

## THE PERCEPTION OF THE TRADITIONAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SCHOOLS REPRESENTATIVES ON THE EVOLUTION OF WORLD ORDER AFTER THE POST-COLD WAR

*Ioan HORGA\**

**Abstract.** *After 1990 the international society knows two contradictory phenomena, political-military instability, the expansion of the market economy on a global scale, which contributed to the forging of the Post-Cold War Order in which the tendency towards a unipolar and hegemonic system with global dimensions was inevitable in our opinion, entering the first stage of what we called during the study the Global World Order (GWO-1). At the beginning of the twenty-first century, these contradictory evolutions are amplified, on the one hand, by the rising of strong global economies, which compete with the USA (China, India, EU, Japan, Brazil, South Africa) and on the other, by the signs of returning to the international scene of Russia, which claimed the legacy of the place occupied in the great international politics by the Soviet Union, to which are added the political-military ambitions of China and India. To all these are added the challenges that climate change has on the whole of international relations.*

*Or this stage of the evolution of Post-Cold War Order as a global order no longer responds to the characteristics of the first stage (GWO-1), based on unipolarity, so it is necessary to introduce a new concept, which reflects these evolutions, namely the second stage- the Global World Order (GWO-2).*

*In this research we tried to see how these evolutions are perceived by the main representatives of the traditional schools of international relations - realists and liberals: first, how are these transitional evolutions perceived from GWO -1 to GWO-2, and secondly, how GWO -2 is perceived and finally what are the options regarding GWO -2.*

**Keywords:** *Post-Cold War Order, Global Word Order (GWO- 1; GWO -2), realists, liberals, unipolar, multilateral, Post-Cold War Order, international agenda*

The fall of the Berlin Wall not only ended bipolarism in international relations, the specific feature of international relations after WWII, but also marked the rise of the international order built after World War I, that is, the Old World Order (OWO).

The international order is understood according to the theoretical movement to which the author belongs. For example, for an appreciated theorist of liberalism, G. John Isenberg, the international order is “explicit principles, rules, and institutions that define the core relationship between the states that are party to the order” (Ikenberry, 2001: 23). Instead, for realists, the international order is "an organized group of international

---

\* Dean of the Faculty of History, Political Science, International Relations and Sciences of Communication, University of Oradea. E-mail: ioanhorga56@gmail.com

institutions that help govern the interactions among the member states ....an order does not necessarily include every country in the world” (Mearsheimer, 2019: 9).

In an attempt to give a comprehensive definition of the international order, but at the same time dynamic and functional, Charles L. Glaser, believes that " any international situation could be qualified as an international order, as long as its members accept the sovereignty norm” (Glaser, 2019: 55).

The last decade of the twentieth century marked the entry at large-scale of the international society into the era of globalization, characterized, on the one hand, by the state of turbulence, called by James Rosenau "a situation of uncertainty and great tension" (Rosenau, 1999: 50), and on the other, expecting international stability to come from a single center of power; International society enters into a period of contradictory evolutions: anarchy and order, globalization and fragmentation, globalization and heterogeneity, complexity and interdependence.

Most specialists in international relations believe that after 1990 the world became very complex. This change was felt strongly in the years 1990-1991, with the disintegration of the USSR and the Gulf War (1991). But the complexity of today's international society has its origins in the transformations that took place in the world during the seventies (the economic revival of Europe and Japan, as well as the rise of transnational actors) and the eighties (the modification of the economic processes, derived from globalization and the emergence of the problem of the environment). These transformations took the form of variables, which influenced the bipolar relations between the USA and USSR. The disappearance of this bipolarity has led to important changes in the international agenda, especially in the military field and later in other areas, such as the economic, global and environmental agenda.

First, the end of the Cold War, which ended bipolarism, represented a favorable framework for the emergence of an area dominated by chaos, unsafe areas, or gray areas. These spaces resulted as a consequence of the evolution of the modern state towards decentralization, the disappearance of the monopoly of violence and the disintegration of states by creating structures on ethnic criteria. For example, the erosion of the state in Africa has made some authors to talk about failed states (Cooper, 2000). The disintegration of the USSR and Yugoslavia, both federal states, created, at the end of the war, an ample space of conflicts, which amplified the meaning of the notion of failed states.

Secondly, globalization has influenced the new wars. The impact of globalization was evident in the actors of the wars - foreign soldiers, expatriate volunteers, officials of United Nations agencies, peacekeeping troops - as well as their economic factors - the illegal trade in weapons, drugs, valuables or human beings. The impact of globalization has led to the change of the international rules established previously, these rules not protecting the civilian population, but being involved in conflicts - paramilitary groups or mafia groups.

Third, globalization has led to the formation of "gray areas", areas that have become very important in the evolution of international relations. These gray areas have maintained violence in the conflict zone, at the base of which are illegal trafficking and terrorist movements. The areas in the vicinity of potential outbreaks of new conflicts, such as the former Yugoslavia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Andean America and Africa (Moreau Defarges, 2002: 69), are strictly supervised through preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peace stabilization.

This World Order entered after 1990 has an important attribute, it is global, becoming in our opinion the Global World Order (GWO). Only GWO becomes one with unipolar or hegemonic tendencies. In fact, these trends have been emphasized by a number of authors, even before 1990. As a result of the US rise after World War II, many authors believe that we are facing a new unipolar logic. Robert Gilpin considers that the US, after 1945, has acquired the status of "hegemonic power" (Galpin, 1981). Raymond Aron assigns the US the epithet of "imperial republic", with references to the left representatives of the American school of international relations, George Liska and Hary Magdoff (Liska, 1967; Mogdoff, 1969), but also the analysis of American diplomacy from 1945-1972 (Aron, 1973).

GWO, developed for two decades, shows- besides the concentration with unipolar tendencies- an increasingly visible fragmentation. If the enlargement of the EU to Central and Eastern Europe was fundamental on the logic of continuity, this represented the disappearance of the fracture between East and West and a strengthening of the Euro-Atlantic bloc. Instead the rise of South Africa, China, Brazil, India, Russia, South-East Asia, is perceived, on the one hand, as a sign of fragmentation, and on the other hand as a sign of regionalization. The rise of these states will increasingly mark the orientation of the GWO towards a multipolar world, which is getting the size of the emergence in the opinion of specialists and practitioners in international relations, to underline, on the one hand, the dissolution of the global power of the USA, and on the other hand the rise of other competitors.

Given that this second phase of the World Order is not only an alternative to the GWO, but the opposite of it, we are in a position to clarify the two stages of the GWO, so that conceptually they can be easily separated. Considering that GWO is related to the explosion of new information and communication technologies, we believe that we are not mistaken if we say that from 1990 until 2008/10 we have the GWO-1 stage. After 2008/2010 the world entered the GWO-2 stage.

Starting from the above-mentioned aspects, in this paper we will follow the way in which the perception of the representatives of the main traditional schools of international relations - the realists and the liberals - has evolved, in order to be able to respond theoretically to the dynamical changes produced in the world with the transition to GWO-2. In order to be able to answer the central question of the paper in the pages that follow, we will first review the global political changes produced after 2008; Secondly, we are looking to see how these mutations were perceived by the traditional IR theories.

### **1. From GWO1 to GWO2**

In the context of the tensions between democracy and totalitarianism, most authors consider that globalization and fragmentation have manifested themselves especially after the end of the cold war (Clark, 1998). In fact, these globalization/fragmentation tensions appeared long before 1989. A first aspect of this phenomenon is the planetary expansion of values and technology, which stimulated the will of individualization, translated into the defense of their own identities, and in some cases it reached self-determination spurts, as in the USSR or Yugoslavia. As well, these globalization/fragmentation tensions also appeared in the context of the processes of regional economic integration, a fact illustrated by the multiplication of regional trade agreements.

