levels (Kornai, McHale, 2000).

In the beginning of transition, health sectors of different CEE countries faced similar challenges. For instance, the health sectors were underfinanced, overstuffed, and misbalanced in favour of inpatient curative services. To address these challenges, countries in CEE adopted more or less similar strategies. The reforms tendencies in the early 1990s in CEE region can be summarized under four target headings:

- separation of the health sector from the integrated system of budget planning;
- more autonomy for the health sector at the regional level and more autonomy for health care units within the public system;
- privatisation of isolated segments of health care; and
- introduction of new financing mechanisms.

Before 1989 all six CEEC experienced the same problematic experiences with the bureaucratic and hierarchically structured Soviet model of healthcare provision (the Semashko model) that had to fit into the requirements of the state-directed economy. The health status of the population was defined as public interest and provision was free of charge and founded on citizenship. However, Western reform concepts were implemented on inadequate infrastructure. To cover the financing needs CEE countries reformed firstly the revenue side of their health care systems. The new organization principle for financing health care was the Bismarckian statutory insurance, based on contributions from both employers and employees (see table 1).

Table 1. *Year of change to Bismarckian health insurance in CEEC health care systems*

Czech Republic	Hungary	Poland	Slovenia	Slovakia	Romania
1992	1991	1999	1992	1994	1998

Health financing systems in the CEE countries were characterized by high degrees of fragmentation between health sub-systems (systems organized at each level of public administration, such as district, province etc.) and vertical integration of financing and provision. International statistics have shown that the financing is not the real problem, rather, the unsustainable structure of the health financing the macroeconomic level and flawed financial incentives to health care providers at the microeconomic level. The existing literature on health care financing in the CEE is not articulating this issues: it is mostly written by narrow specialists in health economics who tend to focus on country-specific issues and details of cross-country experiences in health care financing, without providing a “big picture” from the public finance and macroeconomic perspectives. Health care expenditure in the CEE countries has experienced substantial growth since the 1990’s. Health care is a good example of what economists call a “luxury good” in other words, as societies grow richer, the share of their income they spend on staple goods like food declines, but the share they spend on health-related goods increases. There are, however, numerous exceptions to the rule, and there is no consensus on the magnitude of this effect. The variable tested by Newhouse (1977) is the so-called “income elasticity” of health care demand: an income elasticity of 1.13 means that if the economy grows by 1%, health expenditure rises by 1.13%. Rapid population ageing will affect health financing: at the start of the transition the share of population aged 65 was 11% of the population, by 2005 the share had already increased with 14% in CEE countries. In addition to unfavourable demographics, sustainability of health-care financing is also at risk because of some unresolved structural labour market issues in CEE region. In Hungary and Poland, for example, the age composition of societies is currently such that for each person aged 65 or above, there are about five people of working age (15-64 years). By


2020, this ratio will decrease to around three workers per retiree, and in the period up to 2050, this number will drop to two¹.

Often, health care financing systems are categorized by a label (Beveridge, Bismark or Semashko), but these classifications are not adequate to the Central and Eastern European specific institutional landscapes. The relatively low economic productivity in comparison with their Western European neighbour and the shortcomings in the acquisition of contributions caused by organizational problems led to insufficient financial revenues. Hence, the CEEC had a second reforming approach and oriented their strategies for cost reduction on models of Western origin. The basic infrastructure of the health care systems was at stake, the modernization of hospitals and polyclinics, the renewal of the technical equipment, the build-up of the primary ambulant care provision outside the hospitals and remuneration based on performance of the medical personnel represented drivers of reform.

2. Methodology

The research design I present in the case study is an interactive model framed in the general line of design employed out-side research “an underlying scheme that governs functioning, developing, or unfolding” and “the arrangement of elements or details in a product or work of art” (Frederick et al., 1993). For these reasons, the research design consists of the study of interaction of research components and ways in which these components interact.

Figure 1. *An interactive model of research design*



Source: Adapted from Maxwell, 2004

Following Yin’s (2003) theoretical line the present case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not clearly defined. Given the interpretative position adopted in this research and the nature of

¹ This is the inverse of the “old-age dependency ratio”, the ratio of those aged 65 and over to those of working age (15-64) (Golinowska, 2008: 27).

research on health policy reforms and financing trends in CEE countries, I considered that the case study provides a systemic way of data collection, analysis and test findings. I used the methods and the estimation of sources of funding and spending theoretically framed by the OECD Health Care Data. By using different sources of evidence this paper aims to test and validate the main research questions. Therefore, the research combines the information collected through document and database analysis with the information provided by semi-structured expert interviews and participative observation. Due to the lack of data availability I constructed a database by using health related data provided by several international organizations. Data from both primary and secondary sources were analysed. The OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development) and WHO (World Health Organisation) have been cooperating since 2005 to create a common data collection on health expenditure. The main results of this cooperation are the International Classification for Health Accounts (ICHA), a Joint Questionnaire on Health Expenditure, and the manuals A System of Health Accounts (SHA) ². Descriptive analysis of the existing situation in a country's health system with respect to health care financing and resource allocation, and equally as a tool to assist the identification and preliminary assessment of policy options.

The data collection began with a literature review of CEE regions health systems, policies and health reform processes, as well as policy-related studies to construct a generalised overview of health reforms and policy making in the selected countries. The triangulation method served to clarify meaning by identifying different ways the phenomenon is being seen.

It is beyond of this research aim to delineate all the actors involved in CEE region in the health reform processes, assessing all their preferences and strategies on the outcome of this policy-making. Institutions involved in the health policy design narrow the range of strategies, because they limit potential behaviours by "specifying required, prohibited or permitted actions" (Scharpf, 1997: 39). The research does not investigate the concept of influence of different actors in controlling over policy outcomes in health reform processes when analysing actors' engagement in the health sector.

Keeping in mind that health systems always incorporate a mix of public policy elements and that we only focus on the predominant one, my analysis is guided by the following hypotheses:

H1: Weak health financing in the CEE region is caused by various "congestions" in the institutional design and organizational practice.

In order to find possible answers to the main research question "*how to identify appropriate changes in institutional design and organizational practice to address congestions and improve health financing performance?*" this comparative study of health reform processes has several objectives such as:

- Analysing the context in which health reforms take place and understand the institutional framework within which the reform process evolves;
- Mapping the actors who have the capacity and intention to influence the health reform process;

² European Community Health Indicators project was carried out under the Health Monitoring Programme and the Community Public Health Programme 2003-2008. The result is a list of 88 'indicators' for the public health field arranged according to a conceptual view on health and health determinants.

- Identifying health reform strategies and state's capacity to implement health policies.

Sets of variables:

- **Independent variable:** Formal institutional structure: How is governance at the national and local levels structured in terms of the relative strength of the central government to create and administer health policy?
- Location and policy transfer
- Five major causal structural elements in the architecture of a health system: financing, organization, payment and regulation.
- **Dependent variable** (health care system financing method) will be calculated from an index based on the following data indicators:
 1. Public (state) health expenditure as a percent of total health expenditure vs. private expenditure as a percent of total health expenditure (including various OOP, such as co-payments for procedures and pharmaceutical expenditures)
 2. Contribution rates – employee/employer distribution

The function of expert interviews in my research was to increase my insight into differing viewpoints, interpretations or perceptions of health care financing and reforms in the CEE region. Given the possible problems of bias, poor recall, and poor or inaccurate articulation (Yin, 2003: 92), the interviews were used to corroborate information from other sources. Subjective interpretation by the researcher cannot be ignored and therefore it was acknowledged in the process of collecting, analysing and interpreting data. The interviews were conducted from February to July 2012. I recorded and transcribed the interviews (n = 22) and in order to limit the interpretation bias and I sent the process description to all interviewees, asking them to comment both on their statements in the text, as well as on the analysis.

Interview guide development and interviewing

The interview guide was developed using the following thematic areas: 1) Collection; 2) Polling 3) Purchasing; 4) Allocation and 5) Governance of the health care system.

Table 2. Interview guide structure - Health financing in the CEE region

Collection

1. What method(s) should be used to determine the amount of money to be made available for different programmes?
2. How can additional resources for the health sector be mobilized, and what are the strengths and weaknesses of different mechanisms for mobilizing resources.

Polling

1. How do we develop and implement social health insurance?
2. What is current population coverage under SHI and how can it be increased?
3. What is the equity impact of SHI and how can it be improved?
4. What benefits should be included or excluded from coverage under SHI?
5. How do we ensure that private health insurers contribute towards national health systems goals?

Purchasing

1. What are the relative strengths and weaknesses of different purchasing (or provider payment) mechanisms?

Governance

1. Health care systems management

A request to be interviewed was sent by email to the key expert of each eligible organization and a date and time was set either through e-mail or telephone calls.

Table 3. *Key informants*

Organization/Expert Location
European Commission - Policy Analyst – Economist DG Economic and Financial Affairs - Unit C.2: Sustainability of Public Finances
European Commission - DG Health and Consumers (SANCO) Healthcare Systems Unit (D2)
World Health Organization - Office at the European Union - MD MPH Chief Scientist and WHO Representative to the EU
Romanian Health Attaché at the European Union
European Parliament – MEP Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)
National House of Insurance
Romanian Health Ministry
HOPE- European Hospital and Healthcare Federation – President
European Public Health Alliance (EPHA) - Policy Coordinator for Health Systems
EUCOMED Medical Technology – Senior Manager Market Data
Pfizer Brussels

Data management and analysis

I prepared detailed summaries of each interview using both the audio tapes and notes taken during the interviews, and these detailed summaries were subsequently analysed independently. During the analysis, the detailed summaries were first read separately and supplemented, where necessary, by listening to part or all of the corresponding audio tapes. Binary or categorical responses to more structured questions were counted when possible. Themes were identified from among responses to semi-structured questions using a constant comparative method of analysis. Then question - and theme-specific groupings of the detailed summaries were developed and read, and the themes were modified or amplified. Illustrative quotations, as well were identified to supplement the narrative description of the themes. The findings of the expert interviews are detailed in the section of the case study: *Lessons from health reforms in Central and Eastern Europe: Expert interviewing perspective*.

I. Health care systems reform in the CEE region: analysing institutional and organizational barriers to health financing performance

Which are the main causes of the institutional and organizational practices barriers in the health care sector? Is the institutional design and actors behaviour influencing health system performance? Institutions operate according to a set of specified rules; health care actors cannot act without a regulatory basis or may not undertake an important health financing task because of a lack of incentives. Yet, in some instances a prevailing rule may not represent the most efficient institutional design to achieve the health financing outcomes and performance indicators. During the transition period (1990-1997³) countries in the CEE region had often conflictive rules and weak rule enforcement, which allowed health care actors to pursue their specific interests rather than implementing and complying with the rule. In the transition literature, there is a vivid debate on whether the

³To establish the transition period analysed in the study (1990-1997) I used the “initial condition” index developed by European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).


transition is over in the CEE region or not. In present study I use the macroeconomic framework of transition.

The aim of this section is to describe the major changes in the CEEC health care systems during the transition period, present the context in which reforms have been implemented, and analyse possible effects of health policy reforms.

The concrete changes and the timeframe of their realization after 1989 differ between the CEE countries, depending on the specific conditions at the start of the reforms and during their implementation. However, there are some common issues across the health reforms in CEE countries - most notably the introduction of several market-based instruments to replace the Semashko health care delivery systems and the increased role of self-governments in health care delivery. Therefore, I argue that in the analysed countries 1997 year represents a stepping stone and marks the end of transition due to the fact that the countries made major steps necessary for the transition to the market economy: privatisation, creation of property rights, external liberalisation, hardening budget constraint, creation of financial markets and price liberalization.

On the other side, low organizational capacity, the lack of leadership, inadequately skilled human resources, the shortage of financial resources, poor infrastructure or inappropriate organizational procedures and structures (Horton, Alexaki, Bennett-Lartey, Brice, Campilan, Carden, et al., 2003) influenced health sectors reorganization and efficiency.

Figure 2. *Conceptual framework*



Much of the research on the structure of health care systems has focused on the move from private to public financing (Immergut, 1992; Tuohy, 2009). But why do some countries move in the opposite direction? The formerly communist countries from Central and Eastern Europe (Romania, Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland) are an interesting study case of this question. Under communism they have shared a common health care model based on state ownership and control – a hybrid between soviet Semashko-type and the Bismarckian pattern – but since the 90s some of them have moved away from this

system to introduce a national insurance authority or a system of private insurers. The Semashko system was a microcosm of the centrally planned economy, almost all funding came from the state through budget allocations based on numerical indicators of inputs. Consistent with the policy of central planning, the allocation of state funds was driven by norms derived from historical levels of infrastructure and staffing, rather than by needs or outcomes. Management was hierarchical, with no tolerance for adaptation to local circumstances, and there were few incentives for efficiency in the provision of good quality health care.

The state is not a one-dimensional or homogeneous actor in the health care sector and apart from its strictly regulatory and mediating role, the state may act as a health care provider (when it is involved in the direct delivery of services), or as a resource. Furthermore, there are many public agencies that are not part of the health system *stricto sensu*, but that constitute a key element of its organizational environment. This is the case of the legislative and judicial branches of government, as well as the executive offices dealing with public budgets, taxation and law enforcement. Economic theory suggests that government's role in health care system is the response to various market failures. Government and individuals working within, are actors facing incentives and constraints of their own, and the nature of the incentives and constraints depends on details of institutional design. Paradoxically, the capacity of the health-care state is increasing in proportion to the complexity of social regulation, while the state's autonomy from economic interests is diminishing. While the state has a definite role to play in health care, as the financier, organizer and regulator of health services, the extent to which it should directly involve itself with the provision of health care is less certain, which has a bearing on how the health system is governed. What is a function of governments – specifically health ministries – responsible for the well-being of the population and for protecting the public interest?

A function of health ministries across Central and Eastern Europe is to exert influence across all sectors through inter-sectoral collaboration and action, in order to promote better health. From that perspective, national health ministries can play various roles to influence secondary and tertiary health enhancing factors. Health ministries can be involved in: building coalitions across sectors in government, and with actors outside government, to attain health system goals; promoting initiatives aimed at improving health or addressing the social determinants of health; and advocating for the incorporation of health issues in all policies.

One difference between the countries study case, is, precisely, the degree of fragmentation of state involvement in health care. All countries in the sample have moved away from a system in which government is both the solepayer and provider of all health care. Instead, there are now other actors in the system, the health insurers, who purchase health services on the basis of contracts with providers. The move towards an insurance-based system has been a structural shift in the state's role in health care provision. Funding from tax money continues to play a role, but it has been reduced to between 7% (Slovenia) and 18% (Romania) of total health expenditure. In Slovenia, for example, 98.5% of health expenditure had come from general taxation in the year prior to the inauguration of the insurance system. (WHO Statistics, 2007) The logical path as international evidence suggests would be to allow for various competing insurance providers and free choice between them (Health Consumer Powerhouse, 2007: p. 3-4). The only established multiple insurer system can be found in the Czech Republic. Czech health funds compete in terms of the service quality they provide to their customers. Both Slovenia and the Czech Republic offer a system of choice as far as insurance is concerned,

though in a very different way. Patients in Slovenia do not have “horizontal choice” (between different insurers), but they do have “vertical choice” (between different depths of coverage) through the option to purchase individualised extra packages. The Hungarian health sector can be classified as a monopoly insurance, even if after 2003 have been experimental projects which have allowed people to partially opt out of the system.⁴ However, many specific problems remain unresolved. For example, in the Polish case, the autonomy of regional health insurances has created significant complications in the allocation of financial sources as they are needed in practice. Thus, in 2003 Poland recentralized its 17 autonomous health insurances created in 1999 under the common umbrella of a national health insurance fund (Kuszewski and Gericke 2005: 99). The state acts as a regulator of contractual relations, assures the legal framework and regulates competition. Can we talk about competition in the health care sector in the CEE region?

The countries in the sample tried to introduce competition between service providers to drive up standards and promote cost competitiveness. The state can be more or less engaged in the regulation of the relationships between the three major stakeholders of a health care system: financing agencies, service providers, and (potential) beneficiaries, or it can leave this task to corporate self-regulation mechanisms or to the markets.

Health care expenditure in context

The recent financial and economic crisis has amplified concerns over health system performance, sustainability and value for money (OECD, 2010). Financing functions are to achieve the following objectives: (1) resource collection to ensure sufficient and sustainable revenues in an equitable way; (2) pooling of funds to ensure that costs of accessing health care are shared thus ensuring financial accessibility; (3) purchasing/provision to ensure that funds to buy and provide health care services are used in the most efficient and equitable way. Important elements of financing policy include the need to (a) coordinate all sources of funding under a common policy framework; (b) reduce duplication in the pooling of funds and the responsibilities for service provision that result from the existence of vertically integrated health systems associated with each level of the government’s administrative structure; and (c) address the issues of access to care and financial protection for the poor through explicit policies backed with clear financial incentive.

Current expenditure on health measures the economic resources spent by a country on health care services and goods, including administration and insurance. Total expenditure on health care represents current expenditure on health enlarged by the expenditure on capital formation (investments) of health care providers.

This section of analysis is executed to answer the following research questions:

1. How does total spending vary across CEE countries?
2. What predictors explain this variation? and
3. Is total spending a better predictor of health care outcomes?

The level of health-care spending (both public and total) varies widely across countries reflecting market and social choices regarding, supply of services, remuneration of health-care providers, the degree of diffusion of health-care technology or the institutional mechanisms for the finance of health care. The highly publicized cases of

⁴ Since 2003, Hungarian patients can become clients of a ‘Health Maintenance Organisation’ (HMO), an institution which is like a small health care system of its own i.e. both a health insurer and a health provider.

resource shortages in the national health insurance system (NHS) provided an important context for the government reforms across CEE countries. However, while the financial “crisis” and the transition triggered the design of the NHS, the content of the subsequent reform focused on organizational and managerial changes. The financial problem of NHS funding remains a major structural problem although an injection of new funds over the transition is designed to ease pressures and cope with new demands. In Romania, the perceived low level of resources designated to the health sector and the political fashion in which resources are allocated to the health sector within the state budget, has led to calls for the introduction of compulsory health insurance (Collins et al., 1999).

Pooling refers to the accumulation of prepaid funds on behalf of a population, is the accumulation and management of financial resources to ensure that the financial risk of having to pay for health care is borne by all members of the pool and not by the individuals who fall ill. The main purpose of pooling is to spread the financial risk associated with the need to use health services. If funds are to be pooled, they have to be *prepaid*, before the illness occurs – through taxes and/or insurance, for example. Most health financing systems include an element of pooling funded by prepayment, combined with direct payments from individuals to service providers, sometimes called *cost-sharing* (WHO, 2010: 2).

Purchasing is the process of paying for health services. Purchasing refers to the transfer of pooled funds to providers on behalf of a population, allowing individuals to be “covered”. Key issues involve market structure and purchasing mechanisms (for example, contracting, provider payment and monitoring). Purchasing is a three way process: One is for government to provide budgets directly to its own health service providers (integration of purchasing and provision) using general government revenues and, sometimes, insurance contributions. The second is for an institutionally separate purchasing agency (e.g. a health insurance fund or government authority) to purchase services on behalf of a population (a purchaser-provider split). The third is for individuals to pay a provider directly for services.

A vast array of studies disentangling the underlying factors that determine health care expenditure, such as income, aging, time effects, availability of health care factors (Gerdtham and Jonsson, 2000) along with technology progress (Newhouse, 1977).

1. How do we develop and implement universal financial protection?
2. What are the pros and cons of the different ways of identifying the poor?
3. To what extent do health benefits reach the poor?
4. What are the pros and cons of implementing demand-side subsidies?
5. What is the cost-effectiveness of service delivery models and health systems strategies?

Health care systems in CEE countries are facing major challenges. The most notable pressures are connected with the processes of economic globalization demographic changes and unemployment. Reforms aiming at retrenchment or recalibration of health care systems have been widespread in recent years (Marmor et al., 2005).

Wendt (2009) elaborates a comprehensive conceptual framework for analysing health care systems and their transformations. By exploring the dimensions “financing”, “provision” and “regulation” of health care, the article proceeds deductively in line with the “Weberian method of ideal-types” to establish a taxonomy of 27 health care systems,

of which three can be identified as “ideal-types”⁵. Other scholars, (Bambra, 2004, 2005) seek to close this analytical gap by adapting Esping-Andersen’s concept of de commodification to the study of health care systems. Bambra argues that health de commodification’ may be defined in terms of the extent to which an individual’s access to health care is dependent upon their market position and the extent to which a country’s provision of health services is independent from the market. However, OECD study on Financing and Delivering Health care prepared by George J. Schieber in 1987, which, on the basis of three dimensions (coverage, funding and ownership), proposes three basic models: the national health service model with universal coverage, funding out of general taxes, and public ownership of health care provision; the social insurance model with universal coverage, funding by social insurance contributions, and with health care provision in public or private ownership or both; and the private insurance model with private insurance coverage, private insurance funding, and private ownership of health care provision (OECD 1987: 24). Moran (2002) constructs four families of health care states: the “entrenched command and control state”, the “supply state”, the “corporatist state” and the “insecure command and control state”.

Health care in the CEE region is mostly financed through health insurance contributions. Since these contributions are levied as a percentage of wages, they are “hypothecated tax” on labour.

Insurance coverage is defined as the proportion of the population covered by health insurance, taking into account both public and private insurance schemes. Public (government/social) health insurance coverage is the share of the population eligible for a defined set of health care goods and services that are included in total public health expenditure. Private health insurance coverage is the share of the population based on a head count of individuals covered by at least one private health insurance policy (including both individuals covered in their own name and dependants). This financing strategy is already meeting its limits. Romania and Hungary, for example, are already facing difficulties with the collection of health insurance premiums, with workers and/or employers trying to evade them. In 2007, Hungary implemented reforms including stricter enforcement of contribution payments, and new eligibility criteria that widened the base of contributors. The Czech Republic financing system appears especially problematic, 89% of health care is financed publicly, in other words through a combination of financing and insurance contributions (WHO Statistics, 2007) Since January 2008, user fees of approximately £0.85 per consultation and £1.70 per hospital day have been introduced, the reform has sparked opposition⁶. This controversy demonstrates that a shift to economically less risky sources of funding is politically difficult. On the other part, Romanian public spending can be described as a combination of wage-related contributions and general taxation, but it represents only about two thirds of total spending. The remaining third is paid for privately by patients. All in all, the high proportion of direct payments by patients does not result from a deliberate policy decision on the part of government. Rather, of all the countries examined, Romania has the least formalised health care system. The private payments mostly represent additional providers’ charges outside of the formal remuneration system (Observatory on Health

⁵ According to Max Weber, an ideal-type ‘is formed by the one-sided Accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct.

⁶ There has even been an attempted appeal against it before the constitutional court.

Systems and Policies, 2000: 23- 60). The Polish health care system represents an intermediate case between the highly formalised, mostly state-funded health system of the Czech Republic, and the far less formalised Romanian system with its large share of out-of-pocket payments. In Poland, private out-of-pocket spending plays a considerable role (almost 30% of total health expenditure) (WHO Statistics, 2007). Hungary has a similar percentage of private out-of-pocket expenditure as Poland, as Gaal and Riesberg argue a large portion is composed of informal payments (Gaal; Riesberg, 2004: 44-46). The supplementary insurance system used in Slovenia is, to a large extent, a partial-cover insurance. Patients pay for the services they use, and the national health insurance reimburses them with a part of the costs, according to the services and products, reimbursement rates vary, ranging from 25% to 95% of the total costs. A high proportion (95%) of the insured voluntarily opt for some type of extra insurance which covers most co-payments and, if people choose a more comprehensive policy, also covers the costs of additional services.

Table 4: Past trends in total and public expenditure on health 1970-2008

	Total Expenditure ^s on Health as a % of GDP						Public Expenditure on Health as a % of GDP						Public Expenditure on as a % of Public Expenditure					
	1970	1980	1990	2000	2005	2008	1970	1980	1990	2000	2005	2008	1970	1980	1990	2000	2005	2008
CZ	-	-	4.7	6.5	7.2	7.1	.	.	4.6	5.9	6.3	5.9				13.7	16.0	16.8
HU	-	-	-	7.0	8.3	7.3	-	-	-	5.0	6.0	5.2	-	-	-	10.4	11.2	9.9
PL	-	-	4.8	5.5	6.2	7.0	-	-	4.4	3.9	4.3	5.1	-	-	-	-	10.2	11.7
RO	-	-	2.9	5.2	5.5	5.4	-	-	2.9	3.6	4.4	4.5	-	-	-	11.3	10.6	11.2
SL	4.2	4.4	5.6	8.3	8.4	8.3	4.2	4.4	5.6	6.1	6.1	6.0	-	-	-	13.8	13.9	13.8
SK				5.5	7.0	7.8	-	-	-	4.9	5.2	5.4				10.0	12.8	19.2

Source: OECD health data 2010, Eurostat data and WHO Health for All database for health expenditure data. Eurostat data for public (government) expenditure using COFOG.

Table 5. Public and out-of-pocket expenditure as a % of total health expenditure

Country	Public expenditure on health as % of total expenditure on health									Out-of-pocket expenditure on health as % of total expenditure on health						
	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2005	2006	2007	2008	1980	1990	2000	2005	2006	2007	2008
Czech Republic	-	96.6	96.8	97.4	90.3	87.3	86.7	85.2	82.5	-	2.6	9.7	10.7	11.3	13.2	15.7
Hungary	-	-	-	-	70.7	72.3	72.6	70.4	71.0	-	-	26.3	23.8	23.0	24.3	23.9
Poland				91.7	70.0	69.3	69.9	70.8	72.2	-	8.3	30.0	26.1	25.6	24.2	22.4
Slovenia	-	100.0	100.0	100.0	74.0	71.9	72.4	72.0	72.3	-	-	11.5	12.5	11.8	13.3	12.8
Slovakia	-	-	-	-	89.4	74.4	68.3	66.8	69.0	-	-	10.6	22.6	25.9	26.2	25.7
Romania	-	-	-	100.0	67.7	80.4	79.7	82.1	82.0	-	-	32.3	18.5	19.8	17.2	17.6

Source: Eurostat, OECD and WHO health data and Commission services calculations.

Table 6. Health care expenditure by financing agents as % of GDP

GEO/TIME	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Czech Republic	7,15	6,95	6,98	6,75	6,53	6,94	7,98
Hungary	8,05	7,71	8,07	7,85	7,21	7,04	7,28
Poland	5,98	5,92	5,85	5,85	6,02	6,54	6,88
Romania	5,22	5,42	5,49	5,05	5,14	5,27	5,60
Slovenia	8,07	7,95	8,02	7,79	7,42	7,89	8,70
Slovakia	:	:	6,75	7,01	7,36	7,61	8,58
New Zealand	:	8,32	8,68	9,10	8,81	9,56	10,29

Source: Eurostat data

Table 7. Expenditure of health care, euro per inhabitant

GEO/TIME	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Czech Republic	589,76	620,67	708,78	771,05	832,53	1.009,13	1.078,14
Hungary	610,01	654,58	731,59	722,82	747,55	765,57	690,79
Poland	313,13	331,85	397,94	442,35	524,59	666,96	599,47
Romania	129,00	153,81	202,80	230,87	303,49	353,39	310,39
Slovenia	1.086,84	1.134,35	1.207,43	1.279,95	1.338,78	1.541,68	1.607,55
Slovakia	:	:	644,91	749,59	882,96	991,62	1.060,60

Source: Eurostat data

II. Lessons from health reforms in Central and Eastern Europe: Expert interviewing perspective

Arriving at the discussion of health care systems' transformation in the CEE region the expert interviewing method was extremely useful means of identifying a potential range of system change. Recent research shows that all mature health care systems are mixed systems they "have evolved in ways that blur the boundaries of the established typology", shifting variously "the balance of power, the mix of instruments, and the organization principals of earlier models to yield distinct hybrids" (Tuohy, 2012: 618- 627). But can we consider CEE health care systems mature?

The growing hybridization of CEE countries health care systems is mainly resulting from reforms and or the institutional diffusion of policy strategies, both responding to the problem of cost containment, financing mechanisms, public management, quality assessment and more targeted intervention to secure access for underprivileged groups. As previously stated the complicated nature of reform in the analysed countries has affected the outcome of policy change. The contrasting experiences in these six countries present an ideal opportunity for policy analysis. As indicated I selected Romania, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia for evaluation with the general objective to study different patterns of reform in the new Member States.

Results and discussion

Five overarching thematic areas emerged out of the contextual analysis of the interviews: 1) Collection: Method(s) used to determine the amount of money to be made available for different health programmes; 2) Polling: The development and implementation of social health insurance; 3) Purchasing: The relative strengths and weaknesses of different purchasing (or provider payment) mechanisms; 4) Allocation: The cost-effectiveness of current activities/mechanisms; 5) Governance: management of the health care system;

First of all, it is important to state the fact that the overall findings suggest that the current problem of the health sector in general, is that health it's seen by the society and by the governments in isolation. Thus in my opinion that the health sector it's not only a source of expenditures, it should be seen as a source of wealth. If people are healthy, they are more productive and impose on the society less burden on the welfare system, home care or medical care.

CEE countries need evidence based databases and determine what statistical method is needed to be used to evaluate what is the health status of the population and the health financing priorities. What we often see in Western countries, and maybe this is missing in the CEE region, is an overall strategy, what do we want to achieve? Thus, even if we discuss about universal coverage in the region's health care system, the key experts interviewed stated that in the Romanian case, for example, the basic benefit package is not defined on health technology assessment. The DG ECFIN expert suggested that in the Romanian case one can argue that there is a financing problem of the health care system: *"have very few contributors to the system I think only 5 million people in Romania contributes and 20 million are insured or can benefit from the system. You have a financing problem, first of all."*

The main research question explored using the expert interviewing methodology was establishing the mechanism that should be used to determine the amount of money to be made available in different health care programmes in CEEC and how can these countries develop inclusive health insurance systems. Experts argued that the universal coverage is the most inclusive mechanism to provide access to health care services. For example, the WHO expert interviewed stated that: *"the health insurance coming from the general taxation system is the best way. Meaning, health is paid by the population by their on taxes and it goes to the health system, through the regional level and directly to the central level and the state. It depends on the national system, in some cases in decentralised in some cases in centralised"*.

Is decentralisation of health care system the solution? If we compare costs of public administration in health care they are higher in more decentralised systems, in systems which are more decentralised have higher administrative costs. This is the first thing which is negative in decentralised systems. The good thing is of course that there is a better ownership of the health care issues. What kind of polls you need and the funds you need for the health care system. So this could be an advantage. But overall, the European Union's institutions are rather recommending centralising the system. Why? Because decentralising the health systems enables control over the health care systems. You should redistribute risks and the benefit of the health care systems in the all country. You can have rich countries, but also poor regions and an imbalance. If you decentralise it and you have no risk adjustments; The key expert interviewed at DG ECFIN argued that especially in Romania case there is a lot of mistrust to centralise the health care system and *"of course you have the dark side of corruption, but I believe centralisation need to*

happen more and more also because of the IT systems, centralisation allows more control, more transparency, more interaction between ministries of health and local authorities”.

Since social security and the organisation of health care is really rooted in the culture and even if is 20 years history the question should not be in general “should we have competition or not?” but more depending on the existing situation and how can the situation be improved. It will certainly not be the same for Romania as for Hungary and the others. Having competition demands a structure, both of the citizens and the insurers.

Is privatisation the solution to improve health care systems’ performance? Privatisation could mean non for profit, it could mean for profit – chains of clinics – it could mean selection of patients, only part of a public coverage in hospitals; it’s quite diverse. Privatisation in health care systems at least in Europe works when there is a balance with the public sector, when the public sector has an important role. If we are talking about full profit hospitals of course if they want to survive and give money to their shareholders, hospitals need to be efficient. It is true for some very industrial activities, so clear many countries privatise cataracts or so on. Hospital privatisation in one region in itself could be very dangerous, because you would have then only for profit visions and to bring back to their shareholders 10 or 15% of the profit, so what they have to do is to try to find the most profitable things on the social security system and the reimbursement, they will try to select patients not to complex and risky to their margin and so on. That happened in the most privatised countries in Europe, for example France. The way of making profit is by selecting patients. The key expert interviewed at HOPE argued that a great attention should be made to set up privatisation arrangements in the health care system: *“This is very dangerous in a system where the primary care is not really put in place, where you have, the Romanian case, to many surgical thinks so you will just create inflation, a selective system and increasing the distortion of the inequalities in the system. (Putting in place some privatisation for some type of activities could be an extra incentive for the public sector, it works somehow in France and it works also in Germany; has made the public sector to be more efficient and proactive. Privatisation in itself I don’t know is extremely risky, because we come back to this shareholders, you need to have structural changes in place for purchasers of care and it’s very complex to be a good purchaser of care (the UK case) because the health care it’s a very complex sector, is not like purchasing cars or.. It’s very difficult to purchase wisely, not creating inequalities etc.”*

But what role plays the European Union regulation framework the reform trends? The internal market is much more important than the health care policy. The integration process was based on the assumption that new Member States will integrate faster, that will be limited flows. That does not work is a total failure. Health results and health population in general it increases the trend in the Western Europe, for example, no doctors in the rural places, doctors focusing on wealthy places and so on. This is happening at the European level as well; What the EU can do? In 2004 in the European Parliament there were actions to raise awareness about the subject there is a great expectation on flows. This problem is serious in some countries and extremely visible in some regions, in Romania as well. When you talk to the European Commission they started a Joint Action on the workforce planning.

Another main finding of the interviews shows that the health care systems in general share the same management and performance issues. Thus, experts argue that efficient management and the lack of corruption represent necessary conditions to increase health care systems’ performance. The lack of managerial capacity has been blamed for most health care systems inefficiencies (WHO, 2007). The development of adequate leadership

skills and competencies which are needed in order to strengthen healthy services, have been shown less attention in the current literature. My findings suggest that the CEE countries share many of the problems of Western Europe or Northern Europe and the CEE is not an isolated, as key experts suggested. All in all, the CEEC have had historically strong cultures of centralization and lack of individual accountability for the development of a new managerial tradition. The research results show that there is a need for a new health care organizational model based on a decision-making more collective and collaborative.

Do CEE countries need to change their previous modes of health care financing? Experts' observations and recommendations indicate that post-communist countries political economy rationale for such a switch from a tax-based to an insurance-based financial model is a mixture of economic, administrative and political considerations. Thus, on one hand the economic arguments are connected very much with the introduction of pluralistic health insurance system (the switch from general taxation to health insurance with one public HIC is very much just formal change of streams of financial flows). They involve a trade-off between the costs of a public monopoly evident in the previous system, whose efficiency might have been improved by an internal market, and the possibility of excessive administrative costs if there are many competing insurance companies but few economies of scale. Alternatively there would be the general economic welfare problems of oligopolies if the market came to be dominated by a small number of large insurance companies. Secondly, the political considerations for proposing a switch are complex. On the one hand, earmarking taxes for health and sub-contracting their administration to independent insurance funds would have the advantage of distancing government from a contentious area of public policy. And the switch to an earmarked insurance system would have the advantage of reducing pressure on general budgets. But other than the insurance companies, interest groups are not concerned about where extra resources for health will be found. Neither local nor indeed many central policymakers in the health sector are concerned about such trade-offs.

3. Concluding remarks

Current economic and political developments requires a formal analyses of health policy options for developing a health system that has the ability to anticipate problems and not just react to crises. What is needed according to health care experts is to enforce discipline on consumers and providers. This means reforms like co-payments, limitations on coverage, or hospital closures which would either raise additional funds or reduce publicly provided services. Because health programs provide citizens with access to health care as a right in modern systems of social protection, promises regularly appear to reform the sector by lowering costs, expanding access and improving quality. Reform is a complex process embedded in empirical realities of power and privilege as well as economic constraints, therefore is extremely important to analyse the current patterns in the Central and Eastern Europe.

Data from the analysed sample do not highlight any priority from the point of view of what of health care financing is the best option for CEE countries. The practical difficulties in collecting tax and health insurance contributions, particularly in post-communist countries with a large informal sector where the tax avoidance and inefficient tax and insurance premium collection can be serious problems. Second, governments must implement innovative financing mechanisms. Health financing policies in the CEE countries reveals three broad questions when formulation new funding formulas: the proportion of

non-covered population is increasing due to the burden of poverty and this category needs to be subsidised from pooled funds, generally government revenues.

Beyond increasing health care costs, there are also structural and organisational challenges in how countries in the Region finance and deliver health care services. First, my case study shows that health systems priorities must be routed on cost-effectiveness methodologies. Secondly, there are concerns about the microinstitutional level: some of the problems include poor coordination among providers and across subsectors, lack of incentives for efficient service provision, lack of adequate information about quality and cost of services or inadequate management of capital resources.

Another aspect should retain the attention: other factors have health impact and diseases are due to actions taken by other sectors of the society. Think at respiratory diseases related to air pollution for instance, or at obesity, or gastro-intestinal disorders due to food infection. Now, those are the so called externalities of the health sector. And in the system, each sector works separately. Certain decisions will cost in terms of health, and then the health sector has to evaluate the burden of the impact, in terms of costs and diseases. I think that in the future, in a different model, health care should be an integrated approach, a society problem, a holistic system that must be addressed. If I want to implement a new transport policy for instance, we have to take into account not only to the fact that people must be moved from a place to another, or the speed of the movement, but also to the positive and negative impacts we have on the society and the population health. I think these aspects are not considered. If you think about climate change, we are facing a major let's say disaster in the future, if it's not taken seriously and this affects more in terms of health. Increase of extreme events with a consequence on health. All this aspects associated with decision taken in the health sector, associated with other sectors, are not taken into account.

Therefore the recommendations of this study are the following:

- The government and public health organizations must focus on public sector reform efforts: investing in administrative and managerial capacity of central and local authorities and implementing transparent decision-making processes;
- Increasing the efficiency of revenue collection and for the Romanian case separating health care funds from the general collection fund;
- A better definition the basic health care package;
- Implementing health technology assessment tools to enable timely collection of data used in the allocation of resources for health services.

Finally, it is worth emphasising that a key factor for the success of health care reforms in the CEE region is the authorities' ability to manage the political economy aspects of reform. Therefore the authorities need to manage expectations of different stakeholders in health care reform much more actively. Authorities need in particular to elaborate a clear vision of healthcare reform at centre of which stands improving health care services, rather than narrow interests of selected stakeholders. Progress in this direction depends critically on political consensus, which unfortunately seems elusive at the moment given that most countries in the CEE region are governed by unstable coalitions.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bambra, C. (2005), "Cash Versus Services: "Worlds of Welfare" and the Decommodification of Cash Benefits and Healthcare Services", *Journal of Social Policy* 34 (2);
- Collins, C.; Green, A.; Hunter, D. (1999), "Health sector reform and the interpretation of the policy context", *Health Policy*, 47;
- Deacon, B. (1997), *Global Social Policy: International Organizations and the Future of Welfare*, Sage, London;
- De la Porte, C.; Deacon, B. (2002), *Contracting Companies and Consultants: The EU and the Social Policy of Accession Countries*. GASPE Occasional Paper No: 9[http://www.stakes.fi/gaspp/occasional%20papers/gaspp92002.pdf#search='EU%20accession %20social%20policy%20legislation](http://www.stakes.fi/gaspp/occasional%20papers/gaspp92002.pdf#search='EU%20accession%20social%20policy%20legislation) [Accessed 10.02.2012];
- Gaál, P.; Szigeti, S.; Csere, M., Gaskins, M., Panteli, D., (2011), *Hungary. Health Systems Review*, Vol. 13 No. 5, The European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, Brussels;
- Gerdtham, U.; Jönsson, B. (2000), "International Comparisons of Health Expenditure: Theory, Data, and Econometric Analysis" in A.J. Culyer and Joseph P. Newhouse (eds), *Handbook of Health Economics*, Elsevier Science;
- Horton, D.; Alexaki, A.; Bennett-Lartey, S.; Brice, K.N.; Campilan, D.; Carden, D. et al. (2003), *Evaluating capacity development. Experiences from research and development organizations around the world*, ISNAR/IDRC/CTA, The Hague;
- Immergut, E.M. (1992), *Health Politics, Interests and Institutions in Western Europe*, Cambridge University Press, New York;
- Immergut, Ellen M. (1992), "The Rules of the Game: The Logic of Health Policy-Making in France, Switzerland, and Sweden" in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth (eds), *Structuring Politics. Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge;
- Kornai, J., McHale, J., (2000), "Is Post-Communist Health Spending Unusual?" in *The Economics of Transition*, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 8(2), July;
- Kuszewski, K.; Gericke, C. (2005), *Healthcare Systems in Transition: Poland*, WHO, Copenhagen;
- Moran, M. (2002), "Understanding the welfare state: the case of health" in *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 2(2);
- Newhouse, J. (1977), "Medical care expenditure: A cross-national survey" in *The Journal of Human Resources*, 12;
- Scharpf, F. W., (1997), *Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research*, Westview, Boulder, CO;
- Shakarashvili, G. (2005), *Decentralization in Healthcare*, OSI-LGI, Budapest;
- OECD (1993), *OECD Health Systems. Facts and Trends 1960-1991*, Paris, OECD;
- OECD (1994), *The Reform of Healthcare Systems. A Review of Seventeen OECD Countries*, Paris, OECD;
- OECD (1998), *Maintaining Prosperity in an Ageing Society*, Paris, OECD;
- OECD (2000), *A System of Health Accounts*, Paris, OECD;
- OECD (2001a), *Measuring Expenditure on Health-Related R&D*, Paris, OECD;
- OECD (2001b), *Society at a Glance. OECD Social Indicators*, Paris, OECD;
- OECD (2002a), *Social Expenditures Database*, Paris, OECD;

- OECD (2002b), *Measuring Up. Improving Health System Performance in OECD Countries*, Paris, OECD;
- OECD (2003a), *OECD Health Data 2003*, Paris, OECD;
- OECD (2003b), *Health at a Glance. OECD Indicators 2003*, Paris, OECD;
- OECD (2004), *Towards High-Performing Health Systems*, Paris, OECD;
- OECD, (2010a), *OECD Health Data 2010: Statistics and indicators*, OECD 2010. At: http://www.oecd.org/document/30/0,3343,en_2649_34631_12968734_1_1_1_1,00.html, [Accessed 09.05.2012];
- OECD, (2010c), *OECD Health Ministerial Meeting, Health System Priorities in the Aftermath of the Crisis*, 7 and 8 October 2010. At: http://www.oecd.org/document/41/0,3343,en_21571361_44701414_46099689_1_1_1_1,00.html [Accessed 08.05.2012];
- Tuohy, C. H. (2009), “Single Payers, Multiple Systems: the Scope and Limits of Subnational Variation under Federal Health Policy Framework” in *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law*, Vol. 34, No. 4;
- Tuohy, C.H., (2012), “Reform and the Politics of Hybridization in Mature Health Care States” in *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law*, 37,;
- Wendt, C., Kohl, J. (2009) “Translating Monetary Inputs into Healthcare Services – the Influence of Different Modes of Public Policy in a Comparative Perspective” in *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis*, 11 (3);
- WHO, (2011), *World Health Statistics*, World Health Organization, Geneva;
- WHO Europe, (2008), *The Tallinn Charter: Health Systems for Health and Wealth*, Tallinn. Available online at: http://www.euro.who.int/data/assets/pdf_file/0008/88613/E91438.pdf [accessed 13.03.2012];
- WHO/Europe, (2008), *The Tallinn Charter: Health Systems for Health and Wealth*, WHO European Ministerial Conference on Health Systems, June 2008. At: <http://www.euro.who.int/en/home/conferences/ministerial-conference-on-health-systems/documentation/conference-documents/the-tallinn-charter-health-systems-for-health-andwealth> [Accessed 07.02.2012];
- WHO, (2010), *National Health Accounts*, World Health Organization. <http://www.who.int/nha>. [Accessed 18.04.2012];
- Yin, R.K. (2003), *Case study research: design and methods*, Sage, Thousand Oaks.

DIMENSIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN ANTI-GOLD MINING ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT IN ROMANIA. THE CASE OF SAVE ROȘIA MONTANĂ ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT

Cristian BRANEA *

Abstract. *The most substantial environmental mobilization in post-communist Romania is represented by Save Roșia Montană, a movement that opposes the European biggest open pit, cyanide-based gold and silver extraction project proposed by Gabriel Resources Ltd., a multi-national mining company based in Toronto. Over the last 12 years, it has become the most significant Romanian environmental conflict, with a significant national and international impact. Environmental and ecological justice can become an important frame for explaining the conflicts over environmental conditions, cultural and historical heritage preservation, cultural landscape, indigenous lands, identity, and ways of life in Roșia Montană, thus understanding the most significant environmental movement in Romania. The main hypothesis of my research is that the environmental movement that opposes the cyanide based gold mining project in Roșia Montană is primarily an environmental justice movement, being the first of its kind in Romania.*

Keywords: *Environmental Justice, Roșia Montană, Resource extraction conflict, Environmental movement*

1. Introduction

The main objective of my article is to show that *environmental justice* and *ecological justice* can become an important frame for explaining the conflicts over environmental conditions, cultural and historical heritage preservation, scenic landscape, lands, identity, and ways of life in Roșia Montană, thus understanding the most significant environmental movement in Romania. The main hypothesis of my research is that the environmental movement that opposes the cyanide based gold mining project in Roșia Montană is primarily an environmental justice movement, being the first of its kind in Romania. Although the movement does not have the proper language to describe itself explicitly as an environmental justice movement, my attempt is to show that it resembles in many ways the environmental and ecological justice struggles of indigenous people worldwide, and that it articulates its ethical and political claims around a multivalent concept of justice.

* PhD student, National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Faculty of Communication and Public Relations, Bucharest, Romania, E-mail: crisbranea@yahoo.com. "Beneficiary of the „Doctoral Scholarships for a Sustainable Society” Project , project co-financed by the European Union through the European Social Fund, Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources and Development 2007-2013”

Mining activities have generated environmental and civil rights conflicts all over the world. People have lost their lives in their struggle to protect their lands, and natural resources their lives, families, and communities depend on – a struggle for environmental and ecological justice.

In Peru, local protesters opposed the Conga mine project - the biggest Peruvian gold and copper surface mining project - for over 20 years. Conga project is located in the northern Andean province of Cajamarca, and is developed by Newmont Mining Corporation, a US company, and the world's second largest gold mining firm. The indigenous protesters object the mining company plans to drain three pristine mountain lakes and replace them with reservoirs, and the massive quantities of toxic mine waste, (85.000 tones every day) that will be produced and that are likely to contaminate their natural water supplies, and the wetlands. However, in June and July 2012 the protests have been violently put down by the Peruvian government with 5 people losing their lives – including a 17-year-old boy, and dozen of others injured (Flowers, 2012; Environment News Service, 2012a). The Governmental repression took various forms. In July the Government declared state of emergency in the region. Earlier, in June, a representative of Humala's government threatened the women participating in a protest-march against Newmont gold mine project saying that all pregnant women will face jail time for protesting (Wade, 2012). Ridiculing the warning, dozen of pregnant women marched in protest on the streets in Cajamarca.

A number of international organizations expressed serious concerns about "the alarming escalation in the repression of free speech, police brutalities, and human rights violations related to extractive industry projects in Peru", and urged the government to put and end to these abuses. Signatures include Amazon Watch, Earthjustice, Earthworks, Friends of Earth, Mining Watch Canada, Rainforest Action Network, and the United Steelworkers (Environment News Service, 2012b).

Humala's government has to deal with 250 disputes over environment and natural resources in Peru, and this comes with a price: 10 lives lost since July 2012, that add to 174 people who have died in environmental conflicts during the government of his predecessor Alan Garcia (Wade, 2012).

Similarly tragic and worrisome news is coming from Bolivia. In recent fights over a silver mining project proposed by Compañía Minera Malku Khota (a subsidiary of the Canadian corporation South American Mining Corp) in Malku Khota region, a Quechua Indian was killed and other injured (Associated Press, 2012). As a result of these bloody events, the Bolivian President, Evo Morales, the first indigenous president of Bolivia, expressed his will to revoke the mining license and nationalize the rich silver deposits (Aljazeera, 2012) which sparked protests and opposition from the Canadian mining corporation (The Canadian Press, 2012) and threats with legal and diplomatic actions.

The two examples above might be extreme but they are current. They are actual example of struggles for environmental justice, which is an important part of the fabric of both popular grassroots environmentalism and struggle for civil rights in much of the world. Despite the different historical and socio-political context, these two cases of activism resemble the struggle against gold and silver mining project in Roșia Montană. As I will argue in this article, the environmental movement in Romania seems to have more in common with the environmental justice movements in the Global South in general, and in Latin America in particular, than with the environmental justice movements (or race environmentalism) in the United States.

While the environmental justice movement in the United States mainly arose from local waste disposal conflicts, resource extraction activities (mining, oil, forestry, biomass exports, etc.) are at the core of Latin American environmental justice conflicts. This is the case in Argentina and Chile, but also in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. 'Plunder' is one of the key words of these movements that do not necessarily call themselves environmental justice movements but do focus on the relation between social inequalities and the environment. These are sensitive issues in Latin American politics, so framing the mining debate in sacking, anti-dispossession and anti-colonialist terms appeals to Latin American social justice sensibilities (Carruthers, 2008). These features of the Latin American environmental justice movements contrast with the North American Environmental Justice tradition which is more focused on racial discrimination and intra-national justice.

As I mentioned before, the scope of my article is to show that environmental movement that opposes the cyanide based gold mining project in Roşia Montană is primarily an environmental justice movement, being the first of its kind in Romania. Although the movement does not have the proper language to describe itself explicitly as an environmental justice movement, my attempt is to show that it resembles in many ways the environmental and ecological justice struggles of indigenous people worldwide, and that it articulates its ethical and political claims around a multivalent concept of justice. In this regard, environmental and ecological justice can become an important frame for explaining the conflicts over environmental conditions, cultural and historical heritage preservation, scenic landscape, lands, identity, and ways of life in Roşia Montană, thus understanding the most significant environmental movement in Romania.

My research will contribute to an emerging effort to explore the promise and limit of environmental justice as a general umbrella/frame for popular mobilization, but also as a set of principles for analysis, interpretation, and policy. My hope is that by using this perspective I might offer a better explanation and understanding of the environmental movement in Romania that we might not otherwise capture.

Before proceeding to an analysis on movement's claims, discursive practices and actions, and before focusing on the ways the movement conceptualize and express justice, it is necessary to briefly review and present the most recent attempts to define and articulate the concepts of environmental and ecological justice. From the birth of the environmental justice movement in United States of America in early 1980, movements' actors and theorists alike have played an important role in shaping pluralist concepts of environmental and ecological justice.

Theoretically, environmental justice and ecological justice are concepts that belong to the field of political theory. In this regard, my research on the environmental movement Salvaţi Roşia Montană is a case of applied political theory. Despite a growing interest in the recent years in the field of political theory, the discipline remains concerned with doubts whether its reflections and developments can really be applied to politics and policy making in the real world. This concern is particularly important for the academics interested in environmental or political ecology issues, a recent field of investigation that is still struggling to find ways of making various prescriptive and normative reflection on nature and environment relevant for real politics and policy making. This problem still runs even through more applied reflections in contemporary political theory. In my research however, taking one area of applied normative political theory, the actual problem of environmental justice, I will argue that the questions normative political theory should be asking are the ones that arise most naturally from empirical study of discourses

and practices of the environmental movements. This approach will allow me to conduct an exploration of the normative logic embedded in the claims of the existing Save Roşia Montană environmental movement.

2. The Emergence of Environmental Justice Movements

The environmental justice movements made their appearance for the first time in the United States of America at the beginning of the 1980s, and it grew organically from struggles over local environmental issues, and from other social movements such as the civil rights movement (Cole and Foster, 2000), and past struggles over housing and labor (Novotny 2000). Acknowledging that environmental hazards, industrial pollution are inequitably distributed in the United States, with poor people, working class communities, particularly African-American, Native American, Latino and Asian-Pacific communities being more affected¹, the environmental justice movement soon became one of the fastest growing and diversified social movements. It managed to bring issues of environmental justice and environmental racism into national consciousness and influenced actions at the highest governmental level: in 1994, President Bill Clinton signed an Executive Order on Environmental Justice. As Cole and Foster noted “Fueling this recognition is a remarkable rise in grassroots activism communities across country. Thousands of activists in hundreds of communities are fighting for their children, their communities, their quality of life, their health – and for *environmental justice*” (Cole and Foster, 2000).

This movement put forward a new understanding of the environment that connects it with other concerns. It does not separate the problems of environmental destruction, environmental health from issues of racial discrimination. In this sense, the *environmental racism* is just another form of discrimination. Alongside race and ethnicity, other differences are shown to have importance on how environmental impact and hazards affect individuals and communities: socio-economic status, class, education, and gender. In the United States (but in Latin America as well), women often take the lead in environmental justice campaigns precisely because injustice affects them the most, but also their homes, their jobs, and their children’s health (DiChiro, 1998).

For many years, the research on environmental movements that has emerged since the 1970s in developed countries has described the demographic composition of these movements in terms of college-educated, suburban middle class. The lower-income, poor, marginal, and uneducated communities seemed to have no interest in environmental issues, as they are more concerned with issues of impoverishment and unemployment, affordable homes and healthcare. However, the emergence of environmental justice movements that are focused on critical environmental problems of poor, working-class, and predominantly ethnic communities is changing the assumption that these communities are indifferent toward environmental problems (Novotny, 2000). Moreover, the environmental justice movements brought on the scene of environmental contention various types of organizations that traditionally didn’t manifest a concern towards the environment: tenants’ associations, civil rights groups, labor unions, and various churches. Not only that they are new actors in environmental movements, but also they have articulated a new environmental discourse by framing the environment as a problem of injustice, racism, or inequality (Novotny, 2000).

¹ This inequality also suggests that other members of society disproportionately benefit at the expense of others.

Some authors (Novotny, 2000; Bullard and Johnson, 2000; McGurty, 2000 and Steger, 2007) present one case that is considered to have launched the environmental movement. It involved the protest of an African-American community in Warren County, North Carolina against a toxic waste dump. An electronic company dumped thirty-one thousand gallons of industrial toxic waste (polychlorinated biphenyls, or PCBs) along side roads. It was the largest illegal PCBs dumping in the nation's history. In December 1978, state official announced their decision to move the toxic waste at a landfill in Warren County, a rural area inhabited by African-Americans (nearly 75%) and the lowest per capita income in the state. The residents protested the construction of landfill fearing that the waste will contaminate their wells. After nearly four years of petitions, public hearings, and letters campaigns, after the first shipment of materials the locals turned to a campaign of civil disobedience reminiscent of civil rights movement. Arrest occurred daily for six weeks, while trucks kept on carrying the contaminated soil. Men, women, children and elderly alike lay on the ground in front of the trucks while the state police arrested the protesters and carried them away from the site. Civil rights leaders joined the local residents in protests. Some of them even got arrested, including representatives of the Congress for Racial Equality, and United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice. The participation of national civil rights leaders was not only beneficial for the confidence of local residents, but also made the protest in Warren County a definite moment in the emergence of the environmental justice movement (Novotny, 2000).

Another definitive moment in the birth of environmental justice movement took place in Love Canal, New York, when Lois Marie Gibbs, mother and housewife in the working class community found out that the school of her 8-year-old son and her entire neighborhood Love Canal, was build on a toxic waste dump site that begun to ooze toxic waste into the basements of homes and the school playground. With no experience in community activism, she led her community into a long battle against local, state and federal governments, until President Jimmy Carter eventually declared Love Canal a disaster area, evacuated 833 families and initiated a clean up project (Steger, 2007). Lois Marie Gibbs also joined the protests in Warren County (Novotny, 2000).

The two cases demonstrated that those who are socially or economically disadvantaged suffer more, and are more likely to be exposed to environmental hazards.

For accuracy, it is important to note that the struggles for environmental justice do not find its origins strictly in the environmental justice movement in United States. All over the world, but especially in the context of the debate of what is considered North and South debate on environmental issues and postcolonial environmentalism, people experienced and acted against environmental degradation and injustice for a long time (Steger, 2007).

3. Defining environmental justice

As the movements for environmental justice matured, diversified and made their appearance all over the world, the effort to define environmental justice become increasingly important.

Most descriptions and definitions of environmental justice are resolutely anthropocentric, extending social justice to include the right of all humans to a clean, safe, and sustaining environment. The main concern of the environmental justice movement is humans. Nature, wildlife, ecosystems, lands, mountains, lakes are rivers are of interest only to the extent that it affects or it is useful to humans. The centrality of human beings has both advantages and limits. On the one hand this anthropocentrism is the main source

of criticism from other environmentalists with eco-centric or bio-centric convictions, on the other hand it allows it to be incorporated into national constitutions, bill of rights (as for example in the case of South Africa), and to attract allies and actors from other movements for social equality (McDonald, 2002).

The issues of environmental justice appeared in official documents as early as 1987, when the report of the Brundtland Commission (the World Commission on Environment and Development) – a hallmark event in the environmental movement worldwide was published. In addition to the already famous definition of *sustainable development* as development “that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”, the Commission also recognized that “inequality is the planet’s main environmental problem” (WCED, 1987). Linking the two claims we may conclude that the intergenerational rights for the environment, the consideration of a just attitude towards future generations are a component of environmental justice discourse.

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines environmental justice as: “The fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, sex, national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies. EPA has this goal for all communities and persons across this Nation. It will be achieved when everyone enjoys the same degree of protection from environmental and health hazards and equal access to the decision-making process to have a healthy environment in which to live, learn, and work” (EPA, 2012).

In 1991, the United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice – one of the most influential civil rights movements that have been involved in struggles for environmental justice even since the Warren County case – organized the *First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit*. The proceedings of that meeting presented the following definition of environmental justice: “Environmental Justice – is the fair treatment of people of all races, cultures and income with respect to the development, implementation and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, programs, and policies. Fair treatment means that no racial, ethnic or socioeconomic group should bear a disproportionate share of the negative environmental consequences resulting from the operation of industrial, municipal, and commercial enterprises and from the execution of federal, state and local, and tribal programs and policies” (UCCCRJ, 1991).

The United States Department of Transportation defines three fundamental environmental justice principles for the Federal Highway Administration and the Federal Transit Administration as follows (US Department of Transportation, 2012):

- “To avoid, minimize, or mitigate disproportionately high and adverse human health and environmental effects, including social and economic effects, on minority populations and low-income populations;
- To ensure the full and fair participation by all potentially affected communities in the transportation decision-making process;
- To prevent the denial of, reduction in, or significant delay in the receipt of benefits by minority and low-income populations”.

The participants of the Central and Eastern European Workshop on Environmental Justice (Budapest, December 2003), defined Environmental Justice and injustice in the following ways: “A condition of environmental justice exists when environmental risks and hazards and investments and benefits are equally distributed with a lack of discrimination, whether direct or indirect, at any jurisdictional level; and when

access to environmental investments, benefits, and natural resources are equally distributed; and when access to information, participation in decision making, and access to justice in environment-related matters are enjoyed by all. An environmental injustice exists when members of disadvantaged, ethnic, minority or other groups suffer disproportionately at the local, regional (sub-national), or national levels from environmental risks or hazards, and/or suffer disproportionately from violations of fundamental human rights as a result of environmental factors, and/or denied access to environmental investments, benefits, and/or natural resources, and/or are denied access to information; and/or participation in decision making; and/or access to justice in environment-related matters” (Steger, 2007).

The following definition of environmental justice from the quarterly newsletter of the South African Environmental Justice Networking Forum (EJNF) captures these basic philosophical tenets and exemplifies the focus on human and democratic rights that is so central to environmental justice movements and literature worldwide: “Environmental justice is about social transformation directed towards meeting basic human needs and enhancing our quality of life—economic quality, health care, housing, human rights, environmental protection, and democracy. In linking environmental and social justice issues the environmental justice approach seeks to challenge the abuse of power which results in poor people having to suffer the effects of environmental damage caused by the greed of others. This includes workers and communities exposed to dangerous chemical pollution, and rural communities without firewood, grazing and water. In recognizing that environmental damage has the greatest impact upon poor people, EJNF seeks to ensure the right of those most affected to participate at all levels of environmental decision-making” (McDonald, 2002).

4. Defining ecological justice

As I have already mentioned earlier, one of the main criticisms brought to the environmental justice movement is their sole preoccupation with human beings, with human rights, and with human justice. The older environmental movement, focused on wilderness preservation and conservation, found itself under a prolonged attack from the environmental justice movement. Not only that the later does not support environmental issues that impact on human interest and rights, but conservationist groups have been criticized for being racist and classist (Sandler and Pezzullo 2007). In response to this criticism, mainstream international environmental organizations such as Sierra Club and Greenpeace have shifted towards environmental justice issues. In US and elsewhere the environmental justice movements have achieved a great success and prominence and doing so it challenged and transformed the environmental movement, especially with respect with its focus on wilderness and nonhuman nature. It even redefined the concept of *environment* to make it all about humans, communities, their interests, justice and rights.

Lois Gibbs, the main protagonist of the Love Canal incident and the founder of the antitoxins movement in US puts it clearly: “Over the past ten years the Movement for Environmental Justice has redefined the word environment. No longer does the media, the general public or our opponents see the environmental movement as one that is focused on open spaces, trees, and endangered species alone. They have finally got it! The Environmental Justice Movement is about people and the places they live, work, and play” (Gibbs, 1993).

Robert Bullard, academic and protagonist of the Warren County affair, considered to be the father of environmental racism movement, gives an almost identical definition:

“The environmental justice movement has basically redefined what environmentalism is all about. It basically says that the environment is everything: where we live, work, play, go to school, as well as the physical and natural world” (Errol Schweizer, 1999).

To overcome the limits of the exclusively anthropocentric preoccupations of the environmental justice movements, and new concept of justice was recently articulated, primarily in the academic, theoretical domain: ecological justice. The term seems to have been coined by Low and Gleeson in 1998. They presented it as follows: “The struggle for justice as it is shaped by the politics of the environment . . . has two relational aspects: the justice of the distribution of environments among peoples, and the justice of the relations between humans and the rest of the natural world. We term these aspects of justice: *environmental* justice and *ecological* justice. They are really two aspects of the same relationship (Low and Gleeson, 1998: 2).

Another exemplification of what it would mean to do justice to nature and non-human world comes from the work of Brian Baxter: “We must do right by other life-forms, but in a precise kind of way, namely by recognizing their claim to a fair share of the environmental resources which all life-forms need to survive and to flourish” (Baxter, 2005).

Baxter’s articulation of ecological justice extends the distributive approach within the liberal tradition to non-humans, and establishes two critical claims (Baxter, 2005):

1. that all non-humans, sentient and non-sentient, are members of the community of justice;
2. that all members of the community of justice are proper recipients of distributive justice with respect to environmental goods and bads – that is, to ecological justice.

The basis for a discussion regarding claims of justice in our relationship with the non-human, natural world is a straightforward observation: human beings have always had at least some concern to treat at least some of the other forms of life with which they share the environment with what they regard as due respect (Sylvan and Bennett 1994; Perlo 2003; Baxter, 2005). The basis for this respect and consideration varied across cultures, time and space. In various instances, either religious or secular, the humans have for long found reasons to adopt an attitude of concern towards at least some aspects of the non-human world, and to see it as a requirement of morality, righteous living to restrict their behavior in some ways to avoid impiety, sacrilege, inhumanity or cruelty (Baxter, 2005).

A softer discourse of ecological justice stresses the primacy of environment, natural world, and ecosystems as stages of life and human activities. Social needs, environmental benefits and economic opportunities must be understood within the limits imposed by the finitude of the natural life-supporting ecosystems. This approach grows from the sustainability concept defined by Agyeman (Steger, 2007): “the need to ensure a better quality of life for all, now and into the future, in a just and equitable manner, whilst living within the limits of supporting ecosystems” (Agyeman, 2002).

5. Reconceiving the *justice* in environmental justice and ecological justice

“What, exactly, is the ‘justice’ of environmental justice? What do activists and movements mean when they employ the term? And what is the relationship between environmental justice, which addresses environmental risks within human communities, and ecological justice, focused on the relationship between those human communities and the rest of the natural world? Do those who speak of environmental justice, and those who call for ecological justice, understand the concept of ‘justice’ in similar ways? Those are

my central questions, and the basic task of this book is to explore what is meant by justice in discussions of both environmental and ecological justice” (Schlosberg, 2007).

This quote opens Schlosberg’s seminal work *Defining Environmental Justice. Theories, Movements, and Nature* (2007), work which remains to this day the most definite and comprehensive theoretical attempt to define environmental and ecological justice.

This work was announced by the article *Reconceiving Environmental Justice: Global Movements and Political Theories*, published in 2004 in *Environmental Politics*. Analyzing what *justice* refers to when claimed by environmental justice movements, interpreting activist discourses in light of philosophical theories of justice, Schlosberg reached the conclusion that the justice demanded by global environmental justice movements is indeed threefold: 1) *equity* in the distribution of environmental risks; 2) *recognition* of diversity of the actors/participants and experiences in affected communities; 3) *participation* in the political processes which create and manage environmental policy.

Schlosberg argues that a thorough notion of global environmental justice need to be locally grounded, theoretically broad, and plural – encompassing issues of recognition, distribution, and participation. Later on, in 2007, Schlosberg identifies a fourth element to be an integrated part of the environmental justice movement: the *capability* approach. The capability approach is investigated further in *Indigenous Struggles, Environmental Justice, and Community Capabilities* (2010), published by Schlosberg and Carruthers in *Global Environmental Politics*. Schlosberg argues that for both environmental justice and ecological justice the concept of justice can be understood and described in the same ways, as a pluralist concept that refers to all four dimensions listed above: distribution, recognition, participation, and capabilities.

5.1. Justice as Distribution

In the past forty years of political theory, justice has been defined primarily as a problem of equity in the distribution of goods, be they material or social. This path of conceiving justice has been open by John Rawls in his classic book *A Theory of Justice* (1971). Rawls attempts to solve the problem of distributive justice by placing himself in the social contract tradition and by designing a thought experiment. For Rawls, in order to develop a right theory of justice, we need to place ourselves on an *original position* in which anyone can decide principles of just distribution from behind a *veil of ignorance*. This veil will essentially blind people to all the fact about themselves, social positioning, strengths and weaknesses that could influence what their notion of justice is: "no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities. The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance" (Rawls, 1971).

Ignorance of these details about oneself will lead to principles that are fair to all. If individuals do not know how they will end up, they are likely to don’t offer privileges to any group of people, but will be in their own interest to develop a scheme of justice that treats all fairly, adopting a strategy which would maximize the prospect of the least well-off. Moreover, they will come up with a notion of justice that everyone else could agree with: everyone would enjoy the same political rights as everyone else, and the distribution of economic and social inequality in the society should benefit everyone.

Rawls represents the focal point of liberal justice theory: fair distribution away from any substantive agreement on what we each believe as “good”. Following Rawls, Brian Barry develops in his book *Justice as Impartiality* a similar notion of justice: we should agree upon the rules of distributive justice while remaining impartial to different notions of good life individuals have (Barry, 1995). This particular approach to justice theory represent an impartial, proceduralist approach, considered to be the most popular conception of justice in academia (Schlosberg, 2007). This approach is distinct from a consequentialist approach that focuses more on the outcome of the distribution process, and from a substantive approach that is derived from a particular idea of what a good, just society should look like.

When it comes to extending this distributive approach to nature and non-human world (the distributive component of ecological justice), we first need to establish whether the concept of justice can apply to nature at all, as either the subject of justice or simply its recipient. Within liberal theory there are serious objections that nature can be a subject of justice. For most theorists in the liberal tradition, and for Rawls the nature is simply outside of the boundary of relationships that can be based on justice, as we cannot extend the contract argument to our relationships to forests or animals (Rawls, 1971). Barry’s theory of distributive justice also excludes the realm of non-humans, but not because we cannot enter in a contract with them, but because “justice cannot be predicated only of relations among creatures who are regarded as moral equals in the sense that they weight equally in moral scales” (Barry, 1999). Additional objections to extending the range of justice to non-human world arise naturally from liberal justice theories: justice requires a relationship among a group of being that cooperate voluntarily, justice involves an assignment of property rights, and it also requires reciprocity (Baxter, 2005). The ecological justice and a bio-centric perspective seem not to fit the liberal distributive justice paradigm. Biocentrism and the assignment of intrinsic value to nature is nothing but a *preference*, a conception of *what is good* that might not be shared by other members in the society – which should be kept apart from the procedural concept of distributive justice based on impartiality. However, a number of authors try to dispel the myth of liberal neutrality: liberalism itself, in theory or practice is not neutral. Schlosberg lists a few critical positions: Young argues that impartiality is a fiction, as long as we can only adopt situated, that is not universal, points of view; Attifield points out that liberal democracy in practice is not neutral on a number of issues, not just environmental one; Eckersley notes that liberalism is systematically biased against the interest of non-citizens such as future generations or non-human beings. To conclude on this, Schlosberg says that “liberal states are rarely impartial; instead, they advocate particular notions of good all the time. Spreading ‘democracy’ abroad, insisting on denying the institution of marriage to gay couples, favoring the market over social welfare, denying equal pay for women, etc. are policies, based on particular notions of the good, pushed by supposedly impartial liberal states. Given this consistent hypocrisy, a focus on ecological justice is no more illiberal than other state policies” (Schlosberg, 2007).

Schlosberg also describe a number of positions on ecological justice that expand the traditional liberal approach. One option is to invoke a *greater overlapping consensus* (all members of society or at least a majority embrace the ecological notion of good and vote for ecological beliefs). This would result in a ‘green neutralist liberalism’ or a ‘liberal ecologism’ (Bell, 2002, 2003). Other options would be to broaden the approaches to distribution and ecological justice: invoking justice towards future generations (Barry 1999; Norton 1999; De-Shalit, 1995); invoking an ‘ecological space’ a global resource

dividend (Pogge, 2002; Hayward, 2005); or expanding the community of justice to nature and non-human beings (Low and Gleeson, 1998; Dobson, 1998; Baxter, 2005).

5.2. Justice as Recognition

As Schlosberg points out, one of the key inadequacies of liberal justice theory is its sole focus on fair processes of distribution of goods, benefits, but also risks and bads (Schlosberg, 2004).

The focus on distribution has been criticized by other theorists, particularly by feminist political theorists such as Iris Young and Nancy Fraser. Iris Young argues that theories of distributive justice offer models and procedures to improve distribution, none of them actually examine the social, cultural, symbolic, and institutional conditions that are responsible for poor distribution in the first place. Young's point is that injustice is not solely based on inequitable distribution. The lack of recognition of group difference is part of the problem of injustice, and part of the reason for unjust distribution. The lack of recognition, manifested in various forms of insults, devaluation, and degradation and individual or group (cultural) level is an injustice because it harms people, and it is the foundation of distributive injustice. If Rawls and other liberal theorist of justice focus on ideal schemes and processes of distribution in liberal societies, theorists like Fraser and Young explores the actual, real impediments to such schemes and how they can be addressed (Schlosberg, 2004)

For Nancy Fraser, maldistribution and misrecognition are distinct, separate form of injustice. Misrecognition is tied to institutional subordination and inequity, the structural nature of the construction of subordinate and disrespected identities and communities is linked to the maldistribution experienced by them (Schlosberg, 2007).

The recognition is also an element of ecological justice. The concept of recognition can be applied to nature and non-human beings in several ways: we can recognize nature as part of our shared community, and include ourselves, and the rest of the natural world in an extended community of justice; we can recognize similarities such as sentience; we can recognize the integrity and continuity (Schlosberg, 2007).

5.3. Justice as Participation (Procedural Justice)

The third dimension of the concept of (environmental and ecological) justice is the so-called *procedural justice*, which is defined as a fair and equitable institutional process of the state, and which is concerned with the ability of individuals or communities to participate in the political or decision-making processes. According to theorists of justice like Young and Fraser, this dimensions follows naturally from, and it is tightly linked with the aspect of recognition. The lack of respect and recognition is associated with a decline in a person's membership and participation in the greater community, including the political, decisional or institutional order: if one is not recognized, one cannot participate; and if one cannot participate, one is not recognized. Therefore, democratic and participatory decision-making procedures are requirements for social justice – they simultaneously challenge institutional exclusion, the socio-cultural mechanisms of misrecognition, and the current patterns for an unjust distribution (Young, 1990).

6. Aspects of Environmental Justice in Save Roşia Montană Environmental Movement

The main hypothesis of my research is that the environmental movement that opposes the cyanide based gold mining project in Roşia Montană is primarily an

environmental justice movement, being the first of its kind in Romania. Although the movement does not have the proper language to describe itself explicitly as an environmental justice movement, my attempt is to show that it resembles in many ways the environmental and ecological justice struggles of indigenous people worldwide, and that it articulates its ethical and political claims around a multivalent concept of justice. I would like to argue that the Environmental Justice movement in Roșia Montană (Save Roșia Montană, SRM) articulates a concept of justice with three dimensions: distribution, recognition, and participation.

Located in the famous Golden Quadrilateral², the gold deposit that lies beneath the four mountains that surround the village of Rosia Montana is considered to be the largest known gold deposit in Europe. Keeping the proportions, the gold mine project proposed by Rosia Montana Gold Corporation, a subsidiary of Canadian junior mining company Gabriel Resources, will also be the biggest European gold and silver open pit mine.

The environmental conflicts and ecological political contentions appear and grow as consequences of economic development. At the most general level, the collapse of the Socialist bloc in 1989, and the restructuring of global capitalism itself, the rapid expansion and deepening reach of international capital results in overall environmental changes and damages. These changes do not remain unobserved and without response as segments of society get organized and engage in conflicts against the actors that are perceived to be responsible for environmental hazards, destruction and all associated social consequences.

Environmental conflicts are manifold throughout the world. Such conflicts often emerge as resistances and opposition to projects that restrict local communities' rights, access to natural resources, that degrade or carry the risk of degrading the resource base on which they depend and/or pose risks for human health, community life, cultural identity or cultural heritage. The struggles of peasants or indigenous populations against mining activities, building of dams, logging and deforestation; of artisanal fishermen against the threat of industrial fishing; and the defense of the communities living in coastal zones of mangroves against shrimp farming are examples of such conflicts over natural resources, rights, and livelihoods (Guha, 2000; Martinez-Alier, 2002; Peet and Watts, 2004).

The SRM movement has its origins in the first grass-roots attempts of the local people living in Rosia Montana and its vicinities to oppose the mining project proposed by Gabriel Resources. The drive behind SRM movement is a non-profit association Alburnus Maior. It was founded in September 2000 by the inhabitants and owners from Rosia Montana. At the time, Alburnus Maior represented 300 families from Rosia Montana, and 100 more from the neighboring village Bucium. All the members of the association had initially one thing in common: the opposition of the mining project and the refusal to sell their properties. In time the number of members has decreased as a consequence of the relocation and resettlement plan put in place by Rosia Montana Gold Corporation. However, the voices against the gold mine project spread and multiplied. As with other environmental justice movements from United States or South America, SRM movement started as a *not-in my-back-yard* (NYMBY) type of resistance from a local community. However, the magnitude of the gold mine project and its environmental, social and political implications soon raised interest to numerous other actors that started to express their opposition to the plans put forward by Rosia Montana Gold Corporation: local, national and international environmental NGOs such as Green Peace, World Wide Fund

² The Golden Quadrilateral is a region in the Apuseni Mountains which hosts almost 70 gold deposits of epithermal or porphyry copper, silver and gold type.

for Nature, Friends of Earth; academic and scientific bodies like Universities or the Romanian Academy; Churches, workers' unions, football and sport supporters, politicians, intellectuals, artists, and citizens.

As other environmental justice movements worldwide, SRM movement, its discourses, strategies and tactics deployed over time can be analyzed using the three aspects of justice: distributional, recognition, and participation.

The distributional aspect of environmental justice refers to the unfair distribution of economic "goods" vs. environmental "bads". Probably the most common argument of injustice refers to the fact that the Canadian company, the foreign investors will benefit most from the gold mine project in Rosia Montana in a short period of time, while the local community is left with the environmental and social burden for an indefinite (relocation and resettlement of families and entire communities, loss of resources, pollution, loss of patrimony, cost of maintenance) for an indefinite period of time. In the case of Save Roșia Montană movement, the language of distributional injustice arguments takes many forms: it opposes the Developed World (where the capital and the Corporation is originated) vs. Developing World (a rural, undeveloped area in Romania where the gold and silver deposits are located); Transnational corporations (international capital) vs. impoverished local rural community; resource grabbing by foreign corporations vs. slow pace sustainable development (agritourism and valorification of cultural patrimony, small farming, wood processing); job creation vs. environmental and cultural patrimony preservation; the predicted economic and financial gains that the local community and Romanian state will have vs. low royalties, low participation of the State, few workplaces and even fewer available for the locals vs. expats. The distributional aspect is discussed even in terms of intergenerational justice by comparing short term benefits for present generations versus long term costs, environmental burden, and a long term, sustainable development of the Apuseni region through tourism and agriculture.

The recognition aspect refers to the local community, the cultural identity of locals living in the vicinity of affected areas: Rosia Montană – located in Țara Moților, an ethnographical region, local people as known as "moți". The region has a long history of fighting for political, economical and social rights, with movements such as the Revolt of Horea, Cloșca and Crișan (1784-1785), and the Romanian part of the Revolution of 1848 having their origins here. Moții are said to be a very proud, dignified, and self-determined people. This cultural identity has been constantly played on by the movement in the communication campaign or during various events such as the environmental activist festival FânFest or protest events. The focus on "community" is central as it is situated at the core of environmental justice issue. The community of Rosia Montana and neighboring area has become an important battlefield in this environmental conflict. The conflict itself fractured and already impoverished rural community. The rupture runs sometimes through families. A significant part of the community was already displaced and resettled in a newly build neighborhood at the periphery of Alba Iulia. Yet actors in both sides of the conflict refer constantly to the community. In their efforts to gain legitimacy, to strengthen their positions and arguments, they all frame different versions of the local community: the people, their identity, their land, cultural traditions, ways of life, identity and tradition as miners, heritage, their interests (economic, cultural, and environmental), their rights. The community is important because it can be framed in different ways: the community can be a locus of knowledge, a site of regulation and management, a source of identity and a repository of tradition and heritage, a source of resistance and political activism (an important part of a social movement), an embodiment

of institutions, bearer of rights (property rights, assembly), an object of state control, corporate manipulation etc. (Watts and Peer, 2004).

The participation (procedural) aspect of the environmental justice movement has been extremely important for SRM movement, and arguably one of the most successful so far. Procedural justice is a prerequisite for distributive justice. It requires public participation in public decision making: “use all civic and legal means to ensure that the licensing procedure for Rosia Montana Mining Project comply with all relevant legislation on EIA (environmental impact assessment), on the authorization of construction works, protection of cultural patrimony, as well as fully comply with the public’s right to access to information, public participation, and access to justice” (SRM Press release, 2011). Three main strategies of involvement: access to information, access to justice, and public participation.

During the last 10 years of activity over 2000 request for information from Romanian authorities (based on Law 544/2001 on Free Access to Public Information). Additional requests have been sent to European Parliament, European Commission, Government of Canada, and private financial institutions.

Strategic litigation (since 2003), always against state institutions: resulted in annulment of permits, archeological discharged certificates, urban zoning plans. This has been the most successful strategy in delaying or stopping the environmental permitting procedure, but also in revealing the numerous illegal aspects of the mining project, and hence the need for a political resolution that could move the plans ahead despite the legal issues. Another example: the EIA procedure have been contested at the Compliance Committee of UN Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters.

Public participation involves advocacy efforts to influence political decisions, policymaking processes (at all levels/scales: local, national, regional, international, and European level), and participation in public debates, petitions, protest events, and advocacy activities. To name just a few examples of relevant advocacy actions: 1. advocacy to ban cyanide use in gold mining activities in Romania (supported by the Cyanide Free Romania Coalition) is ongoing yet not successful to date (Hungary passed a similar law in December 2009); 2. advocacy to ban cyanide use at the European level (in 2010 European Parliament adopted a resolution calling for a total ban of cyanide in ore processing, recommendation unfortunately not followed by the Commission); 3. Romanian Mining Law, and Romanian constitution – fighting the amendments that would make possible forced expropriation of local people that are not willing to sell their properties and thus are blocking the mining project.

7. Conclusions

The SRM movement can be described as an environmental justice movement that successfully articulates claims for more justice and civic participation in environmental and social issues. All three aspects of justice: distribution, recognition, and participation have been drives for public mobilization against the gold mine.

A mainstream environmentalism opposition to the Rosia Montana gold mining project would fail to pose a sufficient challenge to the developers, therefore the Save Rosia Montana environmental movement engaged into environmental justice and social justice debates. This approach become a necessity, almost a survival strategy for the movement, as the corporate promoters of the project were very good at constructing a variety of an environmental justice argument in a way that appeared to ameliorate the ethical and environmental problem.

The theoretical and conceptual framework of environmental justice is extremely important as it allows us to describe and analyze the environmental, ecological, and justice claims of Roşia Montană environmental movement around the four components, thus showing that it can be best understood as an environmental justice movement that resembles the Latin America indigenous struggles over environment and natural resources (as opposed to North American struggle over environmental racism and justice), and that it articulates a pluralistic demand for environmental and ecological justice.

This conceptual framework could also allow us to describe and analyze the framings of the most important issues addressed by the movement itself, but also to explore the ideological positions within the movement. The theoretical perspective of framing is necessary for understanding the politicization of the environment in the environmental justice movement. Framing is the way that the leaders and actors in a movement assign meaning to and interpret problems in such a way as to mobilize participants. Framing is a part of what is described by some scholars as a dynamic process by which a movement and its struggle for social change is connected with a larger set of cultural values, beliefs, and practices. What distinguishes framing from other parts of a political movement is that it encompasses the culture and even the language that is used in a movement.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Agyeman, J. (2002), *Constructing Environmental Injustice: Transatlantic Tales*. *Environmental Politics* 3 (autumn);
- Appiah, A., Benhabib, S., Young, I., Fraser, N. (2007), *Justice, Governance, Cosmopolitanism, and the Politics of Difference. Reconfigurations in a Transnational World*, Berlin, Forschungsabteilung der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin;
- Barry, Brian (1995), *Justice as Impartiality*, Oxford, Oxford University Press;
- Barry, Brian (1999), *Rethinking Green Politics*, London, Sage Publications;
- Baxter, Brian (2005), *A theory of Ecological Justice*, London, Routledge;
- Bullard, R.D.; Johnson, G.S. (2000), "Environmental Justice: Grassroots Activism and Impact on Public Policy Decisions Making" in *Journal of Social Issues* 56(3);
- Cole, L.W.; Foster, S.R. (2000), *From the Ground up: Rnvironmental racism and the Rise of the Environmental Justice Movement*, New York, New York University Press;
- Di Chiro, Giovanna (1998), "Environmental Justice from the Grassroots: Reflections on History, Gender, and Expertise" in Faber, D. (ed.) *The Struggle for Ecological Democracy*;
- Dryzek, John et al (2003), *Green States and Social Movements. Environmentalism in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Norway*, New York, Oxford University Press;
- Faber, Daniel (1998), *The Struggle for Ecological Democracy. Environmental Justice Movements in the United States*, New York, The Guilford Press;
- Gibbs, L. (1993), "Celebrating ten years of triumph" in *Everyone Backyard* 11, no. 2;
- Heijden van der Hein-Anton (2010), *Social Movements, Public Spheres and the European Politics of the Environment. Green Power Europe?*, Palgrave Macmillian;
- Humphrey, Mathew (2007), *Ecological Politics and Democratic Theory. The Challenge to the Deliberative Ideal*. New York, Routledge;

- Low, Nicholas; Gleeson, Brendan (1998), *Justice, Society and Nature: An Exploration of Political Ecology*, New York, Routledge;
- McDonald, David (Ed.) (2002), *Environmental Justice in South Africa*, Ohio, Ohio University Press;
- McGurty, E.M. (2000), "Warren County, NC and the Emergence of the Environmental Justice Movement: Unlikely Coalitions and Shared Meanings" in *Local Collective Actions. Society and Natural Resources* 13;
- Miller, Jr., G. Tyler (2003), *Environmental Science: Working With the Earth* (9th ed.). Pacific Grove, California, Brooks/Cole;
- Novotny, P. (2000), *Where we Live, Work and Play: The Environmental Justice Movement and the Struggle for a New Environmentalism*, Westport, CT: Praeger;
- Nussbaum, Martha (2000), *Women and the Human Development: the Capabilities Approach*, Oxford, Oxford University Press;
- Nussbaum, Martha (2004), "Beyond Compassion and Humanity: Justice for Nonhuman Animals" in Sustain and Nussbaum (eds.), *Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions*, Oxford, Oxford University Press;
- Nussbaum, Martha (2006), *Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press;
- Peet, Richard; Watts, Michael (eds.) (1996), *Liberation Ecologies. Environment, Development, Social Movements*, London and New York, Routledge;
- Peritore, N. Patrick; Roper, Steven D. (1999) "Romania: Candidate Democracy, Vulnerable Environment" in *Third World Environmentalism: Case Studies from the Global South*, Gainesville, University Press of Florida;
- Rawls, John (1971), *A Theory of Justice*, Harvard University Press;
- Ritchie, Jane; Lewis, Jane (2003), *Qualitative Research Practice. A Guide for Social Science Student and Researchers*, London, Sage Publications;
- Rootes, C. (2002), "Global visions; global civil society and the lessons of European environmentalism" in *Voluntas* 13 (4);
- Rootes, C. (ed.) (2003), *Environmental Protest in Western Europe*, Oxford, Oxford University Press;
- Sandler, Ronald; Pezzullo, Phaedra (2007); *Environmental Justice and Environmentalism. The Social Justice Challenge to the Environmental Movement*, Cambridge and London, MIT Press;
- Schlosberg, David (2004), "Reconceiving Environmental Justice: Global Movements and Political Theories" in *Environmental Politics*, Vol.13, No.3, Autumn 2004;
- Schlosberg, David (2007), *Defining Environmental Justice. Theories, Movements, and Nature*, New York, Oxford University Press;
- Schlosberg, David; Carruthers, David (2010), "Indigenous Struggles, Environmental Justice, and Community Capabilities" in *Global Environmental Politics*, 10:4;
- Schweizer, Errol (1999), "Environmental Justice. An Interview with Robert Bullard" in *Earth First! Journal*, <http://www.ejnet.org/ej/bullard.html>, retrieved 12 July, 2012;
- Steger, Tamara (2007), *Making the Case for Environmental Justice in Central and Eastern Europe*, Budapest, Central European University;
- Young, Iris Marion (1990), *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, Princeton University Press.

THE UNCONVENTIONAL HYDROCARBONS UPSURGE: ECONOMIC, ENVIRONMENTAL AND GEOPOLITICAL IMPACT

*Radu DUDĂU**

Abstract. *The present paper discusses the economic, environmental, and geopolitical consequences of the ongoing unconventional hydrocarbons “revolution” in North America. It offers a conceptual framework and attends to the contentious issues surrounding the environmental and social acceptability of shale gas. It explains the technological and financial specifics of shale operations, and derives the geopolitical implications of this game-changing process, under the conservative assumption that the upsurge will not be exportable in any significant measure before the end of the current decade. Eventually, the prospect of the Romanian shale gas exploration and production is discussed.*

Keywords: *shale gas, shale oil, unconventional hydrocarbons, energy security, energy policies, energy geopolitics*

1. Introduction

Unconventional hydrocarbons refer to unconventional oil and unconventional natural gas. It is convenient to define them separately. *Unconventional gas* refers to natural gas resources trapped in geological formations of low permeability (coals, shale, and tight sands) that necessitate special technologies for extraction. These gas resources differ from the “conventional” gas in being diffuse and continuous accumulations, usually very deep underground, and spread over large areas. Unconventional oil refers to extra-heavy oil contained in bituminous deposits (“tar sands”) and to *shale oil* and *tight oil*¹, but also to kerosene (a chemical precursor of petroleum) also known as *oil shale* – not to be confused with shale oil – and synthetic oil produced from coal or natural gas.

Among the unconventional hydrocarbons, none has made the kind of economic, political, and strategic impact that “shale gas” has in North America. Made possible by an innovative combination of two preexistent technologies – hydraulic fracturing and directional drilling – the “shale gas revolution” is considered by some “the most significant development in the energy industry since coal was replaced by oil as the

* PhD student, National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Faculty of Communication and Public Relations, Bucharest, Romania, e-mail: radu.dudau@gmail.com. “Beneficiary of the „Doctoral Scholarships for a Sustainable Society” Project , project co-financed by the European Union through the European Social Fund, Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources and Development 2007-2013”.

¹ As defined by Leonardo Maugeri, “Shale oil reservoirs are rich with clay and fissile, meaning they split in layers where the presence of clay stone is massive. These layers may stretch horizontally for hundreds and thousands of miles. Unlike shale formations, tight oil formations are made of siltstone (a mixture of quartz and other minerals, predominately dolomite and calcite, but many others may be present) or mudstone without a lot of clay in the reservoir” (Maugeri, 2013: 2)

principal fuel for transport in the 1920s” (Riley, 2013: 1). It is indeed a “game changer”, in that it has already reversed trends in the global energy system that only a few years ago seemed inexorable, such as tightening oil markets and an increasing concentration of the oil and gas sources. The United States has for the last four years been the world number one natural gas producer, passing Russia, and is forecasted to surpass Saudi Arabia’s oil output by 2020, according to IEA’s World Energy Outlook (2012). Apart from the implications upon the global energy markets and trade, the process has ample consequences upon international political and security arrangements.

This paper first discusses the technological and economic aspects that led to the “shale gas revolution.” It then elaborates on its environmentally controversial aspects, and ends up delineating the multifarious geopolitical implications of significant unconventional hydrocarbons production. Eventually, Romania’s prospects for shale gas production in the post-Nabucco era are discussed.

