ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL FIELD IN THE BOLIVIAN CONFLICT OCTOBER NOVEMBER 2019

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Abstract. *The conflict in Bolivia can be understood from different perspectives. The work presented here aims to provide the reader with precise inputs with which to form their own interpretation. To this end, it is proposed to combine a genealogy of power over the fourteen years in which the Movement to Socialism directed the destinies of the Bolivian State. This as historical knowledge referred to the struggle and socio-political conflict adense description of the Bolivian political field, and an analytical model based on the spatial analysis of the exercise of communicational political power devices. This work raises the following objectives: to describe the agents faced, their alliances, their rivalries as well as the strategies that follow each one of the agents; disaggregate conflict scenarios in geographical and political spheres - including symbolic-discursive, as well as provide reference bibliographic material for future conflicts or hypothetical intermediation and dialogue missions.*

Keywords: *Bolivia, Political field, Power devices, Hegemony, Conflict.*

1. Introduction

The pages of the history of nations are written with blood and conflict. No official historiography of any nation-state can affirm that its history was managed in harmony and social justice, since the utopia of equality usually dissolves when ideology comes into contact with the reality of the exercise of political and social power. Bolivia is no exception to this statement. The narrative of our identity, often distressing and meaningless, was chiseled through centuries of contradictions and suffering, whose germ is found in the colonial condition of the peoples that today continue to struggle to forge a political community of its own, with representativeness and legitimacy for the common of its inhabitants.

The main objective of the article presented here is to describe the dynamics of the conflict in relation to the social and geographical space implied by the political exercise, in order to understand the reason for the loss of the once indisputable hegemony that the Movement to Socialism (M.A.S.) has enjoyed in Bolivia for almost fourteen years. In this sense, given the difficult conditions that exist for the collection of data from primary sources, the research methodology was reduced to the bibliographic and hemerographic[1] review with a special focus on analysis of the discourses for the identification of the variables that make up the analysis of the hegemonic conditions and the progressive loss of legitimacy and confidence that the Evo Morales Ayma´s political party has suffered since 2014.

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[1] Understood as a methodic analysis of the newspapers on a specific theme

For this purpose we propose to make use of two theoretical currents: Firstly, Pierre Bourdieu's theory of political fields. Secondly, the concept of the power devices and its analysis exercised by the Movement to Socialism during the three government efforts –in order to understand the agents involved.

In the presentation of the historical-political antecedents we resort -as theoretical and conceptual basis- to the work of the Bolivian political scientist Ph.D. Fernando Mayorga (2019) referred to the analysis of the Bolivian political field and the description of the power devices of the Movement to Socialism (MAS), systematized[2] according to the three government periods, complementing said analysis with contributions accrued from both Political Sociology and Political Science, specifically what refers to hegemony and trust as an analytical category.

3. Historical background

The Bolivian State was born to independent life in 1825 with an enormous territorial extension, (2,336,670 km^2) that conferred a direct route to the Pacific Ocean, and through the Paraguay River waterway to the Atlantic Ocean.

This territory provided the State with access to the watersheds in which the main hydrographic basins of the South American continent originate: the Amazon basin, that of the Río de La Plata, that of the Paraguay River and part of the interior basin that make up Lake Titicaca and the Desaguadero river. Another interesting aspect to highlight is the varied range of ecological floors that were -and are still included-in the Bolivian territory, a variety that, in theory, allowed the Bolivian State to dispose of various natural and agricultural resources.

However, territorial immensity also meant the origin of the main problem of the Bolivian State: the difficult social, economic, transport infrastructure and, above all, institutional integration between the various regions that comprise it, genesis of a social and regional fragmentation whose consequences are still exist in the social conflicts that, at the same time, make the historical-political vicissitudes of their economic and social formation. In other words, the abundance of the original territory of the Bolivian republic was not accompanied by the foundation of strong institutional and social organizations. Due to this, the construction of the identity of the original Bolivian State can be described as exclusive, destined to reproduce the hegemony of the social-caste-white class, relics of the colonial hierarchy inherited by the Republic that denied access and political participation to the immense indigenous and half breed majority.

Renowned Bolivian sociologist and historian René Zavaleta Mercado describes the organic institutionality of the Bolivian Republic for the first century and twenty-five years of its existence as an 'apparent State'[3], marked by the contradiction of being a racist and excluding State in a country of immense indigenous and mestizo majorities(Antezana: 1991).

Said State, historically little or nothing had been concerned with the welfare of indigenous majorities but was based on its exploitation as a semi-slave labor force and subjected, through the control of land and territory, to a domination of ethnic, socioeconomic nature and, above all, symbolic: the 'feudal mining' or system of mining elites that, in concomitance with agrarian elites, supported the State through a system of exploitation of indigenous labor until the mid-twentieth century. The same State asked

[2] Observe ANNEX I Comparative matrix of the Bolivian Political Field

[3] Name given by the said author to the Bolivian State in the period between the wars of the Pacific (1879 – 1883) an the Chaco (1932 – 1935)

these original populations to participate in the defense of territorial integrity, both in the War of the Pacific (1879 - 1883) and in the War of the Chaco (1932 - 1935). Only in the Federal War (1898 - 1889) the central role of indigenous populations in state conflicts can be considered as a legitimate struggle, due to interest in the control of the land-territory factor, as an ancestral demand of indigenous peoples in Bolivia[4].

The set of geographical and social contradictions conditioned the historical evolution of the Bolivian State, including the conformation of the identity imaginary: a citizenship in spite of the State -that is, the imaginary of Bolivian 'citizenship' can hardly be understood only as belonging to a political community, but as a participant of an informal political process, one that is resolved in the streets, in the conflictas social negotiation- and that will negatively impact throughout its history, both when mobilizing resources and human capital in its constant internal conflicts, as in the inability to maintain territorial cohesion and integrity through countless war conflicts that have stripped Bolivia of 51% of its original territory.

This territorial and social fragmentation -36 ethnic groups are currently recognized- contrasted with the unitary and monolithic form of the republican-colonial state[5], resulting in a state density -institutional presence-almost nil at Bolivian borders throughout the country's history, a diluted political and social unity that is reflected in a large number of short-term governments and the continuing reforms of the constitutional letters of the Bolivian State throughout its history.

3. Political hegemony of the Movement to Socialism (M.A.S.)

Evo Morales Ayma directed the destinies of the Bolivian State during three steps of government: a first period of implementation of the MAS as a ruling party (2006 - 2009), a second moment that meant the expansion and hegemonic zenith of the Evo Morales Ayma party (2010 - 2015) and finally, the progressive decline of the hegemonic condition of the political party (2015 - 2019). Consequently, the present investigation proposes to describe the specificities of the Bolivian political field by government management, paying special attention to the last government management, specifically to the immediate antecedents of the conflict (2015 - 2019)[6].

3.1. Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples (I.P.S.P.) – Movement to Socialism (M.A.S.)

The Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples, social and ideological base of the Movement to Socialism, is formed by the Single Central of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (C.S.U.T.C.B.), the 'Confederation' of six Coca Sowers Unions in Chapare, and the 'Bartolina Sisa Federation' –Women in Bolivia. These organizations of a peasant union nature form the hard core of the Movement to Socialism.