In all directions of the planet, regionalism is present, from European economic and monetary integration, to the free trade area of North America, to similar processes in

South America and Africa. But there is another reality - the regionalization of world trade is concentrated in the triangle of Western Europe, North America and East Asia, with China's admission to the World Trade Organization. In other words, trade between these regional blocks and within them represents more than  $\frac{3}{4}$  of the world trade.

This planetary imbalance causes a large part of the world's population to be excluded from the benefits of globalization, which causes profound division and, consequently, a vigorous dispute. Therefore, we can say that globalization is a universal process, which is expressed in an irregular manner and which creates tensions, but also repositions.

The shift from the global order Post-Cold War (GWO-1), concentrated around the US, to the world order of the beginning of the second millennium (GWO-2) was made by the appearance on stage of phenomena and political events with major impact.

For example, the appearance of BRICS did not immediately mean a fact with an impact on the international scene. This block of the big emerging powers (Chatin, Gallarotti, 2018; Xing, 2016; Santino, et al. 2018) will enter the scene, on the one hand, against the backdrop of the American political scene during the Obama administration, and on the other, by trying to create economic-financial alternatives to the Bretton – Woods system and to the existing telecommunications system. Thus, in July 2014, in the context of the BRICS summit in Fortaleza (Brazil), the foundations of New Development Bank were set, and subsequently, in 2015, the initiative of creating the American IT monopoly challenge was launched, which was materialized in 2019, by signing the agreement of cooperation in the field of Information and Communication Technology.

Secondly, Russia puts an end to its decline as a Great Power, on the one hand, through interventions in the Near Abroad space by virtue of the principles - national self-determination, strategic needs based on geopolitics, and historical rights (Forsberg, Makinen, 2019: 214), here including intervention in favor of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Dombas and the annexation of Crimea, which sentimentally creates the idea of Russia as a great revisionist power. According to Richard Sakwa this neo-revisionism "is not the attempt to create new rules or to advance an alternative model of international order but to ensure the universal and consistent application of existing norms" (Sakwa, 2017: 131).

On the other hand, Russia is present in major crises with regional implications in the Middle East (war in Syria) and in Latin America (the crisis in Venezuela), but also in international agendas (influence in certain Central and Eastern European states and in the Balkans etc). For example, the intervention in Syria aimed to have an instrumental value for perception of Russia as an actor (rising power) in international system on the normative level (Pieper, 2019: 366).

In 2013, China launched the One Belt on Road Strategy, which is one of the largest infrastructure and investment projects in history, covering more than 68 countries. In fact, the launch of this initiative has in our opinion a double meaning. On the one hand, it marks China's shift from regional power to global power, with the entry into a competitive tandem not only economically, but politically with the US. On the other hand, the project invites the USA to develop and manage projects of global scale. Moreover, by launching Asia Bank for International Investments in 2017, to which some European countries have joined, an alternative to the current financial system, which is based in the USA, is wanted.

This Chinese initiative has created uneasiness, on the one hand, among the states of East and South East Asia, allies of the US, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore, but also among neighboring states, such as Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia. On the other

hand, the USA are surprised by this initiative and by China's military ambitions in the South China Sea, one of the busiest maritime areas of the globe.

The entry of India and Brazil into the top 10 of World Economic Power is another significant mutation within the GWO-1, which causes the political and economic scene to multiply beyond the traditional configuration - unipolar, bipolar or pentapolar .

After the end of the cold war and a short period of U.S. unipolarity, the international order is now believed to be gradually shifting towards an Asian-centric multipolar order (Wojczewski, 2016: 184). India promoting a vision Nonalignment 2.0, suggests that can lead by “the power of its example” (Wojczewski, 2016: 185; Satish, 2012), and the colonial subjugation serves for the Hyper-nationalist discourse as the most important source for the articulation of an Indian national identity (Wojczewski, 2016: 201). For the Hyper-nationalist discourse, the ‘Western’ inclination towards expansionism and imperialism has not ceased with the end of colonialism, but it is said to continue to shape the policies of ‘Western’ societies and states, in particular of the United States as the dominant power in the world. Hyper-nationalist discourse demands must become militarily strong to stand its ground (Ibidem: 188).

In fact, the rise of Brazil, India and South Africa as the first power poles of the southern hemisphere came to fruition in 2003 when the IBSA group was created as an alternative far from the USA and the EU. IBSA, as one of the main platforms of South-South cooperation, is one of the most notable developments in international politics during the first decade of the twenty-first century (Della Costa Stuenkel, 2014).

These evolutions of these regional powers to the status of great powers come not only to challenge US supremacy, but to constitute alternatives not only to this, but also to the liberal democratic order model and the Atlantic power system (includes NATO and the EU). These emerging powers consider that the liberal democratic order destroyed the international legal order established after the Second World War by the UN, where the key element is sovereignty, and which is replaced with global order without borders.

In fact, the decline of the liberal democratic order in the world, in the stage we call GWO-1, is also due to the intra-Euro-Atlantic space developments, especially after the economic-financial crisis that affected this space having, especially on the economies of the emerging states, a limited impact or no impact.

For example, the EU, after the success of its expansion to the east, after which it became the third demographic pole of the planet, with over half a billion inhabitants and the second economy of the world, for a short period of time, plunged since the end of 2008 in the most complicated economic crisis in its history, after that of 1929-1933. The inability of Brussels to find community solutions to the problems brought by the crisis, especially of Greece's sovereign debt crisis, and also of Italy and Portugal, began to sow domestic mistrust, which weakened the international credibility of the EU. To these are added a succession of crises affecting the EU, the crisis of insecurity of Eastern Border (Ukraine and Moldova), refugee crisis, Brexit and sovereignty and illiberal movement (Hungary, Poland). These domestic issues have hampered the EU's ability to second the US in promoting democratic liberal order to a GWO, and at the same time being a strong alternative force for sound argument in favor of liberal democratic order.

The US elections in the fall of 2016 and Donald Trump's victory, on the one hand, will dig a growing gap between the US and its Western European allies, bringing the Euro-Atlantic system into crisis and giving emerging powers the opportunity to be increasingly dynamic in shaping a new international order which, in our opinion, will be a global order too, but in which more models will coexist , a multiple global world order.

The oristsand international relations analysts have not overlooked these developments, some of them have highlighted trends that will be confirmed over the years, others have had the power to pay close attention to what is happening, others have synthesized these developments in long duration, which gives consistency to these assertions. These above mentioned features are specific to traditional theorists in international relations. The way in which the traditional territories have perceived the changes of the international order in the GWO-1 stage and the GWO-2 rise will be discussed in the next chapter.

## **2. Perception of GWO-2 rise by traditional international relations theories**

From the beginning of the twenty-first century it has become evident that the world is fragmented, on the one hand, into regional blocks, having in the European Union a coagulation model between the states in a geographical area, by creating increasingly obvious conditions of interdependence, and on the other hand, by the rise or returning to the international scene of some great powers - Russia, China, India, Brazil etc. This phenomenon which, on the one hand, tends to transcend the model of the Westphalian world order, based on recognized sovereignty and borders, on the other hand tends to create, in the ascending global order regional, entities that seek to preserve traces of the Westfalian model too, but also to ensure a limited level of supranationality.

