

# ANALELE UNIVERSITĂȚII DIN ORADEA



## RELAȚII INTERNAȚIONALE ȘI STUDII EUROPENE

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## CONTENTS • SOMMAIRE

<b>I. History and Theory of International Relations .....</b>	<b>5</b>
Anca OLTEAN ♦ The Importance of the Act of 23 August, 1944 in the Geopolitical Context of the Second World War .....	7
Raul BERECZKI ♦ The ‘Retreat of the State’ and the Consolidation of Non-State Actors in International Relations: a Theoretical Assessment .....	15
Svetlana CEBOTARI, Carolina BUDURINA- GOREACII ♦ The Republic of Moldova in the Context of Russian Federation’s Strategy of Maintaining Influence.....	35
Elda ZOTAJ ♦ European Union and Democratic Conditionality Mechanism, the Impacts on Western Balkan Countries .....	47
Mircea BRIE ♦ Rethinking the European Neighborhood Policy. Eastern Partnership.....	55
<b>II. Communication, Culture and Education in Europe .....</b>	<b>73</b>
Simona FER ♦ Values of Intercultural Communication in the Relationship between the European Citizens .....	75
Mariana IAȚCO, Natalia PUTINĂ ♦ An analysis of the Impact Generated by the Russian Factor in the Information Space of the Republic of Moldova .....	85
Violeta COTILEVICI, Svetlana CEBOTARI ♦ La Francophonie – une porte supplémentaire de la République de Moldova vers L’Europe.....	99
Mariana BUDA ♦ Different Theoretical Approaches about European Studies .....	109
<b>III. Institutions, Public Policy and Social Realities.....</b>	<b>123</b>
Diana GLIGOR, Dacian PUȘTEA ♦ Romania 2017: Problems Incurred in Accessing the Community Funds .....	125
Cristina MATIUȚA ♦ Incoherency and Inconstancy of Legislation on Parties and Elections in Post-Communist Romania.....	139
Claudiu Adrian POP, Ioan HORGA, Mariana BOCOI ♦ The evolution of Foreign Capital in Western Romania (1991-2017). Case Study – Bihor County.....	149
Mirela MĂRCUȚ ♦ Digital Policies as Instruments in the European Integration Process .....	169
Norbert IUONAS ♦ The Roma Population in Romania. From History to Culture and Education; Policies, Implementation and Differential Treatments .....	177
<b>IV. The Demographic Vulnerabilities of Europe: Migration.....</b>	<b>183</b>
Anca Anda SÎRCA ♦ Europe’s Background Regarding Immigration after 1944 and Immigrant Integration Policy Making in the European Union .....	185
Vasile ANDRIEȘ, Victoria BEVZIUC ♦ The Challenges of Demographic Situation of the Russian Federation in the Context of the Migration Processes....	195
Claudia Anamaria IOV, Maria Claudia BOGDAN ♦ The Process of Forming Collective Identities Among Immigrants: Interest, Recognition or Refuge?.....	203
Alexander GASPARISHVILI, Nikolay NARBUT, Alexander ONOSOV, Zhanna PUZANOVA ♦ Russian Migration Policy in the Last 25 Years .....	213

<b>V. Event</b> .....	<b>225</b>
Constantin – Vasile ȚOCA ♦ International Roundtable on Achievements, Contemporary Approaches and Perspectives in the Evaluation of Cross-border Cooperation .....	227
<b>VI. Honoured Personality</b> .....	<b>229</b>
POLGÁR István, PÉNZES János ♦ In Memoriam István Süli-Zakar.....	231
<b>VII. Book Reviews</b> .....	<b>265</b>
Emilia Nicoleta SCHIOP ♦ The Balkans. A history about Diversity and Harmony.....	267
Anca OLTEAN ♦ Culture and Integration in the Multicultural Europe .....	271
<b>Catalogue of Published Works Department of International Relations and European Studies</b> .....	<b>281</b>

## **I. History and Theory of International Relations**

**Anca OLTEAN** ⇔ *The Importance of the Act of 23 August, 1944 in the Geopolitical Context of the Second World War*

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## THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ACT OF 23 AUGUST, 1944 IN THE GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Anca OLTEAN\*

**Abstract.** *Looking back at the important action from 23 August 1944 when Romania left the war on the side of Germany and ceased the fight with the Soviet Union, an action who contributed to the shortening considerably of the war and to the demise of Fascism and Holocaust in Europe, we have to acknowledge the important role played by King Mihai and democratic political forces from Romania like the leaders Iuliu Maniu, Gheorhe Brătianu (leaders of PNL and PNT) in the democratization of Romania and liberation from fascist experience. Unfortunately the transformation of the state in communist state could not be prevented by these liberal and democratic forces, neither by monarchy in the context of lack of international support for the maintenance of capitalist, western-oriented state.*

**Keywords:** *23 August, Fascism, Communism, Holocaust, King Mihai, democratic Opposition*

### Preliminaries

The factors who determined the success of the act that took place in August 23, 1944 were: the continuity of the activity of political parties at the level of their leadership, the precarity of the situation of Romania on Eastern front, fact that lead the political leaders of the time towards the finding of some solutions, and the action of King Mihai.

In what concerns the first factor, this was favoured by the fact that “Antonescu did not enterprise anything in order to limit at least the contacts and the discussions from the framework of the opposition” (Constantiniu, 1997: 395). On the contrary, it had been always a dialogue between Antonescu and the leaders of the Opposition: Iuliu Maniu, Dinu Brătianu and Constantin Titel Petrescu. These leaders criticised Antonescu in the moment when he decided to cross the Nister and to continue the fight on the territory of the Soviet Union. It had been also weaknesses coming from the part of Iuliu Maniu who declined allways the responsibility concerning the signing of the armistice. He did not want to assume the responsibility of the cease of some parts from the national territory (Bessarabia, the North of Bucovina and the land of Herța), agreeing all that this responsibility had to be granted to the Marshall. In spite of these endeavours, neither Antonescu is not disposed to sign the armistice (he was asserting that he is ready to give the power to the Opposition, if their leaders assumed the responsibility of such step), neither the Anglo-Americans did not seem receptive towards the fears of democratic parties concerning the future of Romania. Coming from here, the long waitings and pertractations of the leader of National Party of Peasants, Iuliu Maniu (Constantiniu, 1997: 395).

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In what it concerns the precariousness of external situation of Romania that led to the inevitability of the act of 23 August, I will mention a few moments concerning the position of Romania in the context of the outburst of the war.

The Marshall let himself be engaged in the conflict and he declared his loyalty towards Hitler that, starting the war against Soviet Union, did ask to Antonescu to do only what was in his own interest. In the vision of the Marshall, the war was not only one of liberation of the Romanian territories found under Soviet domination, but also against of an ideological enemy, the bolshevism.

An aspect that it can be reapproached to Antonescu is that he kept King Mihai outside the politics, about the entrance in the war of Romania, Antonescu finding by BBC.

At July 2, 1941, Antonescu opened the offensive on Eastern front. It followed then the liberation of the Romanian territory at July 25, 1941 and liberation of the Chişinău at July 16, 1941. The passing over the Nister, after the liberation of Bassarabia and the North of Bucovina, was criticised by leaders of National Party of Peasants and Liberal Party. But Antonescu motivated his decision. (Constantiniu, 1997: 403) It was initiated by a strategic calculus in order of not exposing the Romanian territory to Soviet attacks, but it had also a political motivation, having as purpose the fulfillment of German dolances with the purpose of obtaining ulteriorly the annulation of the Diktate of Vienna. This was the motif of collaboration of Antonescu with Germany, he being on the side of Germans, unconditionally.

In August 30, 1941, he signed the agreement Romanian- German from Tighina that it foreseen the instauration of Romanian civil administration on the territory between Nistru and Bug named Transnistria.

The signs of bad luck came up since the Battle of Odessa (August 18–October 16, 1941) when the Romanian army lost 98 000 of people (death persons, injured, missing persons). (Constantiniu, 1997: 408) In the same time, the Germans lost the Battle of Moscow where they applied the Blitzkrieg. After the entrance of United States in the war (December 7, 1941), the balance of forces changed in favor of the allies. Romania and USA declared simultaneously the war. In 1942, the Romanian troupes fought at South of Harkov and at Sevastopol. Another important defeat was at Stalingrad where the Romanian army lost 158 854 militaries (Constantinescu, 1997: 415), this fact causing a crises of trust between the High Commandments Romanian and german.

Besides the defeat from the Cotul Donului and Calmuca stepa, the Romanian army suffered the defeat from Kursk (July 5-August 23, 1943) that, corroborated with the leaving out of Mussolini in Italy at July 25, 1943, worsen the situation from Eastern Front. It was more probable that Romania to be occupied by the Russians. The Romanians did not know that at Teheran (November 28-December 1, 1943), Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill rejected the plan of the Anglo-American debarcation in the Balkans. At March 5-April 17, 1944, the Soviet troupes entered on the territory of Romania. At April 2, 1944, the Red Army came in Old Kingdom. The declaration of Molotov showed that the Soviets entered the territory of Romania not from the wish of taking over of a part of the country or to impose another social system, but from purely strategic reasons. This assertion proved ulteriorly untrue, being a politic-diplomatic lie.

In what it concerns the third factor, King Mihai I, he played a role that can not be contested. Although he was advised and counselled by the representatives of BND (peasant party members, liberalls, social-democrats, communists), he was the main initiator of the act of 23 August. Later, the communists arrogated the role of main coordinators of the events. The main character of those days was King Mihai that hurried

the rhythm of events during the day of August 23, the initial action being fixed on August 26. At August 23, the king acted alone, the leaders of the main political parties were not to be found.

### **The evolution of events**

The Act of 23 August was prepared since 1942. At Cairo, Barbu Știrbei tried to negotiate with the allies, but his action was stopped by Antonescu who received from Hitler the promise that Transylvania will become a part of Romania. Hitler, basing himself on the Marshall's loyalty, renounced to the plan Margareta II who foreseen the occupation of Romania by the Nazi forces. In the meantime, in October 1943, the Romanian vice-consul to Istanbul was taking the connection with a representative of S.O.E. (Special Operation Executive) and he was presenting the plan of a stately insurrection in order to eliminate the Marshall. This action failed though, partly because of the lack of British forces support. (Giurăscu, 1995: 1)

With the help of Maniu and Brătianu, the king was trying to organize and also, Maniu could send news and inform the Allies at Cairo and Ankara. (Ciobanu, 1997: 18) After this transmission of news, Maniu and Brătianu used to come to Palace to make a rapport of their action.

In order to be able to cooperate with the Allies, the King was compelled to receive, also, communist members, in the future actions that followed, although their number was very small. The actions of the King, were to a very small extent based on exterior action. Thus, on one hand, at BBC and the Voice of America, they were advised to get out from the war, and, on the other hand, the message of Romanians towards the Allies were not confirmed: "We were working intensively to reach a viable solution, but as the time was going by, we realized we had no help from anyone and that exactly the ones who lead us to get out of the war, they end all actions when we wanted to propose something more concrete". (Ciobanu, 1997: 20)

Finding out that Antonescu had to go on the Front, although the date for the proposed action was 26 August, the king had convoked the Marshall to the Palace, together with the Ministry of External Affairs, Mihai Antonescu. In August 22, Maniu, Brătianu, Titel Petrescu and Pătrășcanu were not to be found. King Mihai received the two Antonescu in the presence of Sănătescu and tried to convince the Marshall of the necessity of signing the armistice. For Antonescu, his word of honour given to Hitler worthed more than the situation in which was the country, thus he refused to give his consent. The marshall did not feel the danger of his situation, he continued to see King Mihai as a child who had to be kept out of politics. He asserted that he can not go and to leave the country in the hand of a child. The solution that came up was that of the arrestment of Antonescu after which his collaborators were called to Palace and arrested. Maniu, Brătianu, Titel Petrescu, Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu were named ministers without portofolio in the new government.

The communists were unpleasantly surprised by the spontaneous action of the King who put them in the situation of not asserting the paternity of the Political Act from August 23. This aspect did not imperished the communist journals (Scântea) to declare, since the second day, that them, the communists, were the main initiators of the events.

In the same time, it started the bombing of the Germans towards the capital. The King took a refuge in Oltenița, at Dobrița. They were taken 50 000 of German prisoners. The Russians interrupted the offensive hoping that the Romanians be defeated by the

Germans. On the Eastern Front, the Romanian troops were treated as prisoners. Russians entered in the Capital in September 1, after the leaving of German troops in August 26.

Another problem that aroused controversies was the surrender of Antonescu to the Soviets. He was left in the surveillance of Emil Bodnăraș who gave him to the Russians, without having the King's consent.

### **The Act of August 23, 1944 (event, signification, the role of King Mihai)**

At August 22, Antonescu comes back to Bucharest and talks with Mihalache and Gh. Brătianu who ask him to conclude the armistice. With the support of the Opposition, Antonescu seemed to agree to sign the amistice. Gheorghe Brătianu promised to bring letters of guarantee from Maniu and Brătianu. Antonescu asked for an audience to Palace for 16.00 p.m. and in the discussions with the political leaders of the time the king decides, that if the marshall would be not agree with the signing of the armistice, to arrest him during the audience.

The discussion King Mihai-Antonescu developed in contradictorial terms. To the assertion of Ion Antonescu that he can not accept the conditions of the armistice, the king told him: "We can not bargain at this late hour and in the situation in which we are". Antonescu proposed to call back the Romanian troupes and to organize a resistance in the Carpathians, but the king opposed asserting that the whole country will transformed into ruins. The marshal is arrested. The monarch was criticized later, that he gave the marshal to the communists of Emil Bodnăraș to watch him.

At August 23, 8 o'clock p.m., in a royal decree, Constantin Sănătescu was named president of the Council of Ministers. The new government included a representative of each party from BND. The majority of the government, was formed by military technicians.

At 21.30 p.m., all the radio stations from the country announced that they will transmute an important communicate for the country. At 22, 12 o'clock p.m., it had began the transmission of the proclamation. The proclamation was containing the leading message of King Mihai I, addressed to Romanian Army to stop the war against Soviet Union and to turn back the guns against the Germans. *The fact that Romanian army was subjected to him, demonstrates that the king remained in the eyes of the army the head of the troops*, although Antonescu ignored this prerogative of him. The fact that in the night of 23/ 24 August it took place spontaneous manifestations in front of the Palace demonstrates the fact that *the king was enjoying popularity and trust* in the eyes of the people. On August 26, 1944, the Romanian army liberated Bucharest found under German occupation, and in October 25, the last Romanian city, Carei, was liberated from the German occupation. The act of August 23, was an action meant to support the United Nations and, especially, the Soviet Union, but, unfortunately, the Russians did not appreciated the gesture of the monarch. The Romanian army, after the proclamation of August 23, opposed no more resistance to the Soviets. These occupied the whole territory of Romania, taking over 130. 000 of prisoners.

The meaning of the Act of August 23 was highly important. After turning the weapons against the Nazi forces, Romania, the second country as surface in Eastern Europe, changed in a few days the line of the front with 500 of kilometers. This thing happened with the price of numerous victims, Romania lost 500 000 of soldiers on Eastern front and 168 000 on Western front. The act of August 23, had a special meaning also for the situation of Romania. In the opinion of Șerban Papacostea (Papacostea, Revista 22, 23-30 August 1995), the Act of August 23, had numerous significations such as: to avoid

the transformation of the country in a theatre of war, to avoid the direct occupation by the Soviet army and the immediate taking over of the power by the exponents of Soviet interest, the communists, the return of Ardeal to the Kingdom of Romania and the annulment of the Diktate of Vienna because of the participation of the Romanian army to the military operations together with the allies, the reduction of the war time period on all fronts, because of the huge vacuum provoked by the action of Romania in the defensive system of the Reich.

King Mihai played the key-role in these events. Although he was helped and advised by the representatives of BND (nationalist peasants, liberals, social-democrats and communists), he was the main initiator of the act. Ulteriorly, the communists arrogated themselves the right of main initiators and actors in the events of the act of August 23, but the reality was completely different. In 1944, Romanian Communist Party had a reduced number of members and it was accepted to negotiations only because it was hoped that the implication of the communists in action, will determine the acceptance by the Soviet Union of some easier conditions of armistice with Romania. There are also opinions that minimize the role had by King Mihai in this operation, using the same discourses that Ion Antonescu used when he isolated the king by the political realities and the roles he had under the pretext that he was nothing more than a child. Thus, in an interview granted to Gabriela Adameșanu, Ion Iliescu asserts that the Act from August 23 “was not his merit (of the king) in principal, as it was accredited. A young man of 22 years old...But I appreciated and I considered that it is right this justification, the fact that he contributed to the achievement of this turning back of the weapons against Germany and to the ralliation of Romanian military forces to the forces of United Nations-participation to Romania to war until the defeat of Germany”. (transl.) (Ion Iliescu Apud Adameșanu, Revista 22, 12-19 October 1994).

The Act of August 23 and its significations were acknowledged also in international plan. Thus, at July 6, 1945, the Presidium of Supreme Soviet of Soviet Union granted to King Mihai the Order Victoria, the highest military Soviet distinction. With the same appreciation the president of the United States, Harry Truman names Mihai I as Chief Commander of the Legion of Merit. In spite of these distinctions which openly acknowledged the role of the King in the solutionning of the Second World War, the situation evolved differently. The Romanian communists supported by the Soviet Union, the indifference of Great Britain and of the United States of America, who accepted that Romania to arrive in the Soviet sphere of influence, the lack of diplomacy of adjunct of Soviet minister, Andrei Vâșinsky who came in Romania in order to exert pressures of the king and of the democratic forces in the country, all these lead to the end of monarchy and of the political democratic regime of Romania.

Towards this situation king Mihai adopted a cooperant attitude towards the Soviet Union not knowing from the very beginning which were her real intentions, then he *tried to oppose* to the communization of the country through actions that culminated with the royal strike started in 20.02. 1945. The end of royal strike and the acceptance of Groza Government was the beginning of a policy of concessions and resignation in front of Moscow and of the communists supported by it. King Michael had understood that he can do nothing to change the situation. In time, only by his simple presence, the monarch become persona non grata and he is imposed the act of abdication. The attitude of Romanian communists was not from the start hostile to the monarch, they knew about the prestige of the monarch: “In Romania, it was created an unusual political phenomenon. Here, the communists trained by/in Soviet Union, unlike the communists in general who

hated the monarchy praise the merits of royalty. No one from the communist ministers miss the occasion to appear in public or official occasions together with King Mihai”. (Deletant, Revista 22, nr.9, March 1995)

### **The reflection of events from August 23, 1944 in the press of the time**

At August 23, 1944, at 22 o'clock, King Mihai was announcing his *Proclamation to the country*. It represents the moment of the rupture of the relations with Germany. The Crown and the Throne were becoming the only factors of balance in a country ruined by the war: “The Romanian people understands to be itself master on his destiny. Anybody would stay against our decision freely taken and which do not undermine anybody’s rights, is an enemy of our people. I order to the army and I call the people to fight by all means and with any sacrifices against him. All the citizens to gather around the Throne and Government, for the salvation of the Mother country”. (Universul, nr.231: 25 august 1944) In the same time, it was transmitted also a declaration of the Government through which it was announced the formation of a BND government, the country receiving benefits of independence from the side of USSR, USA and Great Britain. With this occasion, it was formulated the option of Romanians to take back Transylvania: “The acknowledgement by the governments from Moscow, London, Washington of the injustices made to Romania by the Dictate of Vienna opens the possibility that the Romanian armies together with allied armies to liberate Northern Transylvania under the foreign occupation”. (Universul, nr.231: 25 august 1944)

The king named a new government together with General of Army Corpus Constantin Sănătescu as president of the Council of Ministers. The members of the Government became Iuliu Maniu, Constantin Brătianu, Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu and Constantin Titel Petrescu. Other portofolios were occupied by the general Mihail Racoviță (secretary minister to the department of National Defense, Grigore Niculescu Buzești (secretary minister at the department of Foreign Affairs), the general Aldea Aurel (secretary minister at the department of Internal Affairs). Other ministers were: general Nicolae Marinescu, Dimitrie Negel, general Ion Boițeanu, Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu (minister at the Justice Department).

In August 26, the legionnaire movement was destroyed. The Constitution from 1923 came into force.

Through the Act of August 23, the power is detained by the monarch, after, during four years, this was subordinated to the Marshall: “Thrown away, from the columns of the newspapers by the photographic exhibitions of the dictator and of his family, surveyed in the most inoffensive movements, isolated in the narrow circle of the Court and being forbidden to take contact with the chiefs of the army and with the political men, deprived by all information, the King and Queen Mother had an existence of martyrs”. (Lugosianu, Universul, no. 246: 1944)

Although the communists arrogated later the role of the main initiators of the Act of 23 August, the mass-media of the time acknowledged in all newspapers, no matter of their political orientation, the role of King Mihai I in the development of the events. Thus in the liberal newspaper “Viitorul” it is asserted ca “M.S. King Mihai I, taking the leading of the state from unskilled hands and giving back to the people, besides the spread liberties, on the wire of its traditional politics, he cemented once more the ties that unite our glorious dynasty with the Romanian People”. (Zurescu, Viitorul, 29 august 1944:1) In “Greater Romania”, the paper of communist orientation, it is acknowledged in the same time the role of the King”. His Majesty the King never ceased for a moment to prepare the

action fulfilled at August 23, action in the view the presence of the Majesty in the midst of the nation was as simple, as indispensable act". (România liberă, nr.18, 2 Septembrie, 1944: 1)

The solidarity with the monarchy had not excluded, also, the solidarity with the Red Army. Thus, the press of the time publishes eulogistic articles at the address of Soviet Union and of Red Army: "The winning troupes of the Red Army entered yesterday in the capital. Young, vigorous, admirably equipped, framed in a total discipline they bring not only the quiet pride of some brilliant victories, but also the conscience of a mission of liberation against a detested enemy on all the world territory" (Universul, nr. 239, 31 august, 1944:1). In the same world of ideas he wrote, also, the journal "Free Romania" ("România liberă"): "The great Red Army, the strongest and most glorious army of the Great United Nations entered in August 30 in the democrat Bucharest...This day will enter in the history of our country. The workers and the citizens of the capital, in a continuous enthusiasm, received the allied army of Soviet Union with flowers and flags, with endless ovations (...)" (România Liberă, 31 August 1944: 1)

The press of the time debated, also, the problem of the closing of the armistice. It was signed from the allied part by General Rodeon Malonovski and from Romania by Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu, general adjunct Dămăceanu, Barbu Știrbei and Ghiță Pop. The text of armistice was stipulating that at the date of August 23, 1944, Romania lost the military operations against USSR. Romania was carrying the war against Germany and Hungary with the purpose of restoring the independence and sovereignty of Romania. To this campaign, they were participating 12 divisions of infantry. The military operations against Germany and Hungary could be put under the general command of the Higher Allied Commandment (Sovietic). Romania had to ensure to the Soviet forces and to the other allies more easiness for their free movement on the territory of Romania. It had to support the expenses of the war and it had to re-establish the frontier with USSR so it was decided by the Convention Romanian–Soviet from June 28, 1940. Towards the Russians, they had to be delivered all the materials of war of Germany, including the vessels of war anchored in the Romanian ports. The government of Romania had to do regularly the payment asked to him by the Higher Allied Commandment (Soviet). In the same time, this is obliged to give back to USSR all the values taken during the war but also the payment of some compensations of 300 000 of dollars. In turn, "the allied governments think about the decisions of the Arbitrage from Vienna with regard to Transylvania as null and inexistence and they are agree that Transylvania (or its greatest part of it) to be given back to Romania under the condition of the confirmation through the Treaty of Peace". (Romania Libber, 17 September 1944: 1) In "Romania liberă", Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu asserted the necessity of the respectation of the armistice. (România Liberă, nr.31, 15 September, 1944) This would undermine the trust of the allies in Romania, especially of Soviet Union.

They appeared since then severe attacks on the address of the Fascists from the communist newspaper "România Liberă", Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu asserted the necessity of expectation of the armistice. This would have determined the trust of the Allies in Romania, especially of the Soviet Union.

It appeared since then grave attacks on the address of the fascists from the communist newspaper "Free Romania", fact that constituted later a weapon of the communists against all their political adversaries which they accuse with or without basis of fascism.

But, for the moment of the year of 1944, the King Mihai was attributed the role on initiator of the political Act from August 23 as a premise of the Convention of Armistice.

No one was supposing the turnure which the events will take soon, in the direction of the direct subordination of Romania to the Soviet Union and Romanian communists that had become simple instruments of the “brother from East”.

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## THE ‘RETREAT OF THE STATE’ AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A THEORETICAL ASSESSMENT

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**Abstract.** *The second half of the 20th century saw the emergence of an unprecedented number of non-state entities, varying from conventional intergovernmental organizations, to nongovernmental organizations, multinational companies and other transnational forces challenging the centuries old dominant position detained by the state on the international scene. Demystifying these new categories of actors has also created some hardship for the IR scholars, who found it really difficult to fit them within the existent scholarly literature elaborated around the state-centric approach promoted by the realist paradigm. Accordingly, the current study wishes to explore the rise of non-state actors from a theoretical perspective, departing from the presumption that their appearance refutes the state-centric vision promoted by the realist/neorealist scholarship and can be more efficiently addressed by implementing the liberal pluralist or the constructivist approach.*

**Keywords:** *Westphalia, realism, neorealism, liberalism, complex interdependence theory*

Over recent decades due to the effect of globalization every sphere of human activity from the economic to social, cultural, technological, political and military have gone through major transformations. These transformations that are changing the way communities are interrelated, also affect the position of the *state* as the primary model of political and bureaucratic organization in the international society. Globalization has led to the emergence of a new category of actors in the international arena i.e. *transnational* or *non-state actors*, which are increasingly gaining prominence at domestic, regional and international level. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century the importance of non-state actors is increasing, substantially influencing the decision of governments. As a consequence, many IR specialists argue that while non-state actors are gaining leverage, the authority of the state is waning. Even according to James N. Rosenau “while states may not be about to exit from the political stage, and while they may even continue to occupy centre stage, they do seem likely to become vulnerable and impotent” (Rosenau, 1980 apud Kegley, Blanton, 2011: 162).

The appearing of non-state entities (varying from conventional to unconventional ones) has eroded the traditional *nation-state approach* of world politics, dethroning the state from its position as the most important and the only rational entity capable to act on the international arena. Non-state actors can have a dual effect on states: their role can be *benign* if they assist states in resolving pressing global issues, or supplement the capacity of the state by managing situations which states aren't able to; or *malign* when they

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question and undermine state authority, corroding its basic principles of sovereignty, legitimacy and identity.

Accordingly, the present study set as its main target the analysis of the emergence of non-state actors by assessing them through theoretical lenses, arguing that the state centric model promoted by the realist and neorealist paradigms represent an obsolete view of the world and of the current power relations. We stress that the liberal pluralist and constructivist approaches offer us a more up to date vision concerning international actorhood.

### **The rise of *non-state actors* and the ‘retreat of the state’**

Although definitions framing *non-state actors* abound in the specialty literature, we contemplate that it is rather difficult to find a proper description which would interpret the concept in its intrinsic nature. By this, we mean that its interpretation is linked to that of *state actors*, namely non-state actors are the opposite of state actors, being everything which states are not, thus the term cannot be deciphered without referring to *state actors* first, diagnosing an inseparable bound between the two entities in question.

Before highlighting the differences between a *state* and *non-state* actor, we shall reveal first the meaning of the term *actor*. The famous IR scholar, Esther Barbe describes an *international actor* as a unit of the international system (entity, group, individual) which has the ability to mobilize resources in order to reach its objectives and has the capacity to exercise influence on the other actors of the international system which enjoy certain autonomy (Barbe, 1995: 117). On the other hand, the *state* is defined as a sovereign political entity with a government exercising exclusive control over the territory and population it governs (Mansbach, Rafferty, 2008: 792). Hence, it may be concluded that despite the existing differences, both *state* and *non-state actors* have a few things in common, namely: they detain resources, are able and willing to use these resources and influence the behaviour and actions of other actors from the international scene, in the same time having the power to influence the developments in regional and global politics.

Historically inspecting the emergence of states as actors in the international system, the Treaty of Westphalia concluded aftermath the Thirty Years’ War in 1648 is of a major importance, as it put down the basis of the global system of sovereign territorial states (Kegley, Blanton, 2011: 325). The concept of *state sovereignty* and the position of the state as the primary actor in international affairs are legacies of the Westphalian system. Despite the emergence of the principle of sovereign authority with regard to the conduct of foreign and domestic politics, the process of state building with delimited borders and jurisdiction has taken centuries and was accompanied by a myriad of intra and interstate wars (Reinalda, 2011:9).

The Westphalian system imposed for decades a *state-centric approach* to world politics, portraying the international environment as a *state system* (or *system of states*), transforming the distinctive characteristic of the state, *sovereignty* into the main organizing principle of international affairs (Heywood, 2011: 4).

The appearing of non-state actors is a challenge to this legacy and to the supremacy of the states, as these entities influence more and more the development of international affairs, contributing to the diminution of the role of the states. Even the well known British theoretician, Susan Strange in her landmark volume speaks about the “Retreat of the State” (Strange, 1998: 3), epitomizing the diffusion of power in global politics, certain functions previously performed by the states being taken over by non-state entities. Conclusively, the *state centric model* is not adequate any more to describe global

politics, pluralist theorists advocating for the application of the *mixed actor model*, a paradigm, which without overlooking the importance of states and national governments, affirms that international politics are moulded by a wide range of interests and multiple entities (Heywood: 5).

There is no consensus among political scientists concerning the degree of influence detained by non-state actors in world politics, as there are some areas where they are taking over the role of the states as leading regulatory bodies, performing certain functions which states aren't able, and there are also fields in which their role is secondary, complementing that of the states (Peters, Koechlin and Zinkernagel, 2009: 10).

Thereafter, it can be concluded that nowadays when it comes to governance, the states are not the sole entities, the international arena being characterized by the plurality of actors taking part in the global governing process. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye's *complex interdependence theory* can be implemented not only in the realm of interstate relations, but also in the relation between state and non-state actors, as in the current international system both state and non-state entities are mutually dependent on each other and are linked to each other through multiple channels of formal and informal nature (Keohane and Joseph Nye 2012: 20). Keohane's and Nye's groundbreaking insight developed in the 70s' questioned the fundamental maxims of the traditional realist theory, which have rendered to the state and its military and economic might the most important role in shaping international politics, completely disregarding the regulatory capabilities of the rising transnational actors. According to the two scholars non-state actors have the potency to compensate the traditional military capabilities of the states, to outstrip their economic might, considering the fact that some MNCs (multinational corporations) have a larger profit than the entire GNP per year of a state or multiple states, and finally they can also pursue the implementation of foreign policy decisions more efficiently than individual states. Thus, we may note that the *complex interdependence paradigm* emphasizes the rise of transnational actor vis-à-vis the state in international affairs, ultimately challenging the traditional centuries-old state-centric approach, which is considered as an obsolete view of world politics (Rana, 2015: 290-291).

Besides the substituting and compensatory relationship, between state and non-state actors we also distinguish a third type of rapport, namely situations when non-state actors employ violence against states, and act as destabilizing factors. These *violent non-state factions* are labelled in the specialty literature as monolithic actors, signifying a major threat to the *raison d'être* of states, i.e. survival, stability and security.

### **The historical and numerical emergence of 'conventional' non-state actors in global politics**

In historical terms the appearing of non-state actors is dated to the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, when the first private societies and organizations with a public purpose were created. One of the first entities of this kind were the *issue oriented non-governmental organizations* set up against slavery by average citizens who became aware of the pressing social and ethical problems prevailing in society. These groups of citizens assumed that by establishing associations and societies they would be able to deal more efficiently with these above mentioned problems. The headway of the "polite society of the gentry and nobility" in Great Britain, augmented by the increased mobility facilitated by advancements in the road system, played an important role in the emergence of these societies, associations and committees. The emancipation of the middle class in the 19<sup>th</sup> century Britain had contributed to the spread of these associations, constituted of members

of the middle class, who disposed of time, education and resources to form and take part in such entities (Reinalda, 2011: 11). The social and ethical problems were present in other states as well, enabling citizens to begin interacting with each other, thus establishing various forms of transborder contacts, like visits, meetings and conferences, putting the basis of transnational networks as well. The exchange of ideas, experience and expertise among these citizens from various states resulted in the establishment of transnational *issue-oriented societies* with member organizations in various countries, more commonly known by the laymen as NGOs or *international nongovernmental organizations*. Thanks to the successful advocacy of such organizations (**British Movement for the Abolition of Slavery**) the issue of the abolition of slavery was included by the British government on the agenda of the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Moreover, not just the issue was added on the agenda, but also the representatives of these organizations were allowed to take the word during the conference, marking the inception of continuous transnational activities (like the creation of transnational advocacy networks and of NGOs) and of private international politics (such as forwarding questions to governments and intergovernmental organizations, participating and taking the word at international conferences etc.) (Ibid, 11:12).

The Congress of Vienna didn't only mark the end the of the Napoleonic era and the reinstatement of the status quo (the balance of power) maintained by the great powers, but also stimulated the rise of a new category of entities, called IGOs, or *international governmental organizations*. The key European decision-makers present at the conference recognized that the then existing *system of states* (dated from Westphalia) was not satisfactory any more for states to pursue their domestic interests on the international stage in the plane era of communication and industrial developments. This revelation contributed to the launch of certain innovative actions and processes, such as: follow-up conferences for monitoring the domestic implementation of decisions taken at multilateral conferences, rendering legal framework to diplomatic relations by regulating them, the gathering of know how concerning the functioning of and working within institutions, the promotion of international public law and finally the openness of multilateral conferences which made possible the participation of representatives of NGOs. All of these innovative actions later had become the basic principles on which IGOs were built and according to which they have functioned (Ibid, 13). The first organization, which genuinely incorporated all the necessary characteristics of an IGO was the **Central Commission on the Navigation on Rhine**, established by the Congress of Vienna in 1815, instituting the principle of free navigation on international rivers. This principle led to the appearing of other regulatory fluvial commissions, like the ones on the Elba (in 1821), Po (in 1849) and Danube (in 1856) rivers. In the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the international landscape was enriched with new structures, the *international administrative unions* (**International Telegraphic Union** in 1865, the **International Meteorological Organization** in 1873 the **Universal Postal Union** in 1874), and regulatory organizations (**Hague Conferences** 1899 and 1907, **League of Nations** and **International Labour Organization** in 1919 and finally one of the most important the **United Nations Organization** in 1945) etc. (Horga, 2006: 124).

Although, some political scientists (Moore, Lewis, 1999 apud Chandler, Mazlish, 2005: 2-3) have traced back more than 2000 years<sup>1</sup> the emergence of the third category of

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<sup>1</sup> Businesses operated by the ancient Assyrians, Phoenicians, Greeks, and Romans in the 2<sup>nd</sup> millennium B.C.

conventional non-state actors, MNCs or *multinational corporations*, the first entities, which can be truly identified as such, emerged in the 1880s in the wake of the Industrial Revolution, becoming the pioneers of the modern global economy. On the other hand, there are some scholars who argue that various entities from the Middle Ages already had the characteristics of what we call today as multinational companies or enterprises. Among these they enumerate: (Wilkins, 2005: 48-49)

- the Italian banks already present in England in the 13<sup>th</sup>-14<sup>th</sup> centuries;
- the Hanseatic League;
- a Bank owned by the powerful Medici family with its headquarter in Florence and branches in other important European cities such as Geneva, Lyon, Basel, Avignon, Bruges, London;
- merchant trading houses from the 17<sup>th</sup> century;
- the famous transnational joint-stock trading enterprises, the Dutch and the British East India Companies.


A second wave of multinational corporations with a more mature shape rose in the 70s', leading to the diversification of the palette of transnational actors, by the new millennium managing to expand dramatically in scope and potential contributing to the globalization of the world economy (Chandler, Mazlish, 2005: 1). However, these entities have a rather controversial character: on one hand are labelled positively as they enhance the free flow of trade, enable products, services and technology to reach all the citizens of the globe regardless of state boundaries, through their branches situated in various countries create jobs for citizens of nation states, hence improving living conditions and decreasing unemployment rate; while on the other hand, are viewed with animosity, as due to outsourcing they move the production to other poorer countries (mostly to 2<sup>nd</sup> or 3<sup>rd</sup> world countries)<sup>2</sup>, exploiting the local workforce by giving them lower wages, thus deepening the existing *north-south gap*<sup>3</sup>, not to mention the fact that their GNI<sup>4</sup> is larger than that of many nation states, this representing a serious threat to the position traditionally filled in by the state on the global scene (Kegley, Blanton, 176-177). According to statistics large MNCs can produce more profit and are wealthier than 120-130 nation states altogether (Chandler, Mazlish, 1). For example, in 2014 **Wal-Mart Stores**, **Sinopec** or **Royal Dutch Shell** on their own produced more revenues in billions of dollars than countries like Russia or the Netherlands. **Exxon Mobile**, **BP**, **PetroChina** surpassed the GNI of two of the most affluent states from the Middle East, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. On the list of the 100 entities with the highest annual revenues in 2014 states were numerically outrun by corporations, the first category representing 37%, while the latter 63% (Freudenberg, 2015).

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<sup>2</sup> Otherwise called as the *Global South*.

<sup>3</sup> The economic inequalities between the richest and the poorest countries of the world.

<sup>4</sup> Gross National Income.



**Map No. 1.** Top 500 MNCs in the world with the location of their headquarter with the circle size representing the revenue (Fortune, “Visualize the Global 500”)

Examining the map provided by the analysts of the online version of the highly ranked American business magazine, **Fortune**, we notice that the biggest and most powerful multinational companies in the world are concentrated mostly in North America (USA), Europe (mostly the Western and Central part) and Southwest Asia, the Middle East is seriously lagging behind with only two MNCs with large revenues, one located in Saudi Arabia (SABIC)<sup>5</sup> and the other (Emirates)<sup>6</sup> in the United Arab Emirates (Visualize the Global 500).

There has been a boost in the number of both NGOs and IGOs in the past century, especially after the 60s’, this significant growth being labelled by the scholars as the ‘most striking phenomena of contemporary international relations’. This mushrooming of non-state entities was fostered by the liberalization of trade relations and the process of decolonization, leading to the emergence of new states, which driven by the desire to catch up with the old and powerful sovereign states and to redistribute the global wealth entered in as many international governmental organizations as possible, additionally forming organizations of their one (Josselin, Wallace, 2001: 7).

Analysing the historical evolution of the number of NGOs, respectively IGOs we find out that at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century in 1909 there were only 37 IGOs and 176 NGOs. Their number increased significantly by the 1960s’ reaching 154 IGOs and 1255 NGOs. In the new millennium by 2009, the number of conventional IGOs doubled reaching 240, the number of NGOs experiencing an unprecedented growth summing up 7628 *conventional* NGOs. However, it must be noted that this calculus did not include the additional 724 *unconventional* IGOs and 4362 *unconventional* NGOs that are listed by the Yearbook of International Organizations (Kegley, Blanton: 138). The 2015-2016 edition of the Yearbook of International Organizations enumerates 273 conventional IGOs and 8976 conventional NGOs (Yearbook of International Organizations 2015-2016: 25).

As we could notice the yearbook differentiates between two major types of IGOs and NGOs, namely *conventional* and *unconventional (non-conventional)* ones (Ibid.). By

<sup>5</sup> Saudi Arabia Basic Industries Corporation is a manufacturing company active in chemical industry, with total revenue of 39.5 billion dollars, and a profit of 5 billion dollars in 2016.

<sup>6</sup> Emirates is a multinational holding company specialized in providing aviation services, with a total revenue of 22.7 billion dollars, and a profit of 1.94 billion dollars in 2016.

a *conventional* IGO we understand an entity (an institution, organization) with international legal personality and a membership comprising at least three or more states' governments. There's a clear delimitation between the competences of the states and that of the organization, which is authorized to make collective decisions concerning the management of certain issues on the international arena. According to Rittberger, Zangl and Kruck IGOs play a triple role, being perceived as *instruments*, *arenas* and *actors* in the same time. As *instruments*, IGOs are perceived as tools used by states to reach their particular objectives; as *arenas* they become the playing ground, the forum for state interactions, facilitating dialogue by offering a venue for permanent meetings and conferences, where the representatives of states' governments can exchange information and expertise, can justify and condemn certain actions, can take common positions and can pursue domestic political strategies; and finally as *actors* they are interpreted as autonomous corporate entities able to act independently on the international scene as a consequence of the pooled or delegated sovereignty, prompting the states to take concerted actions (Rittberger, Zangl, Kruck, 2012: 4-5).

In a traditional approach *unconventional/non-conventional organizations*, are identified as entities which are not formally constituted and their characteristics are distinct than those of conventional bodies (Yearbook of International Organizations 2015-2016: 17). However, recently, some young scholars approached this concept from a totally new perspective, understanding by non-conventional organizations, bodies with an "above-average performance, or having the potential for such performance in their own field of operation or industry", not linking the conceptual delimitation to forms/ways of constitution or feature differences (Csigás, Németh, 2015:4). We state, that within this research we shall stick with the traditional definition of non-conventional organizations.

Concerning the number of multinational corporations, the **United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)** in its *World Investment Report for 2016* identified 80.000 complex MNCs, registering a decline from 52% of the sample in 1994 to 45% in 2009 (World Investment Report 2016: 188).

After the historical and numerical inspection of conventional non-state actors in global politics, in the following part we propose to deconstruct the concept in question, and to dig our way through the seemingly infinite attempts from the specialty literature to classify these entities.

### **What do we understand by the term *non-state actor*? A conceptual framing and classification**

As highlighted before there is an inseparable bound between *state* and *non-state actors*, especially when it comes to conceptual framing, many authors falling into the trap of describing non-state entities merely based on their antithetical position with states, failing to reveal their specific features.

Joshua Goldstein and Jon Pevehouse are amongst those IR specialists who give a quite superficial definition to *non-state actors* by putting them in contrast with states, describing them as "actors other than state governments that operate either below the level of the state (that is, within states) or across state borders" (Goldstein, Pevehouse, 2014: 510). This definition is rather scanty, as it does not unfold what non-state actors truly are, it only emphasizes upon what they are not, focusing on the negation of a state character. We note that this is the standard definition identified in the vast majority of the examined literature, that's the main reason why these won't be listed in the current research, as we

are interested in investigating non-state actors in their inherent position, not in relation with other subjects.

Daphne Josselin and William Wallace offer a more piercing insight of the term in question, understanding by it organizations, which are “largely or entirely autonomous from central government funding and control: emanating from civil society, or from the market economy, or from political impulses beyond state control and direction” (Josselin, Wallace, 2011: 3-4). These organizations operate or participate in networks which go beyond the “boundaries of two or more states, thus engaging in transnational relations linking political systems, economies and societies” (Ibid.: 4). According to the authors these entities have the capacity to affect and to shape political outcomes “either within one or more states or within international institutions, either purposefully or semi-purposefully, either as their primary objective or as one aspect of their activities” (Ibid.).

The *Encyclopaedia of Political Science* defines *non-state actors* as “non-sovereign entities that exercise significant economic, political, or social power and influence at national, and in some cases international, levels” stressing that it is utterly difficult to decide which entities can be classified as its members, because these come in various shapes and forms and operate transnationally (Kurian, 2011: 1117).

When accommodating *non-state actors* in the realm of international law, Jan Klabbers asserts that these entities should be taken seriously, must not be excluded from global politics and they also may be subjects of international law. However, comparing their position and role played on the international scene with that of the states, *non-state actors* are perceived as *derivative subjects*, which must comply with a *second class status* (Klabbers, 2003: 361).

The **classification** of non-state actors is a subject of much scholarly debate, given the fact that there is no consensus among IR specialists which entities should or shouldn't be included.

Charles Kegley distinguishes between two principal categories of non-state actors: *intergovernmental organizations* (IGOs) labelled as transnational bodies composed exclusively of states and *nongovernmental organizations* (NGOs) identified as associations of which membership comprises private individuals and groups (Kegley, Blanton: 138). The author identifies IGOs as the embodiment of various cumulative state objectives, as they are established by and formed of exclusively state actors in order to solve shared problems and pursue policies on the global stage. However, it must be noted that whatever authority they may possess, is given to them by states' governments for the purposes assigned to them by states. On a hierarchy scale IGOs are regarded as more influential and more important than non-state entities, this supremacy emanating from their membership status<sup>7</sup> and the perpetuation<sup>8</sup> of their institutions (Kegley, Blanton: 138). Kegley applies the term NGO to all non-state and non-profit organizations which act as agents between entities/persons detaining resources and a targeted group in order to solve pressing global issues. NGOs are acting as inter-societal mediator organizations interposing between and among states fostering negotiations in order to reach the most favourable outcome for the public policy issues on the agenda (Ibid.: 139). In Kegley's categorization *multinational corporations* do not receive a distinctive place on the palette of non-states actors, being classified within the family of NGOs, which besides

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<sup>7</sup> They comprise states.

<sup>8</sup> They have permanent bodies and venue, and they meet on regular intervals, furthermore they are able to carry out functions on global arena.

transnational humanitarian organizations also incorporates transnational religious and ethnic groups, and most importantly global terrorist networks (Ibid.: 17, 162).

It's the outermost interesting that the *Encyclopedia of Political Science* does not classify IGOs as non-state actors, and singles out nongovernmental organizations as the most important and well-known types of non-state entities, described as "private, self-governing, voluntary, non-profit, and task- or interest-oriented advocacy organizations" (Kurian: 1117). This classification perhaps originates from the study of international law, which distinguishes between governmental organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but allows the enlisting of international entities which, albeit not being states, but due to their quasi state character are closely enough associated to the state through legal arrangements (Noortmann, 2011).

The encyclopaedia emphasizes the position of *multinational corporations*, rendered as one of the most influential categories of non-state actors without including them in the group of NGOs as previously the political scientist, Charles Kegley. International media, armed groups (including rebel opposition forces, militias, and warlords), terrorist and criminal organizations, religious groups and transnational diasporas also expand the list of non-state actors, being identified as separate categories (Kurian: 1117-1118).

Andrew Heywood shares the approach promoted in the Encyclopaedia, cutting out IGOs from the group of non-states actors, listing only transnational/multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, terrorist networks and international criminal groups in this category (Heywood: 234).

Also the Hungarian professor, specialist in the study of non-state entities, Szörényi András underscores that he classifies among non-state actors: the non-governmental organizations, advocacy organizations, multinational enterprises, interest groups, transnational trading companies, financial funds, peace movements, separatist movements, terrorist organizations, private security companies, research centres, and some media players (Szörényi, 2014: 182).

As noticed in **table no. 1**, the empirical swamp of non-state actors is further deepened by the classification made by Joshua Goldstein and Jon Pevehouse, who beside labelling non-state entities as *transnational actors*, highlight four types of non-state actors, clearly differentiating between IGOs, NGOs, MNCs and a fourth undefined category, which incorporates constituencies different than the previous three categories, allowing sufficient room for manoeuvre for IR specialists. According to this classification for example *violent (armed) non-state actors* can be listed in the fourth category. The authors also identify another prototype of non-state actors, *substate actors*, which operate within a specific country and have the capacity to influence the foreign policy of that country and also to carry out activities internationally (Goldstein, Pevehouse, 2014: 17).

**Table No. 1.** Types of non-state actors (Goldstein, Pevehouse, 2014: 16)

Type	Who are they	Examples
IGOs (Intergovernmental Organizations)	Members are national governments	United Nations, NATO, African Union, Arab League
NGOs (Nongovernmental Organizations)	Members are individuals and groups	Amnesty International, Lions Clubs, Red Cross, Greenpeace, Caritas
MNCs (Multinational Corporations)	Companies that span borders	ExxonMobil, Toyota, Wal-Mart, Microsoft, IBM
<b>Others</b>	Individuals, Cities, Constituencies, etc.	Bono, Iraqi Kurdistan, al Qaeda, Islamic State

**Table No. 2.** International system level analysis: A classification of the players in the international system and how they relate to one another on five levels (Duncan, Jancar-Webster, Switky, 2009: 72, 74)

Levels	Actors	Types
<b>International system level</b>	States, non-state actors, and individuals	
<b>Regional level</b>	States, regional NSAs, individuals	International government organizations (IGOS) International organized crime and drug groups International paramilitary and terrorist groups Public interest and professional nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) Firms and businesses, especially multinational corporations (MNCs) The international media Transnational diaspora communities
<b>State level</b>	States, state-level NSAs, individuals	
<b>Substate level</b>	Interest groups, ethnic groups, individuals	
<b>Individual level</b>	Individual people	

Similar to Goldstein and Pevehouse, Carmit Valensi also distinguishes among four types of non-state-actors, IGOs, NGOs, MNCs and finally the so called *super-empowered* individuals (Valensi, 2015: 61-62), defined as “persons who have overcome constraints, conventions, and rules to wield unique political, economic, intellectual, or cultural influence over the course of human events” (National Intelligence Council, 2007: 2).

Table no. 2 shows a different categorization, at a systemic level also introducing besides the traditional and most well-known non-state actors (IGOs, NGOs and MNCs etc.) unconventional violent groups, such as international organized crime and drug groups and international paramilitary and terrorist groups.