Since 2006, the National Confederation of Rural Teachers, the National Confederation of Rentiers and Senior Citizens of Bolivia (which will later leave the party)

[4] The indigenous struggle against the so called Ex-link Law (*Ley de exvinculación*) of 1874 was the inmediate antecedent of indigenous participation in the so called civil war or federal revolution of 1898 – 1899, and throughout the social and political process between 1898 and 1903 (Choque: 2017=

[5] Giving rise to the historical demand for autonomy, as a form of management that, theoretically, would allow the territories away from urban and political centers to manage the public apparatus together with te redistribution of resources.

[6] Observe ANNEX I

and the National Confederation of Micro and Small Enterprises (Conamype) have joined. On the other hand, in 2009, trade union organizations of corporate nature, such as the Central Obrera Boliviana (C.O.B.), the National Federation of Mining Cooperatives (Fencomin), the Central Obrera Regional (C.O.R.) of El Alto, and the National Council from Ayllus and Markas de Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ) - which brings together indigenous and indigenous unions from the Andean area of the country.

3.2. Historical-political process: from the 'democracy agreed' to the 'Plurinational State': The rise of social movements

Juan Evo Morales Ayma assumed the presidency of the Bolivian State on January, 22 – 2005, after a historical period of political and social instability (2000 – 2004) (cf. Infra), characterized by the strong social rejection of economic policies of structural adjustment –of orthodox neo-liberal court- imposed in Bolivia since 1985, trough Supreme Decree N° 21060- and reaffirmed at the continental level by the Washington consensus in 1989. This anomic period was characterized by a progressive loss of representativeness and legitimacy of the then multiparty political system, manifested in an acute social crisis, due both to the loss of purchasing power and the low participation of less favored social sectors in the political life of the country.

Three periods of social and political upheaval can be recognized prior to the start of the Morales government: the 'Water War' (2000), the 'Gas War' (2003) and, finally, the social conflicts of 2004 that derived in the resignation of the then president Carlos Mesa Quisbert and the subsequent call for general elections. It is necessary to observe the catalytic speeches of the social revolt and the scenarios of the conflict: the privatization and access of Water and basic services (2002) with epicenter in Cochabamba, the exploitation and usufruct of hydrocarbon resources (2003) with epicenter in the city of 'El Alto' (La Paz), coupled with the demand for a 'Constituent Assembly' -what would later be known as the 'October Agenda'.

This system of political parties came to include up to 13 acronyms that fought for access to the executive and legislative power, the so called 'agreed democracy', a presidentialism of coalition, centered on a system of political parties and congressional agreements[7] that based its model of governance in the subordination of parliament to the executive branch and the weakening of unions (Mayorga: 2019)

The assumption of the presidency of Evo Morales on January 22, 2005 marked the beginning of a period of charismatic leadership[8] typical of 'Bolivian populism', as it articulates elements of the 'national-popular'[9] project with traits of trade union indigenism,

[7] In this political system, the presidency was defined among the three candidates with the highest vote and the congressional agreements were based on quotas of institutional power mechanism such as government and municipal ministries, wich until then were designated by the president of the state

[8] According to Mayorga (2019), situational charisma: the combination of power resources (union and political party), based on the indigenous status and humble ancestry of Mr. Morales. Benefactor that promotes an executes the redistribution of wealth for unprotected and historically excluded majorities

[9] René Zavaleta Mercado's own concept, which refers to the political culture of the mining union leadership as a historical actor in Bolivian social formation and which contemplates the presence of union leaders in areas of political representation (Parliament) as a mechanism for participation and channeling of demands social since the mid-twentieth century. The union is understood as a mechanism of mediation between the State and society, by transcending trade unionism towards the political arena

such as anti-imperialist discourse, the search for indigenous autonomy and the defense of the coca leaf.

Said 'indigenism' cemented the construction of the legal and ideological frameworks that shaped the Plurinational State[10] in various ways: under the discursive premise of the '*Suma Qamaña*' or 'live well' in Quechua language, as a programmatic and ideological principle; through the inclusion of indigenous-native autonomies, the recognition of indigenous justice and the traditional forms of indigenous-native management -use and customs (cf. Infra)

The sphere of citizenship constitutionally included the concept of peasant-indigenous-originator a specific entity of citizenship and specific subject of law. In this sense, the Environment -*Pachamama* or mother earth- is also transformed into a subject of law by opening, with this background a new chapter in the use and management of Bolivian natural resources - at least in formal discourse and institutionality.

3.3. Political field during the three governmental efforts of Evo Morales Ayma

Evo Morales Ayma focuses his first political management on a refundational discourse, the transformation of the Bolivian-colonial Bolivian socio-political matrix that had lasted until the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century.

The legitimacy of origin and the implementation of the 'October agenda' managed to strengthen the charismatic leadership figure of Evo Morales (Mayorga: 2018) within the social movements and peasant unions that will constitute the hard vote of the Movement to Socialism.

As a governance model, a pact based on negotiation and inter-union consensus was developed. Bolivian governance takes the form of a government coalition formed by social organizations with a peasant-native trade union base, progressively expanded through the incorporation of the Bolivian Workers' Central and other trade union entities of regional scope.

The reforms face in the first management of Evo Morales were immense and were guided by indigenism ideology, under the principle of '*Suma Qamaña*' or 'living well' (Walsh: 2008) as a discursive core of political-legal reforms that they reflected in a new political Constitution of the State, approved in February 2009.

In the economic field, the Bolivian State began a progressive recovery of the actions of its strategic companies –hydrocarbons, energy, services and telecommunications. Giving way to a new relationship dynamics with global capitals.

The main transformations in the political field occurred when inaugurating the dispute over the vertical dimension of power, that is, the democratic election of governors. Regional autonomy and indigenous autonomy began to complement municipal autonomies as scenarios of management and political dispute.

The Plurinational Electoral Body was also established as the fourth state body. Deepening the democratic process through the implementation of 'Intercultural Democracy'. Model which complemented representative democracy with direct

[10] The promulgation of a new Political Constitution in February 2009, dated February 7, 2009. After being approved, by referendum, on January 25 of the same year with 61.43% of the vote. The promulgation was made possible through a political pact in the congress that modified several articles. On the other hand, the constituent assembly finalized and approved the new text in November 2008 after strong social conflicts.

democracy via referendum, and community democracy –as a formal recognition of traditional forms of political management of indigenous and native peoples. The expansion of the democratic process was reflected in the holding of elections for authorities in the judiciary –with poor participation and high percentage of null and blank votes.

The political field varied significantly between 2006 and 2010, consolidating the M.A.S. in his second term as a hegemonic party. The support and legitimacy that the then thriving UNASUR gave Morales during conflicts with elites and regional political parties in 2008 were key to ensuring the exercise of a hegemonic capacity after the 2009 elections. Despite taking great risks, the MAS political planning ensured the continuity of the 'process of change' by expanding the consensus and legitimacy of origin, this was reflected in the electoral processes. According to Mayorga (2019) Radical rhetoric and moderate decisions characterized the government of Evo Morales Ayma during this period.

The hegemonic period of the M.A.S. (2010 - 2016) involved the dissolution and fragmentation of the Bolivian political opposition in a cluster of political parties and regional political groups without the capacity for cohesion or articulation in a national representation. In this period, the main hegemonic strategy of the ruling party was to broaden the consensus capacity it enjoyed, through the realization of social summits that led to the expansion of the pact within the M.A.S. to include in the concertation sectors as unlikely as the agricultural business of eastern Bolivia, traditional bastion of liberalism in the country.