2. The shale gas revolution

Seldom has a technological breakthrough achieved the commercial success and the political and strategic reverberations in a wider sense that *hydraulic fracturing* (known as *fracking* in the industry’s lingo) has. In a matter of few years it has propelled the U.S. to the status of leading world gas producer (Table 1).

Table 1. Top Natural Gas Producers (2011)

Country	billion cubic meters (bcm)
United States	651.3
Russia	602.0
Canada	160.5
Iran	151.5
Qatar	146.8

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2012)

From a country deeply concerned about its energy security, fracking turned America into a virtually energy self-reliant economy, with the prospect of becoming a world leader in oil and gas production, as well as exporter over the coming two decades. The shale gas revolution has led to a resurgence of the U.S. industrial competitiveness in the energy-intensive sectors, such as the steelmaking and petrochemical industries, due to the plentiful and cost cheaply supplies of natural gas. It has also impacted on the energy environment of the European Union, directly affected the business model of Gazprom, and stirred serious concerns among the OPEC producers about their future market shares and price levels.

3. The technology

The shale gas development was possible due to the fruitful combination of two pre-existent technologies: directional drilling and hydraulic fracturing². The latter is a technique used in the conventional oil and gas production since the 1950s and consists in high-pressured injection of a fluid (usually a mix of water and other chemicals) in the well in order to raise the recovery factor (i.e., the proportion of the extracted oil and gas) of

² Two other auxiliary technologies are just as important: the capacity to pump large volumes of fracking fluid at high pressures over long distances through small diameter casings, and multi-well pads, i.e. the ability to drill multiple directional wells from the spot on the surface.

“conventional” reservoirs by increasing their pressure³. As for directional drilling, its application began in the early 1980s, favored by improvements in the drilling technology – especially downhole telemetry and drilling motors. Importantly, the same technological recipe applies to shale oil production. As noticed in U.S. Energy Information Agency 2011 report on shale gas production, “the advent of large-scale shale gas production did not occur until Mitchell Energy and Development Corporation experimented during the 1980s and 1990s to make deep shale gas production a commercial reality in the Barnett Shale in North-Central Texas. As the success of Mitchell Energy and Development became apparent, other companies aggressively entered this play so that by 2005, the Barnett Shale alone was producing almost half a trillion cubic feet per year of natural gas. As natural gas producers gained confidence in the ability to profitably produce natural gas in the Barnett Shale and confirmation of this ability was provided by the results from the Fayetteville Shale in North Arkansas, they began pursuing other shale formations, including the Haynesville, Marcellus, Woodford, Eagle Ford and other shale” (EIA, 2011: 1).

It is at this point useful to clarify in more detail the terminology in use. What is *shale gas*, in the first place? A useful answer has been provided by the International Energy Agency 2012 report, *Golden Rules for a Golden Age of Gas*: “Shale gas is natural gas contained within a commonly occurring rock classified as shale. Shale formations are characterized by low permeability, with more limited ability of gas to flow through the rock than is the case with a conventional reservoir. These formations are often rich in organic matter and, unlike most hydrocarbon reservoirs, are typically the original source of gas, *i.e.* shale gas is gas that has remained trapped in, or close to, its source rock” (IEA, 2012b: 18).

Shale gas is but one species in the richer “fauna” of unconventional natural gas, which also includes *coalbed methane* (gas contained in coalbeds, typically present in coal mines), and *tight gas* (gas contained in various sorts of low-permeability geological formations, of which argillaceous shale are one subtype). Notice, however, that shale gas differs from conventional gas not in chemical structure, but in its container geological rock formation, which accordingly necessitates a different technological approach.

In order to perform fracking, a horizontal well is drilled in the shale rock formation, which typically lies at depth of 1,500 to 6,000 meters, spread out blanket-wise, over large areas underground. Then, by pumping massive quantities of *fracturing fluid* (water, sand, salt, emollient, acids, etc) into the wellbore at very high pressure, cracks in the shale rock are caused. The fluid permeates the cracks and keeps them open with the help of a “proppant” – sand or ceramic particles that prevent the fractures from closing back. Thus, the “propped” cracks allow the gas molecules trapped in the shale rock to flow into the well and thus be extracted. The precise location of fractures is calculated and strictly controlled by perforations in the cased wellbore at the right intervals. From the same location on the ground surface (*drilling pad*) many wells can be drilled directionally (obliquely and then horizontally). Thus, a single surface pad allows for multiple wells to be drilled, thus reducing both the surface footprint and the operational costs.

³ As pointed out by Nersessian (2007: 187), “the overall average recovery factor for oil fields is only about one-third (natural gas fields have higher recovery factors). Thus, when a well that relies on the natural drive of the reservoir goes “dry”, about two-thirds of the oil is still in the ground”.

4. The economics of fracking

“In 2000, shale gas was 2 percent of the U.S. natural gas supply; by 2012, it was 37 percent” (Mufson, 2012: 1). In absolute terms, American shale gas production jumped from about 11 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2000 to 135 bcm in 2010, or 23 percent of the entire American gas production (EIA, 2011: 2). The EIA 2012 *Annual Energy Outlook* puts the unproved technically recoverable resource of shale gas in the U.S. at 482 trillion cubic feet (13.6 trillion cubic meters, Tcm). By 2035 shale gas production is projected to increase from 141 bcm in 2010 (23 percent of U.S. gas production) to 385 bcm in 2035 (49 percent) (EIA, 2012: 1). In 2010, the United States surpassed Russia as the world number one gas producer. The IEA 2012 World Energy Outlook forecasts that by 2020 the U.S. will overtake Saudi Arabia as the world largest oil producer, thanks to its huge tight oil reserves, and that by 2030 it will have ceased depending on external oil supplies, instead becoming a net oil exporter (IEA, 2012: 1).

Outside the United States, shale gas production has taken place in Canada, where the five large Western Canada shale plays contain a total of 1,323 trillion cubic feet (37 Tcm) of unproved reserves (EIA, 2011: I-1). In 2010, Canada’s shale gas production was 60 bcm (IEA, 2012: 64). What is relevant, though, is that shale gas is quite a widespread natural resource, on all continents. Mexico and Argentina in South America, Great Britain, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine in Europe, China in Asia, and Australia have significant potential resources, and the governments have shown a clear interest in developing shale gas plays.⁴ The significance of this potential abundance will be shortly elaborated upon. In any event, it must be pointed out that so far unconventional gas other than from shale has been coalbed methane produced in China and Australia – about 10 bcm and 5 bcm per year, respectively (IEA, 2012: 64).

Let us first look at the economic upside of the shale gas revolution. First, it has considerably raised the degree of energy security in the U.S., putting the country on a path of energy self-reliance. For decades in a row America was the world prime oil importer, guzzling up about a quarter of total production. For natural gas, the mid-2000s were perceived as a period of chronic deficiency. For example, in October 2005, Andrew Liveris, CEO of the American giant Dow Chemical, complained about the tightness and volatility of the domestic natural gas market: while the gas price had been \$2 per million Btu (Mbtu) in 1999, it jumped to \$6 in February 2005, then to \$10 in the summer and to \$12 in the aftermath of the Hurricane Katrina; by October 2005 it reached \$14 per Mbtu (C&EN, 2005: 1). In 2013, the price was hovering around the \$4 mark, after a slow growth from under \$2 per Mbtu in the summer of 2012 (EIA, 2013). By contrast, on Europe’s cheapest market, the UK, natural gas is traded at the National Balancing Point Hub at around \$11 per Mbtu. The current international gas price spread is shown in Table 2.

One effect of this remarkably stable pattern is the competitiveness gain for the American energy-intensive industries compared to the EU and even to the labor-intensive markets of Asia and South America. Michael Birnbaum (2013) indicates the almost irresistible appeal that the American economic environment offers at present to the major petrochemical and steel companies in Europe, which use gas both as a power source and as feedstock. BASF, the German petrochemical colossus, channeled more than \$5.7 billion in new investments in the U.S., while steelmaking giants such as ArcelorMittal

⁴ As explained by Dianne Rahm (2011: 2975), “The term ‘play’ is used by the oil and gas industry to denote a specific geographical area that is targeted for exploration because of the belief that there is an economic quantity of natural gas to be found there”.

have been warning both EU decision-makers and national governments to cut the costs of energy prices in Europe as a measure in support of maintaining jobs. Moreover, the latter company announced investment plans for about \$400 million in North and South America until the end of 2013 (Economic Times, 2013: 1)⁵. Besides, the American domestic consumers enjoy low prices for heating.

The tight and volatile gas market of the mid-2000s in America led to large investments in LNG regasification capacities along the Gulf of Mexico coast, intent on tapping into the increasing supplies of Qatari LNG. Against that background, the sudden increase of domestic shale gas production stopped those LNG imports, to the effect that considerable LNG volumes were diverted toward the European and Asian LNG markets. This in itself has had profound and multiple effects upon Europe's natural gas sector. The oversized LNG supply that flooded the West European LNG regasification terminals⁶ by the end of the 2010s arrived just as the effects of the economic crisis dumped industrial activity. The German "denuclearization" decision of 2011 complicated the forecasts, since the diminishing nuclear power was to be replaced by supplementary gas-powered electricity generation. All in all, a "gas glut" had built up in Western Europe, of which a sizeable part was traded on Northern Europe's spot markets: the National Balancing Point (UK) and the Title Transfer Facility (Netherlands). The result of the hub-based "gas-on-gas" pricing was a lowering by about one third on average of the gas price, as compared with the long term contracts (LTCs) used by Gazprom and Statoil.

Table 2. *Natural Gas Prices Worldwide in October 2012*

Country	\$/Mbtu
U.S. (Henry Hub)	3.50
Europe	11.58
Japan	16.65

Source: World Bank and EIA, compiled by Berzins (2013, 5).

But yet another significant phenomenon occurred, albeit unintended from the EU's vantage point: a steep raise of American coal exports to Europe, more than 120 percent from 2009 to 2012 (EIA 2012b, 207). Two factors have favored this evolution: first, the cheap natural gas on the U.S. market replaced coal consumption in the domestic energy mix, thus making available massive quantities of high-quality coal for export. Second, the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) (the "cap-and-trade" system designed to limit and reduce GHGs emissions by putting a price on each tone of emissions) has

⁵ In the presentation of a position paper by the German Advisory Council on the Environment (*Sachverständigen Rat für Umweltfragen*, SRU, 2013), Karin Holm-Müller downplayed the significance of the competitiveness advantage that shale gas offers to the U.S. economy: "The competitiveness of the U.S. economy does not stem from fracking; only in very few industries energy prices have a significant impact on its competitiveness. In most industries, for instance in engineering, energy costs account only for 2 percent of total production costs;" "One should bear in mind that compared to the euro, the U.S. dollar lost 30% of its value since 2002. This fact provides a much better explanation for the increased U.S. competitiveness than does fracking gas" (EurActiv, 2013: 1).

⁶ According to LNG Europe (2012), the following European countries have operating LNG regasification terminals: Belgium (1), UK (4), France (3), Spain (6), Italy (2), Netherlands (1), Portugal (1), and Greece (1). Poland is close to finalize construction at the Swinoujscie LNG terminal – June 2014, according to *Hydrocarbons-Technology.com*, 2013.

virtually collapsed due to the very low price of the emission “allowances” traded on the market, to the effect that there is at present no serious fiscal penalty in place to help more environmentally-friendly hydrocarbons, such as natural gas, withstand the price competition with high-emissions coal. The argument is well put by Crooks and Pfeiffer (2012: 1): “the surge in transatlantic trade has emerged because *U.S. and European power companies are facing opposite incentives* in the competition between gas and coal-fires plants. In the U.S., the glut of natural gas caused by the shale revolution has driven prices to a 10-year low, and pushed the share of the country’s power generated by coal to its lowest for 40 years. In Europe, natural gas is generally sold on contracts linked to the oil price, which is still relatively strong, and it is often more expensive as a source of power than cheap U.S. coal” (My emphasis).

As such, the *shale gas revolution* resulted in increased coal consumption in the EU, further depressing the gas demand in the main market of power generation. Besides, electricity demand itself is at a low point in recession-hit Europe, also as a result of energy-saving measures.

Further along the causal network of the European energy system, the gas glut has also impacted upon Gazprom’s contracts and business model. The Russian company was compelled to make price discounts to its main West European clients, such as Germany’s E.ON and RWE or Italy’s Edison (Ria Novosti, 2013: 1). The price corrections also resulted from settlements in arbitration courts on compensations demanded by European utilities for losses due to the gas price differential between LTC-based and spot-based transactions.

The booming shale gas production in the U.S. has pushed the prices so low that the very economic basis of the industry is in doubt. The gas producers are therefore looking to export a good part of their growing output in the form of LNG. Indeed, no less than 21 export application had been submitted to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) as of January 2013: “All but four involved the export o LNG to both FTA⁷ and non-FTA countries. If all the projects were approved, the total volume of LNG proposed for export – at 29.21 billion cubic feet per day – would comprise 44 percent of daily U.S. natural gas production in 2012” (Berzins, 2013: 10).

To date, DOE granted only two permissions: First, in May 2011, to Cheniere Energy, pending completion of its Sabine Pass (Louisiana) terminal in 2015-2016; Sabine Pass is authorized to export 2.2 bcf/d to non-FTA countries that include large LNG consumers of Europe and Asia. Second, in May 2013 the Freeport facility in Texas was authorized to export 1.4 bcf/d for the next 20 years to FTA and non-FTA consumers (Assis, 2013: 2).

It is however unlikely that DOE will grant many other permits, given the domestic debate surrounding the issue of LNG exports. The debate is framed as a question of national interest. On the one side of the debate are the gas companies and their financial backers, who see in exports to more lucrative markets a way to boost production; on the

⁷ “FTA countries” are those with which the U.S. has signed a free trade agreement (FTA). The American law presumes that exports to FTA countries are deemed to be consistent with the public interest; therefore such applications are to be granted without delay. For non-FTA countries, supplementary hearings are required in order to check compliance with the national interest. As pointed out by Berzins (2013: 8), “in 2012, the U.S. had signed FTAs with nineteen countries: Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, Jordan, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Oman, Peru, and Singapore”.

other side are industrial consumers, who see in the low prices of the currently over-supplied market a fundamental source of international competitiveness, and defenders of “energy independence,” who oppose sending away valuable domestic resources that have not properly “internalized” their true costs – in particular, the intensive water use (Ebinger, Massy and Avarasala, 2012: 3).

A study by NERA Economic Consulting, commissioned by the DOE and published in December 2012 (NERA 2012), argues that LNG exports will have net benefits for the American economy (employment opportunities, trade deficit reduction, coal replacement, and enhanced national security), while leading to only marginal price increases (about 12 percent). But there is also a more strategically-minded take on the issue, exemplified in the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton’s “energy diplomacy” speech at Georgetown University on October 18, 2012: “We want to see countries grow and have stronger economies, but also because energy monopolies create risks. Anywhere in the world, when one nation is overly dependent on another for its energy, that can jeopardize its political and economic independence. It can make a country vulnerable to threats and coercion. And that’s why NATO has identified energy security as a key security issue of our time. It’s also why we created the U.S.-European Union Energy Council to deepen our cooperation on strategic energy issues. *It’s not just a matter of economic competition, as important as that is. It’s also a matter of national and international security*” (Clinton, 2012, my emphasis).

Thus, in the former Secretary of State’s view, the U.S. foreign energy relations ought to be shaped also in light of strategic considerations, privileging Washington’s friends and strategic partners. Indeed, this take is particularly relevant to America’s East European allies, as their energy dependence on a monopolist supplier is much higher than the EU average. Ironically, however, potential American LNG exports cannot reach them directly, because of the geographic restrictions posed by congested tanker traffic through the Bosphorus. But the indirect impact of the shale gas revolution upon Gazprom’s business model is already obvious, as it erodes both its European market share and its supply contracts. More will be said about the geopolitical aspects of unconventional oil and gas in section 7.

5. The financial characteristics of fracking

There are two kinds of controversies surrounding the shale gas revolution: a less ample one, related to the financial aspects of the industry: critics accuse, more or less radically, a bubble of the shale gas production that they presume will be short-lived and lead many companies to bankruptcy. The second one, much more developed and complexly branched out, concerns the environmental effects, actual or presumed, of hydraulic fracturing, and the widespread international activism and contestation against this technology by coalitions of NGOs and local communities. Let us take them in turn.

The critique of fracking’s financial model is, basically, that companies have had to operate under large capital debts in order to finance their expensive equipment and operational expenses; moreover, the swift decline rate in well productivity – typically just one year to drop to as little as 10 percent of the *initial production during the first 30 days* (IP30) – is compounded by the very low prices per Mbtu. As put by Wolf Richter (2012: 2): “The economics of fracking are horrid. All wells have decline rates where production drops over time. But instead of decades for traditional wells, decline rates in horizontal fracking are measured in weeks and months: production falls off a cliff from day one and continues for a year or so until it levels out at about 10% of initial production. To be in the

black over its life under these circumstances, a well in the Barnett Shale would have to sell its production for about \$8 per million Btu, pricing models have shown.

At today's price of \$2.43 per million Btu at the Henry Hub—though up 28% from the April [2012] low—drilling is destroying capital at an astonishing rate, and drillers are left with a mountain of debt just when decline rates are starting to wreak their havoc. To keep the decline rates from mucking up income statements, companies had to drill more and more, with new wells making up for the declining production of old wells”.

The criticism occasionally takes conspiratorial accents insofar as the allegedly inadequate financial model is seen having Wall Street intentionally fuelling the “bubble,” “without providing reality checks to the shale gas people,” and so effectively perpetuating financial practices that led to the subprime credit collapse of 2008 (Ahmed, 2013: 2).

Even in a more balanced note, there is something real to the concern about the finances of shale gas. The industry is, indeed, more capital-intensive than the “conventional” one, and the prices are currently too low for the boom to sustain itself. But as explained by Maugeri the “shale economics is a different universe” (2013: 11). Given that the depletion profiles are similar in shale oil and shale gas wells, “because of the dramatic decline of shale wells, oil companies resort to intensively drilling for new wells that offset the loss of production from older wells. This is a common feature for all low-permeability and unconventional formations, where drilling more wells per number of acres is always necessary to boost production rates and increase the overall recovery factor of the entire field/formation” (Maugeri, 2013: 5).

To be sure, shale wells productivity depends on the *drilling intensity* of the activity, defined as the number of well drilled per unit of time and unit of surface. Unconventional drilling intensity has to be much higher than conventional drilling intensity just to compensate the steep decline of well productivity. This, in turn, involves higher capital costs and, accordingly, a higher break-even point – that is, a price level at which productions costs are covered by selling income. Two consequence follow from that: first, production through hydraulic fracturing is largely dependent of a relatively high oil price just to be able to keep going.⁸ Concerning this, it ought to be mentioned that the industry has made remarkable productivity progress, so that the break-even point continues to decrease. On the other hand, it is a characteristic of shale well production that it can be switched off and on again relatively swiftly, so that it can be resumed as soon as the economic situation improves again.

The second point regarding drilling intensity has to do with the environmental and social acceptability of hydraulic fracturing. More drilling entail more truck traffic, more pipelines, more odorous emissions, more noise and more landscape disruption. Apart from a few regions with legislation and culture exceptionally favorable to oil and gas activities, such as Texas, this is likely to meet resistance in the more densely populated areas. But more on this will follow in the next section.

In order to support the economics of shale gas, U.S. federal authorities must authorize exports of substantive LNG volumes: the price differential on foreign markets will help companies finance their operations, and the domestic prices in America will also grow – albeit only limitedly so. Thus, the opponents to LNG export licenses will realize that by trying to keep the shale gas output captive in the U.S., the likely result is not low

⁸ “Given the industry's current cost structure, per-well productivity profile, transportation bottlenecks, and refining constraints, the higher-cost, marginal shale oil barrel has had a break-even point of \$85 per barrel, without taking into account the additional production of natural gas and NGLs” (Maugeri, 2013: 14).

gas prices on indefinite term, but rather a significant slow-down of the shale gas boom and a consequent price increase. Besides, as rightly pointed out by Berzins (2013: 8): “Even if the United States chooses to restrict exports of LNG to non-free trade agreement countries, a significant volume of American shale gas could reach international markets through Canada. This may occur because U.S. natural gas exports to Canada may free up greater volumes of Canadian gas to be sent abroad, or because U.S. producers may contract directly with Canadian LNG export terminals. The U.S. and Canadian natural gas markets are integrated by virtue of the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the United States exported 939 bcf (26.6 bcm) of natural gas to Canada in 2011”. Therefore, it is to be expected that the financial pressure will lower as soon as sizeable American gas exports will have had a confirmed prospect.

Now, the environmental debate is not without import on the first one: the financial prospects of oil companies involved in fracking depend on the social acceptability of their activity; whether the “overleveraged” ones will be redeemed or go down the road of insolvency is also a matter of costs imposed by the stringency of the regulatory environment.

Let us now see what the environmental concerns are about. There is a whole series of suspicions, concerning virtually the entire technological process of hydraulic fracturing: that natural gas and other toxic substances may spill out of the well or from the shale fracture deep underground and contaminate the water table; that the *flowback* fluid⁹, which leaks up the well pushed by the fractures’ pressure may contaminate the surface water; or that it may contaminate underground waters, if disposed of by underground injection; that fracking can cause earthquakes, that gas spilled or vented causes air pollution, that massive truck traffic damages the roads and bridges, and that the intensive use of water by this technology depletes the available reserves needed for agriculture and other industries.

Of all these concerns, the notion that the aquifers integrity is jeopardized by shale gas drilling is the most common in the U.S. and in other parts of the world as well, including Romania. One reason has been the public success of the 2010 American documentary *Gasland*, written and directed by Josh Fox, aired on HBO television and prized at the Sundance Film Festival. Among other things, a landowner from Colorado is depicted igniting with a lighter the gas venting out of his kitchen’s water faucet, gas that the film attributes to shale gas activity in the area. *Gasland* has catalyzed an anti-fracking grass-roots movement worldwide, active by way of civic opposition and calls for regulatory action¹⁰.

However, that water tap gas was proved by a 2008 COGIS (Colorado Oil and Gas Information System) as being of “biogenic origin,” i.e. close-to-the-surface natural gas,

⁹ As explained by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), “After fracturing is completed, the internal pressure of the geologic formation cause the injected fracturing fluids to rise to the surface where it may be stored in tanks or pits prior to disposal or recycling. Recovered fracturing fluids are referred to as *flowback*. Disposal options for flowback include discharge into surface water or underground injection” (EPA, 2013).

¹⁰ In 2013, a “counter-documentary” was release: *FrackNation*, created by Irish freelance journalist Phelim McAleer. The film attempts to debunk *Gasland*’s claims. Although it has not reached the same level of audience, McAleer’s film operates on the same level of emotion-laden images, and has already generated its own constituency. The more general problem concerning public policy decision-making is, how can public interest be defined, debated, and pursued on a scientific basis when the voice of experts and scientists themselves is invariably filtered by such media products.

usually methane, generated by microbes in landfills or marshy areas. By contrast, “thermogenic gas” extracted through fracking is formed under high pressure and heat, and contain a mixture of light and heavy hydrocarbons. Thermogenic gas is entrapped too far below the surface – under thousands of meters of impermeable rock – for it to migrate all the way up to the water table, which seldom lies deeper than 100 meters. The point is accurately put by Zoback, Kitasei, and Copithorne (2010: 708), in a WorldWatch Institute briefing paper: “Because the direct contamination of underground sources of drinking water from fractures created by hydraulic fracturing would require hydrofractures to propagate several thousand feet beyond the upward boundary of the target formation through many layers of rock, such contamination is highly unlikely to occur in deep shale formations during well-designed fracture jobs. ... Geologists estimate that there is at least a half mile of rock between the natural gas deposits and the groundwater, including nine layers of impermeable shale, each of which acts as a barrier to vertical propagation of both natural and artificial fractures”.

To be sure, the biogenic nature of gas is no guarantee that hydraulic fracturing cannot cause it to intoxicate the aquifer. Indeed, as pointed out by Cornell University’s Anthony Ingraffea in support of *Gasland*’s claims, “The drilling process itself can induce migration of biogenic gas by disturbance of previously blocked migration paths through joint sets or faults, or by puncturing pressurized biogenic gas pockets” (*Affirming Gasland*, 2010: 1). Yet not only is this not likely to happen in general,¹¹ but gas companies typically perform water sampling and quality analysis before and after fracking, if only for legal liability reasons.

What is left is the possibility of a “poor cement job”, i.e. a defective cementing that does not properly fill and seal the annulus between the well casing and the drilled hole. Were that to happen, it would allow thermogenic gas to contaminate the water table. The cement job is, indeed, a pivotal piece of a successful fracking operation. And, unfortunately, there have been occurrences of poor cementing. Although it is controversial how many wells have had bad cement jobs¹², the 2011 MIT study, *The Future of Natural Gas*, investigated about 20,000 wells drilled across America and documented 20 cases of groundwater contamination by natural gas or drilling fluid between 2005 and 2009, coming down to 47 percent of the total number of contaminations (MIT, 2011: 47). That is, the incidence is 1 per 1,000. Although the number seems statistically acceptable, the impact of even one cement-related contamination case generates widespread public adversity and mistrust. This can only be intensified by the fact that, at least in some American states, neither cementing, nor cement composition are regulated by public authorities; instead, the industry has its own self-regulatory standards. However, independent regulation of this crucial activity would remove most risks and build public confidence at affordable costs. In any event, it is inconceivable that shale gas development in the EU could take place without adequate state intervention.

¹¹ A May 2013 study published in *Applied Geochemistry* by scientists at Duke University and the United States Geological Survey (USGS) has found no evidence of water table contamination from shale gas production in the state of Arkansas (Warner *et al.* 2013). The researchers caution, though, that “much more research is needed in order to evaluate and understand the environmental risks of shale gas development”.

¹² As noticed by James Conca (2012), “There are disputes over how many wells have bad cement jobs. Scott Anderson, of the Environmental Defense Fund, says up to 15% of cement jobs are bad, whereas Ray Walker of the drilling industry quarrels with that number, thinking it’s less than 1%”.

Other problems concern the challenges of *water use*, namely *wastewater management* and *water consumption*. The flowback fluid contains water and sand (over 98 percent of the volume) and the chemical substances mixed in the fracking fluid to stimulate the flow of gas, but also “high concentrations of salts, naturally occurring radioactive material (NORM), and other contaminants, including arsenic, benzene, and mercury” (Zoback et al., 2010: 11). Accordingly, wastewater (consisting of the flowback fluid and the “produced” water that resided underground for geological ages) must be properly disposed of. This is done in two different ways: one the one hand, pending on the availability of adequate disposal wells, the wastewater is injected into saline aquifers deep underground. Now, apart from problems of disposal wells availability,¹³ underground wastewater injection opens the discussion about the seismic risk induced by shale gas development.

There is virtual consensus that hydraulic fracturing itself does not cause significant seismic activity. Two new studies of 2013 confirm that conclusion. A Durham University (U.K.) study led by Energy Institute’s director, Richard Davies, concludes that “The size and number of felt earthquakes caused by fracking is low compared to other manmade triggers such as mining, geothermal activity or reservoir water storage” (Bakhsh 2013, 1). In a separate study conducted by the National Research Council (NRS), sponsored by the DOE, the conclusion was similar: “Hydraulic fracturing has a low risk for inducing earthquakes that can be felt by people” (Dittrick, 2013: 2).

However, underground wastewater injection is the riskier part of seismicity-inducing activity in the shale gas development chain. A study published in 2012 by Cliff Frohlich (Institute for Geophysics of Texas University at Austin) found a correlation between injection wells and small magnitude earthquakes in the Barnett Shale region of North Texas (UT, 2012). As Frohlich states, “You can’t prove that any one earthquake was caused by an injection well, but it’s obvious that wells are enhancing the probability that earthquakes will occur” (Ibidem, 1). Most tremors identified in the study ranged in magnitude from 1.5 to 2.5, unperceivable by people. Nonetheless, a June 2013 study by researchers of Oklahoma University and Columbia University’s Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory (Keranen et al., 2013) connects a series of high magnitude earthquakes in central Oklahoma to wastewater underground injection. As noted on the Observatory’s site, “researchers now say that the magnitude 5.7 earthquake near Prague, Okla., on Nov. 6, 2011, may also be the largest ever linked to wastewater injection. Felt as far away as Milwaukee, more than 800 miles away, the quake—the biggest ever recorded in Oklahoma—destroyed 14 homes, buckled a federal highway and left two people injured. Small earthquakes continue to be recorded in the area” (LDEO, 2013: 1).

Relevantly, the study identifies as cause of the 5.7 quake the pumping of wastewater for almost 17 years into an abandoned oil well, with no previous incidents. In order to keep the fluid going down the well, the pumping pressure was increased, to the effect that a nearby geological fault was eventually jumped, thus triggering the earthquake. The study draws attention to the effects of wastewater injection under

¹³ This is just as much a regulatory issue as a geological one: “While injection is regulated at the federal level under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), the availability of adequate disposal wells is a major issue that needs to be addressed for shale gas development to take place. There are tens of thousands of licensed 11 injection wells in Texas, but because of political and geological constraints, many fewer exist in the Marcellus Shale. The state of Pennsylvania currently only has about 10 Class II wells” (Zoback et al., 2010: 12).

increasing pressure, and becomes part of a more sophisticated effort at understanding hydraulic fracturing's long-term environmental effects.

Let us now return to the other method of wastewater disposal: treatment at wastewater facilities followed by the eventual discharge of treated water into surface rivers or streams. The main question here is whether sufficient treatment facilities are available at convenient distances, and technologically able to handle significant flowback volumes. According to a press release by the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PADEP) (2008), the Monongahela River, which supplies drinking water to approximately 350,000 people in Western Pennsylvania, saw at the end of 2008 and 2009 major increased in the level of "total dissolved solids" (TDS). PADEP consequently ordered specific waste water treatment facilities to reduce their intake of drilling wastewater.

Indeed, accessible, sufficient and technically capable wastewater treatment facilities are going to constitute a major constraint in the way of future shale gas development, especially outside of the U.S. That, along with the regulation of temporary storage and transport of the fracking fluid to treatment or disposal, is an important factor of social acceptability for the entire sector.

For both environmental and economic reasons, gas companies have learned to recycle and reuse as much wastewater as possible for future fracking operations. Moreover, in a recent technological innovation by Halliburton Co. (*Natural Gas Europe*, 2013: 2), wastewater can be used for hydraulic fracturing without any further treatment: "You look at the rush of people that are trying to treat the water to high quality, to make a frack fluid, and now we're coming to the market saying: 'Look, let's not treat the water, let's not take the salt out. We can make frack fluids out of it'" said Halliburton's Walter Dale (*Natural Gas Europe*, 2013: 2). To be sure, this prospect open by Halliburton's innovation and other of the like bears enormous relevance for the other major concern about water use in fracking operations: the large amount of water intake, which is larger by more than a tenfold than in conventional oil and gas production. This is seen as a reason of alarm for communities worried that limited clear water reserves would thus be taken away from households, agriculture or other industries.

Table 3. *Water use per unit of energy*

Resource type	Range (liters/KWh)	Average (liters/KWh)
Shale gas	0.01 – 0.09	0.02
Nuclear power	0.12 – 0.22	0.17
Oil	0.12 – 0.31	0.22
Coal	0.20 – 0.50	0.36
Corn ethanol	38.94 – 451.40	245.09
Soy biodiesel	217.17 – 1,163.40	690.28

Source: Compiled from Ground Water Protection Council and U.S. Department of Energy data

It is true in fact that a typical shale gas well takes 3 to 6 million gallons of water – which comes to 10,000 to 20,000 cubic meters. However, calculated on a per-unit-of-energy basis, this is substantially less than the water required to produce coal, uranium or oil, and far and away less water than biofuels. Table 3 below puts things in perspective. Besides, it is instructive to know that the power generating sector is everywhere in the world the largest water user by far, followed by irrigations in agriculture, and municipal water supply. In the U.S., as of 2005, the water used for oil and gas operations was just 1 percent of the entire national usage (FracFocus, 2013": 2).

Nevertheless, shale gas operations do involve an important degree of discomfort especially for exploitations close to community areas: heavy truck traffic, noise, dust, unpleasant odors, damage to the roads infrastructure etc. Some of them can be still reduced through regulatory measures, but at the end of the day hydraulic fracking activities also depend on their social acceptability. The local community ought to balance the disturbance caused by shale well activity with benefits generated by it, such as economic gains for the community and energy security for the entire country. As a rule of thumb, the more densely populated a region is, the more likely it is to be resistant to the drilling-intensive operations of hydraulic fracturing. Occasionally, though, the rule seems to be broken: Forth Worth, in Texas, has become a true urban gas field in the United States. As observed by Dianne Rahm (2011: 2976), “more than 14,000 wells have been drilled in the Barnett Shale of Texas (as of 2010) and about 1200 of them are in the city of Forth Worth. By the time the Barnett Shale gas play is fully established there will be about 6000 wells in the city of Forth Worth. ... Pipelines are not being built within feet of residential housing, causing considerable concern”. This peculiar evolution has been possible due to an exceptionally favorable legal regime that oil and gas companies enjoy in the state of Texas. The land property and mineral property rights are separated and can be sold independently of each other. Moreover, “mineral rights supersede property rights” (Rahm, 2011: 2979): “Mineral rights owners can use as much surface land as it is reasonably necessary to explore, drill, and extract minerals. ... In Texas, private gas companies have been given the right of *eminent domain* by state statute, which in practicality allows them to lay lines where ever they choose” (My emphasis).

Besides, the state regulatory authorities – such as the Texas Railroad Commission (RRC), in charge with regulating the oil and gas industry, and the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ), in charge with air and water quality issues – have a well-known pro-business attitude that has been often at odds with federal authorities, such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)¹⁴. Nevertheless, in other U.S. states the authorities have taken measures to provisionally stop or limit hydraulic fracturing activities. In March 2013, the New York State Assembly approved a two-year ban on hydraulic fracturing over the Marcellus Shale, pending a Health Department review of the health histories of the people who live close to the wells (Klopott 2013, 1).

The fact that social and environmental concerns about shale gas extraction can be a serious hurdle for the industry’s future globally has been emphasized, among other places, in the *Golden Rules for a Golden Age of Gas* special report by IEA (2012b). The report elaborates a detailed set of norms that gas developers ought to abide by in order for shale gas production to fulfill its “Golden Age” potential and triple until 2035, reaching 1.6 trillion cubic meters. The following is a selection of those recommended norms:

¹⁴ “Tensions between the TCEQ and the EPA escalated later in 2010 when Texas became the only state to refuse to implement EPA’s greenhouse gas regulations. ... In December, EPA announced that it would seize authority and issue Clean Air Act greenhouse gas permits in Texas because of Texas’ unwillingness to do so. Texas has appealed to the courts and continues to fight the EPA. ... The RRC has come into conflict with the EPA for its lax enforcement of the Safe Drinking Water Act. In December of 2010, EPA issued an Imminent and Substantial Endangerment Order to Protect drinking water in Southern Parker County. By this order the EPA ordered a natural gas company operating in Forth Worth to take immediate action to protect water wells of local residents. EPA testing confirmed the presence of flammable substances in the drinking water. By issuing this order of endangerment, the EPA trumped the RRC, which had done nothing in response to complaints from homeowners” (Rahm, 2011: 2978-2979).

“Integrate engagement with local communities, residents and other stakeholders into each phase of a development starting prior to exploration. Establish baselines for key environmental indicators, such as groundwater quality, prior to commencing activity, with continued monitoring during operations. Measure and disclose operational data on water use, on the volumes and characteristics of waste water and on methane and other air emissions, alongside full, mandatory disclosure of fracturing fluid additives and volumes. Choose well sites so as to minimize impacts on the local community, heritage, existing land use, individual livelihoods and ecology. Put in place robust rules on well design, construction, cementing and integrity testing as part of a general performance standard that gas bearing formations must be completely isolated from other strata penetrated by the well, in particular freshwater aquifers. Reduce freshwater use by improving operational efficiency; reuse or recycle, wherever practicable, to reduce the burden on local water resources. Target zero venting and minimal flaring of natural gas during well completion and seek to reduce fugitive and vented greenhouse-gas emissions during the entire productive life of a well” (IEA, 2012b; 13-14).

The good news is that the industry has both the know-how and the technological means to meet these challenges, and that the large oil and gas corporations involved in overseas shale gas development are actively pursuing such guidelines. However, it will be seen when discussing Romania’s case, that state authorities have themselves a long way to go in order to earn public confidence and assuage fears that state regulations would bow down to “big oil” interests. The latter are often seen at best in “NIMBY” terms – (“good for the society, but *not in my backyard*”) – and as worst as detrimental, exploitative, and reckless.

Energy geopolitics of a taller order will also shape the future of shale gas, and will in turn be shaped by it. But, very likely, one of the lower-key interventionist tools used by foreign powers that stand to lose from such a development is to foment public fear and misperception and to fuel activist radicalism against shale gas development.

6. Unconventional oil: oil sands and tight oil

The two main sources of unconventional oil discussed in this section are *heavy crude oil* in bituminous deposits (Canadian oil sands in Athabasca and Venezuelan tar sands of the Orinoco Belt), and *shale* and *tight oil*, the petroleum equivalent of shale gas, in the United States.

Canada’s Athabasca region of the northeastern Alberta province is home to some of the world largest oil reserves: a gigantic quantity of bitumen, sand, clay, and water mixture spread out on a 141,000 square kilometers surface of boreal forest and muskeg. Those “oil sands” contain no less that 1.7 trillion barrels of bituminous heavy crude, of which at least 10 percent is deemed to be economically recoverable at today’s oil prices. Thus, according to the U.S. Energy Information Agency (2012b: 3), “Canada had 173.6 billion barrels of proven oil reserves at the beginning of 2012. Canada controls the third-largest amount of proven reserves in the world, after Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. ... The oil sands now account for approximately 170 barrels, or 98 percent, of Canada’s oil reserves.”

This massive reassessment took place virtually overnight in the mid-2000s, as it became clear that oil sands resources were technically and commercially recoverable. In a few years, Canada had become the world sixth largest oil producer and America’s number one oil supplier, providing it with more than one million barrels a day from oil sand sources. Major technological changes had to come in place. Yergin (2012, 491-92)

describes them with acumen: “The mining process was modernized, expanded in scale, and made more flexible. Fixed conveyer belts were replaced with huge trucks with the biggest tires in the world, and with giant shovels that gather up oil sands and carry them to upgraders that separate out the bitumen. Refining processes then upgrade the bitumen into higher-quality synthetic crude oil, akin to light, sweet crude oil, which can be processed in a conventional refinery into gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, and all the other normal products.”

Besides, since no more than 20 percent of Alberta’s oil sands are recoverable through open-pit mining, a new technology was developed for *in situ*, underground extraction. Called SAGD (*steam-assisted gravity drainage*), it consists in underground injection of superhot steam, that melts the bitumen and thus allows the extraction through a well of a fluid mix of super heavy crude and water. By these means, Canada raised its oil sands production to almost 1.5 million bbl/d (mbd) in 2010 and has the industrial potential to reach an aggregated oil production of 4 mbd by 2020 one of the world’s largest. Since 1997, it has taken investments of no less than \$120 billion to reach the present level of oil development in Alberta (Yergin, 2012: 493-94).

But there is considerable contestation and adversity against the production of this “mega-resource.” Open-pit mining of oil sands has a large environmental footprint, destroying in the process areas of boreal forest and muskeg. The government of Alberta issued the *Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act* (EPEA, 2002), which states that the objective of land reclamation is to return the land to an “*equivalent land capability*,” meaning that the ability of the land to support various land uses after conservation and reclamation must be similar to the ability that existed prior to an activity being conducted on it. This is an important requirement, although critics complain about vagueness and lack of independent standards in defining what “similar” refers to in the previous sentence (Parkland Institute 2008). And there is the issue of the mining waste tailing ponds, which apart from being toxic, also cover significant areas. Due to the proximity of some of these ponds to the Athabasca River, there were several leaks of tailing pond sludge into the river’s water.

Then, the open-pit mining requires very large amount of water (2.0 to 4.5 m³ per m³ of oil), but the SAGD process is much more economical, at 0.2 m³ of water (Griffiths, Taylor and Woynillowicz, 2006: 171). In any event, the amount of allowed water intake from the Athabasca River is strictly regulated by the provincial government.

A main contention related to oil sands production in particular, and to unconventional hydrocarbons in general, is the volume of greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs), i.e. gases such as carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and ozone, typically emitted through the combustion of fossil fuels and whose increased presence in the atmosphere causes global warming. Because oil sands extraction involves the use of large amounts of energy-intensive steam in employing SAGD, burning massive gas volumes to this purpose, the volumes of carbon dioxide thus emitted are higher than in conventional oil extraction.

But how much higher are those emissions? This is a question whose answer bears vast regulatory and commercial implications. According to a CERA 2009 report on Canada’s oil sands, this fuel emits 5 to 15 percent more CO₂ than the average crude oil, measured over the “well-to-wheels” lifetime (Gardner, 2009). Yet others disagree, and very consequentially so. In a recent dispute between Canada and the EU, at stake has been the European Commission’s decision to amend the Fuel Quality Directive (Directive 80/70/EC) so as to label petroleum *extracted from oil sands as* being 22 percent more polluting than the average crude. The EU Fuel Quality Directive was amended in April

2009 through Directive 2009/30/EC, establishing specifications for petrol and diesel fuels and ranking them according to their carbon-intensity. It sets a 6 percent GHGs reduction target for transport fuels; fuels ranked as greener are deemed to contribute proportionally more toward achieving it. Consequently, the gas stations EU-wide would have to sell fuel “cocktails” that include minimal proportions of greener fuels.

Ottawa responded that Brussels’ decision was discriminatory against oil sands and denounced the scientific model behind the calculation as flawed. Moreover, Canada’s natural resources minister, Joe Oliver, threatened a trade war with the EU via the World Trade Organization (Carrington, 2013). The debate has taken dramatic overtones, with James Hansen, one of the most famous climate scientists (seconded by numerous NGOs and Canadian indigenous populations) warning that tar sands exploitation is tantamount to “game over” in the battle against climate change (*idem*).

The debate is turning into an outright political and commercial fight, with lobbies and interest groups on both sides of the barricade, but also with geopolitical effects. Other than the “green” protesters, who typically extend their complaints against all forms of unconventional hydrocarbons, the OPEC members and Russia would certainly be pleased to see the unconventional tide subside.

Another huge concentration of extra heavy bituminous oil is in Venezuela, in the Orinoco belt. Nonetheless, the political and economic circumstances in today’s Venezuela are not conducive to the kind of massive foreign investments needed to develop a resource that requires such a complex treatment. Hence, although Hugo Chavez proclaimed in 2011 that his country has the world’s largest oil reserves, the undercapitalized national oil company, PDVSA is in fact struggling with a dwindling oil production.

Finally, let us turn to the other type of unconventional hydrocarbon: *tight oil* and *shale oil*, the cousins of shale gas. The extraction began in Bakken oil formation, in northern United States. As observed by Yergin (2012: 503), “production in the Bakken increased dramatically, from less than 10,000 barrels per day in 2005 to more than 400,000 in 2010. In another several years it could be 800,000 barrels per day or even more”. The technique has also spread to Eagle Ford in Texas, Bone Springs in New Mexico, and Three Forks in North Dakota and is likely to see an expansion comparable that of shale gas. With the addition of shale oil, the total U.S. projected production in 2017 is put by Harvard’s Leonardo Maugeri (2013: 20) at 10.4 mbd.

According to some analysts, the broader geopolitical implications of the shale gas revolutions are actually related to shale oil. As noted by Alan Riley (2012: 1), “the first important point to understand is that *the shale gas revolution is not principally about gas*. When exploring for shale gas, a significant amount of shale oil is also being discovered, which alone may make the U.S. ‘energy independent’ in oil by 2020. An even more significant factor is the ability, with large volumes of cheap gas available globally, to develop a natural gas-fuelled transportation network in the U.S., Europe and China” (My emphasis).

But what is the potential that the American shale upsurge gets replicated internationally? According to EIA’s latest state rankings for shale oil and gas resources, Russia leads the top regarding shale oil, with estimated 75 billion barrels, followed by the U.S. (58), China (32), Argentina (27), Lybia (26) and Australia (18), while the shale gas top is led by China with estimated 28 trillion cubic meters, followed by Argentina (22.7), Algeria (20.2), U.S. (18.8), Canada (16.2), and Mexico (15.4) (EIA, 2013: 10).

Nonetheless, there are several reasons why the unconventional hydrocarbons revolution is quite difficult to export outside North America. First, lack of equipment (rigs

capable of directional drilling) and adequate skills makes it unlikely that the required level of drilling intensity can be replicated elsewhere in the world. As observed by Maugeri (2013: 21), “in 2012 the U.S. averaged 1,919 active drilling rigs, just below 60 percent of worldwide activity, and held a potential of more than 2,100 drilling rigs. Canada came in second with 356 active drilling rigs. BY contrast, there were only 119 drilling rigs across all of Europe (excluding Russia), of which only one-third was equipped to perform horizontal drilling”.

Second, another major factor has to do with the uniquely incentivizing legal framework in the U.S. that enables land owners to transfer their mineral property rights to the oil and gas companies. Third, the relatively sparsely populated areas covered by the major oil and gas shale plays allow for a level of drilling intensity unlikely to be easily replicated in many other places of the world. Fourth, the existence of the most sophisticated financial system, knowledgeable and willing to finance independent oil and gas companies has made possible the very business model of shale hydrocarbons, without which the industry could not have taken off. Fifth, the upsurge has certainly been supported by the advanced American “midstream and downstream infrastructure (pipelines, storage, refineries), as well as adequate water supplies, that in many countries – including China – appears to be inadequate” (Maugeri, 2013: 25).

Therefore, at least for the coming decade, it is difficult to foresee a global replication of the shale oil and gas upsurge, although a significant diffusion effect will certainly come in place – be it merely in the intensified use of hydraulic fracturing as a means of recovery rate enhancement in conventional developments. Having noticed that, it is important to understand that the effects of the shale gas revolution have already been rippling around the world and will continue to do so for decades to come.

7. Global winners and losers of the unconventional hydrocarbons upsurge

Riley (2013) plausibly sees the coming shale gas developments in the U.S. and worldwide as directly strengthening America and the Western nations, as well as NATO, while threatening the economic and political stability of Russia and Saudi Arabia. The point about a probable energy-based reinforcement of the trans-Atlantic ties has also been made by Paul Isbell (2012: 11-12), in his analysis of the energy dynamics of the Atlantic Basin.

Obviously, the unconventional hydrocarbons upsurge will bring on the market sizeable new volumes of oil and gas. The quantities are significant enough to reverse a trend generally feared just a few years ago, as the International Energy Agency 2008 World Energy Outlook (IEA, 2008) warned about tightening oil markets, concentration of supplies, and resource nationalism. At present, the pattern seems to have reversed to an important extent. As argued by Maugeri (2012), we are witnessing a steady increase of oil production globally, combined with a slow growth of demand – due, in its turn, both to a slowing world economy and to energy efficiency measures. It is thus likely that, at the macro level, the relevant parameters of the global energy system will be of commercial nature – *cost* and *price*, in the first place – and not geopolitical, although the latter certainly remain important mainly due to the global traction of the national oil companies (NOCs) in both producing and consuming countries, and the projection of military power in numerous energy-bound conflicts worldwide.

Working on the conservative assumption of shale oil and gas production growth limited to North America, with no massive output of unconventional hydrocarbons elsewhere in the world within this decade, the analysis must center on the effects of an American reduction of oil imports and increase of shale gas exports. According to the EIA

(2013d: 1) data on the U.S. import of oil by country of origin, the 8.3 mbd imported by in January 2013, 28 percent came from Canada, 13 percent from Saudi Arabia, 10 percent, from Mexico, 9 percent from Venezuela, and 5 percent from Russia. Other significant suppliers are Nigeria and Angola in West Africa. Accordingly, the foreseen oil imports reduction in the U.S. will directly affect those supplying countries that directly depend on the American market either by exported volume and/or by refining capacity. Canada exports 95 percent of its petroleum to the U.S. It thus stands to lose a share of its dominant market, which may demand significant readjustments of its export strategies. As noted by Maugeri (2013: 26) Canadian oil exports already compete for pipeline transport capacity with North Dakota shale oil.¹⁵ Moreover, as the break-even price level of Canadian oil sand is very high (more than \$90 per barrel), the prospect of lowering oil prices poses a serious threat to the sustainability of Athabaskan production. Venezuela also stands to lose from diminishing American market share, as it ultra-heavy crude oil depends to a large extent on U.S.'s specialized refining capacity. The likely prospect of having to compete for refining capacity in the U.S. will hurt Venezuelan oil exports. Also, Nigeria and Angola light oil will likely be pushed out of the American market by light shale oil production.

On a broader level, Russia and Saudi Arabia can be threatened only if shale gas production extends significantly outside the U.S. Otherwise these two global producers are not likely to have major difficulties establishing new oil trade relations. On the other hand, regarding natural gas, Russia's Gazprom is already hurting from the gas glut caused on the European markets by the North American shale gas upsurge. It has lost market share and, even more importantly, had to adjust its supplying contracts so as to include a hub-traded price component.

Among the consumers, China is on the winning side in all scenarios of the unconventional hydrocarbons upsurge, as its energy security increased at no extra costs. Moreover, if Beijing decides to mobilize for shale gas production, given its proven capacity for large-scale projects, it is probable that by the end of the current decade China enters the club of shale gas producers – thus further hurting Russia's interests.

Other consequences of the ongoing global realignment of the energy system have to do with hard security. As an increasingly energy self-reliant United States becomes less and less incentivized to bear the costs of securing the strategic chokepoints and geographic pivots on which the global energy trade depends, the question is how will the new security arrangements of the future look like. Is China willing and ready to take over the Persian Gulf security? Will the EU make any significant contribution in that direction, as its energy security also depends on its capacity to ensure that the liberalized international energy trade flows unhindered.

These answers depend on the interplay between several kinds of factors: *commercial* (cost and price); *technological* and *environmental*, on which the shale oil and gas revolution depend in term of increased productivity and social acceptability; *regional* since energy developments in some parts of the world, such as the Eastern Mediterranean, can make a difference to the EU energy security, or the South China Sea, where the ongoing military flashpoints have a serious disturbing potential for the global energy trade; and *local*, where resource endowments and national energy policies can shape the broader energy security context. I turn now to an instance of the latter.

¹⁵ A short to medium-term solution would be the construction of the controversial Keystone XL pipeline, planned to transport oil sands production to the Gulf of Mexico.

8. Potential shale gas resources in Romania

There are no certain data about the availability of shale gas in Romania. The most recent study by the U.S. Energy Information Agency, assessing the technically recoverable shale gas and shale oil resources outside the United States (EIA, 2013c), based on geologically modeling (i.e., absent any exploratory drilling) states the following: “Eastern Europe (ex. Poland, assessed separately) has significant prospective shale gas and oil resources in three sedimentary basins: the Dniepr-Donets Basin, the Carpathian Foreland Basin, and the Moesian Platform. Shale exploration is underway in Ukraine and Romania, while Bulgaria currently has a moratorium on shale development. The total risked, technically recoverable shale resource potential for the three basins is estimated at 195 Tcf of shale gas and 1.6 billion barrels of shale oil and condensate. ... By country, the estimates are Ukraine (128 Tcf and 1.2 billion barrels); *Romania (51 Tcf and 0.3 billion barrels)*; and Bulgaria (17 Tcf and 0.2 billion barrels). Compared with North America, the shale geology of Eastern Europe is more complex, although faulting appears less prevalent than in other parts of Europe” (EIA, 2013c: 346-348; my emphasis). Thus, the most recent estimate for technically recoverable shale gas resources in Romania is 1.61 Tcm, a very substantial quantity that, if commercially and environmentally exploitable, would by itself turn Romania into an important gas exporter.

More than a dozen international oil companies have become involved in activities related to the Romanian shale gas resources. In July 2010, the National Agency for Mineral Resources (ANRM) organized the 10th bidding round for 30 oil and gas blocks – 11 onshore and 19 offshore (BMI, 2013).

The American oil corporation Chevron was awarded four exploration licenses totaling 9,000 km²: one large block in the Vaslui county (southern Moldova region), and three blocks in the Dobrudja region: Costinești, Vama Veche, and Adamclisi. After more than two years into the concession agreement, Chevron has been issued almost all the necessary permits, so that its exploration activities are likely to start in September 2013.

Other companies active in the Romanian shale gas sector are Hungary’s MOL, which won the bid for three concession agreements in the Oradea County of northwestern Romania (Voivozi, Adea, and Curtici). Further, as noted by EIA (2013: 356), “Sterling Resources and partner TransAtlantic Petroleum jointly hold the 5,800 km² Sud Craiova license of southwest Romania.” The EIA 2013 report also mentions the Romgaz statement that it had used hydraulic fracturing as early as the mid-1990s, and that it had discovered shale gas in five out of its exploratory wells of Western Romania.

Now, as the Petroleum Law (238/2004) makes no distinction between conventional and unconventional hydrocarbons, and accordingly lacks specific regulations for shale gas and shale oil development, all shale gas operation are regulated by the law’s conventional terms. However, if the upside of this is that gas companies are – pending all the requires authorizations and permits – are free to proceed as they deem fit, the downside is that the absence of explicit and specific secondary legislation referring to shale gas activities and their associated risks has added to public mistrust and concerns about the putative environmental hazards of hydraulic fracturing.

Indeed, probably the biggest hurdle at present that shale gas development faces in Romania is the public activism against its key technology. The epicenter of protests has been the town of Bârlad, to the south of the Vaslui county, where Chevron holds its largest concession acreage. Fears and concerns, sometimes with apocalyptic undertones, about poisoned waters and wasted lands, have been put forward in styles ranging from close to the argumentative-academic to the emotional-bellucose by a constituency of local rural

inhabitants, priests of the Orthodox Church, retired army officers, an NGO (*Grupul de Inițiativă al Societății Civile – Bârlad*), and fans of a soccer club (F.C. Vaslui). The protests have gathered usually hundreds of protesters, though at times the meetings reached thousands of participants.

More systematically, what are their concerns and complaints? First, what they fear most is the pollution of aquifers as a direct result of hydraulic (shown above to have a low likelihood) or through the improper treatment of wastewater (which is more likely to occur, absent proper regulations and proper investments). Second, they mistrust the state authorities and the regulator, in particular, which they see as weak and corruptible and hence incapable of properly enforcing strong regulations and, if necessary, stop hydraulic fracturing activities. In this sense, they see the petroleum law's lack of reference to shale gas as inadequate, and prone to abuse and unaccountability. Third, they deeply mistrust Chevron's intentions, in particular, and of multinational companies, in general, as being exploitative and mischievous, and as disregarding local communities' needs and concerns. All in all, the controversy has been caricatured as a "Bârlad vs. Chevron" fight¹⁶.

The government's own overbearing stance in downplaying the size and significance of those protests, as well as in presenting the issue as an incontrovertible matter of national interests does not square with its own leaders' rabid opposition to hydraulic fracturing as they had been in power in the *interim* government of April 2002 and then campaigning in the general elections of last fall. A *de facto* (i.e. unlegislated) moratorium was imposed by the first Ponta cabinet in April 2012, only to be utterly reversed by the same decision-makers in the early 2013. Such U-turns incur serious credibility costs among international investors, in a socio-political environment mined by public mistrust in politics.

What Romania needs is an evidence-based discussion about the risks, costs, and benefits of shale gas development. Yet even with overwhelming benefits – provided that proper regulatory and compensatory measures come in place – and the industry's capacity to manage the environmental risks and operate safely, the current public climate is barely conducive to rational deliberation: the quality of public information is low, the media play a rather partisan role, the constituencies are still poorly defined, and the emotions are high. Therefore, local protests are likely to grow in intensity as the shale gas activities approach the production phase. Besides, in spite of the increased reserves estimate mentioned above, there is a non-negligible probability that the exploratory phase will come out empty-handed and that Chevron, possibly followed by other companies, divests from its Romanian business, just as Exxon Mobil did in Poland and Hungary.

In the aftermath of the loss suffered by the Romania-backed Nabucco West project in the strategic competition over the transport of Azerbaijani natural gas to Europe, new domestic gas production is Romania's main prospect of increased energy security. In a market environment dominated by a monopolist external supplier, Romania's new potential gas sources are deep-water reserves in the Black Sea offshore, and shale gas resources. The decision to pursue their exploration must rely on the public interest, first and foremost. However, conceiving the public interest simply as a matter of denying exploration of unconventional gas – either by thinking that the entire energy mix can be turned "green" or by assuming that the energy system can simply go on as it has until now – is deeply spurious. On the one hand, renewable energy sources (mainly wind, water, and

¹⁶ A track record of anti-shale gas protest actions in the Bârlad area can be found, among other sites of the local press, at www.vrn.ro.

solar power) are variable and discontinuous, and hence require back up and balancing by conventional sources (preferably natural gas). On the other hand, the conventional oil and gas resources in Romania are on a steady and rapid depletion curve, with the prospect of becoming negligible no later than 10 years from now. They certainly need substitution. Some of the latter may well be done by extending the application of hydraulic fracturing to conventional oil and gas oil, in order to increase their production rate. But access to new geological formation will be needed in the near future, in a country with more than 100 years to conventional hydrocarbons production.

To be sure, Romania must not accept any natural resource exploitations which pose untenable environmental and social costs. Yet the Romanian society ought not to close itself dogmatically (out of mistrust in state authorities and/or international companies) from considering evidence-based, regulated, and best practices-grounded technological solutions for new energy sources.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Affirming Gasland* (2010), http://1trickpony.cachefly.net/gas/pdf/Affirming_Gasland_Sept_2010.pdf, accessed June 2013;
- Assis, Claudia (2013), "Landmark DOE decision OKs second LNG export permit" in *Market Watch*, May 17;
- Bakhsh, Nidaa (2013), "Fracking Doesn't Cause Significant Earthquakes, Study Says" in *Bloomberg*, April 10;
- BP (2012), *Statistical Review of World Energy*, June. bp.com/statisticalreview;
- BP (2013), *Statistical Review of World Energy*, June. bp.com/statisticalreview;
- Berzins, Kristine (2013), *European Views on American Natural Gas Exports. A Strategic Primer*. Washington, D.C.: American Clean Skies Foundation;
- BMI (*Business Monitor International*) (2013), "Romania Oil and Gas Report," Q1;
- C&EN (Chemical and Engineering News) (2005), "Dow: U.S. in Natural Gas Crisis", October 7;
- Carrington, Damian (2012), "Canada Threatens Trade War With EU Over Tar Sands" in *The Guardian*, February 20;
- Carrington, Damian (2013), "Tar Sands Exploitation Would Mean Game Over For Climate, Warns Leading Scientist" in *The Guardian*, May 19;
- Conca, James (2012), "The Fracking Solution is a Good Cement Job" in *Forbes*, September 9;
- Clinton, Hillary Rodham (2012), "Energy Diplomacy in the 21st Century", Georgetown University speech, October 18, Washington D.C., U.S. Department of State, www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/10/199330.htm;
- Crooks, Ed and Sylvia Pfeiffer (2012), "US Coal Exports to Europe Soar" in *Financial Times*, October 3;
- Dittrick, Paula (2013), "Study Concludes Hydraulic Fracturing Poses Low Earthquake Risk" in *Oil and Gas Journal*, June 15;
- Ebinger, Charles; Massy, Kevin and Avarasala, Govinda (2012), *Liquid Markets: Assessing the Case for U.S. Exports of Liquefied Natural Gas*, Policy Brief 12-01, May, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution;
- Economic Times (2013), "ArcelorMittal to Expand Brazil Steel Capacity Starting in June", June 7;

- EIA (2011), “World Shale Gas Resources: An Initial Assessment of 14 Regions Outside the United States”, Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of Energy, April;
- EIA (2012a), “Annual Energy Outlook 2012 (AEO 2012)”, Early Release Overview;
- EIA (2013a), “How Dependent Are We On Foreign Oil?”, Energy in Brief, May 10, http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/article/foreign_oil_dependence.cfm, accessed July 2013;
- EIA (2013b), *Natural Gas Weekly Update*, June 6;
- EIA (2013c), *Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources: An Assessment of 137 Shale Formations in 41 Countries Outside the United States*. Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of Energy, June;
- EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) (2013), “Water: Hydraulic Fracturing” water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/wells_hydrowhat.cfm, accessed June 2013;
- EurActiv (2013a), “EU Must Play Hardball on Tarsands”, March 19;
- EurActiv (2013b), “German Experts: Fracking is Unnecessary and Risky”, June 7;
- FracFocus (2013), “Hydraulic Fracturing Water Usage,” <http://fracfocus.org/waterprotection/hydraulic-fracturing-usage>, accessed June 2013;
- Gardner, Timothy (2009), “Canada Oil Sands Emit More CO₂ Than Average” in *Reuters*, May 18;
- Griffiths, Mary; Taylor, Amy and Woynillowicz, Dan (2006), *Troubled Waters, Troubling Trends. Technology and Policy Options to Reduce Water Use in Oil and Oil Sands Development in Alberta*, The Pembina Institute;
- IEA (International Energy Agency) (2008), *World Energy Outlook 2008*, Paris, OECD/IEA;
- IEA (International Energy Agency) (2012a), *World Energy Outlook 2012: Executive Summary*, Paris, OECD/IEA;
- IEA (International Energy Agency) (2012b), *Golden Rules for a Golden Age of Gas: World Energy Outlook Special Report on Unconventional Gas*, Paris, OECD/IEA;
- IEA (International Energy Agency) (2012c), *Key World Energy Statistics 2012*, Paris, OECD/IEA;
- Isbell, Paul (2012), *Energy and the Atlantic: The Shifting Energy Landscape of the Atlantic Basin*, Washington D.C., The German Marshall Fund of the United States;
- Keranen, Katie M.; Savage, Heather M.; Abers, Geoffrey A.; Cochran, Elizabeth S. (2013), “Potentially induced earthquakes in Oklahoma, USA: Links between wastewater injection and the 2011 M_w 5.7 earthquake sequence” in *Geology*, June, Vol. 41;
- Klopott, Freeman (2013), “Ney York Assembly Approves Two-Year Moratorium on Fracking” in *Bloomberg*, March 7;
- LDEO (2013), Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory Institute, Columbia University, “Wastewater Injection Spurred Biggest Earthquake Yet, Study Says”, March 26, www.ldeo.columbia.edu/news-events/wastewater-injection-spurred-biggest-earthquake-yet-says-study, accessed June 2013;
- Maugeri, Leonardo (2012), “Oil, the Next Revolution. The Unprecedented Upsurge of Oil Production Capacity and What It Means for the World”, Discussion Paper No, 10/2012, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, June;

- Maugeri, Leonardo (2013), "The Shale Oil Boom: A U.S. Phenomenon", Discussion Paper 5/2013, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University, June;
- MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (2011), *The Future of Natural Gas. An Interdisciplinary MIT Study*, Cambridge, Massachusetts;
- Mufson, Steven (2012), "The New Boom: Shale Gas Fueling and American Industrial Revival" in *The Washington Post*, November 12;
- Myers Jaffe, Amy; O'Sullivan, Meghan (2012), *The Geopolitics of Natural Gas: Report on Scenario's Workshop of Harvard University's Belfer Center and Rice University's Baker Institute Energy Forum*, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School;
- Natural Gas Europe (2013), "Halliburton's New Technology Enables Reuse of Produced Water", March 7;
- Nersessian, Roy L. (2007), *Energy for the 21st Century. A Comprehensive Guide to Conventional and Unconventional Resources*, M. E. Sharpe;
- Rahm, Dianne (2011), "Regulating Hydraulic Fracturing in Shale Gas Plays: The Case of Texas" in *Energy Policy*, No. 39;
- Richter, Wolf (2012), "Dirt Cheap Natural Gas is Tearing Up the Industry That's Producing It" in *Business Insider*, June 5;
- Riley, Alan (2012), "The Geostrategic Implications of the Shale Gas Revolution", The Institute for Statecraft, statecraft.org.uk/research/geostrategic-implications-shale-gas-revolution, accessed June 2013;
- Riley, Alan (2013), "Deploying the Energy Incentive: Reinforcing EU Integration in South-East Europe", CEPS Policy Brief, No. 296, July 8;
- SRU (*Sachverständigen Rat für Umweltfragen*) (2013), "Fracking zur Schieffergasgewinnung. Ein Beitrag zur Energie und umweltpolitischen Bewertung", Stellungnahme, No. 18, May;
- UT (2012), "Study Finds Correlation Between Injection Wells and Small Earthquakes", August 6, www.utexas.edu/news/2012/08/06/correlation-injection-wells-smallearthquakes, accessed June 2013.

HIGHER EDUCATION FINANCING POLICIES IN CEE COUNTRIES. THE CASE OF ROMANIA, HUNGARY AND SLOVAKIA

*Ioana CIUCANU**

Abstract: *The OECD publication of “Universities under Scrutiny” (1987) was among the first official statement signalling the changing role of higher education in the context of a post-industrial society by addressing policy proposals which deal with issues such as productivity, efficiency and accountability. In this light, the main aim of my study is to further current academic debates on governance reforms undertaken in European tertiary education systems, with a specific research focus on financing policies by assessing the degree of policy change in terms of principles, regulations and outcomes in three European countries, Romania, Hungary and Slovakia and analyze to what extent there is a general converging model in financing higher education institutions across the sample case studies. Although common path in higher education funding reforms can be traced in all these countries, differences lie within policy processes of formulation and implementation where internal political and socio-economic factors play an important role. In this sense, policy recommendations entail implementing an evidence-based policy-making model in financing HEIs focused on transnational/international policy learning environment based on communication and policy borrowing as key strategies.*

Keywords: *funding, reforms, HE systems, convergence, policy-making, governance, institutionalism*

Introduction

In his article on Karl Jaspers’ “Renewal of the University”, Jürgen Habermas (1987) tackles the phenomenon of expansion that has evolved after World War II in higher education, which led Talcott Parsons to speak of an “educational revolution” (p.3), thus affecting and changing both nature and structure of higher education systems. Since then, there has been a growing demand to widen access to higher education, which was bound to change the elitist nature of universities (Rosenblit et al, 2007: 373). The phenomenon of massification in education, in general, and in higher education, in particular, which began to take place after the 50’s, called for a reanalysis and reassessment of the role of education in a postindustrial society, and it is inevitably calling into question the character of the university itself as a social institution (Filmer, 1997: 48). All the more, policy proposals sketched by the OECD referred to coupling university’s self-definition with external expectations by designing policies that would promote greater “vocationalism”

* Ph.D. candidate, Political Science Department, The National School of Political Studies and Public Administration of Bucharest, E-mail: ioana.ciucanu@gmail.com. Beneficiary of the “Doctoral Scholarships for a Sustainable Society” Project, project co-financed by the European Union through the European Social Fund, Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources and Development 2007-2013

and a sense of “appliedness” (Peters, 2004: 68), as well as a greater focus on efficiency, productivity and accountability. Therefore, beginning with 1980’s, a change of paradigm has been taking place in terms of what universities are supposed to be and to offer in the larger context of a knowledge-based society, all these involving rethinking funding mechanisms in supporting larger cohorts of students and academic staff, as well as implying diversification of finance streams. Hence, reforms of higher education systems, both at European level and worldwide, were aimed at rendering systems more efficient.

Therefore, the main aim for bringing up the topic of funding policies in tertiary education into this academic enterprise is to advance and render a clearer picture on issues of policy change and adaptation in higher education research in three Central and Eastern European countries for which these types of inquiries have been rather limited to specific processes (e.g. the Bologna Process), or even inexistent, hereby referring to Slovak Republic, Hungary and Romania. I take on a comparative case study research for analyzing national higher education funding reforms within a period of 12 years (2000-2012), assessing the degree of policy change in terms of principles, regulations and outcomes in three European countries, Romania, Hungary and Slovakia and analyze to what extent there is a general converging model in financing higher education institutions across the sample case studies by outlining both differences and commonalities encountered, as well as designing a theoretical framework for explaining them. The central assumption my arguments rest on sustains that all four countries under investigation have pursued higher education funding reforms in line with the main European trends, thus expressing policy convergence towards a common model imposed by the transition to a new governance system, but that the incentives for change played out different on national level.

1. Governance of European Higher Education

1.1. Governance: main perspectives and trends

Theoretical work on governance reflects the interest of social science community in a shifting pattern in styles of governing, thus being concerned with creating the conditions for ordered rule and collective action (Stoker 1998). Although, reviews of literature generally conclude that the term is used in a variety of ways and has a variety of meanings, there is a baseline agreement that governance refers to the development of governing styles in which boundaries between and within public and private sectors have become blurred (1998: 17). Its theoretical roots are various pointing at different approaches like institutional economics, international relations, organisational studies, political science, public administration, development studies and its precursors would include work on corporatism, policy communities and a range of economic analysis (ibid:18). Thence, governance is being perceived as a highly contested concept that concerns the exercise of collective control towards common goals (De Boer and File 2009, Middlehurst and Teixeira 2012).

In this sense, the meanings attached to governance rest mainly on how different researchers view this process. For example, Kjaer (2004) distinguishes between governance in public administration and public policy, governance in international relations, European Union governance, governance in comparative politics, or good governance, while Rhodes (2007) resumes the term only to public administration and public policy by reference to governance as governing with and through networks.

Additionally, Mayntz (1998)[†] suggests that there are three meanings attached to the concept of governance. For one thing, governance is now often used to indicate a new mode of governing that is distinct from the hierarchical control model, a more cooperative mode where state and non-state actors participate in mixed public and private networks. In any case it is clear that attempts at collective problem-solving outside of existing hierarchical frameworks, such as we can observe on the European and the international level, have contributed significantly to this shift in the meaning of the term governance (*ibid*). Thereby, a steering metaphor represents a good way in which to approach the idea of governance, since contemporary societies require collective actions about a range of issues that cannot be adequately addressed by individual action, and finding the means to implement those decisions (Peters 2010).

The second "new" meaning of the term governance is much more general and it highlights different modes of coordinating individual actions, or basic forms of social order. Hence, governance as an alternative to hierarchical control has been studied on the level of national (and sub-national) and of European policy-making, and in international relations and the works by Jan Kooiman (1993) and R.W.A. Rhodes (1997) illustrate these strands (1998).

Furthermore, Mayntz (1998) offers a concise summary of the developments in governance theory that have successively led to the emergence of a model of multi-level, multi-actor governance as the most adequate theoretical answer to the changed empirically reality of policy-making (Witte 2006). After World War II, policy research focus has concentrated on a planning model that would envisage the clear separation of policy development by government and policy implementation by public agencies (2006: 25).

Consequently, the concept of public governance can be broken down into five distinct strands such as socio-political governance, concerned with the institutional relationships within society (Kooiman 2005). In this approach, government is no longer pre-eminent in public policy, but has to rely upon external actors for its legitimacy and impact in this field (2010: 6). The second strand envisages public policy governance aimed at identifying how policy elites and networks interact to create and govern the policy processes (Marsh and Rhodes 1992, Klijn and Koppenjan 2000, Peters 2008). The last three approaches deal with administrative, contract and network governance, all interlinked with the field of policy implementation and public service delivery subsumed to ideas of New Public Management. Therefore, governance research displays a rather wide array of models and perspectives, ranging from network analyses (Sorensen and Torfing 2007), via governance models based in social complexity (Kooiman 2003, Pierre and Peters 2005), towards studies of governance form a more state-centric perspective (Pierre and Peters 2000), thus propelling collaborative arrangements of governing and service delivery (Pierre 2009: 605).

1.2. Policy governance in higher education

Nevertheless, governance in higher education has different meanings and applications both broad and narrow in scope (Middlehurst 2004, Middlehurst and Teixeira 2012). Notwithstanding, governance in higher education is most defined as the structure and process for college and university decision-making at the institutional, system wide, or state level (Rosser 2002).

[†]<http://www.uned.es/113016/docencia/spd%20-%20doctorado%20200102/Introducci%F3n/Mayntz%20governance%20EUI%201998.htm#>, accessed at 23.05.2013

In this respect, Gallagher (2001) states that governance in higher education can be seen as a structure of relationships that bring about organizational coherence, authorise policies, plans and decisions, and account for their probity, responsiveness and cost-effectiveness. Therefore, descriptions and analyses of governance arrangements in higher education refer both to institutional and system levels (2012) by distinguishing between internal and external governance (2002).

Then, while internal governance refers to the institutional arrangements within universities, external governance regards these arrangements at system level by addressing issues pertaining to laws and decrees, funding and evaluation (De Boer and File 2009). Thus, external perspective on governance highlights the degree of supervision by the government and public authorities, as well as views containing the public mission of higher education such as the advancement of knowledge, training of qualified labour, social equity, or its exogenous benefits on society as a whole (Rosser 2002). But, it also suggests the changing role of the state in governing the higher education sector, with state power being dissipated and distributed at different policy levels, thus involving more actors within the policy making processes (2009: 11).

Though, current governance structures of European higher education systems vary with respect to the degree to which national governments can steer HE in a top-down way or take into account various stakeholders, in general they are most adequately characterized as systems of multi-level and multi-actor governance (Witte 2006, p. 28). Moreover, a distinction is being made between policy styles (Van Waarden cit. in Witte 2006) such as liberalism-pluralism (England), etatism (France), corporatism (Germany, Netherlands).

Yet most researchers (Becher and Kogan 1980, Witte 2006) maintain the view that higher education sector is characterized by a network-like governance structure regardless of the styles employed. As Becher and Kogan put it (2006, p. 28), in the case of HE “we are not dealing with a hierarchical system, where change can be decreed from above, but rather with a negotiable one in which individuals, basic units and institutions regard themselves as having the right to decide what is best for them”.

Furthermore, others (Cerych and Sabatier) who focus on the implementation stage of the policy process argue that “the special problems posed by HE reform implementation are set primarily by the autonomous actors present, and by the diffusion of authority throughout the structure, thus policy implementation becoming a study of interactions between different actors (Witte 2006).

In this light, the external dimension of governance comprising relationships between government, buffer organizations and HEIs becomes useful within my current analysis of funding reforms in CEE countries by offering a framework for discussing issues regarding formulation and implementation of financing policies in different national contexts and whether a network-like governance model of policy making can be depicted here as well.

1.3. European higher education governance and the knowledge society

The European Commission has put forward a clear vision for the governance of European higher education institutions, which primarily includes a diversification of funding resources, an intensification of ties between universities and industries and a closer match between the supply of qualifications and subject degree, and labour market demands (Dobbins et al. 2011: 666). The classic model of public sector governance, in time, has been replaced by a new one which puts emphasis on “managerialism”, public accountability and quality in

public service delivery. Furthermore, the growth of research interest in higher education is also partly a function of higher education's enormous expansion in recent decades so that today its character and performance have large implications for all members of society, whether or not they engage directly with higher education (Brennan, Teichler, 2008).

In the EU context, the governance of higher education has been shaped through the initialization of the Bologna process by embedding a set of goals, such as to promote citizen's mobility and employability, to achieve greater compatibility and comparability between higher education systems and increase their international competitiveness. Furthermore, the EU Lisbon Council in 2000 has stressed the importance of education and training in forging economic competitiveness and development within European Union outlining the role of universities in the process of knowledge production: "Europe needs excellence in its universities, to optimise the processes which underpin the knowledge society and meet the target, set out by the European Council in Lisbon, of becoming the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion" (COM 2003). The Lisbon strategy could be considered an all-encompassing knowledge society project (Matei, 2012: 678).

Moreover, the Lisbon European Council laid the ground for applying the "open method of co-ordination" for the first time to the field of education, a method suited to build up a high level of commitment (Witte, 2006). This created a Europe with three parallel paths towards a European higher education area: the intergovernmental Bologna Process focusing on system reforms, the European activities in Socrates II focusing on the traditional areas of exchange and networking, and the Lisbon Agenda, emphasizing higher education's capacity to contribute to innovation in the European knowledge economy (Beerens, 2008: 417).

Nonetheless, Beerens outlines that the process of Europeanization can be seen as the emergence of a new layer of governance, a layer with a wide range of interactions, and that layer is the European Higher Education Area which is particularly designed to enhance the convergence between higher education systems in the different countries, the Bologna Process being the main vehicle to achieve this (Van der Wende 2008). Thence, European Commission outlines, promotes and sustains universities' task to continuously adapt to changing needs and society demands, with research supporting knowledge society which depends for its growth on the production of new knowledge and its transmission through education and training (Weymans, 2010: 121).

All the more, cooperation between European HEIs becomes of very importance and it is highly valued on policy agenda by laying out the power to redefine the concept of frontier itself (Horga and Brie 2008, 2011). From this perspective, interuniversity cooperation within the external frontiers of the European Community enforced by the above mentioned process becomes the principal driving engine for promoting the values pertaining to a good neighbourhood policy (2008: 232).

2. Higher Education Funding Reforms Across European Countries

2.1. Funding models and main steering mechanisms

There are different methods for financing higher education depending on the criteria and formula employed by governments for allocating the funds. A typology of funding systems has been described by Salmi and Hauptman (Frolich et al. 2006: 9) who distinguish between direct public funding of institutions, i.e. direct funds for teaching through negotiated formula, performance-based funding, funding for specific purposes/

for research and teaching, block grant or project funding, and funding for students via scholarships, public grants, student loans. For the classification of funding arrangements, Jongbloed (2004) uses two questions which are related to what is being funded by the government, i.e. the funding base, and the way funds are distributed.

The funding base reflects whether funds are tied to educational outputs and performance or rather to inputs such as number of enrolled students, teaching positions, etc., while ways for distributing funds pertain to the degree of competition implied by the funding schemes (2004: 4). According to these two dimensions (the degree of outcome orientation and regulation), four ideal funding models for higher education emerge.

The first model shows a more traditional type of budgeting, where allocations are based on requests and often on the previous year's allocations, being known as negotiated funding. Funding is line item based which is determined by referring to norms with respect to indicators such as unit costs or capacity (2004).

The second model is performance driven under which a formula is used to determine the amounts for individual institutions. One of the most important features of any performance funding system is the set of indicators that are used to measure performance and may be related to input, process, output or outcome measure (Orosz, 2012). As such, inputs include the resources, human, financial and physical, that are used to support the educational, research and administrative activities of higher education institutions. Process measures provide information on how a certain activity is carried out.

Output indicators provide information on the quantity of products that are the result of the institution's activity; in the case of higher education institutions, output indicators may include measures such as the number of credits earned, or the number of degrees awarded, model operating in Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands where a mixture of these criteria are in use, whereas outcome indicators (2012) measure the impact of the institution's activity on its environment. For example, in Denmark the main determinant is the number of credits earned by students, while in Sweden a mix of enrolment numbers and credits plays out (Jongbloed 2004: 5). Furthermore, the level of funding associated with performance becomes critical since the impact of financial incentives varies by the size of the reward. For example, Germany has begun implementing university reform according to the steering paradigm of competition for scarce public funding, and consequently, financial initiatives have been set out to encourage universities to improve their performance (Orr et al, 2007: 5). Though performance funding mechanisms are largely in use across all German *Länder*, their budget relevance is still marginal and they differ from *Land to Land*.

In U.S., formula funding was introduced during the growth era of 1950's and 1960's as a means to ensure the equitable and rational distribution of resources thus taking into account an institutional need for predictability and stability in funding levels, as well as the desire to increase the professionalism of academia (Serban 1998: 16). But even if formula has been introduced, the U.S. funding regime is one of a more complexity due to the multi-dimensional axis of resource allocations across the system, whereby the will of donors, the confidence of parents, the expectations of students and the funding from state and local governments have shaped the environment (Sörlin, 2007). Moreover, performance funding policies are those where the state collects performance data and the legislature/funding agency considers it when crafting the budget, but where there are no formally specified benchmarks that result in automatic increases/decreases in financial support (Rabovsky, 2011). Then, performance budgeting and funding are linked to performance reporting and appears to mandate a form of funding which takes information

and performance indicators into consideration. In U.S., the most common indicators on performance (Sörlin, 2007: 72-3) reveal information on input – admission standards and measures, process – graduation rates, freshmen and minority retention, faculty workload, students' satisfaction, number of accredited programs, output – degrees awarded, sponsor research funds, national rankings and outcomes – placement data on graduates, satisfaction of employers.

On the other hand, in UK, performance funding was initiated within the Research Selectivity Exercise (RSE) in 1986 which became known as the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) administrated by the University Grants Committee. Moreover, there was a tendency to allocate fewer funds on a per student basis, and this was coupled with the aim to embrace an ever wider student population within higher education. Since 1989/90, annual (public) funding per student dropped from close to £8,000 to roughly £4,600 (2002/03) and, for these reasons, performance funding and the RAE were to play a critical role in the distribution of scarce resources. Apart from the RAE, the Higher Education Funding Council of England (HEFCE) distributes funds for teaching and learning according to a formula based on indicators like the number of students enrolled (EU only), subject-related factors (e.g. premium for part-time students) or institutional-related factors (Bakker, 2007). In England, while the allocation of teaching grant is entirely based on input indicators, the determination of research grants is almost entirely performance-based and the system is dual. In this respect, HEFCE issues grants to support research infrastructure (staff, facilities, etc.), as well as projects through different tenders (2007: 35). The purpose specific scheme highlights a market oriented system involving institutions in the tendering process for providing education, training and research to meet national needs. Moreover, the demand driven system implies the use of vouchers and adapting educational offer to students' demands.

Concerning financial steering mechanisms used for funding HE institutions, there are three types first categorised by the German Higher Education Research Council which include formula-based approaches, project-based funding and contracts (Jongbloed et al. 2008: 30), all being implemented as a mix in education policy practice, with every country having a mix of their own reflecting historical and political developments.

2.2. Higher education funding reforms across European countries (1990-2012)


Starting with 1980s, change of paradigm has been taking place in terms of what universities are supposed to be and to offer in the larger context of a knowledge-based society. However, the massification of higher education within OECD countries also involved rethinking new funding models apart from those delivered by the state which also implied a diversification of funding bodies. The change had common roots with more general changes in the entire social context and in the atmosphere and ideologies of economic, social and educational policy. The trend included state budget cuts, pressure for efficiency, conditional contracting, evaluation systems, managerialism and emphasis on the values of an enterprise culture (2009: 183). As a result, there is a strong international science policy trend that emphasizes the research performance of the university sector (Himanen 2009) due to an increase of both public and private financial dependence which led to a performance-based budgeting strategy.

An OECD report (2003) on higher education states the changes in funding patterns across OECD countries under investigation by switching from itemised distribution of public funds to lump sum or block grants. In most countries the majority of recurrent spending for teaching and training, support services and administration is being

provided in block grants. There also has been a move away from negotiated line item funding towards more transparent, formula-based funding (Jongbloed 2004).

Therefore, in a performance oriented funding mechanism, examples of output indicators incorporated in the formula or the budget negotiations are the number of credits accumulated by students, the number of degrees awarded, the number of research publications, and the number of patents or licenses issued (Jongbloed and Vossensteyn 2001: 128). In this sense, most funding formulae rely on input criteria referring to the volume of institutional activities which can be estimated according to the volume of resources such as academic staff, enrolled students, staff salaries, etc.

Figure 1: Total public expenditure on tertiary education as % of GDP, 2008



Source:

Eurydice, Eurostat 2012

Most commonly used criterion is the number of students registered previous or during current year, and in most cases the number of state funded study places is established with or by national government in countries like Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania (Eurydice 2008). Relative to adopting performance indicators, the number of graduates reflects rate of student success, as well as number of credits earned (in Sweden 45% of the block grant is determined by full time study results per year, whilst in Norway performance defined 50% of the educational component of the grant received), completion of the year (UK). Other output indicators used in formulae refer to the relative success of graduates on the labour market, the number of graduates working in jobs related to their fields of study, or the success of universities in generating additional revenues from contract activities like teaching and research (2001).

One of the key questions funding mechanism intents to answer relies, on the one hand, in how much money governments are willing to allocate to public HEIs, and for what purposes, on the other hand. In this sense, in 2008, the proportion of total public expenditure on education was more than 5% of GDP in most European countries, while for tertiary education the percentages range from 0.8% to 2.2%, with Denmark and Norway exceeding 2% (Eurydice, Eurostat 2012).

Several countries have national economic plans or strategies that are linked to their educational policies (with respect to schools as well as HE, vocational education and training, and to research and innovation as much as – or more than – teaching) (Middlehurst et al 2012: 20). These national strategies (e.g. Germany's "High-Tech Strategy", Denmark's Globalisation Strategy, Poland's National Development Programme

or Japan's Fourth Basic Science and Technology Plan) identify national priorities in terms of broad subject areas, themes, particular fields or 'pillars'. In some cases they go further, as in the Netherlands' 'Human Capital Strategy'.

3. Funding Reform in CEE Countries (2000-2013)

3.1. Financing policy reforms in Romania

Starting with 1998 until 2012, various policy initiatives have been undertaken aiming at improving the system by introducing new mechanism that would enhance better performance and efficiency in allocating and distributing funds to public HEIs (Miroiu and Dincă 2000). In this light, the turning point in reforming higher education financing schemes is marked by the year of 1999, when a new formula-based funding mechanism has been introduced for allocating funds to public universities. The new philosophy, coherently integrated into the wider process of the systemic reform, has been developed based on the premise to which the state allocates funds not for the unfolding of the educational process, but for its results (Dumitrache et al. 2006: 44). Furthermore, it was design as to hold elements of competition and scientific evaluation criteria for funds' allocations, along with the core idea that "resources follow the student" (Miroiu and Dincă 2000).

The reasons behind introducing this kind of formula was to replace the old centralised financing philosophy with a student-centred scheme mainly driven at university level and based on the number and structure of student body (CNFIS[‡]). These changes were an expression of a set of priorities envisaged by the subsequent reforms in financing tertiary education which outlined the need of a more complex funding scheme, along with increasing financial, thus managerial, autonomy of universities, diversifying funding sources, cost sharing through tuition fees, a clear separation between allocations for education and training and those for research (CNFIS).

The reform set forth in 1999 introduced formula-based mechanism which comprises the general input criteria such as the number of students enrolled in different programmes (Bachelor, Master, PhD) and a series of adjusted coefficients by field of study and type of programme (Miroiu and Vlăsceanu 2012, CNFIS 2009). Moreover, the funds are distributed on a block scheme in two major components: basic fund which is addressing staff costs and material expenses, and the complementary fund (or additional fund) is to cover the subsidies for student accommodation, equipment, investment and general overhaul, and funds for academic research, the latter being granted on a competitive basis only (except subsidies for student accommodation which were mainly established by taking into account criteria like the no. of students living in student residence centres) (CNFIS 2009).

Table 1: Number of state-funded students[§] 2005-2011

State-funded students	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
	388.571	362.282	375.188	380.848	396.159	416.824	433.849

Source: CNFIS

[‡] Working paper on the evolution of QI6 (IC6) available at: <http://www.cnfis.ro/documente/011508-analizaIC6-draft.pdf> accessed on 09.01.2013

[§] Number of equivalent student

Furthermore, the new funding policy brought in more transparency within the system of allocation due not only to formula use, but also to the establishment of intermediate, buffer, bodies assigned to apply it, like the National Council for Higher Education Funding (Consiliul Național pentru Finanțarea Învățământului Superior) and the Executive Agency for Higher Education, Research, Development and Innovation Funding (Unitatea Executivă pentru Finanțarea Învățământului Superior, a Cercetării, Dezvoltării și Inovării).

Table 2: Evolution of basic funding 2002-2007

		2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Basic funding	Mil Lei	477	633	847	1041	1175	1560
	Mil Euro	153	169	209	287	332	446
Total weight GDP	%	0.32	0.32	0.43	0.36	0.34	0.39

Source: CNFIS 2007

In 2011, an exercise for classifying universities and ranking study programmes has been designed and implemented in order to render a clearer picture on the quality of the Romanian higher education training and research system. Therefore, along with the enactment of a new National Education Act in 2011, a new funding methodology (proposed for the 2012 academic year) has been put in place which is intended to re-enforce the linkage between performance (both research and institutional) and public funding by introducing “excellence indexes” into the formula, thus replacing the old quality indicators used in previous allocations (2002-2010).

The new Education Act 1/2011 introduced different categories of funds into a new methodology by making a clear distinction between basic, complementary and supplementary (additional) funds. The 2011 Law does not lay out a detailed picture of the new scheme, but the basic funding still addresses staff spending (salaries, training, etc.), material spending (maintenance, implementation of study programmes, books and related publications, etc.), while the supplementary fund is allocated for financing MA and PhD study programmes in science and high technology, study programmes held in foreign languages, institutional development capacity and efficient management, as well as strengthening the connection between institutional mission and local and regional environment.

3.2. Financing policy reforms in Hungary

Before the fall of the communist regime in early 1990s, Hungarian higher education system was historically centralized (Darvas 1994), with large state-funded institutions, specializing in certain fields of knowledge, and with a dual structure (colleges and universities), except for theological institutions. Today, there are 69 institutions of tertiary education gathering 18 universities, 13 colleges, 26 church-owned institutions and 12 private institutions (one is university and 11 are colleges) (Eurydice 2004, Balázs et al. 2011). The most important element of the programme set forth to reform the Hungarian higher education system was the priority of increasing the number of student admissions up to 60-80%, thus reflecting the changing requirements of the economy and employment policy (1994).

Anyhow, the sudden increase in student enrolment in Hungary, with the ratio of first year higher education students to the number of school graduates (same year) which has increased from 38% in 1988 up to 65.8% by 2000 and 73.5% by 2005, may be attributed to the relative low level of participation in higher education during the socialist

era (Berde and Ványolós 2008: 301). Accordingly, the increase of student enrolment took place mainly in the public sector, with Hungary having fewer private HEIs than neighbouring countries. In the academic year 2006-2007, the increase in tertiary education reversed, the decrease in enrolment being the result of declining demographics (2008).