As we could notice the examined literature comprises a myriad of definitions and classifications trying to distinguish primarily states from non-state entities and secondary one category of non-state actor from another. Entities which are hard to classify in any of the categories because they are in possession of certain characteristics which differ from the required criteria, blur the boundary between state and non-state actors. These so called ‘black sheep’ of international actorhood challenge the traditional dichotomy between state and non-state actors.  **Hamas, Hezbollah** and according to some scholars also the **Islamic State** represent such anomalies in the international system (Valensi: 66). On some occasions they are also referred to as *proto/quasi states*, or *states in waiting*, defined as “non-state organizations that have assumed a plurality of the functions of the state, thereby challenging its legitimacy”. (Szekely, 2014: 2).

### **An assessment of non-state actors through theoretical lenses**

#### ***The emergence of non-state actors on the international scene: a challenge to the realist/neorealist approach***

We cannot pursue an all-encompassing inquiry of non-state actors without trying to understand first their evolution and functioning from a theoretical point of view, thereby in this section of the article we shall take non-state entities as a self-standing category of IR actors, venturing to demystify their emergence by implementing the central

assumptions of the most well known theories of international relations, such as realism/neorealism, constructivism and neoliberalism (liberal pluralism).

It is imperative to take the concept of *non-state actor* unabridged and determine how the traditional and the most well known theories of international relations explain the appearing of these new protagonists on the international political landscape. We stress that the realist and neorealist theories fail to include in their analysis the emergence of non-state actors, thus within this research we shall promote the liberal pluralist (neoliberal) and constructivist approaches, which attempt to fill in the gap in the existent IR literature.

Accordingly, the analysis will begin with the *realist theory*, about which it is known that favours a state-centric approach. Realists give a major importance to national interests and power on the international scene, the most important being the survival of states, as states determine their own interests and how to obtain them. Realism is based on three basic assumptions: (Ayanoglu, 2007: 8)

- According to the first assumption, the state plays the role of the dominant actor in the international arena, only the state being able to act as a rational and coherent unit;
- Secondly, states do not recognize the supremacy of any other power above them;
- Finally, states interact in anarchy, in which politics is dominated by military considerations and the fragility of trust and cooperation, that's why war is always a possibility.

That international anarchy forms the conduct of states as well as their external preferences. Power and security are quasi-essential for states, and they are always predisposed to competition and clashes with each other. International institutions only marginally can limit the effects of international anarchy on the behaviour of states. Realism emphasizes the absence of a superior government with no common norms or rules that could predetermine the conduct of states. In such a system conflict is unavoidable and states must always prepare for it (Haugsdal, 2005: 14).

Since the birth of the first organized human communities living under a single political structure and especially after the rise of the nation-states in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the state became the most important unit in the international system. According to the Encyclopaedia of Political Science the ubiquity of this centric role has become a predominant characteristic of the state since the appearance of its modern form in Europe (Kurian: 1597) The realist approach emerged after the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War as a reaction to the presumptions promulgated by idealism (utopianism), which utterly believed that the creation of an international governmental organization under the name of the League of Nations will be able to enforce its will upon nation states in order to bring harmony amongst them and prevent the escalation of another world conflagration. (Valensi: 62).

After the incompetence of the League of Nations to tackle the animosities between the sovereign nation states, in the post-war period the realist thinkers exploited this weakness and put states as the centrepiece of their scientific studies. In the realist perception states are perceived as *black boxes* (Dunne, Kurki, Smith, 2013: 78) due to the fact that neither the internal social, political or constitutional, nor the cultural arrangements are congruous to their demeanour in the international system. Besides black boxes, states are also labelled as robust self-ruling entities, which through coercive measures are able to control the territory and the people and impose their will on them and to extract the resources, entirely subordinating their foreign policy goals to considerations related to power and security (Heywood: 139).

As the realist agenda is dominated by matters related to the maximization of power with the purpose of state survival, other topics, such as the need of analyzing the ascent of actors, others than the state, are completely excluded, downplayed or trivialized (Riotti, Kauppi, 2012: 76-77). It's a controversy though, that while security threats and problems are at the core of the realist approach, diverse violent (armed) non-state actors, such as terrorist groups, which represent a serious hazard to the international security environment tend to be overlooked by the realist scholars. Furthermore, one well established realist thinker, Colin Gray even stresses that transnational terrorism is a "pretty small beer", (Jackson, Sorensen, 2013: 282) minimizing its importance in the global realm. Nevertheless, it is rather controversial the fact that the representatives of structural realism emphasize that putting the state at the heart of their analysis and rendering to it the primary position among the IR actors does not deny the presence of other individual and collective actors (Gilpin, 1984: 300 apud Viotti, Kauppi, 2012: 77).

Realist intellectuals are the subject of heavy criticism for failing to include in their spectre of analysis non-state entities, regarding non-state actors such as multinational companies as part of state agencies (Steans et al. 2010: 71). As a reaction to this criticism, realists justify their choice of excluding non-state actors from their agenda by using a conditionality pattern, identifying three major criteria what every unit has to meet in order to be labelled as a global political actor. The criteria are the following: (Valensi: 63)

- detaining sovereignty (autonomy)
- state recognition
- control over a territory and population.

Obviously, if no other entity but the state meets these criteria, they will be automatically excluded from the subject of analysis, being perceived as negligible organisms in the international system.

The newest version of realism, *neorealism (structural realism)* just like its predecessor sees the world as a place of anarchy, as a land without sovereign, and within this battlefield states interact and must survive. Since we are not talking about the presence of a sovereign, there are no mechanisms either that could prevent states from threats coming from the international policy ring. Thus the war is very possible, and in order to survive the war the military power is absolutely indispensable. As previously stated, both advocates of realism and neorealism claim that the international system is anarchical, and in such an environment, sovereign nation states adopt a conflicting behaviour. Besides these, for both realists and neorealists, the ultimate goal is the survival of the state. The only way to ensure their own safety can be achieved by increasing military power, thus reducing the chances of a possible attack. Realists and neorealists both agree that there is no way out of this international anarchy, precisely for this reason the formation of a world government (supranational, supra-state power) would not be feasible, because states would never give up their sovereignty to such an entity (Waltz, 1979): 126.

However, contrary to the common views, there are some issues about which the followers of realism and neorealism have different perceptions, such as human nature. Hans Morgenthau, a convinced realist, claims that international anarchy is due to the human nature, which is predisposed to violence and conflict. Contrary to this hypothesis, neorealists are more likely to seek the causes of conflicts in social matters instead of holding accountable the human nature. Kenneth Waltz, the founding father of neorealism, says that self-organization of social relations demonstrates the existence of war, human nature not being an important aspect. In other words, realists and neorealists think differently when it

comes to conceptualizing international anarchy, that is to say, according to the militants of realist thinking, international anarchy constitutes only the environment in which the states operate, whereas the representatives of neorealism claim that this international anarchy describes and forms those social relations between sovereign nation states that explain the reason for the outbreak of wars (Weber, 2005: 13- 35).

Although neorealists also regard states as the primary actors in the international system, they focus less on them than realists, being more interested in unveiling how the international system works, especially in terms of power relations. Thus, we might say that neorealist thinkers are less agent centred and are more interested in the system as the whole, analysing how the decentralized and anarchical structure of the international system impels states to act in certain ways. According to neorealist scholars changes take place in the international system on the occasion of the rise or fall of great powers, which consequently will alter the existing balance of power (Jackson, Sorensen: 310). In Waltz's point of view the number of great powers influences how the international orders fluctuate, differentiating between *bipolar*<sup>9</sup> and *multipolar*<sup>10</sup> systems (Donnelly, 2004: 17). Furthermore, neorealists accentuate the rational character of states, trait which prevails despite the constraints imposed by the anarchic structure of the global system (Steans et al, 2011: 237).

We must emphasize, that although the neorealist approach is not as agent centred as the realist one, it also fails to include non-state actors in its field of analysis, however its systemic approach allows some room for manoeuvre for IR specialists who are adventuring in deep water, when targeting to demystify the relations between states and violent non-state actors (or among violent non-state actors) by using the *balance of power concept*. These thinkers<sup>11</sup> argue that if neorealism with its systemic level analysis can unveil the behaviour of states and mostly how they interact with each other, it could also give a genuine image of the habits of armed (violent) groups, describing "when and why armed groups act in ways that balance power, whether that is with other armed groups or states" (Vinci, 2009: 8).

### **Can the constructivist or the liberal pluralist approach explain the rise of non-state actors?**

The 1960s' and 70s' (post-war period) saw the emergence of new categories of IR actors, varying from multinational companies and intergovernmental organizations to liberation movements, separatist and terrorist groups. As these new entities also wanted to actively take part in the international actions, also exercising some kind of influence on states, scholars acknowledged the need to include them in their scientific debates, therefore challenging the decades long postulates elaborated by the followers of the realist scholarship. This necessity highlighted the existing limitations of the realist perception, which couldn't answer for all the structural changes taking place in the international system, thus propelling the launch of novel theoretical approaches (Valensi: 63).

Among these theoretical insights we include the *constructivist*, *structuralist*, *neoliberal institutionalist/liberal pluralist* approaches which have introduced non-states actors within the IR scholarly debate.

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<sup>9</sup> International system dominated by two superpowers.

<sup>10</sup> International system dominated by more big powers.

<sup>11</sup> See Anthony Vinci.

The structuralist perception does not make the subject of our interest as far as it concerns the theoretical framing of non-state actors, that's why it shall be treated only succinctly within these lines.

*Structuralism*, in the form of a self-standing theory of international relations appeared in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, trying to investigate the variations of international orders and the relationship between the IR actors from an economic point of view. The structuralist scholars have committed themselves to dissect the causes of economic inequalities between different parts of the world, and also to reveal which are the mechanisms which perpetuate this state of discrepancy. They have blamed the state for its secular<sup>12</sup> bias towards certain privileged classes of society, the so called elites, allowing to one social class to exploit the other, thus undertaking a thorough analysis of the international system, taking as starting point the evolution of market economy. Although the state is important in the structuralist scholarship, it also introduces other actors in the field of discussion, varying from multinational corporations and intergovernmental organizations to nongovernmental organizations and transnational social classes. (Steans et al.: 75, 86).

The *constructivist* scholarship also dates back to the same historical period as the structuralist paradigm, promoting a rather nonconformist view of the international system and the entities making its agenda. Constructivist intellectuals also regard states as rational entities, but not the sole actors in the international environment, also listing transnational and international organizations as the main protagonists in the IR field.

Constructivists<sup>13</sup> emphasize on ideational factors, such as identities, norms and values, these playing a major role in the construction of identities and the shaping of preferences and behaviour of both state and non-state actors (Viotti, Kauppi: 278). Arguing that world politics (also comprising the preferences, demeanour and interests of states and other non-state entities) is individually and socially constructed is the most relevant characteristic differentiating the constructivist worldview from the realist and the liberal one (Kegley, Blanton: 46).

Alexander Wendt, one of the most important militants of the constructivist ideology, has introduced three major concepts, which represent the core of the constructivist belief, such as: (Wendt, 1992: 391-425 apud Valensi: 65).

- identity, which determines the actors' personality
- norms, defined as shared expectations concerning the proper conduct for the actor's identity
- interests, referring to what the actors want to achieve.

Due to the fact, that the constructivist approach highlights the importance of rules, norms and values, also admitting that the identity and behaviour of IR actors are not fixed or predetermined, but change in time and accordance with the international context, it could serve as a good starting point in examining for example violent non-state entities. The realist and neorealist angles, inspecting the behaviour of actors (states) only in terms of pursuit of power and financial benefits do not provide the IR scientists with the necessary know how, to understand for example the motivations/ideology/radicalization of violent non-state actors, such as terrorist groups. In comparison with realism/neorealism and neoliberalism, the constructivist outlook is much more dynamic as it promotes a pluralistic view by not disregarding the ideological components in shaping the preferences

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<sup>12</sup> Here meaning age-long.

<sup>13</sup> Such as Alexander Wendt, Nicholas Onuf, Friedrich Kratochwil etc.

of actors (Valensi, 64-65). Accordingly, in our opinion constructivism could come with a critical perspective on how we comprehend for example the emergence of various terrorist groups not from a hard power and traditional realist point of view (Heywood: 287).

Naturally, the rise of various paramilitary, insurgent, criminal or terrorist groups could also be analyzed using the insights developed by the representatives of the *Copenhagen School*, insights which subscribe within the constructivist thought, by presenting the emergence of such groups and the upward trajectory of transnational terrorism as a security threat to a reference object,<sup>14</sup> which needs to be tackled by a securitizing actor<sup>15</sup>. The counter-actions what securitizing actors can initiate in order to manage/prevent these phenomena depend on the successfulness of the discursive construction of threat, prompting the initiation of a *securitization process*, in which terrorist groups are labelled as security risks by the political elites asking the reference object for its consent in order to take actions/measures which under normal conditions wouldn't be allowed.

In comparison with realism, the *liberal thought* dates back to the 18-19<sup>th</sup> centuries and its representatives are mainly preoccupied with the possibility of overcoming the international 'state of nature' or 'war of all against all' (Steans: 26) by establishing orderly and peaceful relations amongst peoples. Liberal thinkers have a positive view of human nature, emphasizing on the perfectibility of mankind also denying the anarchical/lawless nature of the international environment. According to the liberal belief human beings are perceived as rational individuals capable of collaborating with each other and this feature is also applicable to states as well, thus reducing the prospect of conflicts. The backbone of the liberal political ideology and philosophy is composed of the works of the so called *early liberal thinkers*, such as Erasmus of Rotterdam, William Penn, Jeremy Bentham, Voltaire, Immanuel Kant, Denis Diderot, Adam Smith, Richard Cobden, David Ricardo or Woodrow Wilson et. al., thinkers which disagreed with the presumption that peaceful relations amongst states could only be achieved through the vigilant juggling with the instruments provided by the *balance of power* or the formation of alliances against states which have dared to threaten the existing international order by trying to monopolize power (Sutch, Elias, 2007: 66-72). In reference to the hierarchy in the international system, liberal thinkers put individuals in the centre of analysis, disregarding the state as the primary actor in IR, without ignoring though its important role in influencing and tracing the evolution of world politics (Steans: 31).

As noted before, the changes occurred in the international realm in the 60s' and 70s' due to the headway of various international governmental organizations, multinational companies and other non-state entities and the increase in the level of interdependence amongst them, had prompted the supplement of the liberal literature with a new thought, in the form of neoliberalism. This new theoretical approach challenging the realist and neorealist assumptions goes by several labels, being known in the specialty literature as *neoliberal institutionalism* or *liberal pluralism* (Kegley, Blanton: 42).

The neoliberal (liberal pluralist) worldview can be summarized in five basic hypotheses, namely: (Viotti, Kauppi: 129-130)

- the key role played by non-state and transnational actors alongside states in world politics

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<sup>14</sup> This can be a state, citizens from a state, a certain domain, the EU or even the entire international community.

<sup>15</sup> Such as government agencies, EU agencies, UN/NATO agencies, i.e. political elites.

- the pacifying or at least moderating effect of the increase in the political, economic, social, cultural, technological etc. interconnectedness among state and non-state actors, the international arena being portrayed as a scene with complex arrays of overlapping or cross-cutting coalitions and networks, resembling to a cobweb<sup>16</sup>
- the openness of the international agenda, ready to include and also deal with other issues beside the traditional security/military ones, such as economic or environmental issues in contrast with the anarchical world view promoted by neorealism, the favouring of a distinct approach examining how the factors analyzed at the state-society and individual levels influence outcome and international relations as a whole.
- the examination of conditions which could lead at least to collaboration at international level if not to the very much desirable peace, by highlighting the positive and mediating role of international organizations.

Conclusively, it can be emphasized that the neoliberal institutionalist paradigm offers to us a pluralist view of the world, endorsing the presence of other actors besides the state in the international environment, including in their field of analysis entities varying from IGOs, to NGOs, MNCs, transnational networks and individuals.

One of the groundbreaking works<sup>17</sup> in the neoliberal scholarship belongs to **Robert Keohane** and **Joseph Nye**, introducing the concept of *complex interdependence*, which has contributed to tearing down the state centric myth sustained by realists for decades. Nye and Keohane refuted the realist assumptions according to which states are isolated black boxes, bringing to the fore the existence of a high level of interdependence in the interactions involving both state and non-state entities (Haynes, 2017: 139). Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye's perception of presenting world politics as a system of *complex interdependence* had replaced the *atomistic billiard ball*<sup>18</sup> conception, which had been the predominant model for describing state interactions in the period aftermath the Cold War.

The complex interdependence model has three main assumptions: (Keohane, Nye, 2012: 20-21)

- Societies are being linked to each other though multiple channels incorporating: informal ties between governmental elites; among nongovernmental elites; and transnational organizations;
- The preoccupations of states are much more varied including multiple issues, apart from the classical military and power policy line; the line between the domestic and foreign issues becomes fuzzy;

<sup>16</sup> "The image which the cobweb model conveys is an intricate matrix with an enormous number of nodes (that is, points of intersection) which represent the way that the vast number of actors in international relations are connected to one another. From a liberal pluralist point of view, a multiplicity of actors interact in myriad ways. Liberals argue that these relationships are of different types and need not be characterized by conflict." See Steans, *op. cit.*, 38.

<sup>17</sup> *Power and Interdependence* 1977.

See also *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, 1971.

<sup>18</sup> According to this model the international system is portrayed as a billiard table where states are perceived as the billiard balls in permanent collision with each other. This denotes the impossibility of cooperation among states, which are seen as the most important and the only rational actors.

- The fading of the importance of military power, this being less used as a tool of constraint by one states towards the other, especially when we speak about the prevalence of the status of complex interdependence.

This *complex interdependence* model reveals a more genuine picture of the nature of interactions taking place in the international realm not just between states but also between non-state entities. These interactions are portrayed as an overlapping web of relations amongst actors across the entire range of policy preoccupations.<sup>19</sup> Accordingly, both states and non-states entities are trapped in this web and due to the overlying interests they are somehow impelled to collaborate and bargain with each other, in order to reach the most desirable outcome (Kolodziej, 2005: 154-155). Moreover, besides introducing non-states actors in the field of analysis by offering us a pluralist view of the interplay between actors, Keohane and Nye also pinpointed the existence of a *transgovernmental*<sup>20</sup> and *transnational* level of analysis, emphasizing the possibility of creating multiple channels, apart from the singular channel of state intercourse through which IR actors can achieve their goals. The transgovernmental level of analysis refers to the invalidation of the assumption according to which states operate coherently as units, while the transnational one signifies the denial of states being the only units in the international system (Kolodziej, 2005: 154-156).

As previously noted, the neoliberal paradigm is not limited to include in its agenda only preoccupations related to great power politics and military/security issues, but it's also interested in examining interstate and inter-institutional connections in terms of other concerns and different variations of power. Therefore, we find economic and environmental/ecological etc. issues at the heart of the neoliberal insitutionalist thought (Ibid,; 156).

As we could see the emergence and functioning of non-state actors is being successfully addressed by the neoliberal scholarship.

### Conclusions

As it has been revealed in the study, the Westphalian system imposed for centuries a *state-centric approach* to world politics, presenting the international milieu as a *state system* (or *system of states*), transforming the distinctive characteristic of the state, *sovereignty* into the main organizing principle of international affairs. With the appearance of other entities besides the state, their traditionally held primary actor position is being severely contested. In regards to the degree of influence held by non-state actors in world politics there is no unanimity among political scientists, as there are some fields where they are taking over the role of the states as leading regulatory bodies, performing certain functions which states aren't able, and there are also fields in which their role is secondary, complementing that of the states.

In conclusion, we assert that the *state centric model* does not fit any more to describe the current global politics, instead of which the *mixed actor model* is more appropriate, as without overlooking the importance of states and national governments, it argues that international politics are mould by a wide range of interests and multiple entities

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<sup>19</sup> Not only military or security ones.

<sup>20</sup> Governmental elites of states bargaining with their homologues.

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## THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA IN THE CONTEXT OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION'S STRATEGY OF MAINTAINING INFLUENCE

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**Abstract.** *This article analyses the strategies of Russian Federation to maintain its influence in the Republic of Moldova. Also, Russia's influence in the Republic of Moldova is examined through soft and hard power strategies.*

**Keywords:** *Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, strategy, soft power, hard power, conflict, influence, armed forces, embargo*

The issue of the Russian military presence has emerged from a political and legal point of view when the President of the Republic of Moldova has signed the Decree no. 234 of November 14, 1992. According to the document it was stated that the military units of the Soviet Army - weapons, ammunition, means of transport, military technique, military bases and other assets that were deployed on the territory of the republic, were declared property of the Republic of Moldova. On 18th of March 1992, the Decree No.73, which was issued by President M. Snegur, has stipulated that “in order to create the basis for the establishment of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova”, the ex-Soviet military units deployed in Moldova were transferred under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Moldova and transmitted to the Ministry of Defence of the Republic Moldova “with all the equipment, weapons, buildings and other wealth at the balance of military units”.

Ignoring the Decrees that were adopted by the President Mircea Snegur, on April 1, 1992 and the President of Russian Federation, Boris Eltin, it was issued the Decree no. 220 “On the Transition of Russian Military Units of the former URSS Armed Forces which were temporarily on the territory of the Republic of Moldova”. According to this Decree, the “14th Guard Army, Formations, Military Units and Ex-Soviet Armed Forces institutions, which were located on the territory of the Republic of Moldova and were not part of its armed forces, were transferred under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and under the supreme command of the Community Independent States (CIS) Unified Armed Forces. The transfer of troops under the jurisdiction of Russian Federation is explained by the following reasons: to maintain a stable leadership and to ensure the

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functioning of the troops; to not allow the involvement of troops in interethnic conflicts; to protect the military soldiers and their family members from the social point of view.

Although the Decree of April 1, 1992 was an illegal and unfriendly act on the part of Russia, the Moldovan leadership did not contest it. This is probably due to the fact that the Decree was issued in a very tense period of Moldovan-Russian relations, one of its purposes being to not allow the involvement of troops in the conflict. There are a number of reasons to consider President Eltin's Decree illegal. It is unanimously accepted that within the state there are operating certain internal laws and international law rules that the state has accepted by adhering to certain conventions, international treaties. President Yeltsin's Decree, however, despite this unanimously accepted rule, extended to a territory that was not part of the Russian Federation, to organizations and wealth that didn't belong to Russia. Thus, taking into consideration the statements mentioned above, the Decree of April 1, 1992 cannot be considered as legal. Also the military technique, armaments, ammunition and other assets of the ex-Soviet troops, which were deployed on the territory of the Republic of Moldova at the date of issuing this Decree, belonged to Moldova. Russia acquired a wealth that did not belong to it. (Gribincea, 1999:124-125)

Transnistrian conflict is only a geopolitical conflict. Talking about the geopolitical and geostrategic value of the conflict, Transnistria is a "Russian knife shot behind Ukraine". Transnistria was also a base of Russia for the Balkan "direction". Today, Russia enters the Balkans rather through Ukraine, or South Bessarabia which is no longer a part of the Republic of Moldova. The Transnistrian conflict is one of the basic problems of the Republic of Moldova. Even if, according to opinion polls, this dispute only occupies the eighth place in the hierarchy of the most pressing problems facing the Moldovan society, no political force, no government of the Republic of Moldova can afford to treat it as a matter of "the second place". This is also understood by Russian Federation, which, being involved in the initial stages of this conflict, have succeeded to maneuver very skilfully either the officials from Chisinau or from Tiraspol. Thus through the eastern zone of the country, Russian Federation managed to control the whole of Moldova. (Europa Războiul hibrid ...).

Still, the relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol have cooled. Igor Smirnov blamed the Moldovan leadership for failing to respect the provisions of the "Primakov Memorandum" in 1997. In reality, however, Transnistrian leaders, once received from the Moldovan Government certain advantages, customs, which allowed them to export goods without the consent of the central authorities, gave up their obligations under this Memorandum. On February 25, 2001, after the parliamentary elections, the Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) came to the leadership and Vladimir Voronin became the president. The electoral platform of the Party at that time contained several points related to the rapprochement with Russia, including: the entry into the Russia-Belarus Union, the granting of the Russian language as the second language, and other promises that attracted Russia's support. One of the priorities of the new head of state was the reunification of the Republic of Moldova by settling the Transnistrian conflict. (Transnistrie...)

Another risk factor that has been reported by the analysts refers to the elections in the region of the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia (UTAG) in the Republic of Moldova, where the separatist movement is becoming stronger. In this context, "NATO and the EU must maintain the economic sanctions imposed on Russia, otherwise there is a possibility that Moscow will try to destabilize the Republic of Moldova", stated the Prime Minister of Great Britain, D. Cameron. At the same hearings hold at the Washington

Congress, several US defence ministry officials have warned that the danger of destabilization is particularly high in East European countries that are not part of NATO, giving the example of the Republic of Moldova. Moldova could be the next victim of Kremlin. (Europa Războiul hybrid...) "The West has no reason to believe that the Russian President limits his plans for Eastern Europe to Ukraine, and Moldova is the next point on the Moscow list", several Pentagon and NATO officials warned. "We need to monitor the places where a strong media campaign supported by Russia is to be implemented. It is what happens in the Republic of Moldova", said the head European Command of the US Army, General Breedlove, in front of the American Congress. (Europa Războiul hybrid) "In Transnistria there are Russian troops that aims to prevent the Republic of Moldova from heading to the West", the NATO Commander reminded. (Ministerul Afacerilor Externe și Integrării Europene al Republicii Moldova) "Such a separatist outbreak can be stopped at any time in the Bugeac region, part of the historic Bessarabia, which now belongs to Ukraine", write the "Moscow Times". For Russia, the area between Bugeac and Odessa is of strategic importance, providing a corridor between separatists in Transnistria, the Crimea, and eventually Donetsk and Lugansk. (Sieg)

There are two risk areas in Moldova. The first is Gagauzia. Formed of ethnic enclaves, its elites cooperate closely with Russia and support the idea of independence. The second risk area is Transnistria, which is not controlled by Chisinau authorities and where Russia has a constant military presence. The activation of the frozen conflict in the area is the most serious threat to Moldova and the whole region. According to the information provided by Transnistria, in August 2014 there were officially 402 Russian military soldiers in Transnistria who are involved in peacekeeping mission. They actively cooperate with the leadership forces under Tiraspol - 492 employees. The Russian Foreign Ministry said in early August that Moscow interprets attempts to remove Russian peacekeeping forces from Transnistria as unfriendly actions. It is worth recalling that this statement was made without answering any challenge, but to publicly mark a firm position of Russian Federation in the area. Also, during this time, the military and political activation of the Transnistrian and Russian forces in the region could be noticed. Russia organized anti-terrorist exercises in Transnistria in March 2014, causing the US concern. It is noteworthy that, at the same time, Russian Federation also organized military exercises in eastern Ukraine, where unidentified Russian troops were involved. At the same time, fighters were recruited in Transnistria to participate in military actions on the territory of Ukraine. Taking into account the low standard of living in the officially unrecognized republic, "the recruitment process provided cheap combat forces (\$ 400-500 per month of military campaign - full combat allowance", as sources say). The recruited fighters were then taken to the east of Ukraine to join the mercenaries. (Transnistrie...)

Transnistria has helped the separatist republics in eastern Ukraine not only through combat forces but also through high-level specialists - former employees of the security bodies. In July, for example, V. Antiufeev, a former state security minister in Transnistria, was appointed as Deputy Prime Minister for State Security in the Separatist Republic of Donetsk, and was transferred there to Moscow's direct order as a result of local authorities' malfunctioning. Besides this, Russia used Transnistrian citizens as combatants during the provocative actions produced in Odessa in May 2014. In June it was announced the creation of the youth organization "Zvezda" (Star) in Transnistria, its main aim being to train young people for military service and their participation in military action. In fact, it is the creation of paramilitary units, which have proved their efficiency during the actions in eastern Ukraine. It is worth mentioning that this

organization is actively cooperating with the Institute of Strategic Research in Russia. Meanwhile, Transnistria continues to take steps that could be considered as preparatory for military actions. For example, in August 2014, the KGB's Special Forces in the separatist area carried out unplanned parachutist exercises previously. On August 20, 2014, a special training call was made for reserve officers for officials. Moreover, on September 5, Transnistrian President O. Sevciuk said that Transnistria has ample means of rejecting any military aggression, showing that major risks come from Moldova and Ukraine. (Afanas...) One remarkable thing is that today this statement has no basis. Ukraine itself fears a possible Russian invasion of the Odessa region from Transnistria, a threat that really exists. At the end of 2013 it was declared that the military service in Tiraspol, which belonged to the 14th Army, was maintained. Although the airport is not currently used, its runway can be used to provide military air transport. In addition, the region could also be used for the recruitment of combatants and the creation of paramilitary units for carrying a hybrid war in Ukraine. (Analiza ...)

Despite a fertile soil, Moldova however does not occupy a very good geographic position and doesn't have mineral resources. The post-independence reforms' process has been painful, and governments at that time lacked political support in their implementation. This fact made the Moldovan economy dependent on the Russian market. After tightening relations with Russia, the Republic of Moldova has begun searching to diversify its exports, and in this sense the European market has become an attractive one, especially since it is much less dependent on the political factor, unlike the Russian market. Soon the EU has become Chisinau's main economic partner, and even the Transnistrian region, which is traditionally close to Russia, exports more to European countries than to the East. Regarding the energy sector, however, Moldova is totally dependent on Russian gas, which is used by Russia as another tool for imposing its will in certain territories. Another problem for Moldova is that, due to corruption and certain government decisions, many foreign investors avoid investing in the Republic of Moldova, so the only investors are Russian companies, which can lead to a situation similar to that of Belarus. (Vrabie...)

In fact, Russia has been participating for a quarter century to write the destiny for the Republic of Moldova: Moldova, an independent country since 1991, has become virtually totally dependent on Russia's fuel supplies. Half of the state-owned company "Moldovagaz" belongs to the Russian giant "Gazprom". Russia is the main market for Moldovan agricultural goods. Besides this, hundreds of thousands of citizens from Moldova work in Russia. The transfers made by Moldovans working in Russia constitute much of the Gross Domestic Product. In the separatist republic of Transnistria, Russia placed about 2,000 soldiers and a large weaponry arsenal that is not withdrawn despite the 1999 Agreement. Every time the Republic of Moldova tried to get out of Russia's influence. Moscow is making pressures in general, stating the use of the gas supply issue and, increasingly, embargoes. In September 2013, when it became possible for a partnership with the EU, Russian Federation has interrupted Moldova's wine and divine imports, citing the reason for inadequate quality. The sanctions became tougher in the summer of 2014, as a result of the signing of the Association Agreement with the European Union. As a response, Russia does no longer import fruit from the Republic of Moldova. (Soltan..)

After the collapse of the USSR, the Republic of Moldova, as an independent and internationally recognized state, has legally inherited the whole system of transportation, transit and distribution of natural gas on its territory. In 1992, after the Transnistrian

conflict, when Chisinau lost control over the territory on the left bank of the Dniester River, part of this patrimony passed under the administrative control of the separatist authorities (politically and financially supported by Russian Federation) because the localization of the compressor node of the main pipelines is located in the city of Tiraspol.

At present, the gas industry in the Republic of Moldova is directed from the outside, being 100% dependent on a single export market - Russian Federation, namely a single supplier - S.A. "Gazprom". Moreover, the entire gas industry in the country is under the monopoly of Gazprom, thus the Republic of Moldova losing control of this branch of strategic importance. The issue of natural gas supply of domestic and industrial consumers in the Republic of Moldova has become a particularly sensitive issue, which directly affects Moldova's energy security. The situation in the Moldovan energy sector is a serious factor, because it is often used in various political or military scenarios. The tariff policy or blockage of gas supply systems creates many dangerous dependencies for the country's modernization course, taking into account the country's economic and financial situation and the reduced payment capacity for the imported energy resource.

So far, the price issue for imported gas from Russian Federation remains sensitive for the Republic of Moldova following the review of Russia's Gazprom's relations with the former Soviet republics. These changes have been felt by pro-Western countries. In this regard, we draw attention to the fact that Gazprom has not signed long-term contracts setting the fixed price for energy resources with many ex-Soviet states. (Gullo...)

Another factor, which has political repercussions, refers to the debt of the Republic of Moldova to the Russian Federation for the imported natural gas resources. At present, SA Moldovagaz has a debt of about US \$ 2.4 billion for imported gas from Russia. Of this amount, about 2 billion are the debts of Transnistria. Tiraspol's debt belongs to Tiraspoltransgaz SRL, which manages the gas network in Transnistria, but it is not part of Gazprom's basic purchase and sale contract concluded with Moldovagaz. As a consequence, Gazprom has the legal right to demand from us the payment of all debts, both those accumulated by Chisinau and those accumulated by Tiraspol. We emphasize that debts are the main channel for exerting economic and/or political pressure. Thus, the debts of Tiraspol accumulated over the last 18 years have become the debts of Chisinau, which does not control the territory.

Thus, the Tiraspol administration negotiates the conditions for transferring to Gazprom of its share in Moldovagaz. Tiraspol also wants to get the possibility to conclude direct gas contracts with Gazprom in the Transnistrian region. At the same time, a rescheduling of Tiraspol's debts to Gazprom is negotiated. We find it difficult to believe that such an arrangement would agree to Moscow, because Russian Federation does not need an independent Transnistria. Russian Federation needs a maneuverable Moldova through Transnistria. In this context, it explains the Duma's rejection vote on the independence of the "TMR" after the declaration of Kosovo's independence or after the Georgia war in the summer of 2008. In addition, the Russians agree that this growing debt in Tiraspol (approx. USD 2 billion) to be attributed to Moldova [3]. Until 2008, the separatist authorities paid for Russian gas rates 4-5 times lower than in the rest of Moldova. However, since 2008, Gazprom has been reorienting its energy policy, imposing on the Transnistrian region the same tariffs it applies to the Republic of Moldova. So, the debts of Tiraspol will grow in "geometric progression", which, at present, automatically become the debts of Chisinau. Under these circumstances, we can expect that Moscow will have all the levers in the Moldovan energy sector. We note that low tariffs in Transnistria have increased its debts for gas supplied by Gazprom. Now,

when tariffs have risen, the debts and energy dependence of the state as a whole are rising. Debts (approximately US \$ 2.4 billion), which are qualified as belonging to the Republic of Moldova, may have a negative impact on the state regarding the payment of debts for imported gas. (Baltag...)

In this context, we can say that Moscow is using Gazprom as an instrument of foreign policy, trying to capitalize on the gaps faced by the Republic of Moldova, especially the enormous vulnerabilities in the face of energy risks. Thus, the Republic of Moldova should cope with the country's full dependence on the import of energy resources through an integrated approach, consisting in the diversification of the energy mix and the diversification of the sources and routes of imported energy supply: energy conservation, construction of its own gas tanks, ensuring the connection with the gas system in Romania in the West-East direction, etc. In addition, the example of the Baltic States, which is largely dependent on a single supplier, is as conclusive as possible for Chisinau. However, a new approach is needed in the energy security strategy, which would increase the payment capacity for the imported energy resource. In this way, the Moldovan-Russian relations on the energy segment would take a new approach, based only on the assumed obligations. (Baltag...)

The monetary and financial destabilization of the Republic of Moldova through its banking system, taken over and controlled by Russian Federation, is also an extremely efficient process as a *hard power* strategy to dissipate the population's confidence in the European development vector. The mission of the fifth column in this concrete case was made by the Government of the Republic of Moldova, on the one hand, and the National Bank, on the other. The *leu* (national currency) depression, the explosion of prices, the deepening and widening of poverty, the growth of despair and mistrust in tomorrow, the stimulation of youth exodus and skilled labor - all are coordinated actions of a hybrid war against the Republic of Moldova. (Saharneanu...)

Another tool of Russia's *hard power* to achieve geopolitical interests through the economic weapon is to impose embargoes on various products. Since March 2006, Russia has introduced various sanctions against exporters in the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, and Belarus. If we are to analyse the causes of these sanctions, then each of them has one and the same reason - the disobedience or intent to leave the Russian Federation's sphere of influence [9]. Russian Federation is one of the economic and political partners of the Republic of Moldova. In the last 24 years, the Moldovan-Russian relations have had a sinusoidal evolution, marked by uncertainty and incoherence. Moscow's dissatisfaction reached its peak in 2005-2006. Moldovan agricultural products and wine products were boycotted and political negotiations in the "5 + 2" format were passed to the deadline until 2011. After the refusal to sign the "Kozak Memorandum", the relations between the Republic of Moldova and Russian Federation became tense, both countries accusing each other of failing to sign the document. Moreover, after 2004, in the context of Russia's direct support of the Tiraspol regime, Moldova's foreign policy course have changed, at least formally orienting itself towards the European Union. The culmination point of this period was consumed by the introduction of the new regime at the Moldovan-Ukrainian border in March 2006. This measure was interpreted in Tiraspol and Moscow as an economic blockade. In response, Russia imposed an embargo on the export of Moldovan wines, which seriously affected the Moldovan economy. This has made the President V. Voronin be more receptive to Russian proposals. (<http://www.referatmd.com/relatii-internationale/relatiile-republicii-moldova-cu-federatia-rusa>)

Both officially and media plan, Russia reacted, stating the action as an “economic blockade”, accusing Moldova of creating a “humanitarian disaster” in Transnistria. Thus, Russian Federation stopped the import of Moldovan wines, one of the most important branches of the Moldovan economy. In this context, the rhetoric of the Republic of Moldova towards Russian Federation has changed. Foreign Minister A. Stratan and President V. Voronin himself said that Transnistria is part of the country which is occupied by Russia. During this period, on 22 July 2005, the “Law on the autonomy of the districts of the left bank of the Dniester (Transnistria)” was adopted unanimously. Also along with Ukraine, it was managed to establish the EU Border Monitoring and Assistance Mission (EUBAM) at the Moldovan-Ukrainian border. However, having no external support and facing economic problems due to Russian sanctions, the Chisinau leadership was forced to be more receptive to the Russian proposals. Thus, in the so-called package proposed by the Republic of Moldova to Russia there can be mentioned several provisions: granting a broad autonomy to Transnistria and recognizing its properties, giving the special status for Russian language, ensuring permanent neutrality and accepting the Russian military presence in reunified Moldova. So far, however, neither President A. Medvedev nor President V. Putin has officially responded to this proposal. However Moscow's actions lead to the thought that these proposals are not enough. Russia wants more provisions, especially regarding neutrality, demanding the signing of an international document to approve this. In general, it seems that Russia would abandon status quo only if its change would make Russia's influence grow throughout Moldova (Cebotari, 2015: 142-158)

The ban on Russian imports of Moldovan wines started at the end of March 2006 and created a major diplomatic conflict between the Republic of Moldova on the one hand and Russia, on the other. As in the case of Russian-Georgian relations, the trade in wine at that time represented 80-90% of the total Moldovan exports. The situation regarding the quality of Moldovan winery products is repeated. Similar to the 2006, actions taken by Russian Federation with regard to the quality of Georgian wines are also repeated for Moldovan winemaking products, with domestic producers being blamed for falsifying them (Vrabie ...) The Russian consumer protection agency also argued that Moldovan wine sold in Moscow does not meet the health requirements, as it contains pesticides. However, the Moldovan authorities argued that there is evidence provided by the Russians themselves and other dozens of countries around the world importing Moldovan wines without the reported problems. The Republic of Moldova has argued that the ban is in fact an economic blackmail. The ban on wine imports has come at a time of worsening diplomatic relations between states amid the changes and the divergence of positions between Russia and the Republic of Moldova on the future of the Transnistrian region. A year earlier, the Russian Duma called for a ban on Moldovan wine imports, as the Republic of Moldova was considered to promote anti-Russian policies. (Embargoul rus...)

In this context, it can be mentioned the embargoes imposed in 2013 on the Republic of Moldova on wine and meat products as well as on fruit in 2014. By taking a close look at the conditions in which these sanctions are imposed by Russia, it is obvious that all these actions are of a political nature. As Moldova receives the EU support, Moldova has become the largest beneficiary of European financial support per capita. If we are to examine the geopolitical interests of the EU in the Republic of Moldova, then there are not convincing the statements that the EU is guided in Moldova by geopolitical reasoning. Obviously, in Eastern Europe a competition has emerged between the European integration and the Eurasian integration. Conflicts such as those in Ukraine or

Moldova affect European security, and instability in Eastern Europe can generate other threats to EU countries, such as organized crime. In this sense, European integration is, for the EU, also a mean of overcoming the chronic instabilities in Eastern Europe. In the case of the Republic of Moldova, European integration is not only a way to ensure the stability of the country by belonging to a larger union. Rather, here European integration is an external supplier for the internal reforms and conditions that Moldova needs to improve its development. For half a century of united Europe, the European Union has adopted the experience that the implementation of the fundamental values of the EU - human rights, rule of law, good governance, democracy and a market economy with equal opportunities - are the best guarantee to ensure prosperity and stability. (Sieg...) Thus, Russia has used all available instruments to obstruct the European pathway assumed by these states. Russia's pressures have increased with the dynamism of these countries' relations with the European Union and the conclusion of negotiations on the Association Agreement, implicitly the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area.

Analysing Russian Federation's strategies to maintain the Republic of Moldova in its sphere of influence, besides the *hard power strategy*, which includes the use of military and economic means, currently Russia is also turning to the soft strategy- *soft power*. Being one of the main sources of information for most of the CIS population, the Russian press is being used as one of the tools by which Russia is promoting its policy in the region. A proof of this refers the case of the Republic of Moldova, where over the last eight years there have been several changes in the attitude of the Russian media, which took place at the same time as changing the official Russian speech towards Moldova. In addition to traditional propaganda tools, indirect news such as films, concerts, sports and other non-political programs, but extremely popular outside the borders of the Russian Federation, are also being used through newsletters, analytical programs and talk shows. They are often more effective than those with a clear political character. The multitude of Russian channels denotes the presence of the soft power of the Russian Federation. Thus there can be mentioned: Pervyi Kanal, RTR, RTR Planeta, Rossia 1, Rossia 2, Rossia 24, Peaty Kanal, Kanal 3, Sarafan, Kinoliux, Ren, Nostalgia, STS, SET, TNT Bravo, TV 1000, TV 1000 Action, TV 1000 Russkoe Kino, Detskoe Kino, TV Tentr, Karusel, MIR, MUZ TV, Nashe Kino, Domashnii, Iliuzion +, Draiv, Ohotnik i rybalov, Mnogo TV, Domashnie jivotnye, RBK TV, 24 Tehno, Usadiba, NTV + Nashe novoe cinema, NTV + Sport, NTV + Kino Club, Ruskyi ekstrim, Avto plius, India, Boets, Mati i ditea, Kuhnea, Komedia, Detski Klub, Detski, Retro, Dom kino, Russkaia noci etc. Moreover, Euronews, History, Animal Planet, National Geographic and other general culture channels are in Russian language. At the same time among Romanian televisions it can mentioned only to TVR mixed and to Pro TV. On Romanian televisions it is impossible to watch football, public debates as well as information, reports about the handcuffing and conviction of the great corrupts. This is happening at SUN TV, the largest service distributor in Chisinau. Of the Ukrainian channels, there is only one TV station- Inter. (Propaganda...)

Thus, according to the results of the latest public opinion surveys, the Moldovan society is dependent on television, which is the main source of information, overcoming other media such as written press, radio or the Internet. According to the same polls, television is the main source of information for about 90 percent of the population. In this context, the Russian television station "Perviy Kanal" is about 50 percent the most credible post-TV. In general Russian TV programs are the most watched, exceeding the Romanian and Moldovan local ones. (NATO: Rusia pregătește...) This influence of the Russian press (in the first place of the televisions) has made, over the years, the mental

map of the Moldovans, Russia becoming one of Moldova's closest neighbours, excluding the natural neighbour - Ukraine, although the geographical distance to the Russian border is more than 500 km. Also, due to this influence, Moldovans know much better about the situation in Russian Federation than in the Republic of Moldova, and for many of them, the news program "Vremea" from Pervyi Canal, which is broadcasted in Chisinau at 08.00 p.m. (local time), represents the "window" through which citizens understand and see what is happening in the world. On the other hand, "Messenger" from the Public Television Station, which is broadcasted at 09.00 p.m., is a kind of local news informing about the life of the country. The result can be seen again in the Barometer of Public Opinion, which says that about 60 percent of the population sees Russia as a strategic partner of the Republic of Moldova. Also, according to the document, it is mentioned that Russia must be the partner to help us integrate into the European Union. Another paradox that can be noticed refers to the fact that among Moldovans, Vladimir Putin has the biggest credibility of the political leaders in the world. He is followed by Dmitry Medvedev and only then at a great distance from them comes Vladimir Voronin, the President of the Republic of Moldova (2001-2009), who, in fact, held the title of the most credible politician in Moldova. Heads of states and governments in Western states occupy a steady place in Moldovan preferences. On the left side of the Dniester - in Transnistria, the situation is even more interesting, the popularity and influence of the Russian media is even higher than on the right bank. This is largely due to the fact that the population there is Russian, despite the ethnic component (30% - of the Moldovans). Also the Tiraspol regime has always been supported by Russia, including through the press. (NATO: Rusia pregătește)

Russia launched an unprecedented propaganda offensive during the Cold War against the West by expanding the role of Russian news television, and by launching a radio and web news service, Sputnik, which is issued not only in CIS space, but also around the world. Priority targets are the post-Soviet space and the former Warsaw Treaty states. (Propaganda...)

Today, the Republic of Moldova is targeting several forms of attack by Russian Federation. The most important is the attack on the southern territory, given in 1994 to the Gagauz minority, forcing the international law to recognize and accept the development of the Gagauz language and culture. Russia has taken the strategic initiative and is using autonomy as part of the hybrid war in this region in south-eastern Europe. (Saharneau...) There have been multiple attempts of Russian Federation in the last two years to create a pro-Russian coalition in Moldova. Russia hoped that Moldova would have modest results in the European integration process. All this should have brought the Communists to power, in the view of the Russian Federation administration.

The Russian Orthodox Church is considered to be one of the most effective tools for the propagation of Russian interests in the spaces that Moscow regards as influential areas. The Republic of Moldova is part of this group of countries because the majority of the population is Christian-Orthodox. Also, the Church is the institution with the highest degree of trust from the Moldovans. Although officially in the Republic of Moldova, the Church is separate from the state, it plays an important role in everyday life. Usually, churches are influential in the villages and its visions or opinions matters. The use of the Church for political purposes has been and continues to be a thing often used by politicians in Chisinau. This was acknowledged by the Communist Party. Although got the leadership in 2001 on a platform where no religious values were found, and PCRM leader Voronin in the documents submitted to the Central Electoral Commission mentioned that he was atheist, shortly PCRM began to pay special attention to the Church.

In this context under the patronage of President V. Voronin, during his mandate several churches and monasteries were restored, including monuments such as Capriana Monastery, Curchi Monastery, actions that attracted sympathy from citizens, especially from the people of the third age, which is, in fact, the main electorate of this party. At the same time, the PCRM pays special attention to the celebration of the religious holidays. In the dispute between the Moldovan Metropolitan Church, which is subordinated to the Patriarchate of Moscow and the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, which is subordinated to the Romanian Patriarchate, the first is supported, thus for a long time not recognizing the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia. However the legislation stipulates that every person has the right to choose his religious cult on the territory of the Republic of Moldova. This was only the European Court of Human Rights has obliged the Republic of Moldova to legislate its status. The Moldovan Metropolitan Church, which is subordinated to Moscow Patriarchate, also supports the PCRM, recording cases when during the electoral campaigns, the priests stirred up encouraging people to vote for this party and, as experts argue, “this has an important impact; the Moldovan society, especially the rural one, most often believe in what spiritual leaders say”. (Vrabie...)

Thus, Russian Federation has demonstrated and continues to demonstrate the interests of maintaining the Republic of Moldova in its sphere of influence. Russia's *hard* and *Soft power*, as hybrid war strategies, focuses on a combination of Moscow means on Chisinau, which includes both the use of force by maintaining Transnistrian separatism in the eastern part of the Republic of Moldova by using economic means such as blackmail energy; the embargoes imposed on domestic products, especially on wine and agrarian products, on fruits and vegetables, as well as the defence of the interests of ethnic Russians through the means of communication. All of this are more like geopolitical and geostrategic strategies, with a geopolitical aspect to Chisinau's decision to approach the EU. Also, the threat of separatism was used with a double connotation - the European integration will lead to the loss of the Transnistrian region by the Republic of Moldova and will contribute to the resumption of the Gagauz separatism by carrying out the anti-European referendum held in 2014 in Gagauz Autonomous Territorial Unit. (Cebotari, 2015:1-5). In the context of an escalation and even a possible proliferation of hybrid conflicts such as the one in eastern Ukraine, but not only, a reconsideration of policies, strategies, programs and capabilities to maintain social order and prevent crime is more than necessary, especially for the Republic of Moldova.