An aspect that can be rescued is the institutionalization of women's participation in political life, under the principle of political alternation and indigenous dualism that implants 50% of female participation in the lists of representatives of political parties.

Over the years, the M.A.S., as the hegemonic political party, has included demands of high aggregation in Bolivian civil society, such as maritime demand before Chile in the International Court of Hague (2014) and the 'patriotic agenda 2020 – 2025', which reiterates conventional goals, leaving aside its refundational and de-colonizing discourse and recovering historical continuity with the Republic founded in 1825.

After ten years of 'change process' (2014 – 2016) –the hegemonic zenith of the Movement to Socialism- a higher state density was established (*Ciudadanía*, LAPOP: 2018) due to the expansion of the representative capacity of political institutions and the citizen participation –always under the protection of the government party and its decisive instance of informal negotiation between union groups and their power differentials. In the political field, the concentration of power in the ruling party had deepened. The political opposition –a precarious and dispersed system of opposition parties- lacked bargaining power in a predominant or hegemonic party system –a political party controlling the instances if the decision-making process, very characteristic of Latin American presidentialism.

3.4. Hegemonic Decadence of the Movement to Socialism (2016-2019)

Although the 2014 general elections were a resounding success for the Movement to Socialism in the horizontal dimension of power, in the vertical dimension they meant the loss of very important municipal governments and governments such as La Paz, El Alto and Santa Cruz. In this sense, the articulation of 'citizen groups' - forms of non-union political and collective management - meant the emergence of new political actors, whose varied origins made it very difficult to apply the principle of opposition or contingency by the Movement to Socialism (M.A.S.).

The referendum of February 21, 2016 constitutes the biggest electoral defeat suffered by the M.A.S. as a political force and show the impossibility of finding an enemy

for the operationalization of political identity. This referendum tested the counter-majority control that the different State organs should exercise over the executive body –since multiparty control was not exercised, due to 2/3 of the Movement to Socialism in the Legislative Assembly. It also meant a very hard test for the institutionality that requires the socio-political viability of 'intercultural democracy'. This electoral process evidenced the exacerbated hegemonic condition of the M.A.S. as a political party: the electoral and judicial bodies not only validated a third re-nomination –under the surrealist speech of Political Rights as Human Rights- but it also did unconstitutional, according to the ruling of the Plurinational Constitutional Court, several articles of the political Constitution approved in 2009 by the same Movement to Socialism

This series of contradictions, together with the re-articulation of the political opposition in the form of citizen movements with regional representation and whose main stage of action were the streets, prevented the M.A.S. achieve an effective articulation and representation of the real interests of the Bolivian middle classes -that incidentally had 'widened' due to the inclusion of a significant percentage of vulnerable population, mostly migration settled in the main urban centers of the country (Ciudadanía: 2018, Brújula digital: 2018). In other words, the hegemonic capacity of M.A.S. had serious problems dealing with the emerging urban middle classes, reluctant to reproduce union management as a form of representation or political participation, due to the country's bitter experiences with corporate interests and the consequent corruption within the ruling party.

On the discursive level, the opposition built a new discourse around an empty signifier: corruption and prebency of the M.A.S. as an old Bolivian 'political *habitus*', represented by the sum of corporate interests, that did not identify the economically informal and entirely dissimilar majorities of the peasant union identity, and although the Bolivian political opposition did not exist in the vertical dimension of power distribution, it did existed -and in a very strong way- in the streets of the main urban centers, articulating interests around an anti-corruption discourse, which indicated the 'cult of personality' that the hegemonic party had developed for almost fourteen years, the political opposition, divided and diluted he found in the negative aspects of the Morales government his principle of opposition.

On the other hand, the demand for improvements in the health system, together with a forest fire of magnitude, managed to unite the common of the middle classes as a political collective, a 'chain of equivalences' (La Clau: 2000) that it was much more representative than the 2025 agenda than the M.A.S. had developed within his own ranks with the participation of 'opportunistic' private sectors that, like the social and union movements that made up the M.A.S. as a political party, sought to satisfy their own interests -control of land and territory- through the political management.

We believe that the statement of Benjamin Arditti (2007) pointing out that the State has lost the monopoly of politics –when it refers to the inability of the political party system to achieve effective representation within the social fabric and its agents- is particularly true in the multitude variety of interests and antagonisms that make the Bolivian political field: not only has the satate/market cleavage been overcome, but the union/political cleavage does not seem to be sufficient to achieve an effective representation of collective interests beyond the interests of corporative/union nature.

1. Conflict Development

The 2019 elections were presented as the only scenario in which the hegemonic condition of the M.A.S. it could be challenged. After almost 14 years in power all state apparatus had been co-opted and included in the sphere of influence of the powerful ruling government party. The continuous legal and electoral arguments -including the election of magistrates in different constitutional courts where the null vote far exceeded valid votes- along with several corruption and nepotism scandals, as well as the various conflicting interests within the corporate union fabric of the then the government party undermined the image, legitimacy and credibility of the Bolivian electoral organ, taking with it much of the support for the MA.S. by the urban middle classes within the Bolivian electorate

Although the elections of October 20, 2019 were peaceful and with broad electoral participation, the background presented here seriously undermined the credibility of the Plurinational Electoral Tribunal (T.E.P.). This resulted in serious consequences when the said electoral body suspended the Fast Transmission of Preliminary Results (TREP) late at night with an advance of 84% and with results that suggested the inevitability of a second electoral round. However, the statistical trend of said count varied significantly the next day, with notable delay in the counting of the votes and a tendency of evident favor to the percentages of the M.A.S. that led Mr. Morales Ayma to declare himself a winner without the need for ballot, even before the quick count (95% of the count) was concluded and without having known the final official results by the T.E.P. Detonating civil protest movements and allegations of "shameless fraud" by members of the Bolivian political opposition.

The social protest spread progressively after Monday, October 21, when several civic, trade union and social leaders stand apart from the M.A.S. calling for an indefinite national strike with the request for the execution of a second electoral round between the first two political forces in the elections. On Tuesday, October 22, the then president Morales denounces a ‘coup d'etat’ with racist dyes against him, calling on his social bases to mobilize in defense of the legitimacy and legality of a hypothetical fourth term. Reporting on Wednesday, October 23, the first clashes between civilians and trade unionists, against and in favor of a new Morales government, respectively.

On October 24, the Organization of American States recommends holding a second electoral round, adding to this request the governments of the United States, Colombia and a Argentina the next day. On October 25, Morales Ayma declares himself winner of the elections challenging the Bolivian political opposition to a reviwe of the results of the election ‘vote by vote’ and, at the same time, requesting the Organization of American States (O.A.S.) to carry out an audit to the electoral process with biding character, something that is rejected by the political opposition.

On November 1, the Plurinational Electoral Tribunal formalizes the official results of the vote count, declaring Morales Ayma a winner in the first round. This generated a generalized rejection that was visible in the form of an ultimatum by eight of the nine civic committees of the country, demanding the resignation of Morales Ayma in a term not exceeding 48 hours.

On Wednesday, November 6, the conflicts intensify with those killed in the towns of Montero and Vila Vila, in which there are also acts of torture and sexual abuse of protesters by followers of the M.A.S. The fire of the offices of the Municipal Autonomous Government of Vinto (Cochabamba) is reported by opponents of the regime - as a result of the death of two teenagers at the hands of Morales Ayma's followers.