### **2.1. The beginning of the challenge**

Or these phenomena have come to the attention of many authors belonging to the traditional schools of International Relations. The first signal is given by the Copenhagen School, which conceptualises another architecture regarding International Security. Between the national and international levels of security, the members of this school distinguish the level of regional security. Barry Buzan and Ole Waever shape in *Regions and Powers. Structure of International Security* for the first time a global suborder, based on *Regional Security Complexes* (Buzan, Waever, 2003).

In a note similar to the one given by the Copenhagen School, but with arguments that come from the economic sphere, technology and foreign investment, domestic and international security, and cultural diplomacy and popular culture, Peter J. Katzenstein positions himself towards those that support the persistence of the nation-state, as well as towards those who support the inevitable march of globalization (Katzenstein, 2015; Payne, 2004). According to G. John Ikenberry, Katzenstein's work *A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium* claims that "world politics is built around regions that have been deeply influenced by the United States' postwar "imperium." Both Asia and Europe exhibit what Katzenstein calls "porous regionalism," an openness that is reinforced by growth in cross-border exchanges and global transformations in interstate relations" (Ikenberry, 2005).

The two above-mentioned works will pave the way for the rise of a new field of studies in International Studies-Regional Studies- which will reach a considerable explosion after 2003, both from the perspective of the studies regarding the evolution of different regions of the world, as well as of a new type of relations - interregional relations (Manea, 2004: 369-396; Acharya, 2004: 239-275; Carrapatoso, 2011: 177-194; Rüländ, Bechle, 2010: 157-176) , which will strengthen the idea of fragmenting the global order (Hänggi, Rolloff, Rüländ, 2006; Baert, Scaramagli, Soderbaum, 2014), but also the coagulation of a network of regions that will be recognized as a voice in the new global order (Rüländ, 2014: 28).

Another perception that announces the transformation of GWO-1, the one dominated by American hegemony, comes from the realist theorists' area. On the one hand, we will see very active neorealist theorists. They are mainly representatives of defensive realism, Kenneth Waltz's faithful followers, with his Theory of International Politics, when he argues that the anarchic nature of the relationship system encourages states to undertake defensive and moderate policies, defensive realists - Robert Jervis (Jervis, 1997) or Stephan Walt offer a "cold" perspective on the international realities, in which affirmative powers exist and are emerging, which can reshape the balance of powers. For example, Stephan Walt, in *Taming American Power: the Global Response to U.S. Primacy* (Walt, 2006) raises the question that the assertion of new powers would question not only America's ability to meet its foreign policy goals, but would threaten American supremacy.

John Mearsheimer, theorist of offensive realism, offers in *Tragedy of Great Power Politics* a very clear perspective of the evolutions that took place on the international stage in the direction of transformations of the existing world order, considering that states are not satisfied with a given amount of power because international society creates multiple unforeseen situations. This is why Mearsheimer considers that "great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by another great power" (Mearsheimer, 2001: 35).

The prospect of a new global international order, different from that of the years 1990-2008, where US supremacy is frankly discussed, can be found in the works of the younger representatives of classical neorealism, especially Fareed Zakaria with his work *The Post-American World* (Zakaria, 2008). Zakaria presents the perspectives of a world in which the United States will no longer dominate the global economy, orchestrate geopolitics, or overwhelm cultures. He considers the "rise of the rest" (China, India, Brazil, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey etc.) as a reset of the world. How should the United States understand and thrive in this rapidly changing international climate? What does it mean to live in a truly global era? These are the questions to which Zakaria gives very courageous answers.

Also from the same scale of classic neorealism are Stephen G. Brooks, William C. Wohlforth, with their *World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy* (Brooks, Wohlforth, 2008). The book is considered the most comprehensive analysis to date of the United States' use of power in pursuit of its security interests. The authors examine arguments from each of the main international relations theories - realism, institutionalism, constructivism and liberalism. They also cover the four established external constraints on the U.S. security policy - international institutions, economic interdependence, legitimacy, and balancing. The prevailing view is that these external constraints conspire to undermine the value of US primacy, greatly restricting the range of security policies the country can pursue. But, in their opinion, so far the international environment does not tightly constrain the U.S. security policy.

## **1.2. The turning period: 2005-2010**

The international landscape knows a turning moment from the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century until the middle of the second decade. For a number of authors the year 2010 is an important milestone in this passage (Mearsheimer, 2019: 28).

On the one hand, there is a certain fatigue of the liberal order, dominated by American hegemonism in the context of the effects of the economic-financial crisis, of an American withdrawal in the face of international challenges under the Obama administration. The two pillars of the liberal order, the US and Europe, though embarked on an ambitious plan to have not only a solid security space through NATO, but also a trans-Atlantic market, by starting negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), will be on stand-by again. With the Trump administration's coming, all these steps have been blocked. In a succession of crises, the European Union can no longer support the US in the management of international affairs; The EU believes in multilateral solutions to solving international crises, as opposed to the American vision.

On the other hand, China's economic rise, its plans in the South China Sea and the launch of the One Belt One Road strategy, Russia's return to the international scene, the rise of India and Brazil and South Africa entering the scene as a great power on the African mainland, all come to question the model of the liberal international order, bringing back into the discussion the Westphalian order, but within a new framework.

These developments will undermine the consistency and image of the post-Cold War world order, but at the same time they will challenge GWO1, which has increasingly been challenged by the center or unipolar order by the rise of emerging powers.

Or all these evolutions will have an echo in the analysis of all Western schools of international relations. Their approaches will bring to light the need for a correction of the global international order to adapt to these evolutions, that is, the entry into a new phase of the global world order, namely GWO-2.

### **2.2.1 Realism announces the end of GWO-1 and the need to move to GWO-2**

Not only does the school of realism maintain the same criticism of the Liberal International Order, as a challenge to American unipolarity emerges, but it becomes more and more dynamic. According to G. Ikenberry, a liberal analyst, realist authors have begun to focus on the rise of China, invigorating the debate on 'power transitions'. Generally speaking, realists offered relatively contingent theoretical accounts of the rise of China (Ikenberry, 2009: 215).

Of course we cannot avoid in this framework the perspective given by one of the most prominent realistic author, but also a practitioner, Henry Kissinger, who in the work *World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History* (Kissinger, 2014), makes a solid analysis of the types of order in Europe, in the Islamic world, in the United States of America and Asia, with particular reference to China.

Henry Kissinger considers that the current world order must rely on the balance of power and competing national desires between status quo states, such as the US, EU, Russia, China and Islamic states.

He considers that "Asian regional order" is different from European order, and constantly requires "outside powers," especially the US as an "integral feature" (Ibidem: 209). Kissinger believes China's rise can cause disruption to the world order, when he states that "China explicitly states, and all other key players implicitly, the option of military force in the pursuit of core national interests. Military budgets are rising. National rivalries, as in the South China Sea and North Asian waters, have generally been

conducted with nineteenth-century European diplomacy methods"(Ibidem: 179). Therefore, in Kissinger's opinion, the rise of China is a potential threat to "world order." He compared the current situation with the one that emerged after World War II, when Japan from the US adversary became an ally of it " (Ibidem: 175).

The future world order, according to Kissinger, must rely on a subtle balance of restraint, force, and legitimacy. In relation to China, the US must combine a balance of power with a concept of partnership. A purely military definition of the balance will shade into confrontation. A purely psychological approach to partnership will raise fears of hegemony. Wise statesmanship must try to find that balance " (Ibidem: 233).