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# EUROPEAN UNION AND DEMOCRATIC CONDITIONALITY MECHANISM, THE IMPACTS ON WESTERN BALKAN COUNTRIES

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**Abstract.** *The collapse of political regimes in the former communist bloc countries was accompanied by challenges and efforts to overcome the major problems with which these countries have faced. In this new geopolitical situation the former communist countries have faced many problems simultaneously. It is worth mentioning that among the urgent problems that have had former communist countries were major economic difficulties and the orientation toward a new political course. Both of these elements cannot be realized without the help and support of international institutions, where the European Union has played a major role. Researches submit that is a clear causal relationship in the use of conditionality by the EU to provide political or institutional results to the countries that want to integrate. Democratic conditionality has to do with the acceptance of new members only after they have met all the requirements set by the EU. EU enlargement with new member states from former communist bloc countries testifies the EU positive role in the incentives for the transition of former communist countries to democracy and market economy. The situation changes in the journey that Western Balkan countries have made towards democracy. This paper will analyse the effects of democratic conditionality mechanism in the strengthening of democratic regimes in the Balkans. Did this mechanism of democracy conditionality been effective in the institutionalizing democracy in the Balkans countries, if not, what were the reasons that this mechanism has not functioned in this region. The answer to these questions will be the core of this paper.*

**Keywords:** *Conditionality mechanism, Democracy, Western Balkan, Transition.*

## Introduction

The importance of national borders has been greatly reduced in an era characterized by international joint ventures, mergers, licensing agreements, foreign capital investment, and offshore production<sup>1</sup>.

Intercultural communication is defined as a symbolic exchange process whereby individuals from two or more different cultural systems negotiate shared meanings in an interactive situation. The EU concept of “unity in diversity”, in terms of “intercultural dialogue” itself, evokes ideas of peace and solidarity, which are among the founding values of the EU<sup>2</sup>. The European Union has played a major role among international

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<sup>1</sup> Intercultural communication and global integration Némethová, Ildikó online:

<http://kgk.sze.hu/images/dokumentumok/kautzkiadvany2013/kultura/nemethova.pdf>

<sup>2</sup> Religion and intercultural dialogue in the EU: a counter-radicalisation strategy or reinventing integration? Dr Sara Silvestri, pp.11 online: [www.sps.ed.ac.uk/\\_data/.../SHEFFIELD\\_Silvestri\\_DRAFT.doc](http://www.sps.ed.ac.uk/_data/.../SHEFFIELD_Silvestri_DRAFT.doc)

actors interested in the process of democratization in the former communist countries<sup>3</sup>. The European Union has been a powerful engine and a model provider for emerging countries from dictatorial regimes. Increasing influence of the EU in the democratization process in the former communist countries has come as a mutual report of these aspiring countries to fulfil the conditions of accession to the European Union and the obligation expressed by the EU assistance and the possible admission case of compliance. The Researches submit that there is a clear causal relationship to the use of conditionality by the EU to provide political and institutional results to the countries which aim to integrate. Conditionality is one of the EU's most powerful instruments for dealing with the candidate and potential candidate countries<sup>4</sup>. Democratic conditionality means the acceptance of new members only after they have met all the requirements set by the EU. Based on the model of conditionality, the political integration in the European Union means that the EU approach, computes to the democratization. Studies about the conditionality of the European Union begin from a basic premise which states that: "Conditionality works because there is an asymmetry of power which enables the Commission to impose and adaptation to the *acquis*-n, as a precondition for entering Central and Eastern European countries in the European Union<sup>5</sup>". Over two decades of political and economic transforming of ex - Communist bloc countries, naturally the EU has combined the desire, the will, the effort and commitment of these countries in the implementation of integration and democratization through the mechanism of Conditionality Democratic. According to Grabbe (2002) conditionality mechanism works as "The asymmetry of power between the aspirant countries and the Union gives the EU more ways binding influence in drafting internal policies of the applicant countries than in the EU itself, as candidate countries face additional conditions that the current members do not perform<sup>6</sup>". Grabbe specify "mechanisms" the processes that have affected institutional and political transformation in Central and Eastern European countries. He divides into five categories the Mechanism of democratic conditionality:

1. Providing models (templates) legislative and institutional,
2. Financial aid and technical assistance,
3. Assessment and monitoring,
4. Consultation and twinning
5. Access to negotiations and further stages in the accession process<sup>7</sup>

<sup>3</sup> ELBASANI, Arolda, "Albania in Transition: Manipulation or Appropriation of International Norms?", Southeast European Politics Vol. V, No. 1, June 2004, p.24.

<sup>4</sup> ZUOKUI, Liu, "EU's Conditionality and the Western Balkans' Accession Roads European Perspectives", Journal on European Perspectives of the Western Balkans Vol. 2, No. 1, p.82, April 2010, online: <http://www.cep.si/dokumenti/81-100.pdf>. accessed on 29.10.2015.

<sup>5</sup> HUGHES, James ...ect, "Conditionality and Compliance in the EU's Eastward Enlargement: Regional Policy and the Reform of Sub-national Government", JCMS 2004, Volume 42. No 3. p.523.

<sup>6</sup> GRABBE, Heather, "Europeanisation Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Process" The Politics of Europeanisation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2002 (Chapter to appear in K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli (eds.) pp.2.

<sup>7</sup> GRABBE, Heather, "Europeanisation Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Process" The Politics of Europeanisation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2002 (Chapter to appear in K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli (eds.) pp.9

The perceptions of asymmetric power between the EU and candidate countries is related to the fact that the interaction and power relations between them are based on the conditions for membership or otherwise known as conditionality expansion. The studies on Conditioning EU, are concentrated in the context of Central and Eastern Europe countries that are most advanced in the development of transition to democracy. While the positive role of EU incentives for the transition to democracy and a market economy has been widely recognized in the case of the aforementioned countries, the instrument of the EU conditionality has not proven effective in the case of Western Balkan countries<sup>8</sup>. Integration is a fundamentally different concept from adaptation, which has long been a central organizing principle in the field of intercultural communication<sup>9</sup> and in Western Balkan countries the intercultural communication between countries of the same region has been a hard step.

### **European Union and the Enlargement Policy**

The enlargement policy of the EU toward East countries is a subject that faces wide discussion. Questions about enlargement are related as of the EU possibility to absorb new members as well as their adapting possibility to the EU itself, we will not stop on analysis in favour or against the enlargement arguments but only in the strategy followed by EU for the rapprochement of these countries toward it. The basis for this engagement are found in the Maastricht Treaty in which is noted that: “*Any European country can apply to become a member of the Union ...*”<sup>10</sup> articulation of geographical criteria for membership option gave hope to the countries of Central and East Europe. Until 1993 year, the Union does not have a specific strategy for the impact that would have the EU to the Central and Eastern Europe countries. An important political development was undertaken by the Union during the Copenhagen summit in June 1993, where the European Council took the historic decision to open the EU to the Central and Eastern Europe countries by defining the conditions of admission to these countries. The conditions that are widely recognized by term “Copenhagen criteria”<sup>11</sup> set out the criteria that must meet an EU candidate country.

Copenhagen political criteria states that the candidate country must have stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. Economic criteria relates to the existence of a functioning market economy and capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.

The third criteria relates to the adaptation of the *acquis communautaire*, which includes the obligations deriving from the status including and loyalty to the tendency for to political, economic and monetary unions of the member country.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>8</sup> HOFFMANN, Judith, Integrating Albania: the Role of the European Union in the Democratization Process. Albanian Journal of Politics 2005 p.55.

<sup>9</sup> Intercultural communication and global integration Némethová, Ildikó online: <http://kgk.sze.hu/images/dokumentumok/kautzkiadvany2013/kultura/nemethova.pdf>

<sup>10</sup> Article 49 of Maastricht treaty is known as a treaty of foundation of EU.

<sup>11</sup> *Bashkimi European*, QNK “Arbnori” Tiranë, 2010 pp.21.

<sup>12</sup> MEKSI, Ermelinda, PASHA, Auron, “*Kur mbaron Tranzicioni? Teoria kundrejt realitetit në Shqipëri*” MEKSI, Ermelinda, PASHA, Auron, “When does the transition end? Theory versus reality in Albania” p. 5. [http://www.bankofalbania.org/web/pub/c\\_25\\_Fjalimi\\_Meksit\\_Pashes\\_790\\_1.pdf](http://www.bankofalbania.org/web/pub/c_25_Fjalimi_Meksit_Pashes_790_1.pdf). (downloaded on:10.11.2015).

The discussion about the achievements of the former communist countries Europeanization is not submitted only in the EU incentives role to the democracy promotion and the market economy but also to the elements that inhibit or encourage countries to achieve results in the democratization process. Through the mechanism of "democratic conditionality" The European Union has provided a standard association model for each candidate. The researchers highlight the difference between the two main categories of "democratic conditionality" mechanism; formal and informal conditionality. THE formal conditioning means preconditions above mentioned in Copenhagen criteria and the legal framework of the *acquis*, while the informal conditionality includes operating pressures and recommendations from the stakeholders within the Commission to achieve specific results in interaction with political actors of the countries of Central and East Europe regarding the enlargement possibility<sup>13</sup>, it does not mean that both types of conditioning are clear and always distinguished between them because they often act in teamwork.

The reasons for success in the CEE countries and failure in the Western Balkans are associated primarily with these countries achievements in the field of democratization. The integration process toward the European Union is deeply connected with the political, economic social system democratization. In modern constitutional democracies, the separation and balance of powers is based feature where unquestionably and also the establishment of the specific restrictions over the states powers against the individual are the essential elements of democracy<sup>14</sup>. The existence of many powers within the state, which operate as independent from each other is vital for the development of democratic institutions and strengthening of the state. The basic elements of a democratic state can be formulated in various ways, but it is the responsibility of those who have the political power that the formulations should realize in function of the country's democratization. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro are committed to the concept of economic, social and political sustainable stability that will be guaranteed through connections and closer relations with Europe.

In this context, the asymmetrical power and the EU influence in the fulfilling the political conditions becomes possible when *national policy is guided by democratic governance practices*.

If we referee to Freedom House results they do not identify any states in the region as "consolidated democracies". Instead, the study groups Serbia, FYR Macedonia, and Montenegro in the category of "semi-consolidated democracies". The same report then classifies Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina as "transitional governments" or "hybrid regimes", and labels Kosovo a "semi-consolidated authoritarian regime".

Also the results of the *Bertelsmann Transformation Index* for 2014 indicate that only Croatia and Serbia qualify as democracies, whereas all other Balkan states may be collectively described as "defective democracies": they hold relatively free elections but fall short of adequately ensuring political and civil rights or the effective separation of state powers. Between 2011 and early 2013, Serbia has made some progress in achieving its goals of moving closer to EU membership, bolstering a free market economy and strengthening the rule of law<sup>15</sup> (see tab.1.).

<sup>13</sup> HUGHES, James ... ect, "Conditionality and Compliance in the EU's Eastward Enlargement: Regional Policy and the Reform of Sub-national Government", JCMS 2004, Volume 42, No 3, pp. 526.

<sup>14</sup> *Kushtetuta dhe material shpjeguese*, dhjetor 1998, Tiranë, QAKAPP pp. 1-9.

<sup>15</sup> Bertelsmann Index 2014, online: <http://www.bti-project.org/reports/country-reports/ecse/srb/index.nc#chap4>. downloaded (29.10.2015.).

Western Balkan Countries	BTI index 2014			
	Democracy Status	Market Economy status	Status Index	Trend democracy
Albania	6,7	6,4	6,6	falling
Serbia	8	7,1	7,5	the same
Bosnia and Herzegovina	6,4	6,4	6,4	the same
Macedonia	7,2	7,1	7,2	the same
Montenegro	7,9	7,1	7,5	the same
Kosovo	6,6	5,9	6,2	the same

See: Bertelsmann Index 2014, online: <http://www.bti-project.org/reports/country-reports/ecse/srb/index.nc#chap4>. downloaded (29.10.2015.).

In the countries with fragile democracy such as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo, the implementation of democratic norms have often controversy because they are in conflict with the interests of governing political leaders of every political force.

The empirical data and specifically for the Western Balkan countries, emphasize that the informal conditionality seems to play a particularly important role in the fulfilling failure of the Copenhagen political criteria. If we refer to Albania or Macedonia, the informal conditionality is related to the willingness that present or not presents the political class in the functioning of the formal acts undertaken as a result of the commitment to the EU membership. The lack of results in this regard has highlighted the *factors that depend on the candidate countries themselves*.

### **Western Balkans and the European agenda**

The region of Balkans has often fouled West with its problems. After 1990' as a result of a violent disintegration of ex-Yugoslavia, the Balkans states have been involved in several wars and continual conflicts. Despite many problems with the borders and ethnic minorities, the Balkans countries are definitively the poorest and the most undeveloped countries in Europe. The war in Kosovo accompanied by the intervention of international community, despite the conflict resolved, and projected a real new perspective for the region.

The Western Balkans is a neologism coined to describe the countries of "ex-Yugoslavia (minus Slovenia) and Albania". Countries of the Western Balkans are Croatia (now an EU member), Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania.

In the first decade after '90, the political agenda for this region have been inefficient. The first important initiative of EU and international community for the Western Balkans has been Stability Pact, approved in 1999. The strategic objective of SP was the full possible integration of these countries in the EU political and economic course.<sup>16</sup> In this framework the WB integration received a new impetus in the political agenda of EU in the Zagreb Summit, held in Feira in 2000<sup>17</sup>. In this Summit, the EU countries heads has claimed their will and support for "the full integration of WB in the political and economic European community through SAP (The Stabilization and Association Process), political dialogue, trade liberalization and cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs. All the countries concerned are potential candidates for EU

<sup>16</sup> ZAJMI, Iva, "E drejta Europiane", Tiranë 2010, pp.216-7.

<sup>17</sup> Enlargement Strategy, 2005 European Commission, Brussels, 11.09.2005. pp.6.

membership.<sup>18</sup>” The so called Plan *The Stabilization and Association Process* (SAP), defines the specific conditions that Albania and the other Balkans countries have to fulfil to be part of EU. This process was connected with the conditionality model that EU offered to Albania and to whole the region for the possibility of democratization following the preconditions for EU membership. The EU policy continued further by deepening the Balkans involvement in Thessaloniki summit, on June 2003, strengthening the process of Stabilization and Association with new tools supporting the reforms and efforts of these countries for European integration.<sup>19</sup>

Enlargement to the Balkans will remain one of the EU-s most important projects for generations to come. The EU’s enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans Countries follows the same pattern as the CEE experience, but also introduces some new aspects to the process of political conditionality. These reflect internal EU anxieties and balances, as well as regional and country-specific contexts.

Despite the support with same mechanisms from EU, Western Balkans countries are at various stages of development in rapport with integration process toward EU. Integration processes fluctuations are related with the progress made by these countries in many fields like political, economic and legislative one. One of the most positive experiences in the region is Croatia, now since 2013 the new member state of EU. Croatia today is significantly different from the country that 22 years ago was in a war for its independence. The European perspective gave to Croatian people and all the Western Balkans countries the necessary impetus to change and improve their future.

The rate of integration process of WB countries in the European Union has had its ups and downs. If in the mid 90’s, Albania and Croatia were in similar phases of their integration to EU, as a result of political and economic developments, Albania did not reached the Croatia rhythm. The political elite and Croatian society has exploited better the financial and technical assistance. Croatia followed all the directions given by EU to meet the required standards for a possible acceptance. It is because of its historical heritage too. While that Croats are enjoying the success of their achievements Albania and Albanians “find themselves together with Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina not completely out of game, but still very distant according European integration perspective”.<sup>20</sup>”

The performance of Albania, Serbia, FYROM, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, according the fulfilment of integration agenda by the political class of these countries, has not gone in a line with citizen aspiration. The continuing failures have reinforced their conviction that only EU can stimulate the integration process for these countries.

The reason for connecting the success of political forces in these countries with Europeanization agenda depends on the perception that Balkan people have about integration and EU, itself.

European perspective set out for the Western Balkans, this region is the closest to the European Union in terms of not only geography, but of values and aspirations. The citizens in the region want better socio-economic conditions at home, a strengthened rule

<sup>18</sup> Cited: Albania Progress Report, the EC, 2005, pp.3.

<sup>19</sup> Albania Progress Report, the EC, 2005, pp.3.

<sup>20</sup> Austin, Robert C., “Fillime të para dhe të dyta: Shqipëria pas Luftës së Parë Botërore dhe komunizmit”, “Shqipëria në dhjetë vitet e ardhshme –vështrim drejt së ardhmes” botim i AIIS, Tiranë 2012 p. 79.

of law and accountability, improved connections inside their countries as well as to their neighbours and to the whole EU<sup>21</sup>.

The EU is a moving target due to its continuous integration process, and is setting stronger conditions both through the accession mechanisms and through its action to contribute to peace and state-building in the region. EU conditionality in the Balkans is therefore more demanding than ever before; multi-dimensional as it simultaneously targets reconciliation, reconstruction and reform; regional, sub-regional and country-specific; driven by economic, political, social and security considerations; and positive as well as negative.

As Klaus-Dieter Borçard pointed out “The real importance of EU recommendations and its opinions is political and moral one.”<sup>22</sup>

The influence of these recommendations and opinions become fruitful when they are taken in consideration by political forces and do not clash with their political interests. In these conditions, it is necessary further coercive measures, especially addressed to political factors, so that political strategy and the EU contribute gives long term results in the Western Balkans countries.

### Conclusions

The mechanism of democratic conditionality used by the European Union to the aspirant countries did not give the same results and expectations in Balkan region. The EU’s enlargement policy towards the Western Balkans Countries follows the same pattern as the CEE experience, but also introduces some new aspects to the process of political conditionality. These reflect internal EU anxieties and balances, as well as regional and country-specific contexts. The lack of results becomes more evident in the case of Western Balkan countries. If Croatia today is a member of the EU, countries like Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, etc., still have more work to do to be part of the Union. This is a result of historical consequence, political and economic factors which for each Balkan country has a unique start in the road of integration process. Internal factors such as: the rule of law, building of the institutions and the establishment of a functional free market economy are strongly related by political stability and social development of society. These internal factors are deeply related with the country progress toward democracy.

Despite the integration process contains the same steps; these internal factors determine the success for WB countries. The role of the political class in the Balkans countries is highly conspicuous due to the lack of consolidation institutions, rule of law and the lack of an active civil society. The EU has increasingly focused on problems relating to the rule of law and the strength of the judiciary in the region, mainly in response to fears that organized crime and corruption-related problems could spill into the rest of Europe. But a democracy is much more than that.

Still one of the European Union most important projects for generations to come is the enlargement process toward Western Balkans countries. Consolidating democracy is the best short and long-term approach to simultaneously create favourable conditions for

<sup>21</sup> Mogherini, Federica etc, Towards a common future for Western Balkans and the EU *source online*: <http://www.delme.ec.europa.eu/code/navigate.php?Id=3113>. downloaded (4/11/2015).

<sup>22</sup> BORÇARD, Klaus-Dieter, “ABC – ja e të Drejtës të Bashkimit Evropian”, *Bashkimi Evropian*, 2010, p. 96. *online*: [http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/the\\_former\\_yugoslav\\_republic\\_of\\_macedonia/documents/more\\_info/publications/abc\\_of\\_european\\_law\\_sq.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/the_former_yugoslav_republic_of_macedonia/documents/more_info/publications/abc_of_european_law_sq.pdf). downloaded (22/10/2015).

all western Balkan countries. The EU needs to focus both on formal and substantive criteria in assessing and pushing for democracy in the Western Balkans.

The accession process is important to move forward and ensuring that aspiring members will be able to take on the principles and obligations of EU membership, in this context, the results of conditionality mechanism will be more effective for EU membership countries.

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# RETHINKING THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY. EASTERN PARTNERSHIP<sup>1</sup>

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**Abstract.** *The new geopolitical realities, in conjunction with the redeployment of European policy and program directions in the aftermath of the crisis, with the new foreign policy priorities and neighborhood borders of the EU, have led to the need to rethink the European Neighborhood Policy. Reforming this policy for the Eastern European Space through the implementation of the Eastern Partnership did not reach its original goal. The current paper aims to analyze the European Neighborhood Policy in terms of its evolution, its mechanisms and instruments, but also by addressing the new challenges that European integration has in Eastern Europe. Beyond the general and contextual introductory character, the emphasis is on the analysis of the Eastern Partnership, its progress, its stages and, in particular, its current challenges. The European Neighborhood Policy has evolved much since its launch in the early 2000s. The European Union has been obliged to rethink this policy due to the new geopolitical challenges, but also to the need for internal reformation, including at the institutional level. Thereby, European policies and programs for cooperation at European external borders have diversified and adapted to the new needs. The rethinking of the ENP has led to the implementation of Eastern Partnership in Eastern Europe, a partnership that initially wanted to be a solid, open-ended opportunity to facilitate the European integration of the six partner countries. Meanwhile, the geopolitical context has changed a lot. Russia has strengthened regional power, and the European presence has been considered a competitive situation where former Soviet states that have begun a special relationship with the EU have often been forced to choose between the two sides.*

**Keywords:** *European Union, Neighborhood, Eastern Partnership, cross-border cooperation*

## **Introduction**

The new geopolitical realities, in conjunction with the redeployment of European policy and program directions in the aftermath of the crisis, with the new foreign policy

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priorities and neighborhood borders of the EU, have led to the need to rethink the European Neighborhood Policy. Reforming this policy for the Eastern European Space through the implementation of the Eastern Partnership did not reach its original goal. Until now, the states included in this partnership have evolved differently and in a sinuous manner within the European integration process. Some states have made significant progress while others have experienced a regression in the face of geopolitical reorientation towards the EU.

The current paper aims to analyze the European Neighborhood Policy in terms of its evolution, its mechanisms and instruments, but also by addressing the new challenges that European integration has in Eastern Europe. Beyond the general and contextual introductory character, the emphasis is on the analysis of the Eastern Partnership, its progress, its stages and, in particular, its current challenges. In this respect, we aim to bring to our attention those processes and mechanisms of rethinking, reorienting the European programs and instruments specific to the new format of the Eastern Partnership.

### **1. The European Neighbourhood Policy: General Characteristics and Context**

*The European Neighbourhood Policy* (ENP) represents the support and starting point of the perspective of the European Union regarding its external relationships with the states based in its proximity. Its results have been noted by the European Commission as positive even from the first years since it has been launched in 2003<sup>2</sup>. The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union signal the positive effect later on. Therefore, “ENP has strengthened the relationships with partner countries and has brought concrete benefits both to the Union, and its partners, including the launch of regional initiatives and support given to democratization in the European proximity”<sup>3</sup>. The concept of external frontier of the European Union begins to take new forms of expression under the influence of the European Neighbourhood Policy. On the one hand, we notice more flexibility of the contracts between the two parts of the frontier. Such a trend is amplified through the cross-border cooperation mechanism, through the euro regions, and the European instruments implemented successfully at the external frontier. On the other hand, the actions of the European Union by which it tries to implement policies of regional cohesion at its current borders are, according to some analysts, proof that the European Union is consolidating its current external frontiers, taking therefore into account, at least for a moment, the option of slowing the process of expansion toward East, without having the gates closed per se<sup>4</sup>. Seen in a regional context, the ENP appears

<sup>2</sup> See *Communication de la Commission. Une politique européenne de voisinage vigoureuse*, Brussels, 05/1272007, COM (2007) 744 final.

<sup>3</sup> EUR-Lex, Access to European Union law, *Regulamentul (UE) NO 232/2014 AL Parlamentului European și al Consiliului din 11 martie 2014 de instituire a unui instrument european de vecinătate*, Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene, L 77/27, 15.03.2014, [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/RO/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L\\_.2014.077.01.0027.01.RO.N](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/RO/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2014.077.01.0027.01.RO.N), accessed 02.03.2017.

<sup>4</sup> By making the connection with the “orange revolution” from Ukraine, the European Commissioner for foreign relations and European neighbourhood policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner stated on December 1, 2004 that „*la question de l’Ukraine dans l’UE n’est pas à l’ordre du jour. Mais il est clair que nous ne fermons aucune porte*”. See Régis Matuszewicz, *Vers la fin de l’Élargissement?*, in Laurent Beurdeley, Renaud de La Brosse, Fabienne Maron (coord.), *L’Union Européenne et ses espaces de proximité. Entre stratégie inclusive et partenariats removes: quell avenir pour le nouveau voisinage de l’Union?*, Brussels, Bruylant, 2007, p. 109.

on the background of the EU expanding toward the East, corroborated with Russia's strategy vis-à-vis the Eastern Europe.

In doctrine, good neighbourliness is defined as a "state of affairs", an "inevitability" (the neighbors are given by history and geography), exists since the people and states have appeared and generate in frontiers two reactions: maintaining the state of security by solving conflicts and maintaining states of cooperation between neighboring countries (Apud Brie, 2009: 83). Good neighbourliness is strongly tied to the concept of "frontier" even if, in time, the role of the frontier has changed from barrier, becoming little by little a meeting point between different realities that unveil the possibility of complementarity beyond the rigid conceptions on national sovereignty. In the cross-border space of the good neighbouring, a particular role is played by the "small diplomacy", under the influence of the official framework of relations, which is manifested through this. The positive activity in the space of "small diplomacy" creates security and trust, good neighbouring being expressed as a principle. The border regime, according the given definition in specialized literature (Niciu, 1999: 246), is established by each state through its legislation, in compliance with the agreements made with the neighbours. The states seek to ensure they are good neighbors, avoid border conflicts, without losing sight of the attribute of sovereignty of defending the borders.

The removing of the borders and avoiding the appearance of a new line of separation between the extended Europe and its new neighbors is the declared purpose of ENP since its launch (Apud Pop, Pascariu, Anglițoiu, Purcăruș, 8). The areas of cooperation are various: from politics to economy, from culture to security launch (Apud Pop, Pascariu, Anglițoiu, Purcăruș, 9). Cross-border cooperation proved to be a priority of the European Neighbourhood Policy. These target promoting a coherent and integrated approach of the regional development, manifesting interest for the mutual challenges, guaranteeing the efficiency and security at EU's external borders and encouraging cooperation at a local level<sup>5</sup>. Since its launch, ENP has stimulated the application of difficult political, economic and institutional reforms, and promoting mutual values that would ensure a closeness of the EU to its neighbors and vice-versa. This process, in the vision of the programmatic documents, was going to prepare the neighboring states for a progressive integration.

Within the EU 2007-2013 financial exercise, the European Union's cross-border collaboration with neighboring states, including the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, was inscribed within the framework given by the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. In its quality of member of the EU, Romania held the position of direct partner of both European states within ENP. This European policy of supporting and consolidating the political and economic relationships with neighbouring countries continued to be a priority, being encompassed within the "cooperation, association and partnership" plans<sup>6</sup>. This was in compliance with the text of the Treaty regarding the European Union which states that "The Union shall develop a special relationship with

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<sup>5</sup> EUR-Lex, Access to European Union law, *Instrumentul european de vecinătate și de parteneriat - Documentul de strategie privind cooperarea transfrontalieră 2007-2013, Cooperarea transfrontalieră 2007-2013 - Sinteză*, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/RO/TXT/HTML/?uri=URISERV:r17104&from=RO>, accessed 19.02.2017.

<sup>6</sup> *Către o nouă politică europeană de vecinătate*, Document comun de consultare, Comisia Europeană, Înalțul REaPrezentant al Uniunii Europene pentru Afaceri Externe și Politica de Securitate, Brussels, 4.3.2015 JOIN(2015) 6 final, p. 2, [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/neighbourhood/consultation/consultation\\_romanian.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/neighbourhood/consultation/consultation_romanian.pdf), accessed 18.02.2017.

neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterized by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation” (art. 8 section (1))<sup>7</sup>.

In regards to the 2014-2020 financial exercise, along with bilateral or regional programs for the East and the South, the European Neighbourhood Instrument, rethought in the spirit of the new policies of the European Union, finances *the cross-border cooperation programs between member states and neighbouring countries*<sup>8</sup>. These programs consider financing projects of cooperation between one or more member states, on the one hand, and one or more partner countries and/or the Russian Federation, on the other hand, developed over their shared border of the external frontier of the EU. There are taken into account multilateral mutual operational programs that regulate cooperation at a frontier or at a group of frontiers that have multiannual measures destined to answer to a coherent set of priorities that can be applied with the support of the EU. In compliance with the principle of partnership, the actors involved select mutual actions susceptible to benefit from support from the Union, which comply with the priorities and measures of the mutual operational program.

Through the policies and instruments of ENP, the Union provides neighbouring countries “a privileged relationship, building upon a mutual commitment to, and promotion of, the values of democracy and human rights, the rule of law, good governance and the principles of a market economy and sustainable and inclusive development.”<sup>9</sup> The European Union is interested in the success of this policy of neighbourliness which it tried to reform both at an instrument level, and at a programs level. In the new acceptations, the support of the EU is used to the benefit of partner countries and the areas involved in the cross-border cooperation, through a separated approach, but also to the mutual benefit of the Union and partner countries. The new instruments and regulations give the Russian Federation access to the cross-border cooperation, regional cooperation, with the participation of the Union. Moreover, the Russian state can be part of the relevant multinational programs, including the cooperation in terms of education<sup>10</sup>.

Short after the ex-Communist states from Central and Eastern Europe adhered, the EU was forced to *reform its European Neighbourhood Policy*. This was not because the new neighbors from the East were too much of a challenge for the EU, although this could also be said of it, but to the fact that this period brought many changes at its external frontier. Now, the neighbouring countries are less stable than they were in 2004 or 2007. In the East, the European partners faced big issues, of internal nature as well, but mostly due to the pressure, including of military nature, from Russia. The European Union had to protect its partners against a more and more expansive Russian state. The 2008 crisis in Georgia or the conflict Ukraine are eloquent for this reality to which the EU had to adapt.

The ENP evolved and was reformed in this context. In 2009 was launched the Eastern Partnership (EaP), after in 2008 started to take shape in Paris the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), therefore being consolidated the regional component of ENP. The premise from which ENP starts are different now. Its area of application and the way of

<sup>7</sup> *Ibidem*

<sup>8</sup> European Union, External Action, European Neighbourhood Instrument 2014-2020 - Programming documents, [http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/documents/financing-the-enp/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/documents/financing-the-enp/index_en.htm), accessed 12.02.2017.

<sup>9</sup> EUR-Lex, Access to European Union law, *Regulamentul (UE)...*, L77/27.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibidem*, tit. I, art. 1, (2), (3), L 77/30.

using the instruments, cooperation sectors, but also the connections between the internal and external priorities have known significant changes. The EU must take into account the aspirations and particularities of its neighbors. Some of the neighbors have European aspirations and are inclined to building a democratic society based on the fundamental European values. In the case of other states it is necessary a different approach. Regardless of neighbors' aspirations, stability, security and prosperity at the external European frontiers remain important to the EU. It is necessary to develop a better communication with Eastern partners of the EU in the sense of explaining the benefits closeness can bring and, why not, European integration, instilling the European values and profound reform of the societies from this part of the world. The EU is forced to make efforts in order to ensure that its neighbourhood policy "remains attractive and corresponds with partners' needs"<sup>11</sup>.

In 2013, the EU revised its financial instruments in the context of the multiannual framework that was modernized accordingly to 2014-2020, including of the *European Neighbourhood Instrument*. According to this new instrument, the support of the European Union for its neighbors becomes faster and more flexible, allowing the rise of differentiation and stimulants ("more for more" – principle which includes altogether the differentiation of states and stimulates the performant ones) given to states that are more strongly engaged in adopting reforms and which had progresses in consolidating a profound and durable democracy. Despite the financial crisis and EU's global budget cut, the level of financing reserved for the European Neighbourliness Instrument rises to €15.4bn<sup>12</sup> which highlights the fact that the EU prioritize its proximity. Up to 5% of the total value of the financial package is given to the cross-border cooperation programs.

Through the European Neighbourliness Instrument, which replaced the European Neighbourhood Instrument, support is given for the application of political initiatives that target the modeling of ENP, including the Eastern Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean. Assistance given to neighbors becomes more flexible and faster, reducing the complexity and duration of the programming process, so that the relevance of the assistance is not undermined<sup>13</sup>. In an optimistic forecasting, it is considered that on the medium run ENP will bring, despite the recent difficulties at EU's frontier, "stability in the South and integration in the East" (Apud Pristaș, 2015: 61; Lippert, 2008: 14).

Therefore, in the context following year 2007, the logic with which the ENP was thought for the Eastern European states had to be changed and correlated with the new realities. Moreover, it had to respond to the regional and national particularities of the partner states. The Eastern Partnership (Prague, May 2009) was proposed and promoted on the background that involved the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Paris, July 2008) and the launch of the Black Sea Synergy (Kiev, February 2008). The initiative addressed a number of six ex-Soviet states of the Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Georgia, Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan) (Van Elsuwege, Roman Petrov, 2011: 691).

Ultimately, on the background of developing the relationships with some of these, the geopolitical realities or the new precepts of EU external politics, the level of the

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<sup>11</sup> Comisia Europeană, Înalțul Reprezentant al Uniunii Europene pentru Afaceri Externe și Politica de Securitate, *Comunicare comună către Parlamentul European, Consiliu, Comitetul Economic și Social European și Comitetul Regiunilor. Politica de vecinătate la răspântie: punerea în aplicare a politicii europene de vecinătate în 2013*, p. 7, EUR-Lex, Access to European Union law, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/RO/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014JC0012&from=RO>, accessed 29.01.2017.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 13.

<sup>13</sup> *Instrumentul european de vecinătate*, Moldova Europeană, Centrul de Resurse "DIALOG-PRO", <http://infoeuropa.md/instrumentul-european-de-vecinatate/>, accessed 31.08.2016.

relationships was furthered even more: the Association Agreements. However, these Agreements were only signed by three Eastern states: Ukraine, Republic of Moldova and Georgia (Brussels, June 2004) (Petrov, 2015: 241).

## 2. The EU and the New Neighbourliness within the Eastern Partnership (EaP)

The European Union had its target, through the initiation of the Eastern Partnership, to consolidate and deepen ENP in the Eastern-European space. The purpose was that of supporting and accelerating the closeness of the Eastern European states to Europe. The Republic of Moldova and Ukraine were part of the group of the six states included in this partnership starting from its official launch. At the basis of this partnership were shared values such as democracy, the rule of law, respecting the human rights, applying the principles of the economy of scale, sustainable development and good governance. EaP was based on “mutual interests and commitments, and the implication and shared responsibility”, being “governed by the principles of differentiation and conditionality”<sup>14</sup>.

This initiative belonged to Poland and Sweden, which presented to the General Affairs and External Relations Council, on May 26, 2008, a proposal targeted at creating an Eastern Partnership, which will “represent a superiorly qualitative form of the ENP”<sup>15</sup>. Following the European Council on June 19-20 2008, the European Commission was invited “to prepare a proposal regarding the Eastern Partnership, which will highlight the need for a differentiated closeness to the Eastern neighbors, while respecting the character of the Neighborhood Policy as a singular and coherent framework” (Pristaș, 2015: 125). The reply of the European Commission was given on December 3, 2008, when it furthered the proposal to member states, the Parliament and the Council for examination a new initiative to consolidate the relations with member states from the Eastern dimension the European Neighbourhood Policy<sup>16</sup>. According to the European Commission Release, which took a special significance in the context of the Georgian crisis of 2008, the Eastern Partnership had to “send a lasting political message of solidarity on behalf of the EU and offer a concrete supplementary support” with the purpose of reforming these states, but also to “consolidate their state sovereignty and territorial integrity”<sup>17</sup>.

The steps taken by the two sides in order to create this new cooperation mechanism were materialized at the ***Eastern Partnership Summit in Prague (May 7, 2009)***. The Eastern Partnership was, therefore, conceived to complement the European Neighbourhood Policy and took into account the intensification of the political and economic integration, none of the six ex-Soviet states obtaining promises regarding a potential adherence to the European Union (Rinnert, 2013: 2). There has to be noted, in order to refer to the states of the area, that neither Russia nor Turkey were included in the Eastern Partnership, both gaining a distinctive status in their relationship to the EU:

<sup>14</sup> *Declarația comună a reuniunii la nivel înalt de la Praga privind Parteneriatul Estic*, Praga, 7 May 2009, (1), p. 5, <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=RO&f=ST%208435%202009%20INIT>, accessed 02.09.2016.

<sup>15</sup> *Avizul Comitetului Economic și Social European privind implicarea societății civile în Parteneriatul estic*, 2009/C 277/06, in *Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene*, 17.11.2009, C 277/31, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/RO/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2009:277:FULL&from=RO>, accessed 11.12.2016.

<sup>16</sup> *Comunicare a Comisiei către Parlamentul European și Consiliu. Parteneriatul estic*, Brussels, 3.12.2008, COM(2008) 823 final, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/RO/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52008DC0823&from=EN>, accessed 18.12.2016.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 2.

Turkey was a state in the course of adhering the EU, and Russia had a strategic partnership agreement with it<sup>18</sup>.

The Eastern Partnership is a political instrument of the EU destined to develop cooperation between partner states both on a *bilateral* plan<sup>19</sup> (signing and implementing association agreements, creating the area of a deepened and thorough free trade, liberalization of visa regime, creating programs of institutional development specific to each country, cooperating in respect to energetic consolidation), as well as on a *multilateral* level, which is done through themed platforms and leader-initiatives<sup>20</sup>. With the purpose of identifying and promoting shared interests was decided that, in principle, state and govern leaders within the Eastern Partnership meet once every two years, and foreign affairs secretaries once a year<sup>21</sup>.

Synthetizing, *the main objective* of the Eastern Partnership is that of creating, developing and even accelerating the necessary conditions of political association and of deepening the economic integration of EU-Eastern European partner countries. In this respect, it was proposed the “development of an Eastern dimension, specific to the European neighbourhood policy”. In order to reach this target, the EU supported the political and socio-economic reforms from partner countries, which favorited the mutual commitment of stability, security and prosperity of the European Union, partner countries and the entire European continent<sup>22</sup>.

The mutual declaration of Prague that stated the establishment of the Eastern Partnership contained a clear political message when it referred to “the necessity of maintaining and consolidating the orientation toward reform”. It was attempted, therefore, to give “a new impulse to the economic and social development of partner countries”. The document also contained a commitment “complementary to the macro-financial assistance offered through relevant international instruments”<sup>23</sup>. Along with the launch of the Eastern Partnership, the European Commission allocated €600m for 2010-2013, including €350m for new funds<sup>24</sup>. The Eastern Partnership was supported both through the sums already allocated, specific to the *European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument* (ENPI), and the supplementary allocation with this special destination. For the period of 2010-2013, the total value of the ENPI funds, including the supplementary sums allocated through the EaP, destined to Eastern partners, amounted to €1.9bn (Bocková, Lenč, 2014: 162).

The Eastern Partnership, as part of the European Neighbourhood Policy, created direct connections between this policy of the EU and the one of European integration, respectively of expansion (Bocková, Lenč, 2014: 161; Kochenov, 2009: 29). The ENP, through its Eastern dimension, was transformed in a mechanism of preparation and stimulation of the integration, partner states being stimulated and assisted in their process of reforming, promoting

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<sup>18</sup> *Parteneriatul Estic*, Consiliul European, Consiliul Uniunii Europene,

<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ro/policies/eastern-partnership/>, accessed 08.02.2017.

<sup>19</sup> PaE se bazează pe relațiile contractuale bilaterale existente și este complementar acestora.

<sup>20</sup> *Parteneriatul Estic*, Ministerul Afacerilor Externe și Integrării Europene al Republicii Moldova, official site, <http://www.mfa.gov.md/totul-despre-pae/>, accessed 24.08.2015. A se vedea Oana Mocanu, *The Eastern Partnership – A Premise for an Enhanced EU Eastern Neighbours Cooperation Relationship*, p. 3-5, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1517754>, accessed 13.02.2017.

<sup>21</sup> *Declarația comună a reuniunii la nivel înalt de la Praga privind Parteneriatul Estic...*, (10), p. 8.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibidem*, (2), p. 6.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibidem*, (3), p. 6.

<sup>24</sup> *Parteneriatul Estic*, Moldova Europeană, Centrul de Resurse "DIALOG-PRO", <http://infoeuropa.md/parteneriatul-estic/>, accessed 08.02.2017.

democracy, legislative adaptation to the EU *acquis*, consolidation of the state of law and a functional scale economy integrated progressively on the EU free market.

The establishment of the EaP did not transform immediately EU's relations with its Eastern European partners. At a bilateral level, the basis of direct relations with them within the ENP was PCA and AA. Significant changes were expected within EaP as direct negotiations were evolving, with the purpose of signing the Association Agreements (AA). These were the only legal instruments valid to consolidate significantly economic integration and political dialogue between EU and partner countries, lead to the renewing of the institutional framework in the relation between the EU and partner countries (Delcour, 2011: 6). The same aspects were seen in the case of the other components of the bilateral dimension of EaP, each state being forced to pass through hard and long negotiations with the purpose of finalizing each agreements. From this point of view, EaP was thought to be an initiative of not much consistency as long as it did not offer very much in respect to the agreements negotiated beforehand or after the moment of Prague 2009 (Kochenov, 2011: 10-11). Wrong, if one has to see the adhering of CEECs to the EU, in which case, along with the AEA were developed a number of bilateral and multilateral instruments of political cooperation and economic collaboration destined to facilitate, through the multiplication of the effort on both sides, the adherence (Bărbulescu, 2015: 268-270)<sup>25</sup>.

Undertaking the agreements agreed by the parts, along with reaching the objectives established both at a bilateral level, as well as a multilateral one, were able to contribute to the European integration of Eastern European partners. The Declaration from Prague did not have references to other regional initiatives from the ex-Soviet space, respectively at the cooperation with Russia, which allowed to be "perceived as a point of dispute between the EU and the Russian Federation, both by Russia, and by the EU" adherence (Bărbulescu, 2015: 268-270). The states encompassed in the EaP were situated therefore in the "uncomfortable" space between the Russian Federation and the EU, being real "pawns on the chess table where took place the simultaneous game between Russia on the one side, EU and the US on the other side" (Oehler-Șincai; Matache-Zaharia, 2015: 252), each side perceiving the actions of the other as attempts of drawing "spheres of influence" in the Eastern European space.

Unfortunately, during all this time, the Eastern Europe lived moments of escalating the tensions and conflicts at levels hard to manage from a diplomatic point of view, the states included in the EaP being the ones that had, in the first place, to suffer because of these. Therefore, the crisis of Georgia in 2008 takes place in the context in which this partnership was signed, respectively the closeness of the Georgian state to the EU and NATO. Similarly, when the Association Agreement was signed between Ukraine and the EU led to a major political crisis in this state that wished to be close to the EU and NATO. All these culminated with the Russian military interventions, the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and the separatist war in Eastern Ukraine. The events from Ukraine affected profoundly its neighbors<sup>26</sup>, generating major geopolitical mutations at a European and even global level. Amid crisis in Ukraine and the separatist region of Transnistria from the Republic of Moldova, reappeared tensions hard to manage in order to avoid their escalation and an open conflict. Russia was no stranger from these events, in the same way in which is no stranger from what is currently happening in the Middle East, Siria etc.

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<sup>25</sup> Jordan Gheorghe Bărbulescu, *Noua Europă. Identitate și model European*, Polirom, 2015, p. 268-270

<sup>26</sup> *Către o nouă politică europeană de vecinătate*,..., p. 2.

Unfortunately, the already unstable situation from Eastern Europe is aggravated from the expansion of the so-called Islamic State or the current crisis of refugees, all of these having an impact on the EU and, as a derivative, over its partnerships, therefore over the Eastern Partnership as well.

Numerous analysts see in all these crises also a failure of the EU, respectively of the ENP, the said forms of cooperation failing to offer appropriate answers to those crises in times of need, or to satisfy changing aspirations of the Eastern partners, “this being (...) to the loss of EU’s own interests”<sup>27</sup>. Then, some states from the immediate proximity of the EU have tried to adapt their relations with the EU to the need of not “upsetting” Russia and maintaining a climate of security on the background of Russian pressures (Berbec, 2010: 7; Shapovalova, 2010: 70-71). All these represented major challenges for the EU, which was forced to respond through appropriate policies to the new needs and geopolitical realities from its borders. From this point of view, the EaP can be considered an answer of the such, numerous efforts of adapting the initiative, of stimulating the partners with the purpose of deepening the mechanisms of European integration enrolling in the same logic.

Over the years that passed since its launch in 2009, the EaP has been confronted with difficulties generated on the one hand by the lack of political will of the partners to be integrated, and on the other hand by the lack of consensus of the EU member states in their relation with Russia. Even so, the results of the EaP were positive, especially for member states such as the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine or Georgia. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus, for various reasons, chose different trajectories and preferences in their relations with the EU (Apud Oehler-Şincai), their expectations being different in relation to the other ex-Soviet states from the area, but also in relation to the EU proposals (Delcour, 2015: 8).

In the process of applying the EaP objectives of a crucial importance was the implication of the civil society – in this respect, immediately after the launch of the EaP, was founded the *Forum of the civil society*, whose role was exactly the one of involving its representatives in multilateral platforms of the EaP. With the occasion of its annual reunion at Poznan, November 2011, were built the national platforms of this forum with the declared purpose of contributing to reaching the EaP targets in partner countries<sup>28</sup>. An important role in this partnership is given to the *European Economic and Social Committee* (EESC), because it supports the dialogue with the civil society from the Eastern states. *The Parliamentary Assembly EURONEST*, created in May 2011, reunites European parliamentarians and parliamentarians members of the EaP. Also in 2011 were founded the *Congress of Local and Regional Authorities* (CORLEAP), which conferred EaP a regional dimension, and the *Eastern Partnership Business Forum*, launched in Sopot in September 2011<sup>29</sup>.

***The second EaP Summit (Warsaw in September 2011)***, highlights the progress made by the EaP states in their process of European integration, but also the need to find solutions for deepening the process. A special place of occupied by the preoccupation for strengthening bilateral political agreements, strengthening the socio-economic aspect and

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<sup>27</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>28</sup> *Parteneriatul Estic, Moldova Europeană...*

<sup>29</sup> *Ibidem*.

mobility<sup>30</sup>. With this event was adopted a mutual declaration regarding the situation in Belarus, state in respect to which reserves were manifested regarding the political climate, deterioration of media freedom, the situation of political prisoners, repression of the civil society, failure to respect human rights<sup>31</sup>.

*The next summit, in Vilnius, November 2013*, had as main objective signing the Association Agreement with Ukraine, including the elaborated and thorough free trade Agreement negotiated as a component of the Association Agreement, and initialing the ones with the Republic of Moldova and Georgia. The agreements with the mentioned states were initialized (their come into operation was made only after their signing and ratification), while the agreements with Ukraine were suspended (Oehler-Şincai). The participants of the summit took notice of the decision to temporary suspend the preparations to sign these agreements with the EU<sup>32</sup>. Kiev's decision, somewhat surprising, was made only a week before the summit, when the Ukrainian Prime Minister, Azarov, signed a Decree of "suspension of the process of preparing the association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU", due to reasons of "national security" (Oehler-Şincai). A similar decision was announced in September by Armenia (Gylfason, Martínez-Zarzoso, Wijkman, 2014: 3). From this point of view, given the importance of Ukraine in the region, its decision to interrupt the negotiation of the agreement was interpreted as a failure of the EU, even though, to an equal measure or even more, it could also be perceived as a failure of Ukraine in its effort to achieve democratization and progress. Moreover, given the complexity of the negotiations with the EU, of association or adherence, their temporary interruption is a used instrument of the European relations and diplomacy, Turkey being an example to this respect; therefore, one should not be haste to tax the Union for the temporary suspensions – as it has been proven after the events happened.

Ukraine's surprising decision came after some positive evaluations the country had received starting with 2011 when the negotiations for the Association Agreements were made<sup>33</sup>. The positive evolution was also remarked in the reports on the EaP of the following year<sup>34</sup>. What no one anticipated was that government's refuse to sign the AA with the EU led to the protests of the well-known Euromaidan of the Kiev, whose climax

<sup>30</sup> *Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit, Warsaw, 29-30 September 2011*, 14983/11 PRESSE 341, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/124843.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/124843.pdf), accessed 02.03.2017.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 9.

<sup>32</sup> *Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit, Vilnius, 28-29 November 2013, Eastern Partnership: the way ahead*, Consiliul Uniunii Europene, Vilnius, 29 November 2013 17130/13 (OR. en) PRESSE 516, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/139765.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/139765.pdf), accessed 01.03.2017.

<sup>33</sup> A se vedea *Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2011. Regional Report: Eastern Partnership*, Joint Staff Working Document, Brussels, 15.5.2012, SWD (2012) 112 final, p. 2, [http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/docs/2012\\_enp\\_pack/e\\_pship\\_regional\\_report\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/docs/2012_enp_pack/e_pship_regional_report_en.pdf), accessed 01.03.2017.