The 1993 Act on Higher Education was the first law to enable the establishment of a binary system with non-state HEIs, e.g. church and private universities, universities (*egyetem*) offering educational training and basic and advanced research, and colleges (*főiskola*) designed as short cycle studies up to at least three years and maximum four years, granting practical training and basic research. On the other hand, higher education institutions could also organize short-cycle (two years) post-secondary courses called Accredited Higher Vocational Training by integrating them into the higher education system (Csepes 2003: 61).

In this sense, the 1996 Amendment of the Law on Higher Education defined a four-level structure of higher education: two years for higher vocational training at its base, 3-4 years for college programmes (undergraduate), 4-6 years for university programmes (graduate) and 3 years for doctoral programmes together with other specialized post-graduate programmes for 2 years (Tarrósy 2002). A special feature of Hungarian higher education institutional system is that the proportion of colleges is relatively high, and, while the majority of state-funded HEIs are universities, the non-state sector is dominated by colleges (Balázs et al. 2011). The Act of 1993 was essentially modified in 1996 Amendment, and in 2000 it was amended into the so-called "Law of Merger" which restructured small universities so that they became larger and more complex.

In 1996, a normative funding system has been established which took into account differentiated expenses on type of institution and fields which were to be encouraged in the context of the knowledge-based economy (to which extra funding is allocated) (2012: 310). Its standard is yearly defined by two factors: the number of new admissions funded by the state and budgetary limit of state support as set by the Budget Act (2011: 10).

Other aspects of the state's financial support are in proportion to the number of academic and management staff which count for research and development activities as well as for maintenance, while social support rests solely on student numbers. Moreover, HEIs may receive state support on basis of an application or an agreement, as stipulated by the 2005 Higher Education Act, with grants being provided for student bursaries, training, research, management and specific tasks. The grant is then distributed directly to HEIs in case of state universities, and through a maintainer for non state institutions based on an agreement with the Minister.

Consequently, subsidies are based on a Maintenance Agreement between the Ministry and each institution, with one part of the subsidies remaining the same, while the other amended yearly according to the number of students enrolled in the institutions. For state institutions, the agreement is valid for three years, and for non state institutions one year. The allocation of funds is based on different formulae, for example funds for teaching are computed according to educational field and grades, and on state level, the maintenance subsidy and for R&D must be at least half the amount paid for teaching (Tarrósy 2002: 10). In Hungary, a treaty signed by the government in 1997 and ratified by the government in 1999 with the Vatican guarantees that Catholic higher education institutions are entitled to the same level of public funding as public institutions (2008: 304). In this way, sector neutrality meaning that state funding follows the student regardless whether the student chooses public or private institutions is even more emphasised by this new Act.

Table 3: State financial allocations 2000-2010 (thousands HUF)

Academic year	State supported training		Study grant		Social assistance		Dormitory residence	
	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%
2000/01	162 296	92.40	88 908	50.62	65 603	37.35	48 165	26.19
2001/02	165 307	89.64	90 516	49.08	50 157	27.20	47 957	24.85
2002/03	170 419	87.50	85 400	43.85	46 120	23.68	48 638	23.91
2003/04	178 215	86.13	81 496	39.38	42 321	20.45	51 034	23.59
2004/05	181 170	84.04	91 900	42.63	47 204	21.90	49 734	22.05
2005/06	185 350	84.06	87 737	39.79	44 103	20.00	49 036	21.18
2006/07	187 675	82.66	84 553	37.24	43 781	19.28	49 584	20.77
2007/08	185 096	80.24	67 732	29.36	50 106	21.72	47 695	19.64
2008/09	184 243	80.37	64 769	28.25	50 407	21.99	47 593	19.59
2009/10	183 458	80.58	60 360	26.51	45 873	20.15	45 968	18.94

Source: Hungarian Statistical Office 2012

The most important change within the higher education funding system since 2000's consisted of the introduction of formula financing model which became more and more complex along the years by adding new factors (Polónyi 2012). The 2005 Higher Education Act didn't bring new features into the financing system, funding being essentially determined by the same elements as those applied in the previous academic year (2004/05) such as training, academic purpose, maintenance, grants for specific tasks (including student support) (2012: 235).

As the general trend, in Hungary there is a double pressure on the financing of higher education through public attempts to bring in private sources, while keeping strong support for free education (Berde and Ványolós 2008). Tuition fee system has been introduced starting with 1995 and its basic value was 2% of state funding per student (approximately 2000 HUF/month), and abolished soon after, in 1998. In 2007, a new attempt for introducing tuition in public higher education has been forged, but a referendum on this issue held in 2008 abolished it again.

Overall, while the resources per capita have been steadily declining, the demand for tertiary education has been increasing up until 2005/06 academic year (2008: 306). Conditions of entry in higher education changed considerably in 2000, containing that output should be in line with the country's real social and economic needs and with labour market prospects (Eurydice 2004). The annual Budget Act determines the per capita funding which presently is 91.000 HUF.

In the last three years, policy issues regarding financing the higher education sector have gained greater attention on the public agenda in Hungary, mainly due to fiscal and budgetary pressures forged by international economic and financial crisis - "these days, I would say that financing higher education sector is the topic number one in Hungary for two main reasons: one is the budget policy, the fiscal goal of the government to keep the budget deficit low, and the second is the general reduction of public spending which is extremely harsh in the sector" (Halász 2013). In this sense, if it is to compare state funding on HE two or three years ago, which was about 180 billion HUF, to the current total allocation which is around 120-130 billion HUF, that leads to a huge reduction in state allocation of 50-60% within a very short period of time (Halász 2013). Consequently, higher education financing policies have been shaped according to both

national and international economic and fiscal context by applying significant budget cuts and therefore inducing the need of designing a new funding model (Derényi 2013).

One other novelty was brought in 2011 by the Government's proposal on decreasing the number of state-funded places from 60.000 to 25-35.000 places within three years and keeping the state-funded places for specific study fields like sciences, natural sciences while fields pertaining to business, economics, law or social sciences and humanities were left to be supported from student fees (Derényi 2013, Temesi 2013). Due to street student union demonstrations, the proposal regarding the decrease of funded places has been withdrawn while maintaining the idea of financing only the fields of science and natural sciences in the forthcoming period (Temesi 2013).

3.3. Financing policy reforms in Slovak Republic

Following the post-communist educational reforms in the South-Eastern Europe, Slovak higher education has undergone structural fundamental changes after 1990s like in many other former communist countries in CEE Europe. First, the New Higher Education Act (1992) stipulated and guaranteed academic freedom, followed by a New Act in 2002 which created the legal framework for implementing the Bologna Declaration, the establishment of HE institutions, as well as changes in public financing mechanisms (EUA Report 2008, p. 13).

The current reform of higher education system in Slovakia, the essential part of which is the reform of its funding scheme, took place during the office of two governments: the first period lasted from October 1998 until October 2002, while the second was linked to it to be finished after premature Parliamentary elections in June 2006 (Mederly 2006). The main reform priorities set forth within the higher education policy area relate to general aspects such as broadening access to higher education, support for Ph.D. students, increasing quality of research and training activities, enhancing study programme and institutional diversification, support of multi-source funding, as well as increasing state subsidies (2006).

The key features identified in the pre-2002 funding mechanism were due to several aspects such as distorted incentives with regard to student numbers, that is, the system didn't provide motivation for growth in full-time student enrolments since the level of state subsidies did not increase. However, the number of part-time students has gradually grown up as higher education institutions increased the number of part-time study programmes during this period.

Table 4: Number of new students in the academic year 1990/91 to 2005/2006

Form of study	1990	1995	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
Full time	13.404	20.809	24.279	24.270	26.974	24.150	32.488	35.542
Part time	1868	3881	9665	12.763	8057	15.057	15.718	17.254
Total	15.272	24.690	33.944	37.033	35.031	39.207	48.206	52.796

Source: Mederly 2006

Another aspect relates to funding scientific research on competitive basis, which was absent in this period as the funding formula did not take into account research outputs and outcomes (2010: 164). Moreover, the lack of a sustainable approach to financial management along with absence of a long-term planning renders an inefficient funding model in the long run. Under these circumstances, the funding model rests on a historical way of distributing public funds to HEIs with separate allocations for wages and operations (Mederly 2006, Beblavý et al. 2010).

On the other hand, owing to long-lasting deficit in the amount of funds from state budget, HEIs were not capable to secure from the funds allocated for maintenance and restoration of their property, not even for the daily operations which resulted in wear and tear of their properties and in running into debts, and which the State partially solved it by additional funding (Mederly 2006). After introducing the new funding mechanism, acceleration in the growth of student numbers can be traced as shown in the table below; consequently, beginning with the 1990's, the number of new students increased from 18% of total population aged 18 in 1990 to 61% in 2005 (in both public and private universities).

Beginning with 2002, the financial support for institutions has been granted in the form of four groups of subsidies on the basis of contract for running accredited study programmes, for research and development, development of higher education institutions and for students' social support (2006).

Table 5: Public expenditure on higher education in SKK**

Total public expenditure on tertiary education	2004	2005	2006	2007
	7.993.261	8.970.209	10.186.577	10.846.947

Source: Slovstat 2012

Therefore, the new system can be characterized by the following main features such as: number of students (weighted by standardized cost coefficients for individual areas of study); number of graduates weighted in a similar manner; number of Ph.D. students and graduates; professional and education structure of the teaching staff (number of full professors, associate professors and other teachers holding Ph.D. degree; research publications weighted by category which should reflect the importance and quality. The criteria used within the funding formula for the implementation of accredited study programmes relates basically to the number of students, number of graduates, economic demand of the study programmes, higher education institution classification and other criteria related to provision of teaching. The economic demand of a study programme is expressed by the coefficient of economic demands (CED), and its value for each study field is derived from the value of the coefficient of personnel demand (CPD) for that study field.

The Law Code states that public funding is issued to state higher education institutions (military, police and medical HEIs) as well, while private universities may be funded by the Ministry upon request: "the Ministry, having received a standpoint of the representative bodies of higher education institutions and with the Government consent may, upon request, grant subsidies to a private higher education institution for implementing its accredited study programme, for research, development or artistic activities and for development of the higher education institution" (Law Code Act 2002, Section 89). Higher education training is free for all level and types of study programmes, tuition fees being charged for exceeding the standard study length or for attending simultaneously, in one academic year, two or more study programmes provided by the public higher education institution at the same level (Law Code Act 2002, Section 92). The most significant change in the allocation system is the switch to a mixture of input and output-based budgeting including number of students (weighted by standardised cost coefficients for individual areas of study), number of graduates, number of PhD students and graduates, teaching staff, research publications, volume of research grants (Beblavy et al. 2010: 164).

** Slovstat: <http://portal.statistics.sk/showdoc.do?docid=3158>, accessed on 18.09.2012

In reforming financial systems for Slovak higher education, several priorities have been formulated and which referred to general issues such as broadening access in higher education by enabling universities to increase the student body, support of quality in education, research and development, support of PhD study, enabling multisource funding and increasing public subsidies (2006: 8-9). According to the new funding mechanism, the criteria used in allocating public subsidies is divided in: allocation based on historical principles, on education performance in which student numbers play a decisive role, on research performance and project quality (2006: 16). However, the lack of quality in higher education, together with poor designed methodologies for measuring it, has been regarded as a highly prevailing issue on national higher education agenda within the last ten years.

Table 5: Funding of the public HEIs from the state budget in 2000 and 2011 in €

Item/Year	2000	2011
Total subsidies for HEIs from state budget	170 mil	425 mil
Subsidies for public HEIs as % of GDP	0.54	0.61
Number of full-time students in public HEIs	88.192	125.501
Increase in number of full-time students in %		42.3
Increase of total subsidies in current prices in %		150.6
Average subsidy per full-time student in current prices	1923	3386
Increase of total subsidies in prices of 2000 in %		60.4
Average subsidy per full-time student in 2000 prices	1923	2168

Source: Mederly 2012

In analysing the impact of funding mechanism employed since 2002, findings contain that the introduction of the new funding system has had significant impact on institutional behaviour, thus making universities become more active within the competitive process of allocation and motivate them to enlarge their educational and research capacities. Furthermore, it enabled the establishment of both a transparent economic management based on clear rules for subsidy allocation of state funds and cost analysis system for calculating the real costs of higher education training (2006: 18). These changes have had a major impact on institutional level, making universities behave in specific ways through different steering financial mechanisms, for example attracting more full-time and Ph.D. students.

Concluding Remarks

The past few decades the field of higher education has been marked by multiple changes which resided in reshaping and redefining the roles of universities towards the state, and the society, in the first phase, as well as towards economy and different stakeholders, in the second stage. Building on this complex picture, the paper aimed at describing and questioning the dynamics in the interplay between performance and diversity with focus on processes and their outcomes. Furthermore, the dynamics have been steered both externally, through different supranational strategies, policies, directives, such as the Bologna process, and internally through national/local standards related to quality and performance criteria and indicators in designing core higher education policies. Related to these changes, major reforming funding policies have been undertaken in the tertiary education sector dating back in the 1990s among all European systems.

The reforms have targeted core dimensions like increasing financial autonomy of universities in spending public allocations, increasing performance and efficiency of public expenditures, rendering quality control of all range of universities' activities

(including education and training, scientific research, staff), as well as enhancing diversification of funding sources through introducing student loan schemes along with tuition fees. In analysing funding reforms undertaken in the past twelve years across CEE higher education systems, patterns of convergence can be depicted in the sense that all three former socialist countries implemented a formula-based funding system which would render the scheme more transparency. All the more, it offered a viable framework for assessing the real costs of both education training and research along with developing measuring systems of quality.

Moreover, the driving forces behind these reforms have been similar pertaining mostly to the international and supranational pressures on national states through different development programmes such as the ones developed and funded by the World Bank (Romania, Hungary and Slovakia), or European Commission's strategies, directives and projects (Romania and Slovakia). Although there is a convergence in policy goals and strategies, the implementation processes have played out different in these three countries due to national characteristics of higher education system and political configurations. In this sense, the roles institutional actors played in the national context, and hereby I refer to Ministry of Education (in Slovakia), HEIs, as well as buffer institutions like Funding Council in Romania, Rectors' Conference and the Chamber of Commerce (in Hungary), become strategically important when it comes to bargaining powers to influence the policy arena.

The predominant issue concerning the implementation of financing policy in all three countries points out the lack of an evidence-policy making model for designing and implementing policies, and for evaluating policy outcomes and impact, a model which implies elements of policy learning and assessment instruments. Political instability due to frequent change of government is considered to be the most important variable within the policy making process because it alters the possibility to observe policy outcomes and to measure their impact both at system and institutional level. The arguments behind this assertion rest on views that the governance of higher education is a complex matter due mostly to the nature of the higher education sector itself, for example, the multitude of actors involved, the economic, social and cultural roles encompassed.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Balazs, E. 2011. Higher education in Hungary. Facts and Figures, Hungarian Institute for Educational, Research and Development, Budapest;
- Barr, N. A., (2004). Higher education funding, London LSE;
- Becher, T, Kogan, M. ([1980] 1992). *Process and structure in higher education*, Routledge;
- Beerkens, E, (2008), The Emergence and institutionalization of the European higher Education and research Area, *European Journal of Education*, vol. 43, No. 4;
- Berde, E, Vanyolos, I. (2008). Impact of institutional changes on Hungarian higher education after 1989, *Higher education Quarterly*, 26(3);
- Bleiklie, I., Kogan, M, (2007), Organization and governance of universities, *Higher Education Policy*, vol. 20;
- Brenan, J., Teichler, U, (2008), The future of higher education and higher education research. Higher education looking forward: an introduction, *Higher Education*, vol. 56;

- Burke, J., Modarresi, S., (2000), To keep or not to keep performance funding: Signals from Stakeholders, *The Journal of Higher Education*, vol. 71, No. 4, p. 432-453
- Colebatch, H.K. (2011). Challenge and development: the emerging understanding of policy work, *Politička misao*, 48 (5);
- CNFIS. (2007). Finanțarea învățământului superior în România;
- Cosma, D., Schneider, S. (2011). The budget funding of the Public Higher Education in some European countries, *Timisoara Journal of Economics*, vol 4 1(13);
- De Boer, H., File, J. (2009). Higher education governance across Europe, ESMU Project;
- Dobbins, M., Knill, C., Vogtle, M. E, (2011), An analytical framework for the cross country comparison of higher education governance, *Higher Education*, vol. 62, No. 5;
- Dolowitz, D., Marsh, D. 2000. Learning from abroad. The role of policy transfer in contemporary policy-making, *Governance*, 13(1);
- Dunleavy, P., Margetts, H., Tinkler, S, (2005), New Public Management is dead – long live digital-era governance, *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, vol. 16;
- Euridyce (2004/2005). The Education System in Hungary;
- Eurydice (2012). Key data on education 2012;
- European Commission (2003), Communication from the Commission, *The Role of Universities in the Europe of knowledge*, COM (2003), Brussels, Belgium;
- European Commission (2008), *Progress in higher education reform across Europe. Funding Reform, vol. 1: Executive summary and main report*, Brussels, Belgium
- Ferlie, E., Musselin, C., Andresani G, (2008). The steering of higher education systems: a public management perspective, *Higher Education*, vol. 56;
- Fehérvári, A. ed. (2011). Facts and Figures. Higher education in Hungary, Hungarian Institute for Educational Research and Development, available at <http://www.ofi.hu/english/publications>;
- Fiel, J, Goedegebuure, L. Eds (2003). Reflections on HE in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, CHEPS;
- Frolich, N, Strom, B. (2008). Higher education funding and incentives: evidence from Norwegian funding reform, *European Journal of Education*, 43 (4), 2008;
- Gallagher, M. (2001). Modern university governance – A national perspective, Paper presented at “The idea of a university: Enterprise or Academy?” Conference organized by the Australian Institute and Manning Clark House, Canberra, 26 July 2001 available at: <https://tai.org.au/>;
- Greenaway, D., Haynes, M. (2000). Funding universities to meet national and international challenges, *School of Economics Policy Report*;
- Halasz, G. Organizational change and development in higher education disponibil la: <http://halaszg.ofi.hu/download/EHEMD.pdf>;
- Gornitzka, A. (1999). Governmental policies and organisational change in higher education, *Higher Education*, 38;
- Gornitzka, A, Kyvik, S, Stensaker, B. (2005). Implementation analysis in higher education in *Reform and change in higher education. Analysing policy implementation*, Springer. Printed in the Netherlands;
- Habermas, J., Blazek, J., (1987), The idea of the University: Learning processes, *New German Critique*, vol. 41;
- Horga, I. and Brie, M. (2008). La coopération interuniversitaire aux frontières extérieures de l'Union Européennes et la contribution à la Politique Européenne de Voisinage in

- Enlargement and European neighbourhood Policy*, eds. Gilles, Rouet and Peter, Terem, Bruxelles: Bruylant;
- Horga, I. and Brie, M. (2011). Europe: A Cultural Border, or a Geo-Cultural Archipelago, *EuroTimes. The Cultural Frontiers of Europe*, eds. Alina Stoica, Didier Francfort and Judit Csoba Simonne, 9;
- Interview Abrudan I. V. (2013). Vice-President, National Council for Higher Education Funding, Bucharest, personal meeting on 28 January, 4:10-5:00 p.m. Bucharest
- Interview Andreescu, L. (2013). Professor Dr. Spiru Haret University, Bucharest, personal meeting on 14 February, 1:00-2:55 p.m. Bucharest;
- Interview Ciuca, I. (2013). Counciller within the National Ministry of Education, Bucharest, personal meeting on 15 March, 11:00-12:04 p.m. MEN, Bucharest;
- Interview Curaj, A. (2013). General Director, Executive Agency for Higher Education, Research, Development and Innovation Funding, personal meeting on 7 February, 3:00-4:00 p.m. UEFISCDI Bucharest;
- Interview Damian, R. (2013). Foremer President, National Council for Higher Education Funding, Bucharest, personal meeting on 15 February, 12:15-1:30 p.m. CNFIS, Bucharest;
- Interview Derényi, Á. (2013). Research Fellow, Centre for Research and Analyses, Hungarian Institute for Educational Research and Development, Budapest, personal meeting on 18 March, 11:00-12:00 a.m. CEU, Budapest;
- Interview Dubécz, Z. (2013). Secretary General, Hungarian Rectors' Conference, Budapest, personal meeting on 22 March, 10:00-11:00 a.m. Hungarian Rectors' Conference, Budapest;
- Interview Gheorghiu, R. (2013). Research Fellow, Institute for World Economy, Bucharest, personal meeting on 15 February, 11:00-12:00 a.m. CNFIS, Bucharest
- Interview Halász, G. (2013). Scientific Advisor, Educational Research and Development Institute (formerly National Institute for Public Education), personal meeting on 19 March, 6:00-7:00 p.m. Hungarian Ministry of Education, Budapest;
- Interview Hornak, F. (2013). Vice-Rector, Slovak University of Technology, Bratislava, personal meeting on 27 March, 2:00-2:30 p.m. STU, Bratislava;
- Interview Horvath, J. (2013). Professor Dr. Head of MA in Economic Policy and Global Markets programme, Department of Economics, CEU, Budapest, personal meeting on 21 March, 9:00-10:00 p.m. CEU Budapest;
- Interview Mederly, P. (2013). Counciller, Ministry of Education, Bratislava, personal meeting on 26 March, 12:00-1:00 p.m. Slovak Ministry of Education, Bratislava
- Interview Polonyi, I. (2013). Professor Dr. University of Debrecen, Debrecen, consultation via e-mail;
- Interview Temesi, J. (2013). Professor Dr. Corvinus University and Co-Director, International Centre for Higher Education Research, personal meeting on 21 March, 11:00-12:30 a.m. Corvinus University, Budapest;
- Interview Semjen, A. (2013). Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, personal meeting on 29 March, 11:00-12:30, Budapest;
- Jensen, H, Kralj, A., MCQuillan, D., Reichert, S. (2008). The Slovak Higher Education System and its Research Capacity (EUA Sectoral Report);
- Jongbloed, B., Vossensteyn, H., (2001), Keeping-Up performances: an international survey of performance-based funding in higher education, *Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management*, vol. 23, No. 2;

- Kezar, A., Eckel, P.D. (2004). Meeting today's governance challenges: A synthesis of literature and examination of a future agenda for scholarship, *The Journal of Higher Education*, 75 (4);
- Klijn, E.H., Koppenjan, J.F.M (2000). Public management and policy networks foundations of a network approach in governance, *Public Management: An International Journal of Research and Theory*, vol. 2, issue 2;
- Kooiman, J. (1993). Governance and Governability: Using Complexity, Dynamics and Diversity in Kooiman, J. (ed.) *Modern Governance. New Government-Society Interactions*, Sage Publications;
- Kooiman, J, Bavinck, M. (2005). The Governance Perspective in Kooiman, J et al. *Fish for Life: Interactive Governance for Fisheries*, Amsterdam University Press, p. 11-25
- Marsh, D, Rhodes, R.A.W. eds. (1992). *Policy networks in British Government*, Oxford, GB, Clarendon Press;
- Matei, L., (2012), A policy gap: financing in the European Higher Education Area, in Curaj, A. Et al. (eds.), *European Higher Education at Crossroads: Between the Bologna Process and National Reform*, Dordrecht, Springer;
- Massen, P, Olsen, J.P.. (2007), *University Dynamics and European Integration*, Dordrecht, Springer;
- Mayer. J. 2011. Strategy proposal for the development of the Hungarian national education sector innovation system, Hungarian Institute for Educational Research and Development;
- Mayntz, R. (1998). New challenges in governance theory, European University Institute, Jean Monnet Chair Paper RSC no. 98/50, available to download at: <http://www.uned.es/113016/docencia/spd%20-%20doctorado%20200102/Introducci%F3n/Mayntz%20governance%20EUI%201998.htm#5>;
- Mederly, P (2006). Funding System of Higher Education in Slovakia and its effects on higher education system, OECD-IMHE project *Funding Systems and Their Effects on Higher Education Systems*;
- Middlehurst, R. (2004). Changing internal governance: A discussion of leadership roles and management structures in UK universities, *Higher Education Quarterly*, 58 (4);
- Middlehurst, R, Teixeira, P. N. (2012). Governance within EHEA: Dynamic trends, common challenges and national particularities in Curaj, A. Et al. (eds) *European Higher Education at Crossroads: Between the Bologna Process and National Reform*, Dordrecht, Springer;
- Miroiu, A., Andreescu, L., (2010), Goals and Instruments of Diversification in Higher Education, *Quality Assurance Review*, vol. 2, No. 2;
- Miroiu, A., Vlăsceanu, L., (2012), Relating Quality and Funding: the Romanian Case, in Curaj, A. Et al. (eds.), *European Higher Education at Crossroads: Between the Bologna Process and National Reform*, Dordrecht, Springer;
- Neave, G., (1998), The Evaluative State reconsidered, *European Journal of Education*, vol. 33, No. 3;
- Neave, G., (2000), *Universities' Responsibility to Society: an historical explanation of an enduring issue*, in Neave, G. (ed.), *The Universities' Responsibilities to Societies: International perspectives*, Paris, IAU;
- OECD (2003), *Changing Patterns of Governance in Higher Education*;
- Orosz, K., (2012), *Accountability and the public funding of higher education. A comparison of stakeholder views and institutional responses in the US and Europe*,

- in Curaj, A. Et al. (eds.), *European Higher Education at Crossroads: Between the Bologna Process and National Reform*, Dordrecht, Springer;
- Orr, D., Jaeger, M., Schwarzenberg, A., (2007a), Performance-based funding as an instrument for competition in German higher education, *Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management*, vol. 29, No. 1;
- Orr, D., (2007b), *More Competition in German higher education: Expectations, Developments and Outcomes*, in Enders, J., Jongbloed, B. (eds.), *Public-Private Dynamics in Higher Education. Expectations, Developments and Outcomes*, Bielefeld, Verlag;
- Osborne, S. Ed. (2010). *The New Public Governance: Emerging perspectives on the theory and practice of public governance*, Routledge;
- Peters, M., (2004), *Higher education, globalization and the knowledge economy*, in Walker, M., Nixon, J. (eds.), *Reclaiming Universities from a Runaway World*, London, SRHE;
- Peters, G. (2010). Governance as political theory, *Working paper no 22, Jerusalem Paper in Regulation and Governance*;
- Pierre, J. (2009). Reinventing governance, reinventing democracy? *Policy & Politics*, 37 (4);
- Rhodes, R.A.W. (1996). The new governance: governing without government, *Political Studies*, XLIV;
- Rhodes, R.A.W. (2007). Understanding Governance: ten years on, *Organization Studies*, 28;
- Rosenblit, S. G., Sebkova, H., Teichler, U. (2007), Massification and Diversity of Higher Education systems: interplay of complex dimensions, *Higher Education Policy*, vol. 20;
- Rosser, V. (2002). Governance. In Forest, J, Kinser, K. (eds). *Higher education in the United States- An Encyclopedia*, Santa Barbara, vol 1;
- Sabatier, Paul. (2005). From policy implementation to policy change: a personal odyssey in *Reform and change in higher education. Analysing policy implementation*, Springer. Printed in the Netherlands;
- Sanderson, I. 2002. Evaluation, policy learning and evidence-based policy making, *Public Administration*, 80(1);
- Scott, P., (2002), Reflection on the reform of higher education in CEE, *Higher Education in Europe*, vol. 27, No. 1-2;
- Serban, A., (1998), Precursors of Performance funding, *New Directions for Institutional Research*, No. 97;
- Sørensen, E, Torfing, J. (2007). Theoretical approaches to governance network dynamics in Sørensen, E, Torfing, J. (eds) *Theories of Democratic Network Governance*, Palgrave MacMillan;
- Sörlin, S., (2007), Funding diversity: performance-based funding regimes as drivers of differentiation in higher education systems, *Higher Education Policy*, vol. 20;
- Stoker, G. (1998). Governance as theory: five propositions, UNESCO
- Tarrosy, I. 2002. Higher education in Hungary. Heading for the third Millennium, Ministry of Education, Budapesta;
- Välimaa, J., Hoffman, D., (2008), Knowledge society discourse and higher education, *Higher Education*, vol. 56;
- Van Kersbergen, Van Waarden. (2004). Governance as a bridge between disciplines: cross-disciplinary inspiration regarding shifts in governance and problems of

- governability, accountability and legitimacy, *European Journal of Political Research*, 43;
- Weymans, W., (2010), Democracy, knowledge and critique: rethinking European universities beyond tradition and the market, *London Review of Education*, vol. 8, No. 2;
- William, T., (1987), *Universities under Scrutiny*, Paris, OECD Publication and Information Centre;
- Witte, J., (2006), *Change of Degrees and Degrees of Change: comparing adaptation of higher education systems in the context of the Bologna Process*, PhD Thesis, Enschede, University of Twente;
- Witte, J., (2008), Aspired convergence, cherished diversity: dealing with the contradictions of Bologna, *Tertiary Education and Management*, vol. 14, No. 2.

II. INSTRUMENTS AND MODELS OF PUBLIC POLICIES IMPLEMENTATION

Bogdan BERCEANU ⇔ *The Role of Public Marketing Instruments in Emerging Public Administration System*

Mihaela CONSTANTINESCU ⇔ *Administrative Jurisdictions-Instruments of Settling Litigations in Public Administration*

Cristina SANDU ⇔ *Marketing Instruments for Social Enterprise-Particularities in South Eastern Europe*

Mihaela Violeta TUCĂ ⇔ *Specific Instruments for the Public Administration to Support Social Responsibility*

Dragoş Lucian IVAN ⇔ *Innovation through Local Welfare Culture: The Capacity of Inter-generational Relations to Act against Social and Economic Risks*

THE ROLE OF PUBLIC MARKETING INSTRUMENTS IN EMERGING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM

*Bogdan BERCEANU**

Abstract. *The concept of “emergence” signifies lato sensu a kind of change and it will be used to refer and to define the changes that suffer the public administration. Thus, the aim of the paper is to present how marketing through its instruments is part of the process of modernization and adaptation of the public administration system. The paper will have a specific look on the Romanian public administration and on the approach of marketing within the public sector. The core of the analysis is the Romanian national tourism brand. The conclusion of the research will regard the role of public marketing instruments in promoting tourism in Romania by the central public administration bodies.*

Keywords: *public administration, public marketing, emergence, national tourism brand*

1. Introduction

After the accession to the European Union, the Romanian public administration system had to adapt permanently in order to respond in an effective and efficient mode to the European pressure. Thus, there were used new tools for changing and adapting the system, such as public marketing which were concentrated on the public administration to be always adapted to the present and future requests of the citizens, the carrying out of all these with a maximum of efficiency, a new view over the relationships between the public administration and its environment, the activities, the methods and techniques that are used must be orientated towards the study of the beneficiary and the satisfaction of all their requests.

The promotion of the marketing is a new problem for the Romanian public administration. The implementation of marketing programs in administration depends on the conception of the executive authorities, which can guide the marketing activity towards the quality of the public services from the perspective of the citizens' requests or towards the social field.

The paper will have a specific look on the Romanian public administration and on the approach of marketing within the public sector. The objectives of the paper are reflected through its structure, divided in two main parts. Having no claim to a comprehensive review of the public marketing instruments, the first part reflects on understanding the public marketing instruments and analyses the applicability of public marketing in changing the public administration system.

The second part of the paper represents a case study regarding the role of public marketing instruments in promoting tourism in Romania by the central public

* PhD student, National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Faculty of Communication and Public Relations, Bucharest, Romania, e-mail: bogdanberceanu.snsa.ro. “Beneficiary of the „Doctoral Scholarships for a Sustainable Society” Project , project co-financed by the European Union through the European Social Fund, Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources and Development 2007-2013”.

administration bodies. The core of the analysis is the Romanian national tourism brand. We choose to make this analysis because a country has to specify what it wants to sell and to whom it wants to offer it, in order to have success in an international competitive sector like tourism (Kotler & Certner, 2004), creating clearly differentiated images and tourism identities (Fürsich, & Robins, 2008).

In achieving the objectives of the paper, we will use bibliographic research, qualitative research and document analysis.

2. Theoretical background

2.1. The theory of emergence. General considerations

Emergence is one of the concepts from the general study of complex systems (in which category we can include also the public administration system) that promises to reshape the way analysts think about change and development. It is the way in which new, unexpected, and qualitatively distinct configurations appear in complex systems (Galatzer-Lev, 2002).

Many systems have the property of adapting themselves to changes in the environment (the environment may be economic, political, cultural, or social). This is also the case of the public administration system. The system of public administration is inter-related with other systems which influence it. This is a sub-system of the global social system with strong political, social, economical, cultural determination, in a complex connection with its environment (Matei, 2009).

As part of the category of social systems, the administrative system changes or transformations of a process or phenomenon has the interaction between external factors and internal ones. Governments and administrative elites detect innovations or pressures in the environment that require government response. Consequently, structures—administrative state or a particular organization of public administration—react by adopting changes through new instruments, as the public marketing instruments, and reorganizations to adapt to the environment (Frazmand, 2002: 4). Thus, the concept of marketing may be defined, from the public sector point of view, as “the activity, set of institutions, and processes – always interconnected and interdependent – meant to identify, anticipate, create, communicate, deliver and exchange valuable offerings that satisfy clients, audiences, partners, and society at large” (Serrat, 2010).

“Emergence” signifies *a kind of change* (Pepper, 1929). Through emerging public administration, we understand in this paper an emergent change which is regarding the public administration system as a part of the social-global system which had to adapt permanently to this in order to respond to the new necessities of individuals and societies. These characteristics were concretized in some changes that happened from time to time at different levels of the public administration system under the pressure of the external environment.

In this case, a significant role in influencing the transformations which are happening in the government and public administration can be assigned to the New Public Management (NPM) principles, European Union regulations and criteria or to the public marketing instruments.

2.2. Patterns of emergent change under the influence of public marketing

We will consider that the instruments of public marketing are contributing to the emergent change of the public administration system in the way in which can move us

toward possibilities that serve enduring needs, intentions, and values. Forms can change, conserving essential truths while bringing forth innovations that weren't possible before. The infusion of marketing in the public sphere is somehow natural, taking into consideration the evolutions of the general thinking regarding the state and its role at the beginning of the 80's when NPM started to change the ways in which public organizations function. It is a fact that marketing can be seen as something specific for the NPM movement – trying to import particular private market instruments or techniques in order to raise the efficiency of public organizations – that's the principle behind public marketing as well (Țiclău et al., 2010: 148).

Marketing in public administration is an ensemble of processes and marketing relationship, well determined between the components of the administrative system, through which, as a public power, carried out are the laws and/or the activities involved in the development of services are planned, organized, coordinated, managed and controlled to meet the public interest”(Nedelea, 2006: 25). A definition of marketing should, however, strengthen marketing's organizational role (Gronroos, 2006) and should reflect changes in the external environment (Cooke, Rayburn, & Abercrombie, 1992).

Public marketing examines the uncertain attitudes of some beneficiaries situated in different geographical areas, under imperfect information conditions, hard to be controllable, which means taking risk in formulating marketing objectives in government programs. Therefore, it is obvious that the marketing orientation of the public administration institutions should be concerned by the research of citizens-customers requirements to align the supply of public services (volume, structure, quality level) to the demands manifested on the market (Kotler et al., 2001: 327). Moreover, we can identify the patterns of emergent change under the influence of marketing principles which can be applied in public administration, such as: public administration is serving the citizen, it is necessary that the public institutions activity be adapted to the environment in which they operate, the public authorities will take into account the knowledge of the social trends and foresee the following ones.

As marketing instruments which are used in the public administration and which are influencing the change of the system, we can underline: product, price, brand, distribution, personal sale, paid publicity, sales promotion, and packaging, manner of presenting, post-sale services, logistics and marketing research (Borden, 1964: 2-7). These elements are those that form the marketing mix, which represents the “seller's view of the marketing tools available for influencing buyers” (Kotler & Keller, 2006: 19). In accordance with the goal of the paper, we will try to see how the Romanian central public administration bodies, respectively the Ministry of Regional Development and Tourism¹, used the instruments of public marketing to promote the Romanian tourism. From the marketing instruments, in our research we will analyze the brand of the Romanian tourism.

¹ After the reorganization of the Executive in 2013 through the Government Decision no. 47/19.02.2013, was created the National Authority of Tourism subordinated to the Ministry of Economy.

3. Case Study: public marketing instruments in promoting tourism in Romania


3.1. The relation between public marketing and tourism in Romania

From the 60's when mass tourism appears, to nowadays, tourism has been one of the most successful sectors in overcoming economic crisis such as the current one. This has happened thanks to its ability for relaunching economic activities and getting rapidly over transitory situations of weakness, bringing large percentages of profits and generating important direct and indirect boosting effects on national economies. For this reason, tourism sector is progressively promoting new products aimed at very concrete segments of the market (Buhalis, 1998; Kotler 2007 in Fernández Bendito & Ramírez, 2011: 1225).

Romania is part of the international tourism circuit with unique tourism values both from the categories of natural, anthropic and cultural tourism resources, whose clever capitalization may determine a significant increase in importance of tourism industry role within the national economy, with positive, chain reactions at the level of the entire society. For these reasons, the promotion of the tourism was a new problem for the Romanian public administration, which had to change and adapt to the international environment.

The accession of Romania to the European Union in 2007 discussed the increasingly need for action to promote the country abroad. These can be seen in the chart below which demonstrates that in 2007 the number of tourists who visited Romania increased with 28% in comparison with the year 2006.

Figure 1. Evolution of the number of foreign visitors during 2000-2011 (millions)



Source: Data provided by the National Statistic Institute, 2010, 2012

These changes made the system of public administration to adapt and face the new challenges. These adaptations to the both European and international circuit were realized by putting into practice marketing programs and instruments in administration and they were concretized in some marketing strategies which require the “planning and coordination of marketing resources and the integration of the marketing mix to achieve a desired result” (Kotler et al., 2007: 79).

A marketing strategy is the “Master Plan for the Developing the National Tourism 2007-2026”. It is a public strategy elaborated by the Romanian Government in cooperation with the World Tourism Organization. Regarding the marketing and promoting the Master Plan underlines as strengths: dynamic sector tourism operators, National Institute of Research - Development in Tourism (INCDT), network promotion

and tourist information offices of the National Tourism abroad, comprehensive program to promote tourism abroad - advertising, fairs, media visits and tour operators already existing tourism brands - Dracula and Transylvania.

If the recommendations on the structure, products, services and marketing are implemented, it is estimated that foreign visitor arrivals will increase twice and half by 2026 reaching up to 15.485 million (Table 1).

Table 1. Target for foreign visitor arrivals, the source/country 2006 – 2026 origin

Origin	2006 (‘000)	2011 (‘000)	2016 (‘000)	2021 (‘000)	2026 (‘000)
European Union	2,803	3,777	4,990	6,569	8,642
European States non EU Members	2,886	3,428	4,022	4,663	5,340
North America	164	235	337	484	695
Israel	62	89	128	184	263
Japan	14	23	37	60	86
Rest of the world	108	155	222	319	459
Total	6,037	7,707	9,736	12,279	15,485

Source: Master Plan data estimations, p. 12

In the marketing strategy of developing and promoting the national tourism, was included also the creation of new tourism brand by the public authorities.

3.2. National Tourism Country Brand

The country brand is a set of programs that make a country to be differentiated from one another (Popescu, 2007: 87). This process is meant to provide a country's identity, creating a true, positive and attractive image. The target audience of country branding strategies is tourists and business people. The process of branding includes social, educational, architectural, tourist, environmental and investment.

Romania had since 1990, after the end of the communism regime, many attempts to create a country brand but few of them obtained the expected results (in the Table 2 we underline the main attempts to establish a tourism country brand).

The marketing strategies exposed in the Tabele 2 in most cases did not achieve the expected success and like in the case of “Drakula Park” country brand, the project was never implemented because there were some issues regarding the location regarding the place where the Park can be built.

Starting from the past experiences, the new attempt to create a tourism brand of the country adopted another approach. The strategy was mainly based on the review obtained by the authorities from the qualitative and quantitative research made outside and inside the country.

Thus, in July 2010, a new Romanian tourism brand was launched under the slogan “Explore the Carpathian Garden” which has the overall objective of creating a positive image of the country abroad and increases its attractiveness as a tourism destination and, indirectly, the business.

The realization of the Romanian tourism brand was based on (Realizarea Brandului Turistic al Romaniei, MDRT: 4-5):

- a qualitative research: 91 detailed interviews and 2 focus groups. There were studied also 8 markets sources: Austria, Germany, Hungary, France, Italy, Great Britain/Ireland, Russia and USA and Romania;

- a quantitative research: 10,881 interviews were conducted computer-assisted telephone which means 1200 for each market of the 8 markets and Romania;
- Tourists interviewed: in Romania, people who went on a holiday travel the last three years. Source markets, people who have traveled abroad to spend their holidays in the last 3 years.

Table 2. *Tourism brand of Romania*

Year	Country brand	Observations
1995	“Eternal and fascinating Romania”	It cost 5.97 million dollars. It had to be an edition dedicated to promoting external image of the country. In other words, a photo album with tourist information and maps.
2001	“Dracula Park”	The project was never implemented due to issues with location problems: first Sighisoara, then to Snagov.
2004	“Romania – Simply Surprising”	It cost 2 million dollars. The project was very criticized because it didn’t create a clear or strong market image.
2006	“Romania – Fabulospirit”	It cost 110.000 euros
2009	“Romania – The Land of Choice”	The campaign costs 1, 5 million euros.
2010	“Explore the Carpathian Garden”	The realization of the brand cost 894.970 euros paid by European funds.

Source: The author upon the data provided by the National Association of Tourism

The final results of the research underlined the principal elements of the differentiation of the Romanian tourism brand (see Table 3) and 6 key products for the contraction of the brand (Realizarea Brandului Turistic al Romaniei, MDRT: 9):

1. Rural tourism: holidays in rural hostels, small farms, agrotourism;
2. Wildlife and nature parks: interest flora and fauna, ex. observation of animals, rare birds, etc.;
3. Health and Wellness: relaxation, recovery treatments, healthy food;
4. Active and Adventure: spending time with activities, ex. cycling, hiking, climbing;
5. Routes through the country, visiting cultural sites, historical, traditional and natural;
6. City breaks: visiting a city, over a period of 2-3 days.

Table 3. *Elements of differentiation of the Romanian tourism brand*

	What can be find in Romania	Where can be found
1. Unspoiled nature & landscapes	Nature and well-protected national parks, Isolated Landscapes, Areas with rare flora or fauna, Healthy ecosystems.	The Carpathians, Hilly areas, Danube Delta.
2. Authenticity	Ancient traditions, Simple rural life, Organic food produced locally, Typical local architecture.	Each rural region of Romania, for example in Transylvania, Maramures, Bucovina, Dobrogea In villages and medium-sized cities,

		Generally in small hotels, hostels and restaurants.
3. Unique cultural heritage of Romania	UNESCO World Heritage Sites, Latin and Byzantine historical and cultural heritage, Castles, monasteries and churches, German cultural heritage, Well-preserved historic city centers.	Old town of Sibiu, Painted Monasteries, Dacic fortresses, Wooden Churches of Maramures, Monasteries in Bucovina.

Source: The author upon the data provided by the brochure *Realizarea Brandului Turistic al Romaniei*, MDRT: 14-16

Designing the logo (see Figure 2) was a long-held interactive process between the Ministry of Tourism, the Board of brand consultant and creative agency, repeated tests of acceptability in the market (3 international market tests were conducted at various stages of the creative process).

Verbal identity is a combination of two powerful concepts that have convinced the first market test: “The Carpathian Garden” actively promoting the country's tourism strong right market research and winning theme ”explorer”, clearly indicating the target and his favorite activity that can be enjoyed in plenty of destinations in Romania (*Realizarea Brandului Turistic al Romaniei*, MDRT: 9)

Figure 2. *The brand tourism logo*



Source: <http://www.romaniatourism.com/>, accessed: 27.07.2013


The logotype of the brand is represented by the characters imitating handwriting, with higher personality, friendly and a clear marking and original.

The isotype of the logo brand is a leaf which represents the basic principle of nature that speaks Romanian soul through popular sources; it can occasionally bring a mountainous silhouette. The blue tail represents the importance of water and the Danube River.

The colors of the logo brand are composed of a range of natural green colors representing the natural wealth of forests, countryside and mountains. The curved line reminds the Carpathians and the hill-valley horizons the landscape.

The brand strategy provides a rigorous plan of communication of the national brand at the national and international level through various channels of dissemination of information (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. *The platform of brand communication*



Source: Adaptation upon *The Manual Brand*, MDRT: 18

Thus, on 1st April 2011, respectively 1st May 2011, Ministry of Regional Development and Tourism started the radio-television campaign to promote internally or internationally, the Romanian tourism, based on the recommendations resulting from the brand communication strategy and marketing plan 2011-2015.

The campaign of communication won the support of some important private companies, such as Travel Channel. It realized and broadcasted in 2011 a miniserries called “Wild Carpathia – From the Mountains to the Sea” and in 2012 three spots under the slogan “Romania: welcome to Paradise!”.

4. Conclusions

In Romania’s case, as in the case of the other ex-socialist countries, the public administration system had to adapt permanently to the rapidly changing environment to ensure the necessary premises for the European integration. In order to adapt to the new challenges, the system has adopted new instruments and principles like those of marketing.

The case study indicated the applicability of the public marketing instruments in the creation and promotion of the country tourism brand. The marketing mix is reflected in the elaboration of the strategy for the tourism brand and winning of the beneficiaries’ support for its implementation.

At present, in comparison with the past and taking into consideration the data provided Romanian tourism faces a remarkable evolution. The most obvious related with the marketing mix in tourism is the fact that it is a field where the tendencies are manifested internationally towards the use of Internet, applying on large scale the instruments of marketing in the public sector.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Borden, N. (1964), "The concept of the marketing mix" in *Journal of Advertising Research*, 24 (4);
- Fernández Bendito, V.; Ramírez, M. (2011), "New campaigns of tourism promotion and marketing" in *The importance of specialization in the image of European brochures*, *Ekonomika ir Vadyba*;
- Cooke, E.F.; Rayburn, J.M.; Abercrombie, C.L. (1992), "The history of marketing thought as reflected in the definitions of marketing" in *Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice*, 1(1), 10–20;
- Farazmand, A. (ed.) (2002), *Administrative reform in developing nations*, Westport, Praeger Publisher;
- Fürsich, E.; Robins, M. (2008), "Visiting Africa: Constructions of Nation and Identity on Travel Websites" in *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 39;
- Galatzer-Lev, R. M. (2002), "Emergence. Psychoanalytic Inquiry" in *A Topical Journal for Mental Health Professionals*, 22, No.5;
- Gronroos, C. (2006), "On defining marketing: Finding a new roadmap for marketing" in *Marketing Theory*, 6(4);
- Kotler, P.; Brown, L.; Adam, S.; Burton, S.; Armstrong, G. (2007), *Marketing* (7th ed.). Frenchs Forest, New South Wales, Pearson Prentice Hall;
- Kotler, P.; Haider, D.; Rein I. (2001), *Marketingul locurilor*, Bucharest, Teora Publishing House;
- Kotler, P., Keller, K.L. (2006), *Marketing management* (12th ed.), Upper Saddle River, NJ, Pearson Prentice Hall;
- Kotler, P.; Certner, D. (2004), "El país como marca y como product" in *Gestión de Negocios*, 5 (3);
- Matei, L. (2009), *Functions for subordinating levels of central or regional governments*, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1433740>, accessed: 20. 02.2013;
- Ministerul Dezvoltării Regionale și Turismului (2010), "Realizarea brandului turistic al României", http://www.mie.ro/_documente/media/realizare_brand.pdf, accessed in 12. 02. 2013;
- Nedelea, A. (2006), *Marketing în administrația publică*, Bucharest, Didactică și Pedagogică Publishing House;
- Pepper, St. C. (1929), "Emergence" in *The Journal of Philosophy*, 23, No.3;
- Popescu, R.I. (2007), "National Brand – a challenge for Romania" in *Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences*, 21E;
- Serrat, O., *Marketing in the Public Sector*, www.adb.org/documents/information/knowledge-solutions/marketing-in-the-public-sector.pdf, accessed: 22. 03. 2013;
- Țiclău, T.; Mora, C.; Țigănaș, A. (2010), "Public marketing as a strategic component of public management. A pilot study in Cluj county" in *Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences*, 31E.

ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTIONS - INSTRUMENTS OF SETTLING LITIGATIONS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Mihaela CONSTANTINESCU *

Abstract. *The hereinafter paper represents an analysis of jurisdictionally administrative institutions within the national administrative system, taking into consideration the range of competencies, limits of exercising powers and last but not least their organisation and functioning. The emergence of the present paper was dictated by the lack of a unitary viewpoint regarding the organisation and functioning principles and by the lack of features through which administrative jurisdictions should be characterized, fact that leads to frequent usage of the term in order to define authorities which do not meet the conditions for jurisdictions but only the conditions of mere controlling administrative bodies.*

Keywords: *Administrative jurisdictions, administrative justice, independent authorities, The National Council for Litigations Settlement*

1. The concept of administrative jurisdiction

In current speech, the concept of jurisdiction has several meanings, the most known referring to the capacity of judging, respectively „power, judgment competence of a judge and a law court”.

Administrative jurisdictions, institutions taken over from the French administrative system, have formed part of law authors’ concerns starting with outlining the separation of powers principle, being first considered as a form of executive power by their possibility of exerting their own control on the activities carried out.

Both in the Romanian administrative system and in the French one at the time of their setting up, administrative jurisdictions were regarded as „administrative law courts”, term often occurring in speciality treatises at the end of the 17th and beginning of the 18th centuries being considered „law courts in which judges belong to administrative personnel” (Hauriou, 1921: 870). Although in many documents they are termed courts, they should not be mistaken for judicial courts, by not being included in the states’ judicial system and by the fact that, most of the time, there was not specified a controlling procedure on their decisions by the law courts or any alternative procedure to settle litigations against administrative papers. As we are going to see, features of administrative jurisdictions diverge a lot from those of law courts or administrative courts and the personnel appointed in them is represented by individuals having judgeship in the sense that they have special judicial training.

By analysing the existing administrative jurisdictions within the E.U. member states, we have revealed fundamental differences regarding the conditions they should

* PhD student, National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Faculty of Communication and Public Relations, Bucharest, Romania, e-mail: mihaela.constantinescu81@yahoo.com. “Beneficiary of the „Doctoral Scholarships for a Sustainable Society” Project , project co-financed by the European Union through the European Social Fund, Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources and Development 2007-2013”.

fulfill, very few of the features of jurisdictional authorities identified in Romania can be applied to E.U. member states or international bodies.

Categories of national jurisdictions found in E.U. member states have recently been identified in the document termed „Judicial control of public authorities in Europe: toward a common model" (Woehrling, 2006), existing jurisdictions as branches of the judicial system and jurisdictions within public administration system. Thus, „Administrative justice has been placed in one of the two judicial systems, depending on the historic context (Woehrling, 2006):

- administrative justice as a branch of the overall judicial system: administrative law courts are above all law courts, this fact implying all the corresponding features (independence, impartiality, contradictory procedure, judicial expertise, process of taking decisions based on law). This approach outlines the organic and functional separation between administrative actions and the judicial control. This dimension of the administrative justice has extremely been maintained by the precedent established by art. 6 in the European Convention on Human Rights;
- administrative justice as a phase of the taking administration decisions process and as an instrument in order to justify administrative actions (...). Administrative judgement is still part of the administration process. The objective pursued is the best administrative decision. The administrative procedure establishes the criteria and behaviour but the judicial procedure is an extension of the administrative procedure. If the administrative decision is annulled, generally, a new administrative procedure follows in order to correct the error outlined by the law court. Therefore, there is not a complete separation between the administrative phase and the judicial one".

2. Brief presentation of theories regarding administrative jurisdictions

Considerations retained in the French doctrine are those underlying the theory of necessity for administrative jurisdictions in order to settle litigations regarding public administration activity, to the detriment of judicial jurisdictions, respectively of justice carried out by law courts belonging to the judiciary.

On this basis, Maurice Hauriou considers that there are several juristic, political and constitutional reasons to justify a separation of administrative jurisdiction from the judicial one.

A. From legal point of view, it has been augmented that it is natural for a certain category of cases to correspond to a special judge who, by his origin, to present special competence guarantees „ordinary judge is not necessarily a multipurpose one and, when settling certain cases he is «dangerously incompetent», thus, it is useful to have administrative courts." The occurrence of a special field has to correspond to a special judgement able to present special competence guarantees.

According to the abovementioned theory, it is not natural that the state, public power, to resign its deeds to the control of a judge, standing the risk of a „conviction and execution of this kind of decision". The control exerted on the public power deeds represents, on behalf of the state, an effort of goodwill which could be easier performed if, instead of an ordinary judge, there was a special one.

B. Maurice Hauriou, supporting the need of separating administrative jurisdiction from the judicial one, brings political and constitutional arguments, starting from the separation of powers theory. The author considers that „centralisation and administrative

regime need total independence of administrative authorities from judicial ones which represent the common law". The separation of powers has to be understood both functionally and politically. Functionally, the author applies the division of labour principle which leads to a separation of functions of the two powers, separation of judging function from the administrative one.

Except the advocates of theory according to which there should be administrative jurisdictions, qualified to settle litigations (disputes) within public administration, there also have been theoreticians who opposed such institutions.

Analysing the activity of the State Council and of other administrative bodies with jurisdictional character, Paul Negulescu stated that „this doctrine which admits as bodies and agencies of active administration, considered as courts and even as cassation courts having the right to judge and convict natural persons to penal fines and in the field of property, means to consider judiciary a mere adjunct to executive power, thus violating constitutional principles which proclaim that judging authorities form a distinct power, that means which has tenured personnel separate and independent from executive power" (Paul Negulescu, 1925: 342).

The same viewpoint was shared by Constantin C. Dissescu who, after the abolishment of the State Council, stated that it cannot be set up again because „the principle of power separation was violated when the State Council, which is an administrative authority, was given the right to judge issues in which administrative authority appears as part" (Constantin C Dissescu, 1951, Constitutional Law: 878).

3. Jurisdictional administrative bodies from other administrative systems

One of the representative states through the model of jurisdictions set up within public administration is France. Currently, in France, although administrative jurisdictions are not regulated by Constitution, they are clearly delineated from the common law jurisdictions by jurisprudence and doctrine. Thus, the French jurisdictional system includes law courts and administrative law courts, the latter representing administrative jurisdictions. Like competences given to administrative jurisdictions recognised by the Romanian law, administrative jurisdictions in France settle disputes involving a state private person, a local authority, a public institution or an private organisation having a public service task. However, administrative jurisdictions in France currently have nothing in common with administrative jurisdictions in our country, consisting in¹:

- The State Council, chaired by the Prime Minister, consisting in judges and clerks representing the highest administrative jurisdiction, having competences both in first court instances in appeal depending on the object of the cause;
- Administrative courts which are administrative courts of first instance are were set up in order to relieve the activity of the State Council;
- Appeal administrative courts considered appeal administrative courts. Judges of administrative courts are also counselors and are recruited through (Ecole Nationale d'Administration).

Furthermore, in France, we meet collocations such as independent administrative authorities and public independent authorities. They are administrative authorities with jurisdictional character. As we are going to see, the institution of public independent

¹http://www.marne.pref.gouv.fr/sections/rubriques/coll_loc/la_legalite_des_acte/les_differentes_jur_i/downloadFile/file/Les_differentes_jurisdictions_administratives.pdf?nocache=1271237916.25,14.05.2013

authorities is somehow similar to administrative jurisdictions regulated by Law no. 554/2004 of administrative disputed claims office, mentioned in Romania's Constitution.

Independent administrative authorities have regulatory power and protect the citizens' rights and interests. At the same time, independent administrative authorities are recognised the right to apply penalties and by exerting this right they are similar to administrative jurisdictions regulated by Romanian law. Some independent administrative authorities such as the Authority for regulation in electronic communications and postal services and the Commission for regulation in energetic field have the power to settle litigations and this power enables them to take decisions as a result of a contradictory procedure, whereas the other authorities have mediation power.

These independent administrative authorities are known as regulating authorities. A brief historic perspective regarding the regulating authorities helps in illustrating their origins and objectives. In the past, countries with tradition in Roman Law created regulating bodies as part of the State Councils, such as France and Italy. These bodies were counselors of governments regarding the legality of regulatory decisions. These bodies, also, were administrative courts in order to protect and avoid litigations of governments in front of civil courts regarding special regulations. For example, in France, after the Revolution, the State Council and the administrative courts system were conceived in order to protect the administrative system against the coercion of the separate system of civil courts; judges of civil courts were regarded as more understanding towards monarchy while administrative courts were meant to be more understanding towards the legislative and its efforts to redistribute power and wealth in France after the Revolution. Nowadays, the State Council, acting as an appeal court for administrative courts as well as a supervising body for the state administrative system, contributes with its expertise to verifying the legality of regulatory decisions (Wiener, 2008).

Opposed to the French system we have the British one. In Great Britain, the main part in the control exerted on administrative deeds belongs not to administrative jurisdictions but to judicial jurisdictions. Thus, we find in this system the administrative court, represented by the Administrative Court.

Currently, jurisdiction on administrative deeds is insured mostly by the Administrative Court. Among the administrative deeds that can be contested in front of the Administrative Court there are: decisions taken by ministers, Government, departments and other public bodies. These bodies are local authorities, immigration authorities as well as regulating bodies or certain courts.

Before 2000, judicial control of administrative deeds was performed by High Court, included in the list of Crown Institutions. After that, the Administrative Court was set up as part of the High Court. The judges of Administrative Court are 37, appointed by Lord for Justice and lodged the power to settle litigations regarding administrative cases.

In the Administrative Court any action or non-action of a public body can be contested, by the procedure of reviewing a decision, such as a department of the government or of a local authority or of another body exerting a public role, existing the possibility of obtaining recovery of damages.

Except the causes that fall under the competence of Administrative Court of first instance, it can exert control on first courts. Thus, decisions of an inferior court can be contested. Competence of judicial control of decision given in administrative field is not exerted for the decisions belonging to the High Court of the Appeal Court.

But, in Great Britain we find a great number of regulating authorities whose organisation, functioning and attributes are similar to administrative jurisdictions. Among

them, a rich activity have the following: The Competition Commission; The Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence; The Department for Business, The Enterprise & Regulatory Reform; The Financial Services Authority; The General Social Care Council; The Information Commissioner's Office; The Ministry of Justice: Claims Management Regulation; The Office of Fair Trading; Pensions Regulator; The Solicitors Regulation Authority.

Initially, Great Britain chose a model of bodies based on the idea of setting up an independent regulatory body for each sector of industry in order to act without bureaucracy and to be supported with few personnel. The Government rejected this system of regulatory bodies which we mainly find in the U.S.A. in favour of a less bureaucratic and faster one. This system was highly criticised because there appeared questions regarding to concentration of power in few hands. Yet, it is accepted that regulatory bodies' responsibilities can be taken over by a regulatory authority in order to insure continuity and consistency of decision factors. (Wade, Bradley, 2007: 312)

4. Historic evolution of administrative jurisdictions

Recognition of administrative jurisdictions is tightly connected to recognition of power evolution within the state. In France, the separations of powers principle, was very strictly established by «Declaration on human and citizen's rights» on 16th August 1789. In art. 16 of the Declaration it was stated that «In the society in which the rights guarantee is not performed and separation of powers is not determined, there is no Constitution». Chapter III of the Constitution from 1789, called «Public Powers» regulates three powers: legislative, executive and judiciary.

Along with separation of administrative functions, the court does not have the authority of dealing with active administration, either by regulations or by decisions addressed to administrators and does not have the role of settling claims against administrative deeds. This fact led to separation of law department and judicial department.

Although the separation of powers principle has imposed in our country too, currently, having a clear regulation in Constitution, and although there has been recognised the independence of executive power from the judicial one, there was felt the need for a control on judiciary power, thus limiting the activity of jurisdictional administrative bodies. Such an evolution was the result of an increased caution taking into account that, even if independent, the three recognised powers are inter-conditioned and influence each other. Not desiring an unequal situation, by increasing the powers of one to the detriment of the others, the solution of control exerted by judiciary power on administrative one was the most appropriate in order to prevent a possible endowment of executive with increased judiciary powers and the risk of breaching laws and despise the judiciary and legislative powers. Furthermore, exerting none of the powers recognised in the state is absolute as it can lead to injuring the others and the very notion of lawful state.

In Romania, administrative jurisdictions were contoured through the Law for setting up the State Council on 11th February 1864. This body had both an advisory character regarding the functioning of administration and a jurisdictional one. According to disposals of art. 1 in the aforementioned law, the State Council was placed on the same rank as executive power. "The State Council had the attribute of preparing projects of laws and regulations as well as relative attributes in administrative issues" and in „law department issues related to Administration”.

As a result of abolishing the State Council, part of its competences were given to courts. Administrative jurisdiction, though, continued to exist at the ministries level. Thus,

we find a series of agencies such as: Commission for dissolving ex-enemies wealth functioning within the Ministry of Finance; Customs officers were observed breaching of Customs Law and were giving convictions; Cassation Court within the Domains Ministry; Agricultural Committee settling disputes having as object property; Industrial Commission; Mines Commission; Economic Commission within the Ministry of Industry and Trade; Moral Persons' Commission within the Ministry of Justice. All these jurisdictions did not consist in judges and were considered by the Court of Cassation as administrative courts (Negulescu, 1925: 342).

5. Judicial regulation of administrative jurisdictions

A first domestic mentioning of administrative jurisdiction is found in art. 21, paragraph 4 of Constitution, modified and completed by the Revising Law no. 429/2003, which came into force on 29th October 2003, according to which „special administrative jurisdictions are optional and free of charge”.

Law of administrative law department no. 554/2004 defines special administrative jurisdictions as “activity carried out by an administrative authority which has, according to the special organic law in the field, the competence of settling a conflict regarding an administrative deed, according to a procedure based on principles of contradictionality, ensures the right to defense and the independence of administrative - jurisdictional activity”.

6. Characteristics of administrative jurisdictions

We cannot establish to what extent a certain administrative body can be qualified as administrative jurisdiction without taking into consideration its characteristics.

Because administrative jurisdictions are administrative authorities, regulations of art. 16 in Constitution apply them, regulations which institute their independence feature – “independent administrative authorities”. This has to be analyzed, on the one hand, regarding the way of exerting their attributes and, on the other hand, regarding the means of control on the jurisdictional bodies' activity, of direct implication of these authorities in their activity.

Constitution states, by art 21 the optional and free of charge character of these bodies.

Professor Corneliu-Liviu Popescu believes that, when jurisdictional bodies are not qualified precisely by law as being part of this category, they should fulfil certain conditions in order to be considered as such: “the body is established by law; that body and its members are independent and impartial; the body is invested with full jurisdiction in fact and de jure; the body has decisional power, not only to issue a letter of advice, the procedure is equitable and has contradictorality elements, advertising and reasonable term; respecting the right to defence; the non reformation in pejus principle; the authority of judged cause (after eventual means of appeal); mandatory character of jurisdictional act; the possibility of forced execution of the jurisdictional act” (Popescu, 2004: 88).

Doctrine has identified other basic elements which determine the specificity of administrative jurisdictions (Vedinaş, 2009:135):

- “- from the object point of view, jurisdiction represents a settlement of «means of appeal»;
- from the procedure point of view, we find principles specific to judicial procedure, such as: the possibility for the parties to be heard in the court, the possibility of being represented, contradictorality and parties' independence;

- from the result point of view, it is specific to administrative jurisdiction to issue a motivated decision, as judicial nature-an administrative deed with jurisdictional attributes”.

Except the features we find in Constitution or which derive for the Law of Law Department no. 554/2004, by art. 6, establishes the conditions which have to be fulfilled by the interested party in order to address the administrative jurisdiction :

- firstly the party challenging must address administrative jurisdictions regarding an “administrative deed”;
- secondly the party exerting the administrative-jurisdictional procedure must renounce the possibility of addressing law department courts;
- thirdly, the administrative jurisdictional deed, respectively the paper issued by an invested administrative authority, by organic law, with special administrative jurisdiction attributes, can be challenged in a special administrative jurisdiction if it is mentioned in the law or, directly, in law department court if it renounces the administrative-jurisdictional means of appeal.

7. Administrative jurisdictional bodies, which fulfil conditions of Law no. 554/2004, to be found in the national administrative system

An analyses of the domestic regulations shows that, in fact, very few of the national administrative bodies, through their organisation and functioning rules, have been set up so that they fulfill characteristics stipulated by Law no. 554/2004. Among these, we mention: National Council for Litigations Settlement; National Council for Counteracting Discrimination; Jurisdiction Commission for Imputations within the Defence Ministry.

One of the most known administrative bodies with jurisdictional functions, regulated in domestic law, is the National Council for Litigations Settlement. According to art. 257, paragraph 1 of Governmental Emergency Decree no. 34/2006 regarding assignment of public acquisition contracts, of public works cession contracts and services cession contracts „*The National Council for Litigations Settlement, (...), is an independent body with administrative-jurisdictional activity.*”

Inclusion of the National Council for Litigations Settlement in the category of administrative jurisdictions is give by observance of a series of principles when carrying out its activity.

According to provisions of art. 269 of the Governmental Emergency Decree no. 34/2006, the litigations settlement procedure is carried out by observing legality, expediency, contradictorality and the right to defence.

In order to establish the principles governing the activity of the National Council for Litigations Settlement, we have to take into consideration both the administrative authority and the jurisdiction one. Being, first of all, an administrative authority, the Council must observe the fundamental principles of public administration. Furthermore, its quality of jurisdiction, respectively of a body with competences in litigations settlement assumes appropriation of certain regulations which govern the good evolution of trials and which are applicable in courts as well.

Thus, a first rule to apply in litigations settlement field which is found in art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights is to ensure an equitable trial, translated in practice by establishing equal positions for the parties on the entire length of the trial, observance of all procedures, among which the right to defence. On the entire length of carrying out jurisdictional procedure, the right to defence is, mainly, respected when clarifying an act of trial or when administering evidence. According to art. 275, paragraph

(1): *In order to settle the litigation, the Council has the right to ask for explanations from parties, to administer evidence and ask for any papers/documents, if relevant regarding the object of litigation. Furthermore, the Council has the right to ask for any necessary data from natural or legal persons in order to settle litigations.*

Contradictorality arises from ensuring the right to defence, being the consequence of the possibility granted to each party to present argument to support itself and to the detriment of the other. Observance of this principle is necessary if we start from the main purpose of jurisdictions: the one of amending such situations. The role of contradictorality is to show situations falling under jurisdiction, under all aspects, in all their complexity being the means by which alleged deeds breaching legislation in the field of public acquisitions are exposed. Presuming a debate of litigations and presentation of opposed viewpoints, contradictorality endures a presentation of all relevant aspects in order to take informed decisions. Contradictorality does not necessarily mean oral debates.

Settlement must also offer an adequate and prompt answer to an immediate need of society, ensuring as fast as possible restoring the breached order of law and the citizens' rights who challenged the procedure of assignment of public acquisition contracts. And this means expediency in settling causes, without delay.

Settling litigations with expediency is linked to observance of the right to a fair trial, which according to art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights institutes the necessity of judgment within a reasonable term. As in the European court for Human Rights jurisprudence the phase of settlement by administrative authorities by ways of jurisdictional procedures, in our case the National Council for Litigations Settlement, it is included in settlement given by courts and included in the trial length and the condition of observing the reasonable term belongs to the National Council for Litigations Settlement "Administrative authorities are sometimes administrative bodies, sometimes jurisdiction bodies, depending on the type of power they exert in a certain case.[...] Thus, in civil and penal areas, they are courts in European sense and independent administrative authorities should draw up guarantees regarding the equitable trial and impartial court" (Frison-Roche, 2006).

Another principle governing the activity of the National Council for Litigations Settlement is the legality one which means carrying out its activity according to the law. "Mandatory execution and bona fide of competences with which it was invested, represents the standard of a modern administration (...) The lawful state exigencies involve that, during its activity, public administration should strictly respect the law and, when breaches it, to be set up mechanisms in order to ensure its recovery" (Bălan, 2008: 26).

The principle of independence is characteristic to administrative jurisdictions. It is one of the conditions which define through art. 275, paragraph 1 of the GED no. 34/2006 this authority. It is re-stated in art. 2, paragraph 1 of the Regulation regarding organisation and functioning of the National Council for Litigations Settlement, according to which the Council competences are achieved by observing independence and impartiality principles in taking decisions process. According to this principle, the National Council for Litigations Settlement exerts its attributes without being subordinate to any other authority, subordinate to the Government, Parliament or other public or judiciary authorities. According to art. 257, paragraph 3, *in its activity, the National Council for Litigations Settlement subordinates only to law*" Paragraph 4 of the same article stipulates that *„regarding its decisions, the Council is independent and is not subordinate to any authority or any public institution.*

We notice that this principle is associated to impartiality in taking decisions. Joining of the two principles is not accidental because impartiality can be a consequence

of independence. Thus, there is a higher probability that a counselor involved in settling the litigation to be safe from influences on behalf of other authorities, and can maintain balance between the involved parties, without bias and without placing on the side of the parties prior to closure of the jurisdictional procedure and to careful analysis of the cause.

Stability rule was issued to complete this principle; this rule is stipulated by art. 2, paragraph 1 in the Regulation regarding organisation and functioning of the National Council for Litigations Settlement, according to which competences of the Council are achieved by observance of the stability principle by its members. Stability generates, for the members of authority, the security of their positions, protecting them against possible constraints which could be exerted by other public authorities. Thus, independence and impartiality of the Council members is ensured in order to offer equity in pronounced decisions.

The National Council for Litigations Settlement must also obey the principles which are characteristic of any administrative jurisdictional body activity, as they were identified by the doctrine.

To all these expressly mentioned principles according to provisions of GED no. 34/2006 and those implied by the administrative jurisdictional quality, we can add principles applicable in public administration, such as the principle of transparency. Transparency represents the opening towards society and its informing. Both parties directly implied in litigations brought to the National Council for Litigations Settlement and the entire society have to benefit from the transparency principle.

Informing society about the competences of the authority gives to the interested parties the possibility to appeal to this jurisdiction and encourages them in such a way in order to achieve the maximum of its use and when this lacks we cannot speak about its activity to be efficient. Furthermore, informing about competences can have as effect the increase of the degree of trust on behalf of citizens, trust in the public authority capacity of self-regulating in order to ensure a good administration and to settle litigations.

Obtaining higher results that the resources consumed by the National Council for Litigations Settlement when settling litigations is directly influenced by the quality of the pronounced decisions which leads to the conclusive acceptance by the parties without they challenge in courts or to these decisions to be reconfirmed by courts by rejecting challenges.

Since, by efficacy, we understand “fulfillment of objectives and/or tasks envisaged in time and under the established conditions”, we shall relate to the way in which this reflects in annual reports on issued by the National Council for Litigations Settlement.

From the first published report of activity, we can observe achievement of important results by the National Council for Litigations Settlement activity. Thus, even if we study the evolution of litigations (files) lodged by economic agents and recorded with the National Council for Litigations Settlement in 2011, we can observe a decrease by 20.01% of the challenges as compared to the previous year. At the same time we can observe an increase in the decisions number given by the National Council for Litigations Settlement which remained final and irrevocable, by not being challenged in Court of Appeal or by being rejected by this court. Hence, as we have showed, this decrease was not due to the way the National Council for Litigations Settlement is organised or works, but to the lower number of procedures initiated in the Electronic System of Public Acquisitions and by legislative changes which diminished the „wish” of economic operators to lodge litigations.

Between 1st January - 31st December 2001, the total number of decisions issued by panels within the National Council for Litigations Settlement was of 6,000. As a result of settling litigations (files) there were recorded 1,931 decisions which stated their admittance and 4,055 decisions which stated the dismissal of litigations, some of the reasons being: they were unfounded, tardy, without object, unacceptable, lacking object, introduced by parties without direct interest, renunciation, etc.

Efficacy of the National Council for Litigations Settlement is reflected by the per cent of final and irrevocable decision given. Hence, along 2011, out of the total of 6,000 decisions issued by settling litigations panels, 763 decisions (12.72%) were challenged in the competent Courts of Appeal, to be found on the administrative territory of the contracting authority. As a result of claims of economic operators/contracting authorities in competent Courts of Appeal, only 69 decisions issued by the National Council for Litigations Settlement were quashed/abolished entirely by courts (1.15% out of the total number of decisions issued by the Council) and only 40 were rectified/modified partly (0.66% out of the total number of decisions issued by the institution).

The importance in determining efficacy of the institution is also the short length of the procedure in appeal. Panels involved in settling appeals within the institution have managed to strictly observe the settlement terms provided by art. 276, paragraph 1 of GED no. 34/2006, modified and completed. Observance of this short term is remarkable having in view the low number of counselors reported to the large number of challenges. If we compare the number of challenges (6,293) on behalf of the economic operators in 2011, filed to the National Council for Litigations Settlement, to the number of challenges settlement panels (11) existing in the institution, it results that, along 1st January-31st December 2001 interval, each panel had to solve an average of 572 challenges (files) which means a monthly workload of about 48 challenges for each panel.

8. Conclusions

The model of administrative jurisdiction with its most known activity, respectively The National Council for Litigations Settlement (NCLS), as it is currently organised appears as a positive factor in public administration activity and for the beneficiaries of its attributes it offers enough guarantees in order to obtain pertinent solutions. Analysing the great number of causes it was invested with, it seems to present a high degree of trust on behalf of those appealing to its competence. This pattern of jurisdiction could be extended on other administrative authorities who, at present, have an apparent jurisdictional role, being competent mainly to settle previous claims and to apply disciplinary penalties. Envisaged effort could considerably reduce the number of litigations in courts and, especially, sneering claims without legal grounds.

The essential role in achieving good results belongs to the way in which its organisation was thought, including the members' appointment by competition examination based on their competences; the independence offered and the guarantees in order to maintain it by stating essential principles for carrying out activity; conceiving control procedures; attracting responsibility and the last but not the least establishment of fixed terms and objective penalties in case they were breached.

By better observing the principles that govern the jurisdictions activities has as effect the decrease of settlements issued by National Council for Litigations Settlement challenged in court as well as rejecting claims on behalf of unsatisfied parties against NCLS. These effects are predictable because the control exerted by courts follows the same principles. These primary rules being respected, when settling cases both by

administrative jurisdictions and by courts, reduces the degree of changing NCLS decisions when exerting judicial control. Of course, when in the judicial process occurs the expertise of the panel and the high qualification of the judges who are part of it, in order to prevent eventual breaching of laws remained unpenalised as a result of jurisdictional administrative procedure. Consequently, the condition for limiting the number of claims in court against NCLS decisions is to strictly respect the principles governing its activity. Thus, the number of faulty settlements could be considerably reduced.

Having in view all these, the choice of an independent type of jurisdiction in settling litigations in which public administration is implied, appears as inspired and could be extended to other fields in which there are conflicts with administration, such as fiscal, social insurances and consumer protection fields.

Traditional choice in European countries was between an independent administrative jurisdiction and one integrated to the judicial system. States that set up special administrative jurisdictions were opposed by those which maintained control on administration by common courts. Evolution of the last 20 years has proved that this opposition does not necessarily correspond an essential difference.

In fact, there are two concepts regarding specialised administrative jurisdictions (Woehrling, 2006):

- Specialisation within courts of administration control system; these courts remaining subjects of the same statutes and principles such as the rest of the judicial system. This concept is of a mere functional jurisdiction;
- Creation of administrative jurisdiction, fundamentally different, by nature and organisation, from judicial jurisdiction".

It is more and more rare-even in countries the maintained unity of jurisdiction exists (for example, in the U.K. which, for a long time, was against the idea of autonomous administrative law, has a large number of „administrative courts”, quasi-judicial, commissions responsible for administrative settlement of litigations, and in present, as well, an „administrative court” within the High Court)- not to be, one form or another, specialised judges responsible for administrative litigations (specialised chambers in common law courts, special appeal administrative commissions with judicial functions or other types of bodies specialised in administrative litigations).

The need for judges specialised in certain fields of public law has been recognised almost everywhere, having in view that it is more and more detailed and complex. Practical details of this specialisation can vary among countries.

The solution of having chambers specialised in ordinary jurisdictions is still developing (the Netherlands, countries in East Europe, Spain, etc.) However, it should be noted the fact that occurrence of separate administrative jurisdictions remains the best method of promoting jurisprudence development specially adjusted in order to control administration.

However, in countries where these separate jurisdictions occur, there has taken place a process of closeness to common jurisdictions. These courts are expected to offer the same guarantees of impartiality and independence: administrative judges must be authentic and not clerks, examining administrative claims more or less formally.

At last, no country has brought all litigations regarding public administration to specialised jurisdictions. Most of the times, economic or patrimonial activities of administration fall under the competence of ordinary jurisdictions.

Some of the most recently emerged administrative bodies with jurisdictional attributes are the regulating authorities, found both in the states where litigations settling

competences belong to courts and in countries in which these competences belong to public administration.

The power of regulating authorities was adjudged to them subsequently, thus, completing their competences of adopting general regulations and imposing penalties. As a matter of fact, such jurisdictional attributes have been granted only to certain authorities.

This power of settling litigations seems natural because the evolution of administrative regulating systems has changed regulating authorities, administrative bodies, in a sort of court with the ability of obeying the needs for an equitable trial as a consequence of sanctioning power.

“The reasons of granting jurisdictional competences to certain regulating authorities are: the efficacy of concentrating power in the hands of the regulating body, its technical competence in settling the litigation, expediency in settling the cause”².

But, in essence, another reason could explain this new power of regulating authorities. Generally, the judicial system could explain this new jurisdictional power in a very special case: a dispute between the operator and the owner of a network who denied the access to it, such is the case of telecommunications, energy and transportation. Regulating authorities use jurisdictional power forcing the owner of network to opening it or they can impose a new equitable price. Thus, the most important aspect is not the real litigation but organisation of the access. This jurisdictional power is the nucleus of the regulating system because practical access to the network, which is an essential facility, for each competitor, is the core of regulating economy.

But, if the sector in question does not depend on a network (such as the bank system, media), the reason for granting jurisdictional power to Regulating Authorities does not exist. A state with a good judicial system, with highly-qualified and well-informed judges, aware of the technical and economic implications, seems logical to let them settle such cases.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bălan, Emil (2008), *Administrative Institutions*, C H Beck Publishing House, Bucharest;
- Dissescu, Constantin C. (1951), *Constitutional Law*, Librăria Socec & Co Publishing House;
- Frison-Roche, Marie-Anne (2006), *Office parlementaire d'évaluation de la législation - Rapport sur les autorités administratives indépendantes*, <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/rap-off/i3166-ti.asp>;
- Hauriou, M. (1921), *Précis de droit administratif et droit public*, Librairie de la Societe du Recueil Sirez;
- http://www.rff.org/Documents/Events/090622_Risk_Regulation/090622_Wiener.pdf
- Negulescu, Paul (1925), *Romanian Administrative Law*, Vol I, Publishing House Tipografiile Române Unite;
- OECD (2005), *Working party on regulatory management and reform, designing independent and accountable, regulatory authorities for high quality regulation*,

² OECD, Working party on regulatory management and reform, designing independent and accountable, regulatory authorities for high quality regulation, Proceedings of an Expert Meeting in London, United Kingdom, 10-11 January 2005, <http://www.oecd.org/site/govgfg/39609070.pdf>, 30.04.2013

- Proceedings of an Expert Meeting in London, United Kingdom, 10-11 January 2005, <http://www.oecd.org/site/govgfg/39609070.pdf>;
- Popescu, Corneliu-Liviu (2004), "Administrative jurisdictions according to revised constitutional regulations" in *The Law Review*, no. 5;
- Vedinaş, Verginia (2009), *Administrative Law*, Universul Juridic Publishing House;
- Wade, E.C.S.; Bradley, A.W. (2007), *Constitutional and Administrative Law*, Pearson Education Limited;
- Wiener, Jonathan B. (2008), *Issues in the comparison of regulatory oversight bodies*, OECD paper Working Party 21-22 October 2008;
- Woehrling, Jean-Marie (2006), *Judicial control of administrative authorities in Europe: toward a common model*, OECD paper, <http://www.oecd.org/site/sigma/publicationsdocuments/35937398.pdf>.

MARKETING INSTRUMENTS FOR SOCIAL ENTERPRISE - PARTICULARITIES IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE

Cristina SANDU *

Abstract. *Social enterprise represents a special type of organization. Nevertheless, the greatest challenge for social enterprise is the capacity to “survive”, the capacity to adapt to the continuous changing market social needs, the capacity to become visible and attract supporters, as a notion the capacity to be sustainable. The recommended approach in this regard is a marketing approach, by applying specific instruments for a socio-economical profile, making use of good practices in marketing, non profit marketing, public marketing and the most important social marketing. In order to analyze the current level of adopting and integrating marketing instruments by social enterprises, it is necessary to observe the marketing activity within this type of organizations. The sample for analyzing the phenomenon is represented by specific developing organizations and specific experienced organizations, in the region of South Eastern Europe.*

Keywords: *marketing approach, cross-sectors, national experiences, empirical study*

1. Introduction

The paper aims at identifying a specific position for social enterprises on the market of goods and services, by analyzing a marketing approach and the use of marketing instruments in promoting social enterprises.

The research initiates from the research questions and hypotheses as follows: 1) could be the marketing instruments applicable in the promotion of social enterprise?, 2) is it necessary to (re)adapt/shape marketing instruments for social enterprise?, 3) are there some specific national conditions to differentiate the use of marketing instruments in promoting social enterprise?, respectively: a) marketing instruments are necessary and applicable in the promotion of social enterprise; b) (re)adapting/shaping marketing instruments is needed in adapting to specific social needs; c) each country has its specific perception on marketing instruments application, based on experience and tradition.

The research methodology is based on qualitative method, by literature survey from traditional marketing and public and nonprofit marketing to a new approach on social enterprise, and on quantitative method, through data collection and interpretation for ensue an illustrative analysis at European level on applying marketing instruments in promoting social enterprise.

* PhD student, National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Faculty of Communication and Public Relations, Bucharest, Romania, e-mail: cristinasandu.snsa.ro. Beneficiary of the project „Doctoral Scholarships for a Sustainable Society” POSDRU/107/1.5/S/76844, co-financed by the European Union through the European Social Fund, Sectorial Operational Program Human Resources and Development 2007-2013.

The sample is represented by states from South Eastern Europe, Italian model as reference for the developing Romanian and Croatian models. The research instruments are questionnaire applied to targeted organizations and interview with national experts.

2. Theoretical coordinates in applying marketing instruments in promoting social enterprise

The outset of the paper is represented by literature route on marketing discipline starting from traditional marketing to nonprofit marketing and to highlighted remarks on social marketing for social enterprises.

Identifying the theoretical coordinates at the cross-road between tradition marketing, non profit marketing and public marketing is argued by the position of social enterprise at the cross-road between the three sectors of economy (Locating social enterprise on the cross-sector model in Ridley-Duff, Bull, 2011: 17, 73, 74, 75).

Probably the simplest definition of marketing is provided by Ph. Kotler (2002), namely “marketing represents the delivery of customer satisfaction at a profit”(Kotler, Armstrong, , Saunders, Wong, 2002: 2) and its objective is to “attract new consumers by promising superior value and to keep and grow the current customers by delivering satisfaction”.

The idea of “broadening the concept of marketing” to nonprofit organizations was introduced by Kotler and Levy in 1969, by arguing that organizations not-for-profit perform marketing-like activities whether they recognized it or not and they perform financial, production, personnel, purchasing and marketing functions (Kotler, Levy, 1969: 10).

The challenge for marketing in public sector is the one of fighting against wrong perceptions associated to publicity, manipulating or wrong influence from the private sector (Kotler, Lee, 2008: 19).

Even so, the emergence of public services and their increasing role in the national economy are real challenges for the science of marketing and also for professionals in the field (Barbu, 2011: 58).

For a comprehensive statement, Table 1 illustrates the marketing instruments for private, nonprofit and public sectors.

In literature, social enterprise is associated to social marketing. The authors of the volume “*Management for Social Enterprise*”- 2009 (Doherty, Foster, Mason, Meehan, Meehan, Rotheroe, Royce, 2009: 141) consider that the definition „*Social marketing is concerned with the application of marketing knowledge, concepts and techniques to enhance social as well as economic ends. It is also concerned with analysis of the social consequence of marketing policies, decisions and activities*” is representative for social enterprise, by consolidating both social and economic objectives.

By analyzing the literature from McCharty – 4P model (1960), Kotler and Zaltman (1971), Booms and Bitner – 7P model (1981), Andreasen (1994, 2002), French and Blair-Stevens (2006), the publication’s authors observe that modern definitions adopt the vision of consolidating both *social and economic objectives*, by the use of *traditional marketing methods/knowledge*. Thus, they argue that social marketing goes beyond being just a communication campaign or advertising, with important elements as price determination and distribution (Doherty, Foster, Mason, Meehan, Meehan, Rotheroe, Royce, 2009: 141).

Thus, likewise any other private, public or non profit organization, social enterprise needs and can apply marketing instruments for promoting its mission and activities (Research Hypothesis 1 is confirmed).

Table 1. *Highlighting the main differences between the marketing instruments within the three sectors (source: author based on literature)*

Instrument	Private sector	Nonprofit sector	Public sector
Idea/motivation	Individual need satisfied by buying the services/product	Individual need associated to a person of a vulnerable group, that can not afford buying the service/product	Individual/ community satisfied by goods/services purchased by public sector
Product	Goods and services	Goods and services	Goods and services
Price	For obtaining profit	For cost recovery and social equity	For some costs recovery and social equity
Distribution	Direct and indirect	Direct and indirect	Direct and indirect
Promotion	Personal and non personal communication	Personal and non personal communication	Personal and non personal communication
Persons	Central- client	Central – vulnerable group	Central – citizen and vulnerable group
Physical evidence	Elements that make the product visible for clients	Elements that make the product visible for clients	Elements that make the product visible for clients
Process	Clients Efforts/ actions for benefiting of products Organization' efforts/actions to satisfy the clients needs	Clients Efforts/ actions for benefiting of products	Organization' efforts/actions to satisfy the clients needs

3. (Re) Shaping marketing instruments for social enterprise

Analyzing social enterprise for identifying a specific position within the market can determine marketing instruments for this type of organization, by considering the position at the cross – road between the three sectors.

- 1) Product – is represented by goods and services for *individuals belonging to a vulnerable group* or for *clients*;
- 2) Price – it can be a social price for costs recovery, social equity and ensuring the continuity of the activity or it can be a competitive price, for profit maximization and areas of intervention extension;
- 3) Distribution - at different level of distribution, from direct distribution to retailers. Other distributors can be private, non profit or public organizations;
- 4) Promotion – has the same characteristics and there are used the same communication channels as for the other sectors;
- 5) Persons – belong to all three sectors private (e.g. private organization that supports the activity or donors/sponsors), nonprofit (e.g. partnerships for promoting the same social cause), public (e.g. financial support of a public institution in a campaign). The consumer's particularity is the dual status of a) consumer- vulnerable group or a certain society segment (for whom there is a social price) ; b) consumer – client (for whom there is a competitive price for profit maximization and reinvesting surpluses for accomplishing the social mission);
- 6) Physical evidence and 7) Process have the same characteristics from private, non profit and public sectors (with the process particularity of social mission base)

8) Idea/ motivation – is based on social needs of the vulnerable groups (also in nonprofit and public sectors).

Based on the exposed considerations, it can be argued that there is no need to reshape the marketing instruments for social enterprise, due the fact that these represent a mixture of characteristics from private, public and nonprofit sectors (Research Hypothesis 2 is not confirmed).

4. Empirical analysis at national level

The empirical analysis aims at highlighting the use of marketing instruments within the social enterprises and differences at national level.

For reaching the aim of this section, a questionnaire was applied at organizational level, on the sample composed by organizations from Italy, as successful and reference model and Romania and Croatia, as developing models.


Findings

4.1. Year of establishment, legal forms, domain of activity, types of services and target groups

The targeted organizations are:

Table 2. *Targeted organizations* (source: author)

No.	Name	Identification code	No.	Name	Identification code
1	Cooperative Bottega Solidale, Rome, Italy	IT1	6	Association Therapeutically Intervention in Autism AITA, Bucharest, Romania	RO3
2	Foundation Don Carlo Gnocchi Onlus, Milan, Italy	IT2	7	Association Kulturno umjetničko društvo Bukovac, Zagreb, Croatia	HR1
3	Association LUNARIA, Rome, Italy	IT3	8	Cooperative Humana Nova, Čakovec, Croatia	HR2
4	Association Tonal, Sibiu, Romania	RO1	9	Association RODA, Zagreb, Croatia	HR3
5	Cooperative Bio Hrana, Pantelimon, Romania	RO2			

Figure 1. Year of establishment time distribution (source: author)

The TOs (targeted organizations) were established in the period 1992-2011, thus 1992-IT1, IT3, 1997-HR1, 1998- IT2, 2001-HR3, 2005-RO1, 2009-RO3, 2011-RO2, HR2.

Within the time frame 1992-1998 were established the Italian organizations, meanwhile the Romanian and Croatian organizations after 2001 (HR1 exception).

The majority of the organizations are associations (5), cooperative (3) and 1 foundation, as follow:

Table 3. Frequency of legal forms (source: author)

	Legal form			Total
	Association	Foundation	Cooperative	
IT1	-	-	1	1
IT2	-	1	-	1
IT3	1	-	-	1
RO1	1	-	-	1
RO2	-	-	1	1
RO3	1	-	-	1
HR1	1	-	-	1
HR2	-	-	1	1
HR3	1	-	-	1
Total	5	1	3	9

Table 4. *Frequency services type* (source: author)

		No. of cases	Percentage
Type of services	Personal services	4	28.6%
	Work integration and training	5	35.7%
	Local development	2	14.3%
	Others	3	21.4%
Total	14	100.0%	

The majority of services are personal services and work integration and training, and some organizations offer also services for research, information and advocacy (IT3), production of Bio food (RO2 – considers this activity as distinctive), preservation of national traditions (HR1).