The catalyst for Morales's resignation from the presidency was the police riot initiated in the city of Cochabamba on November 9 -preceded by the refusal of the Police of the city of Sucre, a day before, to repress the protesters- that it spread rapidly to all the capital cities of the country, except the city of Pando. On the other hand, on November 11, the presentation of a final report advance of the O. A.S. which pointed to fraud and serious irregularities, along with the refusal to repress and subsequent 'recommendation' of resignation made on November 10 by the Bolivian Armed Forces with the aim of pacifying the country, they finished sealing the end of the government of Evo Morales Ayma and the political hegemony of M.A.S.

4.1. Geographical Scenarios Of Conflict

At the height of the conflict, according to the newspaper '*Página Siete*' –La Paz, November 18, 2019- the main points of confrontation were four, with La Paz as epicenter -the city of 'El Alto' and the locality of '*Río Abajo*' surrounding the north and south, respectively. In Cochabamba the tension was manifested by the police and military barrier that prevents the passage of the coca leaf peasants through the center of the city. While in Yapacaní (Santa Cruz) the pacification agreements are not made effective. The total number of blockages are: 25 in La Paz, along the roads to *Oruro* city, and the localities of *Desaguadero* and *Charaña*. Another 28 blockages are in Cochabamba and prevent the passage between the Andean and Amazonia zones of Bolivia. In Santa Cruz, six conflict points are reported for transport on the route that connects the eastern capital with Cochabamba. Finally, in Oruro, seven blockades are identified and in Potosí five. With a total of 71 road blocking points. Almost all concentrated around the backbone of the country:

Graph n 1. Main conflict zones and road blockades



Source: Bolivian Highway Agency, road map 18 / XI / 2019

It can be inferred that the objective of the peasant union movements is to isolate both the seat of government (La Paz), and the city of Cochabamba, geographical and road center of the country. In this sense, the reissue of the 'siege of La Paz' as a conflict setrategy (cf. supra) seems to make sense when analyzing the road map of the Murillo Province (La Paz city):

Graph n 2. Road map - murillo province (la paz city)



Source: Scielo - Bolivia

The blockade demonstrates effectiveness because the Aymará peasant unions control both the road that connects the city of La Paz with Cochabamba (and the rest of the country), as well as the roads that link the urban spot with the valleys located south of the same, traditional source of legumes and vegetables for the demand of almost 1.5 million inhabitants. On the other hand, the control of the city of Alto allows those mobilized to deny access to the supply of fuels, since the distribution center is located in district 8 of the other city, specifically in the area called 'Senkata '. In the same way, the control of the city of Alto and its international airport greatly hinders the air supply that the possible government authorities proposed as an alternative to the progressive shortage of the city's informal markets during the conflict.

4.1.1. Cochabamba, geographic and road center of Bolivia

The importance of the city of Cochabamba as road and celavage center in Bolivia should be highlighted. In terms of classical geopolitics, this department could be called the 'heartland' of Bolivia, due not only to being the Bolivian highway center, but to be a reflection of the country´s ethnic and geographical wealth:

Graph n 3. Cochabamba - road communication



Source: Scielo - Bolivia

The city of Cochabamba has considerable geopolitical importance, since its control allows or denies access to the different roads of Bolivia's highway communication. On the other hand, the region called the 'Tropic of Cochabamba' or the 'Chapare' is between the departments of Cochabamba and Santa Cruz - two of the three pivots of the so-called 'Bolivian gold triangle' (Hoffman: 2011) - and It includes the two main roads that connect not only the two departmental capitals already mentioned, but also a territory very rich in water resources, flora, fauna and minerals. However, perhaps the most important feature of this geographical area is the habitat and main housing area - since many of its inhabitants practice multi-residence as a life strategy - of the six coca leaf producer unions - of which Morales Ayma has served as executive secretary since July 1988 and is president since 1991 (Lessman: 2005) - constituting the political base and the 'hard vote' of the Movement to Socialism. Another one of the sectors that constitutes the hard vote of the M.A.S. (cf. Infra)

4.1.2. Santa Cruz, Bolivian 'hinterland'.

With regard to the city of Santa Cruz, it is unlikely that this city will be besieged by peasant-syndicalist movements related to the Movement to Socialism (MAS), because despite relying on the road infrastructure of the 'trunk axis' for trade towards the Pacific Ocean, the supply of essential products does not depend, as in the case of La Paz and Cochabamba, on agricultural communities related to former President Morales Ayma, but rather on considerable agro-industrial production and a well-supplied demand for the areas of existing agricultural vocation around the urban axis:

This department has a fairly developed road infrastructure, not only because of the extensive interprovincial highway network it has, but also because it has access to the Paraguay-Paraná waterway and is the center of international air flow both Bolivian and Latin American - it is one of the main intermediate stops for destinations in South America:

According to the National Statistics Institute (INE: 2018), the region produces 70% of the country's food. Also according to what is indicated by INE, this region contributes with 28,5% of national Gross Domestic Product (GDP), surpassing La Paz (25,2%), Cochabamba (14,2%), Tarija (13,7%), Potosí (5,43%), Oruro (4,77%), Chuquisaca (4,97%), Beni (2,41%) and Pando (0,86%).

The economy of Santa Cruz is based mostly on private activity, mainly agricultural and agro-industrial, in addition to its energy and hydrocarbon potential, the latter in the hands of the State. The private base is driven by 40,398 companies, which, since the middle of the last century, has been leading a vertiginous development process. The CAINCO document "*Desafíos del Siglo. XXI*" (CAINCO: 2016), identifies four main factors:

i) the discovery and production of hydrocarbon resources;
ii) the linking of the cross-border economy with the rest of Bolivia and with the world;
iii) the expansion of agricultural and agro-industrial production; iv) an effective scheme for planning and execution of public works

Graph n 4. Road network department of Santa Cruz



Source: Scielo - Bolivia

Given this background, it seems logical to point out that this department has been characterized by a position reluctant to the "leftist" discourse of M.A.S. It has also become the visible vanguard of the civil and civil 'resistance' resistance movement.

Graph n 5. Department of santa cruz, access to international communication routes.

Source: Scielo - Bolivia

4.1.4. Potosí, the Imperial Imperial Villa 'in backwardness and forgetfulness

Another preminent scenario to consider in the conflict was the city of Potosí. Distance from the government of the M.A.S. Since 2016, it has been characterized as one of the regions that most resisted the fourth re-election of Mr. Evo Morales Ayma. Formerly a first-class mining center, the Potosi department has its hopes set on the industrialization of lithium because the salaries present within its territory comprise, according to different estimates, about 30% of the world reserve of that element.

According to Olivera (2014), the project of industrialization of evaporitic resources was born within several local social organizations –but not departmental- and was implemented in stages, reaching discrete levels of success in achieving its objectives. The aforementioned author also points out that a series of inconsistencies in the execution of the project, together with the specific characteristics of the Bolivian pickles, combined with little reliable information regarding the conditions of exploitation of this light metal among the potosine population have defenestrated the project of exploitation and industrialization of an exclusively state nature; In other words, the imperative need for technology transfer, the dubious competitiveness of Bolivian lithium against Chilean and Argentine private production, as well as the social and environmental unsustainability of the exploitation of this resource made this project unfeasible. For these reasons, the government of Mr. Evo Morales Ayma boldly sought out business partners willing to transfer technology, signing commitments with Chinese companies Xinjiang Tbea Group-Baocheng and German ACI Systems - the latter being the most benefited by an operating agreement at 70 years of shared risk - with the aim of producing lithium hydroxide and manufacturing lithium-ion batteries for European and Asian markets respectively.