<sup>34</sup> A se vedea *Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2012. Regional Report: Eastern Partnership*, Joint Staff Working Document, Brussels, 20.3.2013, SWD(2013) 85 final, [http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/docs/2013\\_enp\\_pack/2013\\_eastern\\_pship\\_regional\\_report\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/docs/2013_enp_pack/2013_eastern_pship_regional_report_en.pdf), accessed 01.03.2017; *Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2013. Regional Report: Eastern Partnership*, Joint Staff Working Document, Brussels, 27.3.2014, SWD(2014) 99 final, [http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/2014/regional/eastern\\_partnership\\_report.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/2014/regional/eastern_partnership_report.pdf), accessed 01.03.2017.

was reached in February 2014, with President Victor Yanukovich's departure (Lovitt (coord.), 2015: 8). What followed in Ukraine, once Crimea was annexed by Russia and the Eastern separatism being supported, led the country to a political, economic and social chaos which generated, among other things, a major humanitarian crisis on the Eastern part of Ukraine. In respect to its relations with the EU, Ukraine hurried the signing of the Association Agreement, and the Union's relation with Russia deteriorated to a level comparable to the one before the fall of the Berlin Wall, the economic sanctions imposed being similar to the ones before 1989.

The natural question, given the conditions of the existence of the EaP, of its new format after the signing of the AA/DCFTA and the repositioning of some of the six partners of the EU from Eastern Europe on the background of the disputes with Russia, is: *to what degree can still be spoken about the ENP as it was known and, if the ENP still truly exists, which is the new format of this European policy?*

The EaP has reached its limits given the annexation of Crimea and the open conflict in Ukraine. Even if three states (Republic of Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine) signed bilateral Agreements of Association with the EU, the other three states (Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan) rather took a step back in their relation with the EU. Moreover, amid Russia's pressure and internal situations, the process is not irreversible, not even for the first three states. Fragile pro-European majorities can be overturned by certain geopolitical changes. Even the EU was forced to rethink its strategies. The new relations with Russia, both at a regional and European level have determined, to a great deal, the rethinking of the Eastern Partnership.

The participants of the *Fourth EaP Summit in Riga (May 21-22, 2015)* tried to give firm assurances regarding the continuity of the European neighbourhood policy through the EaP policy. It was reaffirmed once more the special importance the EU gives to the Eastern Partnership as a "specific dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy). The shared statement of the summit reaffirms the shared vision regarding "this strategic and ambitious partnership as one based on mutual interests and commitments and the support of reform processes" promoted in the EaP partner states<sup>35</sup>. Regardless, in the text of the shared declaration there are prudent messages, especially in regards to the expansion toward the East (Matache-Zaharia, 254). The right of each state to decide its level of European integration, respectively the cooperation areas or objectives to which it aspires to in its relationship with the EU is highlighted by the emphasis on "sovereignty" of the partner states<sup>36</sup>. Then, it is accentuated the "differentiated relation between the EU and the six sovereign and independent partners"<sup>37</sup>, this somehow being to the detriment of the multilateral cooperation platforms which are approached only to a general-declarative level. It is obvious that the language is different and prudent, expressing the EU's concern for the difficult position in which its EaP partners are. The current shape of the ENP does not seem to correspond anymore to the geopolitical realities, given the concrete realities at their frontiers and/or the EU's. Suffice is to remember the fact that the ENP was for a long time regarded as an "anti-chamber" for the expansion of the European Union, at this point being obvious that the mere approach of the reforms, implementation of the policies and

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<sup>35</sup> *Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit (Riga, 21-22 May 2015)*, (1), p. 1, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/05/Riga-Declaration-220515-Final\\_pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/05/Riga-Declaration-220515-Final_pdf), accessed 22.02.2017.

<sup>36</sup> *Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit (Riga, 21-22 May 2015)*, (2), p. 1

<sup>37</sup> *Ibidem*, (6), p. 3.

the European Union *acquis* is no longer enough. Unfortunately, given the conflict in Ukraine, the situation in the Middle East and Northern Africa, the crisis of the refugees/immigrants, it is certain that the EU can no longer promise the adherence of these states to the EU.

Then, another vulnerability of the shared policies of the EU on neighbourhood, visible during the Summit at Riga, is given by the dimension of security in the ENP approach. This proves to be insufficiently clear and uncorrelated with the current geopolitical situation, security being, therefore, a “weak point” (Gogolashvili, 18) on the European neighbourhood agenda.

Even so, the further development of bilateral and multilateral mechanisms are EU’s only solutions to stabilize the areas around itself. The Republic of Moldova is at this time the closest to the European “model”, but even here, with the existence of a parting between the political sides regarding a possible adherence to the EU, making possible the altering of the political preferences of the Moldavian state. Moreover, the perspective of the adherence in a medium time horizon is even more somber, given the Transnistrian reality, which, through its frozen conflict, cuts from the enthusiasm of the EU expansion toward the East and makes the Union concentrate more on the Southeast of Europe, meaning Albania, Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and, at some point, Kosovo.

It is mandatory that the ENP be rethought, including its fundamental purpose, not just the supplementation of the financial instruments, the EU having to promote a good neighbourliness even beyond the financial stimulants. Therefore, the EU must take into account the strategic orientations of its neighbors, the “degree to which each one of them wishes to cooperate with former actors, including the EU”. The European Union, aware of the fact that some of its partners from the EaP have different orientations, is committed to respect “these sovereign options and is willing to take into consideration other forms of dialogue” with these states<sup>38</sup>. But, to the same extent, the EaP states must define explicitly their aspirations and form of cooperation with the EU, to state openly what kind of partnership they want. One to bring adherence or one that would allow a better political cooperation and economic collaboration without other political or security commitments. Therefore, the EU could rethink asymmetrical collaborations, differentiated according to its Eastern partners.

***EaP Summit in Brussels (24.11.2017)***. The Fifth Eastern Partnership Summit was scheduled to meet the two-year rate and respond to the new challenges at the EU’s eastern border. Leaders of the EU Member States met with representatives of the six partner countries that are part of the Eastern Partnership (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine). The need to rethink the priorities and bilateral partnerships has been one of the defining elements of the Brussels talks. The talks led to a few conclusions accepted by all the participants summarized in a joint statement highlighting “the commitment and the great importance which it grants to the Eastern Partnership”<sup>39</sup>. At the summit, EU countries have recognized “**European aspirations and European choice** of partners who have signed association agreements with the EU, namely Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. At the same time, they have recognized the right of other partners to choose the level of ambition they want in their relations with the EU.”<sup>40</sup> At the same time, the text of the declaration underlines the Union’s support for respecting

<sup>38</sup> *Către o nouă politică europeană de vecinătate, ...*, p. 3.

<sup>39</sup> See Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit (Brussels, 24 November 2017), <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31758/final-statement-st14821en17.pdf>, accessed 10.12.2017.

<sup>40</sup> <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ro/meetings/international-summit/2017/11/24/>, accessed 10.12.2017.

territorial integrity, the independence of these states, and their sovereignty. The support for the peaceful settlement of unresolved conflicts in the East European space it was reaffirmed. At the press conference, President Tusk stated that "there should be no doubt that our common future lies in the EU's willingness to open up EU policies to our partners. I can reconfirm that we are ready to do so"<sup>41</sup>.



**Source:** <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ro/infographics/towards-stronger-eastern-partnership/>, accessed 10.12.2017.

At the same time, it was agreed on the need to reform and strengthen the cooperation capacity within the partnership, and "the joint statement stressed:

- the importance of good governance
- the need for better and safer transport links
- the importance of energy security
- the need to further support independent media and denounce misinformation
- leaders' commitment to encourage mobility and empower young people "<sup>42</sup>

"We want to strengthen the Eastern Partnership cooperation in a number of specific areas, such as small and medium-sized enterprises, the digital economy, broadband investments, transport, energy and infrastructure projects. The list is long. But

<sup>41</sup> *Ibidem*

<sup>42</sup> *Ibidem*

first of all, we want to strengthen the ties between our citizens and give more support to civil society. "(President Tusk, press conference at the end of the meeting)"<sup>43</sup>.

Armenia has signed a comprehensive and consolidated partnership agreement with the European Union, namely an agreement on aviation.

### Conclusions

The European Neighborhood Policy has evolved much since its launch in the early 2000s. The European Union has been obliged to rethink this policy due to the new geopolitical challenges, but also to the need for internal reformation, including at the institutional level. Thereby, European policies and programs for cooperation at European external borders have diversified and adapted to the new needs. The rethinking of the ENP has led to the implementation of Eastern Partnership in Eastern Europe, a partnership that initially wanted to be a solid, open-ended opportunity to facilitate the European integration of the six partner countries. Meanwhile, the geopolitical context has changed a lot. Russia has strengthened regional power, and the European presence has been considered a competitive situation where former Soviet states that have begun a special relationship with the EU have often been forced to choose between the two sides. Despite the European Union's concerns over these primary European countries, the diversification of the European Neighborhood Instruments and the reform of the European Neighborhood Policy, the realities at the EU's eastern border did not make much progress in the way expected by Europeans (Brie, 2017: 123-155).

The future of this partnership is part of a new integrative logic. All the parties involved identify the needs of European integration, but also its limits. At the declarative level, integration is a desirable and possible solution, in fact each of the six states chooses to understand and act differently in this process. Moreover, the European Union also seems incapable of finding a different integrative solution that will lead this process to something more than a good neighborhood. The new situation seems to suit up more to than one actor, including Russia. Starting from this, we identify the limits achieved by the Eastern Partnership and the European Neighborhood Policy, as far as we can still say that there still exists in Eastern Europe.

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<sup>43</sup> *Ibidem*

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## **II. Communication, Culture and Education in Europe**

**Simona FER** ⇔ *Values of Intercultural Communication in the Relationship Between the European Citizens*

**Mariana IAȚCO, Natalia PUTINĂ** ⇔ *An analysis of the impact generated by the Russian factor in the information space of the Republic of Moldova*

**Violeta COTILEVICI, Svetlana CEBOTARI** ⇔ *La Francophonie - Une Porte Supplémentaire de la République de Moldova Vers L'Europe*

**Mariana BUDA** ⇔ *Different Theoretical Approaches about European Studies*



## VALUES OF INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN CITIZENS

*Simona FER*\*

**Abstract.** *From a general perspective, we attempt to approach the issue of intercultural communication, mainly because through intercultural relations we should leave aside the differences between cultural and national traditions, way of life, customs and attitudes. In this article we aim to briefly present some theories of intercultural communication, to observe whether intercultural education is implemented in the practice of schools and how European Union institutions are favourable to integrating diversity, fostering interculturalism and promoting intercultural dialogue. Language is the main medium in where information circulates and it assembles itself as the message transmitter and, therefore, we should give special attention to the mediating role of language in the process. Particular attention is to be focused on the characteristics and perspectives of intercultural communication as well as the key factor of understanding this concept and phenomenon. The present study proposes an historical excursion into matters of European culture and identity. This whole brief journey is intended to highlight the reality, but also the immanence, of this approach for the future of Europe.*

**Keywords:** *intercultural communication, intercultural education, multiculturalism, cultural diversity, identity*

### ***A European perspective on the intercultural communication***

*Inter* comes from the Latin word for *between*, and the dictionary defines *communication* as *exchanging information*. Sometimes, this is used to describe a single person trying to interact in a foreign environment but more often, it is a two-way street, where people from both cultures are trying to improve their communication. The term *intercultural communication* is often used today to refer to the wide range of communication issues that inevitably arise within an organization composed of individuals from a variety of religious, social, ethnic and educational backgrounds. Each of these individuals brings a unique set of experiences and values to the workplace, many of which can be traced to the culture in which they grew up and now operate<sup>1</sup>.

Intercultural communication promotes, among the important skills, the understanding of different people and cultures. It includes teachings that accept and respect the normality of diversity in all areas of life. It makes every effort to sensitize the learner to the notion that we have naturally developed in different ways. It promotes equal opportunities and equality in human rights and challenges unfair discrimination. Intercultural communication works to transform not only the individual but the institution as a metaphor and mechanism for the transformation of society.

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<sup>1</sup> *Intercultural Communication Law & Legal Definition*, [definitions.uslegal.com](http://definitions.uslegal.com)., retrieved 2016-05-19, accessed Nov.11 2017

By building a narrative the human being became self-conscious and also able to make himself known by others, his culture and tradition known by others. There is a dialectical motion of *idem* and *ipse*, like Hegel suggested the dialectic of “identity and otherness”, confronting the public and the private space of being (Goudenhooff, 2015:92). Knowing and appreciating his own identity is a first step to communicate it to other individuals linked to him. In the review of the book *Historical Moments in the History of Europe*, Anca Oltean mentions the relevance of the problem of otherness in different contemporary cultural studies, highlighting the importance of identity studies in cultural contexts and fields of study starting from ancient philosophers until contemporary thinkers. She remarks the distinction between “self” and “identity”, between inner assumed being and unity in diversity that implies the relation with the others, cultural otherness, race, ethnicity and alterity (Oltean, 2015:5).

Intercultural communication acknowledges and appreciates the normality of diversity in all areas of human life and induces the individual the idea that humans have naturally developed a range of different ways of life, customs and worldviews, and that this latitude of human life enriches all of us.

Multilingual and intercultural communication arises from the universal right to a quality education, covering: acquisition of competences, knowledge, dispositions and attitudes, diversity of learning experiences, and construction of individual and collective cultural identities. Its aim is to make communication more effective in understanding different cultures, languages and customs in a particular country<sup>2</sup>.

Europe is a rich and diverse culturally, which raises communication difficulties. Jean Monnet, one of the founders after World War II, of the present European Union wrote in his *Mémoires* (1976), a self-critique, where he takes his share of responsibility for the choice of the European integration model being based on the economy, while also defending that the European project should have started on cultural terms and not on economic terms, because culture establishes the communication basis between people and the rulers of countries. Europeans behave differently and they perceive reality differently. Knowledge in social sciences differs among societies and cultural contexts, which raises an important political and social question: is it possible or not to have intercultural understanding? A question to which different people have different answers (Croucher, 2017:30).

The European culture is built on a complex system of shared values that characterize the European cultural space. We mainly refer to the common cultural values, thanks to which we can confirm today the existence of a cultural reality, specific to the European space (Stoica, Brie, 2010:6).

In nowadays society, when Europe is receiving extraordinary numbers of refugees and migrants, supporting national governments in tackling this situation is a key priority for the EU. Within this context, the EU and EU countries must ensure the social, cultural, political and economic integration of the new arrivals. The creative European programmes can fund activities that recognize and celebrate the contribution refugees and migrants make to cultural diversity in Europe. Culture can be a means for refugees and migrants to meet, communicate with and become part of existing communities. These creative European programmes safeguard and promote Europe's cultural and linguistic diversity, itself a result of centuries of cross-cultural interactions, influences and migrations.

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<sup>2</sup> Guide for the development and implementation of curricula for plurilingual and intercultural education, Executive version, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, September, 2010, p.3

Sixty five years after its coming into existence, the European Union can be, therefore, regarded and defined from different perspectives. Considered as a whole, the EU might be defined as an ambitious and difficult political, economic, social and cultural project (Brihan, 2013: 8). Creative Europe supports transnational cooperation projects involving cultural and creative organisations from different countries, taking part in intercultural communication programmes. The European main institutions commit themselves to rethinking and rebuilding Europe as an open, inclusive and democratic space for intercultural communication. With passionate teams, the EU institutions have developed many impactful and innovative projects and facilitated opportunities for cultural change throughout Europe.

### ***Considerations and theories on intercultural communication***

Intercultural communication theories arise out of the concern about the lack of effective cultural communication skills among people who do not share the same life experiences, values and language. The EU, as a political community needs to create and strengthen political and cultural conditions for communication between people who live together, but think and behave differently. The possibility of intercultural understanding is based on scientific research that shows there is something like a rational community, which could be shared by all people<sup>3</sup>.

Because Lustig and Koester (1993) both provide essential communication theories we argue that intercultural communication as a symbolic, interpretative, exchange, reciprocal and contextual process in which the degree of difference between people is large and important enough to create dissimilar interpretations and expectations about what are regarded as competent behaviours that should be used to create shared meanings.

The two theoreticians struggle to offer a meaningful definition of intercultural communication being aware that all individuals represent, in varying degrees, the characteristics of their own culture and that while individuals originate within one or more cultures, their identification with that culture and its central characteristics will change over time (Koester, 2010:7).

Although the phenomenon of intercultural communication is as old as human society, the study of intercultural communication is of recent origin. Communication specialists commonly acknowledge E. T. Hall as the founder and a classic of the field of intercultural communication study (Paulston et al., 2012:21). He conceptualized this new field, in the early 1950s, when he worked for the U.S. Foreign Service Institute. Hall explained in his book, *The Silent Language* (1959) how people behave and react in different types of culturally defined personal space. What was particularly innovative about Hall's early work is that instead of focusing on a single culture at a time, or cross-cultural comparison, as was specific in 1950's anthropology, he responded to the needs of his students at the Foreign Service Institute of the Department of State to help them understand interactions between members of different cultures (Leeds-Hurwitz, 1990:263).

According to Mike Byram (1997), Emeritus Professor in the School of Education, at the University of Durham, language teaching with an intercultural dimension continues to help learners acquire the linguistic competence needed to communicate in speaking or writing, to formulate what they want to say or write in correct and appropriate ways. He also considers that being interculturally competent means to be able to interact effectively

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<sup>3</sup> Croucher M., Stephen , *op. cit.*, p. 31

(using linguistic and non-linguistic resources) with people from another country in a foreign language. This means, of course, to be able to overcome stereotypes (which are a real barrier for cultural understanding), to be empathic, to understand the otherness, to avoid and deal with misunderstandings and to have a certain willingness to learn with the purpose of knowing not only the other but also oneself (Byram, 1997:5).

Authors such as Wittgenstein (1953), Winch (1990), Pitkin (1973) and Habermas (1984, 1987) laid the foundations for a critical epistemology that underlies the possibility of intellectual knowledge based on arguments that claim at the same time the differences and the confluences of cultures which enable democratic dialogue. All of these authors were born in Europe and the majority of them emigrated mainly because of political persecution.

The sociologist Pedersen also illustrated the difficulty in defining culture when, following an extensive literature survey he states "people use culture in the same way as scientists use paradigms (...) to organize and normalize their activity (...), the elements of culture are used, modified or discarded depending on their utility in organizing reality" (Pedersen, 1997:159).

Obviously, the construct *culture* is under continuous modification in the different disciplines in which it is deployed, and especially when it is applied in the context of the processes of globalization and diversity which characterize modern societies.

### ***Language barriers and difficulties in intercultural communication***

Most of the difficulties in intercultural communication are caused by cultural differences. In the process of intercultural communication, both speakers are confronted with a culture different from their own in terms of customs, values, standards and expectations' and adhere to different communication standards. They do not know how to communicate and respond to each other. Communication style that is desirable in the one's culture may be inappropriate in the other's culture. The greater the cultural difference, the greater the communication difficulties (Reisinger, 2012:168).

The role of language is fundamental in cross-cultural and intercultural research. We should give special attention to the mediating role of language in the process. Language is the main medium in which information circulates and it assembles itself as the message transmitter. In order to understand and interpret gestures in a given language, a minimum degree of language equivalence between the language of those being studied and that of the researcher is needed.

All experts, critics and linguists agree that language carries with it cultural coding and that without knowledge of the language, the culture can never be discovered and appreciated. One of the main priorities of communicating in a foreign language is to have the ability to communicate across linguistic and cultural boundaries in an increasingly multicultural Europe, in other words, to acquire intercultural communicative competences. Among the aims of this study, one of a great relevance is to find out how intercultural communication can be integrated into foreign languages learning, developing intercultural communicative competences of their learners<sup>4</sup>.

John P. Fernandez, specialist in Business Management, counsels that "language issues are becoming a considerable source of conflict and inefficiency in the increasingly diverse work force throughout the world.... No corporation can be competitive if co-

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<sup>4</sup> [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/286846166\\_Status\\_of\\_intercultural\\_education\\_in\\_english\\_language\\_learning\\_and\\_in\\_foreign\\_language\\_teacher\\_training](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/286846166_Status_of_intercultural_education_in_english_language_learning_and_in_foreign_language_teacher_training), accessed Nov. 11 2017

workers avoid, don't listen to, perceive as incompetent, or are intolerant of employees who have problems with the language. In addition, these attitudes could be carried over into their interactions with customers who speak English as a second language, resulting in disastrous effects on customer relations and, thus, the corporate bottom line" (Fernandez, 1991). Language differences present a common hesitating section in international business communication.

Multinational working is tending to mean the establishment of collaborative partnerships for the delivery of goods and services. Foreign employees are increasingly required to operate in a way which demonstrates sensitivity and competence in dealing with others from different cultural backgrounds.

While getting to know as many cultures as possible is a noble endeavour, in reality managers are strapped for time like everyone else. If a functional outsourcing group is diverse, or a manager has recently hired a new group of employees, or his company is reaching out to more overseas investors, then this manager will have a great opportunity to develop more effective intercultural communication skills that will be most applicable to his team as an integrated part of his diversity training initiatives.

Other cultural considerations that could be helped with greater intercultural communication skills include: gender differences, generational differences, and socio-economic differences. Of course, these components overlap other cultural considerations, so a manager with intercultural training from a reputable university also generally has an ongoing network of peers who can act as mentors as intercultural communication challenges arise<sup>5</sup>.

Intercultural competence enables to interact both effectively and in a way that is acceptable to others when you are working in a group whose members have different cultural backgrounds. The group may consist of two or more people including yourself. *Cultural* may denote all manner of features, including the values and beliefs you have grown up with, your national, regional and local customs and, in particular, attitudes and practices that affect the way you work.

Whenever one party is using a second language or a translator, the potential for misunderstandings increases. Even if you're bilingual, slang, jokes and figures of speech can cause problems. Professors, linguists or other language scholars recommend that workers abroad should speak slowly and clearly in these circumstances. If you're giving an oral presentation, a clear handout in simple language helps avoid misunderstandings<sup>6</sup> (Farnen, 2017).

Another point of contact between individuals is thinking about language, the aim being to objectivise speakers' intuitions regarding the ways in which languages work, and particularly to generate awareness of the ways in which languages and discourse genres vary, and the significance of their doing so<sup>7</sup>.

When two people in conversation are from different countries speaking in a language which is a foreign/second language for one of them, or when they are both speaking a language which is foreign to both of them, a lingua franca they may be acutely aware of their national identities. They are aware that at least one of them is speaking a

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<sup>5</sup> *Intercultural management. Effective leadership for multicultural teams* (2015), made available by Bisk Education, University of Notre Dame, Mendoza College of Business, p.11

<sup>6</sup> Farnen, Karen, *Cultural Differences and Communication Problems with International Business*, in the online publication Chron, on <http://smallbusiness.chron.com/can-cultural-differences-affect-business-communication-5093.html>, accessed 12 Nov.2017

<sup>7</sup> *Ibidem*, p.6

foreign language and the other is hearing their own language being spoken by a foreigner. Often this influences what they say and how they say it because they see the other person as a representative of a country or nation (Byram et al., 2002:9).

For example, if you are a European, travelling to India, you should be able to cope up with the Indian culture along with understanding the language in India. You should also make an approach to learn their culture which will induce a positive relationship with the host. Learning the culture of a country is not that easy as it seems and this is where the cross cultural training comes into play<sup>8</sup> (Drary, 2010).

In intercultural communication, sharing is not necessarily limited to foreign languages learning. Such content also covers knowledge, ability to understand, ability to learn and do, and critical cultural awareness (the ability to assess, critically and applying explicit criteria, the viewpoints, practices and products of a previously unknown social group, and of the social groups to which one belongs oneself).

Therefore, fostering the intercultural dimension in language teaching involves recognizing that the aims are: to give learners intercultural competence as well as linguistic competence, to prepare them for interaction with people of other cultures, to enable them to understand and accept people from other cultures as individuals with other distinctive perspectives, values and behaviours and to help them see that such interaction is an enriching experience for their future<sup>9</sup>.

In many situations there occur problems while transmitting a message. Nowadays, both culture and communication have considerably developed and have become interdependent of one another, to the point that communication is considered to be an effect or a product of culture. In addition, our own culture has a deep impact on our thoughts and behaviors. Since each culture has its distinct particularities, intercultural communication can be the cause of conflict and problems. There are three main issues which are at the root of the problem of intercultural miscommunication: language as a barrier, cultural diversity and ethnocentrism<sup>10</sup>.

In communication between people of the same culture, the person who receives the message interprets it based on values, beliefs, and expectations for behavior similar to those of the person who sent the message. When this happens, the way the message is interpreted by the receiver is likely to be fairly similar to what the speaker intended. However, when the receiver of the message is a person from a different culture, the receiver uses information from his or her culture to interpret the message. The message that the receiver interprets may be very different from what the speaker intended. Therefore, being aware of intercultural issues, accepting them, understanding and appreciating intercultural differences promotes clearer communication, breaks down barriers, builds trust, strengthens relationships, opens horizons and produces tangible results in terms of business success.

### ***Intercultural communication in educational institutions***

The term *multiculturalism* is in many situations used to present a society in which different cultures live all together without much interaction and the term *interculturalism* expresses a belief that we all become personally enriched by coming in contact with and

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<sup>8</sup> Drary, Tom (2010), *3Tips for Effective Global Communication*, published in Communication and Design, on April 9 2010, accessed Nov.11, 2017

<sup>9</sup> Ibidem, p.10

<sup>10</sup> <https://www.bartleby.com/essay/Intercultural-Communication-FKQUGAXHKUEZ>, accessed Nov. 12, 2017

experiencing other cultures, and that people of different cultures should be able to engage with each other and learn from each other.

Nowadays, communication between different countries becomes more and more frequent and many students choose to study overseas for experiencing culture diversity, their goal being to broaden their horizons and develop themselves from learning overseas.

Intercultural education in schools has been a significant issue in policy discussions and projects within European organisations and institutions for about three decades or even longer if we consider the debates preceding the introduction of the term “intercultural education”. The reasons for this commitment are: first; the international migration movements, which intensified especially after World War II; second, the historical multilingual and multicultural assets of many European countries and of Europe itself; and third the necessity to make formal, non-formal and informal education more culturally open, so that children, youth and adults may become citizens who were aware and appreciative of diversity and capable of intercultural dialogue, not only within Europe but worldwide and regardless of origin (Allemann, 2008:7).

Education not only reflects society but is also an influence in shaping its development. As such, schools are one of the institutions that have a role to play in the development of an intercultural society. While education cannot bear the sole responsibility for challenging racism and promoting intercultural competence, it has an important contribution to make in facilitating the development of intercultural skills, attitudes, values and knowledge<sup>11</sup>.

The major educational institutions consider that all people are enriched by understanding and should be dedicated to the advancement of learning and the search for truth, to the sharing of this knowledge through education for a diverse community and to the application of this knowledge to benefit the people of the state, the nation and the world.

As such, schools have a role to play in the development of an intercultural society. While education cannot bear the sole responsibility for challenging racism and promoting intercultural competence, it has an important contribution to make in the development of the child’s intercultural skills, attitudes, values and knowledge. An intercultural education is valuable to all children in equipping them to participate in an increasingly diverse society. First Lady Michelle Obama, holding a conference for students and their professors, stated at Howard University, in January 2011: “Studying abroad isn't just an important part of well-rounded educational experience. It's also becoming increasingly important for success in the modern global economy. Getting ahead in today's workplaces isn't just about the skills you bring from the classroom. It's also about the experience you have with the world beyond our borders - with people, and languages, and cultures that are very different from our own”. The intercultural matters presented in schools should be considered in the context of internationalizing higher education, direct us to the human, individual, personal, and most of all to the interpersonal domains of internationalization.

Lectures presenting intercultural communication might create opportunities for students who plan to participate in any kind of intercultural intensive experience, whether in the communication department or in other appropriate academic homes. Such courses, which are essentially beginning intercultural communication courses, should provide culture-general knowledge about the key elements of culture that influence an individual’s construction of meaning, and should be grounded in culture specific examples and

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<sup>11</sup> *Intercultural education in the post-primary school...*, p.10

understandings. It is through the intercultural and making the intercultural matter that the goals of international education can be achieved.

Therefore, it is education which respects and acknowledges the necessity of diversity in all aspects of human life. It sensitises the learner to the idea that humans have naturally developed a range of different ways of life, customs and worldviews. It is education which promotes equality and human rights, challenges unfair discrimination and promotes the values upon which equality is built<sup>12</sup>. Education is an important context for intercultural communication, since students and teachers come from a variety of cultural backgrounds and bring a variety of expectations to the classroom. Education not only reflects society but also influences its development and its future.

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## AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT GENERATED BY THE RUSSIAN FACTOR IN THE INFORMATION SPACE OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

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*Natalia PUTINA\*\**

**Abstract.** *After the proclamation of independence in 1991, the Republic of Moldova was and remains in the sphere of influence of the Russian Federation, not just as an “imperialist ambition” of the Kremlin in the illusion of reanimation of the USSR, but also as a buffer zone for not admitting NATO's expansion to the East. A component of the imperialist instrument used to maintain its external influence is information propaganda. The purpose of the article is to investigate and to compare the forms and methods of Russian propaganda in the local informational space, from the perspective of the impact it exerts on the consumer of media products in the Republic of Moldova. By observing the principle of objectivity and truth, using the method of comparative, qualitative and content analysis, the means and tools of Russian propaganda used to manipulate the opinion of the population on what is “truth” and “false” have been identified.*

**Keywords:** *hybrid war, soft power, manipulation, misinformation, the Russian world*

The regional geopolitical events (*the military confrontations between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, the annexation of the Crimea*), as well as the international ones (the war in Syria, the disputes between the Russia and USA / NATO), have begun with the issue of intensifying pro-Russian propaganda offensive / anti-Western channel channeled in two major directions:

- *the internal one*, targeting the native public, aiming at enhancing the internal political doctrine of the “Edinaya Rossia” ruling party;
- *the external one*, oriented towards the space of the former socialist countries with a population consuming Russian press, as well as to the states of the world for the consolidation of the image as “super power”, as well as the preservation and promotion of the national interests in the foreign policy.

In relation to the Republic of Moldova, the influence of Russian propaganda and its effects on consumers of media products is very large and sensitive to the preferences and perceptions of the population, especially during periods of major importance for the future of the Republic of Moldova, such as electoral campaigns, the European vector of the country, the Transnistrian problem.

It is worth noting that Russian propaganda is not limited to the borders of the EU and NATO, but concerns the whole world, which presumes an informational war launched

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by the Russian Federation (Chifu, Nantoi, 2016: 6). On both the information space of the Republic of Moldova and the world, the Russian propaganda applies the concept of “*soft power*”<sup>1</sup> (The ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2016) realized through various loyal / specially created political movements / NGOs, NGOs, “cultural exchanges”, “expression of opinions” (*in fact disinformation*), the cultivation of the concept of patriotism and social self-identification through the use of the religious factor. On the Internet, portals and “*troll bureaus*”<sup>2</sup>, are created, which induce the Kremlin's views from the target audience.

Information influence is closely linked to “*wording*” when Russia engages in an informational or ideological confrontation, using certain terms to create positive connotations in the perception of the target audience. In this context, the Russian media address political issues in conciliation with culture, history, education, language, the latter being the basic directions the Russian Federation focuses on the space of ex-Soviet countries. In propaganda messages, Russia emphasizes the importance of the status of Russian language and culture, interprets certain historical events differently from those existing in that country (an eloquent example of this is the celebration of “Victory Day” - 9 May). Also, the introduction of new terminology by Russian propaganda is also relevant (eg “*polite little people*” / *вежливые люди*, “*imposing peace*” / *compulsion for peace*, “*Our Crimea*” / *Крым наш*, “*fight with fascists*” / *борьба с фашистами*, etc.), aimed at justifying the actions of the Russian Federation on a regional and international level (intervention in Donbas, annexation of the Crimea), as well as the formation of a positive perception among the Russian public and speakers of Russian against Moscow's actions in the space of strategic interest.

Thus, on the western flank of the Russian Federation, the propaganda offensive is oriented towards the audience of the Eastern European countries, offering the Kremlin opportunities for infiltration and influence in the local public space<sup>3</sup>. With the initialing of the RM-EU Association Agreement in Vilnius (*November 29, 2013*), the Russian propaganda apparatus targeted the Republic of Moldova. The alleged “*journalistic materials*” related to the disadvantages and the “economic danger” to which Transnistria is exposed with the European path of the Republic of Moldova. Thus manipulative phrases were disseminated such as:

✓ (*Pervii Kanal*) „...According to the source, following the initiation of the Association Agreement with the EU, the leadership of Chisinau expressed the desire to remove the Tiraspol economic agents from the list of exporters on the grounds that they do not meet the requirements of the EU ...” (Transilvania Regional Business, 2017)

✓ (*RTR*) „...in an intervention, the Transnistrian leader, Evgheni Sevciuk, mentioned that Moldova creates conditions for destabilizing the economic situation in the region ...” (UNIMEDIA, 2013)

<sup>1</sup> The concept of *soft power* is included in the “*Concept for the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation*” and is correlated with the information war, public diplomacy and the international cultivation of Russia's image.

<sup>2</sup> The Internet Research Agency / Агентство Интернет Исследований The Internet Research Agency in Sankt-Peterburg, led by Evgeniy Prigojin, Vladimir Putin's close and personal chef

<sup>3</sup> On the day that Ukraine has redefined its external vector for European integration (*autumn 2013*), Russia has intensified its aggressive and manipulative rhetoric with the massive use of TV stations. Following these reports and materials, Ukraine has permanently suspended all Russian posts. Later, Lithuania also banned a number of manipulative TV stations in Russia.

These are just a few of the statements made by Russian TV Central TV stations, which were misinterpreted and misinterpreted by news agencies, websites, blogs, social networks and pro-Russian “troll bureaus”.

In the middle of 2014, after a period of time when the manipulator news filled the Moldovan media space, the Broadcasting Coordination Council of the Republic of Moldova suspended the activity of the Russian TV station “**Rossia 24**” on the territory of the country. However, after the pro-Russian protests, “**Rossia 24**” resumed its work, with maximum administrative sanction and suspension of work for 6 months. Subsequently, after repeated violations, job activity was permanently suspended from June 2015 (ZIARE, 2015).

The Russian TV station «**Rossia 1**» (*also suspended*), retransmitted by the national TV station «RTR-Moldova», conducted a pro-Russian aggressive propaganda, as the target audience was the population of the south of the republic (*the Gagauz and Bulgarian ethnicities*), and the separatist region. The reports carried a manipulative message saying “... *the Transnistrians will strengthen their security in the region once they unite with Gagauzia*” (ActiveNews, 2014).

It is relevant that ATU Gagauzia did not want to be subject to censorship by the authorities in Chisinau. Cable operators have promised to retransmit Rossia 24 and Rossia 1 regardless of ban, arguing that 90% of Gagauzian want to see Russian news in Russian (UNIMEDIA, 2014).

The editorial policy of the main Moldovan TV stations with national coverage provides for the retransmission of Russian TV stations on the territory of the Republic of Moldova, although there is a draft law prohibiting the retransmission of news programs and foreign analytical programs on the territory of the country that are contrary to national interests of the country.

The analysis of the Russian television programs retransmitted on the territory of the Republic of Moldova denotes an alarming situation regarding the Russian propaganda, namely:

➤ **TV station “Prime”** (*retransmits Russian TV channel “Perviy Kanal”*)

Within the information programs made by the Russian station “Perviy Kanal” and broadcast by the Moldovan television channel “Prime”, we used the tiling of assembly, labeling and way of formulating the information so that the Ukrainian side would appear in a negative light, while the separatists and Russia follow the role of “rescuers and peacekeepers”.

Among these shows were fixed:

- News edition “Sunday times”/Воскресное время;
- The editorial “However”/Однако by the journalist Mikhail Leontiev;
- The TV program “Structure of the moment”/Структура момента – bringing direct allegations US;
- The TV program “Policy”/Политика produced and presented by journalist Alexandr Gordon, who invites representatives of separatist regions of Ukraine to the talk-show.

➤ **TV station “Tv7”** (*retransmits Russian TV channel “HTB”*)

The Russian television station “HTB” has resorted to the production and dissemination of some subjects to panic and to demonstrate Ukraine's anti-human attitude towards its own people, while Russia stands out for its noble purposes, to offer help and support.

By broadcasting some thematic programs, “НТВ” is aggressively conducting political propaganda against Ukraine as follows:

- The TV program “Without cuts”/ *Без кунюр* - having as grounds one year after the Crimean annexation to Russia, a series of reports with the separatist leaders in the region;

- The TV program “A list of Norkin”/ *Список Норкина* – conceived as a show-debate, the guests who support the pro-Russian position are given virtually all the time to express their position.

- **TV station “RTR Moldova”** (*retransmits the Russian TV station “Россия РТР”, after the post “Россия 1” was suspended*)

TV station “RTR Moldova”, in addition to the tendentious materials about the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict, has constantly broadcast reportages justifying and presenting Crimean annexation to Russia as a success of Russian politics and “an act of justice”. In this respect, several promotional topics were made about the new documentary film “Crimea. The Road to Homeland / Крым. Путь на родину”, as well as topics about presenting surveys containing data about the people's opinion on the leadership of Kiev.

Handling public opinion is done not only in newsletters, but also in programs such as:

- The TV program “Special Correspondent”/ *Специальный Корреспондент* the topic of the discussion being focused on NATO's “aggressive politics” and the situation in Ukraine;

- The analytical program “Evening with Vladimir Solovyov”/ *Вечер с Владимиром Соловьевым* - through this program, the intention was to place the US and Ukraine in a negative light, and the Russian Federation - as a positive element in this conflict.

- **TV station “REN Moldova”** (*retransmits Russian TV station “РЕН ТВ”*)

The subjects broadcasted by the television station REN Moldova generally focused on denigrating the Ukrainian authorities, accrediting the idea that the European Union and the US are interested in the escalation of the conflict, and Russia is presented as the only peace-promoting part. A great deal of intensity and aggression, and a longer duration of these messages in informative-analytical documentary programs.

In addition, the share of documentary broadcasts is a considerable one<sup>4</sup>, presenting a well thought-out and structured propaganda material against the backdrop of US denigration, which is presented as the only guilty and interested state in the continuation of the war in Ukraine. Examples are America's intentions at state level to deliver arms to Ukraine.

The situation is even worse in the field of manipulating public opinion, as most of the population are informed from the TV. According to a survey conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation of the Russian Federation / *Фонд «Общественное мнение»* on a sample of 1,000 respondents, 88% of those interviewed find out about the situation in Ukraine, including neighboring countries only from the TV, 73 of which % trust the information disseminated (*Фонд «Общественное Мнение», 2015*).

The main Russian news agencies, under the control of the Kremlin, and from which the local press and electronic media are “fed” are: ИТАР-ТАСС ([www.tass.ru](http://www.tass.ru)),

<sup>4</sup> The TV programs of REN TV: „Drugs of terror”/ *Наркотики террора*; „The territory of delusions”/ *Территория заблуждений*; tv program „Military secret”/ *Военная тайна*; the news program „News 24”/ *Новости 24*

РИА Новости (www.ria.ru), Интерфакс (www.interfax.ru), Федеральное Агентство Новостей (www.riafan.ru), РосБалт (www.rosbalt.ru), ИА Regnum (www.regnum.ru).

The next level is electronic news agencies, which take the information from major news agencies and then broadcast them on the Internet: Newsru.com, RuNews24.ru, Русская Линия (www.rusk.ru), Агентство политических новостей (www.apn.ru), Независимая Газета (www.ng.ru), Коммерсант (www.kommersant.ru), Свободная пресса (www.svpressa.ru).

The Russian Federation's media market is subject to strict control by the authorities, with the Federal Service "Roskomnadzor" / Роскомнадзор - Федеральная служба по надзору в сфере связи, информационных технологий и массовых коммуникаций (www.rkn.gov.ru). This authority withdrew in 2015 the broadcast license of the TV station "Rain" / "Дождь", considered the only independent television channel. Currently, this channel is transmitted exclusively online, being removed from the grid even by private cable companies.

Depending on the opportunity to influence the public opinion, these media resources are mobilized and act on the most sensitive and important subjects on the Moldovan political sphere (*electoral polls, political decisions on the European vector, implementation of institutional reforms, dialogue on the to the settlement of the Transnistrian dispute*), namely:

1. Activation of the separatist administration from Tiraspol in some provocative actions against Chisinau and imposing the idea of federalization of the Republic of Moldova and its use as a "*potential mechanism for settlement of the Transnistrian conflict*".

2. Inspiration to certain separatist ideas of ethnic Gagauzians from ATU Gagauzia and Bulgarians from Taraclia rayon (*the so-called "Republica Budjak"*);

3. Strengthening the pro-Russian ideas in the north of the Republic of Moldova (*municipality: Bălți, city: Soroca, Drochia and Ocnița*) and promoting the ideas of Moldova's accession to the Customs Union.

4. The application by the competent institutions of the Russian Federation of additional coercive actions in relation to Moldovan citizens in seasonal work in the FR.

5. Strengthening the training of opposition forces in the Republic of Moldova affiliated to Moscow that will amplify the aggressive rally against pro-European leadership and policy, as well as promoting the slogans of joining the Eurasian and federalisation projects of the country.

6. Using the religious factor to increase Russian influence. The most important aspect of the new ideology is the society's awareness of *the spiritual place and the historical role of Russia* in the world community.

The media impact that the Russian media have on the audience of the Republic of Moldova is very strong. According to the survey (INDEPENDENT, 2015) conducted by the Center for Independent Journalism, entitled "*How Influential the Russian Pressure is on Moldovans*", he showed that:

- 15% of respondents replied that they trust the Russian press;
- 13% - in the Moldovan press;
- 7% - in the Romanian or European press.

Regarding the objectivity and veracity of the information, 60% of Moldovans believe that the most reliable news is broadcast on Russia's first "*Perviy Kanal*" television station.

Pro-Russian news portals, such as: [www.noi.md](http://www.noi.md), [www.ava.md](http://www.ava.md), [www.pan.md](http://www.pan.md), [www.vedomosti.md](http://www.vedomosti.md), [www.kp.md](http://www.kp.md), [www.gagauzinfo.md](http://www.gagauzinfo.md), [www.kmpress.info](http://www.kmpress.info), including those so named “pridnestrovian moldavian republic” “TMR” take over the informational massive mass media from news agencies in the Russian Federation, translating them into Romanian to cover the largest audience of the local media. Also, periodic editions with national coverage were identified, which are, in fact, subsidiaries of publishing houses in the Russian Federation, on whose pages there is a latent and well camouflaged Russian propaganda, such as: newspapers “Komsomolskaya Pravda v Moldave” ([www.kp.md](http://www.kp.md)), “Argumenty i Fauty v Moldove” ([www.aif.md](http://www.aif.md)), “Kommersant-Info” ([www.kmpress.info](http://www.kmpress.info)).

As an example, the mass media in the Russian Federation has shown the electoral campaign for the election of the Bashkan UTA Gagauzia on March 22, 2015. Irina Vlah was elected as the boscana of autonomy, known for its pro visions and the propaganda message of the Russian media is confirmed from the start by the titles of the articles:

- “*Pro-Russian victory in Gagauzia: the loser government refuses to believe*” / *Пророссийская победа в Гагаузии: проигравшая власть отказывается верить*, [www.mk.ru](http://www.mk.ru) (Московский Комсомолец, 2015);

- “*In Gagauzia, Russia has won*” / *В Гагаузии выиграла Россия*, [www.svoboda.org](http://www.svoboda.org) (Радио Свобода, 2015);

- “*Elections in Gagauzia complicated life to Chisinau*” / *Выборы в Гагаузии усложнили жизнь Кишиневу*, [www.rueconomics.ru](http://www.rueconomics.ru) (Экономика Сегодня, 2015);

- “*In Moldova came Eurasian spring*” / *В Молдавию пришла Евразийская весна*, [www.ruskline.ru](http://www.ruskline.ru) (Русская народная линия, 2015);

- “*Elections in Gagauzia – victory Vlachs in Moldova*” / *Выборы в Гагаузии – победа влахов в Молдове*, <http://russiancouncil.ru> (РСМД, 2015);

- “*Russia has taken a place in Moldova. Elections in Gagauzia was won by the candidate of Moscow*” / *Россия заняла себе место в Молдавии. Выборы в Гагаузии выиграл кандидат Москвы*, [www.kommersant.ru](http://www.kommersant.ru) (КоммерсанТЪ, 2015);

- “*The Ministry of foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation: Results of elections in Gagauzia talking about the need to develop relations with Russia*” / *МИД РФ: Результаты выборов в Гагаузии говорят о необходимости развития связей региона с Россией*, [www.rosbalt.ru](http://www.rosbalt.ru) (РОСБАЛТ, 2015).

The propaganda tactic is focused exclusively on **the ethnic factor** and **the historical past**, the messages transmitted by Russian propaganda being centered on the following directions:

- ✓ common Slavic and Orthodox identity;
- ✓ rewriting historical links;
- ✓ the threat of possible repercussions, including military, in the case of non-alignment to the “*common*” interests of Moscow;
- ✓ Russia as a defender of the Russians in Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova (*including the Transnistrian region*);
- ✓ open support for pro-Russian movements;
- ✓ denigration of hostile movements towards Russia;
- ✓ spiritual purity and Orthodox values in contravention of Western desecration;
- ✓ Orthodox / Slavic roots of nations in Eastern Europe - argument for describing history and ties between Russians and Ukrainians, Baltics, Moldovans, etc.
- ✓ “The right” of the Euro-Asian nations to independence and sovereignty in “partnership” with Russia.

One of the main reasons for the increased popularity of Russian posts with the native ones is represented by the quality of the material being broadcast, starting with news, to entertainment content. The messages of Russian propaganda are clearly reflected in the speeches of pro-Russian politicians in the Republic of Moldova:

- Through agreements with the European Union, Moldova is subject to *slavery*;
- *The Romanian model* is one of poverty in the EU;
- The Customs Union between Russia and the former Socialist states is a preferable alternative despite the agreement with the EU;
- The conflict in Ukraine broke out because of its proximity to the EU and Moldova could find itself in a similar situation;
- Romania has lost its identity and economic independence once it joined the EU;
- Romanians are a nation different from Moldovan, and Romanian is different from Moldovan;
- The EU destroys the Orthodox faith;
- The EU promotes sexual minorities over millennia.

The dominance of Russian TV channels amplifies the impact of Russian “soft power” policies in Moldovan society. This is felt by the existence in the Moldovan society of a set of positivist stereotypes, related to Russia, and by Vladimir Putin in particular.

While wrongdoings such as “the theft of the bill” (FORBES, 2016) and others, committed by “political leaders” that have abusively exploited the slogan of European integration, have contributed to the compromise of the European idea among the less initiate citizens of the Republic of Moldova.

Some sociologists are extremely skeptical about the state of mind in Moldovan society. They found that, as a result of Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the “Russian speaking” population increased the aggressiveness and the chauvinistic spirits, while the spirit of fear and confusion is present in the Romanian-speaking population. The same sociologists have found that “young Russian speakers are lost to Moldova” (NOI, 2017).

To manipulate the important segment of rusified inhabitants of the Republic of Moldova, the idea of belonging to the “Russian world” («Русский Мир») is strongly promoted. Taking advantage of the Russian language of the vast majority of the population of the Republic of Moldova, inherited from the USSR, and of the Russians and ethnic minorities, Russia promotes the policies of maintaining “spiritual relations” in the ex-Soviet space, presenting Russia as a continuation of the “glorious past”.

In promoting its „soft power” policies, the Russian Federation is addressing concrete policies for several segments of Moldovan society. Separate policies are addressed mainly to the population of Transnistria and ATU Gagauzia. Foundation „Русский Мир”<sup>5</sup> Foundation is the most eloquent example of the mechanisms created and used by Russia in this regard. Moscow strongly promotes the idea that, following the collapse of the USSR, the Russian people became a divided one, using in an abusive and speculative manner the notion of “compatriots”/ *соотечественники*, which is much wider and confused than the unambiguous notion of “citizen” of Russia.

Russia's policies are addressed to all age groups of the citizens of the Republic of Moldova. In particular, the mythology of “Great Victory” in the “Great War for the Defense of the Fatherland” (9 May) is intensely exploited. This mythology became part of a state-like quasi-religion in which the Russian imperial past, Christianity in the Russian Orthodox Church, the purely propaganda interpretation of the role played by the USSR in

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<sup>5</sup> <http://ruskiymir.ru>

the Second World War, the “sovereign democracy” Vladimir Putin's version and the eruption of “great russian chauvinism” (*velikorus*), determined by the illegal annexation of Crimea and aggression against Ukraine.

The Russian Federation, with the complicity of “left-wing” local politicians, requires black and white black-and-white perception of World War II events, suggesting that any person questioning the liberation role of the USSR is automatically considered adept of Nazism, etc. With the involvement of Russia-funded NGOs, on the backdrop of propagandist hysteria launched through Russia-controlled media, with the involvement of political parties loyal to the Kremlin, noisy actions are launched every year with the “St. George” ribbons, marches, etc. This policy completely ignores the fact that the population of the SSR, namely after “the Great Victory” and “Liberation” in August 1944, was subjected to inhumane practices of creating the “Moldovan socialist nation”, which resulted in the committing of crimes against humanity (famine artificial 1946-1947, hundreds of thousands of deceased people and multiple cases of cannibalism, repeated deportations to Siberia, etc.)