From what is seen Kissinger prefers to insist that US and China represent two pillars of the future world order, giving them the responsibility to work for their common interests, beyond the underlying divergences, related to the spread of democratic values, the situation in the South China Sea and North Korea.

The realists' perception of the current world order - seen either in the broad perspective of the Liberal International Order (Kundnani, 2017: 1-9), which is in effect since World War II, or in a narrower perspective, as the Liberal Hegemonic (Welton, 2019) (Unipolar) Order - is increasingly more critical.

John Mearsheimer and Stephan Walt, who at the beginning of the twenty-first century announced the inevitable changes in the liberal world order or GWO-1, as we all agree, have increasingly strong arguments for the decline of the US Primacy (Walt, 2018) or the failure of this Dream (Mearsheimer, 2018) nearly two decades after these forecasts.

Stephan Walt, in *The Hell of Good Intentions*, places the US decline externally in one of its repeated feuds and blunders of the foreign policy establishment, and its hegemonic liberalism promoted by Presidents Clinton, Bush and Obama. Walt believes that US foreign policy failed because it lacked the best expertise or was the result of mistakes in understanding how the international world works in its dynamics. Since the end of the Cold War, Republicans and Democrats alike have tried to use the U.S. power to spread democracy, open markets, and other liberal values into every nook and cranny of the planet.

Walt asserts that their recurring failures are a big reason why Donald Trump was elected. He had promised to end the misguided policies of the foreign policy "Blob" . But his erratic and impulsive style of governing, combined with a deeply flawed understanding of world politics, are making a bad situation worse.

In Walt's opinion U.S. foreign policy should look like a return to the realist strategy of including offshore balancing in Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf, which eschews regime change, nation-building, and other forms of global social engineering. It is necessary to bring back diplomacy, and making peace a priority. He addresses leading objections to these ideas and calls on politicians Republicans and Democrats to deliver the foreign policy that the majority of Americans want and deserve. In conclusion, Walt requires abandoning the futile quest for liberal hegemony and building a foreign policy establishment with a more realistic view of American power.

John Mearsheimer believes that US efforts to impose liberal democracy and a neo-liberal economy on all sovereign nation-states are "the best example of "liberal interventionism" (Mearsheimer, 2018) in the Global World Order (GWO-1). The great delusion of US foreign policy is that it is possible to function as a de facto form of world government (Welton, 2019). Mearsheimer thinks this delusory, perhaps insane, project presses the liberal hegemonists to develop "deep-seated antipathy toward illiberal states" (Mearsheimer, 2018).

Mearsheimer believes that respect for sovereignty is the most significant norm in international politics and its purpose is to minimize war and facilitate peaceful relations between states. This means, fundamentally, that nation-state have “the ultimate authority” (Colgan, Keohane, 2017: 42) over events inside one’s border and that foreign powers have no right to interfere in their politics (Mearsheimer, 2018: 158-159).

From the point of view of our analysis regarding the fact that after 2010 we witnessed the end of the post-Cold War, unipolar order, which we called the Global World Order (GWO-1) and at the beginning of a period of turning in the international order, in which there are several powerful states, John Mearsheimer's position is more systematic in the article *Bound to Fail. The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order* (Mearsheimer, 2019: 7-50).

According to Mearsheimer, the Liberal International Order put itself into question. On the one hand, it eroded by itself its actions, resulting in the development of hegemonic liberalism. On the other hand, the Liberal International Order not only created its own enemies, but strengthened and allied them.

First of all, intervening in the politics of countries to turn them into liberal democracies, considers Mearsheimer, "is extremely difficult, and attempting such ambitious social engineering on a global scale is virtually guaranteed to backfire and undermine the legitimacy of the enterprise itself" (Ibidem: 30). It is encouraged, on the one hand, nationalism in these target states, and on the other, states that fear regime change — or other forms of U.S. interference — will band together for mutual support and seek ways the United States' liberal agenda (Ibidem).

Second, through these evolutions in the Liberal International Order space, 'conditions that lead to serious political problems regarding sovereignty and national identity within the liberal democracies themselves' were created by amplifying nationalism, which is far from dead even in avowedly liberal societies' (Ibidem).

Finally, the globalization, which in Mearsheimer's opinion reaches the level of hyperglobalization, which is the economic product of the Liberal International Order, had very important economic costs, which affected large parts of the population within the liberal democracies, including the sole pole. Those costs, including lost jobs, declining or stagnant wages, and marked income inequality, have serious domestic political consequences, which further undermine the liberal international order. Moreover, the open international economy helped fuel China's rise, which, along with Russia's revival, eventually undermined unipolarity, an essential condition for creating a liberal international order (Ibidem).

And as a result of these developments with the rise of China and Russia's return, the international system has become multipolar, which is a death knell for the liberal international order (Ibidem: 42) and especially with the arrival of Donald Trump at the White House, who no longer wants to continue with liberal practices in the stability of the world, under these conditions the danger of American hegemonism continuing, in a unipolar agnostic modal order .

According to Mearsheimer, the order that can ensure, through the balance of powers, peace, stability and prosperity (where the problem of climate change must be a serious option) will be one in which three different realist orders in the foreseeable future will coexist: a thin international order and two thick bound orders - one led by China, the other by the United States. The emerging thin international order will be concerned mainly with overseeing arms control agreements and making the global economy work efficiently [...] In essence, the institutions that make up the international order will focus on facilitating interstate cooperation. The two bound orders, in contrast, will be primarily

concerned with waging security competition against each other, although they will call for promoting cooperation among the members of each order. There will be significant economic and military competition between those two orders that will need to be managed, which is why they will be thick orders (Mearsheimer, 2019: 44).

From what has been analyzed so far, it follows that the realistic authors unanimously agree that the post-Cold War international order in a broad sense (which we call the Global World Order–GWO 1), and which is dominated by hegemonic liberalism, is at an end (Wright, 2017).

The arguments of these scholars are multiple.

First, the post-Cold War Order does not include all of the major powers by inward looking. This order is only between the states that have members of the order and not the interactions between these states and those that are opponents of this order (Glaser, 2019: 64). In other words, the post-Cold War Order does not cover the whole world, but only the transatlantic area, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.

Second, China, India, Russia etc. are not part of this order. For example, China is not a democracy, and it is not a member of the United States' security alliances in Asia; indeed, China is now the target of these alliances. The binding and hierarchy arguments, therefore, do not apply to China. China was, however, increasingly integrated into the international economy, including the WTO, during this period; economic interdependence between the United States and China has grown dramatically (Ibidem: 65).

Finally, especially in the last three years, it is observed that crucial foreign policy challenges arise less from problems between countries than from domestic politics within them (Colgan, Keohane, 2017: 42). Under these conditions, there is increasing pressure for the US, on the one hand, to withdraw from various crisis theaters, and on the other, to re-evaluate the alliances, as is the case with US relations with the European Union.

Representatives of realism offer solutions to move to a new international order. We saw the international order model proposed by John Mearsheimer in which "three different realist orders in the foreseeable future" will coexist: a thin international order and two thick bounded orders- one led by China, the other by the US. In terms of future global order, it depends on the US having to rediscover the Grand Strategy, which means the broad policies - military, diplomatic, and economic - that have been pursued to achieve its vital interests (Silove, 2018: 27-57; Posen, 2014). Grand Strategy appeared with the beginning of the Cold War when the US introduced containment for protecting Western Europe from the Soviet Union (Glaser, 2019: 84). In this regard, Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth argue, "The United States' ability to exercise leadership over the existing order is not a function of its economic size but also partly of its forward security position and associated alliances" (Brooks, Wohlforth, 2016: 159-165).