The target groups are various, but the most frequent are disable people (21%), institutions and NGOs (18%), children/disadvantaged children (12%) and elderly (12%).

Table 5. *Frequency of the target groups* (source: author)

		No. of cases	Percentage
Target groups	children/disadvantaged children	4	12.1%
	Young people/specialized young people/ Disadvantaged your people	3	9.1%
	Unemployed	2	6.1%
	Women./mothers	2	6.1%
	Ill persons	3	9.1%
	Disabled people	7	21.2%
	Elderly	4	12.1%
	Public institutions/ NGOs	6	18.2%
	Others	2	6.1%
Total		33	100.0%

4.2. Marketing instruments within the targeted organizations

4.2.1. Product


The main types of products were identified as materials goods, services (especially social and medical), events organizing and ideas promotion.

Table 6. *Frequency product types* (source: author)

		No. of cases	Percentage
Types of products	Material goods	5	27.8%
	Services	4	22.2%
	Event	5	27.8%
	Information	1	5.6%
	Ideas	3	16.7%
Total		18	100.0%

Table 7. Correlation stage life-cycle and year of establishment (source: author)

		Stage life-cycle				Total
		Introduction	Growth	Maturity	NA	
Year of establishment	1992	-	1	-	1	2
	1997	-	-	1	-	1
	1998	-	-	1	-	1
	2001	-	-	1	-	1
	2005	1	-	-	-	1
	2009	-	1	-	-	1
	2011	1	1	-	-	2
Total	2	3	3	1	9	

Figure 2. Variation of the life-cycle stage (source: author)

The life-cycle stage is in correlation with the year of establishment and Figure 2 demonstrates that the TOs established in the period 1997-2001 are the life-cycle stage of maturity and those in the period 2005-2011 in introduction and growth life-cycle stage (exception IT1 1992 in growth stage). The NA for IT3 is explained by a large variety of products, which does not allow the exact identification of the life-cycle stage.

Table 8. Differential advantage (source: author)

		No. of cases	Percentage
Differential advantage	Product attributes	9	64.3%
	Branding	3	21.4%
	product support services	2	14.3%
Total		14	100.0%

The most frequent stages are growth and maturity and the most frequent differential advantage is the product attributes, but also branding and product support services.

4.2.2. Price

In product price determination TOs adopt the subjective estimation (expertise within the organization), for the IT2 case on medical services the price is determined by the national sanitary system.

Table 9. *Frequency of pricing approaches* (source: author)

		No. of cases	Percentage
Approach	Historical analysis	2	16.7%
	Experimental analysis	1	8.3%
	Intentions research	2	16.7%
	Subjective estimation	6	50.0%
	Others	1	8.3%
Total		12	100.0%

The most frequent pricing strategies are the cost-oriented strategy and demand-oriented strategy, with costs recovery and social equity objectives. For IT2, the strategy is determined in accordance with the national sanitary system. As price-adjustment strategy the most used are discounts and allowance pricing (almost 50% of cases) and promotional pricing.

Table 10. *Correlations between pricing strategy and objectives* (author)

		Pricing objectives		Total
		Costs recovery	Social equity	
Pricing strategy	Cost-oriented	4	3	5
	Demand-oriented	2	4	4
	Competition-oriented	1	1	1
	Others	0	1	1
Total		5	9	9

Table 11. *Frequency of Pricing- adjustment strategy* (author)

		No. of cases	Percentage
Pricing-adjustment strategy	Discounts and allowance pricing	6	46.2%
	Segmented pricing	1	7.7%
	Promotional pricing	3	23.1%
	Value pricing	1	7.7%
	Others	1	7.7%
Total		13	100%

4.2.3. Distribution

In general, TOs prefer as distribution level 0, directly from the organization. Exceptions are cases IT1, RO1 and HR3. The most frequent distribution channels are physical distribution and internet.

Table 12. *Frequency of distribution levels* (author)

		No. of cases	Percentage
Distribution level	Level 0	8	72.7%
	Level 1	3	27.3%
Total		11	100%

Table 13. *Frequency of distribution channels* (author)

		No. of cases	Percentage
Distribution channels	Psychical	7	36.8%
	Telephone	2	10.5%
	Email	2	10.5%
	Fax	1	5.3%
	Internet	4	21.1%
	Where people shop	1	5.3%
	Home	2	10.5%
Total		19	100%

4.2.4. Promotion

Promotion in TOs represents an extensive and complex process, by valuing efficient communication elements with the targeted population segments.

The message content makes appeal in general about the rational and emotional appeal and as format, message as conclusion (44.4% of cases) for reaching the communication objectives – “*For you. Visible art for invisible people*”, “*Let’s preserve our traditions!*”, “*Next life, forever!*”, “*What do you know about autism?*” etc.

The predominant type of message is the moral one (78%), thus illustrating the changing and influencing behaviors approach of the different population segments.

Table 14 *Frequency of appeal types in messages* (source: author)

		No. of cases	Percentage
Appeal type	Rational	2	22.2%
	Moral	7	77.8%
Total		9	100%

Table 15. *Frequency of structure type message* (source: author)

		No. of cases	Percentage
Structure	Message as a conclusion	4	44.4%
	Message as one-sided/ two-sided argument	3	33.3%
	Message as presenting arguments first or last	2	22.2%
Total		9	100%

Table 16. *Message format* (source: author)

		No. of cases	Percentage
Message Format	Print	6	40.0%
	Radio	1	6.7%
	TV	2	13.3%
	Persons	5	33.3%
	Others	1	6.7%
Total		15	100.0%

Printed materials and persons are the most common formats of message use in the campaigns, along with TV and Radio. There is a variety of communication channels, both personal (organizations itself, partners, family/friends) and non personal (advertising, public relations, events) communication.

Table 17. *Frequency of the personal communication channels* (source: author)

		No. of cases	Percentage
Personal communication	Organization	9	56.3%
	Spokesman	1	6.3%
	Partners	3	18.8%
	Family/friends	3	18.8%
Total		16	100%

Table 18. *Frequency of the non personal communication channels* (source: author)

		No. of cases	Percentage
Non Personal communication	Advertising	5	19.2%
	PR	6	23.1%
	Events	7	26.9%
	Direct marketing	2	7.7%
	Print	4	15.4%
	Promotional sells	1	3.8%
	Message & display	1	3.8%
Total		26	100%

4.2.5. Persons

Besides the vulnerable groups mentioned in the previous section, in TOs there are employed special categories of personnel. HR are identified according the TO profile: psychologist, special education teacher, speech therapist, physiotherapist, doctors, medical assistants, educators, trainers, researchers, tailors, designers, specialist social entrepreneurship, engineers, workers etc.

TOs mentioned that they often have collaboration relations/ partnerships with the private, public and non profit sectors. Donors and sponsors represent an important source of finances, 78% of cases.

Table 19. *Frequency of partnership types* (source: author)

		No. of cases	Percentage
Partnership with	Public S	7	36.8%
	Privat S	4	21.1%
	NGOs	8	42.1%
Total		19	100.0%

4.2.6. Physical evidence and Process

Physical evidence for the consumer as the modality of making the product tangible is represented in general by direct service from the organization (according to distribution levels) and online services.

For monitoring the process and evaluation of consumers' opinions, TOs have services of feedback/suggestions/ complains and FAQ service. For the cases IT3, RO1 and RO2 these services are not yet implemented.

Table 20. *Physical evidence consumer* (source: author)

		No. of cases	Percentage
Physical evidence consumer	Direct Organization	8	57.1%
	Door-to-door	1	7.1%
	Public institutions	1	7.1%
	Online	3	21.4%
	Others	1	7.1%
Total		14	100%

Table 21. *Process monitoring* (source: author)

		No. of cases	Percentage
Process monitoring	F/S/P	6	60%
	FAQ	1	10%
	Not yet	3	30%
Total		10	100.0%

4.2.7. Observations and comments (the results findings are limited by the number of 9 cases)

TOs in Italy are organizations with tradition, by the year of establishment (1992-1998) and by the experience they have in the social sector (association, foundation, social cooperative) and the strong connection with the public sector.

In Romania and Croatia there are *new trends* of social economy approach, as a general characteristic of these two states. TOs are established after the year 2000, but they demonstrate a strong capacity of developing models of social economy.

In general, the trend for social economy is more adopted by associations, but also by the cooperatives, especially in Italy. Foundations do not follow this trend, with the Italian case exception.

The target groups are various, from children and disadvantaged children to elderly and disabled people and the solutions found for them are in work integration and education.

Marketing activity is very important for almost all TOs, considering that marketing is necessary for promoting their mission, for becoming more visible, for attracting financial supporters, for attracting beneficiaries and changing behaviors.

The hypothesis affirming that all organizations develop marketing activity, whether they recognize it or not (Kotler, Levy, 1969) is confirmed. Even if RO2 and HR1 affirmed that they do not develop marketing activities, the results of questionnaire demonstrate the contrary.

Marketing instruments in TOs are clearly defined and proper used. The products variety is characterized by a range of goods and services, ideas and events.

Life-cycle stages illustrate a high level of development of the TOs and sustainability within the market.

Pricing strategy has the general subjective estimation tendency and the objectives are identified by costs recovery and social equity, with the possibility of reinvesting surpluses for ensuring the activities continuity.

Distribution and promotion channels' complexity is defined by the jointing both personal and non personal methods.

HR is high qualified and innovative, especially due the importance that the organizations award to this organizational dimension, affirmation enforced by experts' opinion that recruitment process in social economy sector is not different from the other sectors (Adrian Secal, 2013, Social Economy Institute Bucharest, Romania).

Marketing instruments that need improvements are physical evidence and process monitoring.

In the relationship with the public sector, TOs mentioned some strong point and opportunities as responsibility, promotion, market stability, motivation and enthusiasm, knowledge, innovation, visibility and credibility and as for the weakness and threats were mentioned small size of the organization, bureaucracy and administrative constraints, economical crisis, communities mentality, insufficient evaluation and monitoring, etc.

Empirical analysis at national level can allow to affirm that marketing instruments and process has a different approach from one country to another, giving the tradition and experience (Hypothesis 3 is confirmed).

5. Conclusions and future research

Marketing dimension is represented in all organizations, especially in social enterprises giving the complexity of this type of organization (by combining economic activities with satisfying social needs, for accomplishing a social mission).

In order to adopt a comprehensive approach on marketing dimension for promoting social enterprise it is necessary to understand the different approaches in private, public and nonprofit sectors. This fact is argued by the position of social enterprise identified at the cross road between the three sectors.

The challenges in managing and applying marketing instruments in social enterprise are considered the variety of social needs, variety of vulnerable groups, variety of legal forms, variety of goods and services, the dual status of consumers (client and target group). In addition, there are the complexity of the market transaction conditions, from traditional economical conditions to specific social conditions, as social idea/motivation and social profit.

Reviewing the research questions and hypotheses, it can be confirmed that marketing instruments are applicable in the promotions of social enterprise, even more,

there are necessary. They are necessary for the visibility, acknowledgement and support of the stakeholders.

By analysis marketing instruments in all three sectors, it can be confirmed that they find their applicability within the social enterprise and there is not need to reshape specific marketing instruments for the profile of social enterprise. The only adaptations that need to be considered is regarding the social motivation source.

The utility of the case studies is reflected in demonstrating different perceptions at national level and Italian model can represent a reference model for the developing models in Romania in Croatia. All Italian TOs declared that marketing function is mandatory for their activity, while for two organizations in Romania and Croatia it is not considered important.

The outlined differences on the targeted states are as follow: differences on nonprofit or social economy approach, differences on products –Italy more focused on services, Romania and Croatia more focused on material goods, differences on differential advantage - in Italy there is a branding approach), differences on pricing objectives – in Romania and Croatia frequency on costs recovery and social equity, not major differences on distribution and promotion channels, differences in physical evidence and process monitoring for two case in Romania and one in Italy (absence of this type of activities).

Romania and Croatia have sustainable models of social enterprises, especially due the success of combining economic activity with social aim. The lessons to be learned from the Italian experience are related to a more marketing oriented approach.

As a future research is proposed scaling the marketing instruments and extending the sample of states in the region of South Eastern Europe.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ***, *Proceedings Regulations and Best Practices in Public and Nonprofit Marketing*, the 9th International Congress of the International Association on Public and Nonprofit Marketing, Economica Publishing House, Bucharest;
- Andreasen, A. (1994), "Social Marketing: Its Definition and Domain" in *Journal of Public Policy and Marketing*, Vol. 13(1);
- Andreasen, A. (2004), "Marketing Social Marketing in the Social Change Marketplace" in *Journal of Public Policy and Marketing*, Vol. 21(1);
- Bagozzi, P. R. (1975), "Marketing as Exchange" in *Journal of Marketing*, Vol. 39;
- Borden, N. (1984), "The Concept of the Marketing Mix" in *Journal of Advertising Research, Classics*, Vol. II;
- Carrera, D.; Ferrari, M.; Meneguzzo, M. (2008), *Inventing Social Enterprise. Emerging Fields and Innovative Practices of Social Entrepreneurship: A Cross Analysis in Italy and Switzerland*, 8th International Conference of the International Society for the Third Sector Research and Second EMES-ISTR European Conference in Partnership with the CINEFOGO Network of Excellence *The Third Sector and Sustainable Social Change: New Frontiers for Research*, University of Barcelona;
- Carrera, D.; Meneguzzo, M.; Messina, A. (2006), *Social Enterprise Incubators: The Italian Experience*, The Third Annual UK Social Enterprise Research Conference, Londra;
- Doherty, B.; Foster, G.; Mason, Ch.; Meehan, J.; Meehan, K.; Rotheroe, N.; Royce, M. (2009), *Management for Social Enterprise*, SAGE Publications Ltd., UK., cap.6;

- Kotler, Ph. (1969), "Broadening Concept of Marketing" in *Journal of Marketing*, Vol. 33;
- Kotler, Ph. (1979), "Strategies for Introducing Marketing into Nonprofit Organizations" in *Journal of Marketing*, Vol. 43, No. 1;
- Kotler, Ph.; Andreasen, A. (1996), *Strategic Marketing for Non-Profit Organizations*, 5th Edition, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, SUA;
- Kotler, Ph.; Armstrong, G. (2006), *Principi di Marketing*, 11 Edizione, Pearson Prentice Hall, Italia;
- Kotler, Ph.; Armstrong, G.; Saunders, J.; Wong, V. (2002), *Principles of Marketing*, 3rd European Edition, Ed. Prentice Hall;
- Kotler, Ph.; Lee, N. (2008), *Marketing în sectorul public*, Meteor Press, Bucharest;
- Kotler, Ph.; Lee, N. (2008), *Social Marketing. Influencing Behaviors for Goods*, SAGE Publications, SUA, cap. 1;
- Kotler, Ph.; Roberto, E. (1989), *Social Marketing: Strategies for Changing Behavior*, Free Press, SUA;
- Kotler, Ph.; Zaltman, G. (1971), "Social Marketing: An Approach to Planned Social Change" in *Journal of Marketing*, Vol. 35;
- Lazer, W.; Kelley, E. (1973), *Social Marketing. Perspectives and Viewpoints*, Homewood, IL: Irwin in Doherty, B., Foster, G., Mason, Ch., Meehan, J., Meehan, K., Rotheroe, N., Royce, M., 2009, SAGE Publications Ltd., UK., cap. 6;
- Matei, L.; Matei, A. (2012), *The Single Market and the Social Enterprise. From Models to Realities*, The 11th International Congress on Public and Non-Profit Marketing, Vilnius;
- Matei, L.; Matei, A. (2012), *The social enterprise and the social entrepreneurship - instruments of local development. A comparative study for Romania*, World Conference on Business, Economics and Management, Antalya;
- Matei, L.; Sandu, C. (2011), *The Social Enterprise-An Empirical Study for Romania*, 10th International Congress of Public and Nonprofit Marketing, Portugalia;
- Ridley-Duff, R.; Bull, M. (2011), *Understanding Social Enterprise. Theory and Practice*, SAGE Publications Ltd, Londra, Marea Britanie;
- Shaw, E. (2004), "Marketing in the Social Enterprise Context: is it entrepreneurial?" in *Qualitative Market Research*, Vol. 7, No. 3.

SPECIFIC INSTRUMENTS FOR THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION TO SUPPORT SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

*Mihaela Violeta TUCĂ**

Abstract. *Literature offers a variety of instruments on tackling social responsibility but for many years this was considered to be an exclusive mission for the private sector. With the launching of the ISO 26000 management standards a new era for social responsibility has started. Not only that it gives a universal framework but it also introduces the possibility for the public sector to get involved. Talking about organisations instead of companies leaves way for public agencies and other public bodies to implement a social responsibility scheme in their operations. The paper looks at major instruments at international and national level, with a special focus on Romania's new national strategy on promoting social responsibility and then moves on to presenting the ISO 26000 and the implementation of this standard in the Belgian public agencies.*

Keywords: *Social Responsibility, ISO 26000, public sector*

1. Introduction

If in the past, social responsibility of an organization was a corrective instrument of the negative impact of the environment or the communities, with time, a different perspective was shaped: social responsibility as a concern of responsible business, on the basis of values that combine the welfare of the organization, the communities and conservation of resources.

There are a growing number of rules and regulations regarding the social responsibility practices. As a result, it becomes an increasingly difficult task to take all into consideration, especially when each analyst or organization treats them differently depending on their own representation or field. (Bessire, Mazuyer, 2012: 68).

If we look at the current climate in Europe, the Commission recognizes that there is often a gap between public expectations and what they perceive as the actual behavior of organizations. In this case, the European Commission Communication requires them to live up to the promises they make (E.C, 2011: 2).

The European Commission Communication of October 2011 states that to achieve full social responsibilities, organizations should have processes implemented in close cooperation with stakeholder for the integration of social, environmental, ethical and human rights in their business strategy and operations. The purpose of this communication is to foster positive impact – for example through innovation in products and services that

* PhD student, National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Faculty of Communication and Public Relations, Bucharest, Romania, e-mail: mihaelatuca@snsps.ro Beneficiary of the project “Doctoral Scholarships for a Sustainable Society”, co-funded by the European Union through the European Social Fund, Sectorial Operational Programme Human Resources Development 2007-2013.

are beneficial for society and companies – thus minimizing and preventing negative impacts.

The extensive network of social responsibility rules, regulations and recommendations requires a precise structure: some national and some international as sphere, some were initiated by private companies and other by international or non-governmental organization, some documents refer to all SR as a whole and other focus on particular aspects (environmental, social, etc.), some refer to all sectors while other are more specific, some governing actions other reporting issues, organizational management and audit system, some offer certification while others aim only to provide recommendations (Szatmari, Macovei, Horia, 2012: 6).

For the purpose of this paper we will include all concerns in the sphere of social responsibility under the generic title of tools.

The division of instruments in international, European, national ones seeks to facilitate their understanding without ranking them. Some tools govern overall the manifestation of social responsibility, such as conduct codes, which deal with the general scope of business behavior. Others are more specific, helpful for obtaining certification or to build a management system consistent and responsible, with respect to their stakeholders. This is the case for the instruments that offer certification of social responsibility. The third category are the management tools that organizations can use to reflect their values in the day to day activity. The final decision to use a particular tool will belong to organizations, as they are the ones that will be able to choose better what and how to implement them, which of these tools and techniques relates better to their activity or will help them to achieve their objectives set for the social responsibility.

The instruments that serve as guidelines for social responsibility practices can be organized according to their origin, i.e. international, European or national. The main international texts on central and generic social responsibility themes (human rights, social, environmental regulations) can serve as guidelines for private or spontaneous instruments. This is where the Universal Declaration of Human rights, ILO Tripartite Declaration, Rio Declaration fall in. There is also a written framework of the international organizations that target specific organizations. This is the case for the United Nations Global Compact initiative, which placed the ten principles for enterprises, and also the OECD guidelines. At the European level, the European Commission published a Green paper on promoting CSR and recently renewed the strategy to encourage debate on social responsibility among key actors.

The discussion regarding the available instrument from the international level is the object of discussion in the second section, without detailing on the content of the guidelines or conduct codes of the international developing partners, we will analyze strictly the specificity of each instrument to create a coherent working ensemble that organization have in their effort to be socially responsible.

Mirroring the international framework, national instruments follow the guiding lines of international organizations in the support of national effort to promote and implement social responsibility. The national strategy of Romania regarding social responsibility is analyzed (section three) as an example of a country that didn't give much consideration until recently to the social responsibility practices but over comes this.

The instrument revealed as the most suited for implementation in the public sector, ISO 26000, will be analyzed in details in the forth section of the paper. The reasons why we have chosen this particular standard from the whole pole of instruments are

discussed and argued having permanently in mind the criticism it suffers from the literature and practitioners (Ward, 2010).

The implementation of ISO 26000 in the public sector was considered a utopia or at most a wishful thinking for future reform plans. However, Belgian public administration has shown that the using of ISO 26000 in their federal agencies is not only possible but useful. The way in which this was possible and the results and conclusions reached by this pilot project are discussed in the fifth section of the paper.

2. Specific instrument at international level

The main source of social responsibility instruments consists of various instruments created by companies. This trend was initiated by multinational companies that need to provide a benchmark for national branches, and was followed by small and medium business. These include codes of conduct, ethics codes, principles and manual, which differ in legal force and notoriety and management standards.

According to the European Commission a code of conduct is “a formal statement of values and business practices of a company and sometimes of its suppliers. A code is a declaration of minimal standards, accompanied by the company’s commitment to observe and require from its contractors, subcontractor, suppliers and partners to observe themselves” (European Commission, 2001: 5).

OECD’s definition states that a code of conduct is a “voluntary commitment undertaken by a company, organization or other entity that advances standards and principles of conduct for their business in the market”. By definition, we can say that a code of conduct and other similar instruments are also voluntary commitments taken by organizations to meet certain ethical values and rules (in particular social or environmental) with minimal impact on their activities (Bessire, Mazuyer, 2012: 71).

Management standards are found at the intersection of practical and governance tools (guidelines) and voluntary practices (codes of conducts), since standardization organizations created them, the adoption of these standards is voluntary. Technical as primary nature, they serve as references for organization that relate to them. Standards developed by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) plays a central role. ISO meets the national standardization instituted of 159 countries, both public and private. Currently, the most emblematic standards in the field of social responsibility is ISO 26000. Adopted in 2010, it is designed to provide organizations with guidance in addressing social responsibility, identify and communicate with stakeholders, demonstrate credibility when preparing their reports, to improve focus on results and to ensure consistency of the documents and other ISO standards in the field (Bessire, Mazuyer, 2012: 71). This appearance of the new standard marks the transformation of the corporate social responsibility concept to social responsibility, which involves the application of the concept in the public and private sector, regardless of the type of organization.

Management standards help organizations to involve stakeholders and to integrate social and environmental preoccupations in the decisional process and operations. For this purpose the ISO 9000, 14 000, SA8000, AA1000SES are used.

Even though the management standards are applied voluntary, organizations have understood their importance and the benefits they would get from their implementation, particularly in the context of multinational orientation. Competitive advantages stemming from the adoption of these standards were understood, as well as their capacity to strengthen relations between organizations, by positioning the conversation between entities at the same level (European Commission, 2004: 22).

3. Specific instruments at national level

In Romania, the concept of social responsibility is still in the early stages of development. While multinational and large Romanian companies have started a gradual development of their own social responsibility culture, the concept of SR is still little known in the area of SMEs, while in many cases, both at local and central level, public authorities are not sufficiently involved in the promotion of the SR to the benefit of communities. Thus, involvement in social responsibility campaigns is still weak in this sector, but in the wider context of globalization and further European integration, Romanian companies and organizations must adopt a social responsible attitude in order to withstand the market and remain competitive.

In 2011, with the drafting of the National strategy for the Promotion of Social Responsibility 2011-2016, public authorities have recognized the importance of raising awareness and supporting the development of social responsibility in Romania, identifying priorities and setting targets in line with the EUs strategy in the field.

The main aim of the strategy is to raise awareness about the importance and benefits of applying social responsibility and increase the involvement of the public sector and of the civil society in the implementation of social responsibility in Romania (National Strategy, 2011: 30).

The aim of involving public authorities is to support the development of the conditions for the application of social responsibility in companies and other organization, trough a series of active measures in order to increase the motivation and capacity of organizations to exercise their social responsibility, including guidance, openness to cooperation and partnership, dialogue and exchange between authorities, private sector and civil society.

The involvement of public authorities under the conditions presented in the strategy does not replace or affect in any way the responsibility of public authorities to act in co ordinance with the public interest, these being the responsibilities that the public authorities hold under the Constitution.

Regarding private companies and other organizations, the strategy aims to promote the concept of social responsibilities in their activities, the public authorities having the role to create the necessary conditions to generate social dialogue on this topic.

In the “National Strategy for the Promotion of Social Responsibility 2011-2016” a series of principles, objectives and measures are presented for a coherent and active policy, in the support of active and consistent application of the concept of social responsibility in companies, organizations and public authorities of Romania, to be implemented in the period 2011-2016.

Beyond standards taken at national level, the legal system and the law have an important role in creating the framework for a responsible attitude. These legal instruments relevant to social responsibility can be classified according to four dimensions: work environment, market, environment and community.

Regarding working environment and staff, at this time there is extensive legislation to ensure the health and safety of employees at the work place and to ensure their professional development in order to reduce discrimination and to promote equal opportunities. The main themes that the Romanian legislation treats are labor relations, health and safety, employment and labor mobility, training and social security for migrant workers.

Related to market we can mention that with the entry to the European Union a series of harmonization were necessary for the national legislation in relation with the European one, including the legislation on economic and trade relations.

This process of alignment with European regulations regarding trade and quality standards for products are to the benefit of consumers, who has access to such information, but also to safe products, and for the benefit of organization in Romania, who want to remain competitive in a market increasingly tougher, where they have to compete with western European products and services.

The social responsibility dimension regarding markets refers to issues such as anti-corruption policies, fair competition in the acquisition process, the quality of products/services, fair prices, protection of consumer, health and safety, etc.

The environmental legalization in Romania is more extensive after the initiation of negotiations for EU membership. There were ratified a series of various international covenants such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, signed in Rio de Janeiro on 5th of June 1992, the Kyoto Protocol, adopted on 11 December 1997, Councils Directive no. 2003/87/EC of 13th October 2003 establishing a scheme for trading greenhouse gas emissions trading within the Community, the Protocol of Kiev, 2008 and Directive 2008/1/EC concerning integrated pollution prevention and control.

In Romania, organizations that wish to engage in community development are encouraged through tax relief legislation that benefit the development of sponsorship, up to at least 0.3% of turnover and 20% of tax. In fact, these are not actual facilities, but targeting of amounts from the tax they have to pay to the state.

Besides the national strategy in place and the legislation we identified before, the management standards are used in Romania to set the framework for socially responsible activity. For this, the national authority is the Association for Standardisation in Romania, responsible with the elaboration and approval of national standards and the setting of main principles and methodology for national standardization. Thus it contributes, along other public authorities, to the creation of an environment that encourages socially responsible behaviors and operations, and implicitly sustainable development of society.

4. ISO 26000

Management standard ISO 26000 is intended to be useful for a wide variety of organizations in the private, public and non-profit, large or small, developed countries or developing countries. Although not all aspects of the standard are equally important for all organizations, all core subjects are relevant to any organization. All core subjects focus a number of issues and individual responsibility of each organization to identify what issues are relevant or important for the organization to confront them.

Although ISO 26000 is not included in the management standards that aim to offer ISO certification, recommendations are particularly important to provide a coherent and comprehensive picture of what social responsibility is today. So we are talking about a guideline that does not seek in any way to coerce or reward organization or to expand or limit its legal obligations. For this reason, ISO 26000 addresses also organizations in the public sector, as single entities that can apply ISO 26000 recommendations (Roberts, 2010).

Why should public sector organizations consider this standard? Because they can understand better the communities to which they are addressing and affect and can create strong partnerships with investors, citizens, their officials (Gurtler, 2012:6). They can capture powerful aspects about the organization's contributions and issues and pinpoint areas that were neglected, communication with stakeholders leading to a deeper

understanding of needs beyond current information and available resources (Roberts, 2010). The reasons behind the use of this management standard may be different but all in support of the idea that applying SR practices help to achieve sustainable development.

The ISO 26000 aims to assist organizations contribute to sustainable development, to encourage them to act beyond the legal requirement, recognizing that this is a fundamental duty of any organization and an essential part of social responsibility.

Sustainable development means growth and change that maintains and enhances the natural environment, human resources and society we depend on. Organizations that identify, maintain and improve this resource are very competitive, are better able to face the challenges of the market and can anticipate and reduce threats coming from environmental changes and natural disasters so they can adapt quickly to significant social change (Gurtler, 2012: 8).

No organization can foresee perfectly what the future brings but sustainable organizations can plan for a future in which significant environmental and social changes is taking place. Organizations that contribute to a more sustainable society are more likely to be valuable and supported by citizens, investors and policy makers.

ISO 26000 provides information and tools for decision-making so that organizations can identify ways to improve the impact they have on people with whom they interact and on the place in which it operates, and thereby become more valuable and valued as members of society not only as an administrative body.

The first question regarding the impact of ISO 26000 on voluntary standards, is with over a thousand industry standards such as ISO 26000 is this new standards necessary? As a matter of fact, ISO has emphasized that the guidelines is based on best practices developed by existing public and private initiatives in the sector of social responsibility, arguing that although there are many codes on individual social responsibility issues, nothing so far has provided a comprehensive overview of the subject, and that ISO 26000 has been made to provide a common understanding of what is social responsibility (Roberts, 2010). As said ISO Secretary-General Rob Steele, "global agreement on definitions of social responsibility, principles and core subjects, and guidance on how to integrate social responsibility throughout an organization would make things easier for everyone" (in Gurtler, 2012: 9). Therefore, he reiterated that market expectations for ISO 26000, which also are aims for the ISO 26000, are in three main aspects: definition of global agreement on social responsibility, and to its principles, global agreement on the basic topics of social responsibility and guidance on how to integrate social responsibility into an organization (Roberts, 2010).

Also, as of the most recognized international standardization bodies in the world, especially for the private sector, ISO is a known brand, which is crucial to promoting the concept and ideals of social responsibility. "ISO 26000 is a way to truly integrate the concept, using a system of global standards that most companies are likely to be familiar", as put by Dr. Kernaghan Webb, Special Advisor to the UN Global compact on ISO 26000. Therefore, ISO 26000 is not intended to be a substitute for all other standards and initiatives. It provides a platform, a frame or a basic way for businesses and other organizations on the meaning and internalization of social responsibility (Gurtler, 2012: 10).

ISO 26000 does not meets certain "requirements" or level "implementation" but means for social responsibility practices to be updated, and for this ISO 26000 may be necessary, but certainly not enough. Although most standards and voluntary initiatives concern only part of the whole area (in most cases part of the business), that might be more "operational" and "concrete" or "simple". Literally, ISO 26000 is neutral to these

standards or initiatives (Roberts, 2010). On the one hand, ISO 26000 does not discourage or limit the application and adoption of standards and initiatives, nor exclude or frowns upon new standards or initiatives. On the other hand, it sees participation in ISO 26000 standards and voluntary initiatives as an essential approach to achieve responsibility (Gurtler, 2012: 12).

This neutrality can bring influences of two types on voluntary standards or their environmental initiatives and market operation. Ideologically, ISO 26000 will become a platform for raising broad social responsibility, and as more people and organizations know more about the content and its essence, ISO 26000 social responsibility can reduce mystification and can ease mentality of the general public "following blind" different standards or voluntary initiatives.

On the other hand, from an operational point, as more people and organizations know more about the value and potential of social responsibility, through the ISO 26000 platform, there may be an increase in demand for social responsibility services provided by voluntary standards or initiatives of certification or consultation form that cannot otherwise be obtained from ISO (Ward, 2010). Just as Dr. Kernaghan Webb points out, "it acts as a starting-point document, which can lead to more intense and sophisticated actions on other initiatives when an organization is ready for them" (in Gurtler, 2012:9), and ISO 2600 will open the use of more specialized tools, initiatives and social responsibility practices. Realizing this, many organizations, especially business associations, standardization bodies, consulting agencies and even government bodies can produce new standards and initiatives to meet such requests.

It is thus obvious that a combination of the two influences will make things more clear for parties intending to use tools and services standards and voluntary initiatives, which in turn can improve the quality (such as efficiency, credibility, legitimacy and representative nature) of these standards and long-term initiatives (Ward, 2010). In fact, ISO 26000 came with a set of criteria for stakeholders to help them determine whether or not to participate on or to use a social responsibility initiative.

It is also highly probable, on the long run, having in mind that the ISO 26000 gives a common and universal definition, principles, core subjects regarding social responsibility that the ambiguity and discrepancies on the matter will reduce, voluntary standards and initiatives will start to develop in a similar way and coherence and consistency between them will increase.

5. Implementation of ISO 26000 – the Belgium experience

Various authorities are watching globally the ISO 26000 implementation steps. The Belgian federal authorities, via their Public Planning Services (PPS) for Sustainable Development, took the lead to launch a pilot project for governmental organizations. Four public authorities showed their willingness to participate, The Federal Public Services (FPS) Finance, Social Security, Economy and the PPS Sustainable Development itself. Goal of this pilot project was to support and give guidance to the four participating administrations in the implementation of the ISO 26000 directive as well as the release of a report based on the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) directives.

The four participating administrations are quite different, already by their respective size. The headcount of the FPS Finance reaches approximately 26.000, the FPS Economy around 13.000, the FPS Social Security counts more or less 1.300 and the PPS Sustainable Development employs 20 persons. The mission was executed by SUSTENO,

an independent strategic counseling office that acted as a consultant in the field of sustainable development.

This part of the paper uses the final report published by SUSTENO and is a synthetic description of the whole application process of the project.

At the start of the project, two types of objectives were formulated: the general coordinating project (qualitative) goals and the resulting specific (and quantitative) goals for each participating administration.

General objectives:

- a. Apply SR using the ISO 26000 directives,
- b. Gain learning experiences by managing a SR process based on, the ISO 26000 in their own organization,
- c. Realize capacity building, enabling the actors to take the next step and make targeted choices for the SR implementations in the width of the federal organizations.

Specific objectives:

- a. Draft a SR action plan.
- b. Write a GRI report.

The implementation plan of the project was for one year in four very different agencies of public sector. For efficient functioning, an organizations structure was designated to coordinate all actors involved. The project was managed on two levels, so that learning experiences, communication and the follow up of activities could be coordinated.

Build Up Pilot Project ISO 26000 and GRI			
Phase 1- preparation	Phase 2 – understand	Phase 3 – analyses	Phase 4 – results
ISO Preparation	Understand and recognize SR	Analyses	SR action plan
GRI Preparation	Understand GRI-reporting format	GRI data collection	GRI report preparation
1. Interview with the president	Validate and fix definitely scope for ISO and GRI	Complete analyses of all ISO-subjects according to relevance	Proposal SR objectives
2. Scope proposal	Validate the 7 ISO principles and identification in core team	Analyses of the significance of the ISO-subjects	Preparation SR action plan
3. Testing of 7 ISO principles	Identify core activities within scope FPS/PPS	Testing significances according to stakeholders visions	Proposal SR action plan to FPS/PPS management
4. Check present indicators useful for GRI	Fix GRI-method and process per FPS/PPS	Define priorities for future SR actions with the core team	Preparation GRI-report
5. Set composition of the core team FPS/PPS	Define the internal communication flow	Definite choices GRI indicators	Preparation evaluation report pilot project
6. Official launch of the project on 1 st core team	Identify stakeholders	GRI-data collection	Discussion and conclusion pilot project
Timing	1 June – 16 Sept 2011	16Sept – 3 Nov 2011	3 Nov – 1 Mar 2012
			1 Mar – 31 May 2012

Source: Susteno report, page 10

Relevant to this discussion are the results and outputs of the project. Here, a distinction is made between the results and solutions and how this feedback is related to the original objectives.

Results (or outputs) are linked to the direct, tangible, effects of a project and the efforts needed. Results are linked to specific goals; in this case: elaborate a SR action plan and prepare a GRI report.

Outcomes concern the indirect, wider effects (also external to the own organization) one wants to achieve with a project and the activities. Outcomes are linked to the general objectives; in this case: gain learning experience and realize capacity building for a better implementation of SR. The outcome is often influenced by more factors than solely the delivered efforts.

Generally, it can be observed that the knowledge on social responsibility has increased with the people who participated in the project and that there is more insight in what it can mean for a department or an organization. Gradually during the project, a better comprehension of the (sometimes complex) material and SR subjects coming from ISO 26000 occurred. This led to two types of insight: firstly that SR was already used, but could not be named as such in the past, and it was discovered that certain subjects, which at first sight were not relevant for the functioning, such as ex. human rights, upon further debate and exchange contained indeed relevant aspects for the own functioning .

The span of the final effects and the extent to which the learning process and capacity is built up in this pilot project, is also dependent on the chosen scope and the way on how this project and the learning processes is communicated internally. It became obvious that ISO 26000 and the GRI offer a frame to examine its own operation from a perspective of sustainability and social responsibility.

The long-term effects and possible impacts of this project, in the broader sense, are still not foreseeable. Furthermore, they also depend of various other factors. Given the worldwide interest for ISO 26000 and the learning processes coming from this unique pilot project done in government organizations, it can be stated that the publication of the first GRI reports of these four administrations, as well as the further external communication around this project and the release of the final report, will lead to increased awareness and sensitization and will contribute to increased dynamics around introducing SR in the organizations using instruments such as ISO 26000 and GRI.

The conclusions are taken at the level of the administrative organization, content and instruments of ISO 26000 and GRI and the present process for the introduction, that were important to meet the project objectives and the final results and solutions. The conclusions look at the extent in which the project objectives were effectively reached, the degree of relevance for future use of the ISO 26000 and GRI instruments to anchor social responsibility in the governmental organizations.

The manner in which ISO 26000 is used depends on the management's vision and goals in the organization for sustainable development and their sense of social responsibility. This can be done based on a (long term) strategy as well as a (short term) operational engagement. With a strategic vision and engagement, the meta level, the 'why' questions, of the ISO 26000 are tackled, where debates with the top management regarding principles, use of the sphere of influence, processes for continuous stakeholders dialog, good management and management tools, play an important role. At a more operational definition, one answers the 'what and how' question more rapidly and it is verified how priority subjects can be transformed in concrete actions for improvement and

processes in the organization. A strategic engagement implies also other remote conditions than the operational approach, such as a strong management involvement.

The purpose of this one-year project was to implement ISO 26000 as well as to issue a GRI report. It should be taken into account that hardly a good half year ago ISO 26000 was voted when this project started. In other words, it is a pioneer project to start with ISO 26000 and to let it join a GRI reporting.

Because both processes needed to run more or less in parallel, much confusion existed among the participants regarding the relation between both. Although both instruments have many similarities, at the same time another terminology is used and the GRI has another goal than ISO 26000. An additional complicating factor was that the chosen scope for the pilot project for the ISO 26000 exercise did not necessarily correspond to the one chosen for the GRI report. The ISO 26000 was the focus and the starting point of this project.

Building around SR, an organization is better off to define first (via the ISO 26000) what its position is regarding SR and state clearly what the wished expected goals and improvements are, start a dialogue with the stakeholders on this, follow-up with actions and finally write a GRI report on the subject. Now this had to be done almost in parallel, due to time pressure.

This pilot project also served as methodology test of the ISO 26000 instruments and GRI in the government organizations. The participants did not find the ISO 26000 easy and user friendly. Mainly, the presentation of the ISO 26000 documents, and to a lesser extent, the GRI, made it overwhelming in terms of structure and content. The subjects analyses and the aspects, as well as the principles from ISO 26000, were often found to be too detailed and/or too complex. Because of the lack of sustainable development knowledge and SR, a frame was missing that could be used as an immediate starting base. The result is that phase 1 was mainly used to construct the correct framework. The more concrete GRI indicators brought sometimes more grip. The concrete analyses documents had the advantage to make the approach more concrete, being, initially, a little more philosophic for certain participants. The disadvantage is that some restricted themselves using a 'checklist' approach without further reflection.

6. Conclusions

Being such a controversial and circulated in recent decades management concept, choosing the CSR instruments and approach is rather difficult. Given the scope of the research (public sector), we made the choice in favor of international development partners, thus choosing to exclude large multinational companies as a source of tools for social responsibility practices. This presentation and systematic instruments covered the first part of the paper.

The original concept, corporate social responsibility has changed drastically in recent years. In the first instance "social" in CSR has created division among both supporters and critics of including social and environmental concerns in the business of a corporation. The two sides were formed as follows: supporters of critical corporate ideology and traditional economists. First take an extended state control over private companies and thus perceive CSR as an opportunity to transfer responsibility of many urgent problems of the world, such as poverty, injustice and environmental degradation within corporations. But traditional economists reject the idea of "social" as a matter of principle, criticizing strict regulation, public intervention, and the welfare state and refer to companies as the foundation for free societies, with focus on CSR.

If this debate is a horizontal and ideological one between supporters of one or other of the economic theories of state intervention in the economy, now the discussion on CSR has changed the focus to another aspect, namely the "corporate" of CSR.

Globalization, financial crisis, new theories of public administration, international development partners, the general progress and new constraints have led to changing the perception of entities. So far we speak less of companies, firms, SMEs, NGOs, non-profit organizations, public institutions, preferring the generic term of organization. We use therefore a combination of the main characteristics of entities and circumvention of differences, reaching the main idea that the social responsibility is of the organizations.

From the multitude of instruments analyzed, ISO 26000 was chosen because this is the first guide that addresses organizations, generic and universally valid. With experience in standardization in the public sector through quality standards and environmental, ISO advances the idea that social responsibility must be understood and integrated in the work, regardless of their nature.

Although often criticized for lack of power and force, ISO succeeded in 2 years from launching to arouse curiosity and interest of government enough to be applied to practice. There is already evidence and experience from the government who tested sustainability reporting standards and social responsibility. The first pilot project of this kind was held in Belgium in 2011 but several impulses for all around suggest that this was just the begging of what it is called a public social responsibility of the state.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bessire, D.; Mazuyer, E. (2012), "Norms of CSR: densification or degeneration?" in *Developments in Corporate Social Responsibility*, Vol. 3, Emerald Publishing;
- European Commission (2001), *Green Paper. Promoting an European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility*;
- European Commission (2011), *A renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility*;
- Gurtler, G. (2012), „Temptations of CSR. Guidance on Social Responsibility”;
- International Standard Organisation (2010), *ISO 26000: Guidelines for implementing social responsibility*;
- Roberts, J. (2010), "How Corporate Social Responsibility (ISO 26000) mandates undermine free markets" in *Backgrounder*, nr. 2409 from 3of May;
- Romanian Government (2011), *Strategia națională de promovare a responsabilității sociale 2011-2016*;
- Szatmari, C.; Macovei, Horia C. (2012) „Implementarea Responsabilității sociale. Ghid de instrumente și tehnici”;
- Susteno (2012), *Social responsibility in government organisations through ISO 26000 and GRI*;
- Ward, H. (2010), *The ISO 26000: implications for public policy and transnational democracy*, Foundation for Democracy and Sustainable Development publications;
- <http://www.csrlebanon.com/ISO%2026000%20%E2%80%93%20Interview%20with%20Rob%20Steele.pdf> , accesed at 8 July 2013;
- http://www.enebuilder.net/globalcompact/e_article001076768.cfm , accesed at 10 June 2013;

http://www.enebuilder.net/globalcompact/e_article001076768.cfm , accessed at 10 June 2013;

http://www.ioemp.org/fileadmin/ioe_documents/publications/Other%20International%20Organisations/ISO/EN/_2012-09-19__Fact_Sheet_for_Business_CSR_Guidance_-_ISO_26000__final_.pdf, accessed at 25 March 2013;

[;http://www.ioemp.org/fileadmin/ioe_documents/publications/Other%20International%20Organisations/ISO/EN/_2012-09-19__Fact_Sheet_for_Business_CSR_Guidance_-_ISO_26000__final_.pdf](http://www.ioemp.org/fileadmin/ioe_documents/publications/Other%20International%20Organisations/ISO/EN/_2012-09-19__Fact_Sheet_for_Business_CSR_Guidance_-_ISO_26000__final_.pdf), accessed at 26 March 2013;

[http://www.normapme.eu/public/uploads/files/iso26000_gurtler/Temptations%20of%20ISO%2026000%20\(2012-05\)_EN.pdf](http://www.normapme.eu/public/uploads/files/iso26000_gurtler/Temptations%20of%20ISO%2026000%20(2012-05)_EN.pdf) , accessed at 14 July 2013.

INNOVATION THROUGH LOCAL WELFARE CULTURE: THE CAPACITY OF INTER-GENERATIONAL RELATIONS TO ACT AGAINST SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RISKS

*Dragoş Lucian IVAN**

Abstract. *How heavy should the burden of social security be? The answer to this question encapsulates all the problems behind policies meant to regularize the welfare system. Recent economic developments have also strengthened existing inequalities. We have identified social innovations through enabling state welfare system at the national level and intergenerational relationships at the local level in three policy fields: health care, housing and social cohesion. This research examined the missing link between the actions of the welfare state at the national level and the realities at the local level represented by intergenerational relationships. The successful transfer of national welfare policies to local entities able to re-construct intergenerational relationships is the key to limiting the financial burden that crushes European potential for development.*

Keywords: *Intergenerational relationships; welfare-state; family; local welfare*

1. Introduction

Romania has experienced a welfare state that played a major role in the delivery of both service provision and cash allowances. The system was based around the national coverage of the state and the local coverage of the people, seen as active counterparts. The family through intergenerational relationships supplied services for each other, but they also transferred material possessions. Romania was built around the constant interaction between the public sphere of state organizations and professionals and the private sphere of the individual and the family. Under the pressure of economic, political, demographic and cultural factors this system failed. Trying to build another model capable of handling the increase of old and emergence of new risks, the social system in Romania knew a decreasing coverage. It no longer can count on the stability of intergenerational responsibilities for social security and social cohesion at the local level. Traditionally, at the local level social cohesion and social security was handled through the management of intergenerational relationships. In this research we wish to explore the possibility of using intergenerational relationships at the local level, so as to attempt to limit the financial burden of the welfare state. Currently the efficiency of local welfare systems in Romania is at an all time low. It is a pendulum between centralization and decentralization. It started to develop under new forms. We intend to analyze its new forms and the old system of welfare, being a real example for European countries.


* PhD student, National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Faculty of Communication and Public Relations, Bucharest, Romania, e-mail: i_dragos_lucian@yahoo.com. Beneficiary of the “Doctoral Scholarships for a Sustainable Society” project, co-financed by the European Union through the European Social Fund, Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources and Development 2007-2013.

Intergenerational relations not only govern family life by being assimilated in one's cultural pattern of behavior, but also help determine social cohesion within a community. Whatever ingredients are taken to define a welfare state or social cohesion, intergenerational relationships will appear to be more acceptable, however unexpected or dramatic it appears.

How do intergenerational norms and practices affect the welfare system, and vice-versa? How are they influenced by the welfare regimes? Are intergenerational relationships substituting or complementing? How do these cultural, behavioral and normative intergenerational patterns vary between generations? What is the actual and preferred balance between family support through intergenerational relationships and welfare systems? We provide the answers through a strong methodology that guaranteed the results.

The design was based on combined quantitative and qualitative methods. We believed that the quantitative research manifested through collecting quantitative data needed also the support offered by qualitative data. This decision was triggered by the reality that facts do not exist on their own but are located within wide-ranging sets of beliefs, assumptions, opinions and subjective elements.

Picture 1. *The relations that are established within the framework made out of the welfare state and the local welfare system*




2. Motivation

To begin, let us sketch the implicit reasoning behind our research. The last three decades have represented a typical fin de siècle in at least one paramount issue: the welfare system in Romania has gone through severe transformations. Romania has moved from positive demographic growth to a rapid depopulation. This affected its efforts to construct a sustainable modern welfare state.

The development of the welfare state should be regarded as being intertwined with that of the family and of the local community. This is a reality that should be acknowledged. In particular, the family, the major form of social organization in contemporary societies, should be considered as a prolonged concern within the welfare state. At the moment of writing this paper we live in a historical moment of demographic change and family change. This change is experienced not only in Romania, although here it is experienced at an outrageous degree, but it is a reality faced by the European Union. Romania has registered the lowest fertility rate in the EU. Any research undertaken in Romania presents value not only for its own development, but for the entire region and for the EU. The new EU members share a common historical past, a similar population dynamic, consonant economic systems and akin migration flows. There is defiantly a child gap in the case of Romania. This child gap is present all over the European continent, but we believe that the present research in this field has failed to capture the exact specific regional reality for this situation. At the same time Romania experiences population ageing.

The family is a social cell that has continuity and its members are aware of this. Parents are concerned with the future of their children and are concerned with the capacity of the state to provide equality of opportunities and economic stability for the children. Policies meant to support parents are not sufficient in an environment that raises questions for the future. Our research has demonstrated that in Romania the choice of having a child is influenced by the perception upon the capacity of the state to provide a future for that child.

Picture 2. *The potential advantages and disadvantages derived from the existence/inexistence of a welfare state system working together with a local welfare system*



The vast majority of research has presented things from the perspective of the present. Parents were presented as being overly concerned with the present and with their own specific needs such as career, travel, free time, inability to sustain a high level of

living when managing a numerous family. The welfare state was presented as the sole entity in charge with social security. It was supposed to use the same instruments to handle a totally different situation. The welfare state was forced to take over some of the roles that were part of the familial duties or of the competence of the local community. By doing so, it had to increase its financial involvement. This increased the financial burden it had to endure. The financial burden became even more obvious in the time of the economic crisis. Although this effort was made by the welfare state it did not manage to cover successfully the absence of the family or the involvement of the local community. As a result of this type of thinking, most of the policies applied today in all types of welfare states have focused on the present needs of the family, overlooking the fact that the family is made out of several generations, generations that not only support each other but also sustain each other to construct potential development in the future. The family in Romania is supposed to grow, to expand and to gather, to provide for itself not only in the present, but also in the future. Besides these concerns, which are sometimes common with current research regarding other European countries we discovered that in Romania there is also a concern with the development of the country, not only of the family. The generations that construct a family are concerned with the future possibilities of the child and the potential for development created by the state. An unstable and unfriendly environment can discourage a family from having a child, not because they lack the present economic means but because they do not see a bright future for their child. In Romanian mentality things are different. The Romanian mentality measures success of a parent through the realizations of the child, of the younger generation, not necessarily through what the parent can provide at the present moment. We should also mention another misleading fact that can affect Romanian social policies. Most of the policies that are in place today target only one generation, at most two generations and fail to see the permanent communication and exchanges that should exist between the generations.

There are few other social mediums that can match in complexity the family. Furthermore, we should not overlook the sheer size of a family, its continuity and its past as experienced and felt by its members. There have always been grounds for exploring the significance of the family. However, the case is particularly acute at present because of the changes that happen at the level of the demographic patterns and at the economic level of the welfare state. The demographic change and the economic crisis that threatens the welfare state raise crucial questions about the role of the family and its future.

3. Literature Review

Our research was based on two hypotheses. We believe that intergenerational relationships are indeed problematic. At the same time we firmly believe that they are worthwhile.

We are aware of the fact that at this point the majority of research was conducted on intergenerational relationships at the level of the family. Little research was focused upon intergenerational relations at the local. The community has been largely ignored in favor of the family and the greater political structures. We believe that all of these structures are linked together. Intergenerational relations are a significant element of our social identity. Having such a role it should present important implications for local cohesion. Taking into consideration the fact that such relations have a material effect on the quality of life and on the experience of the individual we believe that these relations can and indeed also impacts the welfare state.

Looking over the literature on the subject of intergenerational relationships and their influence on the wellbeing of the welfare state you are most likely to read one of two major perspectives.

The first one is optimistic: the welfare state is at a moment in which intergenerational relationships can help sustain it. Reasons for hope abound, but are centered around the fact that intergenerational relationships can decrease the financial burden of the state at the local level. Although we understand this as being a very important motivation for intergenerational relationships research, we believe that it presents far greater benefits. We experience demographic change and the ageing of the population. This is a reality that blocks the mind within a specific type of reaction. Most policies handle only what we can call damage control. This is considered to be a negative effect. Any change presents also an opportunity. Just because we experience demographic change and the aging of the population it does not mean we cannot sustain an economic growth. This can be achieved through socially developing the community. Each life stage and each age presents its own opportunities and its unique advantages (Grundy, 2007). In the presence of the economic crisis, the welfare state is in the situation of solving more social problems than before. The social needs have grown rapidly and it is expected for them to rise even faster in the years ahead. It seems that the majority of research associates population aging and increase social expenditure of the welfare state with the developed countries. Many countries, not just the resource-rich ones, have to manage this change. Inter-generational relations are something more than just socialization. These relations also include the transfer of consumption habits and health behavior (Mandrik, 2005). These patterns were considered a natural trait of a region. These patterns were considered to be unchangeable, when taken out of the context of their production. At the same time these patterns of behavior are an integral part of what we call the welfare state. Through the elaboration of intergenerational relations adapted to the new context certain consumption and health behaviors can be fostered. Intergenerational relations play an important part in the transmission of collective memory which is vital in providing local cohesion. Although this process of transmission takes place at the level of the family, it affects the community (Attias-Donfut, Wolff, 2005). Through extension it reaches the other immediate strata of society: the community and the societal level. Living in an age dominated by population restructuring we acknowledge the augmentation of the extreme ages on the pyramid population. In Romania the young-adult and older-adult are the most numerous at this time. Having this in mind we identify the danger of ageism. Ageism can manifest itself at both the local and the national level. It can also manifest itself in relation to young adults and older adults. Most of the research in the field of ageism was directed towards older adults. Through fostering the development of intergenerational relations this process can be limited (Ray, 2006). Research has found that intergenerational relationships have nurtured the developed of both adults and older-adults. Caught in this web of generations adults manifest improved cognitive traits, while older-adults were found to have a significant social activity through socialization (Kessler, Staudinger, 2007). Researchers that are optimist on the subject of the importance of intergenerational relationships also notice another important fact. Critics argue that in our contemporary world the number of generations that are part of the same family decreases. We witness decrease fertility and an increase in the number of single parent families. Optimists suggest that in this context, intergenerational relations become even more important because they can manifest themselves also at the local while being transmitted in the community and at the societal level (Constanzo, Hoy, 2007). These relationships at the

local level become even more important when considering the increasing number of families that are made out of members that live apart. Fewer families choose to share the same apartment or the same area. Migration and the job market have forced many to move to distant locations. Work life and personal life stops most from seeing each other. In these conditions the support from intergenerational relationships at the local level becomes even more important (Pinazo, Kaplan, 2008). The welfare state is invited to create policies that will foster more independent relations between generations at the local level (Izuhara, 2011: 157). Till now welfare policies were borrowed or used in different context. We also noticed that welfare policies were built so as to solve national or even global problems. Global problems have a local manifestation that needs a local solution, individualized and specially adapted. The local community can play a vital role in providing help in solving local manifestations of a global problem. Unfortunately, not many policies that function within the welfare state target local and family solidarity. Most of the time the functioning of local welfare systems is taken for granted (Naldini, 2013: 45).

The demographic context has changed and the welfare state needs to go through a reinstitutionalisation in accordance with the life course of the individuals making up the bulk of society (Anxo, Iosch, Rubery, 2011: 64). The institutions of the welfare state can become sustainable once they adapt to current population structure. Current research seems to have abandoned the idea of the welfare state. They fail to put forward the possibility of reform. The welfare state was created and in turn created policies sustainable in a certain context. Now that the context has changed it has to adapt to it and try to use other instruments, such as intergenerational relations to create local welfare systems. The forms of institutionalization characteristic to the welfare state are linked with patterns of social stratification. The welfare state was created taking into account a certain population structure and a certain type of economic distribution of economic and politic power. The welfare state is affected by an imbalance, but this does not mean it can no longer be made to function through new instruments, such as intergenerational relations. The welfare state has constructed its policies around rights and duties. These have been focused on specific age groups of the community. A social situation such as the change of the population pyramid results into a new correlation between generations (Vendramin, 2010: 116). The absence of policies directed at these changes can result into negative correlations between generations, such as ageism, while the presence of proper policies and even the removal of the welfare state from the local level can encourage positive local responses.

The welfare state should provide the necessary structure to foster local solutions for local problems. The welfare state was sensitive to political issues. Policies proposed by each European welfare state had at their base the material resources available and the political willingness present in the country. We believe that a change would be to include also a broader cultural understanding of intergenerational relations. Trying to replace some of the roles of the family or of the community puts a real strain on the capabilities of the welfare state. The welfare state is meant to function with broader policies while establishing the proper context for development. Trying to replace the family or the community has created the situation in which the welfare state is no longer financially sustainable. The resources of the state were supposed to cover the availability of the resources of the family and of the local community. In order to cut back on expenses the welfare state should foster a redistribution of roles towards the family and the local community. An withdraw of such manner of the direct involvement of the welfare state could be considered a step back, but in fact it is a step back that allows the family and the community to develop and to offer a better solution for local social problems.

The second narrative is more pessimistic. It casts doubt on the possibility of the welfare state to sustain social challenges while ensuring durable economic growth. This pessimistic view is directly linked with the demographic evolution itself and the age structure of the population. Authors insist upon the fact that we cannot talk about community cohesion in the presence of unbalance between the age structures of population. This point is considered the point of no return. The presence of an unbalanced age structure at the level of the community inherently leads towards lack of local cohesion. The importance of age diversity is paramount for local cohesion (Shore, Chung-Herrera, Dean, Holcombe Ehrhart, Randel & Singh, 2009). As a consequence of this perspective the majority of authors focus on intergenerational conflict (De Dreu & Gelfand, 2008; Dobbs, 2007; Dencker, 2007). Cohesion at the local level would be in danger due to three major sources of conflict: conflict of interest, socio-cognitive conflict and relationship conflict. The first type of conflict would have at its core the access to resources. Economic and power resources are finite. Within the social system different generations have different degrees of access to resources. It is considered that this would result into conflict between generations. This type of conflict would destabilize the community and make intergenerational relationships very difficult to create (De Dreu & Gelfand, 2008: 8-9).

The second type of conflict is created through the existence of incompatibilities between ways of judging reality. This type of conflict is believed to appear between generations that have lived different historical times and use different value systems. The same behavior is interpreted in two different manners. Conflict can arise around issues such as marriage, having a child, same sex marriages or even dress code. This type of conflict is called judgemental. The image is completed once we bring into discussion the second type: the intellectual type of conflict. In the second type we can find discussions around economic, politic and social issues. The young adult and the older adult would find it difficult to agree on the way in which the welfare state should use its funding. The two generations can also have different perspectives upon specific historical periods or on the interpretation of contemporary problems, such as adhesion to the European Union or on the foreign agenda of the country. There are many issues that could trigger an intellectual conflict and thus block intergenerational relationships.

The third source of conflict that it is believed to make intergenerational relationships difficult to create is social categorization. It is argued that the presence of a big age gap between generations can lead to the formation of social categorization (Dencker, 2007). Based on their age, individuals identify themselves with an age group. This identification is done through attributing positive traits to one group and negative traits to the other group. This is done so as to create distance between the two groups. Social categorization is followed by the creation of bias and of stereotype thinking. Age difference constitutes a potential base for discriminatory and prejudice type behavior.

It also casts doubt on the capacity of generations within the community to work together. This doubt starts once it is assumed that each generation has its own interest, an interest that dictates both thinking and behavior. The existence of a different interest contributes to the generation gap (Pain 2005; Holland, 2007; Bal, 2008; Calo, 2008). The bigger the age difference, the more difficult is to come to a compromise. Migration has created a greater generation gap in Romania. The local communities have started to be bipolar: young adults and older adults. High unemployment, migration, selective migration, poverty, low fertility, the lack of access to services and the lack of social protection has resulted in high concentrations of young adults and older adults. The

presence of such conditions results into augmented social tensions at the local level (Hudson, 2007; Dines, 2006). At this point the welfare state has created some policies that are meant to support the local community, but their vast majority is targeted at a specific age group. In Romania there are no policies and structures that deliberately involve people from different age groups. From the perspective of the state, the policies exist and cover all the major age groups, but are also contributing at disengaging the community from cohesion and communication. Each important part of the community is addressed separately and the policies add only more reasons for division and lack of cohesion. In the field of research there is some research on inter-generational relationships, but their vast majority is focused on the family. This is indeed important, but it is not transferable to the community. This perspective notes the depressing persistence of economic decline and the negative social changes that are taking place. Similar to the optimistic view, this perspective is also backed-up by compelling evidence.

Much of the research done the welfare state and the problems with which it struggles has focused on major issues that affect at the national level. Research has focused upon economic issues and macro-indicators, leaving aside the mundane problems that have also taken a heavy toll in our times. Much of the European population suffers from rampant lack of services. Basic services meant to support population and to eliminate mundane problems of the individual represent real deficiencies. These deficiencies will become only more pronounced as Europe's population ages.

And then there's the fact that the European countries, especially those that are rich in resources, seem to be falling prey to what we call policies for macro-indicators. These are policies and practices that are designed to use the wealth of the nation for the purpose of solving macro-economic indicators, in the hope that by solving them the mundane problems of the individual will be fixed. One result is the fact that local problems that put direct and immediate pressure on the individual become chronic. Another result is that the lack of local policies creates inequality. These local effects, which are difficult to capture through indicators often are masked by positive macro growth statistics.

Intergenerational relationships are supposed to be a practical local response to a local need. This method is actually grounded in the local reality and in the needs of the persons that inhabit that specific location. Personal accounts coupled with local experience should be paramount in establishing a local system of social help and cohesion based on intergenerational relationships.

The lack of a coherent policy towards intergenerational relation development is a significant barrier towards the participation of all the members of a community to the prosperity of both the community and the state. A system based on intergenerational relations at the local level can foster present and future social and economic development. It can play an important part in reducing social and economic inequalities. We stand in a time of crisis, in which inequalities are becoming more apparent. We admit that it was placed a lot of stress on economic inequality, but it is not the only problem that affects the standard of living. Unequal access to representation, health, housing, education and interaction can create just as much problems while also destabilizing the cohesion of the community. It is very difficult to prove through hard indicators that intergenerational relations create cohesion within the local community, but we certainly realize that its lack can decrease cohesion. It is an instrument that presupposes the active engagement of older and young people in planning the local development in an age in which we observe lack of political and social involvement. Young adults and older adults make up the majority of

the population. Without their engagement we can not envision a stable community. Policies should focus on creating more inclusive public spaces for their engagement.

4. Methodology

The first method of research constituted content analysis. Scientific literature is rich in the concepts of welfare state and in the concept of local community development, intergenerational development, but literature around the two topics linked together is seldom present. Content analysis has been used in order to be able to analyze the theoretical models regarding intergenerational relations as they have evolve in time and in the end we had the capacity to make inferences around the links of welfare at the local and national level. The inferences offered us the possibility of starting a broad description of the phenomenon of local welfare system. Our content analysis was deductive and we also identified its inherit limitations.

Limitations regarding this method steam from the subjective nature of content analysis. We assume the danger that our point of view may not be understood by all scientific readers with different and valid points of view. There was also the danger that our own findings may be misinterpreted. Both of these dangers were considered from the start and we took measures to ensure relative protection from them such as: using a long bibliographic list and using correct scientific language.

The quantitative study took place via the Internet and we initially contacted 400 persons, but we received a positive answer from 280 respondents. It was the intention to recheck the initial results of the study and we contacted the second time the 400 persons that we had in the data base and tried to invite them for a second questionnaire completion. This time, we received 135 affirmative answers and we decided to pick randomly from these another 50 to retake the initial questionnaire. The variables that described the first group of participants were kept, differences in the structure of the participants being different with only 2% - 3% from the initial structure. The second questionnaire, in fact the same design and the same questions, was conducted on a reduce number of people out of those that responded initially 50 persons and at an interval of three weeks after the first questionnaire. All the persons that took part in the interview received thank you letters and follow-up e-mails so as to demonstrate their importance in the study.


The feed-back received from the participants and the piloting test demonstrated that the questionnaire took between 1 hour and 1 and a half hour to be completed. The respondents were contacted in two ways: personally or via the Internet. In both cases the participants were offered a guarantee of confidentiality and a cover letter explaining the research and the methodology. We asked the participants to return the questionnaire completed in maximum two days from receiving it. The respondents were advised to answer the questionnaire question by question, respecting the order of the questions.

The respondents were grouped into age groups: 65+, 55-64, 45-54, 35-44, 25-34, 16-24. The participants were equally divided in male (n=140) and female (n=140). Each category was relatively equally represented by both male and female participants.

The research has been complemented with a qualitative study represented by 12 in-depth interviews. We selected 12 PR practitioners in such a manner that to represent most of the categories above. Each interview had a length between 35 minutes and 60 minutes.

5. Results

Picture 3. *Young people can learn from older people*




Our quantitative research found that older respondents strongly believe that young adults can learn from them. During the qualitative research we discovered that they were thinking about transmitting to young-adults their experience and their values. Interesting was the fact that they also referred to actually transmitting practical knowledge. Older adults believe that young-adults know more about field of activity such as the internet, technology and the world, but have very little knowledge about taking care of the house, taking care of their health or the health of others and sometimes they fail to understand the people around them. The qualitative research also revealed that older adults believe that young-adults have the knowledge to cope with technology and with the work market, but fail to have the knowledge necessary to take care of themselves or their families. When discussing about taking care of the house they mostly talk about the inability of young adults to repair, fix or solve common problems in the household such as changing the light bulb, replacing pipes.

The quantitative research found that young adults believe that they have very little to learn from older-adults. Although the percent of those that strongly disagree with the statement is not very high, the degree of those that do not even think about this perspective is rather large. Qualitative research has discovered the tendency of young-adults to believe that they do not need to know more than what they can use at school, in their circle of friends or at the job site. Although they place a lot of importance on practical knowledge, they see no use in acquiring practical knowledge in the household. They believe that these problems are better left to the professionals. Older-adults are not used to pay a professional to fix or to handle household problems. They are used to solve such problems by themselves or seek the help of other in the community. Young-adults believe that they should seek help among professionals and would not turn to somebody in the community for help. Young-adults believe that older-adults can not offer valuable knowledge. They consider valuable knowledge information related to their formal education, technology related or job related. They consider that the current times surpass the information that can be offered by older-adults.

The responses display a worrying situation. There is not a mutual awareness of the possibility for knowledge transmission between generations. Although older-adults are

aware of the important of knowledge transmission between generations, they can not offer their knowledge to young-adults, while also being blocked from learning others skills from the young-adults.

Picture 4. *Outside of their families, a natural part of the ageing process is for older people to become disengaged from younger people*




Knowledge transmission is blocked between generations. This suggests that the knowledge relationship at the level of the Romanian community is in a real danger and needs the support of intergenerational mechanisms. This is a clear proof that intergenerational relations are worsening, but that they were at a different level in the past. Older-adults remember that they were used to transmit knowledge and practical information within a greater circle of generations. The difficulty in establishing knowledge transmission can result into isolation: an unwilling but obvious isolation for older-adults and a willing and subtle isolation for the young-adult. The community and the family would find an improper environment for development because useful life-skills are no longer transmitted between generations. Knowledge is in danger of not being transmitted up or down generations, while discrimination can know widespread.

Overall, the majority of the respondents disagreed with this statement. We were curious to witness that the different in opinion between the age groups was not significant. The quantitative study revealed that the majority of the respondents disagree with the statement. This was baffling at first and we tried to solve this riddle through qualitative research. During the qualitative research we discovered that older-adults consider themselves as being central to the community. They are still interested in acting as sources of support, while also wishing to be engaged by the other members of the community. They believe that their relationship with the community holds two important exchanges. On one side they believe they can still offer something to the community and on the other side they believe the community owes them help in return. They believe they can help young-adults financially, through their limited economic power, practically through offering housing and shelter and also through moral support. In return they believe they can also be offered help with health related issues and services. Older-adults are willing to house young-adults and even to offer them a permanent residence. In return they expect the young-adult to be aware of their health and social needs. Young-adults also believe that older-adults should not be disengaged from the community. They admit that they still need their support and would encourage older-adults to continue supporting them towards

achieving their life goals. They are not very clear on how they should or would show their appreciation.

Picture 5. *Within the local community, people of different generations generally find it difficult to communicate*




This question was meant to identify whether intergenerational relations are possible at the level of the community. Most research was focused upon the family and the intergenerational relations that take place at its level. We were curious whether the situation is different at the level of the community. Older-adults find it difficult to communicate, while young-adults believe they do not have this problem. The quantitative study revealed a paradox. It seems that young-adults do not see a problem in establishing proper channels of communication, while older-adults experience difficulties in engaging others. Initially we were encouraged by these findings, but qualitative research has presented the limits of quantitative research. During the qualitative research we found that young-adults were thinking only of their own generation while they reserved very little time to communicate with older-adults. They found no problem in communicating with those that share their age and they rarely engaged older-adults in communication. We also discovered that their idea of communication was made out of only limited channels of communication. In other words they communicate at a basic level with older-adults and this level is easily achieved, but not considered communication by older-adults. Older-adults find it difficult to communicate with people from any generation. They feel like it is very difficult to engage people of your own age because they are with their own families. There is very little contact between them. Secondly, they have very little opportunities to establish communication with young-adults. They feel that they are not encouraged to communicate and that they are isolated. These findings bring real problems for policymakers and for the groups at the level of the community. Older-adults believe that the community is split between groups based on age and on family. It is very difficult for someone to penetrate into any other group. Older-adults are expected to socialize only within their own family and it is odd for them to do otherwise. They are also expected to socialize within their immediate vicinity and it would be difficult for them to engage people that are not close by or with whom they do not have close relations. Besides this barrier there is also the barrier of trust. They do not trust people they do not know, even if they are of the same age. Young-adults have a more trusting nature and are willing to socialize and share with people with whom they did not have any previous contact.

It seems that the majority of the respondents live real communication problems. The difference is that one group is more aware of this difficulty because it has experienced a difference situation in the past, while the other group is not aware because it has not lived any other situation. Older-adults have the experience of a more united community. They lived in a community where people met more and experienced social events. At the level of the community there were special gathering to improve communication and for socialization. Older-adults have a different life experience and they compare the present situation with the life as young-adults. Present day young-adults already live in a community with limited access to communication with other generations. They are used with this type of community and believe this is the norm. For them is something natural and anything different would need an adjustment period.

In the next graphic (Picture 6) we notice that it is a lot more difficult for young-adults to relate to older-adults. This makes communication even more difficult. Older-adults are more inclined to try to relate to young-adults. This is also influenced by their need to battle isolation and from their natural need of preserving the existence of intergenerational relations. Older-adults experienced life through intergenerational relations. They believe they have to preserve this system and they try to relate to young-adults. They invest effort and time into this activity, but to very little success. On the other hand young-adults are preoccupied with relations that they can control and with which they are comfortable. They see no real benefit in constructing relations with older-adults, or at least they see no real benefit into improving their communication with older-adults. From their perspective they have a perfectly normal relationship with them. This becomes a barrier to positive intergenerational relations. Current social and economic trends have a negative impact on intergenerational relations. This would justify a response from policymakers. It should be the welfare state that should compensate for this situation and try to balance the situation at the local level.


Picture 6. *It is harder for people to relate to people from a different generation*



We believe that globalization also accentuates the difference between the age groups. Earlier we mentioned that young-adults consider knowledge about the world as very important. They also believe that the knowledge offered by older-adults is not fit for them also because it is not global. Usually generations were brought together also through shared knowledge. In the context of globalization this seldom happen. This is especially true in Romania where older-adults rarely have the opportunity to acquire knowledge or

experience outside their community. Older-adults are anchored most of the time in the local community, with little access to the global community, while young-adults have the instruments to experience and explore the world outside the community. The lack of this shared experience makes empathy between generations and shared identity less probable to manifest itself.

Picture 7. *Relations between old and young in society today are worse than in the past*



Overall, we notice that the vast majority of respondents that make up the older-adults agree with the statement. The majority of young-adults disagree with the statement. The findings suggest that we indeed experience not only a problem in communication at the level of generations, but we also experience a different perspective on this issue. The overlooking of this potential problem can result into disengagement at the level of the community. This finding can be interpreted in numerous ways. Qualitative research has offered us part of the answers that can explain this situation. Young-adults believe that they should communicate more with those from their own generation, while older-adults should expect less communication time. They believe this applies in all types of interactions and that this aspect is something natural, linked with the life-course of a person. Older-adults believe that the current situation of disengagement between generations is something related to present day social and economic trends. They believe that this disengagement between generations is not something pertaining to the life-course, but an anomaly that should be fixed. Unfortunately we do not have historical data to compare their perspective. We can rely only on data provided by the participants.

6. Limitations

Historical data was not available so as to be able to compare. We had to use qualitative research to realize a few historical comparisons and we relied on data collected from the individuals. Another limit of our research is the limited number of respondents. In order to be able to present findings that can be true for the entire country we would need more respondents. On the other hand the number of respondents was sufficient to demonstrate a change in the relations between generations and to motivate further research. Another limitation of this paper is that it is part of a greater research work. It may lack some details and some information because it was meant to be part of a great project.

7. Conclusions

The first is that the support of intergenerational relationships clearly does allow for new forms of support at the local level, but under the presence of the welfare state. Indeed, this new type of local welfare management might even require the existence of the welfare state. On one hand the numerous and various institutions of the welfare state serve to facilitate the process of inter-generational relationships at the local level. On the other hand the welfare state can check and even control the development of this local system. To propose such a solution means to strike at a deregulated world order. In this deregulated world order the state, even the welfare state seems to have been cast aside. It would be an error to view the local welfare state under the form of intergenerational relationships as either essentialistic or fatalistic fashion. It should be viewed as a new form of social support, a natural form of support, largely uncharted, but which can give rise to a diverse welfare state that solves social problems at both the national and local level, with a personal touch. There is a great need for a local welfare system to combat local problems that have been debated extensively such as unequal access to housing (Antón, 2008). In short, research on the welfare state and on intergenerational relationships must proceed in partnership, using many of the conceptual tools already in use.

The majority of European states have experienced different social protection. Romania has experience periods in which social protection was family-centered or community-centered and now it seems it is situated in the paradigm of state-centered social protection. We experience demographic change. The majority of European countries have used a welfare state focused on social protection through a state-centered system. The period of state-centered social protection presents great advantages when the population is mostly made out of active individuals. At this time European demography has known a shift. The majority of European population is made-out-of young-adults and older-adults. At this point a family-centered social protection system would present real advantages. Shifting from a period of high state involvement through financial involvement to a period of high state involvement through social management is difficult. The welfare state can create policies that can support the family and the community to develop local social protection systems through both implicit and explicit.

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank Professor Paul Dobrescu from the University The National School of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest, who supervises my research.

I am grateful to and I would also like to thank Professor *Lluís Flaquer* who was kind enough to supervise my research activity while a visiting scholar at the *Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona* (UAB), Departament de Sociologia and Fernando Antón Alonso, Tècnic de suport a la recerca, Departament de Sociologia, *Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona*.

I also owe my most sincere acknowledgements because the author, Ivan Dragos Lucian, is a beneficiary of the „Doctoral Scholarships for a Sustainable Society” project, co-financed by the European Union through the European Social Fund, Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources and Development, 2007-2013.

Any errors or shortcomings are solely my own.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Antón, F.; Cortés, L.; Martínez, C.; Navarrete, J. (2008), “Lecciones y enseñanzas de la intervención pública sobre la exclusión residencial” in *Trabajo Social Hoy* (número extraordinari dedicat a treball social i habitatge);
- Anxo, D. (Author, Editor); Bosch, G. (Author, Editor); Rubery, J. (Author, Editor) (2011), *The Welfare State and Life Transitions: A European Perspective*, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd (31 Aug);
- Attias-Donfut, C.; Wolff, F. (2005), “Generational memory and family relationships” in Johnson M (ed.), *The Cambridge Handbook of Age and Ageing*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge;
- Calo, T.J. (2008). “Talent Management in the Era of the Ageing Workforce: the Critical Role of Knowledge Transfer” in *Public Personnel Management*, 37 (4);
- Constanzo, P.; Hoy, M. (2007), “Intergenerational Relations: Themes, Prospects and Possibilities” in *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 63, No. 4;
- Dines, N.; Cattell, V.; Gesler, W.; Curtis, S. (2006), *Public spaces and social relations in East London*, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, York;
- Flaquer, L. (2007), “How can we orientate the reform of childhood policies? Challenges, dilemmas and proposals” in *Wellchi Working Paper Series*, No. 8/2007, Barcelona, Children's Well-being International Documentation Centre;
- Flaquer, L. (2010), “Las políticas familiares en España en el marco de la Unión Europea” in S. Lerner and L. Melgar (eds) *Familias en el siglo XXI: Realidades diversas y políticas públicas*, México, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, El Colegio de México;
- Flaquer, L. (2010). “Pobresa infantil i famílies a Europa” in *Educació social: Revista d'intervenció socioeducativa*, Núm. 46, Barcelona, Fundació Pere Tarrés, Universitat Ramon Llull;
- Flaquer, L. (2010). “Famílies i relacions familiars” in *Revista Papers*, Barcelona, Institut d'Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona, Núm. 52;
- Flaquer, L.; Escobedo, A.; Navarro, L. (2009), “El impacto de la maternidad y la paternidad en el empleo” in *Itinerarios laborales de madres y padres en hogares con menores de tres años. Análisis de cambios y discontinuidades a partir de la muestra continua de vidas laborales*, Madrid, FIPROS;
- Flaquer, L.; Navarro, L. (2005) “Change of family structures and informal care work”, in Schüttpelz, A.; Pfau-Effinger, B. (eds) *Report on the International Workshop 'The Hidden Work Regime. Informal Work and Social Cohesion in Europe*, Hamburg, University of Hamburg;
- Grundy, E. (2007), *Successful Ageing and Social Interaction*, ILC-UK, London;
- Holland, C.; Clark, A.; Katz, J.; Peace, S. (2007), *Social interactions in urban public spaces*, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, York;
- Hudson, M.; Phillips, J.; Ray, K.; Barnes, H. (2007), *Understanding social cohesion: Everyday interactions in diverse communities*, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, York;
- Kessler, E.; Staudinger, U. (2007), “Intergenerational potential: effects of social interaction between older adults and adolescents” in *Psychology and Ageing*, Vol. 22, No. 4;
- Izuhara, M. (2011), *Ageing and intergenerational relations Family reciprocity from a global perspective*, Policy Press, (February 17);
- Mandrik, C. (2005), “Intergenerational influence: Roles of conformity to peers and communication effectiveness” in *Psychology and Marketing*, Vol. 22, Issue 10;

- Naldini, M. (2013), *Family in the Mediterranean Welfare States*, Routledge;
- Pain, R. (2005), *Intergenerational relations and practice in the development of sustainable communities*, ODPM, London;
- Pinazo, S.; Kaplan, M. (2008), "The benefits of intergenerational programmes" in Sanchez M (ed.), *Intergenerational programmes: Towards a society for all ages*, "La Caixa" Foundation, Barcelona;
- Ray, S. (2006), "Ageism: A benchmark of public attitudes in Britain" in *Age Concern England*;
- Vendramin, P. (2010), *Generations at Work and Social Cohesion in Europe (Work & Society)*, Peter Lang, 1 edition (September 29).

III. FAMILY, FEMINISM AND EMANCIPATION

Dragoş Lucian IVAN ⇔ *Changing European Families: Trends and Issues not Since the Black Death Stalked Europe in The Middle Ages Have We Seen Population Collapse Like This*

Ioana VLAD ⇔ *Organizational Development and Change in Romanian Women's Rights Groups: in between Personal, Inter-personal and Contextual Factors*

Andreea MOLOCEA ⇔ *Democracy and the Romanian Context in Early 90s. The First Feminist Attitudes*

Florin DUMITRESCU ⇔ *The Frivolous Revolution Fair/Carnival Elements of Mărțișor in University Square Before and After 1990*

Răzvan IONESCU-ȚUGUI ⇔ *Ethics and Political Activism in Anthropology*

Ioana VLAD ⇔ *Coalition Building Inside and Outside the Romanian Women's Rights Scene*

CHANGING EUROPEAN FAMILIES: TRENDS AND ISSUES NOT SINCE THE BLACK DEATH STALKED EUROPE IN THE MIDDLE AGES HAVE WE SEEN POPULATION COLLAPSE LIKE THIS

*Dragoş Lucian IVAN**

Abstract. *In all the member countries of the EU-27 demographic changes have occurred. These dramatic changes have occurred in the past decades and as a result family as we know it has gone through interesting changes. The relationship between the family and public policy has changed, is changing or should be changed as a result of the new context. This paper will try to focus on trends that can be seen at both the level of the EU-27 and at the national level. Traditional family norms are gradually being replaced by new realities.*

Keywords: *European Union; demography; family; social trends*

1. Introduction

The EU-27 is changing. At this point there is a constant focus on the evolution of population. This is a new perspective on the EU-27 because till recently the focus was the economic problems and political problems of the EU-27. Demographic change is considered a trend at the level of the EU-27. We aim to present it and also to introduce other trends, less visible, but which have contributed to the changes that affect the EU-27. The population within the borders of the European Union is expected to age as a result of the ageing of the baby boomers generation (Lutz, Richter, Wilson, 2012:56). Currently the European Union has a percent of around 17% of people aged 65 and over. Forecasts expect the European Union to have around 30% of the population aged 65 or over by the year 2060. The active population in the European Union was at 67% in 2010. We are referring to people between the ages of 15 and 64. Forecasts expect this percent to decline by the time of 2060 to 59%. Population ageing is a potential threat to economic and social stability in the European Union. The European Union uses the welfare state as a means of preventing social risks, but with population change this system can become unsustainable. Recent developments, such as the economic crisis, have hurried this process and made governments aware of this problem. The European commission has worked on a report concerning this problem. This report was released in 2012 and was entitled Ageing report. Public spending is expected to rise consistently between the years 2010 and 2060 as a result of demographic change within the European Union. Pensions, healthcare, services and other social risks are expected to consume by the year 2060 a staggering 29% of GDP on average (Huijts, Kraaykamp, 2012:58). This evolution was anticipated in 2012, but

* PhD student, National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Faculty of Communication and Public Relations, Bucharest, Romania, e-mail: i_dragos_lucian@yahoo.com. Beneficiary of the Project “Doctoral Scholarships for a Sustainable Society”, project co-financed by the European Union through the European Social Fund, Sectoral Operational Program Human Resources and Development 2007-2013.

without taking into consideration the raising in unemployment among young-adults and adult population. It seems a long time till 2060, but the percent could go through a sharp raise rather quickly because the percent of older adults is already high. At the European level 37% of individuals were between 55 and 64 in 2000. In 2010 the percent reached 46%. This category can move towards and enhance the percent of people above 65 that are dependent and no longer part of the labor market. The youngest population was present in Ireland (21.6%) and the smallest category of young population was in Germany (13.2%). This may pose a problem for the future of the EU-27 because Germany is at present the main driving force for development. A decrease in its demographic potential could affect the entire union. We can't help but observing that the difference between the highest level of young population and the lowest level of young population within the EU-27 is not that large, only 7%-8%.

Population aging is one of the major trends in the EU-27. Statistics show that between 1992 and 2012 the proportion of active population increased with 0,5% a year, while the proportion of dependent population increased by 3.7% a year. This trend was paired with a sharp 3.5% decrease in the young population.

The EU-27 is a place of paradox. The EU-27 is indeed experiencing population growth, but at the global level the European population becomes less important. The global population is on the rise and the population in the EU-27 represents only 12%. This percent is expected to drop by the 2050 to only 9%. The population growth in the EU-27 is far behind the global increase. In 2012, the EU-27 experienced population growth reaching on the 1st of January 2012 an estimated of 503,7 million, but the age of the population increased. Out of the EU-27 eight countries experienced population decline and population ageing. The EU-27 experience the same demographic trends, but at different degrees.

2. Literature review

As we have observed several key trends occur at the level of the EU-27. These trends have influenced the Romanian family, setting the state for more diverse intergenerational relationships (Hagestad, 2001:34). There has been a dramatic delay in entering parenthood and family life (Minquez, 2013:75; Beets, Schippers, teVelde, 2010:143). There has been significant aging of the population (Sharrab, 2011:5). Significant migration has already changed the demographic scenery in the EU-27 and changes occurred at the social level. The labor market offers both opportunities and challenges. So many opportunities are offered that there is an increasing number of persons that commit to the work environment so much that they choose to remain childless. Women's role has changed. Women have more responsibility, both at home and in the work place. Unfortunately, the expectations have remained the same. Women are still expected to handle most of the household problems and the care of the dependents (McCalain, 2006; Ylanne, 2012: 93; Connidis, 2009: 167-180). Having to balance so many responsibilities, there is no surprise that some of them postpone entering parenthood or even forming a family. So many roles are very difficult to reconcile.

To summarize we are noticing trends in the EU-27 that affect the Romanian family. Women are under severe pressure to handle both work and family (Tasha, Howe, 2011: 132-150). Their employment means that they have a reduced number of hours that can be dedicated to unpaid care towards children and elderly. Although women have taken on more responsibilities people around them still expect them to perform their past roles and their current roles (Knijn, Komter, 2004: 67-90; Neufeld, Harrison, 2009: 17). The demands from

the women have substantially increased (Jamieson, Simpson, Lewis, 2011). Women were regarded as the primary caregivers and this image continues to influence people's behavior (Albertini, Radl, 2012: 45-50; Finn, Scharf, 2012: 15). Delayed marriage and delayed parenthood means that there are higher chances for work and family important moments to overlap (Blome, Keck, Alber, 2009: 120-125; Saraceno, 2008). Delayed parenthood means that there is an increasing chance that one's parent may suffer from age related problems before one's child may be independent. Delay marriage may also mean that one may have to raise the child alone because one's parents are already experiencing age related problems and are unable to provide financial or even moral support (Kreyenfeld, 2010: 35-37; Parr, 2010: 89). As a consequence more and more parents are forced to split their financial effort in supporting both a child and an older adult.

Raising children in the EU-27 becomes even more complicated. The economic crisis brought about the problem of unemployment, even more acute now than in the past. Parents have to offer financial support to their children for longer periods of time. Young-adults experience problems in securing a job and thus their transition to adulthood is stopped (Hughes, 2004: 150-153; Amato, 2000: 5).

These trends underline important variations in the social make-up of the EU-27.

Confronting the issue of demographic decline and the issue of the family will be long-term task. Providing social security and equity between generations could be the answer for promoting demographic renewal (Hagemann, 2007:23-29).

Adapting to so many trends is quite of a challenge for policy makers. We are witnessing a period of history in which demographic factors enhance economic trends (Knudsen, 2012; Vendramin, 2010). Globalization and demographic change determines changes in the family, as we know it (Smith, 1980: 16; Sherif-Trask, 2010). The identification of these changes needs specific research.

We believe that the family is changing, not deteriorating. These changes can be perceived as negative through comparison with the traditional norms. On the other hand, if these changes are not accompanied by proper individual and state actions, it can indeed lead to defragmentation of the family and community. In the end the entire human environment will be affected. Family life has changed and the environment around the family has changed also.

3. Methodological concerns

a) Research Questions

1. Research question: What are the trends that influence the evolution of the EU-27 population and family?

This question refers mainly to the theoretical analysis of this issue and its importance in the relation to the overall perception integration as an issue of demographic and family importance for the EU and Romania.

2. Research question: Do we notice any link between the changes in society and the changes in the construction of inter-generational relationships and family changes?
3. Research question: How do scientific theoretical elites assess inter-generational relationships, family and population changes in the EU-27? Can we notice a change in their perspective and structure?

b) Assumptions

1. Hypothesis: Theoretical models can become sectors of positive influence between theory and practice, this in turn can expand into research methodologies that support the theoretical aspect and capture the reality as it was depicted in theories, managing to either support or attack the theoretical support.
2. Hypothesis: Theoretical observations show that these trends are directly linked with changes affecting the EU-27.

During this theoretical research we have used content analysis. We have chosen this type of analysis so as to be able to present, interpret and discover the trends that affect the EU-27. We have analyzed documents, scientific journals and scientific books and we were able to make correct inferences that constructed a broad description of the social phenomena that influence EU-27. The purpose of our content analysis was to build a general context describing the evolution and future trends within the EU-27

Our approach was from the earlier models. This was the starting point and was deductive in nature. From there we have advanced from the general to the specific.

c) Limitations

As we have used this method we also took into consideration its limitations. The primary possibility of limitation for our study is the way in which the content has been analyzed. The content is made out of important and primary theories and their interpretation can be different. In order to prevent this we have analyzed a long bibliographical list on the topic of the European Union, family, intergenerational relationships and social change.

4. An agitated and changing labor market

The European labor market is competitive but it does seem to discriminate or discourage participation from young-adults and older-adults. In 2010 only half of the individuals with ages between 55 and 64 were actively participating in the labor market. Policies and political discourses mention fairly often the importance of continuity in being part of the labor market, but in practice the percent of young-people and older-adults that are welcomed is low and even decreasing. In 2011 only 34% of the total young-adults of Europe were contributing through labor. The economic crisis and the general policies that govern the labor market prevent even the adults from reaching a higher degree of involvement in the labor market. In 2010 only 78% of the adult active population between 25 and 49 was contributing through taxes and was actively participating in the labor market. Although the state needs more active participants, there is also a problem in absorbing the people that could contribute. Paradoxically, there are many reports that mention the problem, but the degree of absorption of active individuals in the labor market is far from 100% and continues to decrease. The relation between the dependent population and the workforce cannot continue at the level it is today. The target set by the European Union is 75% employment by the year 2020. Only by reaching this level can the current model be sustained. Not succeeding in reaching this target could result in a public finance crisis and social unrest. Despite these figures there are little measures taken to offer the possibility for employment among older-adults and young-adults. In an European society with a declining active population it would make sense for integrating age discriminated categories such as young-adults and older-adults. This could be a potential solution for the declining labor force.