The aforementioned agreements, together with an agenda composed of a series of mining union claims, as well as the progressive depletion of mineral resources and hydrological basins, have been the pivot of the civil and political resistance discourse

wielded by the departmental civic leadership in the conflict that led to the resignation of Morales Ayma to the presidency

4.1.4. The Chapare region and 'General Coca Law' (2017).

Enacted on March 8, 2017, the 'General Law of Coca' benefits the coca growers of Chapare, since it establishes 22,000 Ha of coca, of which 14,220 are from the Yungas and 7,700 from the Tropic of Cochabamba, defending the Law 1,008 of the Regime of Coca and Controlled Substances, which only allowed 12,000 Ha in La Paz territory and considered illegal production in Chapare because it was not ancestral - in other words, legalizes coca crops in the Cochabamba Chapare. According to the agency, most of the production of coca from Los Yungas is marketed in the legal market, while in the case of Chapare[11], slightly less than 10% is destined for legal human consumption. (UNDIOC: 2018):

The Confederation of Producers of Coca of Chapare comprises 965 unions and 50 thousand families' affiliates -with a total of about 200 thousand producers (BOLPRESS: Trade union genealogy of the coca leaf peasant. Feb 17 – 2018). Covering almost all of the municipalities of this province. This is reflected in the composition of political power, holding the M.A.S. local governance positions can easily mobilize resources, with the State´s apparatus to guarantee logistics supported by the representation and legitimacy granted by unions as social organizations.

Graph n 6. Bolivia: Coca leaf production areas



Source: UNDIOC 2018

According to UNDIOC (2018), global coca production in Bolivia has increased significantly since 2016, contrary to the declining trend of the previous five years. Between 2016 and 2017, production increased 17 percent in Chapare and only 1 percent in Yungas,

[11] Coca growers unions in Cochabamba can be described as an organic power structure, based on the organizational and cohesive strength of the union. As noted above, they constitute the political base and main electoral support of Mr. Morales Ayma. These unions include around 50 thousand families organized in six provinces of the department of Cochabamba - and one of the department of Santa Cruz.

while in 2018 it decreased by a small percentage. This led to Chapare concentrating up to 34 percent of coca crops in Bolivia. Due to the higher productivity of Chapare crops, UNODC (2018) estimates that the region produces almost half of the country's coca, allocating just over 91% of that production to the illegal market or cocaine production.

On the other hand, as can be seen in the map presented under this lines, coca production areas comprise not only the two main communication routes between Cochabamba and Santa Cruz, but also include territories framed in protected areas, whose legislation does not include sowing and production of coca leaf:

Graph n 7. Coca sembrades in relation to communication routes and protected areas



Source: UNDIOC 2018

The UNDIOC report (2018) highligths that 22% of coca leaf crops in Cochabamba are found in National Parks –both in TIPNIS and Carrasco National Park. The figures indicate that 12% of the coca crops planted in the department of Cochabamba are in the TIPNIS, the other 10% in the Carrasco Park, and the remaining 78% in Chapare region, and the municipalities of Tiraque and Yapacaní (Santa Cruz). It should be notes that important conflicts took place in these natural reserves –the TIPNIS conflict (2011) being one of the first political defeats of the Movement to Socialism.

4.1.5. El Alto as agent and political-social scenario

This bustling city of more than one million inhabitants, the majority indigenous - established immigration - is located in an Andean plain over 4,000 meters (13,100 feet) above sea level. The population of the city is made up mostly of young people, seven out of every 10 inhabitants are under 25 years old. The Public University of Alto (UPEA) now has more than 40,000 students.

It should be noted that it is the entrepreneurial capital of the Andean area of the country, with 119,000 companies, 93% of them small and medium, according to Roberto Alba Monterey, director of the business development network of El Alto, in an interview with the journalist Barbassa (2019). The aforementioned author

also notes that El Alto has become a kind of dry port, the link between the vast indigenous plains and La Paz, characterized by being a free zone and its business climate. That is, a city with its own agenda and specific needs.

This population played a crucial role in the popular demonstrations that brought Evo Morales Ayma - the first Bolivian president of indigenous descent - to power in 2005 and was the main bastion of resistance to the civic movement that ended with said government: El Alto was part of the hard voting core obtained by the MAS in the elections, with 77% in 2005, 87% in 2009 and 72% percent in 2014.

5. The nature of the conflict: Particularities of the struggle for the meaning of democracy.

The conflict resulting from the presidential elections held on October 20, 2019 entails the effective re-articulation of a political opposition -deeply conservative in Catholic and evangelical moral and ethical values and, paradoxically, extremely liberal in the sense of citizenship and political rights. As we pointed out in the previous subtitle, the opposition discourse creates its identity from the denial or differentiation of its collectivities with the set of peasant and labor unions that make up the M.A.S. In this sense, a demand for high common aggregation -the quality of health services and their eventual collapse- constitutes the discursive core that what will later take the form of a strong criticism of Morales's political management, especially what its third consecutive re-postulation implies for the institutionality of the organs of the State and the subjection that these organs showed before the political hegemonic quality exerted by the M.A.S. since 2010: there was a common enemy before which to unite a collage of political-regional identities that had nothing to do with the union peasant corporate interests.

On the contrary, Morales's party was not sure who his political rival was. The heterogeneous composition of the new opposition camp and the little formal political representation they had radically contrasted with the significance of 'neoliberal and imperialist' political figures presented as antagonists to the common imaginary of socialist militancy, already accustomed to the hegemony and protection of repressive apparatus of the State.

However, beside the background of the referendum of February 21, 2016, three historical moments can be recognized within the conflict that resulted in the resignation and subsequent abandonment of Mr. Morales Ayma's duties: a first period that includes since the elections of October 20 until the resignation of Evo Morales from November 10. A second moment of power vacuum and negotiation of political forces between November 10 and 12. And, finally, a third period that includes from the self-proclamation of the Senator Yeanine Áñez to the presidency of the Plurinational State (November 12) -which unleashed protests and mobilizations by the peasant union base, the 'hard vote' of the MAS- until the eventual pacification of the country (November 23), thanks to a new political and social pact, achieved between the hitherto inconsequential Bolivian political opposition and the social and trade union movements still loyal to Morales Ayma

The first moment was a deep questioning of ‘intercultural democracy’ because the absence of counter-majority control by the electoral and judicial bodies was found. On the other hand, the scenarios of the conflict at this stage showed that although in the political field the opposition is diluted and dispersed, it conglomerates different urban sectors in the main cities of the country, through a high capacity of aggregation from the priority attention demands to the health system, the environment and, above all, the institutionality of the democratic and political process.

Even more, the fact that several regions and unions –including peasant unions- have been gradually unraveling form the M.A.S. during the trance it demonstrates the conjuctural character of the political bond that unites Morales with that 'organic' militancy of corporatist court. The very fact that the once powerful Bolivian Labor Center ('*Central Obrera Boliviana'*) requests the resignation of Morales –almost in parallel with the Bolivian Armed Forces- demonstrates that the conflict over political legitimacy tests any type of loyalty that means the elucidation of political pacts in function to sectorial interests.