It is imperative to note that especially after Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the transformation of „St. George's” ribbon from the symbol of military glory during the Russian Empire and the USSR into the symbol of chauvinism “*velikorus*” with obvious elements of a totalitarian regime, uniquely identified with the regime of Vladimir Putin. These ribbons “unite” the representatives of all separatist regimes, whose ideological foundation is based on fidelity to Russia and the ideology of chauvinism “*velikorus*” (Transnistria, Crimea, the regions of Donetsk and Lugansk, etc.) and which have emerged and survive thanks to support coming from Russia

In order to achieve the maximum propaganda effect, Russia resorts to the creation of international Kremlin-led structures that cultivate the spirit of belonging to the succession of the “Great Victory”. Every year there are organized actions dedicated to the 9th of May in ATU Gagauzia, focusing on the involvement of the youth, involving the local administration in organizing these events.

Another „soft power” policy sample is the Gorciakov Foundation (Горчаков)<sup>6</sup>, representing “a unique mechanism of state-civic partnership in the field of foreign policy”. The activities of this Foundation are addressed to young people from the former Soviet space, and aim to cultivate the spirit of belonging to the “great heritage” of the Russian Empire.

An extraordinary role in promoting Russia's geopolitical interests in the Republic of Moldova lies with the **Russian Orthodox Church**. It is well known that in the RSSM the Soviet regime has promoted extremely tough policies directed against religion. Representatives of the **Moldovan Metropolitan Church** (subordinated to the Russian Church) are actively involved in media campaigns aimed at compromising the European course of our country in the perception of Moldovan faithful. In particular, this refers to the hysteria caused by the subject of the Republic of Moldova's commitment to adopt legislation on equal opportunities. Representatives of the clergy were actively involved in the media campaign, the purpose of which was to associate the European area with despair, homosexuality, family degradation, etc.

As the EU-Moldova relations were strengthened, there was an obvious activation (EVENIMENT, 2014) of the “Euro-Asian” vectors of Gagauzia, of the “Moldovans”, with the open involvement of odious representatives of the church. It is certain that these

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<sup>6</sup> <http://gorchakovfund.ru>

actions were (and are still) orchestrated from an area controlled by the Russian Federation, and that the Orthodox Church in Moldova has an important role to play in promoting the interests of the Russian state.

A special target for Russia is the population of the eastern districts of the Republic of Moldova (Transnistria), ie the „Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic” (“pmr”) media space. The population in the region, especially after the installation of cable television, is premeditated by the media space of the Republic of Moldova, the regional media space being totally dominated by Russian TV channels, accompanied by the local “state” television channel. In recent years, the idea of the existence of a new entity of “Transnistrians” - a local version of “Moldovanism” in its Stalinist version - has been strongly promoted in the separatist region. The purpose of these policies is obvious - justifying the existence of the “pmr” and imposing the idea of incompatibility of the local population with the realities of the Republic of Moldova.

ATU Gagauzia, together with the permanent Transnistria, have been and will remain the policy target promoted by Russia. Moscow consistently promotes “positive discrimination” policies towards Gagauzia - the unmotivated embargo on the export of production to Russia, imposed on the Republic of Moldova *as a whole*, does not apply to economic agents in Gagauzia and Transnistria. In Gagauzia, humanitarian aid from the Russian Federation has been sent repeatedly. The Russian Embassy in the Republic of Moldova is very active in the region, ranging from massive donations of books in Russian to direct interference in domestic political processes.

For example, the last elections of Bashkan (the head of the Regional Executive) of Gagauzia (March 22, 2015) turned into a farce - Irina Vlah was promoted in various ways, so brutally and massively to Russia, that all other candidates they had no chance to compete with her. At the same time, any attempt to question the “choice” of Irina Vlah has shown a lack of loyalty to the “Great Russia”, which is inadmissible for the mentality of the population of the autonomous region. As a result, Irina Vlah “defeated” in the first round. For then, in a rectilinear manner, already as a Bashkan and a member of the Government of the Republic of Moldova *ex officio*, to engage in various activities (NAȚIONAL, 2016) subordinated to the interests of Russia. At the same time, in the local government-controlled Gagauzia media, any positive mention of EU assistance is consistently removed. If all the contacts with the regions of Russia are presented in a triumphal way, Irina Vlah's visit to Romania and high-level meetings (ACCENT TV, 2015) have been silenced.

The impact of these policies in the southern area of the Republic of Moldova is extremely serious. In addition to using classical, media propaganda channels, and formation of formations, Russia also uses its minorities in various states in the region to create instability. The tactics of Russian propaganda is to accuse governments of not respecting the rights of the Russian minority. It is an increasingly widespread idea of Russia through non-governmental organizations and affiliated media that Russian speakers are being discriminated against and that “*the Romanianization of the population of the Republic of Moldova is taking place*”. By these manipulative methods, Russia is trying to destabilize the Republic of Moldova and at the same time to exert pressure on the Moldovan society

As an example, some results of the sociological survey conducted by the Institute for Public Policies within the Moldova-East-West Project: Gagauzia and Taraclia (Institutul de Politici Publice, 2016). It is enough to mention, for example, that about 64% consider that the Republic of Moldova belongs to the “*Russian World*” and about 35% see

the future of the Republic of Moldova “*in the composition of Russia*”. About 85% would have voted for a referendum that Moldova might join the Eurasian Union.

The results of the survey unambiguously prove that Russia's aggression against Ukraine was perceived exclusively by Russian propaganda. As a result, about 70% believe that “*after the Maidan, fascists came to power in Ukraine*” and over 80% say “*the Crimea's entry into Russia*”. The above figures show that this category of citizens of the Republic of Moldova lives in a virtual reality, created by the propaganda machine of the current political regime in Russia.

From the above mentioned, it is outlined the action tramp of Russian propaganda, which unfolds in three main directions:

1. Highlighting Russia's role and place in maintaining the “*statehood/independence/integrity*” of the Republic of Moldova. The analysis of the propaganda messages and the themes approached by the Russian media on this vector highlights such theses that “*Moldovan workers working in Russia are very appreciated*”; “*The Russian Federation recognizes the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the Republic of Moldova, while the Transnistrian region has historically belonged and is currently part of the "Russian World"*”; “*The Government of the Russian Federation will intensify cooperation with the Moldovan authorities aimed at educating the young youth, cultivating and promoting Russian language and Russian cultural traditions*”

2. The reasoning of the Russian Federation's actions in its foreign policy and the consequences for the Republic of Moldova in its attempts to get out of Russia's influence. In general, propaganda messages are channeled on important topics, such as: “*Moldova's abandonment of traditional ties with Russia will have a direct impact on the Moldovan economy*”; “*Moldovan products can not find a market in the EU*”; “*Moldovan workers working in Russia will be deported to their country of origin if their illegal presence in Russia is found*”; “*Moscow is interested in solving the Transnistrian conflict in the “5 + 2” format - (which proved to be inefficient)*”; “*In the context of defusing the military conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Moscow will not withdraw the military contingent from the Transnistrian security area*”.

3. The denigration of Romania and Ukraine in front of the Moldavian autochthonous audience, both Russian and Romanian, and the presentation of these states as potential enemies for the Republic of Moldova. Media messages promoted to the Kremlin's interests are centered on sensitive issues for the Moldovan society, such as: “*Romania is plotting to destroy the sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova, following the **Great Union***”; “*Chisinau tolerates the Romanization of the population of the Republic of Moldova, including the ethnicities of Gagauzia, Taraclia and Balti*”; “*Ukraine is trying to attract the attention of the West by provoking a conflict in Transnistria*”; “*Kiev and Chisinau have started a hybrid war against Transnistria, wanting to bust it economically*” (ПолитНавигатор, 2017).

In the context of the latest events in Ukraine, Russian propaganda introduces new themes in the public space, the purpose of which is to determine the population to act in the sense desired by the manipulator of the public opinion (*Russian propaganda*). Even if the theme itself is new, we use the message lines already conveyed in other contexts to give credibility to the transmitted messages. For example, the risk of triggering a Maidan in Chisinau in the context of the presidential / parliamentary elections (POINT, 2017). These propaganda theses are accompanied by messages such as: “*There have been several NGOs funded by the West in the region. They discredit the idea of the rule of law and*

*pursue the challenge of a Maidan in the region”; “The unionist aspirations of some political descendants, on the one hand, the State and pro-Russian statements of other political forces, on the other hand, will be a catalyst for the launch of the Maidan in Chisinau”; “ATU Gagauzia will reserve its right to self-determination under conditions in which the Republic of Moldova will lose its sovereignty”.*

Among the other propaganda tools used by the Russian Federation on the Moldovan space are radio and print media (*electronic and paper*).

Since March 2015, the radio station “Univers FM” in Chisinau has become a Russian-state federal media federation “Россия Сегодня”<sup>7</sup>, which is the successor of the News Agency “RIA NOVOSTI” and financed by the federal budget. For the year 2015, USD 108 million (6.4 billion ruble) was allocated, twice as much as in the years 2013 and 2014. For the year 2017, the federal budget provided USD 100 million (6 billion rubles) to finance the agency, with the rectification of funding to an increase of 792 million rubles (\$ 14 million) (BBC - Russian version, 2017).

Due to licensing and technical reasons, the broadcasting of the radio station “Univers FM - Studio Sputnik Moldova” has been suspended. Subsequently, since September 2015, another radio station “Radio Alla” has been broadcasting the news block in Romanian and Russian, which was signed by the “Sputnik” news agency. In this context, the online broadcasting of Radio Sputnik («Радио Спутник») radio station in the country is made by accessing the website <http://www.sputnik.md/popup/radio/>.

The “Sputnik / Спутник” radio network is part of the Russian media group ‘Sputnik News’<sup>8</sup>, which in turn is part of the media group “Россия Сегодня”.

According to the general manager of the media group “Россия Сегодня” Dmitri Kiseliou, the “Sputnik News” platform, will broadcast in 130 cities in 34 countries around the world with offices in Bucharest, Chisinau, Kiev, Minsk, Belgrade, etc. The “Спутник” radio network will operate in 30 languages from 2015 and will deliver over 800 hours of content per day (НТВ, 2014).

Russian propaganda through the international news network “Sputnik News” has found a segment of the Moldovan media market. He is focused on the Russian speaking audience, as well as on the Romanian language, by disseminating news and interviews with alleged politicians and policy analysts in Moscow. Obviously, the information flow broadcast by this radio station is pro-Russian and anti-Western. In order to combat aggressive propaganda as well as diminish the influence of the mediaeval “Россия Сегодня”, the Chisinau authorities declared to its media-holding journalists an undesirable person for 5 years (*until 2020*) (Коммерсантъ, 2015):

- the general manager of the media group “Россия Сегодня” Dmitri Kiseliou;
- the journalist and publicist of the same media-holding, Armen Gasparean, former editor-in-chief of the Russian radio news “Голос России”;
- the journalist and author of the documentary film “Crimea. The Road to Homeland”/Крым. Путь на Родину, Andrei Kondrashov.

Taken together, the “soft power” policies promoted by Russia have a particularly serious impact, including the complicity of the political class in the Republic of Moldova.

<sup>7</sup> On December 9, 2013, the RIA Novosti News Agency was liquidated through the presidential decree, and the International News Agency “Россия Сегодня”, funded from the federal budget, was created. For the year 2015, USD 130 million (RUR 6.48 billion) was allocated, two times more than in 2013 and 2014. For the year 2016, the federal budget bill foresees USD 108 million (RUR 6.7 billion) to finance the Agency.

<sup>8</sup> [www.sputniknews.com](http://www.sputniknews.com)

No government or political party has been able to promote population consolidation policies based on the spirit of citizenship by conscious detachment from the Soviet past by conscious overcrowding of ideological clichés and ethno-linguistic cleavages inherited from the USSR in order to reach that a level of society's consolidation that would have rendered useless both “soft power” policies in the Russian version, while annihilating the consequences of the informational warfare triggered by Russia.

However, the Association Agreement with the EU signed on June 27, 2014, is a legal commitment of the Moldovan state to reform the state in line with European standards, but the political class in the Republic of Moldova chose to mimic reforms. Key people with whom the state of “captive state” is identified do not want to escape the state institutions, nor the possibilities of exacerbating public money. This is why they ignore all claims from Moldovan society and development partners. Instead, it looks for opportunities to establish “confidential relations” with the Kremlin, and does not try to counter the consequences of Russia's "soft power" and informational warfare, using state resources

Russian propaganda campaigns bring real harm to the national interests of the Republic of Moldova. Their main objective is to discredit the notion of democracy, to undermine the legitimate government of the states in the region, including the Republic of Moldova, and to strengthen Russia's political and military power.

Given that the Moldovan Government and public institutions are inert to civil society warnings, it is necessary to ask the US and the EU to support the domestic media companies capable of destroying the hostile propaganda of the Russian Federation, especially those of radio and television stations, who are responsible for inciting hatred and war.

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## LA FRANCOPHONIE – UNE PORTE SUPPLÉMENTAIRE DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE DE MOLDOVA VERS L'EUROPE

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**Résumé.** *La France peut être considérée l'avocat de la perspective européenne de la République de Moldova. Dans ce contexte, la principale motivation d'action favorable de Paris pour la République de Moldova est la Francophonie, un facteur important dans le contexte où l'expansion de la langue française sur le territoire des Etats voisins de l'Union européenne est évidente.*

*La République de Moldova peut être considérée le pays le plus francophone de l'Europe Centrale et de l'Est. Partenaire et animatrice de la Francophonie, l'Alliance Française de Moldavie participe activement au processus de rapprochement de la Moldavie à l'Union européenne. La francophonie et la francophilie en Moldavie pourraient être des atouts pour la conquête de nouvelles parts de marché et faciliter de nouvelles implantations à la suite des grands groupes comme Orange, Lactalis, Société Générale et Lafarge, déjà présents avec succès depuis plus de dix ans.*

*Outre l'accès à de divers programmes culturels et pédagogiques, l'appartenance à la grande famille des Etats francophones représente une autre voie pour l'intégration européenne de la République de Moldova.*

*Il est à mentionner que la République de Moldova s'approche de l'Europe à l'aide des médias francophones: TV5MONDE et RFI.*

**Mots-clés:** *perspective européenne, Francophonie, filières francophones, Alliance Française de Moldavie, AUF, OIF, médias francophones.*

### **Introduction**

Il n'y a pas de doutes que la France puisse être considérée l'avocat de la perspective européenne de la République de Moldova. Dans ce contexte, la principale motivation d'action favorable de Paris pour la République de Moldova est la Francophonie, un facteur important dans le contexte où l'expansion de la langue française sur le territoire des Etats voisins de l'Union européenne est évidente.

La République de Moldova peut être considérée le pays le plus francophone de l'Europe Centrale et de l'Est. Notre pays a adhéré à l'Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie en février 1996, ayant le statut d'Etat membre. Emmanuel Samson, assistant linguistique et audiovisuel de l'Ambassade Française et de l'Alliance Française de Moldavie soutient dans un interview que l'adhésion de la République de Moldova à l'Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) est une victoire de longue bataille et pas une victoire d'étape. C'est une ouverture vers le monde entier, une possibilité de se

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faire entendue à travers le monde par tout ce qu'elle a de mieux – science, culture, spiritualité (Prin Francophonie..).

Outre l'accès à de divers programmes culturels et pédagogiques, l'appartenance à la grande famille des Etats francophones représente une autre voie pour l'intégration européenne de la République de Moldova.

Le correspondant moldave auprès l'Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie Iuliana Novac explique que l'affiliation à l'espace francophone commun a créé une série d'opportunités de développement, par la mise en œuvre de nombreux projets culturels et éducatifs. L'OIF a dépassé le cadre linguistique, en représentant une plateforme efficace de dialogue dans les domaines prioritaires, comme est celui des droits de l'homme, de la démocratie, du maintien de la paix, de la protection de l'environnement, de la diversité culturelle et linguistique, qui offre de grandes opportunités de promotion des intérêts de la Moldavie sur le plan international.

Le vicedirecteur de l'Alliance Française dans la République de Moldova Adrian Cibotaru affirme que par le biais de la Francophonie, la Moldavie devient plus démocratique, plus ouverte, plus tolérante et elle a une porte supplémentaire vers l'Europe, encore une voie sur laquelle elle peut se faire valoriser et réaffirmer son attachement aux valeurs auxquelles elle a adhéré et qu'elle déclare des plus hautes tribunes ( Francofonia, o poartă...).

### ***Alliance Française de Moldavie - Partenaire et Animatrice de la Francophonie***

Avec une histoire de 24 ans, l'Alliance Française de Moldavie a été la première institution culturelle européenne qui a annoncé sa présence à Chisinau, avant l'ouverture d'une représentation diplomatique française dans la République de Moldova. L'Alliance Française est devenue aujourd'hui un moyen excellent de promotion de l'influence française et francophone en Moldavie et un instrument de développement pour la Moldavie et ses habitants. L'Alliance Française de Moldavie est un acteur important dans la vie culturelle moldave. Son programme culturel et artistique, qui sert assez souvent de modèle pour les autres acteurs culturels, est établi en accord avec l'Ambassade de la France et les structures culturelles locales. Etant un acteur important de la vie culturelle moldave l'Alliance Française de Moldavie a pour vocation de promouvoir les cultures francophones mais aussi la diversité culturelle. « Journées de la Francophonie » ou « Festival du Film Francophone » sont des événements attendus par le public moldave et inscrits dans le paysage culturel local. La programmation de l'Alliance Française est guidée par la volonté de diversifier les publics, particulièrement les jeunes (Alianța Franceză din Moldova...).

Les jeunes moldaves qui parlent la langue française peuvent obtenir une bourse ou peuvent trouver un emploi bien payé à l'étranger ou dans les grandes entreprises ouvertes dans notre pays par des investisseurs français. Chaque année, environ 1.000 Moldaves étudient dans les universités de France, Belgique ou Suisse. La langue française reste la première langue d'étude dans la République de Moldova, même si les dernières années elle cède la place à l'anglais.

Dans l'année académique 2011-2012, en Moldavie le français était étudié par 163.461 élèves et enseigné par 1.711 professeurs. En outre, sept lycées de Chișinău, Bălți, Ungheni, Cahul et Soroca ont des classes bilingues. Hélène Gauthiere, responsable des projets linguistiques dans le cadre de l'Alliance Française précise qu'à l'aide du Baccalauréat linguistique les élèves peuvent entrer dans les Universités de France sans passer un examen. Et les adultes apprennent le français. Les uns pour émigrer au Québec, les

autres – avec des intérêts de service ou personnels ou dans le cadre des projets. Par exemple, pour cinq ans, plus de 600 fonctionnaires publiques ont bénéficié des cours gratuits de langue française de spécialité, organisés par l'OIF (Francofonia, o poartă suplimentară).

Partenaire et animatrice de la Francophonie, l'Alliance Française de Moldavie participe activement au processus de rapprochement de la Moldavie à l'Union européenne. Elle assure également le processus de formation en langue française des fonctionnaires, des cadres administratifs et politiques moldaves dans le cadre du Plan pluriannuel pour la langue française en Europe, organisé par l'Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie. Ce plan est soutenu financièrement par le Ministère français des Affaires Etrangères et Européennes, le Grand Duché de Luxembourg et la Délégation Wallonie-Bruxelles. Etant et le siège de la Chambre de Commerce et Industrie France-Moldavie, l'Alliance Française soutient également le développement économique du pays (Alianța Franceză din Moldova...).

Le 13 octobre 2008, dans le cadre du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de l'Intégration Européenne a été signé le Mémorandum concernant la mise en œuvre du „Projet Europe”, programme pluriannuel de formation en français des fonctionnaires publiques de la République de Moldova. Le projet a été lancé en 2002 ayant à la base l'Accord multilatéral signé entre l'OIF, la France, la communauté française de Belgique et Luxembourg, en vue de soutenir les pays candidats dans le processus d'intégration européenne. L'inclusion de la Moldavie parmi les bénéficiaires du plan pluriannuel pour la formation en langue française a lieu exceptionnellement, étant donné que le «Projet Europe» vise seulement les États membres de l'UE et les candidats, indépendamment de leur appartenance à l'OIF. De la part de la République de Moldova, le Mémorandum a été signé par M. Andrei Stratan, vicepremier ministre, ministre des Affaires Etrangères et de l'Intégration européenne, mais de la part de la République Française – par M. Pierre Andrieu, ambassadeur de France à Chișinău (La Chișinău va fi semnat Memorandumul privind..).

Selon Andrei Stratan, le but principal de ce projet est d'aider la République de Moldova par la consolidation des capacités d'utilisation de la langue française par les diplomates et les fonctionnaires publiques. Le projet permet aux fonctionnaires publiques l'étude des documents en français émis dans le cadre de l'UE. En même temps, selon Pierre Andrieu, dans le cadre du programme „Projet Europe” les pages web des ministères de la République de Moldova seront traduites en français. La traduction permettra d'attirer plus d'investissements français dans la République de Moldova, en favorisant un nouveau contact du pays avec l'UE ( Funcționarii moldoveni..).

Dans le cadre de l'Assemblée Parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe, pendant un débat qui a précédé l'adoption de la résolution concernant le respect des obligations et des engagements de la République de Moldova, M. René Rouquet, membre de l'Assemblée et député français, a souligné, dans son discours, le rôle de l'Alliance Française de Moldavie en ce qui concerne l'enseignement de la langue française dans le cadre du Parlement de la République de Moldova. Il soutient que grâce aux discussions concernant le fonctionnement des institutions démocratiques de la République de Moldova il y a un réel espoir de stabilité et de progrès pour la première fois au cours des dernières années. Grâce aux réformes, la situation des droits de l'homme et de l'Etat de droit dans la République de Moldova a été grandement améliorée. M. René Rouquet a mentionné notamment la création du plan national d'action pour les droits de l'homme et du programme concernant l'égalité entre les sexes. Le député français a constaté que la République de Moldova a encore un grand manque de ressources. Mais grâce à une réelle volonté politique de nouveaux dirigeants elle a réussi à entreprendre une série d'actions avec un nombre très réduit de ressources. Selon le député français, même si les problèmes persistent,

notamment dans le domaine de la justice et de la corruption, les réformes vont continuer et vont se consolider.

Dans le même discours on parle de l'événement majeur pour le futur européen de la République de Moldova, la signature de l'Accord d'association et de libre échange entre la République de Moldova et l'UE, un événement qui constitue une opportunité pour le pays. M. René Rouquet soutient que les accords de ce type sont d'une importance incontestable. Ils peuvent contribuer aux changements réels et peuvent devenir des instruments indispensables pour les futures réformes. En outre, l'eurodéputé français salue la décision de l'UE d'ouvrir son marché pour les vins moldaves. Ainsi, l'Union européenne a démontré que le Partenariat de l'Est ne concerne pas seulement le domaine géostratégique et ne suppose pas seulement une intégration économique. Il est une vraie solidarité des valeurs communes pour une Europe unie et libre. Finalement, M. René Rouquet a mentionné que la France va continuer soutenir la République de Moldova sur la voie de l'intégration européenne ( *Activitatea Alianței Franceze.*).

Comme il est mentionné dans le Traité d'entente, d'amitié et de coopération entre la République de Moldova et la République Française, dans la perspective de la construction d'un ensemble européen, les deux Etats prennent leur engagement à créer un climat propice à l'approfondissement de leur coopération économique, qui aura une signification particulière dans la réforme économique en Moldavie. (Tratat nr. 1993...).

Le 7 juillet 2007 il a eu lieu le premier forum France-Moldavie ayant comme thème „La Francophonie - une voie européenne pour la République de Moldova”. Lancé par le président du Parlement Marian Lupu, ce forum a généré toute une série d'idées et de projets collaboratifs. Ce forum a été organisé, en coopération, par le Parlement de la République de Moldova, la Fondation française « Jean Jaurès », l'association « Les Moldaviens » et de nombreux invités prestigieux de la société civile. Le but principal a été le développement des relations entre les sociétés civiles pour contribuer à l'europanisation de la Moldavie. Les liens créés avec les pays francophones contribuent à la réalisation de ce but. L'idée des villes jumelées est apparue dans les années 1950, immédiatement après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, à un moment où il fallait encourager le dialogue entre les peuples et quand il fallait créer des liaisons étroites entre des communes. L'objectif initial consistait à construire un partage des connaissances, un échange d'expériences et compétences dans tous les domaines de la vie au niveau local. Par son esprit, cet idéal de paix et dialogue est profondément européen. Une délégation de la ville Grenoble représentée par Mme Laure Masson, élue municipale et Françoise Rousset, attaché en Relations internationales de l'Université Recherche ont participé à un forum afin de reprendre le contact avec Chișinău. La délégation a eu une rencontre avec le maire Dorin Chirtoacă et a proposé à Chișinău d'élaborer et de transmettre aux collectivités locales de la ville Grenoble les projets prioritaires. Le maire Dorin Chirtoacă, un francophone excellent, a réussi à gagner la confiance de ses interlocuteurs. Le jumelage des villes Grenoble et Chișinău a une importance considérable pour promouvoir l'image de notre capitale à l'étranger, et, notamment, dans le monde francophone. Chișinău constitue une vitrine de la Moldavie, étant donné la concentration des activités économiques dans la capitale et de l'attention internationale (Un nou inceput...).

### *Les Médias Francophones*

La République de Moldova s'approche de l'Europe à l'aide des médias francophones : TV5MONDE et RFI. TV5MONDE est la première chaîne mondiale de télévision en français. Elle revendique des contenus universels, porteurs de sens et de

valeurs humanistes, et privilégie la qualité, l'innovation, la découverte dans le choix et la conception de ses programmes.

Depuis 2008, TV5MONDE est partenaire de la Holding de l'Audiovisuel Extérieur de La France qui détient 49% du capital et regroupe France 24 et RFI. TV5MONDE entretient des partenariats avec dix chaînes francophones : France 2, France 3, France 5, ARTE France, RTBF (la Radio Télévision Belge de la Communauté Française), TSR (la Télévision Suisse Romande), Radio Canada, Télé Québec, RFO (Réseau France Outremer) et le CIRTEF (Conseil International des Radios-Télévisions d'Expression Française). TV5MONDE est partenaire stratégique de l'Alliance Française de Moldavie et soutient chaque année des événements culturels - festival des Nuits Pianistiques de Moldavie - Mer Noire, festival du Film Francophone - ou des actions contribuant à la promotion du français en Moldavie - formations "apprendre et enseigner avec TV5MONDE", brochure de promotion du français etc. L'Alliance Française de Moldavie participe à la promotion de TV5MONDE en Moldavie. TV5MONDE est diffusée en hertzien en Moldavie, sous-titrée en roumain. TV5MONDE est également accessible en Moldavie sur les réseaux câblés et par satellite, sur la souscription de base, sous-titrée en roumain ou en russe pour les non-francophones. L'Alliance Française accueille le représentant local de TV5MONDE pour la Moldavie : M. Adrian Cibotaru, directeur adjoint de l'Alliance Française, qui affirme qu'outre TV5MONDE, l'Alliance Française assure également la promotion en Moldavie de Radio France Internationale (RFI). Le plus grand opérateur de câble moldave, Sun Communications, diffuse RFI, depuis 2009, dans son bouquet numérique. Un accord de libre diffusion de RFI sur le territoire moldave a été signé avec le Conseil Coordinateur de l'Audiovisuel en 2009. RFI est diffusé sur une partie du territoire moldave - Chisinau et alentours - depuis 1994 en FM sur 107.3MHz. Depuis 2004, RFI rediffuse en Moldavie environ 4 heures des programmes matinaux de Radio Delta RFI Roumanie. (Ce partenariat există...)

### ***Agence Universitaire de la Francophonie***

L'AUF regroupe plus de 800 institutions universitaires utilisant la langue française dans plus de 100 pays. Elle est l'une des plus importantes associations d'institutions d'enseignement supérieur et de recherche au monde. Elle est également l'opérateur pour l'enseignement supérieur et la recherche de la Conférence des Chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement des pays ayant le français en partage. Sa mission est de promouvoir une francophonie universitaire dynamique impliquée dans le développement.

L'AUF accompagne ses institutions membres dans leur dynamique de structuration, d'expansion et d'implication dans le développement. Son intervention couvre trois domaines constitutifs de l'enseignement supérieur : la formation, la recherche et la gouvernance universitaire. Ses équipes, présentes à travers le monde, apportent suivi et conseils pour la conception et la mise en place de projets, offrent un appui technique et financier initial et un accompagnement dans la recherche de nouveaux partenaires. L'AUF construit, anime et pilote des projets multilatéraux d'envergure dans tous les champs du développement des universités et des sociétés notamment, l'accès à une éducation de qualité, l'égalité homme-femme, le numérique éducatif, l'internationalisation des établissements, la science pour le développement, l'entrepreneuriat, l'insertion professionnelle des diplômés, la formation continue. Elle collabore régulièrement avec les entreprises privées et leurs fondations, les Etats et gouvernements, les agences nationales d'aide au développement, les organisations internationales, les organisations non

gouvernementales et les associations universitaires, scientifiques et culturelles (Présentation de l'AUF...).

Dans un interview Roman Kwiatkowski, responsable de l'Antenne de l'AUF Chişinău, mentionnait que l'agence soutient des programmes de longue durée qui visent les classes bilingues des lycées de la République de Moldova; des programmes de bourses internationales. Par le biais des programmes des bourses, les étudiants moldaves font leur stage de trois mois dans des entreprises françaises ou francophones. Il existe aussi les bourses de doctorat ou postdoctorat „Eugene Ionesco” destinées aux chercheurs de la République de Moldova. Dans ce contexte on peut parler des filières francophones des universités de la Moldavie (Université Technique, Université de Médecine, Université d'Etat de Moldova, Université Libre Internationale, Académie d'Etudes Economiques). L'AUF soutient encore les cours de français et les projets de master en français pour les étudiants moldaves. L'AUF organisent des conférences à un haut niveau, avec une large participation internationale (Susţinem cercetarea...).

Au mois de mars 2017, M. Jean-Paul de Gaudemar, Recteur de l'Agence Universitaire de la Francophonie (AUF), a effectué une visite officielle en Moldavie. Les points forts du programme de cette visite ont été la présentation de la nouvelle stratégie de l'AUF aux représentants des universités membres d'Arménie, d'Azerbaïdjan, de Géorgie, de Moldavie, de Russie et d'Ukraine et plusieurs rencontres avec la communauté universitaire autour des nouvelles orientations de l'Agence.

Les questions qu'on se pose ont plusieurs aspects. D'abord, l'évolution de la francophonie et puis l'évolution de l'université. L'AUF essaie de définir sa mission au confluent de ces aspects. D'abord, si on prend l'université d'aujourd'hui, la première des caractéristiques c'est, depuis une vingtaine d'années, une explosion du monde universitaire, en termes de nombre d'étudiants, nombre d'universités ou d'établissements d'enseignement supérieur, plus généralement, et cela donne des conséquences très importantes, liées à une demande de tout type – une demande sociale, d'abord : les jeunes générations souhaitent faire des études supérieures. Le progrès dans la plupart de pays fait que des classes moyennes apparaissent qui peuvent envoyer leurs enfants faire des études à l'université, ce qui n'était pas le cas forcément il y a une génération. Il y a une demande aussi du monde économique pour avoir des qualifications supérieures. Cela a beaucoup de conséquences sur le fonctionnement des universités et sur leurs missions, et les missions de l'Agence doivent refléter les besoins de nos universités. Ces besoins, ils sont d'abord liés aux flux nombreux d'étudiants.

Le Recteur de l'AUF mentionne trois défis de la qualité : aider les universités à maintenir ce niveau de qualité de la formation, développer leur capacité de recherche et développer des modes de gouvernance adaptés aux nouvelles conditions.

Sa vision de la promotion de la francophone c'est de promouvoir la francophonie à travers les choses originales, les choses réussies, les solutions que nous trouvons à des problèmes dans les universités francophones qui peuvent par elles-mêmes faire un exemple et donner envie de rejoindre la francophonie, parce que les étudiants qui sont passés par ces filières-là auront trouvé plus facilement un emploi, seront mieux insérés (Notre vision...).

L'AUF a donc plusieurs axes d'activité : formation, recherche, gouvernance. La dimension formation est la plus explorée par les universités francophones de Moldavie et c'est peut-être celle sur laquelle l'Agence a mis l'accent, mais on voit des évolutions intéressantes en matière de développement des capacités et en matière de recherche.

La contribution de l'Ambassade de la France en Moldavie, des partenaires de la Francophonie : l'AUF, l'OIF, TV5MONDE, RFI et CCI France-Moldavie est incontestable.

Dans le livre « Moldavie: les atouts de la francophonie » Florent Parmentier a fait un essai sur le poids de la francophonie en Moldavie et sur l'impact des échanges au sein de la francophonie sur le développement politique et économique du pays. Grâce au cadre offert par l'Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, aux réseaux d'entraide et à la coopération européenne, les citoyens moldaves s'émancipent peu à peu d'un héritage stalinien mortifère et aspirent à des jours meilleurs. La Francophonie joue un rôle important dans les relations moldo-françaises et présente un atout pour une Moldavie démocratique, européenne et prospère. Selon l'auteur la Francophonie représente un vecteur qui pourrait conduire la Moldavie vers l'Union européenne ( Parmentier, 2010: 23).

Jacques Attali est l'auteur de l'ouvrage *La Francophonie et la Francophilie, moteurs de croissance durable*, un rapport présenté à François Hollande, président de la France. Selon lui, la France a vocation à être un acteur majeur au sein de deux zones intégrées : l'Union européenne et le monde francophone. C'est bien un enjeu stratégique pour une France forte sur la scène internationale, à l'image du Royaume-Uni qui se considère comme partie intégrante tant de l'Union européenne que du Commonwealth.

Ce rapport contient quelques pages destinées à la Moldavie qui peut être considérée comme le pays le plus francophone d'Europe centrale et orientale. Le français n'y est pas la langue maternelle, mais reste parlé ou compris par une grande partie de la population. L'URSS y a favorisé l'enseignement du français (jusqu'à 80 % d'apprenants de français à l'école à la veille de l'indépendance, diffusion de l'Humanité dans les kiosks à journaux). Pour beaucoup de Moldaves, la pratique du français à l'époque soviétique était une manière de préserver leur latinité, donc leur propre culture, alors que l'usage public du roumain faisait parfois l'objet de discrimination. Aujourd'hui, encore 45 % des Moldaves apprennent le français. La présence d'une grande réserve de personnes francophones (10 à 20 % de la population), bien formées, pour un salaire moyen modeste, constitue actuellement une opportunité pour le développement de centres d'appels et d'externalisation de certaines activités de services. Elle permet à certaines entreprises françaises de réduire leurs coûts, d'améliorer leur compétitivité et leur rentabilité. La francophonie et la francophilie en Moldavie pourraient être des atouts pour la conquête de nouvelles parts de marché et faciliter de nouvelles implantations à la suite des grands groupes comme Orange, Lactalis, Société Générale et Lafarge, déjà présents avec succès depuis plus de dix ans. Malgré la petite taille du marché intérieur, la Moldavie présente des avantages certains : déjà membre d'une zone de libre-échange avec la Russie et dans le cadre de la CEI, le pays a signé le 27 juin 2014 un accord de libre-échange complet et approfondi avec l'Union européenne. La France bénéficie d'une bonne image, mais demeure assez mal connue, les médias étant concentrés essentiellement sur les affaires locales, ou des programmes d'information russes. Il n'y a pas d'école française en Moldavie, mais un besoin commence à se faire sentir en particulier auprès des élites moldaves, dans un contexte dominé par la seule école internationale américaine très coûteuse. Avec l'élévation du niveau de vie locale, une école française trouvera toute sa place dans ce pays. Il y a en revanche 8 filières francophones dans les écoles et lycées. 3 711 élèves suivent une filière bilingue français dans le primaire et 6 260 dans le secondaire. On compte 6 filières francophones (autant que le nombre de filières anglophones) au niveau licence qui avaient été mises en place par l'AUF : médecine, informatique, technologies alimentaires, relations économiques internationales, gestion et

administration des entreprises et droit. Ces filières accueillent 415 étudiants en 2012. Elles ne reçoivent plus de soutien direct de l'AUF depuis plusieurs années. Parmi les hauts fonctionnaires, on peut estimer entre 10 et 20 % le nombre de francophones. Pourtant, la disparition progressive du programme de formation des hauts fonctionnaires de l'OIF (plus de 200 fonctionnaires formés il y a deux ans, réduction de moitié en cours d'année 2013, puis suspension depuis le début de l'année) n'encourage pas le maintien de la francophonie dans l'élite administrative du pays. Beaucoup ont appris le français à l'école et conservent une compréhension passive, mais sans occasion de le pratiquer. À mesure que la Moldavie intensifie sa coopération avec l'Union européenne, son corps diplomatique et le personnel des ministères techniques chargés de relations internationales se tournent davantage vers l'anglais. Cette francophonie moldave reste donc fragile et sur le déclin. Désormais sevrée de presque tout soutien externe (arrêt du soutien aux classes bilingues par l'AUF, extinction progressive des programmes de l'OIF, chute brutale des crédits de coopération bilatéraux), le risque est qu'elle ne s'érode avant même que les agents économiques français aient pris la mesure du parti à en tirer (Attali, 2014 : 27-28).

### *Conclusion*

La francophonie en Moldavie contribue à la formation de nouvelles élites, à la promotion de la diversité culturelle et à la création d'emploi pour les citoyens francophones. La Francophonie représente un moyen évident d'euphémisation de la République de Moldova.

La Moldavie devient, par le biais de la Francophonie, plus démocratique, plus ouverte, plus tolérante et elle a une porte supplémentaire vers l'Europe, encore une voie sur laquelle elle peut se faire valoriser et réaffirmer son attachement aux valeurs auxquelles elle a adhéré et qu'elle déclare des plus hautes tribunes.

La Francophonie joue un rôle important dans les relations moldo-françaises, la France ayant la vocation à être un acteur majeur au sein de deux zones intégrées: l'Union européenne et le monde francophone. Le poids de la francophonie en Moldavie est majeur et elle a un impact sur le développement politique et économique du pays.

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## DIFFERENT THEORETICAL APPROACHES ABOUT EUROPEAN STUDIES<sup>1</sup>

*Mariana BUDA\**

**Abstract.** *The European Studies, as a discipline of study or specialization, is no longer a new-entry in today's Higher Education. All the European countries, but even countries from the others continents, have introduced this discipline in their curricula. The aim of this article is to present and to analyse different theoretical approaches that have existed during the time in Europe and have conducted to the specialization of European Studies that we know today. The Bibliography in this domain is much extended, that's why we assume the risk and we do not pretend to be exhaustive with this classification. Otherwise, our study is a faithful representation of a theoretical basis.*

**Keywords:** *European Studies, European Union studies, European integration studies, core curricula in European Studies, teaching European Studies*

Generally, the European Studies focuses on the analysis of national and transnational changes on the European continent, with an emphasis on the European integration and European construction as a central theme (González, Wagenaar, 2005: 19). The definition of this field is also closely linked to events taking place in the contemporary age and the curricula of European Studies is subject of constant updating and evolution. The European Studies are considered to be both multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary studies at the same time. However, there are some differences related to the structure, content and approaches to the teaching and learning of European Studies, depending on the national traditions, but also on the faculties or departments where these study programs are being held.

Nowadays, there are differences and different ways of approaching the teaching and the learning of European Studies, depending on the country where they are taught, because the countries of European Union have a different view on the process of integration (González, Wagenaar, 2005: 19). This diversity is part of the European Studies and we think is a mistake to impose uniformity in this field. Despite that, there are similarities between the objectives of the European study programs and the skills that the graduates have to acquire while completing their studies.

This paper is the product of the desire to have a general overview about all the theories that have guided the European Studies to their actual shape. On the other hand, this study is also an overview of the different specialties of European Studies in Europe. The paper does not claim to be exhaustive. It would, however, reflect a state of fact and an existing reality, an inventory of the current resources and it is a tool able to reflect a new approach and the dynamic of a field of study. It is also important to underline the fact that this study will

<sup>1</sup> Research based on the PhD Thesis of the author

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only make references to the European Studies in university education; it is not within the scope of this paper to cover said studies at high-school level or other levels of study.

### **Conceptual delimitations regarding the terminology**

The new millennium brings changes in the field of education, especially with regard to higher education. Changes are multiple, and so are the approaches. The first step could be considered the implementation of the Bologna process, a major university reform process. Regarding the field of European Studies, we could talk about the theorization of the field: there are more and more articles and studies on European Studies; there is a difference on how the European Studies are being referred to. They are no longer simply called European Studies, but European integration studies or studies about European unity or European Union studies. A real explosion of these studies is remarkable especially after 2000, when the countries in the process of joining the EU are playing along the game with the others countries and when we are actually the witnesses of a real diversification of reflections on the European Agenda. This is also the moment when it starts to appear the interrogations on the new university course (Horga, Buda, 2012:8) and thus, there is more and more used the syntagm of European Union studies. It is also the moment when many authors set out the question of embracing all European Studies in one fundamental field: should they fall under the field of political studies, or social sciences, or humanities? The questions are justified in view of their diversity, but especially given that European Studies are by definition multidisciplinary.

The extensive existing expertise in European Studies, as well as the numerous specialized studies that have been written, give us the opportunity to present a rich bibliography in the field. By going through the literature and synthesizing the main studies in the vast field of the European Studies, we have noticed that they are revolving around some essential issues.

First we have followed the literature that refers to the definitions of the European studies, thus making the corresponding conceptual boundaries since the beginning. Today we are confronted with concepts such as European Studies, European Union studies, European integration studies, as we have mentioned above. The debate on the used terminology is varied. Michael Smith from Queen's University of Belfast, UK, believes that European Union studies (Smith: 2003: 3) are the centre of the European Studies. On the other hand, Chris Rumford & Philomena Murray (Rumford, Murray: 2003: 86), state that European Union studies are actually European integration studies. If the studies about the European integration aim at the analysis of the phenomena related to the common market and, consequently, all the other phenomena connected, the European Union studies are more than an analysis of the market. Those represent a social model as well (Rumford, Murray, 2003: 88; Delanty, 1998: 3). The European Union can be just a framework for globalisation, anchored in solidarity and sustainability (European Council, 2001). On the other hand, the topic of multilevel governance started to be more and more present in the European Studies, and particularly since the debate around the governance took consistency (Hooghe, Marks, 2001). The model of multilevel governance permitted to detach the European Union studies from the European integration studies (Murray, 2000), because the European Union studies allow the development of other kind of approaches like: studies about regional policy, studies about the relation between globalization and European Union, studies about social policy, etc.

European integration studies are those studies or disciplines that in their content refer only to the European integration process. We believe that this kind of study was only

a step towards the further development of European-oriented Studies, because European integration was one of the first major processes that Europe and the European Union went through. The broadest of concepts is certainly the European Studies. European Studies are multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary at the same time, and their purpose is to describe, conceptualize, explain and understand a reality across Europe that cannot be understood and summarized by a single discipline. European Studies refer to all the realities in Europe, not just those related to the European Union or European integration. The point of their convergence is the European unity. By European unity, we understand all those studies that promote the European dimension in education, that is, that contributes to the formation of the consciousness of belonging to Europe under any of the following aspects: geographic, historical, political, economic, administrative, religious, etc. Thus, European integration studies include only those disciplines that refer strictly to the integration process, to the enlargement of the EU, i.e. to the accession process and its consequences on all levels.

Also Gaby Umbach and Bruno Scholl from the University of Koln, Germany, in their researches related to a common curriculum for all the specializations in European Studies, make a clear distinction between the concepts frequently used: European Union studies, European integration studies and European Studies. The European Studies are the most general ones and include the other two categories; they are generic studies and they refer to all aspects related to Europe: culture, legislation, economy, languages, etc. The European Union studies are more limited studies and they refer strictly to the events related to the EU, starting with its creation, its development and ending with the most recent topics. These studies do not refer to larger contexts like the European culture, European economy, etc, disciplines which would take into discussion elements that do not belong to the EU, but to the European space in general. The most reduced studies are those about the European integration. They are included by the European Union studies, because the integration is a process that belongs to the creation and the development of the EU (Umbach, Scholl, 2003). Consequently, we can set up the following scheme:

$$ES^2 \leftarrow EUS^3 \leftarrow EIS^4.$$

### **The development of a curriculum in European Studies**

Probably the first study about uniformity in the teaching about Europe was conducted by Margaret Shennan in 1986 and published in the journal *The Social Sciences*. Margaret Shennan's project focusses on three aspects (Shennan, 1986:9). The first refers to the knowledge that students must have, the second to the skills they need to assume and third to the attitudes and values that must be transmitted by the studies about Europe. The ideas proposed by the author come after a few personal observations of Margaret Shennan, who noticed that in Europe, the studies about Europe are taught chaotic, without having common parts or even basic ideas. Thus, whether these studies are taught in the framework of history, foreign languages, geography, literature, political science, they must have common objectives and goals (Shennan, 1986:8).

Regarding the discussions and the scientific production in the field of a core curriculum in European Studies, we find two types of approaches. On one hand, there are

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<sup>2</sup> European Studies

<sup>3</sup> European Union Studies

<sup>4</sup> European Integration Studies

the supporters of the idea of a basic curriculum in European Studies, understood as a list of items considered essentials for the knowledge in the domain of European Studies, which also contains a list of objectives and teaching methods. And on the other hand, we find the proposal of a learning companion, defined as a kind of book or guide that provides information on a particular topic or explains how to do a certain thing. Therefore, the study guide in European Union studies will provide information about a deeper perception of European integration, materials and resources for teaching and learning this subject.

Wolfgang Wessels, Ingo Linsenmann and Susan Hägele propose another interesting research study called *Teaching European Integration. A Core Curriculum on European Integration Studies; Basic assumptions and proposals*. The article of the three authors is part of a wider research, a project called "Developing a core curriculum of European integration", funded by the European Commission. The authors start from the statement that it is required a basic curriculum of European integration studies and the political challenges require the need for courses on European Union. The European Union is the crucial element of the political architecture of Europe and therefore for all the political systems in Europe. They do not want to harmonize the resources, but to establish frameworks, that is a frame in which you can make applicable changes also across borders, whether national or disciplinary (Wessels, Linsenmann, Hägele, 2001:4). A core curriculum, as the authors understand, consists of a list of items considered to be essential knowledge in a given field. The article is based on finding those objectives and purposes to form a curriculum in European integration studies and those educational methods that can be applied for the acquisition of knowledge. Thus, the authors suggest the following directions of study regarding the European integration studies:

- History of European integration process
- Theoretical approaches of European integration
- Evolution of EU system
- EU as a system of multilevel networks, administration, governance
- Fundamental Law of EU
- Institutions
- Procedures
- Policies
- Types of governance
- Further development of the integration process
- EU's role in the world.

Sure, the list proposed by the authors is not exhaustive and it is open for revisions (Wessels, Linsenmann, Hägele, 2001:5-6). As a conclusion of their research, the authors stress that interdisciplinarity is the key for the study of European integration. In addition, taking into account the fact that European integration is a quicksand, the teaching methodology is required to be more sophisticated than normal.

Gaby Umbach and Bruno Scholl from the University of Köln, Germany, made another study on core curriculum in European studies. The study that the two authors propose is a natural continuation of the study conducted by Wolfgang Wessels, Ingo Linsenmann and Susan Hägele and mentioned above. Umbach and Scholl explain the need of a core curriculum in European integration studies. In their research they also exemplify their model of core curriculum. Thus, it can be made once again the distinction between the two types of studies, those about the European integration and those about the European Union. The European integration studies cover all events centred on the

European integration. The European Union studies cover all the events centred on European Union. The overview is clearer now.

The two authors of the research study *Towards a Core Curriculum in European Union Studies* start their investigation from the finding that the study programs in European Union studies at Bachelor level and Master level have become more and more numerous in the last decade, not only in the framework of political sciences, but also in other fields of study. In addition, the European Union has become a key topic both in the frame of traditional courses and conventional courses. The purpose of this research is to explore how these experiences could contribute to a core curriculum containing basic items and relevant methods for the European Union studies and how these resources could be shared in order to facilitate the teaching (Umbach, Scholl, 2003:71). The mentioned study begins with an overview both of the European Agenda with reference on the development of the curriculum and on the academic and political challenges associated with the teaching about the EU. Finally, the authors propose some conclusions on how it should look a good core curriculum and offer some suggestions on how the professors of European Union studies could use web resources in their teaching, but also on how New Information and Communication Technologies (NTIC) could facilitate the teaching.

To answer the questions related to the concept of core curriculum in European Union studies, the authors state that this, in their vision, is like a list of items considered to be essential for the knowledge and the understanding of European Union studies. Therefore, the development of curricula in EU studies should focus initially on the core objectives proposed by the curriculum and then on the teaching methods. This is the reason why, for the academic curricula, the European Union studies should be treated either as area studies (EU being the case, the situation) or as a horizontal theme (EU representing the theme) in several disciplines and courses (Umbach, Scholl, 2003). On the other hand, there are some practical arguments against the existence or creation of core curriculum in European Union studies. The first argument would be the rigid content that these core curricula would impose, but also the materials and the methods that would come by default. Secondly, the flexibility of the professors should not be restricted by a fixed curriculum that would block the variation and the competition between universities.