The family and intergenerational relationships are challenged not only by the demographic change that is taking place in Europe, but also by the demands of the labor market. In general researchers are quick to witness that the European population is increasingly becoming top-heavy. The population is ageing and the percent of older-adults is increasing. It is no longer unusual for families to have grandparents and great grandparents. Grandparents and great grandparents are starting to visibly outnumber children and grandchildren. We believe we should also notice that the family is also becoming increasingly top-heavy. As a result inter-generational relations are changing. Inter-generational relations are also evolving in Europe under the ramifications of two other trends. The labor forces are imposing its own rules upon the individuals, most of the time without considering the needs of the family. We are witnessing a destabilization of the relationships formed between parents and children, grandparents and grandchildren, wife and husband.

When introducing in the equation a raising unemployment level we notice that the potential evolution becomes even more frightening. Social risks are difficult to cover. Presently the welfare state protects the individual from social risks through financial aid and provision of services. The European economy finds it very difficult to sustain these expenses, but till now countries have chosen to either impose more taxes to young-adults and adults or to cut pensions. Such policies can only further damage intergenerational relationships. Europe has to find a solution to maintain the living standards of all its citizens while maintain social and family cohesion, so important for its development. The cohabitation of welfare state policies and family solidarity through intergenerational relationships is perhaps an option out of this predicament (Kuehne, 2012; Rijken, Liefbroer, 2010). We believe that plotting a way out of this predicament can be done through combining the functions of the welfare state and the functions of the family. It would result in a consensus between generations on how to use the resources of the society (Fischman, 2011). We are talking about both financial and non-financial resources.

4.1. Life expectancy

The European Union invests not only in economic development, but also in the social life style and quality of its citizens. As a result the population ages also as a result of the policies that increased substantially the average life expectancy. The aging population of the European Union is expected to increase by as much as three quarters till the year 2030, while the young population will decrease as a result of low fertility rates (Parr, 2010). Population growth in the EU-27 through natural increase represented only 39% out of the 1,3 million that the EU-27 gain. Life expectancy does not present an uniform value. Life expectancy in Eastern Europe is considerable lower than in Western Europe. This is just one of the factors that should be considered when creating policies at the European level. Life expectancy is particularly lower in the case of males from Eastern Europe.

Life expectancy at the level of the EU-27 has also a gender bias. At the level of the EU-27 the expect age for females is 79.4 years, while for men is only 72.1 years. This is another general trend at the level of the European Union. On another topic the East-West divide continues to exist even at this level. A female from Romania is expected to live on average with 11 years less than a female from France. This discrepancy is very persistent.

4.2. The economic crisis

The economic crisis has brought fertility to an even smaller level. We are surprised to notice that the vast quantity of research done around European fertility has been conducted outside the family. We are witnessing the use of policies focused on encouraging fertility rates, but the most promising are the policies which target the family. The Nordic countries are the ones that come close to solving some of the negative population trends in the UE-27 through focusing all of their policies on the family. A report prepared by the Rand Foundation found that the best policies in Sweden were those that targeted family life and family formation as a whole.

While the young population will represent a smaller proportion of the European Union's population, the elderly will increase considerably. We believe that this does not necessarily mean an increase burden on the European Union, but it will alter the family structure as we know it and the intergenerational relationships established at the level of the family. The economic burden is something debatable. We notice that especially in developed countries the elderly are changing their educational, career path and family path to respond to these changes. Over-all, the European Union might experience this change differently. Nevertheless, Romania, where the career and life path of the elderly is not something so easy to change, due to the lacking infrastructure, we expect that such changes will bring more problems than in the rest of the Europe. The life course of the elderly will differ across Europe. This is not only representative in comparison with the other generations within the same country, but also between the same generations in different countries. The European Union houses countries with different history and with different degrees of Europeanization. Simply following the indicators of population structure will not be enough to offer solutions and to take advantage of this population change. Therefore, there is the danger that this population change will constitute a real problem for Romania, as it has proven till now. We expect that without proper research and proper policies in nexus with the research, social changes will take place that can bring about difficult to manage social risks. It is grossly misleading to believe that ageing population has the same effects across the entire European Union and that the family changes in accordance with the same patterns across the entire Union. It is true that there is a relative homogeneity in demographic trends across Europe. Despite this homogeneity national policies and social and economic development cannot be put aside. Major demographic trends are felt across the entire European Union, but it is recognizable that in Romania we are experienced an accelerated trend of ageing and depopulation. The possibilities offered to people concerning life and career paths are diverse across the European Union. They reflect societal factors and social policy choices. There are countries within the European Union that are better equipped than others. Most researchers focus on the fact that the majority of European countries are part of this European Union and treat every problem at the level of the union. It is obvious that we are dealing with a political union that faces similar problems, but this does not mean that differences have ceased to exist. Historical, cultural and demographic differences (Coleman, 2002) are becoming apparent.

It has been brought into question the current economic crisis has moved beyond its economic impact, but has reached a level in which solidarity between EU members no longer exists (Dobrescu, Negrea-Busuioc, Radu, 2013: 84).

5. The historical past of the countries that make-up the EU-27

Researchers sometimes forget the differences between the two historically separated Europe within the European Union. Eastern and Western Europe have a different historical evolution. Western and northern Europe have experienced demographic transition for more than half a century. Policies in these regions had time to understand at least in part the changes and implications of this process. Eastern Europe is catching up. The changes that have reshaped Western and Northern Europe are starting to reshape the population pyramid in Eastern and Central Europe. The life span and the family structure are changing.

Even the removal of the totalitarian regime present in Romania before the 1990 brought about serious changes in the Romanian society (Brie, Pop, Polgar, 2012: 120), changes that set it slightly apart from the normal evolution of the European Union or any other country.

Europe goes through an economic crisis and an existential crisis. Sometimes people and even researchers tend to forget that historical events, such as financial depressions create dividing lines between generations. Only the existence alone of the economic crisis should be reason enough to research the family and intergenerational changes. The economic crisis and the identity crisis of the European Union create demarcations. Unfortunately, little research has been undergone in the demarcation between the new members of the European Union and the old members. These demarcations have created differences between member states and differences between generations. Today, there are generations in Romanian families that have not experienced the changed following World War II, the communist regime, and the Cold War. The contrasts between the generations within the Romanian family are not created only by the generation gap, but also by conditions of their lives and historical context. The Romanian family is the unique place of meeting for generations that have experienced even different historical contexts. Each family, similar to a population, creates its own generation structure according to age (Hagestad, 2001).

Before continuing our research on the Romania family and on intergenerational relationship we need to understand the context. Romania is part of the globalization process, but it is also a member of the most efficient to date union in the world: The European Union. The European Union creates an interesting context of development for Romania. Its evolution is strongly influencing the evolution of Romania. This is another sign of the growing inter-relations within which Romania is caught.

One of the differences that set apart some of the countries that are members of the European Union is life expectancy. Life expectancy has steadily increased mainly in Western Europe. The average life expectancy among the new member of the European Union has known only slow improvement. Not only the increaser percentages are different, but they are applied to different values. Western Europe has always known a higher life expectancy, in comparison with the rest of Europe. In absolute terms, the gap between the two Europe's has increased even while being in the same union. European countries differ in their morbidity levels. Such differences are related to historical, cultural, social and economic structures. Before joining the European Union and immediately after the fall of the Communist divide, Eastern Europe has experienced a sharp increase in morbidity. Periods of improvement alter with periods of deterioration in Eastern Europe, while in Western Europe periods of improvement alter with periods of stagnation. Despite the fact that there is a tendency towards convergence between the two sides of Europe, in general, Eastern Europe is has experienced an accentuating trend in

population decline. At the level of the European Union life expectancy is increasing, but at the level of Romania, life expectancy is below the European average.

Fertility decline is another trend that affects the entire European Union. Western Europe experienced a steady decline in fertility rates, but Eastern Europe experienced a sharp decline in fertility, that continues to this day, after the fall of Communism. The highest drop in fertility is observed in the case of the new European Union's members, the former communist countries. Romania goes through the most severe depopulation to this day and the lowest fertility in the European Union. This is even more surprising while taking into consideration that before the 1990's revolution, Romania had positive population growth. Although the decrease of fertility affects the entire European Union, there are some differences. The countries in the northern part of the continent have started out with a decline, but right now they are registering positive figures. Nevertheless, these are countries with a small population and their increase in population cannot change the trend of the union. Statistics indicate that lower fertility is registered in Western Europe, but it tends to stabilize at current values. This is not the case with the new members, from Eastern and Central Europe. The tendency towards lower fertility is accentuating yearly and there are no sign of stabilization. According to fertility, the European Union is divided into low-fertility, Western and Northern Europe (<2.0), and devastating low-fertility in Eastern and Central Europe (1.3) (Billari, Kohler, 2004). It seems that although there is convergence between the countries in the existence of low fertility, there are big differences between these values. This is shocking taking into consideration that at the moment in which Romania decided to enter the European Union it brought the advantage of a high fertility rate and a young population. Grave changes have affected the Romanian population and its potential.

Together, the trend in life expectancy, low mortality and low fertility influence the structure of the family and influence the structure of intergenerational relationships. the size and composition of the family changes as a consequence.

The EU-27 has constructed special policies that target the family (Flaquer, 2010: 57). Among these measures we believe we should mention family planning. Family planning has become a major concern among the citizens of the European Union. Family planning is used in many countries to fight population growth that increases poverty. Family planning has moved from general actions towards the capacity of the individual to contact professional counsel on this subject. Long term planning and strategies make family planning extremely efficient in the EU-27.

6. Family postponement

Another trend in the European family is postponement (Billari, 2005). Postponement refers to more family issues. It refers to postponement of marriage. More and more people chose to live in a different type of relationships, such as living together. Cohabitation has started to become another major form of arrangement between couples, putting marriage in a disadvantage. They delay a major commitment such as marriage. Individuals also postpone parenthood. Another important trend in Europe is the increasing ease with which cohabitation or even marriage can be dissolved (Liefbroer, Dourleijn, 2006). Lower fertility is also a result of an increasing tendency for couples to remain childlessness (Rowland, 2007). Couples choose to postpone marriage, than to postpone parenthood. In the end they either have their first child at a later age or renounce completely this desire. As a result another trend has been born in Europe. There is the tendency that despite the higher number of generations that live together and have the

chance to meet each other, the percent of households in which a child lives is getting smaller. The proportion of households with no children or with just one child is increasing. On the other hand, the proportion of households with more than 2 children is decreasing.

6.1. Societal changes

The current society is made out of a majority of families where both adults are wage earners. This situation is different, more out of economic instability than out of personal choice. The general trend within the EU-27 is for both adults to active on the labor market. Another trend that influences the structure and intergenerational relationships in the family is the increase of the age of retirement. There is a tendency towards maintaining people active on the labor market to a later age.

The European Union is characterized by postponement in both marriage and parenthood. As a consequence the European Union is experiencing a decrease in the number of children per family although fertility aspirations have remains largely at the same level.

Age remains a major factor of influence on the conditions and opportunities available for the individual. Everyday life and experiences are lived and perceived according to age. Social and economic perspectives are influenced by age. The European nuclear family is started to be replaced by alternative forms. These forms are linked with particular and non-traditional ways of living and working (Kapella, 2009).

6.2. Household change

Household composition has changed in some parts of Europe and continues to change in the present. Before the economic crisis the number of individuals living alone had increased consistently, especially in the Western part of Europe, in the EU-15. This was considered a model belonging to the western lifestyle. As a result expectations in the new EU-27 vi-a-vis the composition of the household began to suffer some alterations. The ideal for many young people was to live alone. The model of the single-person household began to be considered the ideal situation. It meant that you were independent. It meant that you were able to sustain yourself financially. It was a clear sign of progress. This continues to represent an ideal, but in Romania the household continues to be represented by more than just one individual and more than just one generation. There are many potential reasons for explaining this situation. Perhaps the most important is the financial aspect of getting one's own place. This was a trend at the level of the European Union, but it is one that can be very difficult to apply especially in the context of the economic crisis. The size of the households can be expected to increase, as the economic situation becomes even more complicated. Nevertheless, the existence and acceptance of the single-person household ideal can bring frustration and dissatisfaction to an entire generation. The high costs of owning or renting a household and the high costs involved in the maintenance of a households makes this ideal almost impossible for a vast majority of the Romanian young population. This pressure to be a single-person household owner was not something strange in Romania, but it has overlapped with the culturally based way of living in an extended household. The period before the 1990's offered opportunities to own a household, but this was mostly for couples, never for single persons. Multi-generations household were not uncommon, but could be avoided. The ideal was not the single-person household, but the model was the nuclear family household which was right next to the multi-generational household. Household size was based before the 1990 on

demographic and cultural trends. Nowadays, we believe the household size is also strongly linked with financial stability. Demographic trends can be countered by economic factors. The worsening economic conditions can lead to a new revival of the multi-generational household. A household which can afford covering expenses such as water, electricity and heating. On the other hand we can also notice an increase in the multi-person household, but this applies for those who study and chose to share the financial burden with other people. Most of the time, this type of household is specific to students or workers who move to different cities in search for opportunities. Common households are not our concern, but we felt to notice that intergenerational relationships need to be developed also outside the context of the family. The economic and social evolution practically demands it. We expect that in the future economic factors will continue to dominate household choices and demographic factors will determine the local characteristics of those sharing the multi-generational household. We expect a decrease in the share of single-person households and an increase in the household size.

6.3. Ideational change

At the level of the EU-27 there was also the trend of change in ideas. When so many countries with histories and cultures that are different meet it was only normal to assume that we are going to notice some ideational changes. We found very little research or discussions on the topic of ideational changes that influenced the family within the EU-27. Countries that adhere to the European Union perceived economic and political changes directly, but ideational changes are more subtle in the changes brought about. It has brought important changes on the way in which the family is perceived. One example of a signification ideational change is the change in the over-all desire for a family. The career and the family as achievements in the life of a man have changed places. This is sometimes the case, although the traditional focus on family life continues. Nevertheless, no one person can argue that he or she has never prioritized career success over family matters or interests. Ideational change is a trend across the EU-27 and it is responsible for several demographic trends. The EU-27 has institutionalized tolerance. After centuries of prejudice and warrior like behavior among European countries, the EU-27 has made tolerance one of the common values for the European continent. Tolerance has permitted the elevation of new forms of families, such as non-marital unions and births. Single parenthood and non-marital cohabitation are accepted family forms in all the EU-27 community. Most importantly they stopped representing reasons of shame and are tolerated by the local community. The European society has learn to accept these types of coexistence and the individuals have learnt that it is normal for other to coexist. Alongside the traditional norms of the family coexist new norms that in the past might have met opposition. While ideational changes have taken place in EU-15 over a long period of time, in the EU-12 these changes have happened in a relative short period of time. We believe it is uncommon for change to happen at such a rapid pace, but this a reality. There has been a break with the past ideology and we believe this was possible in such a short period of time because it was associated with an unpleasant regime. This contributed to a rise in uncertainty. People found that the old norms were disliked and were not accustomed with the new norms. This made them postpone important decisions, including parenthood and adulthood. New demographic trends appeared in a relative short period of time in Romania as a result of ideational change. Romania has gone through of period of social instability, social uncertainty and economic downfall. The present demographic situation is a natural response to uncertainty and instability. In this context family

continued to represent the most important instrument of support and advice. Nevertheless, the family has limited resources. Probably, realizing this many decided to postpone adulthood and parenthood.

6.4. Migration

On the other hand ideational change has created some other trends that came to dominate the demographic and family realm of the EU-27. A mono-cultural state is probably less willing to accept migration as part of its policy. Within the EU-27 migration is supported through treaties and inter-state relations because the EU-27 is not only a tolerant, but also a multi-cultural society.

Another trend that had a powerful effect on population and family structure is migration. Migration has been encouraged indirectly within the European Union because it helped population growth. In 2011 69% of the 1,3 million population growth was achieved through migration. Migration continues to be the main source of population growth within the EU-27. The western countries provide financial opportunities that are irresistible to those living in less developed Europe. Migration has also solved some of the demographic problems in Western Europe, but it also triggered other reactions less pleasant. Migration had a powerful impact on the family. Migratory movements become more possible within the borders of the European Union. More and more persons, especially women at one point, started to leave their families in Romania in order to search for some financial support for their home families. The Romanian family lost some of its members through this movement. On a different note, migration created also ethnically different families abroad. Unfortunately, these families have also a weak position and most of the time they are the target of prejudice and inequality. Migration and its effects are becoming more visible within the European Union. In the last twenty years the majority of migration flows within the European Union were intra-flows. We are referring to migration within the EU between EU countries. Policies exist at the level of the EU that favor intra-flows as opposed to outside migration. Migration constituted a solution for old EU members because it helped to cover some of the structural impacts of ageing, but as a result created other structural impacts in the countries of origin. In the target countries migration created also families that were affected by inequality and prejudice. This is another topic worth researching, but not the target of our current investigation.

As a result of the growing number of elderly people there has been a growing need for social protection in western developed countries. The average life span is higher in developed western countries than in Romania, not with much, but with enough. The increased number of elderly people and the presence of economic resources created the potential for new job opportunities in the sector of elder care. The increasing number of elderly people in need of care has grown constantly and this triggered migration of young-adults and adults from Romania towards the west. The growing need for care was met by the growing migration from other countries with a younger population and with few economic opportunities. Among these countries we find Romania. Inclusion in the European Union made travel and working within the European Union accessible and safer. No longer was migration constructed around adventurous people, but around people that were willing to work. The search for opportunities encouraged many to leave their family behind in order to provide some financial security.

We expect that the need for elderly care will increase. It will probably follow the demographic trends that we are experiencing today. Why do we believe this? Generally,

age is a determinant of a person's health. We agree that age incorporates a lot of dynamic dimensions, but most of the time age brings with it some health problems. We are used to observing that with age comes also a deterioration of health. Arguably, this can be experienced at different degrees, but as a general rule, age comes with a deterioration of health. As a result the proportion of people in need of care increases. When we mention health deterioration we are also referring to health problems that need daily care or increases the dependency of the person on other individuals. Health deterioration cannot necessarily be something severe, but it can hamper a person's capacity of fulfilling the daily activities needed for personal survival and comfort. At this point someone will have to fulfill these daily activities. On the other hand, with age comes also a shrinkage in the social network of a person. Most of the time the social network became smaller and smaller or it is made out of other elderly people. At this point we realize that the person might not be able to depend on the social network for help. The combination of these factors with the loss of the spouse or long working hours of the adults and young-adults brings about an increasing need in elderly care. In the western welfare state the elderly are more exposed to social isolation because much of the services needed are provided through the welfare state. The potential lack of support from the family makes the person more vulnerable. As a result the financial resources provided by the state are used to employ personal care assistants. The potential of the family as a secondary care giver should be carefully analyzed. If we consider the current demographic trend in Romania and in other countries that experienced migration towards the western countries we can understand that future trend might stop at one point due to lack of people able to migrate. We consider that intergenerational relationships are very important in considering the current demographic trends. A larger generation's network within the family can represent the potential solution for this radical evolution of demography. The growing proportion of people needing support from the state and the decreasing economic power of the European States going through an economic crisis should trigger the search for new solutions to obvious social problems. Obviously, there is no way the number of people needing social care will decrease. All the trends point to an increase in people dependent on the help of the state. In order to ease the considerable social pressure on the state to spend more on social risks the strengthening of intergenerational relationships should become a target within the European community. The inevitable pressure put on the welfare state to spend more of its limited resources on helping the individual, could be directed towards family building and intergenerational relationships building. The availability of paid carers could become a major problem as demographic trends affect also the countries from which these people migrate towards Western Europe. The continuation of other liable factors such as increased labor participation and children living far away will not help this evolution towards a positive outcome. At this point the future degree of family involvement remains unknown, but we believe its potential is high. The increase in the dependent population, the increase number of hours spent at work and the constant geographical mobility are just a few of the reasons that announce an increase in the need for professional care. We believe that this trend will not meet for ever migration trends from other countries as demographic trends continue to affect the source of migration. All these points imply that future European policies should be dedicated more to the well-being of the individual, but by placing him within his family and by developing intergenerational relationships.

We notice that migration is a trend within the EU-27 because it is a free society. It was a normal result of integration in the EU-27. The European Union is the world single democratic union and its values guarantee freedom of travel within its borders. Migration,

despite its impact on local demography and on local families, is a testimony of the freedom provided by the European Union. The EU-27 is a protector of democratic societies and allows free migration. We expect that this pattern of migration would be augmented in the future. We discussed a lot of the fact that countries profit from migration both economically and socially. Nevertheless, today we are also witnessing an increasing trend towards migration. It has become an issue of national security, but especially in the EU-27 countries that benefited from it. EU-27 domestic policies have started to disregard the role played by migration.

When discussing migration people often forget that it is closely linked with the family. We are not talking about family disintegration, but rather about family reunification. This can too happen and it can represent another trend that can increase migration. More than three quarters of migration within the EU-27 comes from family reunification. Despite policies meant to limit migration, family reunification can become gradually the most important way of legal migration to the EU-27.

6.5. A decrease in the multi-generational households

Despite the increase of generations that come into contact, the interactions between generations have declined. The number of multi-generational households has decreased and this is yet another general tendency at the European level. Family relationships that span across several generations have stopped being the norm and it is in the majority of Western Europe a thing of the past. The situation is not yet generalized, but it can be considered a European trend.

6.6. The decrease in the influence of religious beliefs and norms

Within the EU-27 the influence of religion on the population knows a considerable decrease. This especially applies when talking about family practices and the need of the individual to be within religious patterns when creating a family. The construction of the EU-27 and the institutions of the state attract more attention and confidence from the people. The evolution of their policies and their involvement in the social protection of the people made possible for people to distance themselves from traditional values regarding the family. This separation was possible also as a result of a weakening of the religious institutions, institutions that usually supported traditional family orientations. Rarely is it discussed, but a weakening of the religious involvement in the family creation and life is a trend met within the EU-27. Extramarital birth, marriage postponement, alternatives to marriage and same sex marriages are just a few of practices that are practiced in our contemporary times and that were not encouraged by religious institutions.

6.7. New societal contemporary values On a different note, the values promoted by the contemporary society have interfered with family life and family perspectives. The idea of success and of individualism has played its part in the current state of the family. The beliefs, norms and values of the European Union impact the family because they are supported by institutional prestige. The European Union is associated with progress and development. Values promoted by it through its policies set standards and the individual aspires to these standards. Standards guide both family and individual life.

6.8. A better educated European population

Within the borders of the EU-27 the trend is towards an educated population. Education is no longer targeted at young-adults, but it is life-long. The expansion of education may have played its part in parenthood postponement and time with the family. Family formation is postponed and the family has also to support increasing costs to support the education of its members. Education is an important causal force because not only does it engulf the interest of people and occupies time, but it also involves costs and develops ambitions not oriented towards the family. Education influences behavior and beliefs.

6.9. The construction of the welfare state

From the political perspective, the trend is towards enforcing the existence of the welfare state. The welfare state expands its involvement beyond what is the public and becomes an active part in the intimate life of the family.

6.10. The change in roles assigned to genders

One of the most interesting discussions is the trend towards the changes in roles assigned according to gender. In terms of gender the general trend is towards a unification of responsibility and a free exchange of roles between genders. The family involves more the division of labor within itself between male and female. Research performed on housework participation in accordance with gender has revealed a decrease in the gender gap. The EU-27 is experiencing a decrease in the unequal division of labor at home. Inequality is being challenged and traditional gender roles are being replaced with a growing sense of entitlement.

We should also point out that the burden of care is a heavy one. Those that are involved in caring for others are less available on the labor market. There is a price of adjustment of which the policies should be aware. Adjusting to this situation might even imply sacrifices in the professional life or in the family life. The burden of care is heavy and might mean that the person is less able to be active on the job market. On the other hand the burden of care might discourage a person from parenthood. It is a demanding and stressful work. Taking into account this issue we believe that the family alone cannot constitute the answer to current social evolutions. We believe there is a need of cooperation and sharing responsibility between the European welfare state, the community and the family. Intergenerational relationships can unburden the welfare state by taking on some of the responsibility, but it would be a mistake to place the entire burden on the family. To this point the financial stability of Europe was not under question. This led to an increase in the degree of independence. European citizens were able to live alone and the model of multigenerational households became a thing of the past. Yet, in contemporary times, there is a degree of uncertainty over how the welfare state will be able to finance pensions or social security. The capacity of the elder to pay for professional assistance and for day-to-day support has become a problem. This is another reason for which intergenerational relationships should be researched and supported through policies at the level of the European Union. Formal and informal care through the family should become complementary. Both type of care and support have their own shortages and policies should be careful to balance them in a complementary position.

7. The presence of the European Union

National and regional research on the impact of changes brought about by the European Union at the level of the family and the current state of intergenerational relationships is needed because these changes vary from country to country. There are key issues that must be addressed in concern with the family. Between the 1960's and 1970's there was some research on the topic of family change within that period's European Union, but since then other countries have joined and things have changed. The period of the 1960's to the 1970's represented a turning point for the family as the number of divorces knew a considerable increase, the number of marriages was in decline and more and more families decided on not having children.

Despite all of these negative trends, the EU-27 still can muster the energy necessary to remain an important global player. Technology, innovation and family-friendly policies can help combating these trends. Europe has to utilize the full potential of its citizens and to realize that treating a citizen only at the individual base fails to offer full development. Combating age discrimination and optimizing intergenerational relationships within the family offers great opportunities.

Demographic trends in EU-27 have to be seen in the global context. The European Union is vulnerable to socio-economic realities (Popoviciu, 2010: 37) and this vulnerability transcends into the state and local level. Just as well, the evolution of intergenerational relationships within the Romanian family has to be researched within the global and European context. The EU-27 has to move from considering economic growth strictly linked with population growth and adult population to considering exploiting the full potential of all of its citizens, without age discrimination. Europe has to develop policies that take into account the inner workings of the family, the individual fails to reach full potential outside the relationships established with the family or with the community. It is important for the EU-27 to turn this challenge into an opportunity. Otherwise it risks to fall from its paramount position on the world stage. Growth and security can be achieved in a demographically new EU-27, despite an ageing population.

It is only natural to assume that the existence of the European Union has put Romania in the path of its trends. It has been observed that Romania has been strongly influenced by European cultures even before the existence of this union (Pantea, 2010: 28). It is only natural to assume that being part of the European Union, Romania is influenced in a far more profound manner, beyond political and economically.

8. Conclusion

We have been used to consider European growth in terms of population size. We are living in a global world where major players right now have taken advantage from their population size. Current population trends prohibit the European Union to take this path. As a result alternatives should be constructed. These alternatives could focus more on the potential of the individual within his family for development and towards an improved cohesion. When comparing old EU-27 members with new EU-27 members in terms of prosperity and development we notice large gaps. It is important to recognize that family through intergenerational relationships does not exist in a social and economic vacuum. Policies that focus on this aspect could have a positive impact on EU-27 society. Social cohesion is a major step towards maintaining economic productivity and social security.

These trends affect the entire continent. The variety of the trends that challenge traditional perspectives on the continent demands proper sets of policy responses. Demography changes because the individual changes. If the individual changes it is

natural for the family to change as well. These changes are just as challenging as environmental change and changes the EU-27 landscape and prospects. These challenges bring also opportunities. Change is part of the natural order of things and achieving a better match between contemporary realities and future goals is just one of the purposes of research.

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank Professor Paul Dobrescu from the University The National School of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest, who supervises my research.

I am grateful to and I would also like to thank Professor *Lluís Flaquer* who was kind enough to supervise my research activity while a visiting scholar at the *Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona* (UAB), Departament de Sociologia and Fernando Antón Alonso, Tècnic de suport a la recerca, Departament de Sociologia, *Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona*.

I also owe my most sincere acknowledgements because the author, Ivan Dragoș Lucian, is a beneficiary of the „Doctoral Scholarships for a Sustainable Society” project, co-financed by the European Union through the European Social Fund, Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources and Development, 2007-2013.

Any errors or shortcomings are solely my own.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Albertini, M.; Radl, J. (2012), “Intergenerational transfers and social class: Inter-vivos transfers as means of status reproduction” in *Acta Sociologica*, 55;
- Beets, G.; Schippers, J.; Velde, E. R. (2010), “The Future of Motherhood in Western Societies” in *Late Fertility and its consequences*, Springer;
- Blome, A.; Keck, W.; Alber, J. (2009), “Family and the Welfare State in Europe: Intergenerational Relations” in *Ageing Societies*, Edward, Elgar Pub;
- Brie, M.; Pop, C.A.; Polgar, I. (2012), “Interculturality and Ethnodiversity in Post-Communist Romania” in *Analele Universitatii din Oradea – Relații Internaționale și Studii Europene*, Editura Universității din Oradea;
- Connidis, I. A. (2009), *Family Ties and Aging*, Sage Publications, Inc.;
- Dobrescu, P.; Negrea-Busuioc, E.; Radu, L. (2013), “Requiem for European Solidarity. An analysis of the European Discourse on the 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Network” in *Romanian Journal of Communication and Public Relations*, Vol. 15 No. 1 (29). April;
- Finn, C.; Scharf, T. (2012), *Intergenerational Programmes in Ireland: An initial overview*, Irish Centre for Social Gerontology, National University of Ireland, Galway;
- Fischman, R. (2011), *Generations: Of family: Past, Present and Future*, Xlibris;
- Flaquer, L. (2010), “Famílies i relacions familiars” in *Revista Papers*, Barcelona: Institut d’Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona, Núm. 52;
- Hagestad, G. O. (2001), “Adult intergenerational relationships” in *Gender and generation programme: Exploring future research and data collection options*, New York and Geneva, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and United Nations Population Fund;

- Huijts, T.; Kraaykamp, G (2012), "Formal and informal social capital and self-rated health in Europe: A new test of accumulation and compensation mechanisms using a multi-level perspective" in *ActaSociologica*, 55;
- Jamieson, L.; Simpson, R.; Lewis, R. (eds.) (2011), *Researching Families and Relationships*, Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Family and Intimate Life series;
- Knijn, T.; Komter, A. (2004), "Solidarity Between The Sexes and the Generations" in *Transformations in Europe*, Edward Elgar Publishing;
- Knudsen, K. (2012), "European grandparents' solicitude : Why older men can be relatively good grandfathers" in *ActaSociologica*, 55;
- Kuehne, V. (2012), *Intergenerational Programs: Understanding What We have created*, Routledge.
- Kreyenfeld, M. (2010), "Uncertainties in Female Employment Careers and the Postponement of Parenthood in Germany" in *European Sociological Review*, Vol. 16;
- Lutz, W.; Richter, R.; Wilson, C. (2012), "The New Generations of Europeans: Demography and Families" in *The Enlarged European Union*, Bath Press, UK;
- McCalain, L. (2006), *The place of Families: Fostering Capacity, Equality and Responsibility*, Harvard University Press;
- Minquez, A. M. (2013), "Family Well-being: European Perspectives (Social Indicators Research Series)" in *Social Indicators Research series*, Springer;
- Neufeld, D.; Harrison, M. (2009), *Nursing and Family Caregiving: Social Support and Nonsupport*, Springer Publishing Company;
- Pantea, D. (2010), "Aspects from Anglo-Romanian Relations from the Beginning up to the 19th century" in *Analele Universității din Oradea – Relații Internaționale și Studii Europene*, Editura Universitatii din Oradea;
- Parr, N. (2010), "Satisfaction with life as an antecedent of fertility: Partner + Happiness = Children?" in *Demographic Research*, Vol. 22(21);
- Popoviciu, A. C. (2010), "The European Social Law Between the Treaty of Rome and The Lisbon Strategy" in *Analele Universitatii din Oradea – Relatii Internationale si Studii Europene*, Editura Universitatii din Oradea;
- Rijken, A. J.; Liefbroer, A. C. (2010), "Double Standards: A Cross-European Study on Differences" in *Norms about Non-Marital Cohabitation and Divorce for Men and Women*, Conference Paper;
- Saraceno, C. (2008). *Familiei, Ageing and Social Policy: Intergenerational Solidarity in European Welfare States*, Edward Elgar Pub.
- Sharrab, Noora (2011), *Intergenerational Differences of Identity*, LAP LAMBERT Academic publishing;
- Sherif, B. (2010), *Trask, Globalization and Families: Accelerated Systemic Social Change*, Springer;
- Smith, J. (1980), "Modeling the Distribution and Intergenerational Transmission of Wealth", *National Bureau of Economic Research – Studies in Income and Wealth*, Volume 46, University of Chicago Press;
- Tasha R. H. (2011), *Marriages and Families in The 21st century: A Bioecological Approach*, Wiley-Blackwell;
- Vendramin, P. (2010), *Generations at Work and Social Cohesion in Europe*, Peter Lang;
- Ylanne, V. (2012), *Representing Ageing: Image and Identities*, Palgrave Macmillan.

ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE IN ROMANIAN WOMEN'S RIGHTS GROUPS: IN BETWEEN PERSONAL, INTER-PERSONAL AND CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

*Ioana VLAD**

Abstract. *The paper aims at exploring the process through which women's rights organizations in Romania expand or change their means of action and influence. While studies on post-communist activism describe social change groups in the area as employing multiple means of influencing the decision making process, the process through which such tactical expansion occurs is not so much discussed. Data consisting in interviews with women's rights activists and organizational documents point to the variety of factors that lead activists and organizations towards the change or broadening of their strategy: environmental, organizational and personal. The move of service providing organizations towards advocacy activities or of advocacy groups towards protest activities is contextually explained through the relations between organizations and state institutions, through the dynamics of inter-organizational influence, but also through individual feelings of disappointment and frustration over a perceived lack of efficiency in producing social change.*

Keywords: *women's movement, post-communism, tactical repertoire, protest, advocacy, service providing*

1. Introduction

In studying social movement organizations, some authors operate with types of organizations as analytical categories, aiming at analysing the particular changes that particular kinds of groups go through across time (Kriesi, 1996; Minkoff, 1999). But this is a difficult separation to put in practice when dealing with rapid legal, political, and economic changes in the environment.

Minkoff for instance, distinguishes between protest, advocacy, service provision and cultural organizations, depending on their major tactic of influence: outsider tactics/ disruptive means (sit-ins, marches) in the case of protest groups, routine means (lobbying, litigation) in the case of advocacy groups, constituency directed programs in the one of service providing, and cultural and ideological activities (art festivals, libraries, museums, media production) in the case of cultural groups (Minkoff, 1999: 1668). Kriesi (1996) analyses organizational change by dividing groups into social movement organizations, supportive organizations, movement associations and parties and interest groups.

* PhD student, National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Faculty of Communication and Public Relations, Bucharest, Romania, e-mail: ioana_vld@yahoo.com. Beneficiary of the "Doctoral Scholarships for a Sustainable Society" project, project co-financed by the European Union through the European Social Fund, Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources Development 2007-2013".

However, researchers of post-communist social change organizations have pointed to the multiplicity of strategies and tactics that such groups adopt in parallel, explained by some through the careful balancing between “contention and moderation so as not to risk losing their main resource base (tax donations)” (Jacobsson, 2013: 38, for the case of Poland), by others as a way of maximizing their success (Saxonberg, 2013). Either way, this recent research (Jacobsson and Saxonberg 2013) serves to question the dead-end struck by previous conceptualizations of social activism in post-communist countries, as suffering from NGO-ization. This term depicts the dynamic through which civil society has been absorbed, after the fall of communism, into a rather exclusive relationship with the foreign donors on which they depended for securing funds and assuring organizational survival, in the detriment of a participative, mobilizing function typically ascribed to social movement organizations. According to the NGOization hypothesis, foreign assistance has fostered “small, formalized, bureaucratized, professionalized cadre-staff organizations that have learnt to play the “funding game”” (Jacobsson and Saxonberg, 2013: 6), that focused either on advocacy or on service providing (Guenther, 2011; McMahon, 2001). This perspective is consistent with Tarrow's and Petrova's proposition that in the post-communist societies we are talking about a particular type of activism, which is not participatory, but transactional. The low level of public participation, indicated by a the low level of participation in non-profit organizations and by the suspicion towards the civil society sector¹, was explained through “the aversion to formal membership in organizations” and through the persistence of friendship ties as a predominant form of association, developed in the communist regime as a network safe from state's intrusion (Jacobsson and Saxonberg, 2013; Tarrow and Petrova, 2006). In contrast to the low mass mobilization, a certain type of activism emerged, characterized by “weaving relations among civil society groups and between them, political parties, and power holders”; a rather elitist public engagement, but present nonetheless (Tarrow and Petrova, 2006: 7).

But as Jacobsson and Saxonberg state, by investigating activism in this type of societies we are introduced to the variety of mobilizations, groups and repertoires, depending on the different available opportunities for political intervention that helps us go beyond the simplified diagnosis of NGOization.

In what follows I aim at contributing to this new line of investigation, by bringing evidence on the Romanian women's rights organizations (WRO), based on 36 semi-structured interviews with activists from 27 different formal and informal groups, some of them not explicitly feminist, nor exclusively dedicated to women's issues (but having women directed programs). Next, I will try to briefly offer an argument for this selection.

¹ According to the report *Romania 2010. The Non-Governmental Sector: Profile, Trends, Challenges*, the general level of trust in non-governmental organizations increased from 19% to 32% (from 1998 to 2010), while the level of distrust, although high, decreased from 65% to 50%. Moreover, the report shows that Romanians are more likely to donate money (33% have done it more than once) rather than actually volunteer for an NGO (3% have done it more than once) (FDSC 2010, 84-86). According to another report, commissioned by the Agency for Governmental Strategies, on the level of civic culture in Romania, 3% of the population activated in a non-governmental organization, 5% signed a petition and 5% took part in a public demonstration (Metro Media Transilvania, 2007: 61). Comparing the level of volunteering in 31 European countries, a report commissioned by the European Commission points to Romania as the country with the lowest level of volunteering, 10%, compared to 12% in Poland and Bulgaria and 54% and 49% in Sweden and Netherlands (2010, 65).

The rejection of the term feminism in post-communist societies that experienced forced equality imposed from the top is part of the common legacy of the countries in the region, as it was documented by various scholars studying the new women's rights organizations that emerged in these societies (Miroiu, 2004; Miroiu and Popescu, 2004; Grunberg, 2000; Sloat, 2005; Fabian, 2009). That is why researches of this phenomenon sometimes employ a more comprehensive definition of feminism, in order to include under the term of women's activism actual practices rather than using the sole criterion of self-identification as feminist (Fabian, 2009; Guenther, 2011; see also Martin, 1990). For this particularity, the organizations studied as part of this research were not selected based on their feminist identification, but based on two criteria: one was the reciprocal recognition of activists in different groups and organizations as being part of the same struggle; the other, given the limited time of the participants, that not always allowed a thorough inquiry into the group's collaborations, was a complementary investigation on women's groups, based on the region they activated in and their profile of activity (taking as a starting point the Civil Society Catalogue²).

The major focus of the present paper concerns the variety of strategies that WRO pursue, and the variety of intermingling factors that influence the change or the broadening of these organizations' tactical repertoire, namely the means through which social change groups seek to "pursue or prevent change" through "interactions that embody contestation between groups with different and competing interests" (Taylor and Van Dyke, 2010: 269). Interviews with women's rights activists generally confirm the multiple strategy thesis. However, the process through which these organizations expand their means of influence needs further research. The data I gathered point to several types of factors that contribute to this change: environmental, organizational and personal.

By environmental factors I mean the dynamics of the interaction between state authorities and organizations, but also changes in the availability of funding or economic opportunities (Jacobsson and Saxonberg, 2013: 6). Moreover, I include in this category the inter-organizational aspects, giving that communication and collaboration between organizations with different profile of activity and even ideology lead to a certain type of contamination (see for instance McCammon and Campbell, 2002; Meyer and Whittier, 1994). Organizational dynamics, although analytically distinct from the others, are nonetheless influenced and moulded by the other types of interactions already mentioned. Organizational profile and ideology may determine different approaches to state authorities and different visions on the proper means of influence in the case of a service provider and in the one of a cultural group. Consequently, the extension of their tactical repertoires might be expressed differently. Finally, the personal factors I found salient in the interviews I conducted are activists' time availability, but also the change they bring to their organization, following a personal ideological shift or increasing feelings of inefficiency, frustration and rage.

In the following I will try to exemplify some of these factors at work in WRO, leading either to changes in organizational profile or to the incorporation of new tactics, showing how these groups ended up being the multiple strategy actors discussed by the literature on post-communist activism.

² The project Civil Society Catalogue 2008-2010 was financed by Trust for Civil Society in Central & Eastern Europe and aimed at creating a database with civil society actors and identify the changes and trends in the NGO sector, <http://www.fdsc.ro/catalogul-societatii-civile-din-romania>, accessed on 20th of July 2013.

2. Twists and Turns in WRO Strategies

2.1. Service providing organizations and advocacy activities

As mentioned, there is not such a clear-cut difference between service providers, advocacy groups, protest, and cultural groups distinguished in the social movement literature (Kriesi, 1996; Minkoff, 1999). In some cases, the very profile of the organization, put against the local context, makes it necessary to pursue multiple strategies (advocacy and protest, cultural activities and protest, advocacy and service providing).

Organizations providing services for victims of domestic violence make a case in point for this double strategy. One of the professionals, whose NGO (founded in 1996) established, on public money, a centre for victims of domestic violence and one for aggressors, set a complex communication and intervention system comprising all the public institutions responsible on the administrative route of the victims of violence. She described to me all the efforts she undertook in order to bring at the same table all the local public officials and make them work together:

We have another informative newsletter for the other professionals and for the decision-makers. I mean, this woodpecker method, always bugging them, tell them that you exist ... because they don't really approach you or offer their hand. We somehow assumed that, that we are the voice of the victims and their advocate in violence cases; and if this means to keep our service going and the sustainability of social services, our mission is to go every month, or write to them or present them with what we are doing – case stories (under confidentiality), projects we're working on, bigger projects. And yes, at first we went through every commission, we were approved, dissolved, (asked) „why do you want this?” Because we wanted (to make it) with public money, and we clearly said that: it is the victims' right, it is the obligation of the Romanian state to do this. [...] it would have been harder to ask money for the aggressors' centre if I wouldn't have simply volunteered 3-4 years before, with a team that wanted to do this. [...] And this matters to the authorities, that you stand in front of them with some results and you put forward your will to make it and your reliability. And they didn't have anything to object to (Interview E.M.).

However, this is the only private shelter in the country entirely financed by state institutions and, to understand the different courses of action that service organizations pursue we have to look at some other less happy cases. By looking at the dynamic of conflictual/cooperative positions employed by service providing NGOs I aimed at touching on the tensions between state funding and other types of state support and organizational autonomy (Mathews, 1995). As Mathews points out in her research on the strategies of rape crisis centers in the US, such groups were often faced with the dilemma of receiving state support versus maintaining their feminist organizing and commitment. Although in the Romanian case no service providing organizations in the area of violence against women assumed a feminist perspective (with one exception), Mathews' research is relevant because it surfaces information on a certain type of interaction between organizations and state institutions, the one on handling state dependency. The low financial support that state gives to service providers in the domestic violence area does not rule out other types of dependency, stemming from the nature of their work, which fundamentally builds on good communication with the state agencies that step in when domestic violence occurs: General Direction for Social Work and Child Protection, The Labor, Family and Equal Opportunities Department, The Public Health Authority, The Forensic Institute, The Police Department, The Medical Emergency Unit etc. In what follows, I will provide examples that illustrate the switch between cooperation and confrontation.

Such organizations usually perform multiple roles and activities in order to enhance the quality of the services offered: they attract and secure grants for the training of local authorities (police force, state prosecution, social workers) and other important parties (journalists) in handling domestic violence cases, they struggle to maintain the sustainability of their services (legal aid, psychological assistance, shelters), they undertake research activities, they monitor the evolution of the situation of domestic violence and the level and quality of authorities' intervention on cases, they run awareness raising campaigns, and, when needed, they try to mobilize international actors in order to press public officials to take action. All these sometimes make the service providers lonely runners, being so absorbed in securing stability, that it becomes difficult to fully engage in coalition work, as much as this would improve their local chances of success.

Service providers that do not have a constant source of money for maintaining their residential and other types of facilities clearly distinguish themselves from those steadily supported by corporations or religious cults, but rather in the financial obstacles they meet than in the attitude towards local authorities. Preoccupied with making the system work in order to accomplish their mission of assisting victims of violence, service providers only indirectly and subvertly manifest their critical position towards state forces.

Firstly, the authorities are provided with negative and positive incentives that these organizations try to mobilize with more or less success. Among the negative ones, the interviewees have mentioned reporting the police staff to their superiors in case they did not intervene properly in domestic violence situations, or mobilizing the mass media to press local authorities. The last tactic is illustrated by the case of an NGO founded in 1998 that year by year submitted requests to the city hall, asking for a building that they would turn into a shelter. Year by year they went from commission to commission, arguing for the importance of such a space, until they gathered a 15 centimeters pile of requests. Being the only organization in the city doing this work, it made it highly respected by people and press, who were acquainted with its work from the awareness raising campaigns it organized. Reportedly, journalists from the local mass-media kept them informed on the abandoned buildings across the city that could be used for this purpose. Moreover mass media made a public case of the repeated refusal of the local authorities to support the agenda on domestic violence. Depending on foreign grants (provided through PHARE or by different foreign embassies) for sustaining their residential service, they eventually had to close down their shelter, and ended up providing a very limited counselling service, as they had to find full time jobs, away from organizational work.

Returning to the types of incentives or pressure tactics used by organizations, one in particular is noteworthy, due to the possibility of using it as a positive, as well as a negative stimulus, the mobilization of international or foreign institutions. As a positive kick, an interviewee from one of the organizations, the contact Romanian NGO for United Nations Program, explains how they used the monitoring visits of foreign officials, in order to raise their visibility in the local setting: *Four ambassadors came and we invited them to meet the authorities; this mattered a lot. It seemed to me that from that moment on, even if the ambassador left, they knew we were important. And we used that, I mean there weren't just visits, they were all monitoring visits, and when they met with local authorities, they asked them how were things going with us (Interview E.M.).*

However, the appeal to international institutions was more often used as a threat to the central and local public institutions. Process conceptualized by some some scholars as „externalization of protest” (Della Porta and Caiani, 2009), and by others as „the boomerang effect” (see Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Fabian, 2013), it refers to the tactic of

targeting the supra-national level of the public sphere in order to exert pressure on the national level. This was the case of the advocacy organizations involved in the informal Anti-Discrimination Coalition and Reproductive Rights Coalition (founded in the beginning of 2000), which repeatedly mobilized, through public appeals and open letters, foreign and international organizations, as well as European institutions against public decisions perceived as harmful for their constituencies³.

Besides using mass media and international institutions in order to press local authorities to take action, a second mechanism of expressing dissatisfaction towards the state's way of handling the domestic violence agenda is the sharing of human resource and know-how. Starting from the second half of the 1990s and continuing to the first half of the 2000, foreign assistance grants helped develop expertise in the civil society sector. Activists and professionals underwent trainings and workshops that helped them develop organizing and advocacy skills. When, following the adoption of the first law against domestic violence (217/2003), specific public policies and institutions started to develop, public administration tried to make use of the know-how accumulated by NGOs. While some shared their knowledge, in an effort to build a functional and integrated system that comprised both service providing NGOs and local authorities representatives, others perceived this pretention as being unfair, in the context of the low public support for their activities. Complaining about the expectance of public institutions to benefit for free from the experience built in the service providing NGO sector, one of the respondents noted:

Some local authorities contacted us; they had to open a shelter there and they didn't know how and they got in touch with us. They actually didn't know how to make the shelter procedures; they didn't know what was supposed to happen there. And I asked them to do the documentation themselves; we gave them some materials we had, but that's it, that was all we could do for them, because everybody expects to do this for free and we weren't willing to do this (Interview A.D.).

As shown by the quote above, NGO professionals' frustration over the lack of support for their own activity and their perception of state institutions' incompetence in the field determined a reluctant attitude towards cooperating with the state in matters of violence against women. This type of perception, noted more than once in the interviews conducted, helps explain the entrepreneurial approach that some of the women's rights organizations developed. With no support from state institutions, and given the lack of continuity in financial resources, the organizations that did not manage to secure the support of local authorities (like in the first case presented) had one of the following paths: some of them got competitive in the private sector and created programs that generated profit, in order to maintain the service providing; others reduced their activity and closed

³Euroregional Centre for Public Initiatives. "The Right to Abortion Remains Unharmful also in the New Romanian penal Code", <http://www.ecpi.ro/dreptul-la-avort-rãmãne-intact-si-in-noul-cod-penal-al-romãniei/> 18.01.2010, accessed on 20th of July 2013; Euroregional Centre for Public Initiatives. "International NGOs Concerned over the draft law regarding compulsory counselling for crisis pregnancy write to prime-minister Victor Ponta", <http://www.ecpi.ro/ong-uri-internationale-ingrijorate-de-proiectul-de-lege-privind-consilierea-obligatorie-pentru-criza-de-sarcina-ii-scriu-lui-victor-ponta/> 21.05.2012, accessed on 20th of July 2013; Euroregional Centre for Public Initiatives. Romania at UN on the Issue of Reproductive Health, <http://www.ecpi.ro/romania-la-onu-pe-tema-sanatatii-reproducerii/> 11.07.2012, accessed on 20th of July 2013; Euroregional Centre for Public Initiatives. Call against Politicizing CNCD (the National Council Against Discrimination) <http://www.ecpi.ro/apel-la-nepolitizarea-cncd/>, 17.01.2012, accessed on 20th of July 2013.

their shelters (VIF Coalition Report 2004, 25). Some of the organizations that reduced their activity, gave up service providing altogether and moved towards advocacy, as appearing in the following case:

We moved towards activities that are easier to do, like lobby, advocacy, monitoring, because they go well together, in my opinion. They don't require big funds and they don't require constant funds, so you can make monitoring, lobby and advocacy a month per year with little money and have an impact, while you cannot provide services for a month, because you don't solve a beneficiary's problem in a month (Interview M.P.).

Another noteworthy cause reported as strategy changing, apart from the inconsistency of resources, was the relationship with authorities. As one can see from some of the quotes above, while in some cases the efforts of service providers paid off in terms of securing good collaborative relations with persons from local public institutions, a systematic lack of openness from their part drove to the reorientation of NGOs either towards less conflictual areas of activity or towards more conflictual positions. For the first direction, a case in point makes an organization (founded in 2000) that provided residential, psychological and legal assistance to victims of violence, but that also provided training for the state institutions' personnel, such as police officers. Although the training was effective and the NGO formed with great success many people from the police staff, according to the interviewee the institutional resistance was so great that the trained police officers were most of the times transferred to other departments, as they were perceived as a threat by their superiors. After the transfers appeared to be a pattern, and the training efforts were perceived as not paying off, the organization reoriented towards educational purposes: *We were seen by all the directors of public institutions as a threat to the status-quo, which was one of non-intervention, of not coming with new ideas. And then we focused, in the period of 2005-2010 on working with schools, with educational institutions, on forming children, young people (Interview L.A.).*

Illustrative of the second direction is the organization that struggled to convince the city hall to lend them a building that could be used as a shelter. Following repeated denials and even treated with mockery when going from commission to commission, the organization still managed to acquire a small subvention from local authorities for service providing. At one point, them and other organizations were fined by the city hall on the grounds of not using the subvention money properly. This situation made clear the tensions between confronting the local authorities and staying in good relations with them, which might have brought financial and cooperative advantages.

There were situations in which it was very clear that if we accepted compromises we could have had more resources on the long term. At one point we were sued by the city hall for something that was unfair. [...] we consulted each other (all the fined NGOs) and we said that if we don't pay them, we will go into a direct fight with them. And we asked ourselves how we collaborated so far. Is this going to ruin us even more? We thought that at least we, the NGOs, should be a team and together sue them, because it's abusive. Of the eight, five said ok, we sue them, but do we know how long it will last? If in the meanwhile you want to make a project, we have to say that we are in litigation and you are no longer eligible to apply. [...] It took a long time, but we won. Still, we also paid the price, the individual price, the organizational price; but we just could not have done otherwise. Even if we knew that strategically speaking it will... That's what they told us, that one can see that this is a women's organization, because it works on principles... now I am at least 10 years older and I don't know what I would decide now (Interview E.L.).

2.2. Advocacy organizations and protest activities

The data collected show changes not only in what concerns the strategy of service providing organizations, but also in the one of organizations previously focused on advocacy activities. Also, by looking at the so called cultural groups, that mainly deal with festivals organizing, political art activities, book clubs, and managing collections of feminist fanzines, one can notice that their commitment to protest activities has been a steadier aspect of their existence, in that involvement in organizing and participating in street actions can be traced before more formalized women's rights organizations started to take to the streets⁴. The increased collaboration between them and formalized advocacy organizations was concomitant with the adoption on the part of the latter of more confrontational public positions.

In looking at organizational change, one should not ignore the personal motives, and the dynamic in the broader field of groups and NGOs working on women's rights issues. To give but one example for the way in which personal and professional motives intermingle in broadening the tactical repertoire of organizations, I will provide a quote from an activist whose organization (founded in 2002) gradually moved towards community, grassroots activities, but also towards street action as a means of political influence:

There is always a conflict for me, and now I don't know if I speak in the name of the organization or only for myself, but there is always an internal conflict between the rage on the system and on all the bad decisions, and on all the loses, because they are actually loses, there are things for which you put pressure, and you work a lot and you invest a lot [...] and all of a sudden those things are lost and you find yourself at T0 again. [...] This on one hand; on the other hand, I always find in myself the temptation to keep supporting the system, because sometimes there seems to be no other way, because above all the people that take decisions, at times very bad ones, in the back you have some people that should implement those decisions and that could have the willingness, but no instruments at their disposal. [...] and you ask yourself "What should I do?" Do I keep on building with this potential partner or do I decide to break away completely and practically stop working? [...] It's not easy at all for me and I realised that because in the past two years I felt that ... somehow I don't have the patience anymore (Interview L.A.).

Feelings over one's own helplessness in producing substantial changes in the system can be taken as a catalyst of organizational reorientation towards community projects, in this case working on the empowerment of victims of trafficking or settling support groups for victims of breast cancer.

In what concerns the dynamic in the broader organizational field as influential for groups' expansion of the tactical repertoire, two aspects should be mentioned. Firstly, new groups established out of the dissatisfaction over the perceived power relations in the field, as in the following reflection of one of the interviewed activists (whose NGO emerged in 2011):

Until we had our organization, we participated at another organization's protests, on 8th of March and 25th November, but we had always felt an informational asymmetry

⁴Feminists connected to the left activist scene comprising socialists, communists and anarchists actively took part in the actions organized through 2006-2008 on the International Day against Fascism and Anti-Semitism, and also organized to support the GayPride march in 2007, promoting messages pro tolerance and solidarity and against discrimination. For a timeline of these actions, see the blog of the Anti Fascist Front, <http://frontul-antifascist.blogspot.ro/search?updated-max=2008-04-25T17:54:00-07:00&max-results=1>.

and a separation between the girls that organize and the participants; I don't know how pertinent was our rebellion against this status-quo, but we certainly didn't feel very comfortable, in that we felt we had things to say and we didn't have the environment in which we could express ourselves (Interview L.C.).

Secondly, the more intense contacts between formalized organizations and more informal, non-hierarchical feminist and queer groups, starting with Slutwalk demonstration organizing (October 2011), and continuing with joint protests, workshops and other types of meetings, strengthened the relation between these, giving way to organizational change and to the adoption of a more radical and confrontational position by formalized NGOs. As one activist in a formalized group, founded in 2000 and previously focused on research and advocacy activities, pointed out, Slutwalk⁵ organizing precipitated an important organizational shift towards horizontal, non-hierarchical practices, that eventually materialized in the formal adoption of rules that prevented the monopoly of power (as NGO director, no one can have more than one successive mandate) and in efforts to enhance the participatory character of the organization.

I felt that there are many insights, which for us would be very useful and that in fact we have a lot to learn from them. Actually this was the way I raised this issue to them – look, after all we come from a certain context, we have another type of action, which will never be an informal, anti-institutional group. But at the same time I thought that their feminist exercise was a thing that could be, with distortions and limits, translated to other contexts as well. And this is what we have been trying to do since last year (Interview A.I.).

Moreover, the incorporation of more confrontational tactics was explained by some activists also through the overall change in the political environment. The announced cuts in the public sector, starting from 2010 and following the loan granted by International Monetary Fund to Romanian Government, were seen as the sign of an increasing economical deterioration that would overwhelmingly affect women. The austerity package adopted in 2010 by the Government included a 25% cut in the parental leave allowance, and the allowance for single parents. Moreover, through the Ordinance 68/2010, the National Agency for Equal Opportunities between Women and Men and the National Agency for Family Protection were dismantled and their responsibilities were taken over by the Labour Ministry. Women's rights organizations considered all these measures as a serious backlash in the government's commitment to equal opportunities and reacted as such. They prepared dirty diapers protests and open letters to manifest their disagreement and rage, while pointing to the existing European recommendations concerning the attention governments must pay to the gendered effects of the economic recession⁶.

⁵Slutwalk Bucharest, or on its Romanian name Marsulpanamelor, was staged on the 6th of October 2011, following similar demonstrations in Canada, United States, Great Britain, Australia, Netherlands, Sweden etc. It sparked in Toronto in the beginning of 2011, after a Police representative stated "women should avoid dressing like sluts in order not to be victimized". Slutwalk developed across the world as a protest movement against sexual and street harassment and against the blaming of the victims of such abuses. Slutwalk Bucharest brought together for the first time in a public demonstration different informal and formalized groups from the Romanian feminist scene, and benefited from extensive mass-media coverage (facebook event page <https://www.facebook.com/events/282579735089129/>).

⁶ Mothers protested with dirty diapers in the capital, 17th of May 2010, http://www.realitatea.net/mamele-au-protestat-cu-scutece-murdare-in-capitala-vezi-video_713906.html. Protest letter regarding the dismantling of the National Agency for Equal Opportunities between Women and Men, 6th of July 2010, <http://www.centrulfilia.ro/images/PDF/scrisoare%20protest%20desfiintare%20anes.pdf>.

Following a perceived lack of efficiency and impact of their work with politicians and technical staff, but also the threat of a political system shutting itself against the different voices of civil society, some activists turned to a more open confrontational position, manifested in a sequence of street actions. These comprised, besides the now regular 8th of March and 25th of November public gatherings, demonstrations through which they tried to press for or stop the adoption of certain laws or sanction statements and behaviours perceived as misogynistic and discriminatory. In this category we could place the protest on 25th of November 2011 for the adoption of a revised law on domestic violence that would include a protection order, the flashmob organized in January 2013 that tried to push for a serious and transparent handling of the sexual harassment challenges of a policewoman, and the protest on the 1st of February against the announced modification of the law on legal mediation that would have introduced a compulsory informative session on the advantages of mediation, which would have also applied to rape charges.

On this line, talking about the adoption of a less cooperative, research and counselling oriented stance, one activist in a feminist organization touched on the intermingling of political and organizational factors that influenced the move towards street protest:

That moment it was obvious where the austerity policies would lead, because that was practically the moment in which it was clear that ok: EU won't matter, nor the expertise [...] Meanwhile we felt the need to get out of research and I think that this was the consequence of the interaction we had with certain NGOs and the consequence of the fact that we felt more in control (Interview A.I.).

However, most of the times, these changes in organizational profile cannot be placed only on behalf of external factors (such as political and inter-group dynamic), but have to be corroborated with internal aspects, such as personal time availability of members, or pressures for change coming from the inside. The difficulty to establish any single cause or set of causes that effect change also comes from the very different members' understandings of this process. Some of them see the change as a natural development of the organization, others see it as the effect of their personal inside influence.

3. Conclusions

What I tried to document in the present paper is the process through which organizations broaden or change altogether their profile of activity, getting to a stage in which we can talk about them as pursuing multiple strategies of political influence. In the case of service providers, the examples provided above point to an expansion of the tactics employed, depending on the relation with state authorities (conflictual or cooperative), but also depending on the available resources. In cases in which such organizations did not manage to secure a good relation with local authorities, they either moved into less disturbing fields of activity (such as education), they moved into direct conflict, such as litigation, or they adopted a passive-aggressive position, by not sharing the know-how they accumulated. Moreover, some of the groups investigated moved into advocacy activities, in an effort to increase their chances of success in service providing. In the case of advocacy groups, a move can be noticed towards more confrontational tactics, such as protests and flashmobs, triggered by a combination of political factors (the austerity cuts operated in the face of economic recession), inter-organizational factors (a contamination effect fostered by increased cooperation between formalized and informal groups), and personal factors (feelings over one's inefficiency, disappointment, losing patience in keeping cooperative relations to state officials, technical staff, institutions).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Della Porta, Donatella; Caiani, Manuela (2009), *Social Movements and Europeanization*, Oxford University Press, Oxford;
- Educational, Audiovisual & Culture Executive Agency (EAC-EA) and Directorate General Education and Culture (DG EAC) (2010), *Volunteering in the European Union*;
- Euroregional Centre for Public Initiatives (2010), *The Right to Abortion Remains Unharmful also in the New Romanian penal Code*, 18.01.2010, <http://www.ecpi.ro/dreptul-la-avort-rãmãne-intact-si-in-noul-cod-penal-al-romaniei/>, accessed on 20th of July 2013;
- Euroregional Centre for Public Initiatives (2012), *International NGOs Concerned over the draft law regarding compulsory counselling for crisis pregnancy write to prime-minister Victor Ponta*, 21.05.2012, <http://www.ecpi.ro/ong-uri-internationale-ingrijorate-de-proiectul-de-lege-privind-consilierea-obligatorie-pentru-criza-de-sarcina-ii-scriu-lui-victor-ponta/>, accessed on 20th of July 2013;
- Euroregional Centre for Public Initiatives (2012), *Romania at UN on the Issue of Reproductive Health*, 11.07.2012, <http://www.ecpi.ro/romania-la-onu-pe-tema-sanatatii-reproducerii/>, accessed on 20th of July 2013;
- Euroregional Centre for Public Initiatives. *Call against Politicizing CNCD(the National Council Against Discrimination)*, 17.01.2012, <http://www.ecpi.ro/apel-la-nepolitizarea-cncd/>, accessed on 20th of July 2013;
- Fabian, Katalin (2009), *The Contemporary Women's Movements in Hungary*, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore;
- Fabian, Katalin (2013), "Overcoming Disempowerment: The Home-Birth Movement in Hungary" in Kerstin Jacobsson and Steven Saxonberg (ed.) *Beyond NGO-ization. The Development of Social Movements in Central and Eastern Europe*, Ashgate Publishing;
- Filia Center (2010), *Protest letter regarding the dismantling of the National Agency for Equal Opportunities between Women and Men*, 6th of July 2010, <http://www.centrulfilia.ro/images/PDF/scrisoare%20protest%20desfiintare%20anes.pdf>, accessed on 20th of July 2013;
- Grunberg, Laura (2000), "Women's NGOs in Romania".in S. Gal and G. Kligman (ed.), *Reproducing Gender: Politics, Publics, and Everyday Life after Socialism*, Princeton University Press, Princeton;
- Guenther, Katja M. (2011), "The Possibilities and Pitfalls of NGO Feminism: Insights from Postsocialist Eastern Europe" in *Signs*, vol.36, issue 4;
- Jacobsson, Kerstin (2013), "Channeling and Enrollment: The Institutional Shaping of Animal Rights in Poland" in Kerstin Jacobsson and Steven Saxonberg (ed.), *Beyond NGO-ization. The Development of Social Movements in Central and Eastern Europe*, Ashgate Publishing;
- Jacobsson, Kerstin; Saxonberg, Steven (2013), *Beyond NGO-ization. The Development of Social Movements in Central and Eastern Europe*, Ashgate Publishing;
- Kriesi, Hanspeter (1996), "The organizational structure of new social movements in a political context" in D. McAdam, J.D. McCarthy, and M.N. Zald (ed.), *Comparative perspectives on social movements*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge;
- Lambriu, Mihaela; Vamesu, Ancuta (coord.) (2010), *Romania 2010. The Non-Governmental Sector: profile, trends, challenges*, Civil Society Development Foundation, Civil Society Catalogue Project, financed by Trust for Civil Society in Central & Eastern Europe;

- Martin, Patricia Yancey (1990), "Rethinking feminist organizations" in *Gender and Society*, vol. 4;
- Matthews, Nancy (1995), "Feminist Clashes with the State: Tactical Choices by State-Funded Rape Crisis Centers" in M. M. Ferree and P. Y. Martin, *Feminist organizations: Harvest of the new women's movement*, Temple University Press, Philadelphia;
- McCammon, Holly J.; Campbell, Karen E. (2002), "Allies on the Road to Victory: Coalition Formation between the Suffragists and the Woman's Christian Temperance Union" in *Mobilization: An International Journal*, volume 7, issue 3;
- Meyer, David; Whittier, Nancy (1994), "Social Movement Spillover" in *Social Problems*, vol. 41, issue 2;
- McMahon, Patrice C. (2002), "International actors and women's NGOs in Poland and Hungary" in Sarah Mendelson and John Glenn (ed.), *The Power and Limits of NGOs*, Columbia University Press, New York;
- Minkoff, Debra C. (1999), "Bending with the Wind: Strategic Change and Adaptation by Women's and Racial Minority Organizations" in *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 104, issue 6;
- Metro Media Transilvania for the Agency for Governmental Strategies (Dec. 2007), *Civic Culture. Study concerning the Mechanisms and the Manifestation of Civic Culture in Romania*;
- Miroiu, Mihaela (2004), *Drumul catre autonomie*, Polirom, Iasi;
- Miroiu, Mihaela; Popescu, Liliana (2004), "Post-Totalitarian Pre-Feminism" in Henry F. Carey (ed), *Romania since 1989. Politics, Economics and Society*, Lexington Books, Maryland;
- Realitatea.net (2010), *Mothers protested with dirty diapers in the capital*, 17th of May 2010, http://www.realitatea.net/mamele-au-protestat-cu-scutece-murdare-in-capitala-vezi-video_713906.html, accessed on 20th of July 2013;
- Saxonberg Steven (2013), "The Influence of "Conservative" Women's and Family Organizations in Hungary and the Czech Republic" in Kerstin Jacobsson and Steven Saxonberg (ed.), *Beyond NGO-ization. The Development of Social Movements in Central and Eastern Europe*, Ashgate Publishing;
- Taylor, Verta; Van Dyke, Nella (2006). "'Get up, Stand up': Tactical Repertoires of Social Movements" in David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, Hanspeter Kriesi (ed.), *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, Blackwell Publishing Ltd;
- Sloat, Amanda (2005), "The Rebirth of Civil Society. The Growth of Women's NGOs in Central and Eastern Europe" in *European Journal of Women's Studies*, Vol. 12, issue 4;
- Tarrow, Sidney; Tsveta, Petrova (2006), "Transactional and Participatory Activism in the Emerging European Polity The Puzzle of East-Central Europe" in *Comparative Political Studies* vol. 20, issue 10;
- The National Coalition of NGOs involved in programs on violence against women (2005), *Annual report 2004*.

DEMOCRACY AND THE ROMANIAN CONTEXT IN EARLY 90s. THE FIRST FEMINIST ATTITUDES

Andreea MOLOCEA *

Abstract. *In this article I make a short review of what democracy means in feminist theories and what democracy actually looked like in the Romanian context of the 90s. This is just a small part from a chapter in my PhD thesis, focusing on the importance of contextualization in talking about the revival of feminism movement in our country. In this sense, I used some of the interviews made for my research. The research was a qualitative one, based on the methods developed by narrative research. In these pages I present only the context of understanding democracy in which this movement rose.*

Keywords: *democracy, feminism, women's movement, patriarchy*

1. Introduction

The story of the first Romanian feminist organizations after the 90s is the story of democracy and transition in our country, because we can not talk about a democratic state without talking about the way that state treats its citizens: men and women.

Democracy is not an abstract concept, but rather a space where many voices and stories try to (co)exist and (co)create ideas and rules. Without freedom of speech, without the freedom to organize we can not talk about democracy. In this regard, the 90s are interesting years in the political and social history of Romania. After 45 years of dictatorship and censorship, people have been exposed to new ideas, such as the Western democracy. Those were the years of transition to a better life, they were the years full of hope and disappointment. The role of this article is to capture the context of the feminist movement which arose in Romania, in the years after the revolution.

2. Democratization, short review of feminist approaches

Defined in few terms, democracy is above all a process, a tradition that revolves around the principle of equality between individuals and personal freedom, as opposed to tyranny. This understanding of democracy was used in political theory as one between individuals (equally in front of the law, equally in rights and opportunities, speech freedom, freedom to organize etc.). What feminists are saying is that this theory is lacking issues in which the individuals that form the society are seen as men or women. According to this gender difference, there are different forms of inequality, because men and women

* PhD student, National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Faculty of Communication and Public Relations, Bucharest, Romania, e-mail: andreea_moloceca@yahoo.com. Beneficiary of the "Doctoral Scholarships for a Sustainable Society" project, co-financed by the EU through the European Social Fund, Sectorial Operational Programme Human Resources and Development 2007-2013. This article is part of a research made through the "Civil Society and the State. Analyzing Public Debates on Gender and Environmental Issues in Post Communist Romania" project, financed by CNCISIS - Idei, PN-II-PCE-2011-3 - Proiecte de cercetare exploratorie.

have different needs and expectation from society and their politicians. In the political game, the politicians are the ones that work for the public good and are elected as form of representation of one region or another. What mainstream democracy theories lack is the fact that in those regions, in those towns, there are men and women that vote, and they have different views on the world, on what politics should look like. In other words, classical theories of democracy and of the process/ building democracy are lacking a gendered approach, discussing about individuals and citizens as there were no relevant differences between them. If the first step is a macro democracy for all, the second step which outlines the true democracy is one in which underrepresented groups or non-active part in the decision making process become socially and politically relevant actors.

Carole Pateman (1988) suggest that democracy was conceived in terms of free consent between individuals with free will, but that this freedom is taken from a male paradigm that can not easily be extended to women. It is clear that freedom and democracy were raised in a male perspective of individual, antagonistic towards women's experiences. Pateman believes that the ideal of democratic equality is to be free from its masculinist origins and that to feminists, democracy must come to be implemented in the kitchen, childcare room and bedroom (1988: 216). Democracy - as other theories - appears to be indifferent to gender (or sex, if you take into account the biological separating women from men). Only that, detaching from what is particular, concrete or tangible, theories of democracy come to be written only from one sex, the powerful one: male sex. Iris Marion Young (1990) completes these ideas, stating that "in a society where some groups are privileged while others are oppressed, to insist that people should give up their particular attributes and experiences to adopt a point of general view, this does nothing to refresh that privilege, because the perspectives and interests of the privileged group will tend to dominate, marginalizing or silencing those of other groups" (1990: 257).

Liberal democracies propose and support the need for a clear distinction between public and private sectors, so that supposable, state interventionist policies can not reach an individual privacy. This way of looking at and theorizing the state is problematic to feminist ideas that see the state in patriarchal way, a patriarchal state, a father figure that makes rules for everybody. The idea that a state with minimal powers should only watch over the public sphere, ignoring the private one, becomes problematic for those cases of domestic violence, legitimizing the power of men in their own home. Liberal ideas of public vs. private sphere are actually an extension of two directions: state patriarchy or conjugal patriarchy. For liberal feminists (Wollstonecraft, 1792; Taylor, 1851; Friedan 1963; Pateman, 1988; Moller Okin, 1989) a subject that is against patriarchy is access to knowledge, education. Following pathways developed by Mary Wollstonecraft (1792), it is argued that if men and women are equally educated, they will have equal access to public space in society, considering that democracy is fairly adaptable to both genders. This position is called "common sense policy," a policy that does not shake the status quo to achieve better social and political conditions for women. The fact that liberal feminism was much more open to accepting the fact that men and women can exist in different spaces, as long as it is an autonomous choice has led to much debate in the 70s.

At the opposite pole is Marxist/ socialist feminism (Juliet Mitchell 1971, Heidi Hartmann 1981, Iris Marion Young 1981, Alison Jaggar 1983) who believed that revolution was the real solution to break the patriarchal roots. However, over time, socialist feminism tamed itself, being constantly concerned with how society is divided into classes, gender or ethnicity. It is considered that the intersectionality of these categories is necessary and there is a form of oppression most destructive than another. As

liberal feminists they find it favorable to have collaborative links with men to make social change.

Unlike the above positions we have radical feminism (Millett, 1970; Firestone, 1970; Daly, 1978; Ruddick, 1984; Dworkin, 1981) to the transformation of society. It was born in the United States, having its roots in the New Left movements and the acquisition of civil rights. Being discredited by men during movements, women formed the Women's Liberation Movement to highlight the fact that women are oppressed even when fighting alongside men for common purposes. I will insist a little more on this movement, because it can be a point of comparison with the beginnings of women's movement in the 90's in Romania.

3. Types of power relations: WLM

The attitude of the Women's Liberation Movement (WLM) on structures of power is to be named here, because the feminists within this group were the first to try a different kind of organization, rejecting the dominant role of internal organizational structure and trying to create a counterexample to how the power structure occurs within a group of people. Making an assessment of the movement, Freeman (1977) claims that excluding a dominant role without a clear idea of what might take place can bring many disadvantages. First, mentions Jo Freeman (1977), the lack of power structure within a group can be self-tyranny, leading to informal leaders, pointless bureaucracy and "stars" who can take control without appeal or objection from the group. Following the experience with the Women's Liberation Movement, Freeman pertinent conclusions on the role and power of a "dominant" in a group possible, claiming that there are no group without the structure. A group of any kind or for any purpose would be, will tend over time to form structures of power. They can be flexible to vary (between group members), distribute tasks, power and resources to distribute. Structures formed inevitably because people have different talents, skills, have different preferences, backgrounds and predispositions that will put on some positions in the group. Therefore, there can be only unstructured ways of organizing when people of that group would not interact in any way, and if it is adopted, it will only hinder those formal structures but it will be informal freehand (The same logic applies to "laissez-faire" policies which prevent control of economic power on the market, prices and distribution, but only prevent state involvement in taking these measures). In many respects, the idea is just an unstructured form to mask the power (and the "strong" does not always have to be aware of the power they hold). An implied power structure will never provide opportunities to assert all group members, because there are no clear rules formalized, are not free to be known and understood by all.

4. Types of Romanian democracy in transition

The 90s are years marked by the former communist regime. Romanian democratization is one particular from the context and history of democracy over other models (including the East-European). It may follow the path set by theorists Western analysis (Diamond, 2003; Diamond, Chu, Plattner, Tien, 2004; Dahl, 2004; Linz, Stepan, 2004), but the template can not be applied, and the analysis and its evaluation criteria set by the researchers from West is sometimes inadequate and, moreover, may depart from the reality of that period.

Romanian democracy and electoral democracy

Going on the premise set by political science theories that the road to democracy is not a linear or lacking particular elements by case basis, Romanian democracy began like many others by being an electoral one. Larry Diamond (2004) states that between 1990 and 1996 the number of electoral democracies in the world has increased from 76 to 118, and democracy became the typical form of government (Diamond, Chu, Plattner, Tien, 2004: 18). After the fall of the Soviet Union and the Cold War, democracy has become a desirable end to Romanian politics. With the initiation of this project of democratization Romanian transition process begins. In order to achieve this goal, were the first steps that involved changing the political system from a etatist one to a pluralist one, and this has involved institutional changes (most of which were made in the early post-revolutionary, Pasti: 1994) .

Following the directions on democratization theory developed by Larry Diamond (2003), in the article *What is Left from Democracy? Electoralism and Populism in Romania* (2011¹), Mihaela Miroiu summarizes the three basic stages that lead to real democracy:

- 1 - democratic/ electoral stage: it involves free and fair elections, participation of citizens in their access to resources and public information.
- 2 - liberal stage: this stage to limit state powers, the exercise of individual freedoms basic civil liberties, women's rights and minority rights.
- 3 - republican state / consolidation of democracy: in this stage dominates the "rule of law", government institutions function effectively, there is equality before the law between public and private actors.

The institutional character of democracy, belonging to the first stage mentioned above, is one of the essential pillars of democratic consolidation, which determine its viability and stability. If not effectively constrained by the behavior of public officials a "network of laws, tribunals, agencies and semi-autonomous control of the rules of civil society" in the sense of transparency and accountability, democracy will be weakened by abuse and political cynicism, and the actors will not be able to commit to consensus on the rules of the game, mentions Diamond (2004: 25) drawing attention to the need for an institutional character of a nascent democracy. Post-revolutionary Romania institutional turned to a multiparty system, free elections, a bicameral parliament, election campaign, president limited powers, a new Constitution, a Constitutional Court. For the 90s, a conclusion is that Romania had practically "all institutions own a modern democratic system" (Pasti, 1994: 94) Further, as Linz and Stepan (2004: 53) states, there are five conditions for a democracy to thrive, and these institutions can be effective:

- 1 - development of a strong civil society free
- 2 - a relatively autonomous political society

¹ The analysis made on the elections that took place in Romania, Mihaela Miroiu demonstrates that today we returned to democracy electoralistă. This is important because it proves to be noted that in the 22 years of transition, women's rights have not reached the political agenda as would be necessary in a democratic state. Stagnation the present (with some resuscitation in the pre-accession and accession) that affect women especially in the current economic and political crisis is at some level a determining factor which may explain to some extent the lack of action results visible or strong feminist Romance. Moreover, in general, all these years public confidence in institutions decreased their participation becomes minimal, defined election years (except 2012 and protests occurred, but not the subject of this paper and deserves to be investigated separately).

3 - political actors (government and state apparatus in particular) to be subjected to the rule of law (rule of law) that protects individual freedoms and associational life

4 - state bureaucracy

5 - an institutionalized economic society

Setting these general guidelines about the steps that a democracy makes based on its stages, I return to the main topic of the article, namely the beginnings of the feminist movement in Romania, beginning that will highlight features of Romanian democracy. The specificity of the fact that the post-communist Romanian democracy was an electoral one is important to understanding the institutional and political context in which the people involved in civil society had to attend. A democracy mainly electoral, that managed to overcome this stage is one that is not an advantage for such activities because prioritize other issues and principles such as protecting human rights and ensuring the rule of law, represent the interests of citizens, including marginalized groups remain on the periphery remain peripheral, not finding the "right time" for them: "I do not know exactly when it will end this transition: the creation of new political institutions are resolved in a relatively short time, instead what takes longer is changing attitudes - which are beyond the scope of any law - and privatization of the economy" (Lazarus, 1998/1999: 51).

This process of transition from incipient democratization is a basic variable analysis, which is essential when it comes to the eventual success or failure of the feminist movement. The emergence of this weak civil society is deeply linked to these first steps towards democratic Romanian society and its analysis goes hand in hand with the analysis of socio-political situation of the time. NGOs formed to support gender equality have contributed to strengthening civil society and democratic transition accordingly.

Show-room democracy

In the article "Political Transition: An Evaluation" (1994), Vladimir Pasti argues that it is necessary to measure and evaluate this period, and the directions identified by him are three in number:

- 1 - the change of the ones that rule (those from previous political system because by their activities one could count the transition evolution)
- 2 - the likeness of the political institutions of developed societies (in the sense of looking at our Western neighbors to measure evolution or involution in the land of democracy)
- 3 - the measure in which have been eliminated so far the former political system deficiencies.

This assessment (the first of its kind at the time), has methodological limitations but I will not dwell on that here². To be mentioned here, it would be the temptation of comparing transition with Western political institutions, this temptation being representative for that period where everything was "happening" in relation to West. The similarity between Romanian and Western institutions is not just a notion that you can rely on, because a large part of institutional design created after 89 was made with western support: "the fact that our political institutions resemble those from old democratic traditions might certainly indicate their nature, but are not necessarily a sign that they will function as democratic institutions (so that they could be identified as such)" (A. Miroiu,

² For details see article by Adrian Miroiu "How to evaluate the political transition", Journal of Social Research, No. 2, 1994, which is a methodological response to criteria set by Vladimir Pasti.

1994: 101). This is what Mihaela Miroiu (2004) would later call room service democracy. Adrian Miroiu (1994) finds a justification to this temptation, arguing that leaving the "nightmare of an embracing schizophrenia of the political system" is a factor worthy of consideration in this attitude.

This justification that Miroiu (1994) finds, interests me: the beginning of Romanian transition was made under the shadow of communism and all that was done was influenced (even if this was not recognized) by the past. Including miming an ideological detachment to communism - with all its consequences - is a result of its influence, and this resulted in a stronger economic and political destabilization. Because a common mistake at that time was trying to build something completely new, cutting ties with the past as if it never existed. This attitude towards the past had double effect: 1) lack of an assessment of the political and economic errors in a consistent and relevant way and 2) the inability to identify and develop policies to come in line with expectations and real needs of citizens at the time. Because of this latter effect, templates West (political, institutional, economic, etc.) were not consistent with the company fresh out of dictatorship (appropriate expression would be "showcase of democracy" Pasti, Miroiu, Codiță 1997). Including from a gender perspective, the fall of communism has had negative effects, as for example the rejection of egalitarianism in state policies, which resulted in the perpetuation of traditional patriarchy (M. Miroiu, 2003: 55).

The new democratic government came to power with a new language: democracy, privatization, freedom of expression, human rights etc. Communist language ("wooden-tongue") was replaced by a democratic one, which for most people was as inaccessible as the first, picture of a "democratic fatal ignorance." With regard to this aspect is to be mentioned Liiceanu's opinion (2012) expressed in an interview in February 1990: "There are people who believe that privatization is something related to deprivation ...; someone comes and takes you something, that thing is missing, you deprive him. Or it is believed that a secret ballot is undemocratic because it is not in plain sight, is something hidden and therefore bad. Everything appears inverted"(Li iceanu, 2012: 20). The inability of those in power to establish a point of contact with voters, a common language with them, along with economic instability of those years resulted in a report made by *A Future For Romania* that shows the political impasse of Romanian transition, deadlock that Vladimir Pasti will describe two years later (1994): "The whole political structure, the entire management system of the society begins to lose credibility. Confidence in the parties declines almost uniformly. Faster, decreases confidence in institutions: parliament, government, and more recently even the presidency" (Pasti, 1994: 94). In addition, the lack of civic culture and politics was a real lack justifiable in that context. It is clear that the Romanian society of the first years after revolution have a limited ability to understand the democratic game.

Dominant attitudes in the socio-political context of transition

Some researchers (Kaplan, 1992; Molyneux, 1985; Shayne, 2004) tried to find out to what extent democracy as a set of measures implemented favored women's movement. First, after the 90s it was anticipated that transitions to democracy will create a state that is more equitable from a gender perspective because it creates opportunities for political participation of citizens, male and female. This participation, seen as a fresh interaction and negotiation between civil society and state institutions should encourage the involvement of women, not just men. In a democracy it creates fresh new institutions, laws and brings in the public debate issues of women. In other words, it would be a

springboard for active participation of women in public space, but that does not necessarily mean that women factor benefits it. For example, as specified by Mihaela Miroiu, "women have not tried in transition to rebalance power relations, although the situation was favorable, and very low limits yet participated in government" (2004b: 277). It can be so kind as political circumstances and opportunities exist, but they are not the attention of women involved in the movement. In this respect, questions that arise and become important in my approach are related to the political inertia of our first feminists. The activists preferred in their implication in public sphere an educational approach seeking and informing people about political rights, economy as a way of being empowered and free, gender stereotypes, equal opportunities (it is not the case of those women who were concerned with charity projects).

After the events of 1989, some women tried to be involved in politics and public space by taking and being part of the new changes. They bent their time and energy mostly on projects and educational programs (particularly oriented towards human rights, political rights civil and civic and political education, entrepreneurship, etc.) and charities.

"Basically, since 1992 we entered on the NGO part and tried to gather women from different political parties because we had common interests and needs. We started programs because we had to learn. Because to access a certain position a woman should be prepared „n” times more as man. We went on the idea that we need to prepare" (Marina B.).

Marina B. is an example of a woman in 1990 that immediately got involved in politics, entering the FSN (National Salvation Front). I'll stop for a few lines on her story, because her work and her experience (shared by other participants in the workshop) is relevant to the context under discussion.

We are in the early years of transition, before the CDR government (Romanian Democratic Convention, 1996). These years are characterized as "a state of confusion," which, after a moment of optimism then widened from year to year as expresses authors of *Romania - Taking Stock* (Pasti, Miroiu, Codiță, 1996). This condition was not a bad thing in the first instance (the transitions are not clear) unless it was deepened forms of discrimination of women involved in political parties wanted to produce forms of political activism necessary starting a process of democracy.

"We (a.n. women from Women's Organization of FSN, then PD) have militated for open organizations, where party members have contact with women in civil society and other women from other parties. Our vision was limited by the vision party instead" (Marina B.).

Political parties were at the time (and still are) full of resentment and suspicion toward political activism, adding themselves and conspiracy mania (mania that exists at the highest level, including the then President, Ion Iliescu, using it when losing power control). This type of behavior existed at the micro-level party. The lack of confidence lead to a lack of will in terms of strengthening strategic projects for the future. "Explaining reality through scenarios about conspiracy undermines democracy in two ways. First, assume that democratic institutions are powerless, in reality it is concentrated in centers or occult organizations. Then, the scenarios do not allow for predictions, but looks back, precisely the opposite direction mentality towards modernization". (Pasti, Miroiu, Codiță, 1996: 177). The same authors cited identifies a number of other attitudes that have dominated the political scene of the 90's and have been destabilizing factors for what it should mean healthy civil society (Pasti, Miroiu, Codiță, 1996: 170, 173, 174, 176):

- *Lack of interest in the subject of "human rights"*. This lack was due to the reluctance of politicians, being an important weapon against citizens. It was

compounded by a speech found on their antipodes: „too much freedom is no good”, „do we need to help integrate minorities? is their job to come along with us”, the purity of the nation, the traditions etc.. CDR election campaign broke from this type of speech, but "last time in power, slammed former opposition to the economic shock in so much that it became virtually amnesia the ideology that propelled her to the forefront of the scene political";

- *Collectivist mindset*. Romania is a state transition prevailing pre-modern ideas that people are not an end in themselves, but means to a higher purpose: national interests, reforms to which every citizen must be to obey and sacrifice. In other words the attitude of the state towards its citizens remains even after revolution a patriarchal one, the state being the one who knows what's best and guide everyone toward a common good, that the national wealth and society is more important than the individual, the silence and stability are top values;
- *Dependency as alternative to autonomy*. Citizens are subject to legislative measures and policies, but have no power, no knowledge to influence / change. Including their opinions are formed by some opinion leaders in the media. In addition, the prevailing idea that freedom means chaos and that democracy is a system in which "no one knows who to give orders";
- *Labels, not judgments*. These labels are the result of the media, the media made by people not necessarily proficient specialists and researchers, but by individuals who express their views, opinions. They do not have coverage as a result of analysis and thus generalizations and labels arise investor type = thief, democracy = chaos = neo-communist Iliescu, NPP = monarchists, PDSR = corruption, etc.;
- *Distorted meanings of equality*. Democratic equality as a principle that supports the idea that all people are equal before the law and are entitled to equal opportunities is hardly acceptable. Any out of print, any difference is penalized by the public. This kind of attitude is not only material wealth inequality between citizens it produces, but also by differences in religion, sex, opinion differs (eg vegetarianism.). "Pluralism as multiculturalism are opposed to narrow egalitarianism, whereby being equal means being the same. Without them, any tendency towards modernization is stifled and the citizen stays minimal as social expression";
- *Individualism associated with selfishness*. Romanian individualism is understood as personal interest, lacking real belonging to the community. It is a type of behavior that lends itself to a variety of charity (alms, say the authors) that solve moral dilemmas. As a result, reinforces the passivity of the poor.
- *Lack of free mentality and civic attitude*. The free man is the man who chooses to free enterprise, political pluralism, human rights, free man is not the man of post-Decembrist Romania. "The world of Western values is for most of the people here just a movie on TV or written information. They do not have direct experience of it, they reject it or accept it rationally, but they do not know how to be empathetic towards it - it is not a lived experience and therefore becomes hard inner need".

5. Patriarchy, obstacle to political development movement

Patriarchy defined as "the ideology that stands right in the center of the father, the symbolic father, the one whose word matter and creates" (Bucur, Miroiu, 2002: 3),

represents the source of inequalities and the position of second-class citizen (sometimes the second class human being whose life does not matter, as we can see as a result of execution cases in the Islamic world). Discussion of patriarchy in this context is needed for two reasons: 1) state patriarchy manifested in the first years of transition, it is true to a more "gentle" than the communist period and 2) women politically involved have "felt" patriarchy before reading the theory.

Following discussions with the women involved politically in the early 90s, I consider as a possible hypothesis the fact that desire or will to real a democratic change existed, just that they were crushed by a number of factors (such as those described above) which are often associated with the political leaders, with men. If women would not be ranked as number two in their parties, if their opinions and projects mattered, and if they would not be discriminated consistently that direction might be somewhat different from the current ones. This discriminatory attitude reveals the importance of political participation and representation of women in this area. As long as they are eliminated and discredited and their voices are not heard, and we hear only the voice, image and likeness of man, this way of approaching and orienting the policies do not only affect women, but rather affects the democratic process. The speech regarding the representation of women in politics and the allowances to increase chances of entry and participation of women in politics revolve around the idea "How could women enjoy equal opportunities in the labor market when the standard that they operate ignores the particularities of identity, of bodily and of their experience?" (Nicolaescu, 1996: 9). To advocate for this kind of affirmative action arguing that it is necessary to generate positive social policies and attitudes for women is not complete. Women are needed in this area including the consideration of how the quality policy is. Marginalizing women their work in political parties, limiting their action to March 8 or child's birthday activities, we can not speak of a fair balance of power between women's organizations in the party and the party itself. As Marina B. says, "The men in our party did not understand why we talk to other women in other political parties. They called us treacherous and they also put labels on us. We had exciting adventures. For them it was very difficult to understand this collaboration, that we (a.n. women) all had goals, common ideals. Regardless of party, women were discriminated. They were good just to make a cup of coffee, a cookie, give the gift of 1st of June or 1st of March and Christmas".