Similarly, the role of the Organization of American States and its secretary general were central to conflict management, because, although they had endorsed the third presidential re-nomination of Morales, the report resulting from an electoral audit - with binding character, requested by Morales himself to placate the social protests- completely defeated the cornered executive power, whose 2/3 in the legislative assembly little or nothing meant for political and social legitimacy in the streets. On the other hand, the mutiny of the Bolivian Police demonstrated what Foucault already pointed out: the police state is essentially mercantilist and urban.

The Police, as an institutional organization consisting mainly of indigenous migrants settled in the cities -that is, a population of vulnerable middle classes- can hardly be expected to go against the people they are supposed to provide protection and service. A long list of demands -which has more to do with its institutionality and its historical relationship with the Bolivian Armed Forces- made the riot police the catalyst of a domino effect that ended any institutional support that left Morales in the country's urban centers.

A second moment demonstrated the socio-political myopia of the M.A.S. as a political party, who bet on social confrontation as a conflict resolution strategy, which main scenario was in the streets of the country's urban centers. The demonstrated inability to mobilize the urban middle classes by the then ruling party, contrasted with a speech that sought a more active role for the country's rural populations, causing deaths in specific conflict scenarios: intermediate cities and peripheral urban centers that serve of entry for the migratory flows and for the provision of goods and services to the cities, main economic centers of the country. This strategy was committed to generate a continuous and progressive shortage in the cities, product of a sustained blockade of roads carried out by the agrarian populations.

The power vacuum and the subsequent ungovernability of the Bolivian State put the primeval institutions of the State (the Armed Forces) in uncertainty. Even more, the ghost of a coup d'etat fell deeply into the political and social classes of the country: the institutionality and hierarchy of the Armed Forces were compromised by the political loyalties of the high military command towards Evo Morales and his political project. However, despite the vast majority of the troops being made up of young conscripts coming from the rural sectors and from the less economically and politically favored urban classes, the group of junior and senior officers demonstrated commitment to the political system of representative democracy, which is not the same as' intercultural democracy' and acted in concomitance with the opposition civic movements, facilitating pacification in urban centers by recognizing the self-proclamation of President Áñez.

The overcoming of the conflict implied the creation of a new Bolivian political field in two different but interdependent scenarios: formal and social. Formal as the pacification of the country had involved a negotiation between the government party and the Bolivian political opposition to make viable in first place the assumption of Añez to the presidency (November 12), and later the promulgation of a 'Law of Exceptional and Transitional Regime of Call for Elections', approved on Saturday, November 23, 2019

through the mediation of the European Union, the Episcopal Conference of Bolivia (Catholic Church) and the delegate of the UN, who consolidated the constitutional transition by installing working tables to the election of new authorities of the Plurinational Electoral Body.

The other scenario took place through a direct dialogue and subsequent agreement with the leaders of the mobilized sectors in support of former President Morales Ayma, on the same Saturday, November 23. This pact was gestated, negotiated and approved with live television broadcasting in between. The role of some young political figures stood out to achieve consultation and exchange between the trade union and political spheres: cease civil confrontation in exchange for a 'Constitutional Guarantees Law' that protects union leaders, compensation for the families of the deceased and injured during the conflicts and, above all, the repeal of the Supreme Decree that legally protected the repressive forces of the State.

This denies the Marxist assumption that identity is a hiatus between effective consciousness and attributed consciousness, through the party as an embodiment of class objectives. The economic successes of the M.A.S. they not only assumed internal competition for resources, but also showed the affirmation of the effective identity of the agents that compose it against national a historical interests ’.

In the second place, the identity of the union agents was strongly questioned by the same success of the political project and the subsequent historical process, since the identity in the homogeneity - it pleases the pleonasm - is an illusion: the historical subject is essentially off-center, since its Identity is an articulation of changing positions and interests.

As a prelude to the conclusions we allow ourselves to quote Ernesto La Clau (: 2000), who affirms that the character of all identity is relational, an infinite set of differences whose meaning must be fixed in the discourse, when he states that:

The ideological consists in the recognition of the precarious character of all positivity, the impossibility of a final suture. In those discursive forms by which it tries to institute itself, on the basis of the closing, the fixation of the meaning and the non-recognition of the differences (…) must be seen as a constitutive of the social and the social only exists as the attempt of instituting society. (: 105-106)

6. Conclusions

There are many conclusions that can be inferred regarding the Bolivian conflict that occurred between October 20 and November 23, 2019. However, this article intends to focus its epilogue on the conformation of the Bolivian political field and its particularities

The loss of the hegemonic condition by the Movement to Socialism was entirely the responsibility of its cadres and political leadership. Believing that civic leaderships - essentially representing regional business elites and their interests- could have articulated social movements of such overwhelming nature based solely on their limited legitimacy is to belittle the critical capacity of the urban middle classes. The progressive loss of legitimacy was mainly due to the handling of the legal frameworks that were made to facilitate a fourth period of government, although it was Morales himself who said that if he lost the referendum on February 21- 2016, he will decline the possibility to present himself as a presidential candidate in a new electoral process. The Political Constitution of the State cannot be treated as a letter of utopian intentions, much less malleable or instrumentalized by reason of political interests, as this generates a framework of legal uncertainty and destabilizes any type of political management. In this same sense, it is evident that legal legitimacy is neither synonymous nor rival for legitimacy of origin.

On the other hand, the political field theory -along with its subsequent conceptual operationalization- presented by Dr. Fernando Mayorga in his dense description of the governments of Evo Morales Ayma, suffers from a serious limitation: he omits the informal field that the socio-dimension Politics imposes on Bolivian politics. Deeply different from what representative democracy implies, 'intercultural democracy' was an attempt to formalize the negotiations and subjective relations that move under the curtain of the formality of the party system, since understanding Bolivian politics imposes a series of categories necessary to think about an informal policy characterized by fluctuating, ephemeral and, above all, short-term scenarios, which far exceed the legal aspects that bureaucratic formality implies.

The Bolivian conflict has demonstrated a crisis of representativeness of the political party system, denoting, at the same time, an exhaustion in the exercise of citizenship through trade union entities. This overcoming of the party/union system cleavage implies the formation of heterogeneous political entities, in which 'the empty signifier' is shaped by the demands of high aggregation or, even more worrying, by the cohesion of identities through religious referents.

The hegemonic articulation -that is, the ability to generate cohesion through consensus- is not only formalized in the political party system, since the scene of the dispute and political negotiation is the streets of the main cities and the road infrastructure that furrow the rurality of the Bolivian identity[12]. In our opinion, something that the hegemony of the Movement to Socialism has shown is that these interaction scenarios, in Bolivia, social capital makes political capital viable -at least in the formal stages of state management, especially when it comes to political coalitions formed by trade union coalitions: the informal scenario of politics implies an interaction stripped of all legal parsimony and is, often, of a playful and even festive nature.

In other words, the Bolivian socio-political fabric is intertwined away from the corridors of the 'Burned Palace' or the 'House of the People'. On the contrary, the legitimacy necessary to maintain any hegemony originates in the streets and in everyday life living among populations that, although they are dissimilar, show an intense attachment to what they consider democracy and institutionality: either in the form of pacts, agreements and exchanges between formal agents or in tacit agreements of interaction and social coexistence between groups that, even rural or urban, recognize the plurality born of its rural Andean roots.