Adopting the Grand Strategy is driven by several factors. First, China and Russia have begun balancing, even though the Liberal International Order was open to them. For more than a decade, it has become increasingly clear that China is building conventional and nuclear forces designed to reduce the U.S. military capabilities (Glaser, 2019: 76).

Second, the Liberal International Order discourse is a source of significant confusion about both the evolution of global politics and U.S. policy (Ibidem: 82).

Third, the United States should be reconsidering whether to preserve its international commitments and exploring how best to achieve its fundamental interests in the decades ahead (Ibidem: 83; Friedman, Rapp-Hooper, 2018: 7-25).

Forth, by viewing the Liberal International Order as an unalloyed good, U.S. leaders risk failing to appreciate fully that adversaries of the United States view central

pillars of the Liberal International Order - its alliances, in particular - as a source of competition and threat (Glaser, 2019: 83).

Finally, identify the full spectrum of broad options for achieving U.S. security and prosperity, ranging from neoisolationist policies that would terminate U.S. alliances to global hegemony that requires intense military and economic competition with China (Ibidem). If the United States retains its security commitments in East Asia and Chinese economic growth continues, then, for the foreseeable future, the world will not be the liberal hegemony. Instead it will be a non-liberal, non-hegemonic world (Ibidem: 85-86).

In conclusion, the representatives of realism carried out a broad criticism of GWO -1, by not adapting to the transformations of the international reality and offered solutions to assert a new, more comprehensive world order, which we designate as GWO- 2. This order has the same characteristic of being global, but in which a liberal order, an illiberal order and a revisionist order will coexist. The GWO-2 key in the opinion of the realistic school represented on the one hand, the balance of powers, the hierarchy and confrontation, and on the other, the economic interdependence and convergence arguments between the great powers.

### **2.2.2. Liberals defend the GWO-1**

To the Liberal school, which theoretically constructed the ideas that underpinned the concept of the Liberal International Order in general, but especially the Post-Cold War liberal order, we owe after 2004-2005 an entire defense program not only to the Liberal International Order, but in our opinion, of the model we propose for the debate, the Global International Order -1.

Here it is appropriate to discuss a little bit about the relationship and difference between the Post-Cold War order and the Global International Order -1. The first is a stage of the Liberal International Order, characterized as liberal hegemonism or unipolar order by realists. In the vision of liberal thinking, the Post-Cold War order has evolved almost as a necessary imperative assumed to a unipolar world order (Nye, 2002) dominated by a great power by soft means (Nye, *Soft Power: The Means*, 2004; Nye, *Soft Power and American ...*, 2004: 255-270).

Regarding the Global International Order -1 we consider that it is a stage in the evolution of the world order from the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century, in which the Post-Cold War Liberal Order coexists with remnants of the bipolar order in the transformation process, with political-economic dynamics in the EU, with great powers that are re/affirmed on the international stage, as competing poles (China, Russia, India, Brazil, South Africa etc). In addition, this order also responds to the economic, social and cultural effects of globalization and the impact of developing new communication and information techniques (Nye, *Power ...*, 2004).

Following the views of the creators of the new school of liberalism (neo-liberalism), Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Samuel Nye Jr. on the Post-Cold War global order (Keohane, Nye, 2004: 191-200), which, in our opinion, subsumes the idea of a global international order (GWO-1), the following aspects are to retain.

First, after 1990 we have to deal with a partially globalized international order (Keohane, 2002: 245-271) in which networks of interdependence at multicontinental distances (Keohane, Nye, 2004: 191) operate and which, unlike the previous period, in the opinion of the founders of neo-liberalism, knows a higher density of networks, the velocity of information flows (Ibidem: 196), the institutional velocity, transnational participation and complex interdependence.

Under the pressure of these elements, in the opinion of the neoliberal authors, the world order after 1990 has become more open, more interdependent and more confident. But with Keohane and Nye observing, this order is not uniform, as “the filters provided by domestic political and political institutions play a major role in determining what effects globalization really has and how well various countries adapt to it” (Keohane, Nye, 2004: 198). Therefore the system of sovereign states is likely to continue as the dominant structure in the world, which made the Post-Cold War a fragmented order.

Secondly, after 1990, a redistribution of powers began to occur in the world order, but this was misinterpreted, argues Joseph S. Nye Jr in *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone*, while if power distribution on military issues was unipolar, it made no sense to use traditional terms such as unipolarity and hegemony to describe the distribution of power on economic and transnational issues where the United States needed the help of others to achieve its preferred outcomes (Nye, 2002).

Third, the emergence of non-state actors, especially NGOs, but especially terrorist groups, has changed the liberals' view of unipolarity and hegemony. The successes achieved by the US in Afghanistan and in the uprising of Saddam Husein, facing opposition from the UN Security Council and opposition from the great powers of the EU, France and Germany, have brought temptation into American politics for more control in the world. But the US, although compared to an imperial power, does not actually have the levers to be an imperial power and would not be desirable in the first place by the US itself (Nye, *Power ...*, 2004: 6-7). However, to clarify these metaphors about imperial power, in Nye's opinion "American preponderance of power will generally be more acceptable and legitimate in the eyes of other countries when its policies are embedded in multilateral frameworks. American success in dealing with the new challenges will depend not just on its military and economic might, but on the soft power of its culture and values, and on pursuing policies that make others feel that they have been consulted and their interests taken into account (Ibidem: 8).

Finally, with the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the founders of neoliberalism also seem to be aware of the reality of a crisis of American hegemony through the emergence of great competing powers. Joseph S. Nye Jr, in *The Future of Power*, believes that at the horizon of 2010, the powers are no longer identified in terms of nuclear missiles, industrial capacity, numbers of men under arms, and tanks lined up ready to cross the plains of Eastern Europe. Politics changed, and the nature of power-defined as the ability to affect others to achieve the outcomes you want-had changed dramatically. Power is not static; its story is of shifts and innovations, technologies and relationships.

From the same school of neo-liberalism, but from another perspective, G. John Ikenberry, considers that the Liberal International Order in its (unipolar) hegemonic form had an organizing logic, because the hegemonic factor of the international system "altered the anarchic character of international order, creating opportunities for more open and rule-based relationships " (Ikenberry, 2009: 203-219).

States have incentives and opportunities to overcome security dilemmas by 'binding' together in co-operative security pacts. In addition to these logic of order, the incentives for co-operation built into economic interdependence and democratic community, reinforce the liberal character of the system. Liberal states have opportunities and incentives to build non-realistic sorts of international order (Ibidem).

The liberal international order is based on three major pillars - democratic peace, economic interdependence and international institutions - which work together to reinforce and perpetuate stable peace (Ikenberry, 2001).

After 2010 in liberal thinking there is a repositioning, motivated, on the one hand, by an increasingly obvious crisis of American leadership, on the other, by China's entry as a political actor on the global stage, by a revival of Russia, and by autonomous European and South American forms.

The start in formulating critical opinions and proposing solutions is given by G. John Ikenberry in his article *Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World Order* (Ikenberry, 2009: 71-87) in 2009. Ikenberry raises the question of whether American arrangements can be made - particularly in security cooperation - that provide ways for the United States to remain at the center of a liberal international order. New forms of governance - networks and informal steering groups - will become more important in a post-American-centered liberal international order (Ibidem: 72)..