The involvement of the first women in feminist activism was an organic process, almost intuitively, a "wave" who supported them in their efforts, expressing myself in terms of Laura Grunberg. Their reasons were not initially tied to an awareness of the situation of oppression of women and they neither clearly identified the fact that women as a group are not represented, are excluded or oppressed. Therefore, their initial involvement (meaning the first 2-3 years after the revolution) is one that did not concern the power gap between them and men. It was felt that after the '89 moment, men and women will work in partnership to strengthen democracy. The result was - as in the Women's Liberation Movement in the U.S. - a disappointing one for women: men wanted equality, but "only for dogs, not for puppies". The result of this was left to those women from politics to the civic activism.

"I wanted to say that I had this stage where I was a member of a political party (FSN), then I backed off, I had not the top position in the party, and in that case I entered the NGOs sector. I realized it was more useful to help women in this position with a comprehensive perspective of what happens. I have been in CRED foundation, that was focused on civic education programs and policy. I made the mini-parliament of youth.

After that, I admit, I got out of politics. (...) Since 1996 I left the political parties and I remained an activist" (Marina B.).

The unequal power structure, the existing patriarchy in these institutional organisms had a destabilizing effect. Because, with the attitude of rejection from men, and the small number of women involved, this particular feature facilitate a disjunction of possible feminist movements / women with an agenda. Mihaela Miroiu in the introduction to the volume *The Last Inequality* (Pasti, 1996) sums up these ideas stating that "patriarchy does not compete with other relations of domination, but is one that transcends and intersect all of them, even political democracy. Even when they get into politics, women usually breed the masculin model, it perpetuates and legitimates it. The model replicates everywhere, becoming part of all ideologies, living with traditional society, capitalism, communism" (Miroiu in Pasti, 1996: 13). This report extends dominating power over members of an organization. Again I refer to the experience of the President of the National Organization of Women to NSF, which shows that at the beginning, in the 90s we can identify two categories of women within the organization:

- 1 - those focusing on civic and political education, who wanted "to make democracy" by the book, to take courses and to be trained trained;
- 2 - those who obey orders from above (from big organization dominated by men) and not because of solidarity with others.

Finally, the women from the first category renounced being active in the party, identifying in the emerging civil society sources and resources that could make them be able to act according to the values and principles that they believed in: "Those that wanted from the start to be independent and to learn and to make their own decisions and have their own word, they have left the party. Those that remained were disciplined"(Marina B.).

6. Conclusion

What interested me in my research was to find out what was the context for the feminist ideas to develop in Romania after December 1989. It was important for me to highlight the fact that in a profound materialistic context, in which people were losing jobs and miners were in the streets, in which the first privatisations took place, such ideas as the feminist ones, so idealistic and post-materialistic rised up. To find the answer to this concern I made a qualitative research, based on narrative methods and from a standpoint feminist epistemology. I talked with the women involved in the first feminist NGOs and projects. After I started my research it became clear that I can not catch the essence of this topic without contextualizing it. In this sense I focused in this article on what democracy meant in theory and how it was the Romanian reality. As I had written above, in a patriarchal world and context, haunted by the communist past, the women's movement did not had the political impact that it was expected. Instead, those women involved - mainly from the educational field - focused more on educating women and men regarding gender equality, why it is important for a democracy. It appears to be clear that the lack of support in political parties of women's initiatives made a lot of women move in the civil society sector.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alcoff, L.; Kittany E.F. (2007), *The Blackwell Guide to Feminist Philosophy*, Blackwell, Oxford;

- Assesment Mission Report (1997), *Democracy in Romania*, Stockholm, International Idea;
- Bernhard, M. (1993), "Civil Society and Democratic Transition in East Central Europe", in *Political Science Quarterly*, vol 108, no 2 (summer 1993): 307- 326;
- Daly, M. (1990), *Gyn/Ecology. The Meta-Ethics of Radical Feminism with a new intergalactic introduction*, Boston, BeaconPress;
- Diamond, L.; Chu, Y.; Plattner, M.; Tien, H. (2004), *Cum se consolidează democrația*, Iași, Polirom;
- Einhorn, B. (1993), *Cinderella Goes to Market. Citizenship, Gender and Women s Movement in East Central Europe*, London, New York, Verso;
- Freeman, Jo, *The Tyranny of Structurelessness*, <http://struggle.ws>;
- Grunberg, L.; Miroiu, M. (coord.) (1997), *Gen și Societate. Ghid de inițiere*, București, Alternative;
- Grunberg, L. (ed.) (1994), *Gains and Losses. Women and Transition in Eastern and Central Europe*, București, Metropol;
- Grunberg, L., (2002). *(R)evoluții în sociologia feminist. Repere teoretice, context românești*, Polirom, Iași;
- Grunberg, L., (2008), *biONGgrafie: AnA – istoria trăită a unui ONG de femei*, Polirom, Iași;
- Hirschmann, N. J.; DiStefano, C. (ed.) (1996), *Revisioning the Political*, Colorado, WestView Press;
- Lazăr, Carmen (1998/1999), "Legislația tranziției" in *Caietele tranziției. Revista Institutului de Studii Posttotalitare și a Institutului de Antropologie Culturală*, 2/3;
- Miroiu, M.; Popescu, L. (2004a), "Post-Totalitarian Pre-Feminism" in Carey, Henry F. (ed.), *Romania since 1989. Politics, Economics and Society*, Lexington Books, Maryland, 2004;
- Miroiu, M. (2004b), *Drumul catre autonomie. Teorii politice feministe*, Polirom, Iași;
- Miroiu, M., *Priceless women and room-service feminism*;
- Miroiu, M. (2011), *What is (left) of democracy*;
- Miroiu, Mihaela (1998/1999), "Antifeminism și conservatorism" in *Caietele tranziției. Revista Institutului de Studii Post-totalitare a Institutului de Antropologie Culturală*, 2/3;
- Nicolaescu, M. (coord) (1996), *Despre identitatea femeilor din România modernă*, București, Anima;
- Oakley, A. (2000); *Experiments in Knowing. Gender and Method in the Social Sciences*, Polity Press, Cambridge;
- Pasti, V.; Miroiu, M.; Codiță, C. (1996), *România-starea de fapt. Societatea. Construirea societății de supraviețuire. Achiziția de subdezvoltare. Mecanismele subdezvoltării. Democrația de vitrină*. Vol 1, București, Nemira;
- Pasti, V. (2003), *Ultima inegalitate. Relațiile de gen în România*, Iași, Polirom;
- Shirin, R.; Phizacklea, A.; Pilkington, H. (ed) (1992), *Women in the face of Change. The Soviet Union. Eastern Europe and China*, London, New York, Routledge.

THE FRIVOLOUS REVOLUTION FAIR/CARNIVAL ELEMENTS OF *MĂRȚIȘOR* IN UNIVERSITY SQUARE BEFORE AND AFTER 1990

Florin DUMITRESCU *

Abstract. *March 1st, the pre-Christian holiday of Mărțișor, occasioned in the 1980s and 1990s, in certain areas in Bucharest (mostly in University Square) certain endemic cultural developments, which contributed to the creation of a certain specific trade fair spirit. Mărțișor trinkets, festive amulets ritually presented to women on this occasion, have in time acquired an air of conformity and urban convention. This article follows the way in which, in socialist decades, students' counterculture merged with traditional culture, shifting these artifacts into the grotesque, and turning them into miniature masks in a subversive carnival, if an undeclared one, which undermines both the bourgeois conformity of offering chic brooches and the day-to-day rigidity imposed by the totalitarian regime.*

Keywords: *collective memory, urban anthropology, informal market, calendrical ritual, totalitarian regime, tactical frivolity*

1. Introduction

In my research on fairs/markets, I focused my attention on University Square in Bucharest, caught in a moment of maximum intensity of social life in the spring of 1990, namely the time of the marathon demonstration colloquially known as *Golania*. The vocation acquired by University Square, as a place of public demonstrations with a civil and/or political character, often with a demanding edge to them, does not exclude a range of other forms of behaviour. All these "faces" of the Square seem to spawn from each other, completing each other and integrating into what constitutes an ampler rite. Therefore, one can detect, in the "University Square phenomenon":

- a religious-commemorative dimension (honouring the martyrs and heroes);
- an agora-like deliberative dimension;
- a social/mundane dimension;
- in close connection to the previous, a ludic dimension of civil disobedience (with touches of merry carnival anarchy);
- and last, but not least, an economic, trade-oriented dimension.

Analytically putting them into evidence is meant to help the understanding of the fair phenomenon, which, these distinctions notwithstanding, manifests itself syncretically, holistically, as a *total social fact* (Mauss *apud* Mihăilescu: 119). In order to not crush,

* PhD student, National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Faculty of Communication and Public Relations, Bucharest, Romania, e-mail: textier@gmail.com . Beneficiary of the "Doctoral Scholarships for a Sustainable Society" project, co-financed by the EU through the European Social Fund, Sectorial Operational Programme Human Resources and Development 2007-2013.

with this analysis, the fair's delicate bloom, its ineffable character, I have postulated the existence of a cohesive factor of all these components, which I have called *trade fair spirit*. It can find its correspondent in what Mikhail Bakhtin calls *carnival spirit* or *spirit of laughter* (Bahtin, 1974: 41 *et passim*); and it also relates to Michèle de La Pradelle's pair of concepts of *sociability* and *urbantheatre* (De La Pradelle, 1996: 302-303, 359). This *spirit*, which is present like some sort of fluid in all of a fair's components and which is perpetuated as a continuum at longer or shorter intervals, can account for a certain fair tradition (which we perceive, evoke and sometimes co-create, more or less knowingly).

I have also taken into account Judit Bodnár's remarks (Bodnár: 194-205), defining a market's *trade spirit* as the synchronous super-position of various layers of intensity of social interactions; and, diachronically, as the memory that they convey from one generation to the next, forming a specific landscape.

From my older observations about University Square and from more recent interviews with participants in the *Golania*¹, I have identified an embryo of this spirit even from the period before the December 1989 Revolution. The influence of the December Revolution on the public demonstrations from the subsequent spring is not neglected, but simply bracketed, in order to reveal a less obvious influence which has its own importance.

2. The “zany” Mărțișor market in the University Square

Traditionally, the sidewalk near the University of Bucharest and the small square around the fountain near the Institute of Architecture are dedicated at the end of each February to the trinket fair. It is not the only spot in Bucharest in which artisans set up shop and organise a fair blooming with spring-like freshness and fantasy, year by year, braving the oppression of various political regimes and the restrictions of local authorities. Above all, the trinket peddlers in the University area are famous for their humour and for their inventivity. Traditionally, in decades past, in the area of the University and of the Architecture Institute, as well as in the Roman Circus (*Piața Romană*), close to the Academy of Economic Studies, students and young artists under the aegis of the Fine Arts Fund were allowed to exhibit grotesque, eccentric trinkets, sometimes bearing ambiguous messages, nearly subversive. Painted ceramic little monsters, bearing funny names, such as “*cocomârlă*” or “*prototiptil*”² and praised with carnivalesque, sometimes irreverent tones (bordering on licentious). The grotesque trinkets, student-made, “alternative”, are different from “classic” *Mărțișor* trinkets, which represent symbols of the oncoming spring (flowers, butterflies, chimney sweepers, seasonal birds such as storks and swallows and so on), but one can regard them as inheritors of older traditions, of passage celebrations such as the Saturnalia or, in more recent times, Lent.

These amulets acquire the function of masks, within a small-scale carnival that includes their purchase, their presentation and their display on clothes. If in the case of “classic” trinkets their purchase and offer enters the area of urban social conventions, which are formalised (like bunches of flowers), “alternative” trinkets involve a disruption of the formal, urban convention, as well as a chain of wishes – in their turn anomalous, if not downright insolent:

¹ Which will be rendered in the forthcoming e-book: Dumitrescu, Florin, *Bâlciul Universității. Descoperind spiritual târgoveț în Bucureștiul post socialist (University Fair. Discovering the Trade Fair Spirit in post socialist Bucharest)*, Humanitas, Bucharest, 2013.

² Funny portmanteau words: most probably, *cocomârlă* = *cocoș* + *șopârlă* (rooster + lizard) and *prototiptil* = *prototip* + *tiptil* (prototype + silently).

- first, from the maker to the buyer;
- a second time around, from the buyer to the recipient.

Within both communication pairs, enough familiarity or convergent acceptance of the carnival situation is needed, characterized by the suspension of social conventions (so that, for instance, the colleague or friend who is offered a “*cocomârlă*” shall not take offence, shall not perceive the gesture as a malicious allusion to her own person or as some other type of ethical or aesthetic outrage; but, on the contrary, she should appreciate the gift's originality, even accept it with a degree of self-irony; in other words, to go out in the world wearing the “*cocomârlă*” on her lapel).

In order to enter this game one needs – one *needed* back then, more than now, when post-modernity is in full swing – certain open-mindedness; one has to be what they call “zany” or “funny”.

”Freely-improvised jokes, repartees and counter-repartees among competing traders, innuendos and references bordering on the temerity of political jokes – all of these shared as if in an informal agora. If the trinket sellers were women, they were the first ones to wear the trinkets, with which they would cover the lapels as if they had been generals decorated in battle. If they were men, they would put on a disguise, put on make-up, don wigs, in a way they would have not otherwise adopted, under any other circumstance: they themselves turned into giant trinkets! The buyers' involvement shifted accordingly. Around those stalls, both buyers and hangers-on would flock at all times, infected with the same spirit of freedom, of unfettered thinking, of a normality we had all been hungry for...” (Dumitrescu, 2008a).

This state of accepting the abnormal (and adhering to it) pre-supposes having a sense of humour, even an absurd one; a certain penchant for the bizarre and for rebelliousness, typical for a juvenile area of sub-culture/ counterculture, predominantly associated with students, that can be connected with the fad of artistic brigades and with artistic events in the area of students' clubs. It is an area of free thinking and free expression, tolerated (and, supposedly, kept under control) by the authorities in the Seventies and Eighties; and which corresponds to a latent challenging sensitivity of the youth, present especially in the academic milieu. This youthful spirit - “zany” or “funny”- is (or was, especially before the revolution) perceived directly in the vicinity of trinket-makers' stalls and it rounded off the atmosphere of spring-time holiday and of carnival fair, next to the display of flower-sellers, equally colourful and spontaneous.

In accordance with the “cosmic” optimism of the first days of spring, March 1st “spontaneous” fairs (Chelcea, Radu, Constantinescu: 147-150) constituted for Romanians, in the bleak Eighties (the final stage of the totalitarian regime), *chronotopi*³ of hope, of drawing chthonic protection and reassurance from a common fund.

³*Chronotopos* (or *space-time*) is a concept coined by Mikhail Bakhtin in the field of literary theory and it signifies the (narrative) representation of a “field” that incorporates, in common reference, a certain moment in time and a certain location in space, attributing to both of them a mythical, legendary character, as is the case with the romances from the Middle Ages and so on; or, in the case of the modern novel, the mere reference “in slidarity” of the space-time unit (BAKHTIN 1978). In anthropology, the term *chronotopos* is borrowed by Keith Basso in order to designate the means by which some Apache tribes formulate event references within the tribe's oral history/patrimonial memory (BASSO, pp.44-45). A trend that is similar to some extent to the Apache one (and maybe even more with the European romance readers from the Middle Ages) is for Romanians to regard the fair as a spot/event that incorporates both a time dimension and a space dimension. Therefore, the multiple meanings of terms such as *market* and *fair*, but also

One can suspect that the totalitarian regime allowed such popular events as failsafe. That was the time of popular events organized and controlled by the government with a view to appease social tensions – such as “The Great *Mărțișor* Lottery” and so on. Since it was not a Christian holiday, March 1st did not constitute an ideological threat; moreover, its position, close to Women's Day (March 8th, a holiday internationally endorsed by labour and feminist movements and, therefore, adopted logically and lawfully by socialist and communist regimes). The regime's cultural and ideological strategists may have even encouraged the celebration of the pre-Christian holiday of March 1st, since it, combined with Women's Day, would counter-balance the importance of the period's great Christian holidays (Mardi Gras, The Holy Innocents). Thus, *Mărțișor* trinket peddlers, tolerated and assimilated with artisans, protected and economically monitored by the Fine Arts Fund, could be turned into unwitting agents of a merry anti-clericalism and of “legitimate” popular tradition, with protochronist connotations.

If it was specifically within this *Mărțișor* artisans' community that the “zany” spirit of rebellion emerged, which participated, in a way that is difficult to quantify, yet that should not be ignored, to the undermining of ideological pressure and to the fueling of islets of freedom and of hope in a totalitarian age – these are paradoxes that contribute to the portrait of an ambiguous, protean and uncontrollable figure – the trinket maker; a figure that thus draws near to the one of the trader, the hustler, the carnival fool.

3. The first post socialist *Mărțișor*

1990's March 1st, the first “free and democratic” *Mărțișor*, ought to have symbolically confirmed the great changes from December 1989.

The seeds of freedom, that had until then germinated underground, finally broke into the light then. One could even say that they blossomed, if one were to take into consideration the intensity with which Bucharest's squares, large and small, filled with stalls selling trinkets, jewelry and other “Fine Arts Fund” paraphernalia, more or less connected to spring's symbols. Obviously, University Square topped all of them with extra colour and vitality, in which flower sellers took part as well, but the “alternative” trinket sellers, makers of “*cocomârle* and *prototiptili*”, also vied for their place and role as the holiday's MC's. For the first time, their spiels and urges went out of the obscure allusion sphere, of the seemingly irrational utterance; and they went into the wider sphere of free protest. It was the time when one could shout in the marketplace that “The emperor is naked” – and not only by oneself, but in a (sometimes raucous) chorus. It seemed to be the finest hour of little ceramic monsters, the best time in which they could turn into the market's stars, with no fear and no camouflage. At last, the “*prototiptil*” could be displayed and exhorted even more noisily, more flamboyantly than in previous years.

It did not come to pass...

The glory went to a different kind of artifacts: namely to the religious ones, of those with a sacred/spiritual connotation. The hit sale item of 1990's March 1st was, without the shadow of a doubt, the crucifix; on a string or on a chain, to hang around one's neck or to wear at one's bracelet, or to display on a nightstand. Icons large and small,

Golania/Golaniada (which designates both the urban location and the demonstration's historical moment), according to the statements of people I interviewed (see footnote 1). For Romanian peasants, according to fairy tales, anecdotes and proverbs, the *fair* is a *chronotopos* par excellence, with a high charge of experience. For instance, the saying “Home estimates won't match the fair expenses” can be interpreted both in terms of space and in terms of time (both of them integrated, one can infer, into a level of *experience*).

many of them painted on glass, crafted (most probably in Bucharest) in the likeness of those from Sibiu and Făgăraș; incense burners, bead strings, and so on – a surprisingly large range of cult objects, amongst which there were present reproductions of famous works, such as The Last Supper, The Crown of Thorns and so on. It was a beginning, it was an encroachment of the norm (an unwritten one, but mutually consented upon in the years of state-sanctioned official atheism) that religious accessories should not be mixed with March 1st trinkets. All of a sudden, this fusion occurred naturally, as another form of freedom: if trinkets are destined to bring good luck (or to ward off evil), their effect will be multiplied by attaching a small icon to them (which, in its turned, is charged with “power”).

The sales success extended the area of small-time peddlers of religious items from University Square even after March 8th, which traditionally was the final date for trinket peddlers. (Women's Day was a last opportunity to present trinkets, even if they came in a card). Romanians' newly resurrected interest in religion, the presence in the University Square of places in which to commemorate the martyr-heroes, with recurrent religious services that gathered not only clerics, but also large multitudes of laymen; as well as (one might suppose) the drawing near of Easter holidays – prolonged the trade activity, though discreet, but full of vitality, in certain areas of University Square.

When, six weeks later, the great anti-government demonstration began, it found in University Square a fair location – if not active, at least well prepared, still keeping the recent memory of the first free trinket fair.

One would find again the zany spirit and the fantastic inventiveness of students and young artists in the playful, carnivalesque aspects of the *Golanía*. The self-ironic acceptance of the “Hobo title” (in fact, a spiteful insult addressed to them by President Ion Iliescu), the rebellious endorsement and merry carnivalesque display of badges and buttons labeled “hobo” and “hobo girl” (with variations), continued the tradition of “zany” trinkets. The slogans and rebellious choruses of *Golanía* may have numerous filiations in popular culture, yet their fresh, optimistic creativity and humour can be attributed to the trinket peddlers. Last, but not least, the intermittent presence of some forms of peddling in University Square would anticipate the emergence of small-time traders during the marathon demonstration. Their ambiguous image, their protean character, out of control, in the perception of demonstrators draws them close to the image of the fool/ hustler, whose urban (even academic) incarnation was the “zany” trinket peddler.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bahtin, Mihail (1974), *François Rabelais și cultura populară în Evul Mediu și Renaștere* (translated by Recevschi, S.), Univers, Bucharest;
- Bahtin, Mihail [Bakhtine, Mikhaïl] (1978), *Esthétique et théorie du roman* (translated by Olivier, Daria), Gallimard, Paris;
- Basso, Keith (1984), “Stalking with Stories: Names, Places, and Moral Narratives among the Western Apache” in Bruner, E., *Text, Play and Story. Proceedings of the American Ethnological Society*;
- Bodnár, Judit (2004), “Asamblând piața: transformările sociale ale spațiului public și sfârșitul iluziilor despre economia secundară în Budapesta postsocialistă” (translated by Lățeș, Puiu) in Chelcea, Liviu and Mateescu, Oana: *Economia*

- informală în România: Piețe, practici sociale și transformări ale statului după 1989*, Paideia, Bucharest;
- Crăciun, Magdalena (2009), "Europa: o piață faimoasă în România postsocialistă" in Mihăilescu, Vintilă, *Etnografii urbane: cotidianul văzut de aproape*, Polirom, Bucharest;
- Chelcea, Liviu; Radu, Cosmin; Constantinescu, Livia (2004), "Informatizare și instituționalizare: geografia cumpărării și piețele agricole din două sectoare ale Bucureștiului" in Chelcea, Liviu; Mateescu, Oana, *Economia informală în România: Piețe, practici sociale și transformări ale statului după 1989*, Paideia, Bucharest;
- De La Pradelle, Michèle (1996), *Les vendredis de Carpentras: Faire son marché en Provence ou ailleurs*, Fayard, Paris;
- De La Pradelle, Michèle (1997), "Société du spectacle et approvisionnement" in *Les Annales de la recherche urbaine*, Paris, December 1997;
- Dumitrescu, Florin (2008 a), "Mărțișorul sub presiunea campaniilor media" in *Dilema Veche*, February 29th;
- Dumitrescu, Florin (2008 b), "De la Moșii de iarnă la Babele de Mărțișor" in *The One Magazine*, March;
- Dumitrescu, Florin (2011), "Mărțișorul 2011 între fronturi și lagăre" în *Dilema Veche*, February 17th;
- Mauss, Marcel (1997), *Eseu despre dar* (translated by Lupescu, Silvia), Polirom, Iași;
- Mihăilescu, Vintilă (2009), *Antropologie: cinci introduceri*, Polirom, Bucharest 2009;
- Polanyi, Karl (1944), *The Great Transformation*, Beacon Press, Boston;
- Raulin, Anne (2007), *Anthropologie urbaine*, Armand Colin, Paris.

ETHICS AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN ANTHROPOLOGY

Răzvan IONESCU-ȚUGUI *

Abstract. *I affirm that from the theoretical and in general the material privileged position enjoyed by anthropologist is a duty for them to shed some light in the power relations in which the dispossessed and the deprived are involved, to make through the development of theory but also through different types of direct action a remedy to the structural violence which is reflected in individual suffering.*

Keywords: *ethical neutrality, late capitalism, postmodernism, Enlightenment project, power*

I started my fieldwork in 2008 as my master research in a multinational company from the healthcare industry. Because my fieldwork is related in great part to the operations in Bucharest and Romania of this single multinational company, I am in the less common position in anthropology to be studying at home. My fieldwork, which by location and subject presents itself as sociological but in its approach is rather an anthropological one, was done over a few periods which varied in the number of months and the frequency of participation in the massage centre and is continuing as this article is being written as part of my PhD thesis. The research method used was the ethnographical one, assuming the accomplishment of interviews with members and employees of the massage centre and using participant observation, as a member but also as a student, being able to take notes, conduct interviews, having access to some internal documents, but not being able to observe directly the interaction between the employees and their work behind the scenes.

The company, which is present on the market in more than 70 countries and has more than 3000 sales and demonstration centers in the entire world, has met a real success in Romania. What makes this business exceptional at a first glance is the fact that it offers free health care services, indefinitely and without special access conditions in order to convince the beneficiaries to buy the devices which are used in these centers.

Thus the community formed by the company shows some special features. In its broadest form, the community could be defined as the intermittent but constant interactions between potential clients and the company's staff, by and large in the daily presentations and demonstrations held at the center. What makes the community to be relatively knit, interactive and sustainable on the long run, unlike other brand communities, is the presupposed necessity of indefinite and intense use of the devices which are presented as the indispensable part of a healthier lifestyle. The demonstrations of the products are not just ends in themselves, design for an individual buy, but an untruncated means to build relationships capable of generating directly or indirectly a

* PhD student, National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Faculty of Communication and Public Relations, Bucharest, Romania, e-mail: razvan.ionescu@yahoo.com. Beneficiary of the "Doctoral Scholarships for a Sustainable Society" project, co-financed by the EU through the European Social Fund, Sectorial Operational Programme Human Resources and Development 2007-2013.

potential and future buy. The prospect of future sales, even after a sale is realized, makes the permanent contact with the client an objective. Even so, the community thus constituted has its own limits, the long-term absenteeism and the turnover rate being quite large. On the other hand, the members share a series of relatively homogenous practices and beliefs, which are transmitted and constantly constituted by the employees in the daily presentations and demonstrations of products. These interrelated and relatively systematic practices and beliefs about the body and about the functioning of the devices builds a consensus about the apparently complementary aims of the actors involved. The hegemony produced by the company comes to accommodate some of the interests and aspirations of customers with the imperative objective of making a profit.

For the salvation of their clients, the company offers the solution of consuming free health care services or of buying the marketed medical devices. Without forcing a sale, employees try with great performance skills and persuasive narratives to convince the customers about the importance of health and to raise awareness of the need to take personal action in the search of health. The type of knowledge expressed here about the risks of disease and the nature of the human body makes health a leading and ultimate objective but also an impossible one to reach. To consume in order to prevent the risks and to diminish the consequences of a constant aging and deteriorating body is a permanent quest for an almost reached salvation in the face of disease and pain. The concept of amelioration and not the concept of healing is the key word in the daily presentations of staff. The company is not very different from other public and private actors from the wellness trend that make a “virtue” and a “secular path of salvation” from the avoidance of pain and disease (Lock and Nguyen 2010 : 385). If the discourse about the salvation and hope in a better world remained a feature of millenarian religious movements and had lost the legitimacy in the case of political organizations, what is really relevant is how it has also become an essential component of capitalism (Comaroff and Commaroff, 2001: 2).

My main theoretical and ethical problem, not very easy to settled, even more so in a discipline that has been seduced by the siren songs of postmodernism is that I placed myself as a defender of the principles of the Enlightenment, at least in my polemic with some postmodernist ideas. From the very beginning I have to say that this does not mean that I don't have a critical stance in relation to modernism, at least in its most visible flaws, but I try to link an anthropological discourse, therefore closer to lived experiences of people, with what I think is vital to save from modernism. Despite the methodological, ethical and theoretical problems posed by the fact that, in part but in an essential way, have and support a different view about the reality of my fieldwork in contrast with the persons which I defined as my research subjects or just because of that I think that the case is an interesting one in relation to issues such as modernity and postmodernity, subjectivity and objectivity, domination and resistance and evidence and mystification. Unlike other situations and events to which anthropologists have turned in the spokespersons of oppressed voices, my situation is not so direct and transparent. More attentive at those with vocalized grievances and at the risk of ethnocentrism, the anthropologist had done little for the emancipation of their subjects in the case of subjectivities more sunken in power relations. An example could be here FGM (female genital mutilation), where patriarchal relationships are probably less considered than the fact that FGM is part of a rite of passage, through which the girls come to define as women. Thus not infrequently the anthropologist turns in defenders of cultures, which are seen like species on the verge of extinction, and less so in the defenders of the lives of those who

are often caught at the base of political economy, in relations of exploitations or in asymmetrical power relations in their on culture.

Thus, if there is a sum of behaviors and beliefs that can be treated more easily from the prism of relativism (fashion, religion) there are other issues that have more important consequences on the people involved to be treated just as such (crime, disease, wars).

In the social sciences, continuing the idea of ethical neutrality proposed by Weber, the picture of the researcher uninvolved and detached by an act of methodological reflexivity to describe as good as possible the studied phenomenon made history. For Weber this methodological reflexivity translates into the need for those from the academy to try to evaluate better the value judgments they make in the research, based on culture, personal or political preferences and prejudices. He advocates professionalism and rigor in the discipline, which means tracking the facts and records even when they come in conflict with the political agenda, personal beliefs or attitudes of those involved in research or teaching. In all these respects, with which I resonate, ethical neutrality comes as a guarantee to achieve objectivity. Although Weber is primarily concerned with methodological problems that can occur in the absence of this reflexivity, ethical neutrality, as the name says, it means more to him than that. It means first of all the withdrawal of the researcher and educator from any political and normative activity: "But the professor should not demand the right as a professor to carry the marshal's baton of the statesman or the reformer in his knapsack. This is just what he does when he uses the unassailability of the academic chair for the expression of political (or cultural-political) evaluations. In the press, in public meetings, in associations, in essays, in every avenue which is open to every other citizen, he can and should do what his God and daemon demands" (Weber, 1949: 5). If the methodological warnings raise by Weber are the most important to take into account, ethical neutrality in the sense of withdrawal from politics altogether is not entirely possible, than ideally, as Weber recognize, but not even desirable.

The recent decades have led to the development of two analogous but isolated approaches in anthropology and sociology regarding ethical role that it must promote these disciplines. Burawoy (2011) in sociology and Borofsky (2011) in anthropology have argued for the need for public engagement of the two disciplines. Although the concept of engaged anthropology proposed by Ericksen (2006) is defined critically in relation to the so called public anthropology, it enroll in the same trend. The subdisciplines of applied sociology and anthropology have meant at least in part some kind of involvement in public affairs but their marginal positions made them invisible in the general debate about an engaged social science.

In anthropology, at least with the so-called postmodern reflexivity, the author-researcher seems to come out of the ivory tower of objectivity, now being emphasized with pedantry the political assumptions, the power relations and the actual process of writing of research material. This has given a new impetus to ethical approaches in anthropology, although in general the postmodern approach has made difficult a substantial involvement in producing social changes. So if the issue of ethical neutrality issue is not a topic in today anthropology, what I find disturbing is the direction of political (or apolitical) engagement present in the discipline.

I am attacking a bit reckless, but not alone from this direction, some fundamental assumptions held at this moment by medical anthropology, trying to introduce a leftist perspective (rather orthodox and not a post-modernist one) about the subject of power, different from what is discussed more recently. I'm trying to say that alternative medicine

has gained a good reputation in opposition to biomedicine because of perspective developed by postmodern trends. On the other hand some theoretical and methodological traditions which define the anthropology but which often also act as blinders for the discipline (culturalism and relativism) it help and synchronized well with postmodernism. I argued that this made the anthropology lose sight of the nature of power relations which defines alternative medicine in late capitalism. More so I claim that in the support gave to the alternative medicine, which is presented as a counterforce to biomedical hegemony, the anthropology risks to reproduce the inequalities produced by these unobserved and unanalyzed power relations. Finally, starting from the evidence collected from my fieldwork I will maintain that this theoretical reconfiguration of power could help the anthropology and medical anthropology, in particular, for a reengagement with the society and in special with those that more then others are the object of the exercise of power.

What in my opinion is problematic about the possibilities of political engagement of anthropology are the theoretical difficulties raised by some concepts that have become representative of the discipline, such as cultural relativism. If these concepts can lead to a poor understanding of the relationships of power, even when they are considered as a subject of interest, even more relevant for the theoretical, ethical and methodological difficulties found in anthropology is how the industry uses the anthropological knowledge to promote their interests. In this regard Oldani's next passage about the relationship between anthropology and the domain of sales in the pharmaceutical industry is highly relevant: «This conspicuous gap concerning American pharmaceutical rep-doctor interactions in the ethnographic literature should disturb the ethnographer, considering that although anthropologist have just begun to intensely study pharmaceutical sales (persons), the industry has not failed to study us (van der Geest et. al., 1996: 158). The consequences of this are quite ironic. By referring to anthropological studies that show how non-Western peoples cherish vitamins, blood tonics, antidiarrhea medicines, and hormonal preparations, the industry has been able to claim an “openness” to local variations in cultural concepts of health, illness, and medicine. In short, the anthropological perspective is congenial to market research” (Van der Geest, 1996: 158). From a biomedical and critical anthropological perspective, pharmaceuticals may seem overused, and certain drugs may seem dubious, useless, or even dangerous. Yet, thanks to the ethnographic work of anthropologist (and their emphasis on “pharmaceutical relativism), the industry can claim that it is only providing for all of humankind what people welcome as useful and effective medications for their own culturally specific treatments and “cures”. » (Oldani, 2004: 327)

Obviously theoretical positions that are constructed without an emic perspective seem almost blasphemous in much of today anthropology. To speak in the name of some people who doesn't recognize in part the described reality can be ethically and theoretically challenging, though etic account or a combination of both is common in anthropology. The medical cultures shared by these people can not be regarded as intrinsically related to them. Things may appear in a different light if you consider that the adherence to a kind of medical knowledge, whether it is CAM, folk knowledge or biomedicine is an expression of power relations not a given of class, gender or ethnicity and not necessary a weapon of resistance in group struggles. Moreover, rather than primarily expressing the emic perspective of those involved or looking at things from the perspective of a culture that meant to be expressed and possibly preserved (see the concept of medical pluralism), I find more to describe all the contradictions of reality (a task which is by no means alien to anthropology), all the

constraints and opportunities posed by the practices and discourses held by the subjects, with a more careful concern for their existence.

The appeal to rights, and especially to universal human rights, in the way in which health should be understood by social critics or considered by those who are directly involved in decision-making may seem problematic in anthropology. Although at the level of practices and opinions there was never a consensus among anthropologists, many of them being politically involved in different causes, the AAA official statement claimed non-involvement in universal rights issue, due to the embracing of the principle of relativity. Thus it was considered that taking a stand in this sense would mean normative imposition of so-called universal principles from an ethnocentric perspective on cultures that have developed their own morality and their own conception of these rights (Singer and Baer, 2007: 81-82). A recent statement of AAA (1999) changes the perspective on these things considering that the anthropologists have an ethical responsibility in supporting universal human rights. Although the old criticism on human rights issues, according to Singer and Baer, should be taken into account, the ethical neutrality is not a choice to make. A possibility is to consider the criticism and to try to fertilize it with anthropological theory. For most of anthropologists, and especially for medical anthropologists, the moral detachment shown by anthropologists in the face of suffering, as the authors say, means already to choose to make a moral choice. Furthermore, there is presently a shared belief that starting from a rigorous scientific basis can lead to a amelioration in human suffering. Some questions worth to be made: How was conceptualized the relationship between health human rights and the plurality of medical belief and practices in medical anthropology? Does this mean an acceptance of alternative medicine as a solution in achieving rights in health? The differences between different medical systems in relation to class, ethnicity and gender are perceived as culturally given? For anthropologists there is only the imperative to describe just fleeting cultural realities?

I affirm that from the theoretical and in general the material privileged position enjoyed by anthropologists is a duty for them to shed some light in the power relations in which the dispossessed and the deprived are involved, to make through the development of theory but also through different types of direct action a remedy to the structural violence which is reflected in individual suffering. Through its theoretical and methodological apparatus, the anthropology should to point out all the contradictions that are silenced through the theoretical framework of other disciplines or the traps of a universalistic approach that does not consider the embedded and encompassing way in which at least relatively the culture is lived. The idea of a cultural medical affinity in relation to class, ethnicity and gender I find it extremely problematic. No one doubts that some groups may have a predisposition of accepting some medical systems more than the others but the question is if the analysis should find an end here. What my fieldwork observations bring out at the surface is on the one hand a fetishization of culture, a concept that in anthropology sometimes gets unjustified theoretical proportions (what I say is that the culture is offer as the ultimate cause which is not always the case) but also a relativism that makes from the concept of medical pluralism a liberal concept that seems to leave no room for the effects of power relations.

As a conclusion the postmodern period it meant a surge of engagement of social sciences in the public life through the embracing of a new ethics, especially in relation with "the other". Unfortunately the underpinnings of postmodernism make that the struggles in the name of ethics to be at least peripheral to the territory in which the

capitalism is effective in producing injustice, if not futile or utterly dangerous and reactionary in their scope

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Borofsky, Robert (2011), *Why a Public Anthropology?* Kindle Edition, Center for a Public Anthropology;
- Burawoy, Michael (2011), "The Public Sociology Wars" in Vincent Jeffries (ed.) *Handbook of Public Sociology*, New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers;
- Comaroff, Jean; John L. Comaroff (2001), "Millennial Capitalism: First Thought on a Second Coming" in Jean Comaroff; John L. Comaroff (eds.), *Millennial Capitalism and the Culture of Neoliberalism*, Duhan, Duke University Press;
- Oldani, Michael J. (2004), "Thick prescriptions: toward an interpretation of pharmaceutical sales practices" in *Medical Anthropological Quarterly*, vol. 18, nr. 3;
- Ericksen, Thomas Hylland (2006), *Engaging Anthropology: The Case for a Public Presence*, Oxford: Berg;
- Lambek, Michael; Strathern, Andrew (1998), "Introduction: Embodying sociality: Africanist-Melanesianist comparisons" in *Bodies and persons*, New York: Cambridge University Press;
- Lock, Margaret; Nyugen, Vink-Kim (2010), *An Anthropology of Biomedicine*, Chichester, Wiley-Blackwell;
- Singer, Merrill; Baer, Hans (2007). *Introducing Medical Anthropology*, Lanham, AltaMira Press;
- Weber, Max (1949), *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, Glencoe: The Free Press.

COALITION BUILDING INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE ROMANIAN WOMEN'S RIGHTS SCENE

*Ioana VLAD**

Abstract. *In the present paper I aim at investigating the factors that favor or impede coalition work between women's rights organizations and groups in Romania. By looking at the most enduring and salient coalitions within and across the field, The Coalition against Domestic Violence and the Antidiscrimination Coalition, I find that funding specifically directed to coalition work, and external threats in the form of unfavorable policy changes or of growing countermovement activity are the most conducive to collaboration. However, repeated punctual cooperation between women's rights groups and their allies helps build in the long run a sense of community and of being part of the same struggle.*

Keywords: *women's movement, social movement family, post-communism, cooperation*

1. Introduction

Social movement research points to the fact that social movements “can be understood only in *relational* terms” (Rucht, 2006: 197), meaning on one hand that one of the core features of social change groups is their embedment in “networks of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups, or associations” (Diani and Bison, 2004: 282). On the other hand, social change groups are moulded not only through the interaction with groups that share their beliefs and goals, but also by the ones that oppose them. These two sets of actors make up the alliance and the conflict systems in which social movements operate (Della Porta and Rucht, 1995; Klandermans, 1997; Rucht, 2006). While these two systems comprise a variety of actors, from other organizations to political parties, trade unions, and inside allies in the governing body, social change organizations are foremost embedded in a multi-organizational field, which is „the total possible number of organizations with which the focal organization might establish specific linkages” (Curtis and Zurcher, 1973: 53). The existence of individual organizations in this multi-organizational field has been studied using different conceptual delimitations, corresponding to different levels of analysis, and pointing to different types of relations between organizations. The first to focus on organizations as building blocks of social movements, Zald and McCarthy (1977, 1979, 1987) differentiate between a social movement industry (SMI), comprising all SMOs „with relatively similar goals” and a social movement sector (corresponding to Curtis and Zucher's multi-organizational fields), „consisting of all SMIs in a society, no matter to which SM they are attached” (1979: 2). Della Porta and Rucht, studying left-libertarian movements in Italy and West Germany, introduced the concept of social movement family, defined as a „set of

* PhD student, National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Faculty of Communication and Public Relations, Bucharest, Romania, e-mail: ioanaa_vld@yahoo.com. Beneficiary of the “Doctoral Scholarships for a Sustainable Society” project, project co-financed by the European Union through the European Social Fund, Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources Development 2007-2013.

coexisting movements that, regardless of their specific goals, have similar basic values and organizational overlaps, and sometimes may even enjoin for common campaigns”, a more specific understanding of the organizational field than the one provided by SMIs and SMSs (114). The relations within these broader or narrower fields of organizations vary from cooperation, to competition, and sometimes conflict, whose understanding helps question the idea according to which social movements are unified entities (Rucht, 2006).

In the present paper I aim at investigating the factors that stimulate or impede cooperation and coalition work between organizations addressing women’s rights issues in Romania. The article is based on a research on women’s rights organizations (thereof WRO), defined in a broader sense that includes feminist groups and NGOs¹, but also pro-women NGOs developing such specific programs. The interviews with women’s rights activists and the documents collected point at two types of factors as salient in stemming joint projects: the existence of external funding directed at coalition work and external threats that determine a reactive mobilization, both succeeding in pulling together organizational efforts. Other factors that facilitate cooperation are shared ideology, but also, in some cases, scarce resources, reflecting the disagreement in the literature on whether scarce or plentiful resources are conducive to coalition work (McCammon and Campbell, 2002). Among the factors that impede joint work, one can differentiate between aspects that are conducive to coalition disband and aspects that make activists and organizations skeptical towards joining coalitions in the first place. While organizational financial difficulties are identified by the interviewees as factors in both dissolving or preventing coalitions, ego issues and perception over an unequal and unjust coalition structure are named as examples for the first type of aspects. As for the second set of factors, previous inter-personal conflict, personal time availability, and different priorities stemming from different individual backgrounds and concerns were some of the reasons for not joining coalition work.

2. Previous assessments of cooperation (or lack of) between WRO

The existing literature dealing with the emergence of civil society after the fall of communism formulates several strands of criticism in what concerns cooperation between civil society organizations. Some authors paint a general picture from which we can derive implications on organizational collaboration. Carothens for instance, discussing U.S. funded democracy assistance programs in Romania, states that the Americans involved in developing civil society often equate it with advocacy organizations. According to him, this approach is based on the assumption that advocacy NGOs, and not social movements or service providers are the “core of civil society”. In turn, this derives from the “belief in the central importance of legislative advocacy as a tool of socio-political change” (Carothens, 1996: 72-73). In a similar endeavour of analysing the effects of foreign funding on post-communist civil societies, McMahan points to the fact that international funders’ target of “small groups of elites who they believed would become future leaders of the women’s movement” did not eventually paid off, as “no discernible women’s movements exist in any of the countries studied” (McMahan, 2002: 50, 53). Additionally, Sloat, in a comparative study on women’s activism in the region and Jacobsson, in an

¹Following the criticism brought by researchers studying women’s movements (Buechler, 1990: 1993; Staggenborg and Taylor, 2005) towards the exclusive focus of resource mobilization approach on formalized entities, I use the term organization to include a variety of groups working on gender inequality, ranging from formalized entities (associations, foundations) to informal collectives.

article on animal rights movement in Poland, conclude that fragmentation is a core feature of social change activism in the scenes under research. Reports from Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania point to women's NGO sector as characterized by "'lone fighters', competitive rivalry, mutual bickering and criticism, lack of communication and cooperation, and the tendency to define themselves in opposition to one another" (Sloat, 2005: 444). Jacobsson explains fragmentation in the Polish case through "the lack of trust in unknown others" and through an "individual approach to activism" as manifestations of the communist legacy, as well as a consequence of NGOs' focus on mobilizing economic resources and public support (Jacobsson, 2012: 364-366). In turn, all these get animal rights organizations in competition and determine the establishment of new organizations out of poorly handled inter-personal conflicts, contributing to an even more fragmented movement (see also Jacobsson, 2013). All these accounts paint an unfavorable picture of social change activism in post-communist countries, as focused on foreign funders, lacking a local social base, and making up a bubble of dispersed, unconnected and sometimes competing and conflicting organizations.

For the Romanian case, Grunberg (2000, 2008) in particular, but also Miroiu (2004 a,b) and Miroiu and Popescu (2004) wrote on the disappointments of the lack of a strong and socially connected women's movement. Their concern over the lack of a bottom-up organizing as fundamental for the issue of whether we can talk about a Romanian women's movement mirrors a more general concern present in the post-communist European space over the lack of social movements (conceptualized via western experiences) (see Nyklova, 2013). Talking about the emergence of a professionalized women's NGO sector Grunberg states that it is characterized by small organizations dominated by middle-aged, educated women as paid staff. She decries their lack of dialogue with the flesh and blood women whom they are supposed to represent and takes it as the consequence of both a recast of women in the now low influence civil society sector and of the financial dependency on the foreign grants that make up the primary source of funding (Grunberg, 2000; also Gal and Kligman, 2003: 130).

Moreover, when assessing the state of women's organizations in Romania, she further differentiates between committed feminist activists, voluntarily engaged in social change activities, and what she calls *mercenary-activists* i.e. the ones getting paid for their civic activity, such as the ones working in the newly founded organizations that sprung from and were financially supported by Open Society Foundation (Grunberg 2008, 43). This division suggests a difference of perspective concerning ways of organizing and of exerting public influence, which eventually translates into actual cooperation or lack of. As an example of the consequences of this divide, Mihaela Miroiu recalls a moment when she proposed the Coalition for Equal Opportunities² to elaborate and address the Government a common agenda of the coalition, touching on the gendered division of labour within the public sector, and on the wage gap that derives from that (the feminized fields such as the educational and the medical system have much smaller budgets than the male dominated military sector). The reported reaction of the women's organizations involved was the following: "No! What you propose sounds feminist and we are afraid of being labelled as such. It sounds like a call for war and women are peace lovers. And it

²The Coalition was founded in 2005 at the initiative of Partnership for Equality Centre (one of the organizational children of OSF), and aimed at helping build capacity and coordination among the women's organizations.

also sounds like a political claim and we are NGOs, thus apolitical organizations!” (Miroiu in Grunberg, Vacarescu, Borza, 2006: 57).

Secondly, the perceived divisions between *spare time* activists and paid professionals, and between feminists and non-feminists add up to a more general phenomenon identified by Grunberg, that of women’s NGOs’ marginalization within the public and civil society sphere. Talking about the third NGO Forum that took place in 1996 and that gathered local NGOs, financial organizations, Government and Parliamentary officials, Grunberg states that, although “women’s NGOs were better represented than at the previous meetings, “when analysing the participant lists, the conference themes, and the resolutions adopted at all three fora, one cannot fail to conclude that women’s NGOs and women’s issues were marginalized and ignored – again, despite the fact that women constitute more than half of both the Romanian population and the country’s active NGO membership” (Grunberg, 2000: 329). Additionally, the mentioned author exemplifies the lack of concern of civil society with women’s issues through a shallow gender mainstreaming operated by other organizations. Thus, women’s agenda is taken to be exclusively relegated to women’s organizations, in a context in which “everybody talks and acts in their own language, in their own well fenced yard” (Grunberg, 2008: 45).

Similarly, the „Black Book of Equal Opportunities between Men and Women” that appeared in 2006 and aimed at providing a critical overview on the specific institutional field in Romania, pointed to the poor cooperation between women’s rights groups, as exemplified by: „the absence of sustained campaigns of continuous and constant promotion of women’s rights and of the equal opportunities principle (which could be called lobby in this field!); collaboration is often only „on paper” or „on the internet”, without its materialization in direct actions, protest and rights reclaiming actions; the power relations inside these attempted coalitions often make the activities inefficient (some NGO tries to take over the image capital of the network/coalition and use it in its own interest, not for the cause); information on the activity of these networks, coalitions etc. is brief” (Grunberg, Vacarescu, Borza, 2006: 54).

These pessimistic assessments should be however nuanced by taking a closer look at whatever stems or impedes cooperation between women’s rights organizations and between them and the larger field of organizations with similar basic principles, or what della Porta and Rucht called the social movement family. This is even more necessary giving the fact that more recent (quantitative) inquiries into the characteristics of the Romanian civil society sector revealed that 81% of the NGOs concerned with influencing the decision making process address themselves to other similar organizations every time or most of the times they want to advocate for a certain change or public policy (FDSC, 2011: 28). Thus, even if most of the times WRO are absorbed into their own individual projects and into their own survival struggles, cooperation between them does exist, and takes one of the following forms: partnerships in different advocacy endeavours or other types of projects targeting various layers of gender inequality, and broad coalitions organized in the face of threat.

3. On the exceptionality of cooperation

Diani (2011, 2013 forthcoming) suggests that we can distinguish between “different modes of coordination of collective action”, depending on the boundaries placed by the actors and the level of resource exchange between them: in the *organizational mode*, the boundaries of the collective actor are the ones of the

organization and there is no inter-organizational resource exchange; in *the coalitional mode* there is systematic, but instrumental resource exchange within networks, without the transfer of loyalties and commitments from particular organizations to the network; *the social movement mode* is the one that meets both criteria, in that “dense resource exchanges occur between organizations that also feel part of a broader, longer term political project”; in *the subcultural mode*, there is a shared sense of community between groups, but without the exchange of resources (Diani, 2011: 2). Still, the author repeatedly noted the dynamic character of social change-oriented networks, in which the strengthening of a coalition may lead to the development of more profound, identity links between the organizations involved in multiple campaigns and common events (Diani, 2010, 2011).

Although the analytical distinction proposed by Diani assumes social movement mode as the most sophisticated form of cooperation between organizations, literature on coalition building processes in various fields rather points to the exceptionality of joint efforts, even in the case of phenomena that undisputedly have been called social movements (women's, environmental, peace movements) (Staggenborg, 1986; Shaffer, 2000; McCammon and Campbell, 2002; Roth, 2010; Borland, 2010). What are the factors that spark or inhibit coalition building? Researchers in the field considered the importance of two types of factors that influence the development of coalitions: environmental and organizational aspects. Of the external conditions that increase the likelihood of cooperation, we can further distinguish between opportunities, such as the existence of inside allies or a conflict among elites (usually before elections) and threats, such as the imminence of the passing of harmful legislation or the growing activity of counter-movements (McCammon and Campbell, 2002; Roth, 2010; Borland, 2010). Of the organizational aspects that foster coalition work, researchers have pointed to the importance of similar ideologies and goals, the availability of resources, the existence of well-connected leaders (bridge builders across different groups) and of previous ties between organizations. (Shaffer, 2000; McCammon and Campbell, 2002; Roth, 2010; Borland, 2010).

Additionally to this western centred literature, recent research on the social change groups and networks that emerged in the European post-communist space points to foreign assistance directed at civil society organizing as being part of the opportunity structure (see Irvine 2007, 2012 for women's rights groups; Jacobsson 2013 and Cisar 2010 on animal rights and environmental movement in Poland and Czech Republic). The mentioned authors note that foreign funds invested as part of democracy assistance programs were beneficial on one hand for encouraging coalition work between organizations (Irvine, 2012) and on the other hand for helping develop a progressive civil society agenda that otherwise would have not been supported by a conservative constituency (Cisar, 2010).

Other strands of research on women's movement in the area point to the process of EU accession and to Europeanization as opening up new opportunity windows, consisting in changes in the “resource access and organizational structure of the groups, the national context they operate in, and opportunities to mobilize at the international level” (Cisar and Vráblíková, 2010: 209). Touching also on the financial opportunities opened by European money, the authors come in line with the above-mentioned work on foreign assistance as beneficial. Still, as Roth finds out by interviewing experts and activists in six post-communist countries, one should also take into account the effects that EU funding has on NGOs of different size and strength. She points to the fact that small

NGOs with scarce resources were especially affected by post-accession EU funding, due to certain conditions, such as having matching funds, or having to provide complementary funding (Roth, 2007: 437).

4. Opportunities and Threats as Catalysts for Cooperation

Returning to the types of collaboration between Romanian women's rights organizations, and keeping in mind the fluid character of joint projects, be it the financed ones targeting different aspects of gender inequality, or the reactive ones towards public statements or policies, we can note that groups cooperate based on previous recognition and relations between them (Shaffer, 2000; Borland, 2010). In turn, actual cooperation serves to strengthen these previously existing ties, as it happened in the street protests and petitioning that repeatedly activated in the last couple of years a broad coalition of women's and human rights groups across the country. Even in the case of punctual collaborations, one should not overlook the importance they have on building either long-term personal and organizational relations or on creating temporary and fluid spaces that bring together groups and activists. These spaces do not always function on permanent maintenance, but they can be conjecturally abandoned or revitalized, although in an instrumental fashion that resembles the coalitional mode of organizing described by Diani.

In the following pages I will try to discuss the factors that stemmed cooperation between organizations, by examining the emergence, development and actions of several distinct, but partially overlapping coalitions, the one formed on domestic violence issues, and the other one on antidiscrimination. In doing so, I will point to the environmental and organizational aspects that favoured the collaboration, based on interviews with people involved in these endeavours, and on organizational and public documents.

The Coalition of Organizations against Domestic Violence (VIF) formed as an informal structure in 2003 with the support of John Snow Research and Training Institute and gathered 32 organizations in an effort to prevent, fight and monitor violence against women through awareness raising campaigns and advocacy actions aiming at improving the recently adopted law on domestic violence, which failed to include actual protective mechanisms for victims. The coalition comprised a variety of organizations, from feminist and human rights to family groups, from advocacy to charity and service providing ones. As indicated by some of the activists involved, VIF coalition responded to the individual needs of the organizations working on domestic violence issues, namely the need for effective legislation that would protect the victims of abuse. However, the granting of funds specifically for working together actually sparked the coalition building process, as I will shortly argue (see the VIF Report, 2004 and JSI Report, 2007).

In the period of 2001-2002 two draft laws on domestic violence entered the Parliament, through the parallel efforts of two different organizations, who secured the support of two MPs, Ovidiu Branzan and Mona Musca. In 2001, another 2 senators (Simona Marinescu and Petre Roman) had introduced in the parliamentary process a draft law on domestic violence³. According to the reports of different NGO professionals involved in the process, the MPs and the organizations that later on mobilized other concerned NGOs worked together and agreed on a version that would comprise parts of all three proposals, including the restriction order against the domestic abuser. However, the draft law was voided of its effectiveness when the Parliamentary Juridical Commission decided against the restriction order amendment. As one of the professionals recalls:

³<http://www.cdep.ro/comisii/juridica/pdf/2003/rp154.pdf>

The juridical commission was formed at that time exclusively of men and not only that they were men, but they were also very conservative men. We participated at several meetings in the juridical commission, when the law was being discussed; there were also some ex-militaries or policemen in the commission, and they unanimously voted that the protection and the restriction order be removed from the draft law, and I quote: "because what would the poor aggressor do?" (interview L.A.).

After the passing of a compromise version of the law, the organizations active in the field gathered for a general meeting in 2003 in Sinaia, at the initiative of Partnership for Equality Center (the NGO that emerged in 2002, after Soros Open Network was established, from the gender equality program of Soros Foundation) and John Snow Institute. They decided to form a coalition that would elaborate and press for a revised form of the domestic violence law, that would monitor the implementation of the recently adopted law and, last but not least, that would help build capacity for and strengthen the network of the organizations involved.

However, individual organizations started to experience the growing scarcity in available funds, and some of the groups involved in the VIF coalition gradually became inactive.

Although the organizations joint efforts in awareness raising campaigns, drafted monitoring reports and succeeded in elaborating an improved version of the domestic violence law, they eventually pushed individually, through their own conjectural political connections, for the passing of the law they had put together. Finally, in 2007, the law version prepared in the past years by the coalition was introduced in the parliamentary process through the president of the Equal Opportunities Commission in the Deputy Chamber, Minodora Cliveti, an already active and responsive ally of women's rights organizations.⁴ She managed to pull the support of another 36 MPs who undersigned the initiative, but as the parliamentary elections took place in 2008, the draft law was blocked in between commissions, only to be rejected by the new members of the Commission of Equal Opportunity, and finally rejected in the Deputy Chamber debate in 2009. As the political elite recalibrated following elections and as a new government was put into place, the organizations had to renew their efforts:

There already was a new Parliament and a new Government, [...] and they (the Government) said: "we don't agree with this version, we'll come with a different project". This was in 2009. [...] and then it was a different strategy – the draft laws were reintroduced, the process was restarted and this way three proposals entered; two of them, and even the third, all of them were similar, because it was the same concept (interview V.M.).

In 2010, once more, three law proposals were introduced in the Parliament, and the initiators were connected to different organizations that were previously engaged in the VIF coalition. Some organizations kept a closer contact with the liberal initiators of one the proposals, others with the democrat-liberals that advanced another draft law, which helps explain the different versions of the process offered by interviewees from different associations. However, as the quote above suggests, both proposals were based on the same document elaborated in 2004 by the coalition.

⁴For the process the draft law underwent, see: <http://www.cdep.ro/proiecte/2008/300/80/8/in1239.pdf>; http://www.cdep.ro/pls/proiecte/upl_pck.proiect?cam=2&idp=9039, accessed on 1st of July 2013.

In parallel with these uncoordinated attempts to influence the decision making process, as November 2011 was approaching, feminist activists in Bucharest started to plan a protest in front of the House of Parliament, to sanction the lingering of the new law against domestic violence and to hasten its adoption. Filia and Front associations, along with the Roma rights association Impreuna (Together) Agency (pulled into the initiative by a Roma feminist connected to women's organizations), sent a call for joint organizing to all the concerned women's, Roma, LGBT, and human rights groups, including the ones involved in the VIF coalition. The call to protest on the 25th of November comprised short and clear propositions, illustrating a recently adopted confrontational stand against state's opacity to civil society demands: *We are sick of silence! We are sick that violence is considered a personal and private matter. It is a political matter. We are sick of the politicians that are the accomplices of the aggressors, not the representatives of the victims. [...] We want protection order. We want the aggressor to be evicted from the house*⁵.

Shortly after the protest, and building on the previously discussed advocacy efforts, the version of the draft law advanced by the democrat-liberal deputies (whose party formed the government) passed the final commissions and was registered for debate in the Deputy Chamber, which took place after the winter holiday and was adopted and promulgated in March 2012, as Law 25/2012.

After the adoption, women's rights organizations got together in a coordinated advocacy effort of monitoring and pressing for the implementation of the new law. Once more, joint work was sparked by an advocacy project obtained from the Open Society Institute Budapest, which previously granted some money to two of the organizations involved in the advocacy actions in 2010 and 2011, GRADO (Romanian Group for the Defence of Human Rights) and Transcena⁶. This time, the groups involved were more⁷, based on their previous collaboration in the protest action, and in the process of elaborating the National Strategy in the field of family violence prevention and control.

What I tried to illustrate through the previous account was the intermingling of the organizational and environmental factors that influence coalition-building processes. As one can note, sympathetic inside allies proved fundamental in the advocacy endeavours, although in this case a male dominated parliament and the elite conflict set by the general elections reduced the success of the alliance between organizations and MPs. As one of the persons involved in VIF argued:

What is important and this is what we always told the journalists and people that enter our equal opportunities programs, if the Romanian Parliament would have had 50% women, literally, my opinion is that this project would have passed then, in 2003 (Interview V.M.).

In what concerns the organizational factors, the granting of funds such as those from JSI, USAID or Open Society Institute, provided a kick for joint advocacy projects, that otherwise would have been difficult to sustain, giving the financial struggles of

⁵ STOP Violence against Women Protest. Manifesto, <https://www.facebook.com/events/215471235189101/?ref=ts>, accessed on 1st of July 2013.

⁶Transcena Association. Advocacy Campaign for changing the law on the prevention and control of family violence, <http://blog.transcena.ro/index.php/campanie-de-advocacy-pentru-modificarea-legii-privind-prevenirea-si-combaterea-violentei-in-familie/>, accessed on 1st of July 2013

⁷Transcena Association. Press release: The first national study regarding the implementation of the protection order, 8th of March 2013 <http://blog.transcena.ro/index.php/comunicat-de-presalansarea-primului-studiu-la-nivel-national/#more-550>, accessed on 1st of July 2013

individual organizations. Moreover, the links created through this initially mediated communication were activated and mobilized in different situations that required rapid reaction.

The second coalition I will discuss is the Antidiscrimination coalition, formed in the beginning of 2000, with the purpose of pressing and monitoring the improvement of anti-discrimination legislation. From the beginning of 2000, when Romania entered the European Union's accession procedures, the government started to transpose the European directives concerning antidiscrimination and equal opportunities. The first such measure was Ordinance 137/2000, which set the legal definitions of what constitutes discriminatory practices and their sanctioning and created the premises for the establishment of the National Council against Discrimination, which was settled on paper through the Governmental Decision 1194/2001, but was de facto created in 2002. Ordinance 137 suffered several modifications in the following years, namely in 2002 (Law 48), in 2004 and 2006, each aiming to make the law as comprehensive and as effective as possible. Comparing to the 2000 ordinance, its subsequent versions added more criteria on what constitutes discrimination, and introduced additional coverage on harassment and victimization as behaviours circumscribed to the same phenomenon.

The organizations gathered in the antidiscrimination coalition came from different fields of expertise, such as LGBT, Roma, women's, human, and HIV affected persons' rights, and carefully monitored the parliamentary process on this type of legislation. As it appears from their organizational reports⁸ and interviews (with two members of two of the NGOs involved), they paid particular attention to the independence and functionality of the National Council Against Discrimination, the public body responsible with monitoring and sanctioning such cases. Through the pressures of the coalition, the revised law of 2006 contributed to depoliticizing the Council, by modifying the procedure for appointing its members, who would no longer be designated by the prime-minister, but through the joint meeting of the two parliamentary chambers; also, the new law introduced an additional selection criteria for the president of the Council, that of previous activity in the human rights field, and it required the establishment of internal procedures for handling the cases.

The reason for which such institution was considered by the organizations in the field, including women's rights NGOs, as having paramount importance was its status of legal, political and social lever. Through the work of the coalition and the Council, legal precedents were created in what concerns discrimination on the basis of gender, sexual orientation, race and religion. It was also used by organizations to expose and sanction discriminatory statements made by politicians and other public figures. The high stake placed on the Council's effectiveness was further augmented, in the case of women's rights organizations, by their lack of communication and cooperation with the gender equality body created in 2005 (through the Ordinance 84/2004, and dissolved in 2010 through the Ordinance 68), the National Agency for Equal Opportunities between Women and Men (ANES). Talking about the frustration of such poor collaboration, one activist notes:

ANES just wanted to check a meeting with the NGOs, in order to show that such consultation existed, but afterwards, if you tried to monitor to what extent the feedback you gave, written feedback, for instance comments, observations on a document... if you

⁸ Public position of the Antidiscrimination Coalition, *Appeal to the un-politicization of CNCD*, 17.01.2012, <http://www.ecpi.ro/apel-la-nepolitizarea-cncd/>, accessed on 1st of July 2013

looked at the extent to which your comments and observations were integrated into that document, you could see that they weren't (interview O.B.).

Thus, although it first started its activity through the intervention opportunity created by the EU accession process, the coalition became an important resource to be activated in front of threat, and functioned mostly on a reactive basis. This was the case of the announced draft law to introduce the crisis pregnancy counselling offices, which would have obliged women to undergo biased counselling sessions before having an abortion, and which created a general alert in the field of human rights organizations. The law proposal was first mentioned at a conference organized in March 2012 by the Christian Democrat Foundation and the Women's Organization of the Democrat-Liberal Party, and joined by renowned anti-choice organizations, such as ProVita and The Families' Alliance. Between its announcement in March and its rejection in Parliament in September the same year, a broad coalition of formal organizations and informal groups, launched a massive reproductive rights campaign against the law that would have limited women's right to abortion. Called the Reproductive Rights Coalition, it built on existing organizational bridges, and mostly on the composition of the Antidiscrimination Coalition⁹. It developed an online campaign, through blogs and websites arguing against such a proposal and exposing the connections between politicians, anti-choice organizations and extreme right organizations¹⁰. Moreover, international and foreign connections were mobilized in support of the local efforts, such as the Centre of Reproductive Rights in New York, ASTRA Network for reproductive rights, International Planned Parenthood Federation, and other 26 national organizations from different countries¹¹.

Although the groups and organizations in the women's rights field and its allies reacted in the face of the threat posed by such a law, to understand the success of the mobilization, we also have to look at personal and organizational factors. As Shaffer notes under the influence of incentive theory, organizations join networks when this is the way they can secure benefits that otherwise would be unattainable. Even though this process is not necessarily rationalized as such, coalitions do help compensate a lack of skills or expertise and bring the benefits of an information sharing space (Shaffer, 2000: 113). The

⁹I compared the composition of the Reproductive Rights Coalition, as revealed by the list of organizations constantly co-signing petitions and position takings regarding reproductive rights issues and the composition of the Antidiscrimination Coalition (I corroborated the list appearing on their website www.antidiscriminare.ro, with information from interviews). Seven organizations are members of both informal coalitions, supporting each other in their public position takings: two feminist organizations, Partenership for Equality Center and Filia Center, one Roma rights organization, Romani Criss, one reproductive rights organization, Euroregional Center for Public Initiatives, and three human rights organizations, Center for Legal Resources, Apador-CH and Pro Europe League.

¹⁰AntiProVita anonymous website <http://antiprovita.wordpress.com/2013/03/16/misiune-si-scurt-istoric-pro-vita/>, accessed on 1st of July 2013; Medusa's Blog, "Baconschi and the abortion problem". <http://blogul-medusei.blogspot.ro/2012/03/baconschi-si-tema-avortului.html>, 15th of May 2012, accessed on 1st of July 2013; CriticAtac. Neo-"Decreteii" Theme, <http://www.criticatac.ro/15486/15486/>, accessed on 1st of July 2013.

¹¹Euroregional, "Centre for Public Initiatives. International NGOs concerned about the law regarding the crisis pregnancy counselling offices write to Prime Minister Victor Ponta", <http://www.ecpi.ro/ong-uri-internationale-ingrijorate-de-proiectul-de-lege-privind-consilierea-obligatorie-pentru-criza-de-sarcina-ii-scriu-lui-victor-ponta/>, 21st of May 2012, accessed on 1st of July 2013

interviews conducted with activists point to the complementarity of expertise and profile as important determinants of cooperation. This was an essential aspect of the mobilization situation described above, due to the acknowledged lack of legal expertise in the women's rights organizations. Thus, when one member of a human rights organization started to build legal expertise by participating in trainings on reproductive rights outside the country, that person became an important resource for the movement community. Her importance consisted on one hand in the know-how she accumulated and on the other hand in the connections she established with international and foreign organizations and networks, ready to be activated when needed, as was the case presented above.

The campaign against the law aiming at limiting the access to abortion opens another discussion on the interrelated yet different types of threats against which women's rights groups react and organize. The case presented above specifically refers to a legislative proposal, albeit the result of strong relations between conservative governing parties and anti-choice non-governmental organizations.

Still, we should look separately at women's groups organizing as a reaction to a growing countermovement attacking women's reproductive rights. In 2005 ProVita (prolife) is established and progressively becomes one of the most vocal organizations aiming at limiting the right to abortion, by promoting every individual's right to life, "from conception to natural death"¹². Its tactics of influence include close connections with other pro-family, ultra-orthodox and even far right organizations, but most importantly with politicians and officials from local and central public administration (for a similar account on the influence tactics of conservative organizations in Hungary and Czech Republic, see Saxonberg 2013). Through these they managed to secure a partnership with the County School Inspectorate and to introduce a sexual education campaign in schools, aiming at "forming a responsible perspective on sexual relations"¹³. Women's rights activists expressed their concern regarding these courses, especially as some of them participated to such classes and shared some of the anecdotes used by provita collaborators in schools. One of them reported:

Some of us had the great opportunity – said between inverted commas and with maximum sarcasm, to participate to the sexual education classes coordinated by provita, which comes in a highschool and says that contraceptive methods don't work and that they are unacceptable for a Christian. [...] And for instance one thing that one of us remembered from such a meeting was how provita told the children – it was mostly directed to boys, but it also addressed to girls – that if a girl has more sexual partners, she is like a used toothbrush and they asked the boys in the classroom whether they would use an already used toothbrush - that this is a girl that has promiscuous relationships. [...] And it is very clear that this is about an extremely misogynistic and oppressive attitude towards women, the idea that women should have a certain place in society, which they have to keep (interview R.C.).

From 2011 on, the prolife movement started to annually organize the March for Life, which raised some tactical dilemmas for women's groups and pro-choice organizational community - whether to organize a counter march or to keep quiet in order not to attract even more public attention which could benefit the seemingly Christian and

¹²Pro Vita Manifesto, <http://provitabucuresti.ro/ce-inseamna-provita/manifestul-pro-vita>, accessed on 3rd of July 2013

¹³ Pro Vita Bucharest website. The educational program "Vreausaafllu!"(I want to find out) <http://provitabucuresti.ro/activitati/educare-informare/vreau-sa-aflu>, accessed on 3rd of July 2013

humanitarian discourse of the counter-movement. However, from 2009¹⁴ several joint initiatives started to emerge dealing both with attempted legal changes and discursive attacks against reproductive rights. These initiatives were rather reactive and fragmented, but occasioned the building of a loose network, ready to be activated in case of danger.

In 2011 *fățfrumosșicândvreaueu*¹⁵ emerged, an informal group gathering persons from different activist spheres, from formalized and informal groups, feminist, women's rights and human rights organizations, aiming at unmasking and countering the anti-choice agenda of provita movement, and whose plea closed with "Enough of us died under Ceausescu (regime)! Abortion stays legal!"¹⁶. Although functioning mostly as an online platform used for sharing relevant information, it actually generated several ramifications, in terms of anonymous blogs and websites aimed at countering the provita online web¹⁷, as it also helped establish connections between informal and formalized groups interested in the issue (for example between members of the informal non-hierarchical collective Alternative Library and professionalized organizations such as ECPI or Accept).

As mentioned in the beginning of the section, and as I tried to show, networks organized around women's rights issues are dynamic and have the potential to help develop further collaborations and joint initiatives based on previous ones. They are characterized by individual and organizational overlaps that actually help confine the social movement family that gets mobilized whenever there is a threat to fight or an opportunity to intervene in the decision making process.

Although the focus of the paper was on the evolution of two of the most longstanding coalitions, the one on violence against women and the one on anti-discrimination, I will provide one last example of the way in which resources and

¹⁴In 2009 a large coalition composed of 22 organizations formed to oppose the adoption of four new law codes: criminal, civil, civil procedure and criminal procedure codes. The coalition opposed the codes altogether due to the lack of proper public consultation on the part of the decision makers. Among the changes introduced in the announced criminal code, there was also the criminalization of therapeutic abortion, if the abortion were performed after the 24th week of pregnancy. EuroregionalCenter for Public Initiatives (ECPI), a reproductive rights organization formed only a year earlier, in 2008, was not part of the "Stop the Codes" coalition and opted for an intervention that would minimize the negative effects of the code, rather than for a maximal strategy of boycotting the codes altogether. Along with another sexual and reproductive rights organization, SECS, and with a feminist organization, AnA, ECPI managed to exert pressure on the parliamentary commission that proposed this amendment, through inside political allies (experts and counselling staff) and mass media allies. See ECPI website, *The right to abortion remains unharmed in the new Romanian Criminal Code*, 18.01.2010, <http://www.ecpi.ro/dreptul-la-avort-rãmãne-intact-si-in-noul-cod-penal-al-romaniei/> and Oana Botezatu and Geta Roman, *Abortion according to Ponta Commission*, in *Evenimentul Zilei*, 7.05.2009, <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/avortul-dupa-comisia-ponta-850077.html>.

¹⁵The message enclosed in the name would be "I give birth when I want", but it is difficult to provide a literal translation, due to the fact that the name is pun, in which *făț* is the first person conjugation of the verb *a fãta*, which is used for referring to animals giving birth, but it is also an older synonym of the word *child*. Additionally, *făț frumos* (literally, *beautiful child*) is the Romanian fairytale version of *prince charming*.

¹⁶Facebook community page of *fățfrumosșicândvreaueu*, <https://www.facebook.com/pages/Fat-Frumos-Si-Cand-Vreau-Eu/138075942928300?id=138075942928300&sk=info>

¹⁷Antiprovita anonymous blog, <http://antiprovita.wordpress.com>, *Prolifexine*, No.1, June 2012, produced as part of the exhibition *Behind the Scene*, of Projects Saloon, supported by the National Museum of Contemporary Art, <http://www.salonuldeproiecte.ro/texts/ProLife.pdf>

ideology contributed to shaping a close relation between groups. In 2011, when Slutwalk demonstrations had already spread across the world, one recently emerged feminist group advanced the idea of organizing a similar manifestation in Bucharest. The group's members spread the call on different online networks functioning at that time, in order to gather as many women as possible to work together. However, a permanent problem of the group was the lack of a meeting space, which disturbingly pushed the women involved to always meet in bars or in some small apartment. One of the members previously had the occasion to meet some feminists involved in a self-managed initiative, a space born in 2010 out of the same frustration over having to meet, discuss and organize in pubs and coffee shops. The ones with the self managed space offered to host the organizing meetings for Slutwalk, occasion on which the two groups got to know each other and realized they had similar concerns and perspectives, mainly regarding their anti-capitalist position. Thus, after Slutwalk, the two continued to meet and work together, and the relations between them became even closer during a European feminist summer camp they organized and handled in 2012. The tensions that emerged between the Romanian feminists and some of the foreign feminists who always complained about the poor conditions and lack of food in the supposedly self-managed camp, helped build even stronger relations between the two groups. Based on the intersections and common interests of the two, in 2012 a new group emerged, aiming at performing anonymous feminist interventions in the public space.

5. Factors impeding coalition building

Not surprisingly, the reverse of the conditions that lead to coalition building is expected to impede this process. Most importantly, the interviews with women's rights activists pointed to the resource issue as being one that determines both the disband or the inactivity of coalitions and the resistance towards joining one. As one of the persons involved in the Reproductive Rights Coalition states:

An important obstacle in working with (other) organizations is the fact that most of the times there is no financing, there are no resources dedicated to these projects on which that coalition is formed. I mean we didn't have funds or these organizations didn't have funds to oppose the draft law regarding compulsory counselling (for pregnancy crisis), consequently the time invested by the people involved in the coalition is not rewarded through a particular project, but it is additional to what they (already) have to do – because meanwhile they have to do 2 trainings and 7 publications on a different project.

Moreover, by investigating the reasons for which VIF coalition became inactive shortly after its formalization in a federation (it formed as an informal structure in 2003 and became a legal entity in 2005), activists involved pointed to a variety of factors, among which there were the different organizational needs that were not accounted for when trying to build the capacity of the coalition.

I don't know how ready for networking were the organizations, because they had different expertise and aims, and I don't think that anybody did any assessment of organizational needs, to see what the situation was. Whoever wanted could get in, there was a time in which they were asked for public opinions, common projects were developed, but that's it. And giving that the needs were different, some needed training, other financing.

While funds granted for joint work help spark coalitions, and their lack determine organizations to get together only in reactive efforts, coalition funding has its downsides

as well. The economic opportunity opened by it is not sufficient in building sustained endeavours and, in the absence of a consented structure and distribution of power inside the coalition, its establishment gets to be perceived as artificial and sometimes unjust, stemming resentments and frustration. This is the opinion of one of the persons involved in VIF, who explains why it did not work out on the long term:

What happened here was a forced establishment – if a financier gives money to an organization and says found the organization, somehow it can be said... not that it has an advantage, but it's logical that if you, as an organization, receive money to establish the federation and set the meetings, it goes without saying that the management of the coalition will be done by that organization, not by the coalition per se. [...] It was a negative effect because the first step in the development of the federation should have been the existence of a participative democratic formula, of elections [...]. We take the initiative when we are on an equal basis, part of the network.

Additionally, coalition leading is associated with high professional prestige and can sometimes generate power struggles and ego clashes. Recalling the efforts to establish the Romanian Women's Lobby (RoWL), a national coalition officially formed in 2007 as a representative structure of the European Women's Lobby (EWL), one activist mentioned what she perceived as a conflict between the openness expected by EWL from RoWL and the centralizing tendencies manifested by some Romanian activists who wanted to coordinate the network:

She wanted to coordinate the network. But they (the EWL) insist on openness. Again, some things are difficult to understand - coordination work is very hard, and the work in a network is for free. Why do they fight to coordinate? And afterwards, when they see that they won't get paid, they leave the network.

As expected, the resource issue came up again and again in the interviews conducted, whether we are talking about Reproductive Rights Coalition, VIF coalition or Romanian Women's Lobby. The same activist quoted above also touched on time availability and money difficulties as impeding sustained advocacy and lobby efforts, which usually are not covered by any particular financed project. Moreover, in the case of RoWL work was the more difficult as they also had to pay EWL an annual 1000 euros contribution:

And it (RoWL) was established in haste and we couldn't go on, because EWL wanted to annually gather 1000 euros and ... work in a network, I know it from the World March, is extremely time consuming. If you want the network to be active you have to work for it at least 2 hours a day. And they didn't, and you cannot blame them, because they are desperate – the ones that don't have financed projects and maybe ten times more desperate the ones that have financed projects, because of the money and payment problems.

To the money and time issues that blocked the functionality of RoWL surprisingly added the membership overlapping in VIF and RoWL coalitions. According to one of the activists involved in VIF, she insisted on adding VIF federation among the founding members of the Romanian Women's Lobby, which blocked the entire process of raising the 1000 euros contribution, due to the lack of functionality of VIF as an NGO federation.

We introduced the federation (VIF into RoWL), but the problem was that the federation never paid 100 euros (the membership individual NGO contribution) for the simple reason of not even having a fiscal code, because from the moment in which it (VIF) was established, somebody had to do this procedure, but nothing happened.

6. Conclusions

The several points I tried to make in the present paper, by looking at coalition building processes in the Romanian women's rights organizations and its allies are the following: consistent with existing literature, threats posed by legal initiatives and counter-movements on one hand, and available funding granted for joint work on the other are the factors most salient in explaining the emergence of coalitions in the field. When looking at why coalitions disband or become unfunctional, money and time issues, as well as different stages of organizational development and perceived unequal structure of the coalition are indicated by activists as factors affecting the life course of punctual joint endeavours.

What has also emerged from the research and I tried to emphasize throughout the paper is the dynamic and intermingling character of the coalitions and networks emerged in their particular conjectures. The VIF coalition, the Antidiscrimination coalition, the Reproductive Rights Coalition, the Romanian Women's Lobby, fat frumossicandvreaueu and Slutwalk, provided as examples of joint work inside the women's movement and human rights social movement family, are all linked through overlapping membership, both personal and organizational. Although they have different life spans, ranging from years (in the case of VIF), to months, as is the case of Slutwalk demonstration, and different degrees in the frequency of joint actions, their sometimes lack of sustainability does not equate their going to waste. Most importantly, temporary, ad-hoc or long term coalitions help build a community of committed individuals and organizations who share information and calls for action that help in keeping them connected and ready to mobilize in case of need. Moreover, the process of joint organizing of protest events, open letters, online campaigns, lobby and monitoring activities occasion personal and group encounters that strengthen the activist community.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- AntiProVita anonymous website <http://antiprovita.wordpress.com/2013/03/16/misiune-si-scurt-istoric-pro-vita/>, accessed on 1st of July 2013;
- Borland, Elizabeth (2008), "Social Movement Organizations and Coalitions: Comparisons from the Women's Movement in Buenos Aires in Research" in *Social Movements, Conflicts and Change*, vol. 28;
- Borland, Elizabeth (2010), "Crisis as a Catalyst for Cooperation? Women's Organizing in Buenos Aires" in Nella Van Dyke and Holly J. McCammon, *Strategic Alliances. Coalition Building and Social Movements*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis;
- Buechler, Steven M. (1993), "Beyond Resource Mobilization? Emerging Trends in Social Movement Theory" in *The Sociological Quarterly*, vol. 34, issue 2;
- Císař, Ondřej (2010), "Externally sponsored contention: the channelling of environmental movement organisations in the Czech Republic after the fall of Communism" in *Environmental Politics* vol. 19, issue5;
- Císař, Ondřej, Kateřina Vráblíková (2010), "The Europeanization of Social Movements in the Czech Republic: The EU and Local Women's Groups" in *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, vol. 43, issue 2;
- Critic Atac. Neo-"Decreteii" Theme <http://www.criticatac.ro/15486/15486/>, accessed on 1st of July 2013;

- Curtis, Russell L.; Zurcher, Louis A. (1973), "Stable Resources of Protest Movements: The Multi-Organizational Field" in *Social Forces*, vol. 52, issue 1;
- Della Porta, Donatella; Rucht, Dieter (1995), "Left-Libertarian Movements in Context: A Comparison of Italy and West Germany, 1965-1990" in J. Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans (ed.), *The Politics of Social Protest. Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements*, UCL Press, London;
- Diani, Mario; Bison, Ivano (2004), "Organizations, Coalitions, and Movements" in *Theory and Society*, vol.33, issue 3-4;
- Diani, Mario; Lindsay, Isobel; Purdue, Derrick (2010), "Sustained Interactions? Social Movements and Coalitions in Local Settings" in Nella Van Dyke and Holly J. McCammon (ed.), *Strategic Alliances. Coalition Building and Social Movements*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis;
- Diani, Mario (2011), "Networks and Internet into Perspective" in *Swiss Political Science Review*
- Euroregional Centre for Public Initiatives (2012), *International NGOs concerned about the law regarding the crisis pregnancy counselling offices write to Prime Minister Victor Ponta*, 21st of May 2012, <http://www.ecpi.ro/ong-uri-internationale-ingrijorate-de-proiectul-de-lege-privind-consilierea-obligatorie-pentru-criza-de-sarcina-ii-scriu-lui-victor-ponta/>, accessed on 1st of July 2013;
- Facebook community page of *Făt frumos și când vreau eu*, <https://www.facebook.com/pages/Fat-Frumos-Si-Cand-Vreau-Eu/138075942928300?id=138075942928300&sk=info>;
- FDSC (2011), *Barometrulliderilor ONG.Sondaj national online înrândulreprezentantilor ONG din România*, Elaborated as part of the project „O voce mai puternica pentru sectorul neguvernamental din România”, financed by Trust for Civil Society in Central & Eastern Europe;
- Gal, Susa; Kligman, Gail (2003), *Politicile de gen in perioada post socialista. Un eseu istoric comparativ*, Polirom, Iasi;
- Grunberg, Laura (2000), *Women's NGOs in Romania*.inS. Gal and G. Kligman (ed.), *Reproducing Gender: Politics, Publics, and Everyday Life after Socialism*, Princeton University Press, Princeton;
- Grunberg, Laura (coord.), Borza, Ioana, Vacarescu, Theodora-Eliza (2006), "CarteaNeagra a Egalitatii de Sanse între Femei si Barbati" in *Societatea de Analize Feministe*, proiect finantat de Ambasada Regatului Tarilor de Jos la Bucuresti prin Programul Matra-KAP;
- Grunberg, Laura (2008), *biONGrafie. AnA – istoriatraita a unui ONG de femei*, Polirom, Iasi;
- Irvine, Jill (2007), "From Civil Society to Civil Servants: Women's Organizations and Critical Elections in Croatia" in *Politics & Gender*, vol. 3, issue 1;
- Irvine, Jill (2012), *Women's Organizing and Electoral Breakthroughs in Croatia and Serbia*, NCEEER Working Paper, University of Washington, Seattle;
- Jacobsson, Kerstin (2013), "Channeling and Enrollment: The Institutional Shaping of Animal Rights" in Poland in Kerstin Jacobsson and Steven Saxonberg (ed.), *Beyond NGO-ization. The Development of Social Movements in Central and Eastern Europe*, Ashgate Publishing;
- Jacobsson, Kerstin (2012), "Fragmentation of the collective actionspace: the animal rights movement inPoland" in *East European Politics*, vol. 28, issue 4;

- JSI Research & Training Institute (2007), *Domestic Violence Policy in Romania: Support to the National Coalition Against Violence 2002 – 2006*;
- Klandermans, Bert (1997), *The Social Psychology of Protest*, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford;
- McCammon, Holly J.; Campbell, Karen E. (2002), "Allies on the Road to Victory: Coalition Formation between the Suffragists and the Woman's Christian Temperance Union" in *Mobilization: An International Journal*, volume 7, issue 3;
- McCarthy, John D; Zald, Mayer N. (1977), "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory" in *The American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 82, issue 6;
- McCarthy, John D.; Zald, Mayer N. (1987), "The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization" in John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald (ed.), *Social Movements in an Organization Society*, Transaction Publishers, London;
- McMahon, Patrice C. (2001), "Building Civil Societies in East Central Europe: The Effect of American Non-governmental Organizations on Women's Groups" in *Democratization*, vol.8, issue 2;
- Medusa's Blog (2012), *Baconschi and the abortion problem*, <http://blogul-medusei.blogspot.ro/2012/03/baconschi-si-tema-avortului.html>, 15th of May 2012, accessed on 1st of July 2013;
- Miroiu, Mihaela (2004 a), *The Road to Autonomy (Drumul catre autonomie)*, Polirom, Iasi;
- Miroiu, Mihaela (2004 b), "State Men, Market Women. The Effects of Left Conservatism on Gender Politics in Romanian Transition" in *Feminismo/s*, issue3;
- Miroiu, Mihaela; Popescu, Liliana (2004), "Post-Totalitarian Pre-Feminism" in Henry F. Carey (ed), *Romania since 1989. Politics, Economics and Society*, Lexington Books, Maryland;
- National Coalition against Violence (2007), *Final monitoring report at the national level*, USAID funded project;
- Nyklova, Blanka (2013), "Through our own eyes – Czech feminist scene in self-reflection", Paper presented at the international conference *Democratization through Social Activism: Gender and Environmental Issues in Post-Communist Societies*, National School of Political Science and Public Administration, Bucharest, 16-17 May 2013;
- Pro Vita Manifesto, <http://provitabucuresti.ro/ce-inseamna-provita/manifestul-pro-vita>, accessed on 3rd of July 2013;
- Pro Vita Bucharest website, The educational program "Vreusa aflu!" (I want to find out) <http://provitabucuresti.ro/activitati/educare-informare/vreau-sa-aflu>, accessed on 3rd of July 2013;
- Romanian Women's Lobby website <http://www.dearnetwork.ro>;
- Roth, Silke (2007), "Sisterhood and Solidarity? Women's Organizations in the Expanded European Union" in *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society*, vol. 14, issue 4;
- Roth, Benita (2010), "Organizing One's Own as Good Politics: Second Wave Feminists and the Meaning of Coalition" in Nella Van Dyke and Holly J. McCammon (ed.), *Strategic Alliances. Coalition Building and Social Movements*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis;

- Rucht, Dieter (2006), "Movement Allies, Adversaries, and Third Parties" in David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (ed.), *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford;
- Saxonberg, Steven (2013), "The Influence of "Conservative" Women's and Family Organizations in Hungary and the Czech Republic" in Kerstin Jacobsson and Steven Saxonberg (ed.), *Beyond NGO-ization. The Development of Social Movements in Central and Eastern Europe*, Ashgate Publishing;
- Shaffer, Martin B. (2000), "Coalition Work among Environmental Groups: Who Participates?" in *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts, and Change* vol. 22;
- Sloat, Amanda (2005), "The Rebirth of Civil Society. The Growth of Women's NGOs in Central and Eastern Europe" in *European Journal of Women's Studies*, Vol. 12, issue 4;
- Staggenborg, Suzanne (1991), *The Pro-Choice Movement. Organization and Activism in the Abortion Conflict*, Oxford University Press, Oxford;
- Staggenborg, Suzanne (2002), "The "Meso" in Social Movement Research" in David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier and Belinda Robnett (ed.), *Social Movements: Identity, Culture, and the State*, Oxford University Press, New York;
- Staggenborg, Suzanne (1986), "Coalition Work in the Pro-Choice Movement: Organizational and Environmental Opportunities and Obstacles" in *Social Problems* vol. 33;
- Staggenborg, Suzanne; Verta, Taylor (2005), "Whatever Happened to the Women's Movement?" in *Mobilization: an International Journal*, vol. 10, issue 1;
- STOP Violence against Women Protest. *Manifesto* <https://www.facebook.com/events/215471235189101/?ref=ts>, accessed on 1st of July 2013;
- Taylor, Verta (1989), "Social Movement Continuity: The Women's Movement in Abeyance" in *American Sociological Review*, vol. 54, issue 5;
- The National Coalition of NGOs involved in programs on violence against women (2005), *Annual report 2004*;
- Transcena Association, *Advocacy Campaign for changing the law on the prevention and control of family violence*, 27.02.2011, <http://blog.transcena.ro/index.php/campanie-de-advocacy-pentru-modificarea-legii-privind-prevenirea-si-combaterea-violentei-in-familie/>, accessed on 1st of July 2013;
- Transcena Association (2013), *Press release: The first national study regarding the implementation of the protection order*, 8th of March 2013 <http://blog.transcena.ro/index.php/comunicat-de-pres-a-lansarea-primului-studiu-la-nivel-national/#more-550>, accessed on 1st of July 2013;
- Zald, Mayer N.; McCarthy, John D. (1979), *Social Movement Industries: Competition and Cooperation among Movement Organizations*, CRSO Working Paper No.201;
- Zald, Mayer N., Ash, Roberta (1966), "Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay and Change" in *Social Forces*, vol. 44, issue 3.