The Bolivian conflict also undressed the precariousness of the institutionality of multilateral organizations in South America. The poor discursive coherence that the Organization of American States showed towards Morales' third re-nomination to the presidency contrasts with his restrained disposition to exercise technical control through audits of the democratic process. This demonstrates that political interests affect the decision-making process within the Organization of American States. It is also evident in the existence of two reports with profoundly different ideological tendencies: the audit of the Bolivian electoral process with a technocratic and liberal tendency, contrasts sharply with the report of the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights (IACHR) that omitted the deaths caused by the violence exercised by the followers of Morales and focused exclusively on the description and treatment of the deaths after the resignation of Morales. The disparity with which the Bolivian conflict was treated denotes poor coordination between two interdependent multilateral entities, as well as the preminence

[12] Observe graph 1 at the final notes

of the ideological factor in the exercise of multilateral functions of vital importance for the political and social legitimacy of the American States.

Furthermore, the role of multilateral organizations was vital for the abandonment of functions of the M.A.S. On November 10, then, unlike the conflicts of 2008, there was no South American Union of Nations (UNASUR) that internationally endorses the electoral legitimacy that the 2019 election meant for Morales.

Finally - and perhaps most worrisome - the conflict showed that the imaginary of territory, identity and belonging have a profound effect on Bolivian politics. Social belonging was a key factor for the cohesion of the different antagonistic groups, the scenarios of the conflict demonstrate this. In this same sense, it should be noted that the narratives with which the discourses were constructed have elements of the most 'primitive': the Christian religion and the Andean worldview - often syncretic - were confronted by representativeness in a supposedly secular State. These scenarios include the virtual field or 'the network' that the internet implies, as a locus of social interaction with its own discursive dynamics, which escape the many times nineteenth-century codes of traditional Bolivian politics and even more of peasant unionism, whose interaction is It is based on the communion that work implies, far exceeding the communicative capacity of traditional power devices in the exercise of politics and its representations.

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			FIRST PERIOD 2006 – 2009		SECOND PERIOD 2010 - 2015		THIRD PERIOD 2015 - 2019			
							SUB-NACIONALS ELECTIONS 2014		CRITICAL JUNCTURE 2016 - 2018	CRITICAL JUNCTURE OCTUBER – NOVEMBER 2019
VARIABLES	DESCRIPTION		Establishment of the Process of Change and the Cultural Democratic Revolution		Hegemony of Movement to Socialism (M.A.S.)		Dominant Political Party.		Politicization of the Bolivian middle classes – Strive for the meaning of democracy	Anomie
	COMPONENTS									
POLITICAL FIELD	HORIZONTAL	M.A.S.	Senate: 12 Congress: 72	Divided Government	Senate: 26 Deputies: 88 Qualified majority (2/3)	Presidential decisionism was strengthened, weakening multiparty controls (subordination of legislative power)	Senate: 25 Deputies: 88 Qualified majority (2/3)	Formal and institutional consolidation of the political hegemony of the M.A.S. (subordination of the legislative branch)	Subordination of legislative, judicial bodies. Anti-majority control exercised by the Plurinational Electoral Body	Non-existent counter-majority control: the political hegemony of the M.A.S. overwhelms the organs of the Bolivian State Multiparty control nonexistent by 2/3 of the M.A.S. No state power or body has legitimacy in the main cities of the country
		Opposition	Senate: 15 Congress: 58 Senate veto capacity		Senate: 1o Deputies: 42 Four political parties: Opposition divided, fragmented and diluted		Senate: 11 Deputies: 42 Two political parties: Opposition divided, fragmented and diluted			
	VERTICAL	M.A.S.	3 Prefectures	Power Struggle	Six Gubernators		Six Gubernators Governments Mayors of the main cities.	Emergence of informal political organizations without party affiliation, using the figure of citizenship to define themselves. ('Collectives' and 'platforms')	Consolidation of citizen groups and platforms as local political actors at the level of the main urban centers. Approach of political parties to these organizations	The legitimacy of civic and civil movements has no competence on the part of the central power, whose only margin of action exists in rural areas and in intermediate cities
		Opposition	6 Prefectures Gubernators coalition		Regional political parties without cohesion		Multiplicity of political forces without parliamentary representation, without cohesion or consultation			

VARIABLES	DESCRIPTION	FIRST PERIOD 2006 - 2009	SECOND PERIOD 2010 - 2015	THIRD PERIOD 2015 - 2019		
				SUB-NATIONALS ELECTIONS 2014	CRITICAL JUNCTURE 2016 - 2018	CRITICAL JUNCTURE OCTUBER - NOVEMBER 2019
GOVERNANCE MODEL	COMPONENTS	Establishment of the Process of change and the cultural Democratic Revolution	Hegemony of Movement to Socialism (M.A.S.)	Dominant Political Party.	Politicization of the Bolivian middle classes – struggle for the meaning of democracy	Anomie
	PACT	Coalition of government formed by social organizations with a peasant-native union base.	Expansion of the government coalition, including the Central Obrera Boliviana (Bolivian Labor Central) and Mining Cooperatives.	Absence of multiparty control The more, it is the only party with a national presence. Seeks the reproduction of government conditions	The social legitimacy of the pact in the political field is called into question by the failure of counter-majority control	Dissolving constitutional succession of dissenting sectors of the M.A.S. with political representation of opposition parties and civic and civil movements. The call for elections is feasible among the M.A.S. and the new executive body
	AGREEMENT	Treatment between officialism and opposition makes the enactment of the C.P.E. February 2008, on condition of replacing articles	They are carried out within the social and union organizations that articulate the M.A.S. due to the pragmatism and diversity of the opposition field	The M.A.S. bases its management on the exchange of mutual benefit with the social and union forces that conform it	In the opposition field there is an approach between the political participation of regional elites as political and civic actors with citizen platforms and protest	Political dissent of the M.A.S. with opposition political parties and representatives of regional civic movements. The agreement that pacifies the country is through direct contact between the new president and the social movements and peasant unions related to Morales
	EXCHANGE	Coalition of union policies with corporate and individual-entrepreneurial union bases	The Movement to Socialism broadens the exchange through social summits to define economic, political, legislative and structural actions	Agenda 2020 - 2025. Privatization of health system and social security	Since the February 2016 referendum the opposition field has been mobilized by parliamentary political actors at regional and local (urban) level	Conventional succession in authority alliance union-entrepreneurial for facilitating the exile of Morales and his immediate political circle. The pacification of the country is through the articulation of regional civic movements by the victims of rights violations and the supreme decree that exempts the military and police from responsibilities