Ikenberry seeks to reassert liberal thinking from the perspective of international developments from the beginning of the twenty-first century, by re-evaluating the liberal discourse on the Post-Cold War Order, in the sense of a qualitative delimitation on the Liberal International Order, which after 1990 entered the 3.0 era. According to Ikenberry, this order (Liberal Internationalism 3.0) and especially the one that starts to form after 2010, in our opinion, depends, first of all, on universal scope, expanding membership in core governing institutions to rising non-Western states, which would impose a reformed liberal international order more universal and less hierarchical. According to Ikenberry, the United States will have to play a less central role in providing functional services - generating public goods, stabilizing markets, and promoting cooperation (Ibidem: 80).

Second, the new order international concerns legitimate authority and post-Westphalian sovereignty. It must find ways to reconcile more intrusive rules and institutions with legitimate international authority in which various groupings of leading states occupy governing institutions (Ibidem).

Third, the new order expanded rule-based system, coupled with new realms of network-based cooperation. On the one hand, this means that the US and Europe will accept to reduce their share in international institutions, making space for countries such as China, India, Brazil etc. On the other hand, the new international order based on rule of law also brings a review of norms of Westphalian sovereignty and the continuing rise in the notion of a "responsibility to protect" (Ibidem: 81).

Finally, Ikenberry wonders if non-Western countries such as China and India will seek to use their rising power to usher in a substantially different sort of international order (Ibidem: 83).

Ikenberry's forthcoming books and studies will deepen this turn in this perception of world order from different perspectives.

For example, *Liberal Leviathan* (Ikenberry, 2011) shows the connections between the emergence of a largely liberal international system and the concentration of global power in the United States, but Ikenberry shows that this concentration is also corrosive to the created order. He believes the US must accept competition in the distribution of world power in order to face new challenges.

In Introduction (Ikenberry, 2014: 1-16) to the book *Power, Order, and Change in World Politics*, John Ikenberry brings new clarifications on the changing international order from unipolar (Ikenberry et al. 2011: 1-31) to multipolar (Posen, 2011: 317-341). He considers that "this order itself" is "wider and deeper" than past international orders. Nuclear weapons both determine global war and generate incentives for great powers to negotiate stability in the face of mutual vulnerability. China and other non-Western rising states are putting pressure on the old international order. But China and these other new

powers have profoundly complicated and ambivalent relationships with the old American-led liberal order. They are both tied to it and constrained by it. They bring antagonist values and cultural orientations to the old liberal world order. They look at liberal order and, at least to some extent, see a Western-oriented imperial order" (Ikenberry, 2014: 16). Ikenberry concludes that "in all these ways, international order is continuously impacted by forces of continuity and change" (Ibidem).

The shift in the liberal perception of the global order, in which the US-China tandem begins to function, becomes more and more visible towards 2014-2015, when a number of publications appeared focusing either on the moment or on a perspective. Thus, John Ikenberry questions the relationship between the United States, China in the context of the Global Order (Ikenberry, 2015: 1-18) and is convinced that "for decades to come, the United States and China appear uniquely positioned to dominate world politics" (Ibidem: 1). The United States and China are destined to influence and shape the underlying rules and institutions of world order itself.

When Ikenberry states that "the transition away from American "unipolarity" and growing Chinese capabilities ensure that the world will enter a new moment- perhaps not as dramatic as the one that appeared after World War II, but nonetheless a new moment - when the deep architecture of international order is again open for shaping and reshaping" (Ibidem: 2), we ask ourselves whether this transition has begun or we are in full swing. In our opinion, we are at the beginning of this transition in what we consider to be GWO-2, because, on the one hand, the unipolar American power has to get used to sharing the power and responsibilities with someone else (Mastanduno, 2015: 189-210), and on the other, China, although it is the number one competitor in the economic field for the US, it still does not seem willing to change the status of secondary power with that of main power in the balance of power. Also other great powers will also seek to influence and shape these underlying rules and institutions.

What future international order will look like in the new landscape seems to Ikenberry very clear, because just as the United States and China are uniquely powerful, so too are they uniquely positioned to lead the struggle over the organizing principles and logic of world order in the twenty-first century (Ibidem: 3). Here, in our opinion, things should be more nuanced, given the historical experience of the twentieth century, which has undergone at least three major transformations, so we cannot be sure that for a century the world will only be in bilateral balance, but there will be numerous times when multilateralism will not only be excluded by the two superpowers, but will also be desired for the reset of international order.

Of course, during the current century, Ikenberry considers, the United States and China might clash and compete simply because they have different interests at stake in the organization of global rules and institutions. They also have different national traditions and values that have and will influence their views of global order.

The approach in the volume *America, China, and the Struggle for World Order. Ideas, Traditions, Historical Legacies, and Global Visions* was also a project to put forward the concept of six international relations theorists in the US and China, to see the divergent particularities and convergent similarities of thinkers in international relations from the two superpowers. Both countries want to be at the center of world politics and both want to remain as autonomous as possible within it (Ibidem: 14).

In the same context of the nuance of the perspective of the role that the US has to play in the new war order (GWO-2), Joseph S. Nye Jr. in the book, *Is American Century Over?* (Nye, 2015), brings arguments to explain why the American century is far from

over and what the US must do to retain its leadership in an era of increasingly diffuse power politics. But the US will not be the same. According to Nye America's superpower status may well be tempered by its political dysfunction at home and China's economic boom. He supports his claims that the US remains a very important player in the global order through its military, economic and soft power capabilities that continue to deter its closest rivals for decades to come. He believes that the re-ordering of the world order will take place through two convergent processes, on the one hand through power shifts and on the other, through increasing global complexity, in the sense of interdependence, heterogeneity and fragmentation.

Almost in line with America's need to adapt to the type of leadership required by GWO-2, Ikenberry argues that although we are witnessing the opening of the new opportunities for rising states-China, India, and other non-Western developing countries-to reshape the global order, there are some problems: in what sense will reform or reorganize the rules and institutions of the post-western era; these emerging states will integrate into the existing international order or they will want to transform it into another order and if so, which- one of partner states or one of "revisionist" states (Ikenberry, 2018: 17).

Ikenberry believes that the international Liberal Order will remain intact and the US will remain at the forefront of the leadership, given that they are a "structural power" (Strange, 1988) because they have well-organized security ties, market relations, liberal democratic solidarity, deeply rooted geopolitical alignments (Ikenberry, 2018: 19). The United States does not embody the international order; it has a relationship with it, as do rising states (Ikenberry, 2018: 20).

Ikenberry considers that " if the liberal international order endures, it will be because it is based on more than the American hegemonic order. The broader features of the modern international order are the result of centuries of struggle over its organizing principles and institutions. The struggles over the existing international order will reshape the rules and institutions in the existing system in various ways. But rising states are not simply or primarily "revisionist" states seeking to overturn the order; rather, they are seeking greater access and authority over its operation. Indeed, the order creates as many safeguards and protections for rising states as it creates obstacles and constraints (Ikenberry, 2018: 22).

Ikenberry is convinced that, on the one hand, the Liberal International Order will survive because it has the capacity of self-reinforcing due to: its integrative tendencies, offering opportunities for leadership and shared authority, the fact that the current economic gains from participation within the liberal order it is widely shared and not least because it accommodates a diversity of models and strategies of growth and development (Ikenberry, 2018: 24-25).

On the other hand, in Ikenberry's opinion, this order he defends is the one that seems to promote not only a multilateral system of rules and institutions, but offers rising states some measure of protection and equal treatment.