IV. LEADERSHIP AND BEHAVIOUR IN THE PUBLIC SPACE

Mihaela Ioana DANEȚIU, Jonathan KOBAN ⇔ *Populist Elites in Post-Communist Romania*

Aser NICA ⇔ *Perceptions of Leadership in Public Sector Marketing of Romania*

Ileana SĂDEAN ⇔ *Developers of Leader Rural Development Model*

Andra ROESCU ⇔ *The Effects of the 2008 Romanian Electoral System on Candidate Behaviour. Evidence from the Lab*

Diana Luiza DUMITRIU ⇔ *Competition between Sports on the Battlefield of Public Visibility*

Paul APARASCHIVEI ⇔ *A Model of Web Campaigning in Romania*

POPULIST ELITES IN POST-COMMUNIST ROMANIA

*Mihaela Ioana DANETIU**
*Jonathan KOBAN***

Abstract. *The main goal of this article is to analyze from the point of view of political psychology the situation in which elites identify with the neo-populism phenomenon in present-day Romania. Neo-populism, a concept defined in the early 21st century is common in Latin America, but also in Western Europe where it is embedded in various degrees of intensity. Moreover, the neo-populist phenomenon surpasses the semantic dimension of the well-known populism of the 20th century that has manifested itself within the national and extremist movements. In contrast with this phenomenon, neo-populism manifests itself directly in connection with the expansion of the globalization process, which includes the enormous income of mass-media in its equation. It has been brought on through the spread of talk-shows, political soap-operas and scandalous publications. The article will try to reveal the specificity of the Romanian case by taking into consideration theories and other scientific approaches that have dealt with the evolution of this phenomenon and at the same time offer an informative benchmark regarding the muddled information that has been hidden under the current situation of political elites.*

Keywords: *political elites, democracy, neo-populism, populism*

1. Introduction

Nowadays, the link between democracy, political elites and neo-populism is put under academic debates due to the new meanings that have been attached to the notion of *populism*. The main goal of the article is to underline the evolution of the neo-popular elites in the context of a specific political regime. How did neo-populism shape the discourse of the political elites can be deduced by generating a general overview on the literature. Moreover, in the case of post-communist Romania, the evolution of neo-populism and the transformation suffered by the political elites can be easily depicted. Therefore, the article will briefly define what populism and neo-populism are and also present some major theories concerning the political elites. This theoretical framework is required in order to understand how the neo-populist elites developed and dealt with the changing Romanian political arena. This inquiry over the role played by neo-populist elites in the post-communist period can bring into light essential aspects of the current political situation in Romania. The present role and impact of the Romanian political elites can be understood only if the evolution of the neo-populism phenomenon is put into

* PhD student, National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Faculty of Communication and Public Relations, Bucharest, Romania, e-mail: mihaela.danetiu@gmail.com. Beneficiary of the "Doctoral Scholarships for a Sustainable Society" project, co-financed by the European Union through the European Social Fund, Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources and Development 2007-2013.

** Full Sail University, Florida, USA, jkoban90@yahoo.com

question. Key aspects of the main political moments in the elections after '89 will also be underlined.

From the inner core of radical movements of the 20th century to the effects of globalization, *populism* has suffered major changes that have led to a new political dimension. This has determined the appearance of new bond between the media and the politics and also a misshapeness of both political elites and their governmental instruments. Between communication and populism an indisputable connection can be noticed that exceeds the field of political science. A complete analysis of the implications of the neo-populism phenomenon can be achieved only through the tools given by the media. In order to construct a comprehensive frame of the evolution of the term *populism*, the article intends to analyze the effects that emerge during the interactions between mass communication and the democratic environment. Neo-populists actions and discourses are directly influenced by the implication of the media tools in the political sphere because the role that the political communication plays is one of a crucial factor in the established equation between democracy and populist values. Moreover, before proceeding to analyzing the neo-populists trends in Romania, there is an urge of defining the terms that are used to characterize the political panorama of the current Romanian politics. In other words, besides debating over the meaning of notions such as *populism* and *neo-populism*, the values of the political elites requires studying the existing connections between populism and democracy.

Distinctively, the theoretical approach on *neo-populism* and the *mediatization* of politics can be analyzed in the Romanian case not only because of the current political situation but also because of the significance of the period when Ceausescu was the political ruler. The article will identify the specificities of neo-populism regarding the elections after 1989 but also the opposition between democracy and populism. The idea that will be debated is whether, in the Romanian case, the democratic mechanism has been put under doubt due to the polarization of society (the loss of credibility of the Romanian politics). The national political institutional discourse had repercussions on the external politics of the state. The lack of consistency of the Romanian politics has as main cause the vassalage relations between the political institutions, the civil society and the elites. This process is enhanced by the idealization of Western institutions which has reflected an embroidered positive image. The perception that has been constructed surrounding the economic and political developments in the Western countries has become the main source of inspiration for the populist discourses not only in Romania but also for the whole Eastern Europe (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008: 51).

2. The Populist Phenomena and the Elites. A Theoretical Approach.

2.1. POPULISM AND NEO-POPULISM.

In the literature, the term *populism* has been classified into two major braches: the *agrarian populism* and the *political populism*. Concisely, these two types of populism should be put into question in order to achieve a complete understanding of the implications that neo-populism has nowadays. The *agrarian populism* can be defined through the socio-economical movements and doctrines that deal with the interests of peasants and those of small farms. As opposed to the previous term, scholars suggest that *political populism* is considered to be a mere political strategy that is based upon the bond with the *people*. The *agrarian populism* can be best identified in the following two main cases: the American populism and the Russian one.

Succinctly, during the 1890s, the People's Party from the USA came up with a new term: *populism*. Back then, its meaning was different from what we now define as *populism*. Initially, the term symbolized a rural movement that was borne out of an economic discontent. The movement had as fundamental goal the return of the political power to the *simple people* which required governmental support of small producers. The primordial populist movement failed to the loss suffered by W. J. Bryan in the political elections of the year 1896.

Contrary to this development, during the 19th century, the Russian revolutionary movement had many discrepant key points that have led to an idealization of the lower class made out of peasants. The year 1874 has a different meaning for Russia than the movement of 1890 of the People's Party in the USA due to the young Russian scholars that tried to spread the word among the peasants about the need for rebellion against social injustice. Therefore, this was the age of attempts to penetrate idealistic and revolutionary beliefs into the lower masses. This messianic mission had the aim of calling to arms the peasants who were forced to live under harsh conditions. This historical event – even though the effect of such propagandistic messages was not successful – highlights also the modernization patterns that have been applied in the Russian society in the 19th century. The communitarian rural life style was thought to be suitable for a middle path between the large capitalism enterprises and the bureaucracy implied by socialism (Hermet, 2004). The political concept behind this ideological radical movement that entitled itself as being populism consisted in a strong and inner cooperation between the members of society. In other words, the Russian populism of the 1874 reclaimed the weaknesses of any hierarchic order and claimed to be the proper tool of a socialism that contained the decentralized element. Also, it is worth mentioning that after the end of World War I, *agrarian populism* has been identified in the *green* movements that occurred in the East-European territory (Dix, 1985: 30).

The structural elements that compose the *agrarian populism* are in contrast with the principles that determine the meaning of *political populism*. The most appropriate example that sustains this dichotomy can be traced in the workings of Ernst Friedrich Schumacher which are focused mainly on the economic aspects of the Third World (Wood, 1984: 120). The *agrarian populism* that is directly linked with his political beliefs is constructed on a different pattern than *political populism*. The so called *appeal to the people* that is considered to be the essence of the *political populism* involves also the issue of political elites and of nationalism. Any democratic system that has its roots in the principle of representative government is thought to be in antagonism with the populist democracy which implies the power of the citizen (Knopff, 1998: 685). The most reluctant case that can demonstrate the implementation of such political creeds is the constitution of United States of America that during the 20th century introduced into its laws instruments such as the referendum and the initiative of the citizens through which people can avoid certain decrees given by the political governors and propose their own laws that can be applied through a common acceptance (Radcliff, 1993: 130).

The pejorative characteristics that nowadays are considered to be inherent to any populist discourse or behavior were different from those who composed the reactionary values of the 19th century in USA and Russia. It can be stated that the notion *populism* is worn out because of its negative connotations. It is useless to mention its new dimensions due to its exaggerated usage that sometimes undermines the significance of unity and nation.

The neo-populist phenomenon was triggered by economic modernization and consequently should be related to the mobilization of political masses. There is no doubt that the historical conditions of the 20th century determined a certain paradigm under which populism has fallen into. The *agrarian populism* has been challenged by liberal economists (Mény and Surel, 2002: 102) and the *political populism* has been associated with the right extremist movements that have proven themselves capable of great violence. The Nazis discourse was characterized as populist due to its intolerance towards diversity and foreigners (prejudices formed around culture, religion and race). Only beginning with the '60s was the term of populism refreshed because of the spread of studies concerning the less developed countries.

The economical dimension of populism was put under academic debate but its political nature was reduced to a battle against the elitist constructions of democracy (Crick, 2002: 12). Besides the revival of the economical perspective of *agrarian populism* a new tendency appeared at the break of dawn of the 21st century. Neo-populism is also named the *media populism* because of the new tools of popular dissemination that have developed in the last decades. Neo-populism has originated in Latin America because in that particular region the authoritarian regimes used vast rhetorical strategies that combined populist themes.

3. The Political Elites

Regularly, a populist discourse is described as lacking in solutions that are so needed in constructing any political stratagem. A populist politician tends to avoid the current political issues and through certain discourse tools, distracts the attention of the audience to other problems that are linked to antique topics that have deep roots in the collective mentality of the people. This rhetoric ability that offers the politician the opportunity to hide its weaknesses and ideological black spots and point to peripheral, traditional matters that are very well known to citizens but still remain unsolved is reflected as an *inconsistent political template*. In other words, a populist discourse points out the Achilles' heel of politics.

In order to understand how the political elites identify themselves with this neo-populist phenomenon, the democratic issue comes into equation. The source of legitimacy of the political elites is based at the root of the relationship between those who rule and the citizens that are being ruled. The hierarchy of political power has become the soil of resources used by the political elites and also a legitimized pillar of every individual. In other words, each individual is appraised as belonging to the meritocracy that was first debated in the works of Plato. Scholars such as Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, Robert Michels, Moisey Ostrogovsky, Ortega, Marx, Mills and many others developed appealing theories concerning the political elites (Hayward, 2004).

Their theories put under debate the legitimate source of the political power which is understood as the leading class of the majority of citizens. The distinctive note between the elites and the non-elites is determined by the capability of shaping a political or economic system and also the ability to capture and maintain power. For example, Mosca defines the political elites as the leader segment or a social group which is sturdily united and which was born out of a strong cohesion between its members that is similar to one of a family. Unlike Mosca, Pareto identified the differences between the elites that rule and those who do not manifest any intents in ruling due to their constant alteration of necessities (Mills, 2000: 64).

In Marx's perspective, the political elites are subduing to the revolutionary aim, meaning that the economical factor overcomes the political one. Clearly, for Marx the factual political elites come from the worker class because they are the only ones who can lead a revolution (Zannoni, 1978: 11). In the Marxian perspective, the basic condition for taking part in the movements of the political elites is the class, stipulation that is in disparity with the one proposed by Ortega y Gasset. The distinction between political elites and non-elites is marked in Gasset's vision not by class but by the moral clause. Any type of elite (especially the political elite) cultivates a model and suffers foremost pressure to overcome any limitations that can endanger its goals, values and mission. Therefore, the political elites can be in charge of any society only if they rely on moral principles that are in a bottomless conflict with the mediocrity of the masses.

Undoubtedly, these scholars that postulated specific theories concerning the political elites also concluded that the distribution of power is the key in the identification of any elite. The social segment or group that rules through the mechanisms of power is automatically considered to be the elite. However, that is not always the case because in this process there are also other factors that contribute to the construction of hierarchy of every society such as meritocracy, epistemic legitimacy of authority (Zannoni, 1978). In other words, the power elites are more than those who are in charge of administrating a system. They transform themselves into relevant resources and manifest a colossal impact on the consensus between politics and citizens. Therefore, after revising sociological and political theories, it can be stated that not every minority that embraces a power is a power elite but instead any power can belong to the elites if they prove the capability of using it (Mills, 2000: 21).

Noticeably, there is an indisputable bond between the voice of the people and the political instruments used by populists. These instruments are enhanced by the power which is given to every citizen belonging to a state. On the one hand, this process can be judged as a radical tool of democracy due to its social pressures. Moreover, as mentioned before, the term populism has suffered a broadening that covered the sphere of charismatic political leaders such as Hitler, Peron and De Gaulle (Howarth and Torfing, 2005). Any politician nowadays is labeled as a populist if in his political discourse and actions he tends to use certain prejudices that are common among its governed people. On the other hand, the term and its meanings deteriorated during the evolution of the global political spectrum. The spread of parliamentary systems has been followed by an intensified usage of attractive and mischievous techniques instrumented by politicians to gain more votes (Crick, 2002).


4. Neo-Populist Elites between the Media and Politics

The influence of the media on every actor from the political arena is considered to be either biased or altered. The neo-populist agenda and news that are broadcasted contain an ideological nature that can influence the viewer's political perspective. The growth of consumerism and the expectations of the citizens have led to the spread of political communication tools that have the goal of creating a balance between the tendencies of the mass consumption and an unbiased range of choices (including the political ones). The neo-populist politicians have recognized the substance of the media factor that is considered to be "the complex of processes that are typical of mass communication and especially of the news media in democratic environments, which interact with and affect (or are affected by) political processes to different extents and with different effects" (Axford and Huggins, 2001: 15).

In other terms, the equilibrium between democracy and populism relies on the implication of mass media and the manner in which the politics is communicated to the audience. The fourth power can influence in a positive or a negative way the results of any political action because it has achieved a freedom on its own and has an enormous impact on the citizens. The result of elections can be easily prejudiced intentionally or unintentionally because the media has the power to create or reveal the weaknesses/skills of politicians and also to focus the attention of people on a certain political event no matter its genuine relevance. “All neo-populist movements, including those from Asia and Latin America, rely heavily on some kind of indirect (and direct) complicity with the mass media, and all are led by politicians who, with few exceptions, are shrewd and capable “new makers” themselves” (Axford and Huggins, 2001: 15).

Consequently, even though the political sphere is subjected to the national context (Mény and Surel, 2002: 10) and the media is subdued to social and cultural factors, the neo-populist phenomenon is based on leaders that demonstrate a high charismatic personality and a highly supportive group that can be mobilized under any circumstances. By observing figure no. 1 there can be pinched effortlessly the links that are being created between politics, the media and the choice of citizens.

Figure 1. *The impact of neo-populist discourse of the political elites on the electorate is enhanced by the media factor. In this system, the neo-populist rhetoric projects the current political and social themes on the public agenda.*



The key in understanding the figure above consists in the impact of the neo-populism phenomena on the political elites. The neo-populism statement of belief consists in the existence of a transparent government that must assure the rights and powers of the citizens against the privileges that have been obtained by the elites. In economical and sociological terms, the neo-populist theory claims to be constructed on democratic ideals and to protect the freedom and needs of any citizen (Mazzoleni et al., 2003). The whole neo-populist political philosophy is structured around the individual and the mechanisms available to make his existence more comfortable within any democratic system. Thus, neo-populism has been defined as “a chameleon that may adapt to different contexts and that remains connatural to the concept and practice of mass democracy” (Axford and Huggins, 2001: 5).

Moreover, the neo-populism phenomenon subjects the state to a variable level of responsibility in terms of public goods in order to succeed the fulfillment of its citizens. This idealistic defining of neo-populism conceals its anti-democratic nature which is given by its roots that can be identified as nationalism, ideology or ethnicity. Thus, how can this mischievous hybrid philosophy political that is concerned with prevailing over a flourished corruption have a boundless affinity with the media and to what extend are they influencing each other? The question that rises at this point concerns the media and its position regarding these new rhetoric political mechanisms (Radcliff, 1993).

The rhetoric stratagems used by neo-populist politicians are filled with emotional elements that appear only in the battle against the corrupted system that is dismantling the rights and the freedom of citizens. The set of characteristics that are applied to the neo-populist movements have been transferred (or even the vice versa process) to the mass communication patterns that have to be capable of handling not only institutional pressure but also the expectations of the society (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008).

The national aspects impose a different set of distinctiveness and various types of behaviors that are categorized as being part of the neo-populism phenomenon. Even though the article will focus on the Romanian case, a relevant future question that remains still open is whether there can be established a common pattern that can be used in explaining each national frame, a core element that can unify all the cases of neo-populism in a single and secured phenomenon.

5. Neo-Populism, the Political Elites and the Romanian Case in the Post-Communist Period

The previous parts of the article have dealt with the historical roots of populism and also with the established relations between the media, neo-populism and political elites. The necessity to underline the historical background of neo-populism is accompanied by the utility of understanding how this vast political mechanism actually works. In other words, the application of the new techniques implied by neo-populism is visible in the Romanian case. This chapter is more than a case study because its goal is to create a comprehensible link between the evolution of the term of populism and its transformation forged under the impact of the new communicational form and techniques.

Therefore, the historical forms of populism and the new communicational tools of neo-populism can be fully comprehended through the analysis of the Romanian's neo-populism. The Romanian political arena is considered to be a typical example of neo-populism especially beginning with the year of 1989 (the fall of the Ceausescu's dictatorship). After the fall of communism, in order to establish the desired peace and political stability, the paternalistic government requested a new approach that implied the usage of emotions and traditions through which they thought they could mobilize the citizens (Shafir, 2008).

After 1989, in Romania, the issue that appeared was indeed the almost obligation to make people trust the old and national values because the communist regime already used populist manners of attracting the citizens. The solution that was adopted and that was considered suitable for making a distinctive note with the rhetoric instruments of communism was the appeal to democratic principles (Birch et al., 2002: 91). In the May of 1990, FSN was the political group that obtained the majority of the votes and proposed the composition of the political apparatus that governed the whole Romanian state. The year 1992 was marked by elections and by the split within FSN. Overall, between 1992 and 1996 the reformation of the system was directly connected to the actual elections and

political agenda was constructed strictly through measures that were appealing to the Romanian political electorate (Birch et al., 2002: 101).

In a few words, we will succinctly present some essential electoral moments that can help us understand better the particularities of the Romanian neo-populist elites. Hence, beginning with the year 1996, the Romanian electorate chose to give its vote to Emil Constantinescu (who had a scientific career and whose discourse was focused against the false leaders that came to power in 1989 – wins the elections with 54.43% of the vote) and to his civic party (a political party that alleged the Western values and for which the main issue was the establishment of an accurate democracy). The political discourse of Constantinescu and the campaign that promoted him was constructed on the same principles as an American one: their focal point was the revolution and also the civil society which, in their vision, should be installed in its proper rights (Bandelj, 2009: 130). The new claimed presidency ruled over a defective political system composed of parties that suffered either a split or were on the edge of dividing due to the internal struggle (Jeffries, 2002: 305). The need for radical reforms was a pledge that was sustained not only by the inner political actors but also by NGOs and some journalists. In 2000, after four years, Ion Iliescu came again to power winning against Corneliu Vadim Tudor. Moreover, since then the tendency to be integrated in the European politics such as party alliances has become a national target.

The whole period marked by the years 1990 and 2000 can be summarized as lacking in a consistent electoral system because its elaboration, norms and legislation were never put under real debate. Without a doubt, the political construction that followed the fall of the communism was built through a rough imitation process of the Western European models that emphasized the role of people, representation and democracy but which was inappropriate to the traditions and political customs of the Romanian electorate. During the years that followed the Revolution, the institutions and the parties were marked electoral success and legitimacy that were pursued even through media language. The main political block was FSN - which later became FDSN (PSDR and PSD) - and it was the predominant party that shaped the institutional design of the Romanian political system (Tismăneanu, 1998: 51).

The government stability was not achieved through proportional representation and the electorate's view over the adopted measures can be abridged as simple tools of political domination. The process of elections were taken under serious disputes that have had as foremost results the limitations of fraud, voters' cards and mobile polling booth. Unfortunately, during 1990 and 2000 this precocious assemble of the election procedures was not accompanied by a sober debate over the system itself and the proper form that it should be built on (majoritarian electorate system or mixed system) or by the elucidation and eradication of the communist legacy and its former leaders (Dawisha and Deets, 2006, p. 701). The inference of the audience in this major political decision was insignificant because the media agenda was focused on economic issues.

During 2002 the claimed reformation was a superficial one because the main theme of the political class was maintaining the power. All the political groups, except UDMR (based on the minority rights) were in danger of "delegitimization" (Birch et al., 2002: 105). The political discourse was manufactured and based on the needs of the citizens but on the requirements derived from the imported Western democratic model (Carey, 2004). In other words, the media was flooded with discourses that were filled with ideological meanings and less with practical reforms that could have led to a reformed political system. The political parties of those times were not driven by long-term goals

but by the thirst to be recognized as a democratic builder that brought Western values into the Romanian space. The mediated image of the party and its leading members was a purpose itself because all the components of the political system were greedy to obtain credentials (Birch et al., 2002: 106). “According to an opinion poll published in early June 1999, more than 60 percent of Romanians believed that living standards were better under communism” (Jeffries, 2002: 316).

The next elections that occurred in the year 2004 have marked the inauguration of the presidential leadership of Traian Băsescu. His campaign was based upon the struggle against corruption and those elites that are in front of the political class. Through his discourses, Băsescu tried to gain the electorate composed of intellectuals and civil society. Unlike Constantinescu, he did not manifest a full embracement of the Western values and he kept a vivid skepticism towards the European Union. Even though by comparing the quality of the legislation initiated by the Parliament in the past years, the institutional structure still lacked in coordination, decentralization and in efficiency (European Commission, 2005; OECD, 2005). The private interests of the political class determined a deficiency in the trust given by electors who considered the corruption and democratic shortage as core results attained by an unreformed political system.

All this accumulated discontents of the citizens was redefined and exploited in the political campaign of Traian Băsescu. The aim of the populist elements of his discourse can be traced also in the image that has been built through his public appearances. His populist discourses have been constructed on the aspiration of the citizen towards a transparent political process that can explain and improve the institutional fluidity (Papadimitriou, 2008: 235). The most relevant example of neo-populism that marked the presidency of Băsescu was the battle against the “322 legislators” that tried to suspend him from office. The held referendum and its results have been considered to be the actual voice of the people. In this battle against “tyranny of the majority” Băsescu made use of “classic populist” tools in order to distinguish himself from his political adversaries (Shafir, 2008: 450).

All these electoral campaigns have been smudged with populist elements that have not contributed in consolidating the democratic institutions that Romania was so much in need (Gross, 2008). The weak political culture has led to a political system composed by inconsistent institutions that have no inner or external credibility. The revised Constitution and even the freedom of the media did not guide the path to a well-built representative democracy. The permanent social conflict have been stirred up through neo-populist techniques that have as main result a lack of social consensus. Moreover, a permanent clash has been installed between the elites and the people. In Romania, the division between elites is not very visible and they are considered to be all members of a single alliance that is depicted as corrupted. All these national apprehensions had repercussions in the international environment leading to a lack of credibility (Papadimitriou, 2009: 203).

Nowadays, more exactly beginning with the economic crisis, in Romania subsists a perpetual feeling of electoral campaign and all the neo-populist weapons are used in order to obtain the trust of a certain segment of the society. This disagreement between the elites, media and the citizens can be solved through a better institutionalization of the political power that is not necessarily achieved through populist techniques. As stated above, the neo-populist phenomenon has embedded itself in the collective mentality even since the fall of the communist regime. Populism was inevitable after a ruthless system that wiped out all the individual beliefs. It is commonly known that populism has the

polymorph ability of survival no matter the circumstances and that it is being used almost in all political discourses (Preoteasa, 2002: 281). Moreover, neo-populism flourishes during crisis periods because it gives the impression of rebellion and of a breach with old mischievous calamities caused by cancerous leaders. During the years when Constantinescu was president (1996) the institutionalization of power was a frail one (Birch et al., 2002: 103). The electoral discourses that we heard beginning with 2000 were all proposing a paternalist state that claimed to ease the life of its citizens. Several governmental programs had as main target to buy as many votes as possible and not to strengthen the embryonic democracy that was established after the fall of communism.

All in all, all the political parties and leaders in Romania have the tendencies to maintain a permanent contact with the citizens and to enjoy a superficial dialogue with their electorate rather than with the political elites from which they should belong to. In this desolating scenery, the social responsibility of the media is excessively required and all these expectations and pressure can lead to a deformation of the political reality that has no roots in a viable political culture or in a vigorous institutionalism (Galasinska, Krzyzanowski, 2009: 32). The neo-populism that characterizes the Eastern Europe is considered to be “not anti-democratic but anti-liberal” (Shafir, 2008: 468). Traian Băsescu has been well thought-out as a populist due to his rhetoric techniques and political actions that sometimes are classified as authoritarian. Because there is no other ideological alternative to democracy, popular legitimacy and constitutionalism are the major objectives of any institutional reformation but the tools used after the 2004 elections indicate that the presidency institution has suffered a populist radicalization.

It is undisputable the fact that in the near future the neo-populism illustrated by the Romanian state will pose major issues. The political parties have become more programmatic leading to a deconsolidation of democracy (Shafir, 2008: 469) and therefore to a new wave of “populist dialects” and a new dichotomy among the populists techniques (left and right wing populists). The existence of anti-system parties in Romania indicates that neo-populism does not repel itself from democracy but from the principles of liberalism. In other words, neo-populism in the Romanian case can be traced in governments and in opposition and it cannot be defined as a transition fallacy but as being part of the East European exceptionalism in the process of demise of democracy due to the post-communist mentality.

6. Conclusion

The neo-populist phenomenon creates a precise context depending on the national specificities. The evolution of the neo-populist elites is directly influenced by the role of the media in the forging of a social and political stability. During the years, populism, neo-populism and elites have been defined depending on historical particularities. The analysis of the evolution of the meaning and functions of these terms points out that their interconnectivity is highly depending on the nature of the democratic system and its citizens.

The limits of this article reside in the lack of a rigorous methodological approach. The theoretical perspective can only offer a limited view over the impact and evolution of the Romanian neo-populist elites. A critical discourse analysis of some major political actors in the post-communist and present Romania can reveal more practical data that can sustain the ideas launched in this article. Despite these defaults, the relevance of the theme is given by the current political and economic crisis in Europe and in Romania.

In the post-communist period, in Romania, the major political events indicated that a constitutional regime was implemented and that media gained certain autonomy.

After the fall of the regime, the fight against the legacy of communism was pursued by the political elites through neo-populist tools. Undoubtedly, after the fall of communism, the relationship between the political elites, the community and the media has changed dramatically. Beginning with the post-communist period, the democratic mechanism was put into debate because the Romanian politics lost its credibility.

After 2000, some Romanian political actors were integrated into the European polity even though their contribution is insignificant. The political parties began to be part of international alliances. Since then, the main objective of the neo-populist elites is to construct a European identity. This has led to inertia of the Romanian political system. The neo-populist phenomenon that was embraced by the political elites had a major impact on the construction of the public agenda and political programs. The question that rises after understanding the impact of the discourse of the neo-populist elites on the public agenda is the following one: in the current political and economic crisis at the EU level, how will the Romanian political elites manage to dwell with the lack of political consistency of the political spectrum? Neo-populist discourses and the current state of the Romanian political elites need to find the balance between political projects, political rhetoric and citizens. The globalization and other global political and economic processes force the Romanian political elites to redefine their role and to adapt to the expansion of the media in order to create competitive and feasible political structures. The radicalization of the Romanian neo-populism (*hard neo-populism*) might not give the correct solution to solve current political issues such as corruption or border security.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Albertazzi, D.; McDonnell, D. (2008), *Twenty-First Century Populism. The Specter of Western European Democracy*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan;
- Axford, B.; Huggins, R. (2001), *New Media and Politics*, London, New Delhi, Sage Publications;
- Bandelj, N. (2009), "The Global Economy as Instituted Process: The Case of Central and Eastern Europe" in *American Sociological Review*, 74;
- Birch, S.; Millard, F.; Popescu, M.; Kieran W. (2002), *Embodying democracy: electoral system design in post-Communist Europe*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan;
- Carey, F. H. (2004), *Romania since 1989. Politics, Economics, and Society*, New York, Toronto, Oxford, Lexington Books;
- Crick, B. (2002), *Democracy. A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press;
- Dawisha, K.; Deets, S. (2006), "Political Learning in Post-Communist Elections" in *East European Politics and Societies*, 20;
- Galasinska, A.; Krzyzanowski, M. (2009), *Discourse and transformation in Central and Eastern Europe*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan;
- Gross, P. (2008), "Forward to the Past: The Intractable Problems of Romania's Media System", *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 13, 2;
- Hayward, J. (2004), *Elitism, Populism and European Politics*, Oxford, New York, Clarendon Press;
- Hermet, G. (2004), *The Sociology of Populism*, București, Artemis;
- Howarth, D.; Torfing, J. (2005), *Discourse Theory in European Politics. Identity. Policy and Governance*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan;

- Jeffries, I. (2002), *Eastern Europe at the turn of the twenty-first century: a guide to the economies in transition*, New York, Routledge;
- Mazzoleni, G.; Stewart, J.; Horsfield, B. (2003), *The Media and Neo-populism: A Contemporary Comparative Analysis. Praeger Series in Political Communication*, Connecticut, London, Greenwood Publishing Group;
- Mény, Y.; Surel, Y. (2002), *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, New York, Palgrave Publishers Ltd.;
- Mills, C. W. (2000), *The Power Elite*, Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press;
- Papadimitriou, D. (2008), *Romania and the European Union: from marginalization to membership*, New York, Routledge;
- Preoteasa, I. (2002); "Intellectuals and the public sphere in post-communist Romania: a discourse analytical perspective" in *Discourse & Society*, 13, 2;
- Radcliff, B. (1993), "Liberalism, Populism, and Collective Choice" in *Political Research Quarterly*, 46, 1;
- Shafir, M. (2008), "From Historical to "Dialectical" Populism: The Case of Post-Communist Romania" in *Canadian Association of Slavists*, 50, 3-4, Ottawa, Canada;
- Tismăneanu, V. (1998), *Democracy, nationalism and myth in post- communist Europe*, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press;
- Zannoni, P. (1978), "The concept of Elite" in *European Journal of Political Research*, 6, 1.

PERCEPTIONS OF LEADERSHIP IN PUBLIC SECTOR MARKETING OF ROMANIA

Așer NICA *

Abstract. *In this article our intention is to research the role and development of leadership public marketing in public sector of Romania. Generally, Romania has noticed that there is a great discrepancy between how the public sector is perceived nowadays and how the national interest should be seen now or in the future. Romanian society, however, becomes more diverse and the public institutions are thus more flexible. However, their meaning and use changes when put in a public context. Taking into consideration the last 3 decades of NPM reforms both marketing and leadership got a new meaning for public organizations. The research methodology is based on an empirical analysis. Thus, in order to be able to reach relevant conclusions I will apply in my analysis both qualitative and quantitative research methods. A theoretical part is followed by a legal framework and supported in the end by comparative study examples.*

Keywords: *leadership, public marketing, public sector, reform*

1. Introduction

Leadership has been historically and typically defined and understood in terms of traits, qualities, the situation in which the leader exists and the behaviour of the leaders (Bass, 1985; Blake, et al., 1964; Fiedler, 1967; House and Mitchell, 1974; Yukl, 1994). There are almost as many definitions of leadership as there are persons who have attempted to define the concept (Stogdill, 1974: 259), leadership being defined interms of traits, behaviors, influence, social interaction patterns, role relationships, power and administrative positions. Horner (1997) argues that the current theories of leadership view leadership as a process in which leaders do not lead the followers, but are seen as more of a member of a community of practice.

Leadership challenges of the public sector are directly related to their integration into a broader system, either locally nationally or internationally. Thus, the environment of public sector is becoming ever more complex, changeable and uncertain.

Marketing and leadership are subjects of high interest especially for private sector organizations, with countless research done regarding their influence on organizational performance. However, their meaning and use changes when put in a public context. Public organizations are significantly different compared to private ones especially regarding goal and external environment (but not only these), thus both leadership and marketing have to be put into a “public” context in order to be relevant (Tigănaș, Țiclău, Mora and Bacali, 2011:

* PhD student, National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Faculty of Communication and Public Relations, Bucharest, Romania, e-mail: asernica@yahoo.com. Beneficiary of the “Doctoral Scholarships for a Sustainable Society”, project co-financed by the European Union through the European Social Fund, Sectorial Operational Programme Human Resources and Development 2007-2013.

212). If in the past, marketing has conventionally been viewed by civil servants as, at best, irrelevant and, at worst, antipathetic to the delivery of public services (Laing and McKee, 2001: 560-574), reforms started in the eighties mostly in the western countries, encompassed broadly under the term of New Public Management (NPM), have changed this.

It is increasingly obvious that the higher expectations of the citizens from the public sector become factors of change. Matei, Matei (2010: 207) said that “today we assist at a change of behaviour of the “governmental authority responsible for public service delivery”, determined fundamentally by financial constraints, pressures exercised by “market turbulence”, accelerated and intense competitiveness leading to consumers’ fragmentation, by the new wave of “green movement” inviting the citizens to consume more responsible or by the citizens’/ consumer’s need for information; in the last decade the consumer was identified as an active “partner” of the marketing process, playing a role of catalyst”.

A new relation between administration and society has been developed, involving greater transparency and citizen participation. The traditional administrative structures should develop the capacity to adapt continuously to the changing conditions in order “to protect” the governance action and public service delivery (Ibidem).

Adopting private inspired approaches in management and delivery of public service has inherently brought more attention to the concept of marketing and its significance for the public sector (Laing, 2003: 428-440). Another issue brought by the reforming movements was a different approach to public administration altogether, a more flexible, open, close to citizens’ administration, capable of doing more with less, and responding to the changing context (Tigănaş, Țiclău, Mora and Bacali, 2011: 213).

This means new type of leadership, different from the traditional bureaucrat. It is in this view that we feel leadership and marketing are indirectly linked, as part of a comprehensive change of the public sector that has been taking place in the last three decades.

Table 1 provides a summary of the terms used by different commentators of the roles of leadership.

Table 1. Leadership Roles Emphasized by Different Scholars

	Hierarchical leadership		Market leadership		Network leadership	
	Bureaucrat	Steward	Manager	Entrepreneur	Leader	Professional
(Steen&Van der Meer, 2009)			Manager			Professional and policy advisor
(Van Dorpe, Randour, Hondeghe, & de Visscher, 2011)	Bureaucrat		Manager		Leader	Professional, Policy advisor
(Uhl-Bien, Marion,& McKelvey, 2007)	Administrative leadership			Adaptive leadership	Enabling leadership	
(Fernandez, Cho, & Perrz, 2010)		Diversity-oriented leadership	Task – oriented leadership	Change-oriented leadership	Relations-oriented leadership	Integrity-oriented leadership
(Frederikson& Matkin, 2007)				Change agent	Gardener	
(Debis, Langley, & Rouleau, 2007)		Stewardship		Entrepreneurial (transformational)		

Source: Adapted after Van Wart M., Hondeghe A., Bouckaert G. and Ruebens S. (2012: 7)

The role of the leader is mostly focused on people rather than on the task. Internally, the important needs of coaching, motivating and developing are emphasized (Van Dorpe, Randour, Hondeghem, & de Visscher, 2011). It is the internal part of relations-oriented management that focuses on a supportive leadership style (Fernandez, Cho, and Perry, 2010: 309-321). People oriented behaviors are critical for leaders, such as consulting, team-building, and conflict resolution. Leaders understand that the work of the organization is done by subordinates who are a critical resource for the success of the agency and must be nurtured as much as possible. Externally, the role of leader is about good relations with outside groups and cooperative partnerships (Van Wart, Hondeghem, Bouckaert and Ruebens, 2012: 8). This leads to a collaborative style.

Improving the activities of the public organisations makes more and more reference, in the last decades, to adopting and adapting the instruments that the private sector is using in order to carry out its activity more efficiently (Matei, Matei, Dinu, 2009, p.18). From the practices transferred from the private to the public sector, we emphasize: measuring and assessing the activities, cost-benefit and cost effectiveness analyses, subcontracting (Kotler, Lee, 2007: 8-9) etc.

Marketing can be also an important tool for public leaders to promote their organizations interests and objectives in relation to other institutional or political stakeholders. Still the same reluctance and critiques that are put forward for adopting some private specific “elements” prevail against adopting marketing.

One of these critiques is that marketing does not have a purpose in the public sector, as both values and objectives are different in the public arena – this in accordance to the differences presented above. The reluctance of public sector professionals to embrace marketing principles can be viewed as being based on the perception that the public sector and the services it delivers are unique and distinctive, and an adherence of public sector professionals to established transactional conceptualizations of marketing (Laing, 2003, p. 429). But this does not mean that marketing cannot find a useful place in public sector practice, but rather that it needs to be adapted to its specific context. In fact, not few public services have gone “private” in the last three decades, through privatization, public private partnerships, contracting out or concession, and in such an environment marketing seems almost natural.

2. The Decentralization Process in Romanian Public Sector

After 1990, in Romania took place the process to redefine the role of central government related to local government, the political and administrative competences delegated to local government, the necessary sources as well as the performance of the decentralization and strengthening the local democratic governance. 1990 represents the beginning of the construction of a decentralized system, marked by legislative, institutional, political, economical reforms. Decentralization started in the moment of adopting the Constitution of Romania in 1991, assumed the reorganisation of competencies and responsibilities at local government level, exerting power by different actors and partial loss of the macroeconomic control exercised by the central government (Matei, Vázquez-Burguete, 2011: 9).

The organization of administration in Romania comprises communes, towns and counties with the possibility to declare some towns as municipalities (art. 3(3), Constitution of Romania, 2003). The communes (2.851), towns (216), municipalities (103) and counties (42, including Bucharest Municipality) are territorial-administrative units, where local government authorities shall be organized and will function, and “public administration in administrative

territorial units is based on the principles of decentralization, local autonomy and deconcentration of public services” (Title III – “Public Authorities”, Second section: “Local government”, art. 120, paragraph (1), Constitution of Romania), eligibility of the local government authorities, legality and consultation of citizens in solving local matters of particular interest (art. 2(1), Law no. 215/2001).

As shown by principles, decentralization is a system for administrating the local, commune, town or county interests by authorities, freely elected by the citizens of the respective community. It is a system of administrative organization, enabling to the human communities or public services their self-government, under state control, awarding them legal personality, enabling them to constitute own authorities, endowing them with the necessary resources (Law no. 51/2006 on community services of public utilities). The decentralization process has not been easy, assuming a specific legislation and an adequate organizational structure, on one hand, and procedures for the local autonomy, on the other hand (Matei, Vázquez-Burguete, 2011: 9-10).

The term of public marketing can be approached from more prospects: economic, business, client, social, all correlating the public organizations direction, carried out in an assembly of planned, programmed and developed activities, using specific methods and techniques, with the aim to meet the tax-payers needs and/or to promote some expected behaviors within the communities that represent the target market.

3. Perceptions of Leadership in the Romanian Public Sector

The concept of leadership is neither new nor foreign to the public sector in Romania. It has been frequently discussed in the literature concerning the business management. However, in Romania, the issue of leadership promotion has not been highlighted in detail. While defining the leaders’ role as agents of change, it has been noted that the importance of leadership depends on the state of the society, on the structure of the public institutions and on the type of reform that is being adopted: developing leaders is more important in a diversified society than in a homogeneous one, because leaders are required to submit new values, to mediate conflicts and to create coalitions in order to support the reform; leaders are more important in a decentralized and branched administrative structure than in a centralized and hierarchical one.

The topic of reducing the bureaucratic expenses was introduced recently on the working agenda of the public authorities. The Governance Programme 2009-2012 stipulates the elimination of the administrative barriers through: elaboration of simple, clear and stable legislation; simplification of formalities on companies entrance and exit from the market; reduction of administrative procedures on obtaining authorisations, approvals and certificates (Matei, Matei, Dinu, 2009: 23).

Leadership means different things to different people. In the past, for many, the image of a leader was that of a wise, paternalistic person, who takes all the decisions and conducts the public organization all by himself. The image of leadership is based on the historical requirements and on the characteristics of the society and of the governments that serve them. The society of Romania, however, becomes more diverse and the public institutions are thus more flexible. The new situations that have emerged require new types of leaders.

Leadership plays an important role in the implementation of the reform because it involves two of the most important aspects of the reform: the change and the people. Leadership occurs only in relationships between people. Effective leaders inspire people.

Changing public institutions really means changing the mentality and behavior of the employees, which means that the institutions undergoing reform need leadership.

Leaders within the public institutions can help spread, promote and maintain the new values that are necessary for a successful reform of the public sector. While the public leadership clearly includes the central administration leaders, as well as the political leaders, the vision over leadership in the future tends to become wider. This includes leaders as agents of change spread amongst public organizations to continue the reform process. Leaders prove to be effective by their ability to persuade, to motivate public servants and to direct their efforts for a common cause.

In Romania, the concept of leadership is still on the periphery of the debate, both in the private companies and in the public sector. Regarding the status of the leaders within the public organizations we are dealing with a consistent set of myths: the decision making is rational, leaders control all aspects of the organizational life, they develop coherent strategies, they deal with all problems that occur, they benefit from complex and efficient computerized information systems and from competent advisors, etc. In reality, the issue of the leadership and the public marketing of the public organizations does not lie within such an orderly and predictable context; the characteristics of the leadership in the public administration are much more prosaic: decisions are often reactive, based on intuition and experience, the agenda is overcrowded with loads of minor (detail) tasks, thus sending the making of strategic decisions come second, while the work of the manager tends to be much less about the elements of rationality, predictability and full control.

On the other hand, it is difficult to limit the expansion of leadership only to certain levels - this position is widespread in any society. Holding a leading position involves filling a distinct place in the organizational architecture and provides access to a type of behavior and approaches that are different from those of the majority of the members (obviously, as long as they are justified by the desire of the leader to meet the common interests), this position involves responsibility and provides opportunities and benefits; and from here comes the increased sensitivity of this area and the permanent pressure exercised inside it. In any institution of the administrative system we will meet a variety of formal leaders who have authority due to the bureaucratic tradition defined by Weber; theoretically, they occupy those positions because of their proven competences, because they promote a process of rational decision and because they comply with the legal provisions.

In case study, conducted in 2008 by Cristina Mora (2008: 29-46) the desired goal was to identify the leadership style practiced in different institutions / organizations (from Transylvania, a region in Romania) that operate in the civil services domain. The study was based on a questionnaire that was applied to management and executive officials over three years: 2005, 2006, 2007. The surveyed persons activated in management positions in the following institutions and public organizations: the City Hall, the County Council, the Prefecture, the Regional Training Center for Local Public Administration, decentralized public institutions of the public administration.

The results showed that the leadership style practiced in the institutions and organizations working in the public domain in Transylvania, is an authoritarian one. Thus, these results show that the surveyed persons practiced a management close to that of compromise. There are also situational aspects that influence the managerial behavior of the persons occupying management positions. One of them is given the specific characteristics of the organization / institution. In our case, this regards the organizations and institutions working in the public domain. The author believes that in the case of the public organizations / institutions, the hierarchical organization governed by strict legal

provisions may influence the style of leadership practiced. On the other hand, she considers that other aspects that could influence the managerial behavior are related to: the degree of maturity of the subordinated persons, the degree of responsibility of the leader and the leader's philosophy about people (Ibidem).

Another conclusion concerns the leaders' performance. So far, the attempts to identify a leadership style appropriate for all situations encountered at work have failed. Although behavioral theories have attempted to demonstrate that the democratic style is more efficacious than authoritarian one, criticizing the latter, empirical studies have shown that the authoritarian style may be, in some cases (those of crisis situations), more efficient than the democratic one.

The KRW International consulting company and the Romanian-American Center of Excellence in Business have conducted a study about the perception of this concept in Romania (Lazăr, 2004: 67-68). The study shows that the Romanian companies and the Romanian administrative environment hardly internalize this concept because of the state of dominant conservatism in the mentality. The authors of the study show that to us as a leader is synonymous with having privileges and then taking responsibility. They say that Romanian people from companies and from the public sector scarcely discuss about this concept.

The absence of a functioning internal communication and the fact that Romanian managers, private or public, are afraid to delegate powers (understood by them as a delegation, assignment of privileges), engaging more in solving the tasks of their subordinates and less in their coordination, are background explanations of the low development of the leadership in Romania.

The pressures of the society, economy and external environment on the public sector in our country require more and more its awareness of its need for change at all levels of the public organizations.

4. Cultural aspects about the development of public marketing in Romania

The Romanian public sector still has to fulfill numerous conditions in order to become a modern, citizen oriented system. Marketing is one of the fundamental components in this process, not only in direct relations with citizens but as a component of strategic management. This is directly related to the leaders of the organization who have the authority to start and implement such major changes. As NPM type reforms have been implemented, administration has become more "business like" in dealing with citizens, putting the citizen in the center. This gives great opportunity for public leaders to adopt public marketing as a tool of creating an "open, user friendly and close to the citizen" administration (Țigănaș, Țiclău, Mora and Bacali, 2011: 213).

In Romania, the concept of marketing has to be assimilated by the manager of the administrative structures and his team and adopted as the basic principle in the practical activity of the civil servants and implies that the process of public administration be adjusted permanently to the actual and future requirements of the citizens, as well as their meeting with maximum efficiency. For the Romanian public administration, the implementation of marketing programs depend on what the executive authorities consider, these one being able to direct the marketing towards the social environment or the quality of the public services, related to the individuals requirements (Matei, Dinu, 2010: 224).

The practical knowledge proves that, in our country, the public institutions have as main objective the meeting of the people need for public services, but not all aim at, on the whole, the achievement of this objective. As a result, when the market does not succeed in meeting the people needs, the Romanian public institutions have to act on this direction, to

guarantee the general interest through the preservation of the public goods and to watch the good functioning of the public services market, to promote quality services, in accordance with the European standards of the European Union countries (Ibidem).

The above mentioned theoretical-methodological arguments show the necessity of utilization the public marketing in the public institutions, in general, and especially those in Romania as, its development is really fast. Under the conditions where a large number of civil servants have no minimum knowledge of marketing and are not familiar with the fundamental concepts it is difficult to change a mentality only with theoretical arguing. The results of certain marketing activities are nevertheless eloquent and allow even the winning of the most skeptical persons in the group of the promoters or those destined to form the critical mass needed to implement the new concepts.

On the another hand, in another case study, conducted in 2012 by Tigănaş, Țiclău, Mora and Bacali, the desired goal was to identify the marketing use in public organizations (Tigănaş, Țiclău, Mora and Bacali, 2011: 212-233). By using a qualitative research method based on document analysis, they have tried to identify within each institution included in the research whether practices related to public marketing exist. To better measure and analyse the concept of public marketing, they have chosen several indicators consisting in budgets allocated to marketing initiatives, activity- reports and public marketing objectives. i also have sought to draw up a complete data base classifying institutions on the criterion of hired personnel or even specific departments with marketing responsibilities (Ibid.: 212)

In the first hypothesis of the research they have affirmed that public organizations of Romania's North-Western Region have no institutionalized public marketing activity. Studying each organisational chart received we have found that 71% of the institutions replying the public information request have neither departments or offices nor employees carrying on public marketing responsibilities. This percent may be relevant enough to confirm the above enounced hypothesis at the study sample level (Tigănaş, Țiclău, Mora and Bacali, 2011: 229).

In the second hypothesis they have stated that public organizations of Romania's North-Western Region have no formal budget for public marketing activity. Analysing public budgets of all the institutions and taking into consideration periods as 2008-2010 and also 2011, we have found that 80% of the replying institutions have neither 2011 financial predictions for public marketing activities nor 2008-2010 budgets allocated to the same kind of activities. The percentages resulted by the data gathered also confirm this second hypothesis. Finally, in the third hypothesis we have stated that Romanian public organisations of the above mentioned region have no objectives including public marketing elements. Therefore, those institutions miss strategic and operational aims in this field. The percentage of replying organisations without public marketing aims is 80% which also confirms the last hypothesis (Ibid.: 230).

Through this data - hypotheses confrontation, they sought to underline the large number of Romanian public organisations unable to fulfil some basic public marketing conditions. We consider that elements as organisational structures, financial concerns, goals and activities are relevant items in order to measure the quality of public marketing within public organisations. The gathered and presented data can't be generalized neither at national level nor at regional in the Northern-Western counties because of the methodology sed. However, we feel it is illustrative for the main issue that public organizations face in adopting public marketing as a managerial tool.

Some thoughts regarding the results: (1) *Little openness towards the public* – the fact that only half of the public organizations responded to a request for public information indicates that awareness regarding the importance of transparency and openness towards the public is not sufficiently developed. One explanation could be that this type of requests are not as a priority, and along with the other data gather shows that at least the public organizations analysed are not yet prepared to adopt marketing; (2) *Little or no specific personnel* – according to the data, only around 30% of the institutions have at least one person that has marketing responsibilities according to the formal job description. This is confirming your first conclusion, public institutions do not see marketing as a top priority; (3) *Low budget allocation for marketing thus little or no activity* – both formal budgetary allocation form marketing activities in the last 3 years has been very low, with an average of around 80% which translates in little or no marketing activities and no clear marketing objectives (Ibid.: 230).

5. Discussions and conclusions

In front of the challenges and opportunities brought by globalization, in front of the rapid evolution of technology, demographic changes, rising expectations of citizens and competition from the private sector, the Romanian Government should learn to continue the exploration and exploitation of new ways to improve the situation of the public administration . Romania must call upon internal and international organizations that are prepared to use their ideas in a unique perspective in order to determine the civil servants to identify the new opportunities of the public administration.

In conclusion, leadership and public marketing depends crucially on the interaction between those who follow the head of the organization in achieving its objectives, on the management's intervention, on the recognition of this intervention and on the effective changes. All these are essential elements of the leadership.

From the conclusions derived from the presentation of the case studies analyzed i can notice that public administration leaders have as their main role solving problems and challenges that arise in the organizational environment of each institution. What is desirable for the public administration is to include people who are able to promote institutional adaptations for the public interest. Leadership plays an integral role among the resources of an institution's management, together with the recruitment and selection, the training and development, the managerial performance, the work ethics in the public service and others.

Another conclusion that i can draw is that due to the different values and basic beliefs of different societies, the leadership, the public marketing and the public sector are inevitably culturally anchored. This shows the need for the existence of a good interaction and link, in order to achieve homogeneity and their correlation in modernizing the public sector.

The public administration in Romania is under pressure to improve the provision of civil services and for a more effective cooperation. Therefore, there is an increasing demand for leaders who are able to meet the challenges arisen in the public sector's leadership and whom to carry out these tasks for the reform of the leading system through a profound change.

The public sector in Romania does not have a good diagnosis of the strengths and weaknesses of its leadership and marketing. The fact that this analysis does not exist, suggests that the leadership in the public sector needs time to develop. When the leadership and the public marketing is to be improved in the public sector, i consider, as a

result of our study, that two major challenges must be met: (1) The operating environment should promote a leadership based on a structure and culture of the public sector which should not limit and restrain the leaders who will develop a good quality leadership. (2) The provision of efficient leaders must be improved, both from the inside of the public sector and also with leaders from outside the public sector, who will be attracted by the new perspective that will be opened for them.

In the end of this paper I stress that because of the diverse values and basic beliefs of different societies, leadership and public marketing are inevitably culturally rooted. This calls for better forms of interaction and stronger links, in order to achieve homogeneity and correlation in the modernization of the public sector.

I therefore notice that overcoming the resistance to change, manifested by the public sector in Romania, is a process that takes place in several stages, with consequences on the entire system. Although these strategies are called differently by different theorists, it should be noted that none of these guarantees one hundred per cent the avoidance of the resistance created by the changes imposed, so we believe that they are more successful when combined and methodically adapted to the tailored to the particularities of the group.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bass, B. M. (1985), *Leadership and performance beyond expectations*, New York, Free Press;
- Blake, R. R.; Shepard, H. A.; Mouton, J. S. (1964), *Managing intergroup conflict in industry*, Houston, TX, Gulf Publishing Co;
- Fernandez, S.; Cho, Y. J.; & Perry, J. L. (2010), "Exploring the link between integrated leadership and public sector performance" in *The leadership Quarterly*, 21;
- House, R. J.; and Mitchell, R. R. (1974), "Path-goal theory of leadership" in *Journal of Contemporary Business*, 3(4);
- Horner, M. (1997), "Leadership theory: past, present and future" in *Team Performance Management*, 3,4;
- Kotler, Ph.; Lee, N. (2007), "Marketing in the Public Sector. A Roadmap for Improved Performance" in *Wharton School Publishing, School Publishing*;
- Laing, A.W. (2003), "Marketing in the public sector: towards a typology of public services" in *Marketing Theory*, 3;
- Laing, A.W.; McKee, L. (2001), "Willing Volunteers or Unwilling Conscripts? Professionals and Marketing in Service Organizations" in *Journal of Marketing Management*, 17(5-6);
- Lazăr Marius (2004), "Dezvoltarea leadershipului public o resursă pentru modernizarea guvernării" in *Revista Transilvană de Științe Administrative*, 1(10);
- Matei, L.; Dinu, T. (editors) (2010), *Proceedings. Regulation and Best Practices in Public and Nonprofit Marketing*, Ed. Economică, București;
- Matei, L.; Matei, A.; Dinu, T. (2009), "Marketing of local public services under the reduction of administrative expenditures" in *Theoretical and Applied Economics*, No. 3;
- Matei, Lucica; Vázquez-Burguete, José Luis (editors) (2011), "Proceedings. Permanent Study Group: Public and Nonprofit Marketing", 33rd Annual Conference of the European Group for Public Administration, Bucharest, Ed. Economica;
- Mora Cristina (2008), "Leadership și dezvoltarea organizațională în administrația publică locală din România" in *Revista Transilvană de Științe Administrative*, 1 (21);

- Stogdill, R. M. (1974), *Handbook of leadership: A survey of theory and research*, New York, Free Press;
- Țigănaș, Andrei; Țiclău, Tudor; Mora, Cristina; Bacali, Laura (2011), "Use of Public Sector Marketing and Leadership in Romania's Local Public Administration" in *Review of research and social intervention*, vol. 34;
- Van Dorpe, K.; Randour, F.; Hondeghem, A.; De Visscher, C. (2011), *Het mandaatsysteem in de Belgische federale overheid in een internationaal perspectief*, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven: Instituut voor de overhead;
- Van Wart, Montgomery , Hondeghem, Annie, Bouckaert, Geert; Ruebens, Silke (2012), "Administrative Leadership in the context of governance" in *Paper for the XVI Annual Conference of the International Research Society for Public Management - Panel on Leadership in the public sector: back to the future?* Italy: Rome, April 11;
- Yukl, G. (1994), *Leadership in Organisations*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.

DEVELOPERS OF LEADER RURAL DEVELOPMENT MODEL¹

Ileana SĂDEAN*

Abstract. *The implementation means of LEADER rural development model are unique, as response of each LAG (Local Action Group) to this new challenge. However, the most significant influence is held by the leader of the LAG, which I called “developer”. I attempted to classify the types of developers, based on the anthropological research related to the implementation of LEADER model. The three types identified were: Political, Business, Excelsior, the last being an ideal one, but not impossible to be reached.*

Keywords: *Development, Developer, Excelsior model, LEADER program self-knowledge*

By investigating the LEADER rural development model, I tried to include the **new elements introduced in the rural area along with the implementation of the LEADER model**, new institutionalizations, being external interventions connected to an “imperialism of the development models” and then to analyze the “human adventure” in the implementation process, to anticipate how the society will be transformed, which will register mutations throughout time. In order to describe and explain the external pressure factors acting on the behaviors of the developers, their actions and reactions while facing the reality, the observation and analysis of what happens throughout the interactions between the main actors involved in the implementation, to extract certain representative “elements” out of these developments, I had to permanently widen my knowledge horizon and the holistic approach of the subject without the economic, religious, symbolist and political anthropology was not possible. Religion is the most important due to the role it plays in the social change, in the culture of the Romanian rural area.

1. Anthropology – development – developers

There is a series of reasons for which the economists could use the anthropology in an attempt to understand the sources and impact of the cultural features on the development.

“Life and humanity improvement programmes often failed throughout the history especially because they lacked the reflexive-critical dimension of the anthropological approach²:

- which would balance them to the actual life conditions, behaviors, expectations, values, possibilities, etc. of a certain human group (e.g.: regional development

¹ The research was conducted between 2007 - 2013

* PhD student, National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Faculty of Communication and Public Relations, Bucharest, Romania, e-mail: ileana_sadean@yahoo.co.uk. Beneficiary of the “Doctoral Scholarships for a Sustainable Society”, project co-financed by the European Union through the European Social Fund, Sectorial Operational Programme Human Resources and Development 2007-2013.

² <http://www.scribd.com/doc/142020373/Sociologie-Antropologie>, accessed July 12, 2013

programmes, social policies, etc.)

- which would indicate the utopia degree, the non-adherence to the human reality of such projects (e.g.: traditionalism, attachment to the past, island of happy people, etc.)”

The “development” was associated with the “planning of social changes”, as an exterior intervention of a group over another group. This intervention is often under the form of projects, conscious efforts of “outsiders” to intervene in the less developed communities in order to generate positive social changes.

However, the desire to intervene in the life of other people in order to “improve” it can be dangerous. It actually hides, most of the times, an interest, egoism, need for appreciation, power, various frustrations and repressions. The impact increases along with the size of the target population. Keeping the proportions, it results the same human nature, from studying the support provided to an individual, to a small community, as well as from the observance of what happens with the models generated by the development whose goal is to improve the quality of life of other people. The ultimate goal in providing the gift, studies by Mauss, was to acquire the prestige and the consolidation of the power ratios, and not a free gift. The one who succeeded to provide the most by blocking the capacity of the other to provide back, was the one who increased his prestige and obtained a higher social rank. Apparently, the provision of the exchange had a voluntary, free, costless character, but which actually left room for the constraint, interest, obligation: “it almost always took the form of the gift, of the generously given bounty, even when the gesture accompanying the transaction is nothing but fiction, formalism, hiding the obligation and the economic character (Mauss, 1997: 46).

“The logos of the nature is expressed partially in the good tendency of the human, highlighted by Aristotle, Rousseau, but many people considered predominating the negative features of the humans: egoism, avidity, aggressiveness, pride, will to conquer and oppress the others” (Larchet Jean-Claude, 2009: 136). On the other hand, there is a religious thinking practiced by all the individuals, without any exception, in different degrees, often unconsciously. This period of the humanity tends to be dominated by an economic paradigm where “the profit becomes a supreme value and the interest represents an institutionalized motivational category, even considered to replace the human nature” (Tirca, 2012). Subsequently, the newly created behaviors and institutions cannot be treated as being insulated from this context, but being an integral part of a relation system. Describing and analyzing an institution, a custom, a behavior, “we seek to progressively discover what Lévi-Strauss calls “unconscious structure” which can be identified under the form of a different arrangement in another institution, into another custom, into another behavior. In other words, the comparison terms do not reside only in the reality of the actual empiric facts, but in the ratio systems built by the researcher as operative hypotheses starting from facts”³.

It is very important to reach to the conclusion that no matter how radical the cultural mutations can be throughout time, the human condition scarcely changes. In this case, self-knowledge becomes the most important support we can provide to humanity, and the anthropology plays a substantial role in this approach.

“Therefore the individual who wishes to have an answer to the problem of evil, as it is posed today, has need, first and foremost of self-knowledge, that is, the utmost possible knowledge of his own wholeness. He must know relentlessly how much good he

³ http://www.unibuc.ro/prof/stiucan_a/docs/res/2011noicursmetode.pdf, accessed August 2, 2013

can do, and what crimes he is capable of, and must beware of regarding the one as real and the other as illusion. Both are elements within his nature, and both are bound to come to light in him, should he wish — as he ought — to live without self deception or self-delusion (Jung C.G., 2012: 331).

Through an inductive logic, I noticed even from the first contacts with the rural area, connected to the development solutions that these interventions concealed the personal benefits and advantages of the individuals involved, who are not noticed by the well-intended people. The rural communities actually represent, most of the times, only the object and means of affirmation and personal gain of the ones playing the role of developers⁴. On the other hand, there also is the pulse of the individual to help, to do well to the others, aware of these current challenges, which they are willing to resolve.

“A strategy was elaborated from the office, for large amounts of money. We were forced to accept it. I know they did it for more than twenty LAGs and that the strategies were identical. The mirage of money. This idea of my money-box, of the president and the consultancy company generated all the shortcomings we are currently dealing with within the LAG (...). There is this temptation for the mirage of money, contracts were concluded for certain works and there were discussions which were not communicated. The acquisition part is made within a narrow circle: the coordinator with the Board of Directors or with certain individuals from the Board of Directors concluded contracts between them, externalized services, on products, purchases at unimaginable prices, then they panicked, because there also controls. Everything became a blockage. The management does not communicate with the partners. Reaching to such directing positions, they lose the notion of the territory, namely the members, the partners and ...they take care of their own benefits. For them, the mirage of money is not represented by the money for the projects, but by the operating funds, the externalized services, the acquisitions. This is what interests them. If you ask any member of our Board of Directors, no one will have a clear vision on ..., for instance, to tell you that: I have this idea for the LAG because it will be best for the territory, for the communities, for the environment, etc. On the contrary, they only focus on the fact that it has to be operational, that there is certain money to consume, but there is no vision about the development of the organization; instead, there is a clear vision that the 400 thousand euro assigned for its functioning can be consumed according to their various interests” (B.A., representative of a partner – NGO within LAG, South – West region).

“The ones from AM sent us a control. Now, the management or the style is dictatorial, contrary to the spirit of LAG⁵ and downwards approach. When you are the president and chief executive officer of the Board of Directors, I find it hard to thing that taking decisions ... there are ones which cannot be influenced... unconsciously, from the power position. The LAG team is perceived in an extremely negative manner. Because this gentleman ...He tries to direct discussions connected to applications, why and how they can be done by him. (G.N. – expert in rural development, coordinator of the LAG strategy elaboration project, South Muntenia region).

We also have to prevent these individual interests hidden under the pretext of realism used to justify the need to apply a development model from becoming for the community only the awareness of their own limits, experienced as irremediable if such a model is not applied. This approach can be dangerous because is strengthens the

⁴ Developers are generically referred to as the decision makers in the Local Action Group

⁵ LAG – Local Action Group

dependency of the communities on the individuals who “know what is best for them” and weakens the ambition and “motivation for accomplishment” of their path.

“To persuade them that benefits will be registered. Generally, I went with two of my colleagues. The satisfactions never ceased to appear. The huge gain was that we took the mayors, the private parties and the project team to France into a microregion. What does the Ț. S. gain after this visit? Our change of mentality because we were able to see why other states are so developed and things move so slow in our country” (D.G. – representative of LAG).

The developers should try and favor an autonomous behavior of people and not to take decisions instead of them or to lead them into a direction they would have never chosen by themselves or to make pressures on them in order to determine them to make options which the developers think they are right for them (for instance, to access various financings in order to accomplish the “absorption” index). The application of any development model requires a profound respect for the individuals.

“Our type of management does not classify into the pattern that the MA conceived. They measure our efficiency only with the money absorbed. *How many contracts did you conclude?* We understand that LEADER is a different thing from the absorption. Thus we complicated our existence. All say that if we made “copy-paste”, the money would have been absorbed and we would have no problems. At a certain point the truth will reveal itself and they will see that we, who complicated our existence, are a good example. But today we are regarded as the black sheep..” (M.M. - representative of LAG)

“At the Central regional conference of NFGAL⁶, from Alba, the contributors (especially the ones from the administration) said that our goal is a joint one, to obtain European funds...” (V.A., rural development NGO Director).

On the other hand, the logics of the individuals evaluating the development of the investments is separated from the one of the administrators of the funds, because for the first category, the funds represent the means to elaborate the development policies, and for the others they represent a goal in itself. A report of the World Bank, who conducted a full evaluation, at the central and regional level, of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD), of the two payment agencies (APIA, APDRP) and of the subordinated structures mentions that: “*On all the administrative fields, the operational management deficiencies represent the most important constraint of the agricultural administration and rural development concerning the effective implementation of policies and services. These are more severe than any other budgetary constraints*”.

In the microregion where we established the main research field we noticed the extremely high influence of the LAG president and it became a “strong” hypothesis that the implementation manner depends on the human, professional profile of the person coordinating the LAG. Thus, despite the fact that LEADER is a single model, the implementation was different for each individual LAG. Within this context, one cannot state that there is a generalized LEADER model at the level of all LAGs, but it only represents a power instrument in the hands of the leader directing the LAG according to his own values, beliefs and interests. As the individual acting as leader does not necessarily represent the formal position of president or manager, the database which contains information about the LAG representatives at the national level could lead to distortional result. Similarly, starting from the role of LAG representatives, we neutrally called them “developers”. The attempt to classify the main types of developers became

⁶ National Federation of Romanian LAGs

important for research in order to contribute to the implementation manners of LEADER model and then to the optimization of the implementation. The selection of the comparative approach as a methodological solution increased the representation value of research and of the added value, allowing the establishment of a typology of developers.

“You cannot affirm that a LAG is working fine and another one is not working, because each one is a sole answer to the LEADER challenge” (M.M. – LAG representative – Central region).

“The difference is made by the human nature, human quality and knowing the territory. The LAG manager is extremely important. He establishes the priorities, makes contact with the territory, with the Board of Directors, he is the middle leader (M.P. – LAG representative – N-W).

Analyzing the relation between the management type and the intervention for development, a second research field was NFLAG, as a secondary data source. The difference between “what people say” and “what people do” was high in the microregion where we analyzed the research field and, for the objectivity of the study, we also had to analyze “what people say and do” regarding the representatives of the other LAGs from the NFLAG. Thus, in order to confirm certain conclusions, towards the end of the research, we conducted eight interviews with the representatives of LAGs, which we knew, covering all the main regions of Romania, on one hand, and a wide range of typologies, of human characters, on the other hand. We analyzed the establishment process of NFLAG, we participated to their meetings, we monitored the continuous negotiation with the central institutions, the types of problems raised by each one and their vision on the reality of the development. The subjects of the interviews were the people we talked with on various meetings, the subjects debated on line on the platform of NFLAG group and during phone calls.

In the first stage, the critical (discursive) approach of what we observe as being “illegitimate” determined me to have several interventions. The lack of feedback determined me to analyze deeper, to exceed the criticism and to find out why they react in such manner. I realized that my vision did not intersect with the vision of the “developers”. What differentiates us? “The action can be understood not only logically, rationally, but also through empathy, when we can adequately grasp the emotional context within which the action took place. Thus, we can often understand through self-reflection the errors, deviations from reasoning, the confusions which we equally make” (Păunescu, 2013). The most adequate method was “role play”, “in order to understand their involvement into interactions. The analysis is no longer external, objective, but it is based on the direct involvement in the interaction situation in view of the introspective understanding and interpretation of conduits” (Ibidem). I acted in a manner in which I would be in agreement with the LAG team, but I was aware of the experiment. I wanted to find out what are their reference systems. I discovered that before we were subject to certain different values and insights. The research insight is different from the action insight.

Rationally, it is possible to act alone, but the human nature is dual, a part is inclined towards the good, and the other part towards the evil. Within the interaction with the others, we relate to the social behavior of the human being which is not superimposed on the discourse. This also applies to the development. Even if the discourse aims the positive part of the human action namely to help the others, to reduce the gaps, to improve the life quality of the others, on the arena of the interaction it also appears the other side of the human being which is not taken into consideration by the discourse: the thirst of status, of power, of recognition from the others. Why is it not possible to reach to the estimated

results before the implementation through the external intervention? Because we take into consideration the quantitative elements and to a lesser extent the qualitative elements which also include the human nature. When starting to implement, everything transforms into a battle between the categories of “developers”. Most of the times, the goal to obtain personal benefits is unconscious, but it is actually dominating. Even if they are hidden, they stimulate towards action. This is the main explanation for the existence of discontinuance between discourse and reality. The individual ignores what he cannot see.

There is the Self who mediates our relationship with the external world and the self who mediates our connection with the millenary experience and wisdom of the species. The result of the individuation process, developed with a constant personal effort, marks the progressive shift from the inexperienced and immature self, focused on his personal needs and personal desire of affirmation (sometimes regardless the manner), to the wise, altruist self, who perceives himself included into a broader context populated with alive beings.

“One of the major difficulties of the world we live in: the conflict of the ecologic civilization (focused on the personal and cultural development, in agreement with the laws of the nature) and the technological civilization (exclusively focused on profit), which, from Jungian perspective, appears only as a manifestation within the current cultural space of the archetype conflict between Osiris and Seth, described by an ancient myth. The parallel between the Osiris myth and the discursive approach which is based on the gap between the discourse and the practice is astonishing. It is the explanation of the certainty of the gap.

2. Osiris Myth

A pacifist supporter of the civilization, he taught people to grow grains and vinegar, to make bread, beer and wine. He built towns and temples and he provided all these benefits to the world, along with the joy of music and art. All these were performed without violence, through goodwill and the power of example.

However, the world is an imperfect world. Osiris has a jealous brother, Seth, who wants to obtain the power from Osiris and use it in his egocentric purposes. Osiris is an example of Anthropos and he can be understood as the representative of mankind and of the total archetype approach of the Self. He symbolizes the progress, the creative genius of our species who transformed the hunters – croppers into an agricultural civilization. Seth is totally different. If Osiris represents the self with all his life-giving creativity, then Seth is the greedy self, who embezzles the power of Osiris in order to fulfill his own greedy and destructive goals. Seth prefigures the individual who aggresses the environment in order to satisfy his egotist needs” (Stevens, 2011).

The idea resulting from the study of the development theories, from the transaction from feudalism to capitalism, from the gift theory, is that the human relations are based on the same insight (conscious or unconscious) and action mechanism. The acquisition of power, prestige and material welfare represents the goal pursued within all the social relations, regardless of time and space, both at the individual’s level and at the level of large groups or states. The solidarity manifests only in the relations within narrow groups, friend circles, family, colleagues, etc.

The archetype system regarding the care towards the others, studied by the new generation of psychiatrists with biological orientation, received the highest consideration.

“Taking care is a landmark of the human culture and there is a well founded biological reasons to this end (...) from the perspective of the modern biology, our genes

insure that we take care of the others with similar genes”, so that the genes could survive (...) Why do I have to risk my life to protect my children, siblings or cousins? The answer is that, in terms of the nature, the survival of an individual is equally important, if not more important, than the survival of his clan” (Ibidem).

If we aim to increase the welfare of people by the external intervention, we would reach to multiple conflicts due to the dependency mechanisms.

Once certain people are willing to become “developers”, persuaded of their capacity to “manage” the world towards better, their role is to discover the problems and needs of the community and to mobilize the community for their “awareness” and solution. LEADER model is only a continuation, different according to the context of the current era, of the insight manner of people who discovered fire and created tools to transform the nature in a easier manner to insure their survival.

It is obvious that indirectly, the masses are the beneficiaries of these promoting ideas, trying to adapt, without giving up to what they are. These changes through unconscious adaptations of masses represent, throughout time, a natural transformation for the Romanians. For most of the rural population, the con- or pro-development attitudes are missing. Moreover, there is the orientation of the state policy whose “strategic line” usually has precedence over the local development solutions. There is almost no possibility for the people to completely reject the development (27). The implementing manner of LEADER model is connected to the archetype manifestation of Romanian Orthodoxy. Part of the conflicts we experience in our private life can have an archetype basis, whose description we can find in an ancient myth or evangelic parable. Often, in a surprising parallel process, the society itself experiences a similar conflict, maybe into a somehow different form, but observing the same pattern. The manner in which we solve our personal conflicts and the decisions we take in our life can contribute to a development process at the collective level. It is surprisingly to find out that, in the overall mankind, the particular existence of each of us actually matters.

“In the Western civilization, Osiris finds himself sleeping into the collective subconscious, a deep sleep almost like a coma, while, in the collective conscious, Seth is loosely leading. Seth has no time for the eternal cycles of nature or for the civilized adaptation to such cycles; he subordinates everything to his own egoist needs, materialized under the form of here and now, with no concern for ecology and for the future. When the bulldozers penetrate and destroy the rural world, Seth is driving, because he does not take into consideration the consequences. Seth also rules our world. Seth is the egoist self divorced from the altruist Self” (Ibidem).

For the people whose goal is the welfare of other people, who hold the power, who lead the LAG, their features, way of thinking, motivations and interests are very important. Their area of influence is extremely wide: economic, political, ecological, social, cultural, which provides them the power. The LAG manages the financial resources, and their distribution means mostly depend on the decision of the management board. However, the decisions taken by the LAG leader are inevitably affected by the system of values, beliefs, education and personal convictions. Within this context, the impact of exercising the role of developer raises interest for research because it implies all the communities composing the territory. As we noticed on the research field and confirmed through the discussions and interviews we conducted with the representatives of LAGs from the main regions of Romania, the LAG manager (leader) has the highest influence on the implementation manger of LEADER model. The “alteration” of LEADER principle was thus produced in the implementation stage. Obviously, this is also

due to the external cases, as the delay of implementation and award of the advance payment for operation, excessive bureaucracy, pressure of the central authorities to increase the absorption, weak representation of the civil society, etc. However, all these represented challenges in front of which the LAG coordinators expressed different attitudes. A typology of “LEADER developers” resulted from the manner in which each of them reacted. We can talk about a classification, based on the existence of the dominant behaviors. Because most of them were not specialists in rural development, the analyses of the motivation types regarding the involvement of the developers represented an important criterion in their classification. By exercising the power and authority granted by their position, according to the type of motivation, we could notice several types of behaviors of the developers.

Without pretending that these are representative conclusions at the national level and the typology of the developers could be complete and final, I suggest several types of developers as hypotheses for a new research. Thus, according to their response to the external challenges, their repeatedly observed attitudes and behaviors, determined by the type of motivation, three type of developers resulted: Leader, Business and Excelsior. The classification is based on a number of 20 LAGs whose “developers” I analyzed.

- **“Leader” Developer**

- Extrinsic motivations
- Recognition from the others
- Will to lead and change
- Conviction that he can satisfy certain development needs of the communities
- Prestige and power

This category includes in particular the ones who reached a high level of economic and social development and represent a landmark for the community. The “leader” developer is the supporter of the main ideas of the modernization theory: that the development sources are external for the developing countries, as Romania, the external aid and the copy of the already consecrated model would generate internal transformations through development.

- **“Business” Developer**

- Intrinsic and extrinsic motivations
- Interest to provide their specialized services, the rural being a profitable sales market starting from the will to improve the life conditions of the rural communities
- Attachment towards the community
- Protection of communities against the external political influence, regarding the sense of the development.

This category includes specialists from other fields than rural development, but which are related to the rural: ecology, energy, economy, agriculture, truism, etc. The following situation corresponds to all these motivations:

- Democratic and participative management
- Diluted power and authority
- Apolitical

The “business” developer considers that the external interventions are sources of underdevelopment, that a subordination relation of the LAG towards the “Center” is created through the financing received. Thus, he supports the ideas of the dependency theory “that the Central countries impose the *dependency relation* on the **O**utskirts countries, and the exit from underdevelopment would consist in the activation of the internal resources of economic and political resources” (Vlăsceanu, 2001).


“...And you do not become the slave of PNDR⁷. Actually, the LAG no longer implies sustainable development, but it applies the PNDR. Or, we are extremely happy that we are not in this situation. We have more punctual projects, more normal and more necessary in the territory than the projects we would have been imposed if we had been financed. They would have been imposed through PNDR, namely you had to apply all kind of measures they wanted, measures which most of the time did not comply with the needs of the territory” (C.T. – representative of a LAG non-financed through LEADER axis, N-W region).

- **“Excelsior” Developer**

- Transcendent motivations (Perez Lopez)
- Will to be at the service of the welfare of others

This category includes the ones with a religious insight. The nonconformism towards the authorities is their specific feature, using the power in social purpose.

The selection of this typology, especially the “Excelsior” theme described above is affected by the personal scale of values, personal experiences and research experiences.



The elaboration of “Excelsior” resulted following multiple experiences and experiments I conducted through out-door techniques, through the participation as observer, in more than ten organizations with social – charitable profile, implementation of projects in the rural field. With each experience I discovered the characteristic feature of the humanity, of self. It was also a process of systematic knowledge in anthropological sense of the types of interests behind the “generously” aid provided to the different categories of under-privileged people, ending this classification with the research of the issue represented by the development of the rural communities, of the concrete aspect observed in the LEADER rural development model.


I noticed an important symbolist similarity between the model I built and the poem “Excelsior” illustrated by a chess study. Thus, the name I assigned to the developer originates from the message of the poem and of “Excelsior!” game study, detailed below.

⁷ PNDR – National Rural Development Plan

Experiences (Game development) → Self-knowledge (reaching the pawn transformation field) → Vocation (transformation into queen) → Maximum results (Wining the game) and the cycle is retaken in life, reaching higher and higher points: Excelsior !

“Excelsior” subject – as a comparison degree in Latin, used with a broader sense of desire to obtain more, captivated Vladimir Korolkov who illustrated the lyrics of “Excelsior” poem written by the American poet Wadsworth Longfellow with the moves of his study. When the pawn reaches on the transformation field, it becomes queen and the game is won.

The presentation means of the stages in “Excelsior” developer scheme is a symbolic one, representing the “life arena” through a chess board, and the developer through the traveller represented by the pawn. The game study is one where the battle is decided only by a pawn, which advances upwards on the transformation field. The inconvenient of this comparison can result from the necessity of knowing the language and the chess game.



*The shades of night were falling fast,
As through an Alpine village passed
A youth, who bore, 'mid snow and ice,
A banner with the strange device,
Excelsior!*

1. b:c3+ We cannot use 1:b7 because the black plays 1...e1 Queen+ and wins. We cannot use 1.Kc2 e1 Queen 2.b:c3+ Kc5 3.c:d4+ e:d4 and the black wins **1...Kc5** After 1..K:c3 2.Qb3 chess mate and after 1...Kc4 2.Qb3+ Kd3 3.Qc2+ Ke3 4.Qd2+ Kf 3 5.Qd3+ Kg2 6.Q:e2 and white wins.

*In happy homes he saw the light
Of household fires gleam warm and bright;
Above, the spectral glaciers shone,
And from his lips escaped a groan,
Excelsior!*

2.c:d4+ Does 2.Kb2 lead to a fast loss? **2...Kd6**. If it had taken the pawn from d4. the black king would have been exposed to chess with queen on b2 and after Ke3 3.Qd2+ With known wining maneuver. If 2.. e:d4 3.Qf5+ With win at 2...Kc6 3.Qc2+

*"Try not the Pass!" the old man said;
"Dark lowers the tempest overhead,
The roaring torrent is deep and wide!"
And loud that clarion voice replied,
Excelsior!*

3.d:e5+ Other moves lose in front of the transformation threat in queens of the pawns e and f. **3...Ke7** Eliminating the pawn in e5 would allow the white to have chess with the queen on b2 and to win the black pawns e and f.

*"Oh stay," the maiden said, "and rest
Thy weary head upon this breast! "
A tear stood in his bright blue eye,
But still he answered, with a sigh,
Excelsior!*

4.e:f6+ Kf8 If 4...g:f6 5.Qe4+. If 4...Kf7 5.Qb3+ Kg6 6.Qg3+

*"Beware the pine-tree's withered branch!
Beware the awful avalanche!"
This was the peasant's last Good-night,
A voice replied, far up the height,
Excelsior!*

5.f:g7+ After 5 Kh7 f1Queen+. **5...Kg8**

*At break of day, as heavenward
The pious monks of Saint Bernard
Uttered the oft-repeated prayer,
A voice cried through the startled air,
Excelsior!*

6.g:h8+Queen+. No 6 Qb3+ because of the answer 6...Nf7 7.b7 e1Queen+ 8.Kb2 Qe5+ 9.Ka3 f1Queen 10.b8Queen+ Q:b8 11.Q:b8+ K:g7 tie game.

*A traveler, by the faithful hound,
Half-buried in the snow was found,
Still grasping in his hand of ice
That banner with the strange device,
Excelsior!*

6.K:h8

*There in the twilight cold and gray,
Lifeless, but beautiful, he lay,
And from the sky, serene and far,
A voice fell like a falling star,
Excelsior!*

7.Qb2+ Kg8 8.Q:e2 and the sacrifice of the pawn offers the white its expected victory...

In order to express the reality, I selected the symbolist method. Thus, the symbol becomes a support for knowledge, not through what it expresses, but rather through what it does not express. The symbol does not determine the reality, but it aims it. Anthropology cannot be an impulse, something normative, but it is meant for “those who want to hear it”. What it is intended to be expressed in a symbolist manner, through the anthropological research, is not an apriori intention, because we would only have an arrogant way, full of allusions and insinuations. Thus, the symbol expresses more, although it is not an actual expression, a “complete expression”⁸.

All the empirically observed manifestations, correlated with the theory, reunite into an accumulation of internalized symbolic representations of the individuals involved. The symbolist representation of Excelsior development model helps me to optimally express my ideas.

From another perspective, I also emphasize the anthropological character of the behaviors from the evangelic parable of Christianity, because as Simone Weil says, “before being a “theory of God”, a theology, the Gospels are a “theory of the human”, an anthropology” (Rene, 2006) I selected this parallel because even if at the unconscious level, as Romanians, we relate to the values of the orthodoxy, although it is certain that the modernity profoundly marked the Christian way of thinking.

“Excelsior” developer represents a model compatible with the Christian insight for the promoters of the social transformations, supporters of the development models, but especially for the individuals who are responsible to implement them. In Christianity, the symbol of the human perfection is represented by Jesus Christ. Thus, in order to describe the fundamental features of the developer, in perfect agreement with the above mentioned ones, I also use the symbolist representation of the three gifts offered by the Magi when Christ was born, predicting what He will become: king, saint and martyr symbolized by: gold, frankincense and myrrh.

The same gifts are also attributed to the human being. In the theological anthropology of Saint Maxim, “the perfection of the human nature is a goal which was already achieved, but only at a potential or ideal level. Thus, this perfection of nature corresponds to an achievement or fulfillment ideal of itself which it bears and towards which it tends, and which is the resemblance with Jesus Christ. According to Saint Maxim, the human was created by naturally embedding the determination and all the capacities to allow him to reach this finality, these capacities being naturally and dynamically oriented towards it” (Larchet, 2013).

⁸ <http://www.crestinortodox.ro/editoriale/cunoastere-simbol-crestinism-70015.html>, accessed July 17, 2013

“The fact that he is part of the team is a motivating factor. Without receiving any payment, just to be a part of it, to be a motivating factor. To have experience in rural development, to had traveled throughout the world. The communities who want to be innovative and want to solve their problems need individuals who had traveled throughout the world: If they have not settled down yet, if they still have this urge to leave again and again, to keep searching, then ... no. They have to be the individuals who are satisfied with their current status and condition and to be happy to be a part of the team. To respect the other individuals who come here. No rural development can take place with individuals who only come to make a living.” (M.M. – LAG representative, Central region).

Starting from “Excelsior” developer, the Excelsior development model is based on the idea that each individual has to develop among and along with the others, the harmonious and constructive relations between them being extremely important. There are also intersection points with McClelland’s development model in terms of the “motivation for fulfillment”.

“Excelsior” and “Business” developer correspond to a numerous and voluntary team, displaying the features from the following table, being opposed to the ones of a LAG with “Leader” developer. The LAG where I conducted the main field is part of this category, with “Leader” developer.

Table 1. The differences between the two are related to the following aspects

Criteria	Reduced numerical team and paid (theory of modernization)	Numerous and voluntary team
Involvement manner	Few and increased	Many and reduced
Motivation	Mostly based on extrinsic components	Mostly based on intrinsic components
Level of external constraint	Large and institutional E.g. Fulfilling the indexes; subordination towards the superstructures; PNDR measures; hyper-regulation	Reduced and cultural E.g. To keep the pace with the others
Decision taking regarding the strategic development directions	Short decision time Restrained group	Longer timeframe Large group
Participation degree of communities	Reduced	Increased
Change of paradigm from “developed” into “developing” (downwards approach)	The idea that someone is behind the development is induced. Distribution of power, unequal. It is directly interested in the implementation of LAG operating project	It develops through the conjugated efforts of the community using more efficiently the endogenous resources
Types of projects	Especially aimed on the individual projects Reduced capacity to identify and support the potential beneficiaries Conflict of interests Ballast effect	Aimed on projects which would respond to certain joint and diversified needs Creation of infrastructures, networks, association
Type of discourse	• Establishes the characteristics of a project,	• Natural process

Criteria	Reduced numerical team and paid (theory of modernization)	Numerous and voluntary team
on the development, project vs. process	development, due to the operation of the team as project <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Imposed • Subjectivity 	• Objectivity
Level of credibility	Variable, oscillating	Increasing throughout time
Transparency	Reduced	Increased
Organizational culture	Influences the implementation of Leader approach	Democrat, participative
Partnership	Formal Based on interests	Real, constructive Synergic

In conclusion, anthropology can play an important role in the professional training of the development agents. The advantage of an anthropological insight for the developers consists in the possibility to prevent the clichés and stereotypes regarding the local communities, abounding in development projects. Another set of advantages for the development agents would be noticed in the transformation of their relation with the people from the rural area, in almost completely reducing the long-term negative social – economic impact and eliminating the manipulation forms, which conceal a profound ignorance in terms of the beneficiary communities.

Most of the times, the negative effects of the development projects are due to the absence of the preliminary studies, of information about the local actual situation, the immense volume of the procedures provided by the financier, the incompetence of the individuals from the institutions responsible with the implementation and the ethnocentrism of the foreign experts, etc.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bădescu, Ilie, (2011), *Sociologie rurală*, Mica Valahie, București;
- Durand, Gilbert (2006), “Știința despre om și tradiția” in *Ideea Europeană*, București;
- Girard, René (2006), *Prăbușirea satanei*, Editura Nemira, 2006;
- Larchet, Jean-Claude (2009), *Inconștientul spiritual*, Editura Sophia, București;
- Levi-Strauss, (2011), *Antropologia și problemele lumii moderne*, Editura Polirom, București;
- Maslow, Abraham H. (2007), *Motivație și personalitate*, Editura Trei, București;
- Neamțu, Mihail (2010), *Zeitgeist: tipare culturale și conflicte ideologice*, Editura Curtea Veche, București;
- Rotilă, Viorel (2011), *Omul societății de consum. În așteptarea unei noi ideologii*, Institutul European, Iași;
- Șerdakov, V.N., (1988), *Iluzia binelui*, Editura Politică, București;
- Todorov, Tzvetan (2009), *Viața comună: eseu de antropologie generală*, Editura Humanitas, București;
- Țuțea, Petre (2007), *Tratat de antropologie creștină*, Timpul, Iași;
- Von Mises, Ludwig (2011), *Mentalitatea anticapitalistă*, Editura Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, Iași;

THE EFFECTS OF THE 2008 ROMANIAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM ON CANDIDATE BEHAVIOUR. EVIDENCE FROM THE LAB

Andra-Maria ROESCU *

Abstract. *The purpose of this study is to analyse the probability a candidate has of winning a seat on the proportional tier of the new mixed-member Romanian electoral system, as an intermediary step in studying entry decisions making. Given that the entry decision is based on the probability of winning, the benefits of office and the costs of entry (Cox 1997), I argue it is necessary to first define the probability of winning under the new system before moving on to wider questions as the one of entry. The reason why probability is so difficult to define under the new system is the complexity of the seat distribution. If candidates did not get to run in a safe single member district (SMD) where they would most likely get the majority of votes, then they have to enter this complex distribution process which takes account of multiple factors including aggregate party results, characteristics of the SMD and counter-candidate results. Thus, at this level intra and interparty competition coexist and determine a candidate's chances of winning a seat. Furthermore, because SMD characteristics also enter the equation, running in one SMD or another also contributes to the chances of success of the individual candidate. Therefore, the study first looks to define viable SMDs for the proportional tier for particular candidates and then to determine the extent to which candidates are actually able to identify these SMD and choose them if given the chance. As the system has only been applied twice, in 2008 and 2012, and thus few data are available, in order to analyse these aspects, I use laboratory experiments to simulate elections in a mixed-member district (MMD) with 5 SMDs, where 3 parties with 5 candidates each run for office. In order to identify the effects of the new electoral system on the candidates' chances, I contrast the findings against results under the plurality voting rule, using the same setting.*

Keywords: *Romanian electoral system, electoral studies, lab experiments, voting rules*

According to Duverger (1951), electoral systems impact results both through the mechanical effects – the way the system transforms votes into seats and also through the psychological effects – mainly the voters' strategic response in anticipation of those mechanical effects. However, not only voters can anticipate the mechanical effects and be

* PhD student, National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Faculty of Communication and Public Relations, Bucharest, Romania, e-mail: andra_roescu@yahoo.com. Beneficiary of the "Doctoral Scholarships for a Sustainable Society", project co-financed by the European Union through the European Social Fund, Sectorial Operational Programme Human Resources and Development 2007-2013. This research was supported by a grant from the CERGE-EI Foundation under a program of the Global Development Network. All opinions expressed are those of the authors and have not been endorsed by CERGE-EI or the GDN. This work was supported by a grant of the Romanian National Authority for Scientific Research, CNCS – UEFISCDI, project number PN-II-ID-PCE-2011-3-0746.

believed to act accordingly, parties can also anticipate these effects as well as the voters' potential response when they decide whether or not to enter the elections and where. Thus, first the parties must decide whether to enter the race at all. To do so, they must weigh the benefits of office and the probability of winning with the costs of entry and decide whether it is worth running. Secondly, they must decide whether to run in all districts or just some, where they do not suspect they will be the victim of strategic voting on behalf of the voters. In other words, where they believe voters will perceive them as non-viable and abandon them for stronger candidates, making parties waste their resources in hopeless districts.