VARIABLES	DESCRIPTION / COMPONENTS		FIRST PERIOD 2006 – 2009	SECOND PERIOD 2010 - 2015	THIRD PERIOD 2015- 2019		
					SUB-NACIONALS ELECTIONS 2014	CRITICAL JUNCTURE 2016 - 2018	CRITICAL JUNCTURE OCTUBER – NOVEMBER 2019
	DESCRIPTION		Establishment of the Process of Change and the Cultural Democratic Revolution	Hegemony of Movement to Socialism (M.A.S.)	Dominant Political Party.	Politicization of the Bolivian middle classes – Strive for the meaning of democracy	Anomie
GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICT	STRATEGIC ACTORS	M.A.S.	Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples (I.P.S.P.) founded by: Single Central of Peasant Workers of Bolivia. Confederation 6 unions: association of wholesale producers of Coca - APROMPOCA). National Confederation of Peasant-Indigenous-Native Women of Bolivia Bartolina Sisa (CNMCIOB-BS). Stick (2006): National Confederation of Rural Teachers. National Confederation of Micro and Small Business (CONAMYPE).	In 2009 union organizations join: Central Obrera Boliviana (COB). Federación Nacional de Cooperativas Mineras (Fencomin). Central Obrera Regional (COR) de El Alto. Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas de Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ).	CONALCAM: Single Central of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (C.S.U.T.C.B.). National Confederation of Peasant-Indigenous-Native Women of Bolivia Bartolina Sisa (CNMCIOB-BS). Trade Union Confederation of Intercultural Communities of Bolivia (Coca growers of Yapacani - Santa Cruz; the T.I.P.N.I.S. and Carrasco National Park). Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of the Bolivian East (C.I.D.O.B.). Confederation of Factory Workers of Bolivia.	**M.A.S.'s Hard Core:** Confederation 6 unions: association of wholesale producers of Coca - APROMPOCA). National Confederation of Peasant-Indigenous-Native Women of Bolivia Bartolina Sisa (CNMCIOB-BS). Intercultural Communities of Bolivia (Coca growers in Yapacani Santa Cruz, the T.I.P.N.I.S. and the Carrasco National Park).	**Núcleo 'duro' del M.A.S.** Confederation 6 unions: association of wholesale producers of Coca - APROMPOCA). National Confederation of Peasant-Indigenous-Native Women of Bolivia Bartolina Sisa (CNMCIOB-BS). Intercultural Communities of Bolivia (Coca growers in Yapacani Santa Cruz, the T.I.P.N.I.S. and the Carrasco National Park).
		Political opposition	**Legislative Presence:** - Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario - Unidad Nacional - PODEMOS	**Legislative Presence:** - Convergencia Nacional - Frente de Unidad Nacional - Alianza Social	**Legislative Presence:** - Frente de Unidad Nacional - Partido Demócrata Cristiano	**Political coalition: "Demócratas"** - Gubernator of Santa Cruz, Rubén Costas. - Alcalde de La Paz, Luis Revilla (SolBo). - Carlos Mesa (ex MNR). - Jorge Quiroga por (ex ADN, ex PODEMOS). - Víctor Hugo Cárdenas (ex MNR). - Samuel Doria Medina (UN).	**Citizen Platforms:** - Bolivia dijo No (Santa Cruz). - 21F (Cochabamba – La Paz). With central prominence of university students - Potosí mining cooperatives National Police Union

			FIRST PERIOD 2006 – 2009	SECOND PERIOD 2010 - 2015	THIRD PERIOD 2015- 2018		
					SUB-NACIONALS ELECTIONS 2014	CRITICAL JUNCTURE 2016 - 2018	CRITICAL JUNCTURE OCTUBER – NOVEMBER 2019
VARIABLES	DESCRIPTION		Pact Mechanism	Hegemony of Movement to Socialism (M.A.S.)	Dominant Political Party.	Hegemonic decline of the M.A.S. political party Sociopolitical polarization Strive for the meaning of democracy	Anomie
	COMPONENTS						
GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICT	INSTITUTIONS	M.A.S.	- Armed forces - NATIONAL Police - Social movements and indigenous trade unions (CONALCAM)	- Armed forces - NATIONAL Police - Social movements and indigenous trade unions (CONALCAM)	- Armed forces - National Police - Social movements and indigenous trade unions (CONALCAM)	- Plurinational assembly - Armed forces - National Police **Universities** - Universidad Pública del Alto - Universidad Mayor de San Simón	- Plurinational Legislative Assembly - Municipal Autonomous Governments
		Political opposition	Political Force in the Senate Coalition of governors "Half Moon": - Santa Cruz - Beni - Pando - Tarija - Chuquisaca	Departamental Governments: - La Paz - Santa Cruz - Tarija	**Governments:** - Sol.Bo - Unión Demócrata - A - Demócratas **Municipal Governments** - Movimiento Demócrata Social - Frente de Unidad Nacional - Unidad Departamental Autonomista	**8 Civic Committees:** Does not include the Pando Department. Santa Cruz, Potosí and Cochabamba stand out **Universities** Universidad Mayor de San Andrés (La Paz) Universidad Autónoma Gabriel René Moreno (Santa Cruz) Universidad Tomás Frías. (Potosí) **Labor unions** Union of Health Workers **Churches:** Catholic and evangelical	- Armed forces - National Police **State universities:** Universidad Mayor de San Andrés (La Paz) Universidad Autónoma Gabriel René Moreno (Santa Cruz) Universidad Tomás Frías. (Potosí) **Churches:** Catholic and evangelical
GOVERNMENT STYLE			Radical speech, moderate decisions Charismatic leaderships Imbrication of peasant-indigenous-native organizations	Presidential decisionism. Charismatic Leadership Imbrication of peasant-indigenous-native organizations; Extension of the national agreement	Presidential decisionism. Charismatic Leadership Inclusion of "middle classes" and agro-industrial in the mutual benefit agreement	Presidential decisionism. Exercise of institutional political hegemony. Control against majority and counter-political party control is canceled	Pact of political viability.

		FIRST PERIOD 2006 – 2009	SECOND PERIOD 2010 - 2015	THIRD PERIOD 2015- 2019		
				SUB-NACIONALS ELECTIONS 2014	CRITICAL JUNCTURE 2016 - 2018	CRITICAL JUNCTURE OCTUBER – NOVEMBER 2019
VARIABLES	DESCRIPTION	Pact Mechanism	Hegemony of Movement to Socialism (M.A.S.)	Dominant Political Party.	Hegemonic decline of the M.A.S. political party Sociopolitical polarization Strive for the meaning of democracy	Anomie
	COMPONENTS					
SPEECH	M.A.S.	Refundational National / popular and Indigenismo: Indigenous and peasant Autonomies Sovereignty Anti-imperialist Ethnic-cultural Indigenous Autonomies Environmental Defense	National / Popular Historical Continuity for the Bicentennial Developer	Guarantee of economic and social stability Need for continuity of the 'Change Process' Abandonment of the indigenist trait to include middle classes	Guarantee of economic and social stability Need for continuity of the 'Change Process' "Neoliberal" return risk	Coup. Empire intervention with support from the liberal and conservative sectors
	Political opposition	Departmental Autonomies Citizenship and Democracy	Environmental Defense (T.I.P.N.I.S.) Rejection of the reduction of the subsidy to hydrocarbons	Respect for the rule of law Validity of the constitutional norm Authoritarian Government Exercise	Descontento político Respeto al estado de derecho Vigencia de la norma constitucional Ejercicio de gobierno autoritario Rechazo al código Penal (Demanda de alta agregación y policéntrica)	Unconstitutionality of the M.A.S. Electoral fraud
MAIN GOVERNMENT MEASURES	M.A.S.	Convocation to the Constituent Assembly. Nationalization of strategic companies. Promulgation of the Political Constitution of the State Expulsion D.E.A. and U.S.A.I.D.	Expansion of state density. Judicial reform election through democratic process Expulsion of the North American diplomatic mission Maritime Demand Urea Industrialization Lithium Industrialization Incentives for oil investment General Law of coca leaf	Call for Referendum	Promulgation of the Law of Political Organizations	Call for external audit of the elections. Call for political summit between parties with parliamentary representation. Call for new elections with new Electoral Body
LEGITIMACY	M.A.S.	Original	Of origin and performance Exchange and agreement are made within the social and trade union organizations that articulate the M.A.S.	Of origin - legal	Legal Legitimacy of origin questioned by performance evaluation Legitimacy of the electoral body in question	Anomie