Proving that a core curriculum in European Studies may have more disadvantages than advantages, Gaby Umbach proposes the idea of a teaching companion. Thus, the study entitled *Responding to the European Curricula Development: a „teaching companion” in EU studies*, is part of another phase of the project initiated by the University of Köln, EspNet Episteme II, and follows the previous studies about a core curriculum in European Union studies. This time the author proposes the creation of a "teaching companion". A "teaching companion" is defined as a kind of book that provides information on a particular topic or explains how to do a certain thing. Therefore, this learning guide in European Union studies should provide information regarding a deeper perception on European integration, but also materials and resources for teaching and learning about this subject (Umbach, 2003:23).

Concerning the debates and scientific production in the field of core or basic curricula in European studies, we find two types of approaches. On the one hand, there are supporters of the basic curricula idea in European Studies, understood as a list of items considered essential for the knowing in the field of European Studies, which also includes a list of objectives and teaching methods. On the other hand, there is the proposal of a teaching companion, defined as a kind of book or guide that provides information on a particular theme or explains how to do something. Therefore, the learning guide for

European Union studies will provide information on a deep perception of European integration, as well as materials and resources for teaching and learning this theme. Last but not least, there are the followers of the idea that any curriculum in higher education, but especially a European curriculum, must go through the process of Europeanization, through the process of a permanent change and adaptation especially to political and economic realities. By demonstrating that a common curriculum in European studies could have more disadvantages than advantages, Gaby Umbach suggests that a companion or learning guide could be a suitable solution for European Studies.

Two other researchers, Heather Field and Ian Bache, propose two other studies regarding the curricula of European Studies and the relationship between the curricula and the process of Europeanization.

Thus, given the recent interest of the academic environment on a special curricula dealing with the studies on European integration, Heather Field, author of the article *European Integration Curricula and „Europeanisation“: Alternative Approaches and Critical Appreciation* proposes a study about the relationship between these concerns and the process of "Europeanization". She proposes several "alternative approaches" to the studies teaching European integration and the need to promote a critical analysis. To some extent, some aspects of this approach can be considered Anglo-Saxon or Scandinavian approaches considered to be opposing to the approaches in the EU's member states (Field, 2001:1). The aspect very well argued in this research is that an appropriate approach on the teaching of European integration is covering not only the key events of the integration process, but also the various debates on the subject and their implications. An approach of the teaching European integration studies aiming at standardization and to eliminate problems, risks losing sight of important aspects and suffocate other approach, which would risk the creation of better or worse Europeans, depending on the teaching (Field, 2001:1). The European integration studies should not be uniform, despite the Europeanization process, in order to maintain the diversity. The basic idea that promotes Heather Field is that education in European integration field should be designed to provide to the students, on one hand the understanding of the main ideas and approaches relevant for European integration, and on the other hand to have the capacity and skills to be able to test these theories and approaches (Field, 2001:9).

Ian Bache, in his study *Europeanisation and Higher Education: Towards a Core Curriculum in European Studies?* promotes the idea that the Europeanization of the higher education should be understood in the context of political and economic imperatives, thus creating an even closer union among European countries. In this context of Europeanization, there is the risk that the debates on the academic movements to create a core curriculum in European Studies to be subject of economic and political reasons which would undermine the potential pedagogical benefit of a European cooperation in this field.

The debates around the issue related to the Europeanization of education focuses primarily on what it's necessary to be studied in universities and how. European Union studies include a number of themes to be studied necessarily, although the effects of Europeanization are viewed differently by the States (Bache, 2004:3). In general terms, Ian Bache states that the development of the curriculum must be understood in the context of the changing relationship between higher education and society. While, from the historical point of view, the influence of dominant social institutions such as the church or the monarchic power exercised more an indirect power on universities, today the higher education institutions are directly influenced by the State and the public institutions

adopted the language of the society. In particular, the higher education was quickly transformed from institution *in* society, in an institution *of* the society (Bache, 2004:4).

Continuing our investigations on European Studies, we noticed the outline of different teaching models for these studies. Britain is perhaps the country with the greatest attention to the theory on these studies, which is why the literature is vast in this country. In particular, we can talk about a large number of research papers on European Studies in the UK. The one who analysed this area the most was Michael Smith, a professor at Queen University in Belfast. He proposes several works on European Studies in the UK, which is why we can say that a British model emerges out of these studies. Since the beginning of this study program in the UK, it has been led by three defining key factors. Firstly, European Studies have been a response to the belief that if the UK is ready to enjoy the benefits of accession, it urgently needs specialists in the field able to solve both administrative and economic problems that come as a consequence of EU membership. Secondly, European Studies have been conceived as a way of understanding the importance of interculturality. The latter has been seen as the focal point of European Studies, especially through the promotion of foreign languages among British students. Promoting languages also promotes mobility in other member countries, thus encouraging deeper knowledge of other countries' culture and developing students' communication skills. And, thirdly, the distinctive feature of European Studies has always been the commitment to interdisciplinarity. As a study program, it has always been thought that in order to get to the complexities of the events taking place in European societies and especially those associated with European integration, special and distinct methods are needed, especially in the field of human sciences and social issues. In practice, however, the development of European study programs was rather a special force within universities that created more flexible, less rigid structures, often exceeding the rigid and conservative intellectual boundaries between disciplines (Smith: 2003).

### **Teaching and learning European Studies**

Along with the various discussions around the European Studies, teaching them in institutions represents a separate issue and a very important debate in their dissemination among students. Learning about European issues appears inevitable for the future of political sciences (Georgakakis, Smith, 2004 :5). And it is important to pay particular attention to the teaching method of European Studies. Taking into account that teaching, learning and assessment are the basic components of any knowledge transfer process, we have focused on the teaching methods of the European studies. When we talk about teaching European studies, we always ask ourselves what we need to teach: should it be political science about Europe? European institutions? European Union? European policy? A European Polity Course? Political Sociology of the European Union? The teaching of this has its own unique characteristics that lead us to some preliminary reflections.

First of all, we cannot consider European studies as a sub-discipline, but still it is more than that (Georgakakis, Smith, 2004:11). The environment and the status of courses about Europe are very diverse depending on where they are being taught. There are both European Studies specializations, but also specializations of International and European Studies, as well as specializations with European dominance. Most specializations are at Bachelor and Master level, but at doctoral level they are still underdeveloped. Even the ones at Master level are undergoing constant developments and changes. What is observed at European level is that there are few courses specialized in the political science of the

European Union (Georgakakis, Smith: 2004:12). This does not mean that European themes are absent from political science, but that they are present within a very diverse set of courses. For example, in public policy courses there is often a chapter on the Europeanization of public policies, but also on the matters of European policies. It is also the case of political sociology courses that always contain elements about European elections or the transformation of political professions. However, European Studies do not aim at creating a sub-discipline and still have some juxtaposition problems (Georgakakis, Smith: 2004:12). The development of European Studies is obvious alongside the time. Most of them present sociological or political approaches to European Studies, but interdisciplinarity or multidisciplinary presentations are always being used. We therefore observe that European Studies have always been the subject of debate both in terms of their content and in terms of their location within one or other classical, consecrated disciplines. We assess that the multidisciplinary approaches are best suited to treating any subject of European Studies, because by their very nature, European studies are a combined set of factors.

Another reference study regarding the teaching of European Studies is the volume edited by the prestigious publishing house Springer and entitled *Teaching and Learning the European Union. Traditional and Innovative Methods*, coordinated by Stefania Baroncelli, Roberto Farneti, Ioan Horga and Sophie Vanhoonacker. During the 14 chapters, the authors present different stages of European Studies, and different ways to teach them. The volume starts from the real challenges of European Studies, to inventory then the innovative methods of teaching and learning them. Between the newest methods of teaching and learning European Studies presented in the volume we can include: participation at EU's simulations (Jones, Bursens, 2014:157), distance learning as an alternative method for learning European Studies (Timuş, 2014:187), learning based on case studies (Maurer, Neuhold, 2014:199), learning through the mix of appropriate knowledge (Mihai, 2014: 217) or even learning through social networks (Farneti, Bianchi, Mayrgündter, Niederhauser, 2014:229).

Another important tool that has been perpetuating the teaching of European Studies, but especially the teaching of European integration studies was the Jean Monnet Action. The Jean Monnet Action is a European Commission's initiative which is grouping several types of structures: Jean Monnet Chairs, Jean Monnet Centres, permanent courses Jean Monnet, European modules and others. The Jean Monnet Action can support any university or higher education institution which wishes to introduce in their curricula new disciplines related to European integration (Belot, Brachet, 2004: 149-152).

Regarding the distribution of funding per discipline in 2004, it appears that the most funded are the disciplines related to Community Law comparing to those of Political Sciences, who are on the second place, then those related to the Economy and then the History. This high incidence of the Law on the study of Europe can be considered as an approach for a better knowledge of the legal order, because the European Union can be seen as a creation of the law through the treaties and through an institutional system whose main objective is the production of law (rules, directives, regulations, etc.) (Belot, Brachet, 2004: 153). Taking into account, however, the Jean Monnet chairs of the countries that joined the EU after 2004, there is a preponderance of disciplines in the economic field, suggesting the importance for these countries of the single market, of a free trade area or the belief of these countries that the EU's accession will have beneficial consequences for their economy (Belot, Brachet, 2004: 154).

European Studies have been a subject of study not only in countries within the European Union but also outside. As students in Europe are interested in American Studies, we also find students interested in studying Europe in the United States, this program being taught at prestigious universities. Switzerland, even though not a member of the European Union, is a country where there is a high interest in European Studies, but especially in the European policy and political sciences. Another interesting study about teaching European Studies outside the European Union is the one made by Angelo Santagostino from the University of Brescia, Italy, who carried out a review of European Studies in Turkey. Angelo Santagotino argues that European Studies in Turkey have undergone a broad development process in recent years, especially after the Helsinki Summit. At present, about one in three Turkish universities is engaged in research or teaching in the field of European integration. At the same time, Jean Monnet Action is very active in Turkey, especially after 2001. Thus, European Studies in Turkey can be characterized by a dual focus: on the one hand, on the territorial one, and on the other on the sectorial (Santagostino, 2004). Recently, the academic environment in the Republic of Moldova and the general public have shown an increasing interest in the field of European Studies, especially regarding the relation of the Republic of Moldova with the European Union (Iovu, Toderaş, 2006:3-4).

### **Other theories about European Studies**

Towards the end we included the researches on European Studies programs that had a more particular approach. There is a rich expertise in European Studies, especially within professional associations created for this purpose, which provide interesting theories on European Studies, which are included in this part.

Ian Manners, the director of the Institute for International Studies in Copenhagen, Denmark, proposes the study entitled *Europaian Studies* about the European Studies that can be considered an answer to the question why there isn't a theorization of European Studies or a European theory. The answer that the author proposes from the beginning is that neither should be such a theory. The only need is for the recognition of European Studies as area studies, i.e. multidisciplinary studies and not disciplinary studies concentrated in another discipline.

Sure, there are many theories that try to explain contemporary Europe, as there are many disciplines that handle with different European issues, such as politics, sociology, economics, law and others that contain a lot of theorizing about Europe. What motivates the author to write this research is the concern on the "normalization" or "routine" on European Studies in different disciplines mentioned above, but without taking into account the new developments in the social sciences. He assumes that European Studies are not studies on contemporary Europe but it's a collective term for *specific* studies on Europe, so interdisciplinary studies, summary or integrative of certain knowledge (Manners, 2003: 67).

Area studies versus disciplinary studies is at the moment the problem that debilitate the European Studies and which is central to "trivializing" them or "normalize" them. Thus, European Studies require the existence of some transdisciplinary readings, both for the health and the wellbeing of the European Studies but also of the disciplinary studies. In support of his idea, Ian Manners gives the example of Martin Wight who asked the same question like him, only that he was referring to the International Relations, and namely why there is not a theory of International Relations. Similarly, Ian Manners tries to exemplify the reason for the inexistence of a European theory for the area studies. But he

will not separate International Relations to Politics, as did Wight, but on the contrary, Manners proposes a multidisciplinary approach, i.e. the integration of theories of International Studies and Politics studies together with the study of social and natural sciences in a better way for the understanding of a "European theory". For the author, the "European theory" refers to a tradition of speculations about Europe, tradition that has been lost among the constituent parts of the whole, parts that represents different disciplines (Manners, 2003: 68).

Another important theory, with a direct influence on the academic production in the field of European Studies is the one proposed by Rosamond, who believes that any scientific activity which refers to the European Union is influenced by two types of stimuli, internal stimuli and external stimuli (Rosamond, 2007: 232). The same opinion is shared by the Professor Ioan Horga from the University of Oradea in his research dedicated to the analysis of European Studies curricula (Horga, 2012: 107).

The main point in the research of Ben Rosamond is the identification of two types of factors or stimuli that influenced the creation and development of the European Union studies. These are the internal factors and external factors. The external factors have stimulated the scientific production in the field of European Union in various ways. For example, the European Union enlargement, especially in significant moments for the integrity of the European Union system, coincides with phases of an intensive publishing activity in this area. Also, the evolution of the EU institutions attracted an abundant work in the scientific production (Rosamond, 2007: 239). Or, the events from the exterior, have initiated a request for their knowledge, concretized in different ways to transmit this knowledge. The same thing can be said of the attempts to develop coherent projects where to apply the approaches from the political economy field, multilevel governance, public administration and others (Rosamond, 2007: 241).

On the other hand, in his research, Ioan Horga analyses how internal and external stimuli influence directly the European Studies curricula. Based on the analysis of a database (Horga, 2012: 126-128) that listed courses from 12 European countries, he demonstrates that, regarding the European Studies, they can be considered as a singular science, so they are not part of other sciences such as administrative studies or political sciences. Therewith, according to his investigations, he states that there is a flexible and differentiated curriculum for European Studies, so it is obvious the influence of internal factors within it. The analysis and explanations are multiple and complex. European Studies are analysed from the perspective of the subjects where might be applicable, i.e. legal studies, economic studies, administrative studies, historical studies, etc., both at the Bachelor and Master level. Although there are influences from all these disciplines, however, European Studies are considered a special field, interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary at the same time. Regarding the influence of external factors that are seen in the curricula of European Studies, the professor mentions that European Studies keep up with practical and theoretical developments in the European Union Agenda.

In the end it's important to mention another major international project in the field of European Studies, namely the SENT<sup>5</sup> project, which settled up some directions in the field of European Studies. The SENT project was, maybe, the latest project that deals with the curricula of European Studies. SENT was an ambitious project, developed over a period of three years that had as main objective mapping the European Studies in Europe. The main results or outputs of the SENT project are published books, which

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<sup>5</sup> SENT –The Network of European Studies

represent a step forward in raising awareness on European Studies at European level, but also bringing them to a different level. The publications resulting from the project are, in our opinion, representative for the community of researchers in European Studies and a welcomed theoretical approach. These are: the volume „Analyzing European Union Politics” published by Federiga Bindi and Kjell Eliassen in 2011, the volume „Teaching and learning the European Union. Traditional and Innovative Methods” edited by Stefania Baroncelli, Roberto Farneti, Ioan Horga and Sophie Vanhoonacker in 2014, the volume „European Integration between History and New Challenges” edited by Ariane Landuyt in 2014, the volume „Integration through legal education. The role of EU legal studies in shaping the EU” published by Valentino Cattelan, the volume „Questioning the European identity/ies: deconstructing old stereotypes and envisioning new models of representation” edited by Vita Fortunati and Francesco Cattani in 2012, the volume „Ideas of Europe in National Political Discourse”, edited by Cláudia T. Ramos in 2011, the „Communication, Mediation and Culture in the Making of Europe”, edited by Juliet Lodge and Katharine Sarikakis in 2013 and the volume “Mapping European Economic Integration”, edited by Amy Verdun and Alfred Tovias, also in 2013. Each volume has a different approach concerning the European Studies, demonstrating their diversity but also their interdisciplinarity.

The SENT project, through its results, might mark a new stage in the evolution of European Studies. Thus, we can talk about a period of maturity, settlement and classification of knowledge.

### **Conclusions**

We believe that our work is useful especially in those faculties that teach European Studies, as it provides a picture of the current state of different theoretical approaches in European Studies, both with their positive and negative sides. A good knowledge of them is a starting point for improving the teaching and learning process, but also for the development of these studies, which require a continuous process of renewal and rehabilitation, according to their specificity. On the other hand, the novelty our work brings is precisely this analysis that so far has not been carried out. Thus, we can say that the work is both a starting point for future research and it presents the status quo of an existing reality.

Discussions about the place and role of the European Studies within the social sciences, especially the political ones, have brought about much dynamic debate over time. Although the purpose of this study is to put European research under one or another field of knowledge, it can be easily observed that there is an inclination of these studies towards the political science, but it shouldn't be confused with it. Interdisciplinary studies, primarily, but also multidisciplinary and transdisciplinary as they are today, the European Studies are an integral part of the higher education curricula.

Generally, the existence of European Studies is determined by the need to provide answers to complex problems and European challenges. Understanding European societies in their development from past to present impose the introduction of methods adopted from a variety of different disciplines. Given that Europe is a set of inter-connected societies, that have become even more diverse and more interlinked than any other geographic and political area, there must be increasingly more programs for European Studies as interdisciplinary structures and with a complex approach.

In the end, we believe that education is one of the main pioneers in achieving democracy and we hope that European Studies offer the most appropriate means for

finally reaching it. The scope of this paper is to present and to analyse different theoretical approaches that have existed during the time in Europe and have conducted to the specialization of European Studies that we know today. Although our study can be criticized from various aspects, we believe that this process can help to carry out much deeper, quantitative and / or qualitative research on European Studies not only in Europe, but also throughout the European Community and finally, that our efforts shall promote the necessary European dimensions in higher education. Moreover, we believe that, from what we have achieved so far, we can develop many other lines of research and investigation. Therefore, this paper should be considered as a starting point for further development, but also as a stimulating basis for future studies.

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### **III. Institutions, Public Policy and Social Realities**

**Diana GLIGOR, Dacian PUȘTEA** ⇔ *Romania 2017: problems incurred in accessing the community funds. Observations incurred in the programming period of time 2014-2020*

**Cristina MATIUȚA** ⇔ *Incoherency and inconstancy of legislation on parties and elections in post-communist Romania*

**Claudiu Adrian POP, Ioan HORGA, Mariana BOCOI** ⇔ *The evolution of foreign capital in Western Romania (1991-2017). Case study – Bihor County*

**Mirela MĂRCUȚ** ⇔ *Digital Policies As Instruments In The European Integration Process*

**Norbert IUONAS** ⇔ *The Roma population in Romania. From History to culture and education; policies, implementation and differential treatments*



## ROMANIA 2017: PROBLEMS INCURRED IN ACCESSING THE COMMUNITY FUNDS

*Observations Incurred in the Programming Period of Time 2014-2020*

*Diana GLIGOR\**  
*Dacian PUȘTEA\*\**

**Abstract.** *The problems occurred in accessing European funds are, on the one hand inherited ever since/from the programming period 2007-2013, and on the other hand are linked to the slow evolution of the development and modernization of Romania's administrative infrastructure. Outlining the problems identified has the aim of boosting the correcting of them in the context in which the lack of European financing in economy and administration increases the gap to the Western European countries.*

**Keywords:** *European financing, absorption, programming 2014 – 2020, cohesion policy, European projects*

The present article aims at outlining 10 problems, approached pragmatically, encountered within the Romanian space of accessing structural and cohesion funds, from 2014 to the present. The research mechanism starts from confronting these at every step of the launching in view of consultation and subsequently, to project competition of the applicant guide.

The present study has as a predominant method the qualitative research of the documents published by the Management Authority of the Regional Operational Program, of the documents and studies worked out by the European Commission and its subordinate institutions, as well as the analysis of our own data available from the projects written and currently under evaluation or implementation.

The experience of those years of the first period of programming time in accessing European structural funds through the report published in 2013<sup>1</sup>, following a public debate of March 15, 2013, by the Center of European Expertise EUROPULS<sup>2</sup>, a non-governmental organization set up in 2010 in Brussels by a group of Romanian experts in European affairs, presents a few problems related to accessing European funds in the period of time 2007-2013:

*”The main disfunctionalities that have affected POR in the current financial period were related to the „poor understanding of the funds programming”, the „lack of thematic concentration” and the lack of concrete indicators by which the program*

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<sup>1</sup> <http://2013.eurosfat.ro/images/raport-concluziile-eurosfat-2013.pdf>, accessed on 16.12.2017

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.europuls.ro/misiune/>, accessed on 16.12.2017

*impact to be evaluated. Moreover, the frequent changes at the level of guiding lines/instructions addressed to the beneficiaries have often interrupted the whole process. Therefore, Mr. Friptu<sup>3</sup> is of opinion that for the period of time 2014-2020 the following are required: working out more „clear, more simple strategies, that must be finalized”, „creating a common set of procedures for all the programs”, „enhancing the partnership at national level” and „implementing a common interface mechanism with the beneficiaries”. Similar problems were highlighted by Mrs. Carmen Dobrotă in implementing by the Management Authority for the Development of the Administrative Capacity (AM PODCA) of the PODCA Program (which has as an aim developing the beneficiaries' capacity of accessing European funds from all the other sectorial programs): who mentioned „the poor intra- and inter-institutional coordination at central level” and the impediments created by the lack of unique and non-systematized rules and procedures.”<sup>4</sup>*

We see that nowadays, in December 2017, we are facing the same problems already synthesized in the 2013 report. The form they come in is different at times, but they are actually the same.

The present article shall bring to date –by means of the documents studied – the existence of these difficulties in accessing European funds, bringing them into discussion again, with the aim of finding a solution to the problems.

### **Research premises**

The European Union Cohesion Policy represents one of the most important elements for diminishing of disparities existing between regions and also for reaching the objectives of the Strategy Europe 2020.<sup>5</sup>

**The Cohesion Policy** for the programming period 2014–2020 is meant to help reaching the objectives set by the the **Strategy Europe 2020**, providing the framework and the main lines for investment, being the main European Union policy. This benefits from a financial allocation of 351.8 billion Euros (Păun, Racolta-Paina, 2017:394).

The **Strategy Europe 2020** was drafted during a time of recession, having as priorities<sup>6</sup> the following:

- Developing a knowledge-based economy
- Promoting the intelligent economy by the efficient use of resources
- Increasing the work force occupancy, by means of which the social and economic cohesion to be ensured. For reaching the priorities, a series of objectives were established (Păun, Corpădean, 2017:474), as follows:

<sup>3</sup> Author's note – Gabriel Laurentiu Friptu – ex- director AMPOR

<sup>4</sup> <http://2013.eurosfat.ro/images/raport-concluziile-eurosfat-2013.pdf>, page 9, accessed on 16.12.2017

<sup>5</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/regional\\_policy/sources/docgener/panorama/pdf/mag48/mag48\\_ro.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/panorama/pdf/mag48/mag48_ro.pdf), accessed on 17.11.2017

<sup>6</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:2020:FIN:ro:PDF>, accessed on 30.11.2017

Table no. 1

Objective The Strategy Europe 2020	Target set at EU level	Target set for Romania
<b>Population Occupancy Rate 20 – 64 years</b>	75%	70%
Investments in R&D	3% of GDP	2% of GDP
<b>Energy and climate change</b>		
Reducing the greenhouse effect gases	20% - at the level of 1990	19% - at the level of 2005
The share of energy from renewable sources in the final gross consumption	20%	24%
Increasing the energetic efficiency	20%	19%
<b>Education</b>		
Rate of school early leaving	10%	11,3%
Rate of population aged 30-34 years old graduate of a form of tertiary education	40%	26,7%
<b>Promoting social inclusion, especially by reducing poverty – reducing the number of persons being at poverty risk and social exclusion</b>	Minimum 20 million persons	Minimum 588,000 persons

Romania has been benefitting from the community funds financed by means of the Cohesion Policy since 2007, having gained this benefit once with the European Union integration, being allocated a budget of approximately 23 billion Euro for the programming period of time 2014 – 2020.

The way to accessing European structural and cohesion funds (2007 – 2013), currently known as European Structural and Investment Funds (2014 – 2020) was a difficult one for Romania, with ups and downs, there being encountered several problems which have lead to - and still lead to -a low absorption rate, and, moreover, possibly to a blocking of certain operational programs.

The results generated by the problems incurred in using the funds allocated to Romania by the European Union produce various negative effects both at economic and social level.

The main problems identified in using the community funds allocated by means of the Cohesion Policy can be divided into problems at **management and programming level** and problems at the level of the **potential beneficiaries of financing**.

### **Analysis of the management and programming problems**

The present analysis starts by identifying those problems existing at the level of **management and programming**:

#### **1. The lack of consultation with regard to the real needs existing in the regions of development in Romania and working out the guides ”from the office”**

Identifying the existent needs in Romania’s development regions is faulty, the lack of a detailed analysis on the needs with which the regions of Romania are confronted with being felt at the level of guides launched up to the present date.

Having in mind the disparities existing among the regions at national level (e.g. the North West Region and the South West Region Oltenia), the financing of the same type of activities although the existent needs are different, does not lead to obtaining the expected results established at the level of the Cohesion Policy.

The SAR Report<sup>7</sup> published in March 2017, mentions the following conclusion within the topic "How do we get over „zero absorption”? The performance of development of European funds in a comparative perspective": *We mentioned at the beginning of this chapter that we take a look at the performance of PO-s<sup>8</sup> and at the indicators of a few programs that can be considered closer to what we would like to be the public policies in Romania. The analogy makes sense because in both situations – both in administering structural and cohesion funds, and in the case of the public policies –we talk about identifying certain problems and needs and of planning the inducing of a change by means of a theory and of a logic of change. At the same time, we talk about preparing certain structured processes and operations, about working with multi-annual and pre-defined budgets, about the monitoring and quantifying of the impact, of reporting at regular intervals, both financial, and also comparative to the previous situation, as well as of targets and processes adjustments. Analyzing the data presented above, our conclusion is that the already existing indicators at the level of the PO-s are not sufficient for a detailed analysis of the impact of structural funds, while mentioning the errors in the system does nothing but worsen the situation.*

Also, using statistic data of the latest census (the year 2011) no longer reflects the reality anymore (in the cases of the project calls launched in the years 2016 – 2017), but the technical-economic evaluation grids are drawn up based on these statistic data, thus being prioritized at financing projects for certain localities where there is no need for support from community funds.

## **2. The lack of predictability in launching project calls which lead to the lack of budgetary and managerial planning of the potential beneficiaries**

The lack of a calendar of launching projects calls inevitably leads to a lack of planning at the level of the potential beneficiaries, both from a budgetary point of view, and from the management point of view.

The irregular planning existing within the Management Authorities generates problems in accessing FESI funds and has as a result the impossibility of planning. Moreover, the publication of calendars [schedules] of launching project calls and not respecting them repeatedly (frequent practice occurred in the programming period 2014 – 2020) is conducive to instability and lack of trust from the part of the potential beneficiaries in the financing authorities.

At the same time, the lack of a calendar of launching projects calls, generates, at the level of the potential private beneficiaries and of the public ones an **impossibility of planning the necessary budgetary resources**, both for submitting the project, and for the co-financing of it, thus leading either to the renouncing of submitting a project, or to delays in implementing it.

With regard to the programming period 2014 – 2020, the first project calls were launched on 16.05.2016<sup>9</sup> being destined to the public authorities and on 27.07.2017<sup>10</sup> for the private applicants for financing.

<sup>7</sup> [http://sar.org.ro/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/1.-RAPORT-SAR-2017\\_TOT.pdf](http://sar.org.ro/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/1.-RAPORT-SAR-2017_TOT.pdf), pag.41, accessed on 16.12.2017

<sup>8</sup> PO/OP –Operational Programs (author's note)

<sup>9</sup> <http://inforegio.ro/ro/por-2014-2020/apeluri-proiecte.html>, accessed on 10.12.2017, the calls vising the road infrastructure of regional importance (ROP 6.1), thermal rehabilitation residential buildings (ROP 3.1 A)

Therefore, as it can be noticed, the first project calls belonging to the above-mentioned programming period of time were delayed with 2,5 years, thus creating problems in the absorption process.

**Table no. 2**

Priority Axis/ Investment Priority	Call date estimated launching according to calendar published by AM POR	Date of effective launching
<b>The Regional Operational Program *</b>		
PA 2 – improving competitiveness of SMEs [small and medium-sized enterprises], SO 2.1B –incubators/business boosters	May/June 2017	Call not launched in December 2017
PA3 – Supporting the transition towards a low carbon emission economy /SO 3.1 B –public buildings – SUERD	July 2017	Call launched in December 2017
PA3- Supporting the transition towards a low carbon emission economy / SO* 3.1 C –public lightning - 7 REGIONS	June 2017	Call not launched in December 2017
PA10- Improving the educational infrastructure /OS 10.1 – Increasing the degree of participation at the level of early education and compulsory education, especially for children with increased risk of early abandoning of the system	June 2017	Call launched in December 2017
PA10- Improving the educational infrastructure /OS 10.2 - Increasing the degree of participation to the professional and technical education and life long learning	July 2017	Call launched in December 2017
PA10- Improving the educational infrastructure /OS 10.3 Increasing the relevance of tertiary university education in relation to the labour market and the economic competitive sectors	July 2017	Call launched in October 2017
<b>Programul Operational Capital Uman**/The Operational Programme Human Capital</b>		
PA 4/IP 9ii –Community Forefathers	Trim. I 2017	Call not launched in Decembrie 2017 – planned for the I-st semester 2018
PA 6/IP 10 IV – Doctoral grants	Trim. II 2017	Call not launched in November 2017

\* **Data source:** [http://info regio.ro/images/POR-2014-2020/Ghiduri\\_2017/Anexa%201%20-%20Calendar%20lansari\\_08%20mai%202017.pdf](http://info regio.ro/images/POR-2014-2020/Ghiduri_2017/Anexa%201%20-%20Calendar%20lansari_08%20mai%202017.pdf)

\*\* **Data source:** [http://www.fonduri-ue.ro/images/files/programe/CU/POCU-2014/2016/29.12/POCU\\_29\\_decembrie\\_2016calendar.pdf](http://www.fonduri-ue.ro/images/files/programe/CU/POCU-2014/2016/29.12/POCU_29_decembrie_2016calendar.pdf)

<sup>10</sup> <http://info regio.ro/ro/por-2014-2020/apeluri-proiecte.html>, accessed on 10.12.2017, the call on investments for micro[small]-enterprises (ROP 2.1 A)

### 3. Launching several financing lines at the same time, without considering the capacity of an applicant (TAU/private) of submitting and implementing projects at the same time

This problem affects mainly the Territorial Administrative Units [TAU] which can submit several projects, but coming back to the problem identified at point 2 from the present article, the lack of planning and the lack of an efficient time management leads to the launching in parallel of several financing lines, fact which, in turn, conduces to either the impossibility of submitting projects, or to submitting low quality projects.

In the following part the above-mentioned issues shall be analyzed. Thus, launching project calls concomitantly generates effects at the level of the TAUs budget, since the budgetary burden is either too big for managing the submitting of projects concomitantly, or was not foreseen in the budget, thus they lack the financial resources needed for submitting the projects.

Given this situation, the Territorial Administrative Units are compelled to select only those project calls having most stringent needs and of focusing on obtaining financing for these, even if applying for other calls that are open might lead to the development of the local community and, implicitly, to diminishing the existent disparities.

Moreover, even given a fortunate situation in which the Territorial Administrative Unit submits several projects at the same time, these shall be implemented concomitantly, fact which shall generate a pressure upon the local budget, out of which the co-financing must be provided.

The same SAR 2017 Report<sup>11</sup>, draws a conclusion: *"The last general recommendation pertains to the time horizon which the planning and implementation of the public policies must take into account. We are, for the time being, in a paradoxical situation in which we have at our disposal European financial resources, we need financing that exceeds our public budget, but we are confronted with the incapacity of planning and implementing this change. The incapacity pertains most of the times not exclusively to a system, but rather to the human resources that make up this system, to the lack of professionalization of this segment..."*

**Table no. 3**

Priority Axis/Financing line	Period of handing in/submitting the projects
ROP 2017/6/6.1/SUERD/1, within the Priority Axis 6- priority Axis 6- Improving the road infrastructure of regional importance, Investment Priority 6.1	28 August 2017–December 28, 2017
ROP/2017/5/5.2/SUERD/1, Investment Priority 5.2 Performing actions addressed to improving the urban environment, the revitalization of towns	August 28, 2017–December 28, 2017
Project call dedicated to sustaining the objectives of the European Union Strategy for the Danube Region in what concerns the Priority Area 3 SUERD „Promoting culture and tourism, of the direct contacts among people" (project call ROP/2017/5/5.1/SUERD/1)	August 28, 2017–December 28, 2017
ROP/2017/3/3.1/A/2/REGIUNI, ROP/2017/3/3.1/A/2/BI și	August 28, 2017 –February

<sup>11</sup> [http://sar.org.ro/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/1.-RAPORT-SAR-2017\\_TOT.pdf](http://sar.org.ro/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/1.-RAPORT-SAR-2017_TOT.pdf), page 42-43, accessed on 16.12.2017

Priority Axis/Financing line	Period of handing in/submitting the projects
ROP/2017/3/3.1/A/ITI/1, Priority Axis 3 - Supporting the transition towards a low carbon emission economy, Investment Priority 3.1 – Supporting energetic efficiency, the intelligent administration of energy and of using energy from renewable sources in public infrastructures, inclusively in public buildings, and in the buildings sector, Operation A - Residential buildings	28 2018

**Data source:** <http://inforegio.ro/ro/por-2014-2020/apeluri-proiecte.html>

When bringing into discussion the TAU budgets, which are direct beneficiaries of the financing by European funds, one shall see, further to an analysis performed, that they are not configured nor are they prepared for "absorbing" several projects simultaneously. The need for investments is utmost, but the forecasting of expenses for prior documents is postponed for the moment of the call and even of launching project calls. The lack of predictability conveyed by the Financing Authorities, the publishing of a calendar support, unfortunately, this way of approach. An announced planning could give an impetus to a programmed mode of administration, with a clear and concrete framework, obviously along with planning by the administrative management at local level.

#### **4. The double checking of the documents implicitly leading to prolonging of the verifying and contracting deadlines**

According to the procedures, a project is submitted to and checked by the Intermediate Bodies. Further to these verifications and evaluation, the projects are sent to the Management Authority where they are checked again. The double checking and the lack of transferring certain attributions [tasks] lead to the prolonging deadlines for verifying and contracting of projects, which, in their turn lead to a low absorption rate.

The same "method" applies as well in the pre-contracting stage, the Intermediate Bodies being the ones who check and prepare the sending of documents to the Management Authority, which, in its turn, checks again all the documentation required in view of signing the financing contract.

Thus, the lack of trust and of separating attributions trigger obvious delays for beneficiaries generating, as well, delays and postponements, while at macro-economic level, yielding a decreased rate of absorption and an insufficient diminishing of disparities existing between the EU regions.

More than that, another problem generated by the delays in evaluating projects is represented by the falling out of the eligibility conditions of the applicant for financing, having in view the closing of the fiscal year 2017 and the provisions of the Applicant Guide wherein it is clearly specified that fact that, all along the evaluation, selection and contracting process, the maintaining of the eligibility conditions at the moment of submitting the project is compulsory, the including of the firm in a category other than micro[small]-enterprise being allowed only after the signing of the Contract of financing.

Table no. 4

Type of investment	Month of submitting	Value grant (ROL/lei)	Date receiving clarifications ACE**	Date sending clarifications ACE	Date receiving letter of conformity and eligibility	Date receiving clarifications TFE***	Date sending clarifications TFE	Date sending documents contracting	Date of signing contract financing contract*
Aquisitions equipment - endowment	September 2016	264.978,74	01.02.2017	08.02.2017	10.02.2017	10.05.2017	16.05.2017	21.10.2017	NA
Aquisitions equipment - endowment	February 2017	654.809,58	28.02.2017	03.03.2017	07.03.2017	11.07.2017	18.07.2017	17.09.2017	NA
Aquisitions equipment - endowment	February 2017	103.228,06	21.03.2017	28.03.2017	04.04.2017	17.10.2017	24.10.2017	25.10.2017	NA
Aquisitions equipment - endowment	April 2017	885.212,40	12.05.2017	17.05.2017	29.05.2017	16.08.2017	22.08.2017	22.09.2017	NA
endowment Aquisitions equipment	May 2017	538.435,30	31.05.2017	12.06.2017	13.06.2017	18.08.2017	25.08.2017	15.09.2017	NA

*Data source: own data source*

\*For none of the projects listed above the financing contract was not signed until [the month of] December 2017.

\*\*ACE – Administrative Compliance and Eligibility

\*\*\*TFE – Technical-Financial Evaluation

## 5. The faulty communication between the Management Authority and the Intermediate Bodies and the non-uniform approach of the Applicant's Guide.

At the level of the authorities designated for administering community funds at the national level, there can be observed on the one hand, a lack of communication between the institutions at the central level (The Management Authority) and the institutions at the regional level (Intermediate Bodies) and on the other hand, a non-unitary approach of the Applicant Guide by the institutions at the regional level (among themselves) and of the Management Authority.

Such situations lead to the generating of unequal conditions for the applicants for financing as well as to subjective interpretations of the eligibility and score conditions. Part of these problems are generated by the lack of communication between the MA and the OI/IOs and by the establishing a mutually agreed set of information's and interpreting of the above-mentioned conditions.

### Example:

To the question addressed to POR AP 8, OS 8.1/8.3 A: "In the case of the indicator: **Number of social centers without residential component the infrastructure of which was rehabilitated/modernized/extended/equipped, provided that by the project there shall be achieved a day center and a home unit care and social canteen, the indicator shall be filled in with 3 or with 1 ?(given the fact that one building shall provide all the 3 services)?**

*The answers received were:*

**ADR 2:** *Given the provisions of the Applicant's Guide, page 12: " In the case in which in a single building there shall function two or more social services centers, justifying the need for financing for each and every of the respective centers shall have to be taken into account. Each social services center shall be evaluated separately according*

to its purpose (see criterion 2.7 from section 3.3 Technical and financial evaluation criteria. *Idem*- criterion 2.7 from the technical and financial evaluation grid)-subsequently the average of the score being made.”, **the value of the indicator in the above-mentioned case should be 3.**

**ADR 1:** *Upon completing the indicator "Number of social centers without residential component the infrastructure of which was rehabilitated/ modernized/ extended/ endowed" the number of centers on which it is intervened by means of the project shall be taken into consideration.*

### **Further to the verification of projects in the stage of Administrative Conformity and Eligibility:**

**Clarification at the stage CAE ADR 1:** *-In the section supplementary project Indicators, the value of the indicator „Number of social centers without residential component, the infrastructure of which was rehabilitated/ modernized/ extended/endowed” was filled in wrongly \*, having in mind the fact that the present project proposes the rehabilitation and extending of a social center that shall provide three social services, i.e. day center, social canteen and a domestic care unit for the elderly.*

*\*The value filled in for quantifying the indicator, upon submitting the financing application was 3.*

Consequently, the projects on certain regions have filled in *social centers* at the section **Supplementary Project Indicators 3**, and on other regions the value of the indicator is 1.

## **6. The excessive interpretation of the European legislation and imposing supplementary and unjustified conditions**

The excessive interpretation of the European legislation and transposing of it into practice at national level by supplementing the conditions necessary to be fulfilled by the applicants for financing, leads to the working out of complex procedures and, implicitly, to enhanced bureaucracy and further on, to a reduced absorption rate.

Example:

**The Government Decision HG 399/2015 - Art. 10.** – The expenditures for purchase of cars or other means of transport, purchased inclusively in the way stipulated by art. 9, are eligible provided that they are indispensable activities stipulated by art. 59 of the (EU) Regulations no. 1.303/2013 or to the operation management. The value of the eligible expenditures **does not exceed the equivalent of 15,000 Euro**, without VAT, for each **car** or other means of transport purchased.<sup>12</sup>

### **APPLICANT’S GUIDE, SPECIFIC CONDITIONS FOR ACCESSING EUROPEAN FUNDS**

#### **Chapter 8 Expenditures related to the purchase of means of transport (if that is the case)**

There are included here expenditures related to the purchase of means of transport within [the limit of] 15,000 Euro, without VAT.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup>The Decision no. 399/2015 on the eligibility regulations for expenditures incurred within operations financed by the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund 2014-2020

<sup>13</sup> The project call P.O.R./8/8.1/8.3/A/1, Vulnerable group: elder persons, Complementary to the call POCU BUNICII COMUNITĂȚII – Call 1 Social and social-medical services for the elderly

**Answer ADR 2:** *Several cars can be purchased in the case in which the standards for the services provided impose this, but the maximum eligible value is of 15,000 Euro without VAT for all cars, not per each item.*

**Answer ADR 3:** *Further to the consultations with AMPOR it is considered as eligible expenditure, the one made for **acquiring [purchasing] one single means of transport** within a project, within the limit specified in the specific Guide.*

### **7. The lack of correlation of *soft* –complementary- projects (POCU) and of *hard* projects (POR) in what concerns the launching of the financing sessions**

The lack of correlation between the projects destined to the human resource(s) and those destined to infrastructure - complementary - projects, is generated, first of all, by the lack of a coordinated planning of the launching of the project calls. This [fact] generates problems for the beneficiaries of financing since there is no predictability in what concerns the achieving of a *Hard* project and ensuring its functioning by a financing obtained from a *Soft* project.

Example: POCU/73/6/6/ - the Program Motivated Professors in disfavored Schools– projects currently under contracting, but in schools the part of rehabilitated infrastructure is missing - POR axis 10 is estimated to be launched in November 2017, for which, nevertheless, there are not taken into account project calls financed by means of O.S 6.3,6.4 and 6.6 in evaluating the project.

### **8. Delays and methods in absorption?**

Launching calls such as "first come, first evaluated/served" shall not lead to financing quality projects, which shall generate in turn, problems in absorption since the projects made up in great haste in order to be handed in the first shall not be highly qualitative ones, fact which shall generate problems both in the process of CAE and ETF evaluation, and subsequently, in the implementation period. (the case of the calls to be launched/were launched on POR – axis 10, axis 13, 3.1 C, the financing on SUERD, etc.)

Viewed from another perspective, the problem of accessing community funds is also generated by the gaps existent at the level of the **financing applicant**:

### **9. The lack of property documents, the faulty registration of the real estate/property in the Land Registry**

The lack of property documents, the faulty registration of the properties in the Land Registry or even the total lack of registration of properties in the Land Registry creates problems in accessing community funds, this being an essential eligibility condition.

Moreover, even in the situation in which the care registering in the Land Registry are correct, the applicants for financing encounter problems in correlating the data entered in the TAUs's Public Domain Inventory and the ones entered in the Land Registry.

Here, again, the first problem identified in the present article intervenes, namely the lack of a correlation with the real situation existing at national level. Thus, although in the eligibility criteria one can find the necessity for registering in the Land Registry of the

real estate included in the project, as well as the correlating of these with the TAUs's Public Domain Inventory, the following aspects were not taken into account:

→ The Land Registry was consecrated [established] by the Decree-Law No. 115/1938<sup>14</sup> only in certain regions from Romania, i.e.: Transylvania, Banat and Northern Moldavia, being extended at national level in the year 1996. Thus, at present, not all of Romania's development regions have the properties comprised in the Land Registry, as a proof being as well the Priority Axis 11 of the Regional Operational Program, the objective of which is: *Increasing the degree of geographic coverage and of registering the properties within the Integrated System of Cadaster and the Land Registry.*<sup>15</sup>

→ The Public Domain Inventory is a document published in the Official Gazette [of Romania] wherein one can find all the public properties at the level of a Territorial Administrative Unit and which, in the case of the majority of TAUs was made and/or updated in the year 2002, based on approximate measurements. Moreover, one must mention the fact that bringing up to date the Public Domain Inventory is a difficult process, all the decisions being made at central authority level and take minimum 6 months.

Given the two above-mentioned aspects corroborated [in conjunction], one can notice that the eligibility conditions imposed are difficult to be fulfilled by the applicants for financing, making impossible at times the attracting of community funds.

Despite all these, one must highlight a particularly important aspect for the given situation, namely that at the moment of drafting the legislation pertaining to the Applicant's Guides, the drafters of the document did not take into account the existent situation at national level, nor did they have in mind the differences existent among the development regions.

We are, thus, of opinion that a reversed approach of the property documents issue— in the sense in which the eligibility conditions impose the solving of these and not vice versa —is inefficient from the point of view of accessing community funds, whereas these problems had to be solved before the launching of the project calls.

## **10. The human resource**

Another problem identified at the level of the applicants/beneficiaries for financing, particularly at the Local Public Authorities is represented by the insufficient human resource, poorly paid and poorly trained from a professional point of view. This generates a series of problems from the standpoint of accessing community funds, from delays in implementing the projects, to financial corrections, and even to cancelling the financing contracts in extreme cases.

This aspect was specified also by the SAR 2017 report previously quoted, being necessary to be approached as well, the issue of the human resources from the Administrative Territorial Units, insufficient for concomitantly dealing with several projects.

The late legislative change<sup>16</sup>, dated December 9-th 2017 with regard to the granting of an additional salary payment as to the base salary of the personnel involved in administering projects financed from community funding from the public institutions can

<sup>14</sup> <http://www.ocpialaj.ro/istoric.htm>, accessed on 18.11.2017

<sup>15</sup> The Regional Operational Program – Applicant Guide General Conditions, Annex 10.1

<sup>16</sup> <http://www.monitoruljuridic.ro/act/ordonan-de-urgen-nr-91-din-6-decembrie-2017-pentru-modificarea-i-completarea-legii-cadru-nr-153-2017-nbsp-privind-salarizarea-personalului-pl-tit-din-fonduri-publice-emitent-195564.html>, accessed on 16 December 2017

be an impulse for assuming additional tasks, but does not solve the problem of the insufficient training or that of the overcrowded tasks.

The modality of putting into practice of the "technical assistance" offered by the Regional Development Agencies, by which it invites potential applicants to meetings with a specific topic for each consultative guide launched, represents an example of good practice. Getting familiar with the technical aspects of the guides and of making/writing projects for the staff involved is an added value.

### Conclusions

Simplifying the procedures in what concerns accessing community funds is utmost necessary, the way the European commissioner, Mrs. Corina Cretu stated on 18.12.2017 at Victoria Palace: *"I think that in what the procedures are concerned, Romania complicates its existence by itself. (...) Simplification is one of the main priorities of my mandate. (...) I was struck often times by what I do see in Romania, because these are not European Union requirements. In most of the countries we already get all the applications online, in an electronic format, not with tens of thousands pages stamped and signed, and it is there where we have to get. Thus, in our view, reducing bureaucracy is an absolute priority"*<sup>17</sup>

The regulation of the legislation at national level and correlating it with the eligibility conditions imposed by the financier is highly necessary, in view of increasing the absorption of the European funds.

In view of ensuring financial allocations post-2020 and having in mind the approach proposed by the EU Fiscal Council according to which the EU member states are eligible for EU funding provided they comply with the policies and reach certain results<sup>18</sup>, the adapting of the national legislation to the European norms and directives is highly needed, the ensuring of an efficient management for the new period of programming alike and providing optimum conditions for attracting community funds in the programming period of time 2014 – 2020.

The solutions have been proposed ever since the year 2013, "therefore, Mr. Friptu<sup>19</sup> is of opinion that for the period of time 2014-2020 the following are necessary: **working out „more clear and more simple strategies, succesfully finalized”**, **„creating a common set of procedures for all programs”**, **„strengthening the partnership at national level”** and **„implementing mutual interface mechanism with the beneficiaries”**, these are all necessary in order not to repeat the history of programming of the period of time 2007-2013. At the same time, the **„poor intra- and inter-institutional coordination at central level”** and **the impediments created by the lack of unique and non-systematized regulations and procedures.**"<sup>20</sup> are elements that must be reiterated and put into practice.