Two main aspects must be taken into consideration when talking about the parties' strategic decisions to enter the race in some or all districts. The first one I have already mentioned, it is whether the parties are able to anticipate where and if they will be victims of strategic voting. Secondly, whether the parties have short-term goals, meaning that they only care about the outcome of the current elections or whether they are more far sighted (Cox, 1997:151). The last case is the simplest. If parties have long-term goals, then they might enter the elections and pay the cost of entry even knowing that they are going to lose. But in losing the current election they might get enough visibility, credibility etc. so as to win in the future.

But, if we assume that parties only have short-term goals and they only care about the current elections, then we must return to the question of whether parties are able or not to predict who will be the victim of strategic voting. If the parties are indeed able to predict this from previous elections, or from polls, then parties will only enter the race when the probability of winning (p) times the benefits of office (b) surpass the cost of entry (c) (Feddersen, Sened and Wright 1990). Thus, non-viable parties are expected not to enter the race, or at least not enter on their own. In this situation, no more than $M+1$ parties in total are expected to take part in the elections (Cox, 1997:152), where M is the magnitude of the district. But instead of sitting out the elections completely, non-viable parties (or candidates) can also seek to make pre-electoral coalitions, or seek to be endorsed by stronger parties and negotiate viable seats on the stronger party's list or in their winnable districts, depending on the electoral system. In this case, entry decision making becomes a two-step process. First, the non-viable party or candidates must decide whether to enter the endorsement process of a strong party and pay the cost of entry (c_0), given the probability (p_0) that they will receive the desired place of the list of the desired district. Secondly, given the place they have received, they must decide whether or not to run for office using (p), (b) and (c), described above (Cox, 1997: 160-170).

Therefore, the entry decision making process can be seen as both an inter-party issue, in deciding whether or not to enter the elections as parties and also an intra-party issue, in deciding which candidates to nominate and where. In both, the electoral system plays an important role in determining the number of entrants, their viability and their willingness to pay costs to run in the elections. But maybe the most important aspect regarding the electoral system is its influence on the probability of winning and the ability of the candidates and parties to correctly predict this probability. If the electoral system is a one-tier system, like plurality or PR and it has been used for a long time in a relatively unchanged political scene, then it should be relatively easy for candidates and parties to identify the winnable districts and predict their chances of success under established party labels. However, if the system is a mixed one, then the equation becomes more complicated. Not only do parties have to decide whether to enter the race and face all the issue described above, but they also have to decide whether they will enter both tiers or just one, assuming

that the mixed system only has two tiers. Furthermore, they have to decide whether to run in just some or all the single-member districts (SMDs) in the majoritarian tier, knowing that this decision might also impact their success in the proportional tier. This contamination effect (Moser 1999:150) generally appears if the two tiers are connected through the number of votes or seats and especially if the seat distribution in both tiers is based on the same vote (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001:1-30). But it is also likely that even when the two tiers are not connected, a strong candidate in the SMD will increase the list vote for that candidate's party in that SMD. Thus, under certain conditions, mixed-member systems might incentivise parties to nominate candidates in as many SMDs as possible, even though some SMDs might be hopeless in themselves (Ferrara and Herron 2005:17). Moreover, if both tiers are based on a single vote, voters might not be so quick to abandon these hopeless candidates, knowing that a vote for the candidate is a vote for the party and a chance at another proportional seat for that party.

Therefore, having a complex electoral system with multiple tiers, adds to the difficulty of predicting the chances of success both for the candidates and for the parties, especially given the possible contamination effects mentioned above when having a single vote for both tiers, like in the Romanian case.

It is no coincidence I am bringing up the Romanian case, as it is a very interesting one. Since 2008, Romania has implemented a mixed-member compensatory electoral system for the general elections. Although mixed, the new system uses only *one vote* for individual candidates in SMDs for both the majoritarian and the proportional tier seat distribution. The use of only *one vote*, the ranking of best-losers for the proportional tier on the bases of the *absolute number* of votes they have received, not the percentage of votes received and the condition that there only be *one* winner per SMD regardless of whether the candidate got her seat by majority or from proportional distribution¹, make party nominations and inter and intra-party competition extremely interesting and complex. This complex process raises questions regarding the viability of a SMD for a particular candidate, if no candidate is expected to receive the majority of the votes in that SMD. In other words, SMDs which are viable for the proportional tier for each party. Several factors enter in the equations, starting with the national and county level success of that party, the size of the SMD and the number of votes the party's candidate is expected to receive. The viability of proportional tier SMDs also brings up the candidates' and parties' ability to estimate the probability of the viability of such a SMD and thus decide whether or not it is worth paying the costs of entry.

Therefore, using laboratory experiments, this paper aims at answering two types of questions: the first, regarding the coordinates which increase the probability that a SMD will be viable on the proportional tier for particular parties and secondly, regarding the candidates' ability to identify these SMDs during the nomination process. To this end, the rest of the paper is structured as follows: section I describes in some detail the new Romanian electoral system and section II brings forward the main implications of this new system, with a special emphasis on parties and candidates, sections III and IV describe the main experimental design and the main results and finally section V concludes.

¹ Except of course for additional seats which, similar to the German case, are granted to parties receiving more majorities than the total number of seats they are entitled to. However, the issue of additional seats will be discussed further in section III.

1. The new Romanian electoral system

Since 2008, Romania has replaced the closed list proportional system used for the general elections with a mixed-member proportional one (Electoral law no 35/2008). The 2008 system is the result of a compromise which has ended the long debates regarding the electoral reform. The NGO Pro-Democracy (Pro Democrația) had been pushing for reform back in 1995, when they proposed a mixed system for the Chamber of Deputies and a majoritarian formula, based on single member districts for the Senate. (Pro Democracy, 2008: 19). Since 1995, several unsuccessful campaigns have been carried out by Pro-Democracy in the attempt to gather the necessary number of signatures (250000) to promote the electoral reform to Parliament as a citizen initiative. Although unsuccessful, these attempts have raised awareness among the members of the political parties regarding the necessity of electoral reform. As a result, by 2006 a Parliamentary Commission was appointed to draft a new electoral law. In 2007, the debates concerning the reform amplified, when president Basescu threatened to organise a referendum on the electoral reform if parties could not agree on the content of the new law. To help with the reform process, Pro-Democracy had a series of informal debates with the leaders of the main political parties, the result of which was the draft law that the appointed Parliamentary Commission put forth to the Chamber of Deputies in September 2007. Because by the middle of October the two chambers had still not reached a decision, and president Basescu was again threatening to organise a referendum on the law, the National Liberal led government decided to assume responsibility² and pass the law on the 29th of October.

Even though the government assumed responsibility for the law, the president decided to organize a referendum on the 25th of November, the same day as the first European Parliamentary elections. However, the referendum would not refer to the project assumed by the government, but to the classic two-round majority system, an alternative proposal also considered by the Social Democratic Party back in 2003. The referendum was invalidated due to the low turnout rate (26.51%).

After the referendum, debates regarding the reform continued as two articles of the law assumed by the government were declared unconstitutional, sending the law back to Parliament. The articles declared as unconstitutional referred to the use of a spare national list for the case in which a party would win more seats than the district had to offer, through national redistribution. The argument offered was that these people would become MPs without having been elected by the citizens, going against the spirit of the Constitution (Decision of no.1177/12.12.2007 of the Constitutional Court).

During this last round of negotiations, several aspects of the Pro-Democracy project have been altered. First of all, parties were no longer able to nominate more than one candidate per SMD. Secondly, candidates in the SMD tier would not be elected according to the plurality rule. Finally, no spare national list would be allowed (Pro-Democracy, 2010).

Under the new Law 35/2008, which was finally passed in March 2008, elections are organized in 43 multi-member districts for both chambers of the Parliament (Senate and the Chamber of Deputies). Each of the 41 counties plus Bucharest city represents a

² Under Romanian legislation, assuming responsibility for a law is a provision allowing the Government to adopt laws without passing them through Parliament. Assuming responsibility may result in the termination in the Government if the Parliament strongly opposes the legislation.

multi-member district and there is another district for Romanians living abroad. In each multi-member district there are several single member districts (SMD) depending on the number of inhabitants of the county. SMD's are called uninominal colleges. The representation norm is 70.000 inhabitants for a deputy college and 160.000 for a senator college. Each multi-member district needs to have at least two senator SMDs and four deputy SMDs. The senator SMDs are composed of two or more deputy SMDs. The biggest SMD in a MMD cannot exceed the smallest SMD in the same MMD by more than 30%, the size being measured by the number of inhabitants in the colleges. Also SMDs must include only neighbour regions.

In each SMD a party or an electoral alliance can only propose one candidate. Candidates can also run independently if they supply a signature list of at least 4% of the inhabitants of the SMD where they intend to run for office. In order to obtain representation, each party needs to meet the 5% threshold at the national level, or win 6 deputy SMDs and 3 senator SMDs. The threshold increases to 7% if the alliance has two members, to 8% if it has three members and so on, not exceeding 10% in total.

The mandates are allocated to the electoral competitors (parties and alliances) in two rounds, separately for the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. The first round takes place at the county (MMD) level according to the Hare quota. More precisely, each competitor that has met the threshold receives as many mandates as the times its valid vote share at the county level is divided by the electoral coefficient of the county. The electoral coefficient of the county is calculated by dividing all valid votes in the county for all competitors that have met the threshold by the number of mandates to be allocated in the county. Then, all unallocated mandates in each county are summed up at the national level. Also, for each competitor, all unused votes are summed up at the national level, separately for the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Then, using the d'Hondt method the rest of the mandates are allocated at the national level to the competitors.

Finally, the mandates are also divided between counties. First, the unused votes of each competitor in each county are divided by the total number of unused votes for that competitor at the national level, and multiplied by the number of mandates that the competitor is entitled to according to the national redistribution. The results obtained are ordered in a descending manner, both at the national level and separately within each county. For each county, the number in the ordered list corresponding to the number of unallocated mandates in the county is the allocator of the county. Mandates are allocated in the order of the national list, each number on the list being divided by the allocator of the county it pertains to. The result is the number of the mandates that each competitor receives in this second round in each county.

After the mandates have been allocated to the competitors by county, they are also distributed by SMDs in two rounds. In the first round, a candidate receives a mandate if she got at least $50\% + 1$ of the total valid votes in the SMD where she has run for office. In the second round, a descending list of all candidates that have not received a mandate in the first round is made at the county level, by dividing the vote share of the candidate by the electoral coefficient of the county. Mandates are allocated according to the order on the list if the following two conditions are satisfied: 1) the mandate in the SMD where the candidate ran for office has not already been given to another candidate; 2) the competitor which the candidate represents still has mandates to distribute in that county (MMD). If at least one of these conditions is not satisfied, then we pass on to the next position on the list.

2. Main implications of the new electoral system:

According to Shugart and Wattenberg's (2001) definition, the new electoral system would be a mixed-member proportional one. There are two tiers. The first one, the majoritarian tier, requires candidates to obtain absolute majority (50%+1 of the valid vote) in order to win a mandate. The second tier, the PR tier, is composed of two rounds of compensatory redistribution of mandates³: first at the county level (multi-member district), using the Hare quota and then at the national level, using the d'Hondt system. The candidates entitled to obtain compensatory mandates are the best losers from the SMDs, ordered not by party or by county, but only by the absolute number of votes they have obtained. Ordering the candidates by the absolute number of votes and not the percentage of votes, makes the number of voters in each SMD a key variable in determining a candidate's chance of winning a redistribution seat. The redistribution of mandates follows the nationally ordered list mentioned above, until each party has received all the mandates it was entitled to. In redistributing mandates, the new electoral system also accounts for the SMDs where these candidates have run for office, stating that there can only be one winner in each SMD, either by majority or by redistribution. Thus, higher up candidates both in comparison to their fellow party colleagues running in the same county and in comparison to fellow counter-candidates running in the same SMD have a better chance of winning a mandate. In the first case, it is because the higher the candidate is in comparison to her fellow party colleagues, the better chance she has that the party will still be entitled to receive a mandate when her turn comes. In the second case, it is because the higher the candidate is in comparison to her fellow counter-candidates in the SMD, the better chance she has that the SMD has not yet been won by redistribution⁴ when her turn comes to receive a mandate.

There is an exception to this last rule. A SMD can have two winners, one by majority and one by redistribution if additional seats are involved. Additional seats are those seats won by parties by majority over the limit of mandates they were entitled to proportionally. In this case, the number of seats in the Parliament increases, to allow the winner of additional seats to keep them. However, additional seats pose a problem in allowing the rest of the parties to receive their compensatory mandates in the counties where the additional seats have been awarded. This is because, following the rule that there can only be a winner per SMD, if an additional mandate has been won, then one of the other parties will not have a SMD where to receive its rightful compensatory seat. In this situation, the one winner per SMD rule is waived, and the rest of the parties receive their rightful seats in the SMDs where they received the most votes, even if that SMD has already been won by majority. To make this clearer, let's take an example. Say there is a five SMD (from 1 to 5) county where three parties (A, B, C) had candidates running for office. According to the proportional distribution, party A is entitled to 3 seats, party B to 2 and party C to none. However, party A's candidates have received the majority of voter in four SMDs (from 1 to 4). Thus, party A wins SMDs 1 to 4 and party B wins SMD 5. Party B still need to receive one seat, but now all the SMDs are taken. In this case, the one winner per SMD rule is waived and party B receives its second seat in one of the first four SMDs. More precisely, it receives its seat in the SMD where it has received the most votes out of the four. Say that is SMD 2. Thus, SMD 2 will have two winners, one by majority from party A and one by redistribution from party B.

³ Minus of course the majoritarian seats obtained by each party

⁴ Assuming that the SMD has not already been won by majority

Due to the manner in which the number of compensatory mandates is calculated and due to the manner in which these mandates are distributed, we can conclude that the new system has both a vote and a mandate linkage between the two tiers. Thus, the votes that all candidates of a party have obtained, even the ones of the candidates who received the majority of votes in a SMD, are used in the PR tier. Second, the number of mandates won in SMDs is subtracted from the number of compensatory mandates each party is entitled to, ensuring the mandate linkage.

In comparison to the previous closed-list PR system that has been in place until 2008, the new electoral system does not fundamentally change the mandate distribution process among parties (Marian and King, 2010)⁵, when additional seats are not involved. However, the system does significantly change the mandate distribution logic inside each party, among candidates. Though it has been said that the new electoral system focuses on the candidates instead of the party and the party platform, the party has not lost influence, as candidates are still proposed by parties and also because a candidate's chances of winning a seat depend on the national results of the party as well as on the results of the party in the given county (i.e., MMD). Nominations are still an internal affair of the party and voters get no say as to who the nominees are. From the ballot point of view, the system is still a highly party-centred one on the intraparty dimension (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001: 36). In spite of the fact that the vote is nominal, highlighting the candidate's personal electoral strength and allowing voters to have a say in who gets elected, the redistribution mechanism in MMDs and the fact that individual mandate allocation also keeps count of the SMDs where candidates ran, make party strength both at the county and national level a key variable in determining a candidate's chances of winning through redistribution (Roescu, 2010).

Therefore, the new electoral system introduces both inter and intraparty competition at the county level, as candidates of the same party running in the same county not only compete with candidates of the other parties in the race but also with each other. If they don't receive a majority of the votes in the SMD where they are running, then their chances of receiving a mandate depend upon the number of mandates the party has in the county and upon the results of the other candidates of the same party in the constituency. Thus, on one hand they have to act as a team and gain as many votes in order for the party to receive as many mandates as possible in the two round distribution; on the other hand they have to compete with each other for one of the seats the party won in the county. Also, due to the fact that the redistribution accounts for the SMDs where candidates ran, each candidate has an incentive to try to surpass not only fellow party members but also all other opposing candidates running in the same county, even the ones in different SMDs. Furthermore, candidates are ranked by the absolute number of votes that they have received in SMDs, not by the percentage of votes, meaning that the number of people who live in each SMD and therefore the number of voters in each SMD are essential in order to discriminate among candidates.

To conclude, candidates' chances of winning are determined by personal strength both in the SMD and relative to the candidates of the rest of the SMD's in the county, but also by the strength of the party at the county and the national level. Also, the size of the chosen SMD, measured by the number of votes in the district (Popa, 2010), seems to play

⁵ Using the previous closed-list PR system to aggregate the 2008 results reveals that the mandate distribution at the party level would have been almost the same as under the new system. (Marian and King, 2010)

a key role in determining a candidate's chances. Candidates should either negotiate a "safe" SMD where they have a high chance of winning a majority of votes, or failing to do that, should go for large SMDs where they can expect to get a larger number of votes that would place them at the top of the intraparty and interparty ranking at the county level. However, candidates running in smaller colleges, where they have not received even a plurality of votes are expected to win, if their party still has mandates to distribute while the parties of counter candidates' have exhausted their mandates. This strategy might be appealing to candidates of smaller parties with lower personal strength than counter candidates from larger parties.

Returning to the entry decision making process described at the beginning of this paper and trying to apply its main points to the Romanian case, the following conclusions arise. Parties have incentives to nominate candidates in all SMDs, so as to increase their vote share and the total number of seats they are entitled to. Given the fact that losers in the majoritarian tier can still receive mandates, parties should not fear to much the possibility of being the victims of strategic voting, mainly because voters might be less inclined to abandon non-viable candidates in the majoritarian tier and even if they do, given the end results for the party, the resources invested in those candidates might not have been wasted. On the other hand, it is clear that party endorsements matter a lot for the candidate's individual success, maybe more than under a simple first-past-the-post system. For the majoritarian tier, parties matter because only candidates representing parties that have passes the threshold get to keep their seats and for the proportional tier, the parties matter because of the hole seat distribution process. Thus, not only do parties need strong candidates, candidates also need strong parties. However, simply representing a strong party might not be enough if the candidate cannot negotiate a safe SMD and must win her seat through redistribution. In this case, which SMD she negotiates, who are her fellow party colleagues in the county and who are her counter-parts in the SMD also seem to matter. Unfortunately, in Romania, the nomination process is not transparent, so hypotheses regarding nominations and the candidates' and parties' strategic decisions cannot be analysed, especially under a new electoral system which has only been applied twice. I therefore turn to the experimental methodology, trying to recreate in the laboratory the main features of the system and study candidate behaviour with student subjects. Although the design is not created to test questions regarding the conditions under which candidates will or will not enter the race, it is equipped to answer questions regarding where they should chose to enter, once they have decided to enter. This is a preliminary step, necessary in building a design that tests the candidates' willingness to pay the cost and enter the race depending on the viability of the SMD they are offered or can negotiate. Thus, the design takes the necessary steps to allow the definition of viable SMDs for the proportional tier and the candidates' ability to identify them, both part of the probability of winning, which in turn is at the base of strategic entry calculation.

3. Experimental design and hypotheses

Using laboratory experiments, elections were simulated in order to test hypotheses regarding the viability of SMDs and the candidates' ability to identify them under the new Romanian electoral system. The advantage of the experimental methodology is that it allows the alternation of the electoral rule, while holding everything else constant, in order to analyse the effects of the rule on the viability of the SMDs and on the candidates' behaviour. Thus, using the new electoral system as the treatment and the plurality rule as control, I first analyse the viability of the SMDs and the behaviour of the candidates under

the new system in comparison to plurality. The four hypotheses that I aim to test regarding the viability of the SMDs are the following:

- **H1:** *The better the position of the candidate's party in the interparty competition at the county level (MMD), the better the candidate's chances of winning a seat under the new system, as compared to plurality;*
- **H2:** *The better the candidate's position in the intraparty ranking at the county level, the better the candidate's chances of winning a seat under the new system, as compared to plurality;*
- **H3:** *The better the candidate's position in the SMD ranking, the higher his or her chances of winning a mandate under the new electoral system, as compared to plurality;*
- **H4:** *The larger the size of the SMD, the higher a candidate's chances of winning a seat under the new electoral system, as compared to plurality.*

I also add a fifth hypothesis regarding the candidates' ability to identify the SMDs which are most probable to be viable and chose them if they have the chance:

- **H5:** *The stronger a candidate is in her party and the stronger her party is in the inter-party competition, the more likely it is that she will choose a viable SMD to run for office.*

The fifth hypothesis refers to the strongest candidates in each party because, by design they have the most freedom in choosing the SMD where they wish to run for office and also the most votes in comparison to the rest of their party colleagues and their counter-candidates. Moreover, the stronger the party is in the inter-party ranking, the more seats the party is entitled to, thus increasing these candidates' chances to win. Therefore, these candidates have the best odds of winning even before choosing a SMD and only their SMD choice can further add to their chances of winning a seat.

3.1. The experimental design

Elections for each chamber of the Parliament are held separately in Romania. However, the experimental design does not discriminate between the two chambers, as it only simulates one county with 5 SMDs for which 3 parties, which 5 candidates each, are competing, regardless of the fact that they are competing for senatorial or deputy seats. I have chosen to simulate a 5 SMD county because the constraints of the new electoral system are clearer when the number of SMDs increases. A 5 SMD county would only correspond to a deputy MMD, as no Senate MMD has so many SMDs. However, the same conclusions should also be applicable for the Senate⁶, even though they would probably be harder to notice. Secondly, the experiment only simulates one county, leaving aside the national level which clearly has its own influence in real elections. Thus, the experimental setting is a simplified version of the real electoral setting, making it easier to observe whether the players (candidates) are able to develop strategies in order to increase their chances of winning mandates. Thirdly, with respect to the new electoral system, the experimental setting only simulates the mandate distribution among SMDs, after the county and national mandate distribution between parties has taken place and the number of mandates that each party is entitled to in that county is known. By design, no candidate (player) can ever gain the majority of votes (points) in the SMD where she ran for office. Therefore, under the new electoral system, the experiment only simulates the allocating of

⁶In practice, no county except Bucharest has this many senatorial SMDs. Most counties have 2 or 3 senatorial SMDs, overlapping 2 deputy SMDs each.

compensatory mandates among candidates⁷, which corresponds to the proportional tier. The decision to simulate only the compensatory seat allocation, is due to the fact that the design is aimed at investigating the strategic behaviour of candidates from SMDs that are rather competitive and do not ensure a comfortable majority for any of the candidates running in that district.

The experimental setting builds on the assumption that under the new electoral system, choosing a particular SMD to run for office partly determines the candidates' chances of winning a seat. For this purpose, groups of 15 randomly chosen subjects have been used. The group of 15 was then further divided into 3 random groups, each representing a party with 5 members. Then, a total number of votes were randomly assigned to each party, votes which were further randomly distributed between the members of the party. In real elections, these would be the approximate vote shares that each party and each candidate expects to win in the elections, based on opinion polls or on the results of the local elections, which take place only a few months before.

Votes were randomly assigned to parties and candidates in order to be able to rank the parties and the candidates inside each party. By design, there would always be a strict hierarchy between the three parties and within each party. Table 1. below illustrates the initial, randomly assigned, distribution of votes both among parties and also among candidates. As the table indicates, the initial distribution gives an advantage to the first ranked candidates of each party over their party colleagues and over the rest of the counter-candidates.

Table 1. *The initial number of votes that each party and each candidate were randomly assigned at the beginning of each experimental round*

Candidates	Parties		
	1st Ranked (votes)	2nd Ranked (votes)	3rd Ranked (votes)
1st Ranked	1400	1500	1200
2nd Ranked	1350	1100	1120
3rd Ranked	900	950	820
4th Ranked	850	890	780
5th Ranked	800	750	760

Then, when simulating the new electoral system, one of the two possible distributions of the 5 seats between the three parties was randomly drawn. The two possible distributions were 2-2-1 and 3-1-1, the number of seats each party was entitled to being determined by the random party ranking done at the previous step. For example, if the distribution was 2-2-1, then the first two ranked parties were entitled to two seats each, while the third only got one seats. The random distribution was necessary when simulating elections under the new electoral law, as the design only simulate one county, making it otherwise impossible to determine the number of seats each party is entitled to after the real elections national redistribution.

The distribution, the total number of votes of each party and the vote distribution between the members of each party were written on the blackboard for everyone to see, including the members of competing parties.

Finally, each member of each party was asked to decide in which of the 5 SMDs in the county she would like to run for office, knowing that: SMD I increases the number

⁷According to the 2008 results, only about 25% of all winning candidates received a majority of the votes in the SMD where they ran for office, while the rest received compensatory mandates, in accordance with the party's strength at the county and national level.

of votes of the candidate by 20%, SMD II by 10%, SMD III does not alter the number of votes, SMD IV decreases the number of votes by 10% and SMD V by 20%. For example, if the first ranked candidate from the first ranked party, who initially had 1400 votes, chose SMD I, when her final vote count would become 1540 votes, 20% more than her initial count. The vote variation that each SMD produces accounts both for the difference in size of the SMDs and also for any personal electoral strength or weakness that a candidate might have in comparison to those of the party. It can also alter the final intraparty ranking used for the seat distribution.

Each experimental group made this choice, knowing what voting rule was in place. The two simulated rules, plurality and the new electoral system, were alternated, each one having been played half of the time.

A further variation was made. Half of the time SMDs were selected in an ordered way, known to all, starting with the first ranked member of the first ranked party and the other half of the time, party members negotiated among themselves the SMD each member would place herself in, without knowing how the members of the other two parties would do this, but knowing their total number of votes and the vote distribution between the members.

Financial incentives were provided to the participants as a function of the number of mandates that each of them won. Each mandate won was rewarded with 5 lei, which would be a little over what the minimum income per hour is in Romania. In order to raise the stakes of the game, the first three participants with the most mandates won receive a bonus of 15 lei (a little under 5 euro). As the participants were students, they also received some extra credit⁸ for showing up and taking part in the experiment, regardless of the number of mandates they won.

Finally, a post-experimental online survey was filled out by the participants. First, the survey measured the participants' knowledge regarding the two electoral rules used in the experiment. Secondly, the participants were asked to describe the strategies they employed during the experiments: whether they thought that strategies to improve their chances of winning a mandate existed, and if so, which strategies would those be and whether they had employed any during the experiment.

4. Experimental results

Two groups of 15 students have been used for this experimental design. The 30 students were randomly divided into two groups. A total number of 6 elections were simulated for each group of 15 students, three under the plurality rule and three under the new electoral system. Both groups played both rules in turns. However, it was randomly decided which group would begin with the new electoral system and which would begin with plurality, to account for any effect that would be induced because of the order in which the two rules were played.

Each group was explained the rules of the game and each participant received an instructions sheet with the same explanations. Then, they received an example of the application of the two rules on a fictive situation and each group also played a test round under the new electoral system to make sure that all participants have understood the rules of the game.

⁸ In Romania courses are organized in lectures and seminars. Students typically receive 50% of their grade by taking a final exam and 50% by completing homework assignments and actively participating in seminars. They received an extra point to the seminar grade for taking part in the experiment.

I employ a logit model in order to test the four hypotheses regarding the viability of the SMDs. The dependent variable is whether a candidate has won a seat or not and the independent variables are the size of the SMD, the candidate's position in the intraparty ranking, the candidate's position in the SMD ranking and the party's position in the interparty ranking. I have also included an interaction effects between the voting rule and the other independent variables. I have chosen to use a single regression model and include the voting rule as a dummy variable instead of doing two separate regression models because there were only two experimental sessions so far and the number of cases is relatively small.


Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(> z)
(Intercept)	5.1730	0.7259	7.126	0.00 ***
Party ranking	1.3696	0.7397	1.851	0.06.
SMD size	0.2003	0.3665	0.547	0.58
Ranking in SMD	-5.8595	1.4304	-4.096	0.00***
Ranking in party	0.2062	0.5240	0.394	0.69
R in party * rule	-1.2192	0.5510	-2.213	0.02 *
R in SMD * rule	5.0605	1.4363	3.523	0.00 ***
SMD size * rule	-0.3435	0.3952	-0.869	0.38
Party R * rule	-2.2251	0.7736	-2.876	0.00**

Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

As expected, the results seem to indicate that except for SMD size, all other variables taken into account have a significant impact on the candidate's chances of winning a seat. However, the effect depends on the voting rule in place. Therefore, I further interpret the results using predicted probabilities to make sense of these effects under each voting rule.


H1: The better the position that the candidate's party holds in the interparty competition at the county level, the better the candidate's chances of winning a seat under the new system, as compared to plurality;



As the graph indicates, the interparty ranking makes little difference under the plurality rule, while under the new system there is a significant negative relation between

the interparty ranking and the candidate's chances of winning a seat. Thus, the stronger the party at the county level, the higher the candidate's chances of winning a compensatory seat. This result is caused by the mandate redistribution process at the county and national level. The more votes a party receives at the county level, the higher the number of compensatory mandates it has to distribute among its candidates under the new electoral system. As the experimental design awards the number of mandates under the new electoral system to each party according to the random party ranking, this relation is implicit by design under the new system. However, this result is just to show that having a mandate distribution among parties ties the candidate's chances of winning a mandate to the electoral strength of the party at the county level, as opposed to the situation under plurality where only candidate's individual results matter.

H2: The better the candidate's position in the intraparty ranking at the county level, the better the candidate's chances of winning a seat under the new system, as compared to plurality;




Probably the most important finding of the experiment is the negative relation between the intraparty ranking and the candidate's chances under the new system. While it makes no difference under the plurality rule, under the new system the candidate's chances significantly improve when they are ranked among the first of her party. This result indicates that the highest chance of winning a seat belongs to the best of the best-losers. Even though the new system accounts for the SMD where the candidate ran for office when awarding compensatory mandates and it does not allow two candidates from the same SMD to be appointed⁹, being one of the first ranked best-losers of a party increases the chances of winning a seat. However, this might be at best a necessary but not sufficient condition, as the seat from the SMD where the candidate ran for office might be won by the candidate of a different party having run in the same district. In any case, if this result holds, then in order to increase their chances of winning a seat, candidates not

⁹Except in rare cases where a party cannot receive the total number of compensatory mandates in a county, because the SMDs of some of the candidates who should receive compensatory mandates have already been won by members of other parties. For example, if in 3 out of the 5 SMDs party A's candidates have won a majority and party B is entitled to 3 compensatory mandates, two candidates from the same SMD will receive seats. In 2008 this situation happened once, in the Arad county.


only compete with the other candidates from the same SMD, but also with their own party colleagues in the county.

H3: The better the candidate's position in the SMD ranking, the higher his or her chances of winning a mandate under the new electoral system, as compared to plurality;



While only being ranked first makes a difference under plurality, under the new system the chances slightly decrease as the candidate moves lower in the college. However, even when ranked third, a simulated candidate has about 20% chances of winning a mandate. This result implies that even best-losers should win as many votes as possible in their SMD to increase their chances of winning a mandate.

H4: The larger the size of the college, the higher a candidate's chances of winning a seat under the new electoral system, as compared to plurality;



On the other hand, lower ranked candidate still have a good chance of winning when higher ranked candidates represent parties that have already exhausted all compensatory mandates. In other words, putting hypotheses H2 and H3 together we can conclude that candidates, who cannot negotiate SMDs where they will most likely win a majority of the votes, should negotiate SMDs that rank them among the first in their party and rank opposing candidates running in the same SMD among the last in the opposing parties. If opposing candidates are ranked among the last in the intraparty ranking of opposing parties, it makes little difference if the candidate has surpassed the opposing candidates in the SMD, the odds are that opposing parties will have already exhausted all compensatory mandates in other SMDs.

Finally, regarding the relationship between the SMD size¹⁰ and the probability of winning a mandate, a slight negative correlation can be noticed under the new electoral system, while under plurality, SMD size does not seem to make much difference. Because both candidates of the same party and of opposing parties are ranked according to the absolute number of votes they have received in the SMD and not according to their vote share, the absolute number of votes in the SMD is a key variable in determining candidate ranking, even when assuming the share of favourable votes per party is constant across SMDs. Moreover, a SMD where a lower share of the vote is won is preferred by a candidate to a SMD where a larger share is won if in absolute numbers the former SMD surpasses the latter one. Linking hypotheses H2 and H4 we can conclude that candidates will pursue SMDs large enough to allow them to be ranked among the first in the intraparty ranking. However, the question is how they will position themselves if larger SMDs imply being surpassed by candidates of opposing parties? Again, we argue that the answer resides in the position that the opposing candidates in the SMD would hold in the opposing parties' intraparty ranking at the county level.

So far, the analysis has been focused on the viability of the SMDs for the proportional tier of the new Romanian electoral system. The analysis concluded that the stronger the candidate's party is, the higher the candidate is in the intraparty ranking at the county level and in the SMD ranking and the larger the SMD is, the better chances the candidate stands to win a seat. Having defined viable SMDs brings us back to the question regarding the candidates' ability to identify them and position themselves in them if given the chance. The way to go about this is to look at the choices made by the candidates most likely to win and analyse the extent to which they have managed to identify and choose one of the viable SMDs. In the logic of the experiment, these would be the first n ranked players from each party, where n is the number of seats each party is entitled to¹¹. For example, if the party is entitled to two seats ($n=2$), then the first two ranked players from that party would be the most likely to win. These would be the players most likely to win given their number of votes, which by design is highest not just among their own party colleagues but also among the rest of the counter-players and also because they are the first to choose the SMD where they want to run for office and thus have the most choices.

As the table below indicates, 53.3% of the seats were won by the first ranked candidate of one of the three parties, 20% were won by the second ranked candidate and

¹⁰Where the SMD size, as previously mentioned, refers to the number of inhabitants, and implicitly of voters, in that district.

¹¹ I am referring to the random ranking done at the beginning of each experimental round, before the players chose their SMD and had their number of votes altered by their choice, thus altering the intraparty ranking altogether

only the rest of 26.7% were won by candidates ranked lower. Looking at the situation by the number of seats the candidate's party was entitled to each time, when the party only had one seat to distribute, the first ranked candidate only chose the eligible SMD 87.5% of the time, instead of 100%. For the situation with two seats, where half of the seats should have been won by the first ranked and the other half by the second ranked, the first ranked candidate chose wright 86.7% of the time and the second ranked candidate only 50% of the time. Finally, when the party had three seats to distribute, and each of the first three ranked candidates should have gotten a third of the seats, the first ranked always chose the wright SMD, while the second and third only chose wright half of the time.

Table 2. *The percentage of seats won by the first ranked players of each party (in the initial ranking done by the randomly assigned number of votes at the beginning of each experimental round)*

Intraparty Candidate Ranking	No. of seats			
	1(%)	2(%)	3(%)	Total by row(%)
1st	87.5	43.8	33.3	53.3
2nd	12.5	25	16.7	20
3rd	0	6.3	16.7	6.7
4th	0	12.5	16.7	10
5th	0	12.5	16.7	10
Total by column(%)	100	100	100	100

Therefore, candidates managed to choose a viable SMD at least half of the time if they chose second or third and more than 85% of the time if they were the first ones from their party to choose, proving that indeed candidates are able to identify and choose viable SMDs for themselves if given the chance to do so.

5. Conclusion

The purpose of this study was to analyse the constraints that the new Romanian electoral system imposes on candidates running for office. I argued that under the new system intraparty competition coexists with interparty competition, turning members of the same party running in the same county (MMD) into adversaries. Because candidates who did not receive a majority of the votes in their SMD can still win seats based on a county ranking and because this ranking is done according to the absolute number of votes received, the SMD where candidates choose to run for office becomes very important. This complex system raises questions regarding the viability of the SMDs for the proportional tier and the candidates' ability to identify them, both necessary steps in building the equation regarding candidate and party entry decisions. There are four key variables that determine the viability of a SMD for the proportional tier for a particular candidate are: the position of the candidate's party in the interparty ranking at the county level, the position of the candidate in the intraparty ranking at the county level, the candidate's position in the SMD ranking and the size of the SMD. Thus, candidates that run for office in large SMDs, that have won at least a plurality of the votes in the SMD, that have surpassed their fellow party members running in the same county and that represent strong parties at the county level, have the highest chances of becoming MPs. Simplifying these conditions, candidates should pursue SMDs that allow them to surpass their fellow party colleagues in the county, while competing against counter candidates that do not surpass their own fellow party colleagues in the county. Regarding the

candidates' ability to identify these viable SMDs, the study also revealed that at least half of the time they are able to do so.

Although additional experimental sessions are necessary for conclusive results, these hypotheses are supported by the experimental data collected so far. While these aspects make little difference under plurality, they have a significant impact on the candidate's chances under the new electoral system.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Cox, G. W. (1997), *Making votes count: Strategic coordination in the world's electoral systems*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press;
- Duverger, M. (1963) [1951], *Political Parties: the organization and activity in the modern state*, North B. and North R. tr, New York: Wiley;
- Ferrara, Federico; Herron, Erik S.; Nishikawa, Misa (2005) *Mixed Electoral Systems. Contamination and its consequences*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan;
- Ferrara, Federico; Herron, Erik S. (2005), "Going It Alone? Strategic Entry under Mixed Electoral Rules" in *American Journal of Political Science* 49(1);
- Federsen, Timothy; Sened, I.; Wright, S. G. (1990), "Rational Voting and Candidate Entry under Plurality Rule" in *American Journal of Political Science* 34;
- Grofman, Bernard; Arend Lijphart (2003), *Electoral laws and their political consequences*. New York, Algora Publishing;
- Marian, Cosmin Gabriel; King Roland F. (2010), "Plus ça change: Electoral law reform and the 2008 Romanian parliamentary elections" in *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 43;
- Moser, G. Robert (1999), "Independents and Party Formation: Elite Partisanship as an Intervening Variable in Russian Politics" in *Comparative Politics* 31(2);
- Popa, Costel (2010), "Distribuția mandatelor la alegerile parlamentare din noiembrie 2008" (Mandate distribution in the elections of November 2008) in *Perspective Politice (Political Perspectives)* 1(1);
- Roescu, Andra-Maria (2010), "Competiția inter și intrapartinică în alegerile parlamentare din noiembrie 2008" (Inter and intraparty competition in the parliamentary elections of 2008) in *Perspective Politice (Political Perspectives)* 2 (3);
- Shugart, Matthew Soberg; Wattenberg, Martin P. (ed.) (2001), *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems. The Best of Both Worlds?*, New York, Oxford University Press;
- Svetshova, Olga (2002), "Gaining Legislative Control through Strategic District Nomination: The Case of the Russian Left in 1995" in *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 27(4);
- Teodor, Gheorghe (ed.) (2009), *Alegeri 2008. Campanii, lideri și sondaje (2008 Elections. Campaigns, leaders and polls)*, Iași, Polirom;

Internet resources:

- Electoral law 35/2008, published in the Official Monitor no. 196 from March 31st2008, available online at <http://www.becparlamentare2008.ro/legislat/monitorul%20oficial%20nr.%20196-2008.pdf>, accessed on June 2nd2010 ;
- Permanent Electoral Authority, "Raport asupra organizării și desfășurării alegerilor pentru Camera Deputaților și Senat din 30 noiembrie 2008" (Report regarding the organization and proceedings of the elections for the Chamber of Deputies and

Senate from November 30th2008), available at <http://www.roaep.ro/ro/section.php?id=85>, accessed on June 15th2010);

Pro-Democracy.2008, *Uninomialul: Istoria unui dezacord* (SMD voting: the history of a disagreement). Bucharest, available at http://www.apd.ro/files/publicatii/brosura_uninomial.pdf, accessed in June 2nd 2010;

Results of the 2008 elections, available on the Central Electoral Office www.becparlamentare2008.

COMPETITION BETWEEN SPORTS ON THE BATTLEFIELD OF PUBLIC VISIBILITY

Diana-Luiza DUMITRIU *

Abstract. *The aim of this study is to analyze the competitive dynamics between sports in terms of public visibility and to build up a symbolic map of Romanian sports' visibility. Using a quantitative approach, the study is based on a sample of 403 middle school and high school students. The results show a clear dominance of sport teams over individual ones and a strong masculinization tendency in referring to the most prominent Romanian sport disciplines and actors. Moreover, the visibility of a sport influences students' perception over its performance level, which generates an overestimation of the achievements related to the most popular sports.*

Keywords: *contamination effect, symbolic competition, media exposure, sport culture*

1. Introduction

From a peripheral role in society, nowadays sport has gain its autonomy and became a complex and dynamic domain. What was called the “sportization of pastimes” (Dunning, Malcolm & Waddington, 2004) was strongly related to a significant increase in the role of free time activities and led, shortly, to a real sport industry as one of the most successful products of the consumer society (Baudrillard, 1998). All in all, this domino of changes inside the sport area, but, moreover, the autonomy that sport gained in relation to other social spheres of life, justifies the approach of this area as a social field per se, in bourdieusian terms (Bourdieu, 1998).

Sport is now part of our daily life whether we start our day jogging, watching the sport news, reading about our favourite athlete's love life or just wearing our new and fashionable sport clothing. All in all, sport is everywhere, whether we are aware of this fact or not. We can thus argue that sport has become integral to who we are and, moreover, “our relationship to sport is one of those remarkably naturalized social phenomena that seemingly seep into our pores of sensibility” (Wenner, 2010: 1517).

As any other cultural and socializing force (Sklair, 1991; Creedon, 1998), sport involves more than a recreational dimension. Sport is known for reinforcing social values such as fair play, respect or cohesion and transposing this value system in practices that can be socially reproduced. We can even speak of a dual structure of modern sport promoting, on the one hand, ideals such as freedom, equality, diversity and, on the other hand, remaining still related to aspects like control, discipline, authority or rules (Craig & Beedie, 2008).

* PhD student, National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Faculty of Communication and Public Relations, Bucharest, Romania, e-mail: dumitriu.diana.luiza@gmail.com. Beneficiary of the project “Doctoral Scholarships for a Sustainable Society”, co-financed by the European Union through the European Social Fund, Sectorial Operational Programme Human Resources Development 2007-2013.

Due to its public nature, sport arena has gradually become a referential point, providing models of conduct in and outside the sport field's boundaries. However, for most of us, sport is mostly experienced as a mediated activity, as we usually relate to sport as a media product that allows us to get access to every competition that we want to see, regardless of space and time. In this "hyperreality" (Baudrillard, 1998) of sports events, no competition 'takes place' unless it is transmitted on television, radio or internet. Mass-media has become, in other words, the new global stadium or, to be more accurate, the new collection of much more sport arenas than anyone can watch.

Based on this symbiosis between sport and mass-media, as two parts of the same coin, when it comes to sport as object of daily consumption, the aim of this paper is to analyze youth's perception of Romanian sport dynamics, as well as their media preferences regarding sport broadcasting.

2. "To be or not to be" on the media agenda

Extending the classic approach of agenda setting (McCombs & Shaw, 1972) to sport issues, it can be said that there is a strong correlation between the emphasis that mass media puts on certain sports and the level of importance attributed to them by the audience. A significant tool used in this regard is the structure and the content of TV schedule; first it matters if a sport is selected and present among the daily programs and, second, it is important when and how long it is present in order to become an object of interest for the public. People tend to think that media is the Big Brother through which they can get access almost everywhere they want to, but, more important, they think that media helps them to focus on what is most relevant in this jungle of news and events. So, based on a simple logic regarding media's social role, people tend to rely on the fact that what is important is certainly outlined among media's programs.

Given the public nature of sport major competitions and achievements, as well as the common belief that media is the first to select and promote what is most important for people to know, we can now set out our first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1 – The sports that have the highest level of media visibility tend to be considered to have also the highest level of performance.

This effect is, in fact, a perception error fed by media, which has become both the main source of entertainment, as well as the main source of information. Therefore, people usually find themselves deeply involved in sport phenomenon, while never leaving their armchair and TV screen.

3. The competition between sports is on

Following the consumerist rules of surviving, there is not a place for everybody in the public eye, so, for a sport to count means that it has to find a way to be ON TV, internet or radio. Thus, mass-media is the new battlefield for the symbolic war between sports. Public's time and attention are limited resources and that is why they are directed towards a small number of sports and, along with that, also the cash.

Sports are equal just in theory; in practice, they are fighting against each other for athletes, for audiences and, above all, for investments and profit. Therefore, visibility is a significant indicator of power for this symbolic war and the conquest of broadcasting new fields counts for a sport place in the overall hierarchy of social value. However, there appears to be an effect that is hard to surpass: once media's favourite, the public interest is high, as well as the interest of new investments and, again, this means more media

coverage. In terms of financial power, media coverage reflects the market value of each sport and, at the same time, contributes to it.

Besides this economic dimension, there are also formative and educational implications as media is well known for its contribution as one of the main sources of role-models. This means that sports are fighting not only for money, but also for followers; for new generations of athletes and coaches who can act as real magnets for audiences. "I want to be like ..."/"I want my son/daughter to be like..." or "I want my friends/parents to see me on TV..." are strong reasons for which children choose to practice one sport over another. People choose between sports they know about, and also people usually choose to watch and practice those sports they consider to be the most popular.

4. Perception is the only real thing

When speaking about comparisons and evaluation of sports in terms of social importance and performance, what really matters is not the factual truth, but rather the perception of it. People tend to act based on the representation they have upon things (Moscovici, 1997) as they are constantly involved in a process of negotiating and redefining social meanings. In this context, mass media, in general, and television, in particular, due to its claim of reality revealing, contribute significantly to people representation of sport field's dynamics. However, as Bourdieu (1996) noticed, television has transformed itself in a tool of creating and not of showing the reality. This is why people get caught in this delusion, mixing the reality behind the camera with the reality on the screen. And therefore, nowadays, 'to be' means to be seen on TV (Bourdieu, 1996: 11), as the strongest argument for one's worth.

Giving this persuasive power that media has in redefining what is important and what is real; people's perception of the sport dynamics is, in fact, the reflection of its media construction.

5. The video-child and its media formation

As G. Sartori (2005) noticed, we now live a time when we get informed and get to know things by seeing. The social rise of television meant also the rise of 'tele-seeing' and a fundamental change in the communication process, moving the focus from word to image. The nature of education and formation was also modified and this is how we can now speak about the 'video-child' (Sartori, 2005). The new generation of children is like a sponge that absorbs whatever it sees, without really understanding the information. This way of learning and exploring the world by watching it on TV or discovering it with a click on the internet generates a sort of media dependency of children, who get used to taking everything they see for granted. Therefore, much of children's knowledge about sports is based on what they see on TV or internet as their sport experiences are generally mediated. The live broadcasting is almost as live as being in the arena and stands for the real experience of being present to the competition.

6. Who carries the flag?

It is well known that sport is a symbolic resource for national identity, speaking about pride and the feeling of belonging for an entire society. Sport offers a variety of "stories that can, in many ways, function as a direct mirror of national identity" (Hilvoorde, Elling & Stokvis, 2010, p.90) and, thus, being part of who we are. Speaking about national sports or national sport heroes is part of an entire ethos that people appeal to when they redefine the cultural profile and heritage of their country. Sport victories are

symbolic resources at the international level and, in many cases, athletes and their performances are the first association made with a nation. “Romania: Nadia Comaneci!” or “Romania: best school of gymnasts!” are probably two of the most common type of remarks that people from everywhere around the globe tend to make during their first conversation with a Romanian. Sport is part of our visiting card and offers one of the most popular topics, becoming a global resource for intercultural communication.

Due to the significant role that sport plays for the national identity, one of the many dimensions of everyone’s identity, it is important to know which the sports are and who the sport are actors that are perceived to be representative for an entire nation. In other words, if we were to speak about Romania in terms of sport symbols, which are the elements that build up its image? From so many sports and much more athletes and coaches with poor, ordinary or excellent performances, which are the ones that people consider to be the most representative? The answer to these questions is not the incontestable one based on statistics and overall hierarchies, but an outcome of public perception.

7. Women are easier to forget

Our memory, as well as our attention and knowledge are based on a selective principle. However, sport media coverage itself is the result of a selection of what, when and how to be presented. That is why the audience is faced with a double selection: one made by the mass media and the other one made by each one of us. The chances to remember something that is not seen on TV are thus very poor.

One of the strongest directions of criticism when it comes to sport media coverage comes from the feminists who argue that media tends to outline and perpetuate a male dominance. So, if the focus of mass media is on male sport activity, regardless of their level of performance, which are the chances that people know and remember women’s track records? Having this premise of unbalanced importance given to men and women sport performances, we can now build our second and third hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2 - Men’s sport performances tend to be easier to remember.

Hypothesis 3 – Masculine sports have a higher level of public visibility.

All in all, the masculine dominance in sport field representation should be correlated with the coverage selection used by sport media.

8. Methodological framework

The aims behind this exploratory study are mostly focused on the descriptive level of the symbolic competition between sports in terms of public visibility and their perceived contribution to the national ‘walk of fame’. Despite our choice for a quantitative study, we decided on using more open questions in order to catch the unprompted representation that subjects have upon the Romanian sport profile. Regarding the structure of the questionnaire, there were three main dimensions that we intended to explore: the public visibility of sports, the perception upon the level of performances associated with different sports and the profile of youth consumption of sport activities. However, we used different items to be able to see also the degree of consistency of individuals’ position towards this topic. Moreover, even for those questions that, at first sight, seemed to be focused on individual sport actors, such as coaches or athletes, we recoded the answers on a more general level regarding the sports or the gender of the mentioned actors.

We used a sample of 403 middle school and high school students’ from three different educational institutions and the data gathering took place between 15 February 2012 and 15 March 2012. As for the gender criterion, the sample was well balanced, with

213 (52.8%) female and 190 (47.3%) male subjects. We also tried to plan the research during a period in which no major sport event (World Cup, Olympics etc.) in which a Romania team was present took place. This was because we wanted to limit the bias that could be generated by the sport calendar.

9. Results

For analysing the public visibility of different sports, we should compare the results obtained on four types of items: representative sport actors, sports' perceived level of performance, evaluation of sports' media coverage and sports' popularity. The fact that for all of these aspects we used an unprompted approach works as an amplifier mechanism of testing the level of sports' public visibility.

As we already mentioned, in testing which are the first three Romanian coaches and athletes that students can name, the focus was not on the individuals themselves, but on the sports they represent and on the gender dimension. This is why we recoded all of their answers and compared their first answer for each item with the conjoined results from all three actors mentioned for each question.

The results from Table 1 show that we have a clear leader on public visibility dimension: football and a quite stable leading group of sports: football, gymnastics, handball and tennis. However, there is a clear difference between coaches and athletes' examples: while in coaches' case football stands out with over 80% of answers, when it comes to athletes', although football remains on top of the list, the percentage is redistributed among the leading group of sports. Moreover, there is a strong new entry of box in the leading group, as the percentage of individual sports is, as expected, higher in case of athletes' short list. However, the map of choices from the first mention and the overall list of three examples given by the students are quite similar, with the most notable difference in case of gymnastics.

Table 1. *The sports related to the mentioned sport actors*

Sports	COACHES		ATHLETES	
	First answer	All answers	First answer	All answers
Football	80,8%	83,6%	53,9%	45,2%
Gymnastics	11,1%	8,2%	20,6%	33,2%
Handball	4,5%	5,3%	5,1%	5,4%
Tennis	1,8%	1,6%	8,6%	7,5%
Box	0,0%	0,1%	6,1%	5,7%
Athletic sports	0,0%	0,0%	1,9%	1,5%
Other sports	1,8%	1,2%	3,8%	1,5%

On the gender dimension of these two items, as you can see in Table 2, there is a significant male dominance. Although the differences between the first and the overall examples are present only for the athletes' list, what is most important is the significant differences between coaches' and athletes' top of mind list. The comparison between male percentages in both cases outlines the existence of a powerful male dominance when it comes to coaching or, to be more specific, when it comes to coaches' public visibility.

Table.2. *Gender dimension of sport actors' list*

Male/Female	COACHES		ATHLETES	
	First answer	All answers	First answer	All answers
Male	95,3%	95,6%	62,0%	73,4%
Female	4,7%	4,4%	38,0%	26,6%

When it comes to students' perception regarding the level of performances reached in different sports, the four leading positions are associated with: handball, football, gymnastics and tennis. On the other side of the performances' coin, as it can be seen in Table 3, we find: basketball, rugby, football and volleyball. It can be noticed that, if in case of best performances, students' options are quite concurrent; their opinions tend to be more diversified when naming the sports with the poorest performances. There are two other aspects that worth mentioning at this point: the fact that half of the mentioned sports can be found on both lists and the significant higher percentage that football has as the first choice in both top of mind lists compared with the overall percentage. The possible causes of these facts will be later discussed when we will compare all the results.

Table 3. *Students' evaluation of sports' level of performance*

BEST PERFORMANCES			POOREST PERFORMANCES		
Sports	First answer	All answers	Sports	First answer	All answers
Handball	20,3%	25,1%	Basketball	15,7%	14%
Football	35,5%	23%	Rugby	6,5%	8,2%
Gymnastics	24,9%	15,9%	Football	17,7%	7,9%
Tennis	4,9%	10,5%	Volleyball	6,2%	7,7%
Box	5,1%	6,2%	Swimming	7%	6,9%
Basketball	1,3%	4,7%	Tennis	7,3%	6,8%
Fencing	2,1%	2,8%	Polo	6,2%	6,6%
Athletic sports	2,6%	2,7%	Hockey	3,4%	5,7%
Canoeing	0,5%	2%	Figure skating	3,9%	5,4%
Swimming	0,8%	1,4%	Golf	3,6%	3,7%
Rugby	0,3%	1,3%	Handball	3,6%	3%
<i>Other sports</i>	1,7%	4,4%	<i>Other sports</i>	18,9%	24,1%

The third dimension of sports' public visibility refers, directly, to the mass media agenda and students' media sport consumption (see Table 4). In students' opinion, the TV news are focused on three sports: football, handball and tennis, which, together, concentrate almost 75% of media coverage. Although the same three sports can be found in students' hierarchy of preferences, with a cumulative percent of 59.3%, their sports' interest is a little bit more diversified. However, with small differences, there is a clear correspondence between the results of the two items.

Table 4. *Sports' coverage in TV news and students' media sport preferences*

TV news		Watched on TV	
Football	35,4%	Football	27,3%
Handball	23,6%	Handball	17,6%
Tennis	15,5%	Tennis	14,4%

TV news		Watched on TV	
Basketball	7,8%	Figure skating	7,0%
Box	7,0%	Basketball	6,8%
Gymnastics	1,7%	Box	6,2%
Rugby	1,3%	Gymnastics	2,2%
Figure skating	1,2%	Volleyball	2,2%
Other sports	6,5%	Other sports	16,3%

Another item that can be taken into consideration in discussing Romanian sports' public visibility is their popularity level. When asked to name the most popular sport in Romania, 96, 9% of students went for football, which, without any doubt seems to deserve its well known label of "Romanian king of sports". Gymnastics (1%), handball (0.8%) and basketball (0.5%) were also mentioned, but their very low percentages are put into the shade by the clear victory of football in this unbalanced popularity contest.

The last aspect we will add to our analysis in this exploratory study is the students' involvement in sport practice. And because most of them, 79,4%, do not practice any kind of sport in an organized form (sport club/institution), we will thus present (see Table 5) two types of outputs: the sports that the minority of students choose to practice (the 19.6% of them), along with the sports that the other part of them (the 79.4% of students) would have liked to practice.

Table 5. *Students' interest in sports*

Sports they practice		Sports they want to practice	
Football	24,1%	Handball	22,5%
Basketball	19,0%	Football	15,1%
Handball	17,7%	Tennis	13,2%
Tennis	14,0%	Basketball	9,1%
Karate	8,9%	Swimming	5,4%
Athletic sports	3,8%	Figure skating	5,2%
Other sports	12,5%	Other sports	29,5%

Although the order is different, it can be seen that the leading group of sports in students' preferences, on both real and aspirational level, is the same: football, handball, tennis and basketball. Even if this is not the aim of this study, along with the public visibility of these sports, which has an important impact on students map of preferences, the sport infrastructure is a significant criterion in how people choose the sports they want to practice. Moreover, consonant with the results from Eurobarometer 72.3 - Sport and Physical Activity (March 2010), the most common reason that forbids students from sport practice is similar with the one Romanians, in general, appeal to: lack of time (57% in case of all population vs. 50.7% in case of the students' sample), followed by the local sport infrastructure constrains (for 30.7% of students) and medical problems (for 7.4% of students).

10. Discussion

The main aim of this exploratory study was to built up a map of sports based on the public visibility criterion. In doing so, we took into consideration all of the items presented above – the percentage level, but also the sports presence among the first five positions of every top of mind list – and this is how we came out with the Top 4 most

visible Romanian sports. This visibility hierarchy, as we already pointed out, reflects students' perception of Romanian sports dynamics.

The Romanian sports with the highest level of public visibility:

1. Football
2. Handball
3. Tennis
4. Gymnastics

Managed to remain in the public eye and stand out from the crowded list of sports. Besides this overall ranking, there are some interesting insights that are worth discussing and that could help us understand the mechanisms behind the social field of Romanian sport.

Except for football, the coaches do not have a front site position when it comes to public visibility. Moreover, this was the item with one of the highest level of missing answers (almost 15%), indicating a gap in students sport knowledge. One reason for this unprivileged position of coaches is the media tendency to focus its attention on the athletes, who become, in most of cases, from the main actors, the only actors on the competition field. The more balanced distribution of sports' visibility percentages associated with the athletes' top of mind list was due to some powerful "outside-football-athletes" who gain a high capital of popularity by constantly involving in marketing and advertising campaigns (i.e. Nadia Comaneci, Ilie Nastase, Lucian Bute etc.). This is how, even when the sport engine has stopped, some athletes manage to maintain or increase their visibility level and, thus, to remain in the spotlight. Moreover, if we were to deeply analyze the names of coaches mentioned by the students, most of them were well known former athletes (i.e. Gheorghe Hagi, Radu Voinea etc.) who choose the coaching path after their retirement as athletes, contributing thus, indirectly, to a higher level of visibility for the coaches' community.

As for the gender dimension, our both hypothesis, 2 and 3, were confirmed, with a very unbalanced situation in case of coaches, where there is a very strong male domination. On the one hand, we have the football domination, which, in turn brings the male power up and, on the other hand, there is a tendency to find fewer women coaches as the level of performance raises. In terms of symbolic relations of power, this male dominance confirms the feminist idea that, besides the general masculine profile of sports' field, men also tend to concentrate all the leading position in each sport area.

Back to sports' public visibility, media coverage tends to deceive audiences contributing to the emergence of a contamination effect between the level of visibility and the perceived level of performance reached by every sport. Therefore, although the most notable performance in football is the Champions League won by Football Club Steaua Bucharest in 1986 and some episodic qualification of Romanian teams in the final 8 or 4 teams in international competition, students instinct is to place football at the top of sports' with highest performances. Even if sports like box, fencing, canoeing, gymnastics or handball and the list can be further filled up managed to constantly and more recently reach high international performances (Olympic, World or European medals and titles), football seems to outdo their achievements, as statistics and facts are replaced with visibility rates in young audiences' perception. How does football make up for its lack of real performances and gain its place on the short list of Romanian sports with highest level of performances? One of the reasons is the benefits that media coverage brings along – we must be doing well if football is every day, on almost every channel and in every newscast, with no exception. So, while the sports that brought Romania the most and highest performances and raised up our flag above all other countries are clearly

underestimated, media bears a hand to transforming visibility in “gold”. In other words, even if this is not its intention, for many of us, media ends up by rewriting the sports’ track record. Returning to our first hypothesis and looking at the results, we can now confirm that when it comes to sports with high level of public visibility, people tend to overestimate their level of performances too.

An interesting fact is that in all cases, there is a clear dominance of sport teams over individual ones, which is not surprising, given the fact that, according to Hofstede (2001) individualism versus collectivism (IDV) dimension of national culture, Romanian culture has a more collectivist orientation.

If we were to discuss the relation between sports’ public visibility, students’ sport preferences and their perception of the sport field dynamics, we find ourselves in front of a phenomenon similar to Noelle-Neumann’s (2005) spiral of silence. This is because mass media tends to dictate which are the most popular sports and claims to be answering to the sport interests’ of a majority, although it covers the same few sports. However, this influences audiences’ media sport consumption and, moreover, people’s choices in what sports to practice, as they look for those that are socially valued and popular. In consequence, mass media continues to focus on the same short list of privileged sports based on “what the majority of people like to watch and practice.” And hence, the mechanism of public visibility - perceived performances - media consumption - preferences in sport practice continues its cyclic movement.

Although this is an exploratory study, the results show that this could be a resourceful research direction that deserves further development. One direction might be a comparative study between different age or social groups or an intercultural comparison between different nations, while another distinct path might add to this type of survey a complementary analysis of media’s structure of programs.

11. Conclusion

Despite the limits of the students’ sample - as it is not a representative one - and the clear focus on the descriptive level of the data analysis, reasonable results were obtained. There seems to be a well defined leading group of sports when it comes to the level of public visibility: football, handball, tennis and gymnastics and a clear *dominance of sport teams* over individual ones. The results also confirm football’s undisputable “lion share” in terms of public visibility and highlight the existence of a *strong masculinization* tendency in referring to the most prominent Romanian sport disciplines and actors.

The way individuals perceive the level of Romanian performances reached in different sports’ areas is based on a contamination effect, as public visibility rates tend to be extrapolated to the perceived level of performances. The structural consequence of this representational mechanism is that of an artificial spiral between the public visibility of sports, their perceived performances and the correlated media consumption of sports. So, the logic seems to be quite simple: if they (sports) are in the spotlights, then they must be worth it!

Acknowledgments: The author wishes to thank Emilia Simion and Marian Simion for their assistance in the data collection process of the study.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Baudrillard, J. (2005), *The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures* (Romanian edition: *Societatea de consum. Mituri și structuri*), Comunicare.ro, Bucharest;
- Bourdieu, P. (1998), *Practical Reason. On the Theory of Action*, Stanford University Press, Stanford;
- Bourdieu, P. (1996), *On Television* (Romanian edition: *DESPRE TELEVIZIUNE. Dominația jurnalismului*), Meridiane, Bucharest;
- Craig, P; Beedie, P (eds.) (2008), *Sport Sociology*. Learning Matters, Parkstone;
- Creedon, P. J., 1998, *Women, sport, and media institutions: Issues in sports journalism and marketing* in L. A. Wenner (Ed.), *MediaSport: Cultural sensibilities and sport in the media age* (pp. 88-99). Routledge, London;
- Dunning, E.; Dominic, M.; Waddington, I. (2004), *Sport Histories - Figurational studies of the development of modern sports*, Routledge, London;
- VAN Hilvoorde, I.; Elling, A.; Stokvis, R., (2010), "How to influence national pride? The Olympic medal index as a unifying narrative" in *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*, 45(1);
- Hofstede, G.,(2001), *Culture's Consequences, Comparing Values, Bahaviors, Institutions and Organizations Across Nations, Second Edition*, Sage Publications, London;
- Mccombs, M.E.; Shaw, D., L., (1972), "The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media" in *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, 36(2);
- Moscovici, S. (1997), *Social psychology or the Machine of producing gods* (Romanian edition: *Psihologia socială sau Mașina de fabricat zei*), Polirom, Iasi;
- Noelle-Neumann, E. (1993), *The Spiral of Silence: Public Opinion, Our Social Skin – Second edition*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago;
- Sartori, G. (2005), *HOMO VIDENS. Television and Post-thinking* (Romanian edition: *HOMO VIDENS Imbecilizarea prin televiziune și post-gândirea*), Humanitas, Bucharest;
- Sklair, L. (1991), *Sociology of the global system*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, London;
- Wenner, L., A. (2010), "Sport, Communication, and the Culture of Consumption: On Language and Identity" in *American Behavioral Scientist*, 53(II);
- *** Eurobarometer 72.3 - Sport and Physical Activity (March 2010), conducted by TNS Opinion & Social at the request of Directorate General Education and Culture http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_334_en.pdf.

A MODEL OF WEB CAMPAIGNING IN ROMANIA

*Adrian Paul APARASCHIVEI **

Abstract. *Online political communication in Romania has developed in recent years in parallel with the increasing online presence and access of Romanian citizens. This paper defines the concept of Web 2.0, providing a theoretical basis which will help us in the correct placement of the online political communication in Romania on the Web 1.0-2.0 axis. In addition, this paper defines and operationalizes the concepts of interactivity, personalization and mobilization. These are the main structural elements of any online political presence in the Web 2.0 era. The case study presents the technological elements that defined online political communication in Romania in the 2012 elections.*

Keywords: *online campaign, Web 1.0, Web 2.0, Romanian politicians*

1. Introduction

During election campaigns, to gather a greater number of votes, campaign teams identify, create and use a range of communication (electoral issues, means of communication), electoral (the trust, notoriety and visibility of the political competitor) financial (for the purchase of promotional products, airtime and events) or human resources (spokesmen, activists, supporters or volunteers). The methods and practices of using all these resources in a campaign have constantly improved and evolved. Swanson and Mancini (1996) point out that no electoral campaign resembles another: each campaign is conducted in an unrepeatable historical context, in which different political personalities participate, in a given national political culture, in an electoral competition in which relevant issues and electoral programs are discussed and developed, at a certain time, for the citizens of that particular country or region.

However, the same authors show that the ideal type of modern campaign - which brings together all the resources mentioned above, is not reflected in actual campaigns. In practice, the elements that contribute to the modernization of the electoral campaign are adapted and applied in a particular national framework, taking into account variables and contextual factors such as the national election system, the electoral legislation, the national political culture or the media culture developed in that country (Swanson and Mancini, 1996). In the globalization context, Holtz-Bacha (2003) outlines that any political communication effort should be understood primarily as a manifestation of the political culture of a given democracy, as one of the many forms in which this culture is

* PhD student, National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Faculty of Communication and Public Relations, Bucharest, Romania, e-mail: aparaschiveipaul@gmail.com. Beneficiary of the project "Doctoral Scholarships for a Sustainable Society", co-financed by the European Union through the European Social Fund, Sectorial Operational Programme Human Resources Development 2007-2013.

expressed in public. Therefore, political advertising is part of the project of a specific political system, thus enabling the orientation within the system, and the chance to identify with it (Holtz-Bacha, 2003).

Current trends in political and electoral communication are represented by the high degree of personalization of the electoral campaigns, the focus of the media on the political leader, political attacks as a common practice among the candidates (which led to the development of negative campaigns), decreased interest in political topics and a raising role of the political and communications consultant (spin doctor) at a strategic, but also organizational level of the campaign. All these practices initially generated in the American space were later taken and adapted by other countries, due to Americanization and subsequent professionalisation of political communication worldwide. At this point, given the extension of these trends, the literature speaks of a global framework of the electoral campaign and the national peculiarities that influence the planning and organization of the electoral campaign (Perlmutter, Golan, 2005; Norris, 2000; Plasser and Plasser 2002 Hallin and Mancini, 2004).

1. The evolution of the online environment - from Web 1.0 to Web 2.0

According to the Tim Berners-Lee's testimony, the „father” of the World Wide Web, the emergence of the Internet cannot be exactly determined. At the end of 1990, following the research and programming effort of a web protocol at the CERN complex in Switzerland, Berners-Lee and Robert Cailliau made the first hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) to a server via Internet. This moment is considered by many who have studied the phenomenon as marking the emergence and development of the Internet, being subsequently taken by the author as an important, if not defining, moment in his effort to create the World Wide Web (Berners-Lee & Fischetti 1999). Since then, the Internet has begun to develop, reaching the present phase, when 1 in 3 people (about 2.3 billion people worldwide) are connected to the network (Internet World Stats, 2013).

There is no generally accepted definition of the two main stages of development known by the Internet. Scholars admit, however, that the Internet has initially knew a development stage known as Web 1.0, followed by the Web 2.0 stage, the „new web” (van Doorn, Liesbet van Zoonen, 2009). The latter stage is identified by the new communication technologies and the communicational paradigm shift generated by the adaptation of the users to the new technologic context. Web 2.0 is the contemporary network that made the transition from unidirectional means of communication to complex social networks and a new definition of communication in the online environment.

Until Web 2.0, the Internet wasn't referred to as Web 1.0, but simply „Web”. The term Web 1.0 appeared only to mark the transition to a new stage of the network (Green, 2010). In the first 10 years, Web 1.0 was characterized by web pages who sent, through hyperlinks, to publicly accessible content on other similar websites. During this period the strategies for web indexing and online content searching developed, being designed to reveal and to give users access to online content posted by others.

The introduction of the *Web 2.0* term was necessary in order to create a borderline between the two stages of development of the Internet which, for a short period, worked at in parallel. Tim O'Reilly (2007) shows that, initially, a set of principles that needed to define Web 2.0 sites were formulated, speaking about the platforms that self-improved themselves as they were used by a growing number of users. Effects and changes that users generate on the Web (e.g. the prioritization of the items based on their number of hits) were the main element which separated the two stages of web development (O'Reilly,

2007). It is not only technical changes, but also changes in the role gained by the web users in relation to the platforms they visited.

There is a difficulty in making a clear tie between Web 1.0 or 2.0 websites (Cormode and Krishnamurthy, 2008). Many of the structural elements of these pages start of at the first stage of the Internet and are subsequently developed following the Web 2.0 scheme. There was no sudden break, but rather a transition to the new web, a development in which both the online communication platforms and the online users were attracted. Among the features that make the difference between the two models, note the following: users are main actors of the Web 2.0 system; the ability to build connections among users; the ability to publish content from various forms: images, videos, blogs, comments; the capacity to control privacy functions of an account; the ability to distribute certain information. The Internet, in its second stage stops being „an imitation of Paper” (Ryan, 2010).

In terms of communication practices, the transition to Web 2.0 generates the mass communication decentralization announced by Abramson (2001) and its transformation in two-way or three-way communication (McMillan, 2002), the user can be a „sender”, „receiver” or just an „participant-observer” of the communication process (Ferber, Foltz and Pugliese, 2007). Reported to the mechanisms of communication in general, and the political and electoral communication in particular, Web 2.0 involves „new ways to talk and new ways of listening” from communication specialists. Practitioners are forced to develop new communication skills, adapted to new media (Macnamara, 2010).

2. Political communication in the Web 2.0 era - interactivity, personalization and mobilization

The whole process of Internet evolution in political and electoral communication developed organically over the last 20 years. A transformation at a macro level occurred in the planning, implementing and evaluation of the online political campaigns not only in the USA, but also worldwide. By promoting an unprecedented, cross-border takeover of Web 2.0 practices, online political communication today is not only about the transmission of information to a captive and passive audience, the user becomes a „distributor” of the campaign within his network of friends, also being encouraged to generate political content.

Mobilization, personalization and interactivity are the three main elements that will be included in the analysis represented the by new communication paradigm of Web 2.0. Among them, mobilization (Foot and Schneider, 2006) and interactivity (Lilleker and Malagón, 2010) are the two main elements considered in the literature when analysing the relationship between Web 2.0 practices and political communication.

A macro analytical perspective, which includes five dimensions present in the Web 1.0 and 2.0 technologies, is given by Lilleker et. al. (2011). The authors point out that in order to analyse the extent to which parties have adapted Web 2.0 in their online communication we must consider the impact of each element used in election campaigns. The authors propose a classification of web elements by the main function they perform (information, ensuring the involvement, outreach, interactivity and technical complexity):

- ***The information dimension.*** In this first dimension there should be included Web 1.0 elements such as news, newsletter archives, speech sections, calendar of events, text / video / audio / photo content, party standpoints and other programmatic documents, the history and achievements of the party, code of conduct, section of frequently asked questions, websites belonging to the regional

political organizations or register for mail. In terms of adapting to Web 2.0, the authors summarize this element in terms of public information, the presence of one or more blogs on the web.

- ***The involvement dimension.*** To ensure that the user will be involved in the campaign, Lilleker et. al. show that, at the Web 1.0 level, parties and candidates promote themselves through TV spots, spots showing press conferences or other official appearances of the politicians. Also, this category includes photo galleries with personal or official photos of the candidates, the ability to share some information via email, publishing of audio content, newsletters and a chat function on the website. Web 2.0 elements that contribute to user involvement in the campaign are found in elements for such as assigning ratings for the news, videos and photos published online, live video stream through web cameras, political theme games, apolitical theme games and the prioritization of the content through allocation of ranks for the users.
- ***The mobilization dimension.*** Web 1.0 elements designed to mobilize the user identified by Lilleker et. al. are the possibility of registering as a volunteer in the campaign or in the guest book of the website, registration or subscription to the campaign's events, joining the party, providing promotional materials, the presence of a donation function, an online shop, registration function on the website site, a special section on the site dedicated to the registered members and the possibility to register as a voter. In the Web 2.0 version, to all of the above mentioned elements one needs to add a personal events calendar during the campaign.
- ***The interactive dimension.*** Interactivity for Web 1.0 is generated by the presence of the contact forms on the website, the opportunity to ask questions to politicians, in a special section of the webpage, online surveys and public presentation of the results of the surveys uploaded online.
The Web 2.0 interactive elements which can be found on a website range from the possibility to comment on a blog, the presence of a wiki section (in which users are allowed to make changes to information already published on the site), special sections developed through collaboration among users (political program, party history or other functions of the website), links to social networks, promotion through social networks, the possibility to have a dialogue with the party members or with other members of the online political community, the presence of a forum, the option to post comments on the news, photos or videos uploaded online.
- ***The technical complexity dimension.*** Within this group of elements we can find animations, podcasts, the possibility to download speeches, switch the language in which the website is presented or the fonts in which the text appears on the website, translation features, the possibility to download files (PDF and other format) or a search option. All these features are included by Lilleker et. al. in the larger category of Web 1.0 technologies. As to new technical elements, arising from Web 2.0, we can find the label cloud (present on most of the blogs) and an archive of speeches online.

The five dimensions include more Web 1.0 elements, compared to Web 2.0. This is an additional argument that, from an analytical perspective, it is difficult to draw a clear line of demarcation between the two main stages of the web development. Historically, many of the elements that are present in Web 2.0 development can be traced even in the "old Internet".

3. Political communication in Romania – theoretical and technological context

Regarding Romania's place within the political debate on the characteristics of online presences, the conclusions offered by research involving this country in the corpus analysed (Vergeer et al., 2012; Kruikemeier et al., 2013) indicates an alignment to the European trend of political communication and online election. The analysis of the websites and online communication practices used by parties and politicians in Romania at the 2009 European elections places our country on the 6th place from a total sample of 17 countries analyzed (Vergeer et al., 2012). Even if countries such as Romania still have low penetration rates of Internet access (44% in 2011) compared to Western European countries such as the Netherlands (92.3% in 2011), Kruikemeier et al. (2013) show that political sites in Romania have more interactive features, compared to Dutch websites. Also, the sites were similar in terms of personalization, although not many political leaders of Romania had a personal website.

Regarding the online political communication, the Romanian literature offers a series of studies and analysis on various election campaigns that provided as many examples of the use of new media in political and electoral communication (Gutu, 2007: 152; Salcudeanu, Aparaschivei, Toader, 2009; Dumitru, 2011-Fieraru Alexandrescu, 2011; Barbovski, 2008; square, 2011; Momoc, 2011). Most of these studies are focused, however, on political actors and not on the electorate. Basically, now we know which have been the main moments when the Romanian parties and politicians have communicated online, we have identified the various communication strategies used by them on the Internet, but we know very little about the macro profile of the online campaigning in Romania.

In the recent years, the technological context has improved and the digital divide in Romania has entered a rapid regression process. In 2012, over 8.5 million Romanians, representing 39.2% of the total population, had access to the Internet. Even if compared to the early years, the online environment has developed in Romania in terms of Internet's penetration rate, Romania continues to occupy the last position after the number of residents using the Internet, according to the ranking done by the European Union Member States (Internet World stats, 2012). Although there is still a relatively small number of Romanians connected to the Internet, the digital divide is compensated in terms of connection speed. In 2010, the internet connection speed in Romania was the fastest in Europe and fourth, globally. In 2012, Romania ranked 13th worldwide, and 10th in Europe, with an average connection speed of 6.6 Mbps (Akiki, 2012).

A comprehensive sociological study on how the Internet is used in Romania and on the Romanians' online behaviour was conducted in March 2011 by the Romanian Institute for Evaluation and Strategy (IRES), at the request of the Romanian Association for Assessment and Strategy. From a sample of 1,146 individuals aged over 15 and coming from urban areas, it resulted a sub-sample of 731 respondents who were Internet users. However, the sociological research failed to provide some important answers on the online consumer behaviour of the Romanians living in urban areas. Nonetheless, if we refer to the sub-sample of respondents who said they use the Internet, some of the resulting data were significant: 71.4% of the Romanian use the Internet daily, 97% has Internet access at home, the share of connections via telephone / cable TV is equal, of 45% and 96% of Romanian use the Internet in order to inform themselves.

In another research conducted on the media consumption of the Romanian voters (Aparaschivei, 2012), it resulted that USL voters have a higher consumption rate on online

news and content posted on blogs, being less present on social networks and video sites. "The PSD voters fall under the pattern of the USL electorate, stressing however that the social democrats are more present on Facebook and read more blogs than the average. Liberal voters, on the other hand, are absent from Facebook, but rather present on Hi5 and Trilulilu. In their case, we can observe a medium consumption of online news, conduct which is consistent with the results concerning the overall USL voters "(Aparaschivei, 2012). The results are very interesting regarding the PDL voters, the party benefiting from voters with the highest consumption of online content, on all platforms. Liberal Democrats dominate YouTube, followed by Facebook, online news, blogs and Trilulilu. The right electorate in Romania has a generally high Internet access (approx. 60%) and uses it quite often while the left voters (represented mainly by PSD) have a relatively low Internet access (approx. 40%), consuming mainly traditional media.

4. Research method and corpus of the analysis

In order to test the hypotheses, I've conducted a content analysis of political websites belonging to winning Romanian candidates from parliamentary (Chamber of Deputies and Senate) and local elections (mayors and chairmen of the County Council). The data used in the content analysis was collected within one month after the completion and announcement of the elections results. All sites were downloaded using "Offline Explorer". After centralizing all websites and coding the data, it resulted a total sample of 273 sites belonging to winning candidates in local and parliamentary elections in 2012.

The questions the study aims to answer at this stage of data analysis are:

1. Is Web 2.0 a model that defines the pattern of online political communication in Romania in the electoral year 2012? This paper will analyse the websites of political parties and candidates who have won local and parliamentary elections, relating them to the defining elements of Web 2.0. Also, this paper aims to place the Romanian online political communication on the Web 1.0-Web 2.0. axis;
2. Can we identify major differences between the online communication of the local and parliamentary winning candidates that would allow us to conclude that one category is better represented online than the other?

5. Identifying the general aspects

Compared to the total number winning local, respective parliamentary candidates, the share of those who have had an online presence in each category (Fig. 1) is as follows: 59.6% mayors of a county capital versus 46.3% county council chairmen; 44.9% members of the Deputy Chamber versus 37.1 % senators. From a gender perspective, 88.6% of the analysed websites belong to men and 11.4% to women. Regarding their age (Fig. 2), 35.7% of them have between 41-50 years, 29.8% between 51-60 years, 26.8% between 31-40 years, 6.6% between 61-70 years, while 0.7% are aged 20-30 years and only 0.4% are aged 71-80 years.

The resulting data allows us to draw a first set of conclusions on the Romanian online campaign in 2012. The local elected officials (53.4% of the mayors and chairmen of county councils) were more inclined to promote themselves through personal pages compared to the winning Parliament members (39.4% of the MP's from both chambers had a personal web page during the election campaign). We can also conclude that the vast majority of politicians present online are men aged between 41 and 60 years.

The adoption of Web 2.0 technologies was analysed by including variables showing the presence or absence from the communication mix of the social networks, of the interactive communication and sharing images platforms or of a blog as an alternative means of transmitting information within the website. In the first instance, we will details the adoption of Facebook, Twitter and blogs by the elected candidates in 2012. On average, over half (61%) of the politicians present online have a Facebook account, over a quarter of them (27%) had a Twitter account, and 44% of the winners included in the corpus have communicated online through a personal blog.

Fig. 1 – Percentage of winning candidates present online (compared to the total number of winning candidates)





Fig. 2 – Percentage of local and general elected official present online by age



As can be observed in Table 1, the candidates who won the elections and came from smaller parties (e.g. PC, FC or PPDD) developed a complete online presence, in which were included in a higher extent the three online platforms communication. On the other hand, we should keep in mind that the total number of candidates from these parties is significantly below the average of winners coming from large parties such as PSD, PNL

or PDL. Therefore, a certain degree of scepticism is needed in order to correctly interpret the low number of analysed cases coming from small parties.


Relating exclusively to local elected officials or MPs coming from large parties (PSD, PNL, PDL), we observe a consistent presence on Facebook of the PDL elected officials (74% of all PDL candidates were present online with a Facebook account), compared with those of PNL (55%) and of PSD (54%). Regarding the presence of elected officials on Twitter, the overall situation for candidates coming from the major parties shows that approx. 1 out of 4 candidates chose to promote through this platform. In this case, however, PSD elected officials (26% of all PSD winners present online) and the PNL ones (23%) outnumbered those of PDL (19%). The ratio is maintained when we analyse the political presences on blogs: almost half of the PSD (49%) and 43% of the PNL elected officials had chosen to communicate on a personal blog, in comparison with the 34% of the PDL candidates.

Reported to politicians who had a personal blog (N = 120), the data analysis shows that 82% of them send links to similar pages, through a blogroll. 1226 blogs were promoted through the blogs included in the analysis, resulting an average of 18.2 blogs promoted through politicians blogs who had a blogroll.

Table 1 – Percentage of politicians present online on Facebook, Twitter and a personal blog

	PSD	PNL	PC	UNPR	PDL	FC	UDMR	PPDD	Indep.
Facebook	54.7%	55.3%	70.0%	50.0%	74.5%	100.0%	64.3%	90.0%	66.7%
Twitter	26.4%	23.7%	60.0%	.0%	19.1%	100.0%	21.4%	50.0%	66.7%
Blog	49.1%	43.4%	60.0%	50.0%	34.0%	66.7%	35.7%	20.0%	66.7%
N total cases (271)	106	76	10	2	47	3	14	10	3

Fig. 3 - The presence of Romanian politicians (local or general elected) on social media platforms



Regarding the adoption of social networking sites and other Web 2.0 platforms, based on the total sample, the Web 2.0 platforms preferred by Romanian politicians are Facebook, followed by Twitter and YouTube. Also, there were significant values for platforms like Wordpress, LinkedIn or Google+. On the other hand, from the findings of the research, it results an extremely low presence or total absence of the Romanian politicians from platforms such as Blogspot, Flickr, Youtube, Tumblr, MySpace or Trilulilu.

6. Conclusions and research limitations

Reported to the two research questions of the study, it should be noted that even at this stage of the data analysis we cannot conclude that Web 2.0 has defined the online presence of politicians in Romania in the 2012 election. The research revealed that 39% of the Romanian politicians (local elected or MPs) were present online through a personal webpage. Even so, the structural elements included in their online presences indicate that in the construction of their campaign websites Romanian politicians rather wanted to simply transmit political and electoral information, and not to develop an interactive space of communication, that needed to involve the visitors of their websites.

In addition to their online presence through websites, 61% of politicians included in the analysis had a Facebook account and 44% of them also had a blog, two alternative online platforms displaying elements of Web 2.0. Even so, given the low number or the lack of other Web 2.0 platforms, we can say that at this stage of research the 2012 election year was characterized by an Web 1.5 online campaign, understood as a partial adaptation of the campaigns to the new social media trends.

On the other hand, research results confirm that local officials in general and mayors of municipalities in particular had an above the average online presence. The fact that nearly 60% of the mayors were present online can be explained by the fact that their voters have greater access to the Internet and, therefore, developing an online presence would have been a benefit for the overall communication effort of their campaigns.

At this stage of the research, the study presents several limitations. First, it fails to overcome the descriptive barrier of the online presences and to test to what extent, in addition to the adoption or ignoring of certain technologies, certain dimensions of information, mobilization, interactivity and personalization can be identified on Romanian politicians websites. These objectives will be tested in future analyses, in which concrete context elements such as parties characteristics (party size, ruling / opposition report) or national characteristics that may explain the values of variables (Internet penetration rate in a given region, GDP / capita in a given county, etc.) will be included. Also, in the next stage of the study the corpus analysed will be correlated with the number and socio-demo characteristics of the total number of local and general elected officials who won the 2012 elections).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abramson, Jeffrey B.; Allerton, Christopher.; Orren, Gary R. (1998). *The Electronic Commonwealth: The Impact of New Media Technologies on Democratic Politics*, Basic Books, New York *apud.* Axford, Barrie; Huggins, Richard (Eds.) (2001). *New Media and Politics*, Sage Publications, London;

- Alexandrescu-Fieraru, G. (2011), "Political Discourse on Blogs, an Expression of Identification through Habitus" in *Revista Argumentum*, Vol: 9(2), Iași, Editura Fundației Academice Axis;
- Aparaschivei, Paul (2012), "Political Communication in Romania From a New Perspective: the Online Voter" in *Annals of the University of Oradea. International Relations and European Studies (Supplement/2012)*;
- Barbovski, Monica (2008), "Romanian political blogs: new loci of expression and participation?: an analytical framework for the investigation of the political blogging space as a new form of public sphere" in *Media@lse Fifth Anniversary Conference: Media, Communication and Humanity*, 21st - 23rd September 2008, LSE, London. (Unpublished). <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/21562/>;
- Berners-Lee, Tim; Fischetti, Mark (1999), *Weaving The Web: The Original Design and Ultimate Destiny of the World Wide Web by Its Inventor*, Harper Collins Publishers;
- Cormode, Graham.; Krishnamurthy, Balachander (2008), "Key differences between Web 1.0 and Web 2.0" in *First Monday*, Vol. 13(6); <http://journals.uic.edu/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2125/1972>;
- Dumitru, Mihnea (2011), *INFLUENȚA INTERNETULUI ÎN POLITICA ROMÂNEASCĂ. Studiu asupra evoluției noilor forme de media în perioada 2004-2009*, Teză prezentată în vederea obținerii titlului de doctor în științe politice, Institutul de Cercetări Politice, Universitatea București;
- Ferber, Paul; Foltz, Franz; Pugliese, Rudy (2007), "Cyberdemocracy and Online Politics: A New Model of Interactivity" in *Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society*, Vol. 27(5);
- Foot, Kirsten. A.; Schneider, Steven. M. (2006), *Web Campaigning*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press;
- Kruikemeier, Sanne; Aparaschivei, Adrian Paul; Boomgaarden, Hajo; Van Noort, Guda; Vliegthart, Rens (2013), "Party and candidate websites: A cross-national explanatory analysis" in *West European Politics* on March 6, 2013;
- Lilleker, Darren. G.; Malagón, Casilda (2010), "Levels of Interactivity in the 2007 French Presidential Candidates' Websites" in *European Journal of Communication*, Vol: 25(1);
- Lilleker, Darren. G.; Koc-Michalska, Karolina; Schweitzer, Eva Johanna; Jacunski, Michal; Jackson, Nigel; Vedel, Thierry (2011), "Informing, engaging, mobilizing or interacting: Searching for a European model of web campaigning" in *European Journal of Communication*, Vol: 26(3);
- Green, Lelia (2010), *The internet: an introduction to new media*, Oxford, Berg;
- Guțu, Dorina (2007) *New Media*, Editura Tritonic, București;
- Hallin, Daniel C.; Mancini, Paolo (2004), *Comparing Media Systems—Three Models of Media and Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press;
- Holtz-Bacha, Christina (2003), "Political advertising during election campaigns" in Maarek, Philippe J.; Wolfsfeld, Gadi (Eds.), *Political Communication in a New Era: A Cross-National Perspective*, Routledge;
- Internet World Stats, "World Internet Users and Population Stats", accesat: 22 iunie 2013, www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm;
- McMillan, Sally J. (2002), "A four-part model of cyber-interactivity" in *New Media & Society*, Vol. 4(2);

- Macnamara, Jim (2010), "Public communication practices in the Web 2.0-3.0 mediascape: The case for Prevolution" in *Prism*, Vol. 7(3), http://www.prismjournal.org/fileadmin/Social_media/Macnamara.pdf;
- Momoc, Antonio (2011), "The blog – political PR tool in the 2009 presidential electoral campaign" in *Professional Communication and Translation Studies*, Vol. 4 (1-2);
- Norris, Pippa (2000), *A virtuous circle: political communications in postindustrial societies*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press;
- Pătruț, Monica (2011), "Blogul – un instrument pentru democratizarea comunicării electorale?" in *Sfera Politicii*, Vol. XIX, No. 5 (159);
- Perlmutter, David D.; Golan, Guy (2005), "Counter-Imaging: Myth-Making and Americanization" in Israeli Labor Party Campaign Ads, 2003, *Visual Communication*, Vol. 4(3);
- Plasser, Fritz; Plasser, Gunda (2002), *Global Political Campaigning—A Worldwide Analysis of Campaign Professionals and Their Practices*, Westport, CT, Praeger;
- Sălcudeanu, Tudor; Aparaschivei, Paul; Toader, Florența (2009), *Bloguri, Facebook și politică*, Editura Tritonic, București,
- Swanson, David; Mancini, Paolo (1996), "Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy: Introduction" in Swanson, David; Mancini, Paolo (Eds.), *Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy*, London, Praeger;
- Swanson, David; Mancini, Paolo (1996), "Patterns of Modern Electoral Campaigning and Their Consequences". in Swanson, David, Mancini, Paolo (Eds.), *Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy*, London, Praeger;
- Van Doorn, Niels; Van Zoonen, Liesbet (2009), "Theorizing gender and the internet: past, present, and future" in Chadwick, Andrew; Howard, Philip. N., *Routledge handbook of Internet politics*, Routledge;
- Vergeer, Maurice; Hermans, Liesbeth; Cunha, Carlos (2012), "Web campaigning in the 2009 European Parliament elections: A cross-national comparative analysis" in *New Media Society*.