### **3. Conclusions**

Considering that after 1990 the international society entered the historical stage of the Post-Cold War, in which, on the one hand, the international order based on the bipolarity of two ideological systems - the liberal democrat and the communist - disappeared through the triumph of the liberal democratic model, but without essentially encompassing the whole world, and on the other hand, the economic dimension of international society is becoming more and more global, international society is entering a

period of contradictory evolutions: anarchy and order, globalization and fragmentation, complexity and interdependence.

The instability in the international society from a politico-military point of view, in conjunction with the expansion of the market economy on a global scale, contributed to the forging of the Post-Cold War Order in which the tendency towards a unipolar and hegemonic system with global dimensions was inevitable in our opinion, entering in the first stage of what we called it during the study - the Global World Order (GWO-1).

But these contradictory evolutions of international society are amplified especially at the beginning of the twenty-first century, on the one hand, by the rise of strong economies at global level, which compete with the USA (China, India, EU, Japan, Brasilia, South Africa) and on the other hand, by the signs of returning to the international scene of Russia, as an heir not only of the military force of the USSR, but also as a claimant of the inheritance of the place occupied in the great international politics of the Soviet Union, in conjunction with the political-military ambitions of China, but also of India. Either in the face of these multiplied evolutions, the US can no longer cope with the position of unipolar power, being forced or to oppose - which is risky in the short term and tiring in the medium and long term - or to share the management of world affairs with these competitors. To all these are added the challenges that climate change has on the whole of international relations.

Or this stage of the evolution of Post-Cold War Order as a global order no longer responds to the characteristics of the first stage (GWO-1), based on unipolarity, so it is necessary to introduce a new concept, which reflects these evolutions, namely the second stage of Global Order (GWO-2), which in our opinion will initially involve the characteristics of a pigmented unipolarity more and more often than multilateral resets.

In the present research we first tried to see how these transition evolutions from GWO-1 to GWO-2 are perceived, secondly, how GWO-2 is perceived and finally what are the options of the main representatives of the schools of traditional international relations - realists and liberals- regarding GWO-2.

Regarding the transition from GWO -1 to GWO-2, Stephan Walt and John Mearsheimer, both critics of unipolarism believe that a new international order that responds to global political realities and which can make space to other great powers must be accepted quickly. By comparison, the representatives of liberalism, especially the founders of neoliberalism Robert O. Kheoane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., consider that the world order after it has become more open, more interdependent and more confident, or precisely this global interdependence, given on the one hand, by the multitude of networks and, on the other, by the soft way of America to manage business in the world will ensure the continuity of the developed world order Post Cold War, that is GWO-1.

Regarding the perception of GWO-2, for example, Henry Kissinger considers that the present world order must rely on balance power and competing national desires between status quo states, like the US, EU, Russia, China and Islamic states. The same view is shared from a realistic defensive perspective by Stephan Walt, who believes that the U.S. foreign policy should look like a return to the realistic strategy of including offshore balancing in Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf, which eschews regime change, nation-building, and other forms of global social engineering. Even more trenchant is John Mearsheimer, who argues that the Liberal International Order is a failure and must return to the principles of sovereignty in the international order. This order has the same characteristic of being global, but in it will have to co-exist a liberal order, an illiberal order and a revisionist order. The GWO-2 key, in the opinion of the realistic school, represented, on the one hand, the balance of powers, the

hierarchy, confrontation, and on the other, the economic interdependence and convergence arguments between the great powers.

For liberals, although the impulse to defend the post-Cold War international order is still felt, G. John Ikenberry's voice greatly clarifies things about the perception of global order since the turn of the first decade of the twenty-first century. Ikenberry believes that the relationship between the United States and China in the context of the Global Order is the key to influence and shape the underlying rules and institutions of world order itself. Even if he accepts that American order is over, Joseph S. Nye Jr believes that America's super power status will be intact for a long time, but that status may well be tempered by its political dysfunction at home and China's economic boom.

Finally, when we stop at the options of the representatives of the traditional schools of international relations about what we have called GWO-2, that is, of an intranational order of the beginning of the third decade of the twenty-first century and we notice some common elements at these authors, irrespective of the school they come from: USA must give up (realists) to temper (liberals) superpower role; USA to accept (relays) or share (liberals) the management of world affairs with one of the competitors (China - liberals) or with several competitors (realists); the new order will be global in the economic, technological, communication, cultural spheres, but will return to governance in security and political affairs (support the realists); there will be a global order in all spheres of society by continuing to promote democratic values (liberals) etc.

But there are also many interesting shades in GWO-2 management. In the view of the realistic authors, the management of the international affairs goes from the need to combine a balance of power with a concept of partnership from the US with the competitors, especially China (Kissinger), to the need of abandoning the futile quest for liberal hegemony and building a foreign policy establishment with a more realistic view of American power (Stephan Walt) and to coexistence of three different realist orders in the foreseeable future: a thin international order and two thick bounded orders - one led by China, the other by the United States (Mearsheimer) .

As for the liberals, they believe that the international liberal order will continue, with different shades. For example, in Nye's opinion, it will have to reset itself to respond to two convergent processes: power shifts and increasing global complexity, in the sense of interdependence, heterogeneity and fragmentation. Ikenberry believes that the Liberal International Order will survive because it has the capacity of self-reinforcing due to integrative tendencies, offering opportunities for leadership and shared authority, the fact that the current economic gains from participation within the liberal order are widely shared and not last because it accommodates a diversity of growth and development models and strategies.

Finally, in this analysis, we consider that the stage of the global order in which we find GWO-2 is in the opinion of all the leading representatives of the traditional schools of International Relations a different order of Post-Cold War Order or GWO-1, as we have called it, since everyone believes that American unipolarism must be amended to make space for a new order. The new order that is set up at the beginning of the third decade of the twenty-first century is an order in which not only the promotion of the multilateral system of rules and institutions must take place, but one that offers to a rising state some measure of protection and equal treatment. In a word, GWO-2 will become a Multiple Global World Order.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**

- Acharya Amitav (2004), "How ideas spread: Whose norms matter? Norm localization and international change in Asian regionalism", in *International Organization*, 2004, p. 239-275.
- Aron Raymond (1973), *Republique imperial. Les etats unis dans le monde 1945-1972*, Calman Levy, Paris.
- Baert Francis; Scaramagli Tiziana; Soderbaum Fredrik (2014), *Intersecting Interregionalism. Regions, Global Governance and the EU*, Springer, New York & London.
- Brooks Stephen G.; Wohlforth William C. (2008) *World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy*, Princeton University Press.
- Brooks Stephen G.; Wohlforth William C. (2016), *America Abroad: The United States' Global Role in the 21st Century*, Oxford University Press, New York.
- Buzan Barry; Waever Ole (2003), *Regions and Powers. Structure of International Security*, Cambridge University Press.
- Carrapatoso Astrid (2011), "Climat policy diffusion: Interregional dialogue in China-EU relations", in *Global Change, Peace & Security*, Vol. 23 (2), p. 177-194.
- Chandra Satish (2012), *Why Non-alignment 2.0 does us a Disservice*, available from: <http://www.vifindia.org/print/1215>), (accessed 22.02. 2019).
- Chatin Mathilde; Gallarotti Giulio M. (2019), *Emerging Powers in International Politics. The BRICS and the Soft Powers*, Routledge.
- Clark Ian (1998), *Globalisation and fragmentation. International Relations in the Twentieth Century*, Oxford University Press.
- Colgan Jeff D.; Keohane Robert O. (2017), "The Liberal Order Is Rigged: Fix It Now or Watch It Wither," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 96, No. 3 (May/June 2017), available from: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2017-04-17/liberal-order-rigged>, (accessed 11.02. 2019).
- Cooper Robert (2000), *The Postmodern State and the World Order*, Demos, London.
- Forsberg Tuomas; Mäkinen Sirke (2019), "Russian Discourse on Borders and Territorial Questions – Crimea as a Watershed?," Brille Online Publication, Volume 4: Issue 2, p. 211–241.
- Friedman Lissner Rebecca; Rapp-Hooper, Mira, (2018), "The Day after Trump: American Strategy for a New International Order," *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 41, No. 1, p. 7–25.
- Glaser Charles L. (2019), "A Flawed Framework Charles L. Glaser Why the Liberal International Order Concept Is Misguided", in *International Security*, Vol. 43, No. 4, p. 51-88.
- Galpin Robert (1981), *War and change in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Hänggi, Heiner; Rolloff Ralf; Rüländ Jurgen (2006), *Interregionalism and international relations*, Routledge, London.
- Ikenberry G. John (2011), *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order*, Princeton University Press.
- Ikenberry G. John (2018), "Why the Liberal World Order Will Survive", in *Ethics & International Affairs*, 32, no. 1, p. 17-29.