Cumulatively with these, one of the methods proposed by the current minister delegate of the European funds is that of adopting a set of measures<sup>21</sup>, as follows:

<sup>17</sup> <https://www.agerpres.ro/politica/2017/12/18/corina-cretu-reducerea-birocratiei-este-o-prioritate-absoluta-de-multe-ori-m-a-ingrozit-ce-am-vazut-in-romania—24093>, accessed on 20.12.2017

<sup>18</sup> <https://www.agerpres.ro/economie/2017/11/15/banii-europeni-pentru-guverne-ar-trebui-conditionati-de-prevederile-fiscale-consiliul-fiscal-european--20-22-59>, accessed on 18.11.2017

<sup>19</sup> Author's note – Gabriel Laurentiu Friptu – ex-director AMPOR

<sup>20</sup> <http://2013.eurosfat.ro/images/raport-concluziile-eurosfat-2013.pdf>, page 9, accessed on 16.12.2017

<sup>21</sup> <http://www.fonduri-ue.ro/presa/comunicate/2339-mdrapfe-simplifica-evaluarea-selectia-si-contractarea-la-nivelul-por>, accessed on 10.12.2017

1. Contracting projects subsequent to the stage of verification of administrative conformity and eligibility
2. Extending the deadline for submitting the documents concerning the definitive inscribing [registering] of the public property right within 1 year from the entering into force of the financing contract for all the project calls exclusively dedicated to the public beneficiaries.
3. Supra-contracting POR up to 150% of the projects pertaining to the Priority Axis 4 – Supporting durable urban development
4. Monthly check of the contracting documents at the level of AMPOR
5. Verifying the documents attesting the rights on the real estate, objects of the project

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# INCOHERENCY AND INCONSTANCY OF LEGISLATION ON PARTIES AND ELECTIONS IN POST-COMMUNIST ROMANIA

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**Abstract.** *The paper aims to explore the norms that have regulated, over two and a half decades, the founding of political parties and the mechanisms by which we elect our representatives and militate for the necessity of harmonizing and unifying the procedures after which all the elections are organized into an electoral code. It should corroborate the provisions of electoral laws (for local, parliamentary, MEPs elections, the election of the President of Romania, the law of the referendum, etc.) with other laws that have an impact on elections (the law of political parties, their funding, public administration, etc.), bringing more transparency, professionalism and predictability in the organization of elections.*

**Keywords:** *political parties, elections, electoral rules, electoral constituency, voting system.*

A retrospective look at parties and elections legislation, as part of the analysis of Romanian democratic experiment over the past three decades, leads inevitably to the conclusion that we are on the ground of instability, improvisation and searching for new formulas. The four laws of political parties, plus not less than five laws for general elections, various formulas for local elections, changes to the financing of political parties' activities and electoral campaigns, dozens of amendments adopted by government decrees, some of them in the vicinity of electoral campaigns, creates the picture of a real legislative effervescence in electoral matters.

Let's start with the laws of political parties, four in total: the *Decree no. 8/31 December 1989*, which ratified the multiparty system, introduces a non-constraining legal framework, both as a form (by imposing 251 members for the registration of a political party - Article 3), and as a substance (by establishing the freedom to form political parties, with the exception of fascist parties or those who propagate conceptions contrary to the new state and law order in Romania and without any other restriction on grounds of race, nationality, religion, degree of culture, sex or political conviction – Article 1). The result was, in the context of liberation from the girths of totalitarianism, a "party inflation": at the end of January 1990, 30 parties were officially registered, a party/day rhythm, and around the first free elections in May 1990- 80 parties, 71 of them presenting lists of candidates (Voicu, 1998, p. 213). Inevitably, their quality is questionable, many of them being born of ad hoc groups, some ridiculous even by title. We found, for example, between the parties established in the first months of 1990, the *Party of Fallen Heroes for Freedom of Heroes Remained in Life Affected by Barbarian Bullets*, founded in Caraș Severin County or the *Liber Schimbist Party*, registered in March 1990 as a "moralizing political organization",

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having as a sign the portrait of I.L. Caragiale and obtaining a mandate of deputy in 1990, but also several mandates of local councilors in 1992 (Preda, 2015, p.82).

More restrictive conditions are imposed on the formation of political parties by the *Political Parties Law* issued in 1996 (Law No. 27/April 1996): the existence of at least 10,000 founding members, residing in at least 15 counties of the country, but not less than 300 in each county (Article 17, b). The law also establishes situations in which a political party ceases to exist (as a result of self-dissolution, dissolution by a Court order or as a result of inactivity found by the Bucharest City Court: when the political party does not nominate candidates either alone or in alliance, in two successive electoral campaigns in at least 10 constituencies or has not held a general assembly for five years - Article 31) and gives the existing political parties a six-month term to comply with its provisions, by re-registering to the Bucharest Tribunal. The consequence is the simplification of the political scene, of the over 150 existing parties (the maximum number seems to be reached in 1994, when 161 parties were registered at the TMB on October 1), about half remained around the 1996 legislative elections and 63 political parties and political alliances present lists of candidates to the November parliamentary elections, including the political formations of national minorities (according to the Permanent Electoral Authority).

A new law on political parties, adopted in 2003 (Law No. 14/January 2003), strengthens even more the conditions for registering the political parties, raising the number of founding members to 25.000, residing in at least 18 counties and Bucharest, but not less than 700 people in each of these counties and the municipality of Bucharest (Article 19, paragraph 3). These provisions raise real obstacles to the freedom of association stipulated by the Constitution of Romania and make it impossible to form regional parties by imposing a minimum of 700 members in each of the at least 18 counties. Romania has thus reached the most restrictive law of political parties throughout the European Union, where the minimum number of members or supporters for the establishment of a political party varies from a few people (three people in countries such as Belgium, France, Germany, Italy or the Netherlands) to at most a few thousand (1,000 in Poland, 5000 in Finland, 7500 in Portugal).

Often criticized for its harmful effects to the freedom of association and to the appearance of regional parties, Article 19 of the Law on Political Parties is declared unconstitutional by the judges of the Constitutional Court of Romania in February 2015 as a result of a complaint came from the *Pirates Party* (an organization set up in Cluj-Napoca with three founding members who had requested the Bucharest Tribunal in 2014 to register as a political party without lists of supporters). Thus, a new law of political parties (Law No. 114/2015), adopted in May 2015, modifies and completes the provisions of the previous law in the essential points: a party may be constituted by at least three founding members, and the formula of the organization and functioning of political parties on the administrative-territorial criterion of the old law is replaced by the stipulation that "political parties can be organized and function at national level, at local level or at both national and local level, according to their own statute" (Article 4, paragraph 1). However, new barriers arise in the way of small parties: in order to avoid automatic erasure, a party must submit lists of candidates, alone or in alliance, in two successive electoral campaigns, with the exception of the presidential election, in at least 75 constituencies in the case local elections, as well as a complete list of candidates in at least one electoral constituency or candidates in at least three electoral constituencies in the case of parliamentary elections (Article 47, paragraph 1b). The effects of the law were felt in the increase in the number of parties registered after its entry into force (in March 2017 the

*Register of Political Parties* included 137 parties) and in the appearance of many local or regional parties (*Vrancea Noastră Party, Movement for Medgidia, Union For Codlea Party, Pride We Are From Arad Party* are just a few of them).

Beyond the dynamics of the number of parties resulting from the conditions imposed by the party laws, we have to say that more significantly effects on the modeling and formatting of the party system have had the legislation on elections. A brief reconstitution of the legal framework for local and national elections reveals repeated changes of the rules of the game, both in terms of the electoral threshold and of the voting systems used.

More stability can be said, however, when the President of Romania and its representatives in the European Parliament were elected, where the multiple modifying normative acts did not concern the type of ballot practiced, but especially the conditions of its conduct. Moreover, the way of choosing the President of the Republic, initially stipulated by the *Decree-Law No. 92/1990*, is included in the constitutional text, therefore more difficult to modify. According to the *Constitution* (Article 81), the President of Romania is elected by direct universal suffrage and can perform this function for no more than two terms; "The candidate who has gathered in the first ballot the majority of votes of the voters enrolled in the electoral lists is declared to be elected. In the event that none of the candidates has obtained such a majority, a second ballot shall be held between the first two candidates established in the order of the number of votes obtained in the first round. The candidate who has obtained the highest number of votes is elected". However, the Law No. 370/2004 on the election of the President of Romania, amended in September 2009 by the Emil Boc Cabinet by an emergency ordinance, adds the word "permanent" to the previous statement ("... the majority of voters enrolled in the electoral lists" became "... the majority of voters enrolled in the *permanent* electoral lists"). Although the change is minor, we see "the fact not allowed that an organic law to make additions to the constitutional text", changing the basis of the majority (Radu, 2015, p.5).

Regarding the election of MEPs, *Law No. 33/2007* establishes a proportional electoral system with closed party lists (the candidates are elected in the order in which they appear on the list), with only one constituency (the territory of Romania is a single constituency) and an electoral threshold of 5% of the total votes validly expressed at national level. Independent candidatures are accepted from any Romanian citizen or citizen of another Member State of the European Union who has the right to be elected and who is supported by at least 100.000 voters (Article 17, paragraph 1), while a political party, in order to submit its list of candidates, needs 200.000 signatures. In order to obtain the mandate, the independent candidate must collect a valid number of votes at least equal to the national electoral coefficient. The law has been often criticized both for the large number of signatures required for independent candidates to compete and for the election of MEPs in a single constituency (system used also in other Member States). There were alternative proposals for dividing the national territory into several electoral constituencies (e.g. in 8 regional constituencies, according to the development regions model). Other critics have targeted closed party lists, which do not give to voters the possibility to hierarchize candidates on the list in order of their own preferences. In fact, debates and proposals for electoral reform also take place at the level of the European Union (which now leaves to the Member States the voting systems used and the arrangements for the allocation of mandates), including the introduction of a transnational scrutiny with transnational semi-open lists, made up of candidates from several European countries, as a way to fight against the democratic deficit and to reduce absenteeism.

Returning to the national elections, the first ones from 20<sup>th</sup> of May 1990 were organized on the basis of *Decree-Law No. 92* of March 1990, issued by the *Provisional Council of the National Union*, which provided a system of proportional representation of mandates (Article 4) on closed party lists, "which may include at most the number of deputies or senators must be elected in each constituency" (Article 11, paragraph 2) and without the electoral threshold. 387 deputies were to be elected (to which were added the representatives of the legally registered national minorities organizations, beneficiaries of an ex officio mandate, if they did not get the number of votes needed to obtain it- Article 4, paragraph 2), and the number of senators was given by the county population. The distribution of mandates takes place in stages (Articles 71-72), the first one being their direct attribution, according to the electoral coefficient, to the candidates in the order of their listing and starting with the list for which the most votes were cast, as well as to the independent candidates who have obtained a number of votes at least equal to the electoral coefficient. In the following stages, the remaining unassigned mandates were distributed, after the centralization of the unused votes in the first stage, to the lists or independent candidates, in descending order, by the most remnants method and by applying the same electoral coefficient, first at district (county) level, then at national level.

The next two parliamentary elections, held in September 1992 and November 1996, were based on a new law, No. 68/15<sup>th</sup> of July 1992, which maintains the proportional representation system on closed party lists and sets a representation norm: a deputy to 70.000 inhabitants and a senator to 160.000 inhabitants (Article 3). Independent candidates may take part in the elections only if they are individually supported by at least 0.5% of the total number of voters enrolled in the permanent lists in their constituency (Article 5, paragraph 5), while national minority organizations who do not acquire a mandate of deputy or senator in the elections, are entitled to a deputy mandate only if they obtain a number of votes equal to at least 5% of the average number of votes cast for the election of a deputy (Article 4, paragraph 1). But the main novelty of this law is the introduction of an electoral threshold of 3% of the validly cast votes, attributing the mandates only to the parties and coalitions that have passed this threshold, distinctly for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, according to the same procedure of direct distribution according to the electoral coefficient, followed by the centralized redistribution of the unused votes in the first phase and those given to the parties that have not passed the electoral threshold.

The increase in the electoral threshold, from 3% to 5%, is adopted, as in a suicidal way for the PNTCD (the National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party), the main governmental party of the moment, through an emergency ordinance in the summer of 2000, in view of legislative elections in the autumn of the same year. The Ordinance establishes an even higher threshold for political alliances; thus, "for the second party member of the political alliance, 3% of the valid votes for the whole country are added to the 5% threshold, and for each member of the political alliance, starting with the third party, one percent of the votes validly expressed throughout the country, but not more than 10%" (Article 65, paragraph 2).

The legislative elections of November 2004 take place in a new constitutional framework and are the last held simultaneously with the presidential ones, given that the Romanian Constitution, revised in 2003, stipulates that the presidential elections will take place every five years, while the parliamentary elections from four to four years. A new law on the organization and conduct of these elections, *Law No. 373/2004*, which maintains the same type of ballot (proportional representation on closed lists), the same

electoral threshold (5% for parties and between 8 and 10% for political and electoral alliances) and the same representation norm (a deputy to 70.000 inhabitants and a senator to 160.000 inhabitants). The individual candidacy is accepted this time only with the support of at least 5% of the total number of voters registered in the permanent electoral lists of the independent candidate's constituency (Article 5, paragraph 6), while "The President of Romania, in office at the date of the elections for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, if it is in the last three months of the mandate, can run independently on the lists of a political party, political alliance or electoral alliances for obtaining a mandate of deputy or senator" (Article 5, paragraph 7). If elected, he is obliged to choose between the position of deputy/senator and the one of president. The law tightens (compared to the previous) the conditions for giving a mandate of deputy to organizations of legally constituted national minorities who have not obtained at least one mandate of deputy or senator in elections. Thus, these organizations are entitled to a deputy mandate only if they have obtained a number of votes equal to at least 10% of the average number of valid votes cast in the whole country for the election of a deputy (Article 4, paragraph 2). Let's also say that an entire chapter (chapter IV) is dedicated to clarifying the attributions and the way of organization of the Permanent Electoral Authority, institution established in 2003, in order to ensure the unitary application of the legal provisions regarding the organization and holding of elections or other consultations at national or local level.

Since 2004, there has been a growing debate both in civil society and within parliamentary parties about the need to change the electoral law. The introduction of the single member district voting system, in the various variants under debate (in one or two rounds), was seen as a way of reforming the political class. In disagreement with the draft jointly assumed by the National Liberal Party and the *Pro-Democracy* Association and supported by the Tariceanu Government, the President Traian Basescu initiated a referendum on this issue, which was invalidated by the low participation in the vote.

In the end, the voting system was changed by the *Law No. 35/2008*, which combined the proportional allocation of mandates with the voting in single member districts. According to this law, deputies and senators are elected in single member districts, constituted within the electoral constituencies (whose number was established at 43: 41 in the counties, one for each county, one in Bucharest and another one for Romanians from abroad), based on the representation norm (remained the same). More specifically, the number of the single member districts for the Chamber of Deputies is determined by dividing the number of inhabitants of each constituency to 70.000 inhabitants (the representation norm for the Chamber), and those for the Senate by dividing the population to 160.000 inhabitants (the representation norm for the Senate). To these are added "a district of deputies or senators for what exceeds the half of the norm of representation, without the number of deputy districts in an electoral constituency being less than 4, and the senator less than 2" (Article 11, paragraph 1). The delimitation of the single member districts was to be made by a special parliamentary commission and to comply with several rules stipulated in the law, among which the one of their comparative size ("the largest district would be, as a rule, no more than 30% bigger than the smallest one"- Article 11, paragraph 2.g), or another according to which "in the constituency for Romanian citizens residing outside Romania there will be formed four districts for the election of the Chamber of Deputies and two districts for the election Senate "(Article 11, paragraph 2.f).

The candidatures are therefore individual, in each district each electoral competitor (party or alliance) being able to have only one nominee (Article 29, paragraph

1). One of the novelties of the law, often criticized, is that "when submitting candidatures, each political party, political alliance, electoral alliance, organization of citizens belonging to national minorities, independent candidate must prove the establishment of a deposit, on behalf of the Permanent Electoral Authority, with the value of five gross national salaries for each candidate"(Article 29, paragraph 5). At a simple calculation, a party wishing to apply in each electoral district is obliged to make a deposit of several hundred thousand euros, an excessive amount that infringes the freedom of association stipulated in the Romanian Constitution. The deposited sums shall be returned, after the elections, to competitors who obtain at least 2% of the votes validly expressed at national level and to the independent candidates who obtain at least 20% of the valid votes cast in their districts, the unreturned amounts becoming revenue to the State budget (Article 29, paragraph 7). In addition to the deposit, the independent candidates (both in the country and in the electoral constituency of the Romanians abroad) have to prove, when submitting their candidature, that they are supported by at least 4% of the total number of voters enrolled in the permanent electoral lists of the electoral district where they are running, but not less than 2000 voters for the Chamber of Deputies and 4000 for the Senate (Article 30, paragraph 1).

Also, all candidates born before January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1976 were to declare on their own responsibility their appurtenance or not to the communist secret service (*Securitate*) as a political police (Article 29, paragraph 13). Another novelty of the law is the distinction it makes between not-valid votes (as a result of incorrect stamping) and white votes (put in the ballot box unstamped, as a sign of dissatisfaction with the candidacies). Thus, according to Article 45, paragraph 15, the minutes of counting the votes were to record distinctly the two categories of votes, a premiere in the Romanian electoral legislation.

The law maintains the 5% electoral threshold for political parties and between 8 and 10% for political and electoral alliances, but adds an alternative threshold. Thus, even if they do not meet the electoral threshold, political parties and alliances can acquire parliamentary mandates "by cumulatively fulfilling the condition of obtaining six electoral districts for the Chamber of Deputies and three for the Senate, where candidates of political parties, political or electoral alliances and of the organizations of citizens belonging to national minorities rank first, in the order of the number of validly cast votes" (Article 47, paragraph 2.c). The alternative threshold is meant to favor small parties that would compete with well-known candidates in their districts, although, as we shall see, this has not happened in fact.

The distribution of mandates would take place in two stages. In the first, at the level of single member districts, "a mandate is assigned to candidates belonging to an electoral competitor who has met the electoral threshold and obtained the majority (absolute) of the valid votes cast in the district in which they have candidate" (Article 48, paragraph 11). This condition of obtaining half plus one of the valid votes cast at the district level applies also to independent candidates. The second stage is for all candidates of the parties and alliances who passed the electoral threshold and who did not acquire a mandate in the first stage. In this stage, a proportional allocation of the mandates takes place, firstly at constituency level (taking into account the electoral coefficient of the constituency), then at national level. The complex procedure of assigning mandates in the second stage generated distorting effects (because it didn't take into account firstly the percentage score of the candidates, but the proportional allocation of the mandates to the parties). It generated competitions even between the candidates of the same party in the same constituency and led to an unprecedented oversizing of the legislature in the 2012

legislative elections, when the candidates of Social Liberal Union won many colleges in the first stage, with categorical majorities.

Subject to numerous criticisms since its first use, this law was abrogated and, with the adoption of the *Law No. 208/2015*, the return to the previously used ballot, that of proportional representation on party lists, took place. There are, however, some changes made by the new law: little increase of the representation norm (a deputy to 73.000 inhabitants and a senator to 168.000 inhabitants- Article 5). Also, when enter in the electoral competition, each party, political or electoral alliance and independent candidate must prove the support of at least 1% of the total number of voters registered in the Electoral Register (Article 54) and the electoral threshold (the same: 5% for the political parties and between 8 and 10% for the political and electoral alliances) is doubled by an alternative one: "... or 20% of the total votes validly cast in at least four electoral constituencies for all electoral competitors" (Article 94, paragraph 2a).

We find, from this brief exposure of the electoral laws used in the parliamentary elections that we have to deal with a pronounced legislative instability, in over two and a half decades in which various electoral formulas, different electoral thresholds and various rules for setting up political parties have been tried and combined. And, in order to have an even more precise dimension of this instability, let's not end before take a look at the electoral laws after which the local elections were held.

Repeatedly amended by laws or emergency decrees, the legislation on local elections essentially provides a majority electoral mechanism for the election of mayors (and, for a while, for county council presidents) and a proportional one for the election of local and county councilors. Thus, according to *Law No. 70/1991*, which regulated the organization and conduct of the first post-communist local elections in February 1992, "mayors of towns and cities are elected on constituencies by a vote expressed on the basis of the majoritarian system" (Article 1). The candidate who has obtained the vote of at least half plus one of the voters participating in elections is declared elected. In the event that none of the candidates has obtained such a majority, a second ballot shall be held, within a maximum of two weeks, between the candidates placed on the first two places. The candidate who has obtained the highest number of votes is elected"(Article 67). A new law, adopted in 1996, before the local elections in June, amends and supplements Law 70/1991, stipulating, regarding the election of mayors, that "the candidate who has obtained the majority of the validly cast votes is declared to be the mayor" (Article 67). If none of the candidates meet the majority (half plus one), a second round will be held between the top two. Thus, the formula "half plus one of the total number of voters" in the old law is replaced by "the majority of votes validly cast". A more elaborate wording regarding the election of the mayor, but with the same absolute majority of validly cast votes and the organization of the second ballot if it is necessary is also found in *Law 67/2004* for the election of local public authorities, which repeals the Law 70/1991.

Substantial changes in the election of mayors take place starting with the local elections in 2012, when the two rounds are replaced by a single round of voting. Thus, *Law No. 129/2011*, with a unique article, which amends Law 67/2004, stipulates that the candidate who has obtained the highest number of votes validly cast in the first ballot is declared to be elected. In the event of a ballotage, a new round will be held two weeks after the first round, to which only candidates in this situation will participate. This simplification of the electoral process by moving to a single ballot and electing mayors on the basis of the plurality of votes obtained actually diminishes their representativeness (the more so as the voting is lower).

The pluralistic vote (the highest number of votes, not necessarily half plus one) was also used to elect the presidents of the county councils at the local elections in 2008 and 2012, being introduced in the context of the debates on the single member district system for the election of the parliamentarians. Prior to the local elections in 2008 and after 2012, the presidents of the county councils were (and now are) indirectly elected by the majority of county councilors. And the indirect vote was also used in the election of county councilors at the first local elections in February 1992. Thus, the *Law 70/1991* stipulated that "the election of the members of the county councils shall be made by indirect vote, by a body of electors, within the 30 days from the formation of local councils in the counties. The Electoral Body consists of all the members of the local councils of the respective county, legally constituted"(Article 71).

Starting with the local elections in 1996, through an amendment to the *Law 70/1991*, the direct election of county councilors was introduced, the wording later found in both *Law 67/2004* and *Law 115/2015*, on the basis of which the last local elections in June 2016 were organized, being the following: "Local councils and county councils are elected in electoral constituencies, on party lists, according to the principle of proportional representation" (Article 1, paragraph 3). Electoral districts are organized at the level of the administrative-territorial units and their subdivisions: "For the election of local councils and mayors, each town, city, municipality and administrative-territorial subdivision of the municipality represent an electoral constituency. For the election of the county councils and of the General Council of Bucharest, each county, respectively Bucharest Municipality constitutes an electoral constituency "(*Law 115/2015*, article 11). As regards the distribution of the mandates of councilors, it is based on the electoral coefficient (determined by dividing the total number of valid votes cast for all lists and independent candidates to the total number of mandates in that constituency), in the order of their listing. Starting with the local elections in 2004 an additional provision was introduced, namely that that the electoral threshold of the constituency "is representing 5% of the total number of votes validly expressed in that constituency. In the case of political alliances or electoral alliances, to the 5% threshold a percentage of 2% for the second member of the alliance is added. For alliances with at least three members, the electoral threshold is 8 %" (*Law 67/2004*, article 92, paragraph 1).

The number of the mandates, established by the local public administration law, varies from 31 county councilors (in counties with up to 350.000 inhabitants) and 37 (those with over 650.000 inhabitants); and 9 local councilors (in towns with up to 1.500 inhabitants) and 31 (in cities with more than 400.000 inhabitants.) However, at each round of the local elections, over 40.000 members in the local and county councils are elected, much less than in councils during the communism, but still many (and in some cases ineffective) in the view of those who argue with the justified arguments the necessity of rethinking Romania's administrative-territorial division, the same in the last fifty years. And this redrawing is seen in various forms, ranging from the merging of the small towns, up to renouncing to the counties and switching to the organization by regions.

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Here is the incomplete picture of the legal norms that have governed, for over two decades and a half, the founding of political parties and the mechanisms by which we choose our representatives. Although schematically, it highlights the incoherence and the fragmentation of electoral legislation. The large number of laws, each of them subject to

numerous changes, along with the abusive use of emergency decrees in electoral matters seem to indicate that "a lively passion for electoral construction has crossed all this time" (Preda, 2015b, p.13). The phenomenon is not new; we find it in the pre-communist past. And there is still a thick ink in this painting, to which I have not referred here: electoral fraud in its various forms, from electoral tourism and abusive use of supplementary lists to the violation of the right to vote through the faulty organization of elections (see, for example, the 2014 presidential election in the diaspora). The problem, which in the years of transition has reached dimensions and facets difficult to imagine in a democracy, has been solved partly by computerization of polling stations and by a law of correspondence voting, adopted in 2015. On the whole, the electoral picture calls for the harmonization and unification of the procedures by which all elections are organized in an electoral code, which will corroborate the provisions of the electoral laws (for the local, parliamentary, MEPs elections, the election of the President of Romania, the law of the referendum etc.) with other regulations that have an impact on the elections (the law of political parties, of their funding, the law of public administration etc.), bringing thus more transparency, professionalism and - why not? - predictability in the organization of elections. Furthermore, the codification of electoral legislation has been declared priority on several occasions and several electoral code projects were debated at different times. It was even considered a priority that can no longer wait. But which, however, is still waiting. Let's hope that not for a long time.

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- Law No. 35/2008 for the election of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate and for amending and completing the Law No. 67/2004 for the election of the local public administration authorities, of the Local Public Administration Law No. 215/2001 and the Law No. 393/2004 on the Statute of local elected officials, published in the Official Gazette No. 196/13<sup>th</sup> of March 2008.*
- Law No. 208/2015 on the election of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, as well as for the organization and functioning of the Permanent Electoral Authority, published in the Official Gazette No. 553/ July 24, 2015.*
- Law 115/2015 for the election of the local public authorities, amending the Law on local public administration No. 215/2001, as well as for amending and completing the Law No. 393/2004 on the Statute of local elected officials, published in the Official Gazette No. 349 of May 20, 2015.*

## THE EVOLUTION OF FOREIGN CAPITAL IN WESTERN ROMANIA (1991-2017). CASE STUDY – BIHOR COUNTY

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**Abstract.** *This study aims to make a presentation of the evolution of foreign capital in Bihor County, part of the Western area of Romania, one of the most active regions in terms of country development. The features that make this area attractive for foreign investments are considered: proximity to western markets; the interdependence of the region with other regions of Central and Eastern Europe, the proximity to the major European transport networks, the quality of the workforce in relation to the salary level, etc. Depending on a few variables, the authors distinguish four periods, with particular evolutions: until 2004, 2004-2007, the period of the economic crisis (2008-2012), post-crisis period (after 2013).*

**Keywords:** *Vest of Romania, Bihor county, foreign capital, economic crisis, post-crisis*

At a brief overview of the volume of businesses registered by the Romanian counties, you will find that the Western Romania Counties (Timiș, Arad, Bihor și Satu Mare) are among the most dynamic. For example, at the end of 2016, the businesses volume of the four counties is almost 30 billion euro (meaning almost 11% of the volume of businesses in Romania). Obviously, the companies developed by the foreign capital have brought important contributions to these counties which have found advantages in investing in this area, such as: proximity to the major markets of Western Europe (Austria, Germany, Italy, France, etc.), to the production markets, especially of automotive in Central Europe (Czech Republic and Slovakia); easy access to these markets through road and rail infrastructure in neighboring countries; lower salary levels than in neighboring countries (Czech Republic, Croatia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland and Hungary); the qualification level of the labor force in this area comparable to that of the neighboring competing countries; and last but not least, investment policy in business infrastructure run by local authorities and by private sector actors.

Of course that beyond the common aspects of the four counties, there are peculiarities resulting, on the one hand, from the dowry of the infrastructure and the qualification of the labor force in the specific economic activities, with which these counties have moved from the centralized economy to the market economy. On the other hand, there are particularities resulting from the specific orientation of foreign capital for certain activities and the answers that came from the socio-economic environment in which it was installed.

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In this study we will look at the evolution of the foreign capital in the Bihor county economy starting from several secondary online sources, which we have corroborated with media sources, with statistics made by specialized institutions that we will mention during this study, but also with our own statistics presented at the end of the paper. As a structure of the paper we have established four periods, which have, on the one hand, relevance in the general evolution of Romania after 1990, the accession to the EU, the economic crisis, the post-crisis period. On the other hand, we sought to establish the qualitative changes that foreign affairs brought to the Bihor county economy in establishing these periods.

If we look at the statistics on the number of foreign companies in Bihor County, there are variations<sup>1</sup>. That is why, in our research, which we have materialized in the appendix of this paper, we selected only the foreign companies that at the end of 2016 had at least 10 employees and a business volume of over 1 million euro.

Speaking from the perspective of the impact on the county economy, especially the last 3-4 years, we find that foreign-owned companies in Bihor are quite active, with a contribution of little over ¼ of the production of Bihor County at the end of 2016<sup>2</sup>. Looking at the main protagonists of the import-export activities in Bihor County in 2015, we find that there are on both sides foreign-owned companies<sup>3</sup>.

**1. The first stage is the one between 1990 and 2004**, when Romania is looking for the road to joining the Euro-Atlantic structures, when the country's economy in general and that of Bihor County are looking to adapt to the global competitive market. At this stage, it prevails Italian capital, micro-enterprises in the spaces of the former enterprises or in transformed spaces, the field of activity being *lohn* production in the field of footwear, garments and textiles-knitwear, the average number of employees was 80-100. Many of them have gone or were disbanded after January 1, 2015, when the European market was opened for products from this category coming from China. But some of them still continue today and play an important role in the production of Bihor County. If in Oradea the number of these enterprises is almost non-existent with some exceptions<sup>4</sup>, they are still

<sup>1</sup> <https://marketingdirect.biz/lista-firme-bihor/>, accessed 8 December 2017 - At the end of 2016, of the 22038 companies registered in Bihor County, 2556 (11%) were companies with foreign capital; <https://www.topfirme.com/2016> accessed in 3.01.2018, at the end of 2016, over 65000 companies were registered, without being able to see how many of them are companies with foreign capital.

<sup>2</sup> The volume of businesses made by foreign-owned companies with a minimum business volume of EUR 1 million and a minimum of 20 employees at the end of 2016 of the total business volume registered in Bihor County (EUR 6.3 billion) - was 1.7 billion euros.

<sup>3</sup> Main Exporters: Samsung Electronics Bihor Branch, Celestica SRL, SC Chang She SRL, Ara Shoes Romania / Valea lui Mihai, Faist Mekatronic SRL, SC PGS Sofa & Co. SRL, SC Conectronics Romania SRL, SC Ada Furniture Factory Salonta SRL, Lloyd Shoes Romania SRL / Valea lui Mihai, SC Plexus Services Romania SRL and Legero Shoes Romania SRL; Main Importers: Samsung Electronics Bihor Branch, Celestica SRL, SC Chang She SRL, Ara Shoes Romania / Valea lui Mihai, SC Conectronics Romania SRL, Faist Mekatronic SRL, Lloyd Shoes Romania SRL / Valea lui Mihai, SC Vision Digitech SRL, SC Plexus Services Romania SRL and Legero Shoes Romania SRL (<https://marketingdirect.biz/lista-firme-bihor/>, accessed December 8, 2017).

<sup>4</sup> The DESPA RO company, founded in 1998, has come to provide infrastructure for Italian footwear, textiles, garments and knitwear manufacturers by selling machinery and equipment for these fields.

present in Beiuș<sup>5</sup>, Aleșd<sup>6</sup>, Valea lui Mihai<sup>7</sup> and in some communes in the county (Oșorhei<sup>8</sup>), providing jobs for the people from there.

Another field where Italian capital has been massively implanted was in the field of road transport, either to serve the Italian producers in the area, or to make the carriages between Romania and Italy, given the position of Bihor County. In this area, the number of Italian-owned companies working as transporters and expedition houses has increased each year; some that have been major players in the transport market and had a very large infrastructure in Bors, have entered into insolvency<sup>9</sup>. After 2007, there was a rebound in the Italian transport companies, they started to operate as expedition houses<sup>10</sup> or to use subcontracting of transport services to small Romanian transport companies. After 2004, only one Italian transportation company came, SC Donatiro (2006), and it transported liquid materials, still working in this object of activity, transporting, in most cases, in its own name.

In addition to these two areas - light industry and road transports, Italian capital has come, as expected, with activities in the food industry, from classical (eg. pizzerias and restaurants) to food production, such as SC Andromi SRL from Nojorid<sup>11</sup>, SC Vlasar Agro from Gepiu<sup>12</sup>, Arfungo Comimpex from Aușeu<sup>13</sup>. The Italian capital exploited the experience of the labor force in Oradea before 1989 in the furniture industry and opened in 2004 the Noul Woodest, which, at the end of 2016, had 231 employees.

The automotive industry is the domain in which foreign capital will excel after 2004, but it was announced by two Italian investments, one at Biharia<sup>14</sup> and, especially, one at Oradea - Comau Romania, where industrial robots, especially for the automotive industry<sup>15</sup>, are being manufactured. About machine tools, we have to mention Emsil Techtrans, which started in 1995 as a company with Italian capital in order to take over

<sup>5</sup> Italstei is an Italian company founded in 1998 and specialized in textiles and knitwear production, where at the end of 2016 there were still 134 employees.

<sup>6</sup> Orapluma SRL - founded in 1999 for the production of blankets and feather pillow, today still has 20 employees; Sarmac SRL - founded in 2000 for the production of footwear, today has 232 employees.

<sup>7</sup> Finproject Romania SRL was founded in Valea lui Mihai, in 2000, and has 250 employees in 2016.

<sup>8</sup> Damore Prod SRL shoes factory was founded in 1999 and had 182 employees in 2016; Romanbag Production SRL was founded in 1999 and had 150 employees.

<sup>9</sup> Gallassini Romania was one of the first Italian transport companies that arrived in 1993 with impressive logistics and built an impressive car park in Bors, but today the company is insolvent.

<sup>10</sup> For example, SC Rozoti Prodcom is an Italian transport company that was founded in Biharia in 1993 where it had an important car park, but it turned into expedition house and it moved to the Eurobusiness 1 Oradea Industrial Park in 2012; Girelli Logistics Romania SRL came to Romania in 2001, has been operating for a while as a transport company with car park, and at the moment it has 27 employees and it is dealing with expeditions; SC Autotransporti Emme SRL was founded in 1999 in Bors as a transport company and with its 9 employees it has now only expeditions activity; SC Bruggioni was founded in 1993 in Bors and it is just an expedition house; SC Cecconi was founded in 1994 in Oradea.

<sup>11</sup> Founded in 1994 where currently work 200 employees.

<sup>12</sup> SC Vlasar Agro SRL was founded in 1994 for milling activity. In 2016, here worked 104 people.

<sup>13</sup> Arfungo Comimpex was established in 1994 for intermediation activity with forest fruits and products. In 2016, here worked 54 people.

<sup>14</sup> SC Cavalli Woods Interiors, founded in 1998, has 122 employees.

<sup>15</sup> Established in 1999, it has 435 employees.

finished products and orders from the former Stimin factory (who took over the former machine tool brand from Bihor, the Înfrațirea factory), after it was closed. This company, which has now full Romanian capital, has taken over the former industrial halls of CUG Cluj (The Heavy Equipment Plant) and of the Mechanical Enterprise in Aiud, becoming an important player on the South Asia, Near East and Italy machine tools market.

The former socialist cement factory in Aleșd and sugar factory in Oradea had the chance to not become scrap piles, just by buying them by foreign capital. For example, the Cement Factory in Aleșd was taken over by the French group Lafarge in 1991, then in 2000 taken over by the Swiss group Holcim and, finally, by the Irish group CRH in the context of the takeover of the assets in Romania by Lafarge/Holcim Group<sup>16</sup> assets in Romania. At the end of 2016, 375 people were employed in this company. Almost the same trajectory was made by the sugar factory Diamant in Oradea, being one of the most modern factories in the country, in 1991 it was bought by the French group Cristal Union and the German group Pfeifer & Langen. This factory had 231 employees at the end of 2016, but at the end of 2017 it was announced that it will be closed, as it is on the list of French-German investors to be closed as a result of the EU's limit for quota sugar production<sup>17</sup>.

Along with the Italian capital, which was the major foreign capital in Bihor until 2004, there came entrepreneurs of some states that will play a very important role in the period preceding the economic crisis and especially post-crisis period.

GMAB Consulting, the Romanian management division of the American company International Engineering and Technologies Inc, founded by the American citizen of Romanian origin, Florian Peretz<sup>18</sup>, opened its office in Oradea in 1999, where 131 specialists in the management of design and engineering activities working in Romania<sup>19</sup>. The installation of GMAB Consulting in Oradea is also related to the appearance of SC Comau SRL, specialized in industrial robots, which is a project implemented by GMAB Consulting. Through this joint project, GMAB Consulting and Comau, Oradea, reverted to the statute established before 1989 as the center of the machine tools industry, but with the specific technology level after 2000, oriented especially to the production of insuitable robots.

The Austrian group Schrack Tehnik, specializing in the production of electrical materials, opened in 1994, in a hall of the former Shoe Enterprise Solidaritatea, a distribution center for its products, and then an assembly center.

In 2003, Axe Group Romania, with French capital, opened a branch in Oradea producing various mechanical parts, in which 60 employees worked in 2016.

The second largest share of foreign capital in Bihor until 2004 is the Belgian capital that we find it implanted especially in the field of road transport and the textile industry. Thus, in the field of road transport, Belgian capital entered the Oradea market, where he built a first-class logistics center, the largest in Central and Eastern Europe. After the Centrum Group worked here, in 1999 the expedition house H. Essers Expeditii SRL took over this logistics center and, in 2004, the Europa Centrals division of the H.

<sup>16</sup><http://www.bursa.ro>, from 22.11. 2017.

<sup>17</sup> <http://www.bihon.ro/lacat-pe-fabrica-de-zahar-diamant-din-oradea-214-angajati-vor-fi-disponibilizati/1960453> (accessed 2.-1. 2018). A union of the largest sugar beet producers in western Romania was in the process of forming an investment group to take over the plant ([www.bihon.ro](http://www.bihon.ro) from September 15, 2017).

<sup>18</sup> <http://i-e-t.net/company>

<sup>19</sup> <http://www.gmab.ro>

Essers Group, the largest transport and logistics operator in the Western Romania, with more than 500 employees in the center, coordinating the Belgian group's transports to Central Europe and former Soviet space, the Middle East. About the same time that the Centrum group came in, Borș was setting up the Maes Transport Group (1995), which currently has a lower presence of only 50 employees<sup>20</sup>.

Regarding the Belgian capital in the garment industry, it is worth mentioning SC Albatex in Beiuș, founded in 2000 and which, at the end of 2016, had 150 employees. In regard to the Belgian capital, we have a Dutch investment<sup>21</sup> in Bihor this period.

Until 2004<sup>22</sup>, the German capital had a low level in Oradea. But he turned to Oradea<sup>23</sup> and to two towns located at the border: Salonta and Valea lui Mihai. If in Salonta we see it only by taking over the former local car trailer company by the group Autoflex-Knott in 1999, which will make the experience of the small factory in Salonta (Flaga Gaz) to continue, a company specializing in liquefying gas, Valea lui Mihai will be for centuries the center of German capital in Bihor. In addition to this attribute, Valea lui Mihai became the center of leather garments industry in Bihor, where almost 2500 people worked in 2016 in two German factories established in 1997<sup>24</sup> and one factory in Austria<sup>25</sup>.

**2. The period 2004-2007** marks a real boom of foreign investments in Bihor, especially between 2004-2005. What caused such an evolution? On the one hand, there was a global context favorable to investment, and in this context Romania was discovered by investors in Western Europe for its potential, in the context of the conclusion of the EU accession negotiations; on the other hand, Oradea started to offer a favorable investment environment through some infrastructure works in the business field, such as the Eurobussines 1 Industrial Park project and an improved access to investment areas.

Several mutations occur during this period.

First, the share of Italian capital, seen from the perspective of the volume of business and the number of employees existing on 31 December 2016, in the economy of Bihor County is reduced, being competed by capital from other EU countries (Belgium, France, Great Britain, Germany, Austria, but also from Spain), Canada, Switzerland and Israel.

The largest share in terms of volume of activity and number of employees has the French capital, between 2004-2007. It is distinguished by 5 important investments. The largest is PGS Sofa & CO<sup>26</sup>, followed by Vernicolor<sup>27</sup>, Capirom<sup>28</sup>, Decitex<sup>29</sup> and Aludea<sup>30</sup>.

<sup>20</sup> <https://www.topfirme.com/afacere/maes-transport-romania-s-r-l->

<sup>21</sup> SC Class Furn SRL, appeared in 1998 at Sabolciu and the factory Mobila, with 376 employees in 2016.

<sup>22</sup> Only through the Freeman group, specializing in grain trade, which appears in 2002.

<sup>23</sup> Isoplus Romania, specialized in building installations works using Isoplus profiles, appeared in 1994 and now has 65 employees.

<sup>24</sup> At Ara Shoes, the largest employer in the Valea lui Mihai area, footwear is produced, and Lloyd Shoes produces travel leather articles and harnesses. Related to Ara Shoes, in 2000 Ara Romania was founded, whose business activity was the renting of production facilities. In 2016, the company had 60 employees.

<sup>25</sup> Legero Shoes, founded in 2000, produces footwear under the Legero brand.

<sup>26</sup> PGS Sofa & CO is located in Oradea and produces furniture pieces since 2005, having at the end of 2016 1210 employees.

Italian capital now occupies the second position from the perspective of the volume of business and staff in activity on 31 December 2016, the base date of our analysis<sup>31</sup>. It is noticed that there is a diversification of the Italian investments as opposed to the previous period dominated by the investments in the production of footwear, textiles and garments. Only four investments in this area are in Sântandrei, in a silk textile factory<sup>32</sup>, in Borș<sup>33</sup> and Valea lui Mihai<sup>34</sup>. A significant presence is Italian capital in the field of road transport, where almost half of all jobs were created as a result of Italian investments<sup>35</sup>. The manufacture of communication equipments<sup>36</sup>, sanitary wares<sup>37</sup>, detergents and cosmetics from the ABA range<sup>38</sup>, ceramic products<sup>39</sup> and preparation for industrial pre-treatment<sup>40</sup> are the areas that Italian investors have been focusing on during this period. However, Italian investors in the technological evolution brought to Oradea investments in ITC services through Zucchetti, founded in 2004 and which is located in the Eurobussines Park I in Oradea. The third position is owned by the British capital that came to Borș in 2005 with a large investment of the FAIST group<sup>41</sup>. After the move of Faist Mekatronic to Eurobussines Park I in Oradea, in the location of Borș will be installed, in 2008, Faist Metalworking<sup>42</sup>.

During this period, Belgian capital occupies the fourth position, through 5 major investments in our county, through the perspective of the place these investments have today. We think about the investments of Conectronics<sup>43</sup>, Lava Knitting<sup>44</sup>, Ciocorom<sup>45</sup>, but especially those in the field of paper and paper products for packaging from Salonta<sup>46</sup>.

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<sup>27</sup> Vernicolor SRL from Santandrei, produces, since 2006, plastic parts for the automotive industry. It had nearly 600 employees in 2016.

<sup>28</sup> Caprom SRL from Santandrei has been producing plastic injectors since 2005. He had 249 employees in 2016.

<sup>29</sup> Decitex SRL is an investment in the clothing industry that was implanted in Oradea in 2005.

<sup>30</sup> SC Aludea SRL was established in 2006 and is a franco-Swiss joint venture that makes durable chrome plating.

<sup>31</sup> We have used the data provided by [www.listafirme.ro](http://www.listafirme.ro).

<sup>32</sup> SC Silkest SRL was founded in 2007, with 82 employees in 2016.

<sup>33</sup> SC Reropam was founded in 2005 for the production of shoes, having 282 employees.

<sup>34</sup> SC Il Sole was founded in 2007 for the production of footwear, working here, in 2016, 65 employees; Luna Shoes set up in 2005 with 656 employees in 2016.

<sup>35</sup> Transmec, founded in Bors in 2007, is one of the most important players in the field of road transport in Western Romania with its 445 employees. In 2006, Samogin Trans and, especially, SC Donatiro, specialized in the transportation of liquid products (95 employees) were set up.

<sup>36</sup> SC Microrom was founded in 2005, currently has 60 employees working in Eurobussines Park I in Oradea.

<sup>37</sup> SC Eurociere was founded in 2004, currently has 50 employees.

<sup>38</sup> ABA RO was founded in 2005, with 27 employees.

<sup>39</sup> SC Europoroton from Biharia was founded in 2006 and its 42 employees, working in a mechanized environment, manufacture ceramic construction products.

<sup>40</sup> SC Color Type from Osorhei was founded in 2005, having 42 employees.

<sup>41</sup> The Oradean company will be called Faist Mekatronic and will produce metallic structures, reaching 2016 to be the largest employer in Oradea, with 1437 people.

<sup>42</sup> Faist Metalworking, produces heavy metal parts. In 2016 it had 495 employees.

<sup>43</sup> The Belgian-British joint venture Conectronics has begun building in 2005, near the Eurobussines I Park in Oradea, a production hall for electronic plates and tubes, where 928 employees were working at the end of 2016.

<sup>44</sup> Lava Knitting, a Belgian textile manufacturer, started work in Oradea in 2005, and later developed an investment in the Eurobussines I Park in Oradea, where 42 people worked in 2016.

The Austrian capital will come to Bihor through 6 investments. At Salonta, the ADA Group will open in 2005 an important furniture factory<sup>47</sup>. In Oradea, an important Austrian computer services and media firm, Russmedia Digital<sup>48</sup>, opens. In addition to these more important investments, four small companies with Austrian capital are established in 2006: Kapoline Logistik Transport<sup>49</sup>, Eco Wood<sup>50</sup>, Euriteh and Amari Romania<sup>51</sup>.

A surprising presence going into niche areas will be the Spanish capital. The coming of Iberica Turnătoria<sup>52</sup> will stimulate the location in Oradea of other companies, which will especially process the aluminum products for the automotive industry - Microdeco from Nojorid<sup>53</sup>, Decoletaje & Conjunctos<sup>54</sup>, Mecanizados Auxim SRL<sup>55</sup> and Mecanor Romania<sup>56</sup>. Spanish capital was looking for other production niches in the Oradea area. Thus, two Spanish companies will be located at Oșorhei: Theming and Animatronics Industries S.R.L<sup>57</sup> and Oliver Iberica<sup>58</sup>. At Nojorid, the Spanish Confectii Navabellen SRL company will produce school uniforms<sup>59</sup>.

German capital continues to be still discreet, with the exception of previous investments from the Mihai Valley above all. We see it still interested in the field of footwear industry through Rufind<sup>60</sup>, the intermediation in the production and selling of the

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<sup>45</sup> Ciocorom, the chocolate factory in Beius, founded in 2005, has 75 employees.

<sup>46</sup> Salonta is the center of the packaging industry in Western Romania. It all started in 2005 with a small investment of Lema Carton, which still has 19 employees today, continuing with VPK Packaging's largest investment in the field, which opened in 2007 an investment where 245 employees worked in 2016. In 2008, will install another Belgian company in the field, Corex.

<sup>47</sup> Ada Fabrica de Mobilă will be officially registered in 2004, but production will actually begin in 2005. The Salonta group activity was limited and, in 2015, it decided to open a secondary factory in Oradea. At the end of 2016 there were 1201 employees.

<sup>48</sup> SC Russmedia SRL will be opened in 2006 after an intense activity in 2008-2012, when it had more than 500 employees, in 2016 there were only 143 people.

<sup>49</sup> Kepoline Logistik Transport was opened in Sanmartin and is specialized in road transport and expedition (24 employees in 2016).

<sup>50</sup> SC Eco Wood SRL is specialized in the trade of wood and other building materials (32 employees in 2016).

<sup>51</sup> SC Euriteh was founded in Oradea in 2005 and is specialized in machinery and equipment intermediation, had 21 employees in 2016; Amari Romania was created also in 2005 and has as main activity the trade with machines and minerals, had 27 employees in 2016.

<sup>52</sup> SC Turnătoria Iberica was founded in 2005 and it will reach 120 employees in 2016.

<sup>53</sup> Microdeco was founded in 2007 and now has 35 employees.

<sup>54</sup> SC Decoletaje & Conjunctos comes in 2009 and has 53 employees in Eurobusines Park Oradea in 2016.

<sup>55</sup> SC Mecanizados Auxim SRL was founded in 2010 and will reach 24 employees in 2016.

<sup>56</sup> SC Mecanor Romania came in 2011 and will reach 65 people in 2016.

<sup>57</sup> SC Theming and Animatronics Industries S.R.L will open in Osorhei in 2005 the only factory specialized in butaforics and animatronic effects for amusement parks, the film and theater industry in Central and Eastern Europe, in which 116 people were employed in 2016.

<sup>58</sup> Oliver Iberica will open a branch of the Spanish company specializing in grain trade in Alparea.

<sup>59</sup> In the Spanish company opened in 2010, 53 women from Nojorid will work.

<sup>60</sup> SC Rufind, although appearing in 1998, will see true development after 2005, especially after the opening of the production space in Oradea Eurobusines Park, where 223 people worked in 2016.

famous Bugatti footwear through the Astormueller company<sup>61</sup>, and the meat processing through Canah International in Salonta<sup>62</sup>.

Along with the EU capital, which is preponderant, we also record the emergence in Oradea of capital from other developed countries: Canada, Switzerland, Israel and South Korea<sup>63</sup>.

Well-known in Bihor, Celestica, is a Canadian investment in 2004 in the field of industrial and aerospace electronics. It represents, through its impact and evolution, a foreign investment model, in a top field that grew organically, even though it went through the economic and financial crisis, reaching 2017 to double not only the production area (up to 18000 m<sup>2</sup>), but the number of employees to almost 2000<sup>64</sup>, being one of the first employers of Bihor and the largest exporter in 2017.