- Ikenberry G. John (2015), "Introduction: The United States, China, and Global Order", in G. John Ikenberry, Wang Jisi, Zhu Feng, *America, China, and the Struggle for World Order. Ideas, Traditions, Historical Legacies, and Global Visions*, Palgrave and Mcmillan, p. 1-18.
- Ikenberry G. John (2014), "Introduction: power, order, and change in world politics" in *Power, Order, and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, p. 1-16.
- Ikenberry G. John; Mastanduno Michael, Wohlforth, William C., (2011), "Introduction: unipolarity, state behaviour and systemic consequences," in G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, William C. Wohlforth, *International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity*, Cambridge University Press, p.1-31.
- Ikenberry G. John (2009), "Liberalism in a Realist World: International Relations as an American Scholarly Tradition," in *International Studies* 46, Vol. 1&2, p. 203–219.
- Ikenberry G. John (2001). *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
- Ikenberry G. John (2005), *Review at Peter J. Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium*, Cornell University Press, ed. I 2005, in *Foreign Affairs*.
- Jervis Robert (1997), *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life*, Princeton.
- Katzenstein Peter J. (2015), *A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium*, Cornell University Press.
- Keohane Robert O.; Nye Joseph Samuel Jr. (2004), "Globalisation. What's new? What's not? (and so what?)," in Joseph Samuel Nye Jr., *Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization*, Routledge, p. 191-200.
- Kheoane, Robert O. (2002) (2002), "Governance in a partially globalized world," in Robert O. Kheoane, *Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World*, Routledge, New York, p. 245-271.
- Kissinger Henry (2014), *World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History*, Penguin.
- Kundnani Hans (2017), "What is Liberal International Order?," in *Policy Essay*, The German Marshall Fund of United States, nr. 17, p. 1-9.
- Liska George (1967), *Imperial America. The International Politics of Primacy*, Baltimore.
- Manea Maria Gabriela (2004), "Human rights and the interregional dialogue between Asia and Europe: ASEAN –EU Relations and ASEM," *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 21 (3), p. 369-396.
- Mastanduno Michael (2015), "Still the Liberal Leader? Domestic Legacies, International Realities, and the Role of the United States in the World Economy," in G. John Ikenberry, Wang Jisi, Zhu Feng, *America, China, and the Struggle for World Order. Ideas, Traditions, Historical Legacies, and Global Visions*, Palgrave and Mcmillan, p. 189-210.
- Mearsheimer, John J. (2019), "Bound to Fail. The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order", in *International Security*, Vol. 43, No. 4, p. 7-50.
- Mearsheimer John J. (2018), *Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities*, Kindle Edition.
- Mearsheimer John J. (2001), *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, W. W. Norton & Company.
- Mogdoff Hermann (1969), *The age of imperialism. The economics of US Foreign Policy*, New York.
- Moreau Defarges Philippe (2003), "La gestion des zones grises", *Ramses*, Paris.

- Payne Tony (2004), *The new regional politics of development*, Palgrave, London.
- Nye Jr, Joseph Samuel (2015), *Is American Century Over?*, John Wiley & Sons.
- Nye Jr. Joseph Samuel (2002), *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go it Alone*, Oxford University Press.
- Nye Jr, Joseph Samuel (2004), *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, Public Affairs.
- Nye Jr, Joseph Samuel (2004), "Soft Power and American Foreign Policy." *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 119.2, p. 255-270.
- Nye Jr, Joseph Samuel (2004), *Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization*, Routledge.
- Pieper Moritz (2019), "Rising Power" Status and Evolution of International Order: Conceptualising Russia's Syria Policies," in *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 71, nr. 3, p. 365-387.
- Posen Barry R. (2014), *Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.
- Posen Barry R. (2011), "From unipolarity to multipolarity: transition in sight?," in G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, William C. Wohlforth, *International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity*, Cambridge University Press, p. 317-341.
- Regilme Salvador Santino F.; Parisot James (2017), *American Hegemony and the Rise of Emerging Powers. Cooperation and Conflict*, Routledge.
- Rosenau James (1999), *Thinking Theory Thoroughly. Coherent Approaches to an Incoherent World*, Westview Press, Boulder.
- Rüland Jürgen (2014), "Interregionalism and Intrenational Relations: Reanimating an Obsolescent Research Agenda?," in Francis Baert, Tiziana Scaramagli, Fredrik Soderbaum, *Intersecting Interregionalism. Regions, Global Govenance and the EU*, Springer, New York, London, p. 15-35.
- Rüland Jürgen; Bechle K. (2010), *Interregionalism without regions: IBSA as form of Shallow multilateralism*", in J. Dosch, O Jacobs, *Asia and Latin America: The encounter of two continents political, economic and social dynamic*, Routledge, London, p. 157-176.
- Sakwa Richard (2017), *Russia against the Rest: The Post-Cold War Crisis of World Order*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Silove Nina (2018), "Beyond the Buzzword: The Three Meanings of 'Grand Strategy,'" *Security Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 1, p. 27-57.
- Strange Susan (1988), *States and Markets: An Introduction to International Political Economy*, Pinter Publishers, London.
- Stuenkel Oliver (Della Costa) (2014), *India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA): The Rise of the Global South*, Routledge.
- Zakaria Fareed (2008), *The Post-American World*, W.W. Norton & Company.
- Walt Stephan M. (2006), *Taming American Power: the Global Response to U.S. Primacy*, W. W. Norton & Company.
- Walt Stephan M. (2018), *The Hell of Good Intentions: America's Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy*, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York.
- Welton Michael (2019), "Liberalism as Source of Trouble," in *Counterpunch*, 1 april 2019 (<https://www.counterpunch.org/2019/04/01/liberalism-as-a-source-of-trouble/> (accessed 1.02. 2019))

- Wright Thomas J. (2017), *All Measures Short of War: The Contest for the 21st Century and the Future of American Power*, Yale University Press, New Haven.
- Wojczewski Thorsten Alexander (2016), *India and the Quest for World Order: Hegemony and Identity in India's Post-Cold War Foreign Policy Discourse*, Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der Philosophischen Fakultät der Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel.
- Xing Li (2018), *The BRICS and Beyond: The International Political Economy of the Emergence of a New World Order*, Routledge.