Also have to be remembered: the investments from Switzerland in the footwear manufacturing in Paleu<sup>65</sup>, near Oradea; the association between Rumanian and Polish capital in SC Roprofix<sup>66</sup>; Isrom Impex, Israeli capital, specializing in the sale of machine tools.

### 3. The crisis period - 2008-2012

From the point of view of the share of capital seen from the point of view of the number of jobs created and existent on 31 December 2016 (the reference date for all the companies analyzed), but we also would add of the upward trend, the first place is the US capital with two investments whose positive trend is a certainty at the end of 2017 too, when we do this study. Plexus Services Ro SRL<sup>67</sup>, Inteva Salonta<sup>68</sup> and Vailant TMS RO<sup>69</sup> come to mark two premieres: the presence of the American capital in Bihor and the consolidation of the foreign investments in Bihor to high-value production areas.

The second place, in terms of investment capital and number of jobs created, is the capital of South Korea by 3 investments. The first of these investments came in 2008, Samsung Electronics has been engaged in the import and export of SC Hanil Electronics

<sup>61</sup> SC Astormueller was founded in 2005 and will populate Oradea Eurobussines Park, where 52 people worked at the end of 2016.

<sup>62</sup> Founded in 2005 but having fewer employees (35).

<sup>63</sup> SC Hanil Electronics SRL was founded in Biharia in 2007, reaching 913 employees in 2011, which produced electronic components. In 2012 the company was closed, leaving over 500 workers ([www.ebihoreanul.ro/30](http://www.ebihoreanul.ro/30) July 2012)

<sup>64</sup> [www.ebihoreanul.ro/20](http://www.ebihoreanul.ro/20) November 2017.

<sup>65</sup> SC Bihore, set up in 2005, will reach 705 employees in 2016.

<sup>66</sup> SC Roprofix was founded in 2007 and deals with the distribution of industrial and household tools in Romania. Although the company is registered in Caras-Severin county, the largest investment is in Eurobussines Park I in Oradea, where more than 150 employees work.

<sup>67</sup> SC Plexus Services Ro SRL was founded in 2009, when it had only 14 employees, and at the end of 2016 it reached 785, announcing the intention to reach 1300 employees in the next 3 years (<http://www.locuridemuncabihor.ro/2013-12-03-02>). It works in the production of motherboards for the IT industry and services in the field for US group customers. With the completion of the investment from Oradea Eurobussines Park 1, SC Plexus Services Ro SRL has expanded its production capacity.

<sup>68</sup> SC Inteva is part of the American group with the same name. The Salonta investment in a car parts factory started producing in 2008 and in 2016 it reached 685 employees.

<sup>69</sup> Valiant TMS RO was founded in 2010 and has as its scope of activity information technology services. The 55 employees work in the Oradea Trade Center office.

products and, since 2009, of Shinheung Electronics SRL<sup>70</sup> to Samsung's subsidiary in Hungary. In 2012, Vision Digitech<sup>71</sup> is founded in Santion (near Oradea), which in 2012 will attract a lot of workforce from SC Hanil Electronics, which has entered into insolvency.

The British from Faist continued to invest in Oradea, taking over the premises of the Bors Industrial Park from Faist Mekatronic in 2008 and setting up, with their division from Italy, Faist Metalworking, which manufactures metal products.

German capital holds the largest number of investments (4 investments), but still does not occupy such a large share in the economy of Bihor County. The Germans have developed in three production areas: metal door manufacture<sup>72</sup>, special office furniture manufacturing<sup>73</sup>, manufacture of rubber car parts<sup>74</sup>. Knowing the potential of young people in Bihor County in computer secrets and foreign languages, the Cylex International Group has opened a branch office in Palota where databases are created processed.

Hungarian capital is remarkable in this period through two investments: one in plastics processing at Mădăras<sup>75</sup> and another in machinery and equipment intermediaries, opened in Bors<sup>76</sup>.

Spanish capital is very active in this period through 4 investments. Three of these come to complete the investment in Turnătoria Iberica and in the production of auto parts made in 2007 by Microdeco<sup>77</sup>. They are joined by Confecții Navabellen SRL, which produces school uniforms<sup>78</sup>.

With regard to Italian investments, they are only the sixth place among foreign investors and they are reduced to just 3 direct investments<sup>79</sup> and in combination with the British capital<sup>80</sup>. Thus, is marked the decline trend reported during 2004-2007, as observed in November 2008, when, although in Bihor were registered 800 companies with Italian capital or mixed Italian capital, only 400 were active<sup>81</sup>. Most of them worked in the

<sup>70</sup> SC Shinheung Electronics SRL installed in Oradea Eurobusiness Parc 1, where it built an important production capacity, reaching 563 employees in 2011, but at the end of 2016 there were 370 employees.

<sup>71</sup> SC Vision Digitech SRL is specialized in electronic components repair, it had 337 employees at the end of 2016.

<sup>72</sup> International Turen Manufaktur SRL was founded in 2010 and now operates in Oradea Eurobusiness Parc 1 and where 24 employees worked in 2016.

<sup>73</sup> Zaor Studio Furniture was founded in 2012 at Nojorid and currently has 32 employees.

<sup>74</sup> Plastec Stabil & Reinert Kunststoffverarbeitung SRL was founded in 2008 in Salonta and has 145 employees.

<sup>75</sup> SC Jasz Plaszt Romania was founded in 2009 and had 341 employees in 2016.

<sup>76</sup> SC Adix Technik SRL is founded in 2010 and has 49 employees in 2016.

<sup>77</sup> View Discussion on Spanish Investment in 2004-2007.

<sup>78</sup> Confecții Navabellen SRL appeared in 2010 in Oradea and currently has 54 employees.

<sup>79</sup> Gironacci COM SRL, shoe factory since 2011 at Alesd (52 employees); New Vogue SRL, shoes factory since 2012 at Alesd (41 employees); GVG Aluminum Technologies, manufacturing aluminum mechanical products since 2009 at Biharia (79 employees).

<sup>80</sup> Faist Metalworking, the branch of the British group FAIST, the metalworking factory since 2008 at Bors (456 employees), following Faist Mekatronic.

<sup>81</sup> [www.wall-street.ro/articol/Companii/52095/Criza-ar-putea-inchide-20%-firmele-investitorilor-italienilor-din-Bihor.html](http://www.wall-street.ro/articol/Companii/52095/Criza-ar-putea-inchide-20%-firmele-investitorilor-italienilor-din-Bihor.html), accessed on 5 December 2017.

clothing and footwear industry. This evolution will continue in the background of the economic crisis, so that in January 2010 there were just around 200<sup>82</sup>.

The Belgian capital will make its presence felt in Bihor during this period through 2 investments: a plastics factory<sup>83</sup> and a new investment in the field of paper and cardboard manufacturing in Salonta<sup>84</sup>. Here we have to associate the Dutch capital with an investment<sup>85</sup>.

The 2008-2012 period will be another 2 premieres. In 2010, SC Cesal SA was acquired by the Polish company Atlas, a leader in the production of building materials in Poland and the third largest producer of dry mortars in Europe<sup>86</sup>. In 2008, the first investment in Slovakia was registered in Salonta<sup>87</sup>.

#### 4. Post-crisis after 2013

As in the previous, in the post-crisis period, after 2013, US capital ranks first among foreign investors in Bihor County with 5 investments, which go to areas with high added value: automotive components production<sup>88</sup>, production of electric motors<sup>89</sup>, software production<sup>90</sup> and outsourcing<sup>91</sup>. To this is added an interesting investment in the growth of buffaloes in Salonta<sup>92</sup>. The 6 investments had in 2016 - ?

Italian capital returns with important investments. These new investments continue to be made in the footwear industry<sup>93</sup>, but also in the recruitment of workforce (drivers)<sup>94</sup>.

<sup>82</sup> Said Antonio Sargenti, UNIMPRESA Bihor president and Italian consular representative for Bihor and Satu Mare ([http://www.oron.ro/stiri/catname/stiri\\_Dupa\\_15\\_ani\\_in\\_Bihor\\_Italienii\\_isi\\_strang\\_jucariile\\_si\\_pleaca\\_festina\\_lente:\\_Stiri\\_Bihor\\_355959.html](http://www.oron.ro/stiri/catname/stiri_Dupa_15_ani_in_Bihor_Italienii_isi_strang_jucariile_si_pleaca_festina_lente:_Stiri_Bihor_355959.html), accessed on December 5, 2017).

<sup>83</sup> Grass Tech SRL was founded in Oradea in 2008, where in 2016 worked 93 employees.

<sup>84</sup> SC Corex was opened in 2008 and 23 employees worked in 2016.

<sup>85</sup> SC Jan de Lely SRL, a Dutch road transport company, opened a branch in 2010 to Chislaz, where 65 employees work.

<sup>86</sup> SC Cesal SA had the highest number of employees in 2016 (144).

<sup>87</sup> SC Alverosal SRL is oriented towards the hotel and restaurant industry. Here work 45 employees.

<sup>88</sup> SC Inteva Salonta opened in 2016 the second factory in the former PIC hypermarket where, at the end of 2016, 200 employees worked; In 2017 began the development of production capacity in Eurobusiness Parc Oradea III (<http://www.domnuleprimar.ro/ORADEA-Compania-Intevavrea-investeasca-milioane-euro-parcul-industrial-in-strada-Ogorului-DPE-to-1-a25302.htm>).

<sup>89</sup> Emerson Cluj-Napoca opened a factory in Eurobusiness Park in Oradea in 2016. In 2017, this factory, where 216 employees worked on 31.12.2016, was sold to the Japanese group Nidec.

<sup>90</sup> Imprezio Global opened in 2016 in Oradea Trade Center the second center in Romania after the one in Cluj-Napoca (<http://www.bihon.ro/oradea-interesanta-pentru-companiile-din-it/1661067>); Nordlogic Software opened in 2015 in Oradea Trade Center the second center after Cluj-Napoca (<http://www.ebihoreanul.ro/stiri/ultima-or-31-6/oradea-ia-viteza-tot-mai-multe-firme-it-din-cluj-si-timisoara-vin-la-oradea-in-cautare-de-specialisti-128834.html>, accessed on 30.12. 2017).

<sup>91</sup> SYKES Enterprise Eastern Europe, with subsidiaries in Cluj-Napoca and Sibiu, opened a branch in Oradea Trade Center in 2016, where at the end of 2017 there were 180 people, with the potential to reach 250 in 2018 (information gathered from source).

<sup>92</sup> Euro Buffalo was set up in Salonta in 2014.

<sup>93</sup> Melania New SRL was set up in Alesd in 2013 and reached 1,200 employees in 2015, but in 2016 it went into insolvency; New Orion SRL was founded in 2013 at Marghita and had 53 employees in 2016; Goldenviolet Shoes SRL founded in 2015, in Salonta and Oradea, one production unit, where 220 worked in 2016.

The Austrian capital occupies the third position through 3 investments: one in the furniture industry, in Oradea<sup>95</sup>, another in rental and industrial laundry services for hotels and hospitals<sup>96</sup> and other in the freight transport by road.

German capital occupies the second position with 2 investments: one in the production of exhaust systems for the automotive industry<sup>97</sup> and another in plastics processing for the automotive industry<sup>98</sup>.

It seems the outsourcing activity is the one that has been the star of post-crisis investments after 2013. Along with the US investment from SYKES Entreprise Eastern Europe, which came on the Cluj branch, at Oradea also installed the British from Xerox<sup>99</sup>, Belgians from Aviație Est<sup>100</sup>, the French from JFGR<sup>101</sup>.

It is also worth mentioning the Hungarian investment in Bors in the production of orthopedic footwear<sup>102</sup>.

## 5. Conclusion

On an overall analysis, it is noticed that until 2004 Italian capital was very present, especially in the apparel, footwear, textiles and knitwear industry, the machine tools industry still exploiting the local infrastructure of the former socialist industry, but later setting up production facilities own or rented. The Italian capital benefited at a very low price by a qualified and highly qualified workforce who had worked in the former socialist enterprises. In this area, it goes to the micro-enterprise system. Oradea and its surroundings, Beius and Maghita are the centers of this industry.

Road transport was the sector in which Italian capital was active, making Bihor one of the most important players on the transport market in Romania.

The second place is the German capital by taking over the former sugar factory in Oradea by the association between Pfeifer & Langen and Cristal Union from France, which became the well-known brand «Diamant». The German capital was then felt in the

<sup>94</sup> SC Strada mea SRL was created in 2013 at Borș and has the mission to recruit Romanian drivers for transport companies in Italy. In 2016, 94 people were working in this company.

<sup>95</sup> ADA Fabrică de Mobilă SRL opens in 2015 a new factory in Oradea, where in 2016 there were 200 employees.

<sup>96</sup> SC Salesianer Miettex SRL opened in 2014 in Eurobussines Parc Oradea I a unit in which they worked 43 persons in 2016, meant to provide rental and industrial laundry services for the counties of western Romania and those in eastern Hungary (<http://www.ebihoreanul.ro/stiri/ultima-or-31-1-20/salesianer-miettex-deschide-la-oradea-cea-de-a-doua-fabrica-din-romania-investitia-6-milioane-euro-113691.html>).

<sup>97</sup> Eberspacher Exhaust Techology Romania SRL was founded in 2015, in 2016 there were 132 employees and it is located in Eurobussines Parc Oradea I. It is estimated that by 2018 there will be 650 people working (<https://www.adlo.ro/parcuri-industriale/parcul-industrial-i/rezidenti/115-eberspacher-exhaust-technology-romania-srl>).

<sup>98</sup> REINERT Kunststofftechnik SRL was founded in 2016 at Santandrei, where 22 employees were employed in 2016.

<sup>99</sup> Xerox opened its headquarters in Oradea in 2014, and in 2016 moved to Oradea Trade Center, where it had 110 employees in 2016.

<sup>100</sup> Aviation East was established in 2014 and has its office in Oradea Trader Center, where the 15 employees are intermediaries for spare parts for airlines.

<sup>101</sup> JFGR SRL appeared in Oradea in 2014 and deals with financial intermediation services for clients of French companies. In 2017, the French company Green Hand Recycling SRL, which deals with waste recycling intermediaries, also appeared.

<sup>102</sup> SC Aktapa Ortopedica SRL was founded in 2014 and 52 people worked there in 2016.

leather and footwear industry in the Valea lui Mihai area, where, in 2000, the Austrian footwear company Legero Shoes was also installed.

Then, the French capital, through two investments, take over two companies in 1999: the sugar factory, through Cristal Union and the cement plant in Alesd, through the Lafarge group.

Fourth is the Belgian capital that we find implanted especially in the field of road transport.

During 2004-2007, we are witnessing reduction of foreign investment in the textile, garments and footwear industry. Foreign investments in road transport, which were very active before 2004, no longer occupy a significant place, only 4 investments are registered in this area (3 Italian and 1 Austrian).

We assist at foreign investment orientation on other areas: French and Austrian investments in the furniture industry; the Belgian companies in the field of paper and cardboard packaging, the French plastics industry, British investments in the field of mechanical machining, the production of electronic plates and tubes (Belgian and British from Conectronics), industrial and aerospace electronic components (Canadians from Celestica).

These investments in areas requiring a higher skilled workforce will give the future the trend of internationalizing the business environment in Bihor County, which starts to leave the area of foreign investments specific to underdeveloped states, and to come to the attention of the investors who want production with higher added value.

The 2008-2012 period, the foreign investments in Bihor County are marked by the accentuation of the trend in the previous cycle towards investments in production objectives with higher value added. This trend will have two mutations. First of all, it is about strengthening the production trend for the automotive industry through US, German and Spanish investments. Secondly, it is Oradia's affirmation as an important pole in the electronics industry and the top-level field of the Americans and South Koreans. Finally, we have IT investments made by the Germans at Cylex Interntional and Americans at Vailant TMS.

In the post-crisis period after 2013, there is a decline in the share of foreign investment compared to previous periods, but also a strengthening of foreign investment in the automotive production sector (Americans from Inteva Product, Germans from Eberspaecher Exhaust Techology Romania and from REINERT Kunststofftechnik SRL) or the electric productionsector (Emerson taken over by the Japanese from Nidec).

An evolution that has become certain is the registration of Oradea among the cities with "smart" productions, alongside Cluj, Timisoara and Bucharest, through investments in outsourcing (4 investments, and especially in software production - the Americans from Imprezio Global and Nordlogic software).

#### **Annex 1: List of foreign-owned companies in Bihor**

<b>Company</b>	<b>Capital</b>	<b>Number of employees at 31.12.2016</b>	<b>The objects of the company</b>	<b>Current sites in Bihor</b>
Periode 1991-2003				
Holcim	France Switzerland Ireland	375	Manufacture of cement	Alesd -1991 Alesd -2000 Alesd -2015
Zaharul-Diamant	France/Germany	262	Manufacture of sugar	Oradea -1991

<b>Company</b>	<b>Capital</b>	<b>Number of employees at 31.12.2016</b>	<b>The objects of the company</b>	<b>Current sites in Bihor</b>
Rozoti Prodcum	Italy	72	Freight transport by road	Biharia -1993 EBP Oradea I* - 2012
Galassini Romania	Italy	0 insolventa	Freight transport by road	Oradea- 1993
S.C. Andromi com SRL	Italy	198	Processing and preserving of meat	Nojorid- 1994
Cecconi Transport Oradea International	Italy	20	Other transportation support activities	Oradea -1994
Arfungo Comimpex	Italy	104	Agents involved in the sale of agricultural raw materials, live animals, textile raw materials and semi-finished goods	Luncsoara/Auseu - 1994
Centrum Romania	Netherlands	-	Freight transport by road	Oradea -1994 Preluata in 2005 de H. Essers
Schrack Tehnik	Austria	47	Wholesale of other machinery and equipment	Orade a-1994
Brugioni Romania	Italy	30	Other transportation support activities	Bors -1994
Vlasar Agro Bicaci (com Gepiu)	Italy	54	Manufacture of grain mill products	Bicaci -1994
Isoplus Romania	Italy	65	Other construction installation	Oradea -1994
Emsiltechtans	Romania-Italy	182	Manufacture of metal forming machinery	Oradea -1995
Maes Transport Romania	Belgium	50	Freight transport by road	Bors -1995
Eternal Beauty Srl	Hungary	93	Wholesale of perfume and cosmetics	Salonta -1996
Divio Impex	Italy	17	Wholesale of machine tools	Beius -1996
Ara Shoes	Germany	1214	Manufacture of footwear	Valea lui Mihai-1997
Lloyd Shoes	Germany	709	Manufacture of footwear	Valea lui Mihai-1997
Nord-Vest Camioane/grup JURMILKA	Slovakia/Romania	43	Other transportation support activities	Bors- 1997
Bollhoff SRL	Italy	21	Wholesale of hardware, plumbing and heating equipment and supplies	Bors-1997
DESPA RO	Italy	35	Wholesale of other machinery and equipment	Oradea -1998

<b>Company</b>	<b>Capital</b>	<b>Number of employees at 31.12.2016</b>	<b>The objects of the company</b>	<b>Current sites in Bihor</b>
Hokman Trans	Netherlands	24	Freight transport by road	Hidiselul de Sus - 1998
Class Furn	Netherlands	376	Manufacture of other furniture	Sabolciu -1998
Cavalli Woods Interiors	Italy	122	Manufacture of other parts and accessories for motor vehicles	Biharia -1998
Flaga GPL	Germany	34	Wholesale of solid, liquid and gaseous fuels and related products	Salonta -1998
Damore Prod SRL	Italy	182	Manufacture of footwear	Oșorhei -1999
Autoflex	Germany	24	Manufacture of bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles; manufacture of trailers and semi-trailers	Salonta-1999
Italstei	Italy	134	Manufacture of knitted and crocheted fabrics	Beiuș -1999
Orapluma SRL	Italy	20	Manufacture of made-up textile articles, except apparel	Aleșd -1999
Autotransporti Emme SRL	Italy	9	Freight transport by road	Borș – 1999
Romanbag Production	Italy	150	Manufacture of corrugated paper and paperboard and of containers of paper and paperboard	Oșorhei -1999
GMAB Consulting	USA	131	Engineering activities and related technical consultancy	Oradea -1999
Comau Romania	Italy	435	Engineering activities and related technical consultancy	EBP Oradea III** - 1999
H. Essers Expeditii srl	Belgium	11	Other transportation support activities	Oradea -1999
Ciobanca SRL	Hungary	86/ 2015	Other retail sale in non-specialised stores	Borș -1999
Ara Roamnia	Germany	70	Renting and operating of own or leased real estate	Valea lui Mihai-2000
Legero Shoes Roamnia	Austria	486	Manufacture of footwear	Valea lui Mihai - 2000
Finproject Romania	Italy	250	Manufacture of footwear	Valea lui Mihai - 2000

<b>Company</b>	<b>Capital</b>	<b>Number of employees at 31.12.2016</b>	<b>The objects of the company</b>	<b>Current sites in Bihor</b>
Albatex	Belgium	150	Manufacture of other textiles n.e.c.	Beiuş -2000
OVT Logistkzentrum	Austria	40	Other transportation support activities	Oradea-2002
Radymicx Romania	Ireland	157	Manufacture of ready-mixed concrete	Oradea – 2002
Freeman	Germany	19	Wholesale of grain, unmanufactured tobacco, seeds and animal feeds	Oradea -2002
Axe Group Romania	France	60	Machining	Oradea -2003
Perioade 2004-2007				
Celestica	Canada	878	Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment	PI -Borş -2004
Zucchetti SRL	Italy	44	Computer consultancy activities	EPB Oradea I -2004
Noul Woodest	Italy	231	Manufacture of other furniture	Oradea -2004
Eurocire	Italy	50	Manufacture of other plastic products	Oradea -2004
H. Essers srl	Belgium	495	Freight transport by road	Oradea-2004
Sneider Romania	Germany	10	Manufacture of lifting and handling equipment	Oradea -2004
PGS SOFA & CO SRL	France	1201	Manufacture of other furniture	Oradea – 2005
Decitex RO SRL	France	43	Manufacture of other textiles n.e.c.	EBP Oradea II**.-2005
Conectronics SRL	Great Britain/ Belgium	928	Manufacture of loaded electronic boards	Oradea I – 2005
Lava Knitting SRL	Belgium	42	Manufacture of knitted and crocheted fabrics	EBP Oradea I-2005
Astormueller SRL	Germany	52	Agents involved in the sale of textiles, clothing, fur, footwear and leather goods	EBP Oradea I-2005
Canah International	Germany	35	Manufacture of oils and fats	Salonta -2005
Ciocorom	Belgium	73	Manufacture of cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionery	Beiuş -2005
Lema Carton	Belgium	19	Manufacture of corrugated paper and paperboard and of containers of paper	Salonta -2005

Company	Capital	Number of employees at 31.12.2016	The objects of the company	Current sites in Bihor
			and paperboard	
Sc. Bihore	Switzerland	704	Manufacture of footwear	Paleu – 2005
Microrom	Italy	60	Manufacture of communication equipment	EBP Oradea I-2005
ABA RO	Italy	27	Wholesale of perfume and cosmetics	Oradea -2005
Turnătoria Iberica	Spain	120	Casting of light metals	Oradea – 2005
Rufind SRL	Romania/ Germany	223	Manufacture of footwear	EBP Oradea I-2005
Isrom Impex	Romania/Israel	56	Manufacture of other general-purpose machinery n.e.c.	EBP Oradea I-2005
Wirax SRL	Romania/Poland	20	Wholesale of agricultural machinery, equipment and supplies	Borș -2005
Capirom SRL	France	249	Manufacture of other plastic products	Sântandrei-2005
Luna Shues	Italy	684	Manufacture of footwear	Valea lui Mihai - 2005
Color Type	Italy	42	Pre-press and pre-media services	Oșorhei -2005
Theming and Animatronics Industries S.R.L..	Spain	116	Other manufacturing n.e.c.	Oșorhei -2005
Reropam	Italy	282	Manufacture of footwear	Borș 2005
Euriteh	Austria	21	Wholesale of other machinery and equipment	Oradea -2005
Ada Fabrica de Mobila	Austria	1201	Manufacture of other furniture	Salonta -2005 Oradea -2015
Amari Romania	Austria	27	Wholesale of metals and metal ores	Oradea -2005
Donatiro SRL	Italy	95	Freight transport by road	EBP Oradea I- 2006
Russmedia Digital	Austria?	143	Web portals	Oradea -2006
Vernicolor	France	564	Manufacture of other plastic products	Sântandrei -2006
Oliver Iberica SRL	Spain	9	Growing of cereals (except rice), leguminous crops and oil seeds	Alparea -2006

Company	Capital	Number of employees at 31.12.2016	The objects of the company	Current sites in Bihor
Aludea	France/ Switzerland	11	Machining	Oradea -2006
Samogin Trans SRL	Italy	30	Freight transport by road	Borş-2006
Eco Wood	Austria	24	Agents involved in the sale of timber and building materials	Borş -2006
Silkest	Italy	82	Preparation and spinning of textile fibres	Sântandrei -2007
IISole	Italy	65	Manufacture of footwear	Valea lui Mihai - 2007
Europoroton	Italy	42	Non-specialised wholesale trade (producing and selling bricks)	Biharia – 2006
VPK Packaging	Belgium	245	Manufacture of corrugated paper and paperboard and of containers of paper and paperboard	Salonta -2007
Roprofix SRL,	Romania/Poland	185	Wholesale of other machinery and equipment	EBP Oradea I – 2007
Microdeco	Spain	38	Manufacture of other parts and accessories for motor vehicles	Nojorid -2007
S.C. Hanil Electronics SRL	South Korea	913 (în 2011) – închisă	Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment	Biharia -2007
Kapoline Logistik Transport	Austria	24	Freight transport by road	Sînmartin -2007
Iberia Logistiks Express	Germany	5	Freight transport by road	Oradea -2007
Galassini Grup	Italy	32	Construction of residential and non-residential buildings	Oradea-2007
Transmec RO	Italy	445	Other transportation support activities	Borş-2007
<b>Perioade 2008-2012</b>				
Interva	USA	200	Manufacture of other parts and accessories for motor vehicles	PI Salonta- 2008 EBP Oradea II - 2016
		685		
Samsung Electronic	South Korea	24 (in scadere de la 89 in 2013)	Business and other management consultancy activities	Oradea – 2008
Grass Tech	Belgium	92	Manufacture of other plastic products	Oradea -2008

Company	Capital	Number of employees at 31.12.2016	The objects of the company	Current sites in Bihor
PLASTEC STABIL & REINERT KUNSTSTOFFVERARBEITUNG SRL	Germany	146	Manufacture of plastic plates, sheets, tubes and profiles	Salonta -2008
Alverosal	Slovakia	45	Non-specialised wholesale trade (hotels and restaurants)	Salonta -2008
SC Corex	Belgium	23	Manufacture of corrugated paper and paperboard and of containers of paper and paperboard	Salonta-2008
Faist Metalworking	Italy/Great Britain Faist Group	456	Manufacture of metal structures and parts of structures	Borş-2008
Shinheung Electronics SRL	South Korea	370	Manufacture of electronic components	Oradea I – 2009
Plexus Services Ro SRL	USA	785	Manufacture of electronic components	EBP Oradea I – 2009
Deoletaje & Conjunctos	Spain	53	Machining	EBP Oradea I- 2009
Cylex International Tehnologii Informației. parte grupului Cylex International	Germany	200	Data processing, hosting and related activities	Palota -2009
GVG Aluminium Technologies	Italy	79	Machining	Biharia 2009
Adix Technik Srl	Hungary	41	Agents involved in the sale of machinery, industrial equipment, ships and aircraft	Oradea-2009
Jasz Plaszt RO	Hungary	341	Manufacture of other plastic products	Mădăras -2010
Jan de Lely SRL	Netherlands	69	Freight transport by road	Chislaz -2010
Confecții Navabellen SRL	Spain	54	Manufacture of other outerwear (children uniforms)	Oradea -2010
Vision Digitech	South Korea	425	Repair of communication equipment	Sîntion -2010
Macanizados Auxim SRL	Spain	24	Machining	EBP Oradea I-2010
InternationalTuren Manufaktur RSL	Germany	23	Manufacture of doors and windows of metal	EBP Oradea II-2010
Vailant TMS RO	USA /Austria	55	Computer programming activities	Oradea –OTC**** – 2010

Company	Capital	Number of employees at 31.12.2016	The objects of the company	Current sites in Bihor
CESAL SRL	Poland	144	Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products n.e.c.	Oradea – 2010
Wirax Distribution SRL	Romania-Poland	49	Wholesale of agricultural machinery, equipment and supplies	Borş -2010
Gironacci COM SRL	Italy	51	Manufacture of footwear	Aleşd -2011
New Vog	Italy	42	Manufacture of footwear	Aleşd 2012
Mecanor Rumania SRL	Spain	65	Machining	Oradea I-2011
Romcom Capital Partners	Romania-Switzerland	7	Business and other management consultancy activities	Oradea- 2011
Zaor Studio Furniture	Germany	32	Manufacture of other furniture	Nojorid -2012
Perioada 2013-2017				
New Orion	Italy	243	Manufacture of footwear	Marghita 2013
Melania New	Italy	1023/ 2015 0/2016	Manufacture of footwear	Aleşd -2013
Strada mea SRL	Italy	94	Temporary employment agency activities	Borş-2013
Gruber Logistik	Austria	113	Freight transport by road	Oradea -2013
Salesianer Miettex, SRL	Austria	37	Washing and (dry-)cleaning of textile and fur products	Oradea I-2014
Aviatie Est	Belgium	14	Wholesale of other machinery and equipment (aviation field)	Oradea –OTC – 2014
Euro Buffalo	USA	24	Mixed farming (raising bisons)	Salonta -2014
JFGR SRL	France		Activities of holding companies	Oradea -2014
SC Aktapa Ortopedica SRL	Hungary	52	Manufacture of medical and dental instruments and supplies	Borş -2014
Eberspaecher Exhaust Technology Romania SRL	Germany	132 (650?)	Manufacture of other parts and accessories for motor vehicles (car exhaust systems)	Oradea I -2015

Company	Capital	Number of employees at 31.12.2016	The objects of the company	Current sites in Bihor
SC. GOLDENVIOLET SHOES SRL -	Italy	220	Manufacture of footwear	Salonta 2015 Oradea -2015
Xerox Center Oradea	Great Britain	40/110	Activities of call centres	Oradea –OTC – 2016
Imprezio Global	USA	20	Computer programming activities	Oradea –OTC – 2016
SYKES Entreprise Eastern Europe	USA	150	Activities of call centres	Oradea –OTC – 2016
NordLogic Software	USA	12	Computer programming activities	Oradea –OTC – 2016
REINERT Kunststofftechnik SRL	Germany	22	Manufacture of other plastic products	Sîntandrei-2016
Nidec Emerson	Japan USA	216	Manufacture of non-domestic cooling and ventilation equipment	EBP Oradea I- 2017
Hanning Motors România SRL	Germany		Manufacture of electric generators, motors, and transformers	Oradea I- 2017
Green Hand Recycling	France		Recycling	Oradea – 2017

\* EBP Oradea I – Eurobussines Parc Oradea I

\*\* EBP Oradea II – Eurobussines Parc Oradea II

\*\*\* EBP Oradea III – Eurobussines Parc Oradea III

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# DIGITAL POLICIES AS INSTRUMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS

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**Abstract.** *The comprehensive European integration process is based on the four freedoms and the principle of the ever closer Union. For that, European policies are dispatched and implemented both at the EU level and at the national level for cohesion, economic growth, jobs, etc. However, with the revolutionary development of the digital technologies and the advent of the digital space and the Fourth Industrial Revolutions, several new challenges have the potential to shift the integration process.*

*The purpose of this presentation is to contextualize digital policies as instruments of the European integration process. The basic assumption of this research is that the digital space is a new target for European integration with initiatives like the gradual elimination of roaming charges, a unified copyright reform or the data protection regulation. First, I discuss the concept of globalization and the role of IT in connecting people and businesses. Then, I translate the discussion on IT innovation in the European Union with references to the EU policy documents. Lastly, I bridge the policy references with analyses on the potential of digital policies for the development of the European Union.*

**Keywords:** *digital technologies, digital policies, European Union, ICT, Internet*

## 1. Introduction

The future of the European Union has been heavily discussed in the recent years, especially after the referendum in the UK and as a result of the nationalist tendencies altering the national and European landscapes. More recently, the issue of Catalonia has put additional pressures in terms of regional identity and nationalist tendencies. Despite these woes, the European Union enjoyed another year of economic recovery and a renewal of the commitment towards European values at the summit in Rome. Speaking at the state of the Union in 2017, President Juncker stated that “the wind is back in Europe's sails” (Jean-Claude Juncker, 2017).

Similarly, in the aftermath of the Brexit process, the Commission issued its five visions on the future of Europe and the summit in Rome witnessed the commitment towards a more stronger and resilient Europe in terms of security, sustainability, economic and social progress, as well on the global stage (European Council, 2017). European unity may be threatened by nationalist tendencies, migration, terrorist threats or illiberal democracies, but leaders have responded with a renewal commitment towards the European values and with new initiatives meant to build an “ever closer Union”, as the treaty states. One of the more recent examples features the commitment towards a more structured cooperation in terms of defense policy, a first step towards a common defense policy. Entitled PESCO, it is considered “a driver for integration in the field of defence”(European External Action Service, 2017).

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It seems that the European Union is currently caught between fragmentation and unity, much like the actual subject to be analyzed in this paper, namely the digital space. The issues related to the potential and dangers posed by the digital space in the current socio-political landscape are currently making headlines all over the world, from the involvement of online armies meant to hijack the conversations online within the election process in the USA, UK, France or Germany, to the current consensus that the digital space provides an immense potential for economic growth in the European Union. Ever since the beginning of the World Wide Web, this statement has been spread and repeated by numerous political leaders in Europe. From Jacques Delors to Jose Manuel Barroso and President Juncker, new or digital technologies were put forward as major sources of economic growth. These statements have been doubled by policy papers in this direction, but implementation of proper policies has remained behind digital innovation.

However, does the digital space need policy? The known and accepted statement is that the Internet and the digital space are free, they require no intervention or limitations because policies are limitations and they can only impede the functioning of the digital space. The assumption of this paper is that the digital space has developed in conjunction with the real space, with territory, especially considering the fact that connections offering access to the digital space are grounded in territory. If we apply this assertion to the European Union, we come to the simple realization that the digital space is fragmented, as each Member State has its own digital barriers, especially when it comes to issues related to e-government or e-commerce.

This paper analyzes the current state of the European digital space and argues that policies are necessary to weld together the national digital spaces. The process has already begun, with regulations on data protection, roaming or cross-border portability of content. However, it must be accelerated, as innovation does not wait for policy. The basic assumption of this research is that the digital space is a new target for European integration with initiatives like the gradual elimination of roaming charges, a unified copyright reform or the data protection regulation. First, I discuss the concept of globalization and the role of IT in connecting people and businesses. Then, I translate the discussion on IT innovation in the European Union with references to the EU policy documents. Lastly, I bridge the policy references with analyses on the potential of digital policies for the development of the European Union. Lastly, I bridge the references with policy analyses on the potential of digital policies for the development of the European Union.

## **2. On globalization and change**

The proper argumentation for digital policies in the European Union must start from a thorough literature review on the foundation of these digital policies, namely the direct interdependence between globalization and information technology. These two core concepts are the foundation of the discussion on digital policy and their importance in one of the by-products of globalization, namely the European Union.

The discussion on globalization often starts from the assumption that it is a rather ambiguous term, used to describe a myriad of processes, which determine the shrinking of the global stage. Secondly, we can refer to multiple types and/or effects of globalization, from the obvious globalization of the economy to the lesser crystalized globalization of terrorism. One general conceptualization, by Robertson, refers to globalization as “globalization refers both to the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole” (Roland Robertson, 1992, p. 8). This definition is based on two particular processes, namely shrinking of the world and aggregation towards

a whole, which do not particularly amount to a uniformity that is often blamed on globalization. “Compression” can be considered a similar term to McLuhan’s “global village”, defined as the increasing connectedness of humans due to electric devices, “which eliminate the effects of space and time so that the globe contracts into one interconnected, metaphorical ‘village’”(T. Gibson and S.J. Murray, 2012, p. 312). In this view, technological development is the main trigger for the shrinking of the world. A similar definition is provided by Tomlinson, who states that “globalization refers to the rapidly developing and ever-densening network of interconnections and interdependencies that characterizes modern social life” (J. Tomlinson, 1999, p. 2). Tomlinson provides more context to the intricacies of globalization using other terms than simply referring to the globalizing effect on the entire world, but rather it focuses on “social life”. Although he does not directly refer to technology as a trigger for such interconnectedness, we can assume that it has contributed to the network effects in society.

The second process present in Robertson’s definition is not obvious in the quoted definitions. The notion of a global consciousness can seem far-fetched if we refer especially to cultural aspects, whereas the economic valence of globalization may lead to such an assertion, based on global economic processes or the way in which the markets respond instantly after an event happens. The key to the second process is not nearly that the world has developed a consciousness, but rather it relates to the intensification of this consciousness. Intensification is a gradual process based on the fact that more and more people communicate, trade, travel across the world, with the help of technology. Although this is not a part of Robertson’s definition of globalization, we argue that space has also changed due to this intensification.

Reconfiguration of space in general is one of the hallmarks of globalization. Manuel Castells recognizes the information technology as the new paradigm for what he calls the network society. One of his main theses is that both space and time are reconfigured under this “information technology paradigm” (Castells, 2011, p. 407). Whether it refers to economic flows or the digital space or even the “flattening” of the world, as argued by Friedman, there is no doubt that the component of space has changed along with the development of technology. The notions of space and territory have been reconfigured due to information technology. Although the subject of the influence of IT in globalization has been thoroughly discussed, the changes brought about by IT are not uniform and require careful analysis and reflection (Walfsham, 2000, p. 201). For that matter, Walfsham argues that there are several levels of the analysis triggered by IT in globalization on which authors agree. Firstly, there is the undoubted idea that IT has triggered change across the world, from the individual level to the nation-state level. Secondly, these changes are not “uniform” for societies and individuals, but what they have in common is the interconnectedness. Finally, Walfsham states that there is an increasing need for “reflection and action” related to the role of IT (Walfsham, 2000, p. 201).

In the pursuit of a proper model to provide context for the influence of IT, there is another point of view to consider, namely that “in the new global reality, change is sudden, chaotic, unexpected and difficult to anticipate; it happens almost instantly with unfolding surprises; it produces anxiety, ambiguity, and possible system breakdowns across nations and administrative systems” (Sebastian Vaduva, 2016, p. 4). From weather phenomena to the disruption caused by the information technology, these changes are indeed unprecedented. Change caused by IT is not necessarily negative. However, they must be tackled by the proper actors, either individuals or institutions or states. How can

you tackle change that is unprecedented? The innovation triggered by the technological revolution must not be left for the research and development initiatives of either public or private actors, but they must be translated into society to benefit the citizens and the economy. For this, proper digital tools must be put in place by the relevant players in the field.

IT is considered a general-purpose technology. According to Breshanan and Trajtenberg, the features of this type of technology, which refers to innovations like the steam engine or electrification are pervasiveness, improvement and innovation spawning (Timothy Breshanan and Manuel Trajtenberg, 1992). It is pervasive, considering that the technology has replicated across a varied number of facets of society and economy. Naturally, it aims to improve the economic performance and lives of citizens, while it has the tendency to replicate and generate more innovation. To put it shortly, they cause ripples of change across various sectors. This type of change is considered by several authors to be unprecedented and this discourse has been replicated by those who have the power to influence the translation of innovation into society and economy.

In the case of the European Union, the digital space has grown in importance in the past decade. Currently, the Digital Single Market is one of the ten key priorities of the Commission. President Juncker's justification for the prioritization of the digital technology in the EU's policies related to the idea that digital technologies do not know any borders. Also, Juncker has stated that "enhancing the use of digital technologies and online services should become a horizontal policy, covering all sectors of the economy and of the public sector" (European Commission, 2015, p. 2). Political actors also talk about the tremendous change brought about by the digital technologies. Andrus Ansip, the Vice-President of the Commission and the Commissioner for the Digital Single Market has repeatedly stated this, such as saying that "digital has become a key part of today's economic reality" and "digital has to be made an integral part of all policy areas – including development and foreign policy" (Andrus Ansip, 2017a). The prioritization of "digital" has been based on this new changed reality characterized by globalization and technological innovation. The response provided by the European Union is triggered by two challenges. The first one is external and, naturally, refers to the rapid technological innovation, which requires constant policy implementation and correction, while the second is an internal one, caused by the regional integration process that has been going on for the past six decades.

### **3. Digital space in the European Union**

The basic argument of this paper is that the European Union is undergoing a regional integration process, which has translated into the digital space in the past decade. The real space, namely the territory, has shifted from the national to the supranational paradigm, once the integration process began. The gradual enlargement and unification of Europe is based on the neofunctionalist logic. According to the specialists that defined neofunctionalism, it is based on three integration concepts, "functional spillover, political spillover, and upgrading of common interests" (Mattli, 1999, p. 25). Spillover relates to the highly interdependent character of different sectors of different economies: "functional spillover is based on the assumption that the different sectors of a modern industrial economy are highly interdependent and that any integrative action in one sector creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions in related sectors, which in turn create a further condition and a need for more action, and so forth" (Mattli, 1999, p. 25). Further and repeated actions in more and more sectors of the

economy are the key to integration. The switch to political spillover depends on the will of the political actors, who must take conscious action towards integration.

The most famous experiment in neofunctionalism is the European Union, which started from economic efforts towards unification and transgressed towards the political realm with the gradual surrender of sovereignty to the European level. The third level of neofunctionalism refers to the evolution of integration. As Mattli discusses, the upgrading of common interests “occurs when the member states experience significant difficulties in arriving at a common policy while acknowledging the necessity of reaching some common stand to safeguard other aspects of interdependence among them” (Mattli, 1999, p. 26). The creation and implementation of common policies that engulf more and more sectors of the states relates to the current status of the European Union.

The Single Market is one of the cornerstones of the European unification and it is based on the four freedoms of movement. The policy actors of the European Union have helped develop the Common Market up to the current status with constant spillover actions and the need to upgrade their interests. Along with the completion of the Single Market in the 1990s, the internal market policy has translated to several other aspects, such as banking, energy, transport and, of course, digital. Essentially, the Single Market refers to a unified and free space with hard exterior borders, which has been built on concessions made by nation states and by community policies over several decades. Each nation-state had its own economic policy and its own tariffs, but the accession to the European Community/European Union meant that policies were supposed to be harmonized. The architect of the current Single Market, Jacques Delors, expressed this idea as such: “unifying this market presupposes agreement by the MS on the abolition of barriers of all kinds, harmonization of rules, approximation of legislation and tax structures, strengthening of monetary cooperation and the necessary ancillary measures to encourage European firms to work together” (Jacques Delors, 1985, p. 11). The completion of the single market project was based on the aforementioned combination. But, Jacques Delors has also argued that this initiative was not enough for the European unification, which also linked his project on the completion of the Single Market to the political unification of the Maastricht Treaty and the creation of the single currency.

The effort to build the Digital Single Market is another effort in the push towards integration in the European Union. The European digital space requires a similar effort towards harmonization as the policy actors have repeatedly stated that the EU Member States have their own national digital markets with their own regulations, which interrupt the free flow of content, data or information. The Digital Agenda for Europe, a flagship initiative for the revival of the European economy after the crisis, has been based precisely on this idea: “the internet is borderless, but online markets, both globally and in the EU, are still separated by multiple barriers affecting not only access to pan-European telecom services but also to what should be global internet services and content. This is untenable” (European Commission, 2010, p. 7). In the recent years since the adoption of the Digital Agenda and the Digital Single Market, the European institutions prioritized the adoption of several regulations used to harmonize the digital markets. Some of the most important include the regulation on ending roaming charges for citizens traveling across the European Union and, more recently, the regulation on cross-border portability of online content, allowing citizens to access their subscriptions to online content even if they are not in their home country.

#### 4. Digital policies – tools for integration

The benefits of such regulations for the entire digital space in the European Union can be translated into the daily lives of European citizens, while at the same time benefitting the European economy. The benefits of the digital economy to the overall growth of the European economy have been catalogued and used as a justification for the harmonization of the digital markets in the EU. This is the justification used by President Juncker in the prioritization of the digital single market project, as he refers to digital policies as “horizontal policies” (European Commission, 2015, p. 2)

Hence, digital policies are important for the European Union overall, as they serve as a support for the European economy. But, the digital technology is a general-purpose technology, serving every sector of citizens’ lives, from the interaction with the public administration to their jobs and education. The need for the proper digital policies was two-fold. First, it was necessary to address the fragmentation existent in the European digital space, an effort pursued based on the model of the Internal Market Programme of the 1980s (Mirela Mărcuț, 2016). This process has been unfolding as several Europe wide regulations have been put in place, from the roaming regulation to the General Data Protection Regulation. The stated purpose of this regulation is to harmonize data protection laws in the European Union, with stipulations, such as the applicability to all companies processing data of citizens of the Union: “GDPR makes its applicability very clear - it will apply to the processing of personal data by controllers and processors in the EU, regardless of whether the processing takes place in the EU or not” (EU GDPR Portal, 2017). Other significant improvements concern the rights of data owners to control their data better or the right of data owners to be forgotten. While this regulation is a complicated technical issue, its benefits for the removal of fragmentation in the digital space are relevant.

All the regulations mentioned aim not only to remove fragmentation, but they especially aim to provide more functional spillover towards further integration in the European Union. Considering the pervasiveness of digital technologies, the digital space has become a new space for European integration, based on the need to reinforce the European economy with the help of its digital component, as well as on the Fourth Industrial Revolution, wherein digital technologies underpin every sector of the economy. Andrus Ansip translated this revolution in a metaphor: “as industry turns more digital, it will depend on data: the oil of the digital economy” (Andrus Ansip, 2017b). Ansip signals the new industrial revolution, which is based on data and information technology. The European Union must address these challenges with the help of multiple targeted digital policies for digital integration, as well as the overall integration process.

The current efforts to provide a harmonized framework at the European level aim to create a single digital space that is similar to the single market of the EU. But, at the same time, they contribute to the deepening of the integration process in several manners. Firstly, the harmonized framework for the digital space has translated into direct benefits to citizens, who can travel and use their mobile data plan and their online content across borders. Secondly, these adoption of these regulations is done also by the nation-states, a fact that signals the continued commitment towards upgrading their common interest and their conscious approval towards a united Europe in the digital space. Thirdly, the harmonized regulation framework has the potential to boost the European economy on the global stage, with the help of regulations, such as the General Data Protection Regulation.

## 5. Conclusions

The purpose of this article has been to provide a brief argumentation in support of digital policies in the European Union, as instruments for further integration in the digital space. Starting with a brief theoretical analysis of globalization, which has influenced the metamorphosis of space and territory, the paper suggests that a proper policy framework is necessary to target the constant change and disruption brought about by globalization.

The digital space in the European Union requires not only internal harmonization, as is still considered to be a patchwork, but also it can be the subject of further integration with the help of harmonized policies, like the roaming regulations, data protection or new rules on cross-border e-commerce.

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## THE ROMA POPULATION IN ROMANIA. FROM HISTORY TO CULTURE AND EDUCATION; POLICIES, IMPLEMENTATION AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENTS

Norbert IUONAS\*

**Abstract.** *Throughout history, the Roma have left behind only the documents produced by others, with good and bad, both real and imaginary things. And collective memory has retained more legendary aspects than certainties.*

*Throughout the period, the Roma were slaves, subjected to genocide treatments during the World War II, sedentarised during communism in Romania, and discriminated and segregated nowadays.*

*The educational system in Romania did not come to the aid of Roma, on the contrary, schools represented rather a tool of assimilation and reproduction of social stereotypes and prejudices, hence the perpetuation of social exclusion.*

**Keywords:** *Roma education policies, differentiated treatments, Roma history, Roma: the most numerous population in Romania, banning the traditional garb and the Romani language.*

As European ethnic minorities, Romani people are the population with the highest demography and marginalization rate and probably the population with the highest rate of Civil rights violation. Romania is the country with the highest number of Romani people in Europe, the number being estimated to approximately 2,5 billions. (Mariea Ionescu, 2007: 13)

Bogdan Petriceicu Hașdeu used to define Roma people as ‘enigmatic people’, suggesting that we can take this name as entirely justified, because if we would give it a thought, there is such a little amount of people whom history is surrounded by enigma and mystery. (Lucian Cherata, 1993: 20)

The poverty and the unemployment attached to the social issues, are generating an obsessive concern for the day of tomorrow, also the daily stress and the lack of a suitable education level are inevitably leading to the domestic violence proliferation, the increasing number of alcohol and substance abusers and suicidal individuals, and to a significant increasing the criminality level. The fact that Roma people were at use to the objectification of slavery and discrimination led to deep wounds in the collective memory, often leading to putting this ethnicity up to stigma and marginalization, at the Romanian and also European society level. After 1989 there have been reported the social issues identified at the local Roma community level and it raised the awareness of needing to adopt and apply of specific policies of wellness. This initiated a set of political measures that ultimately became public policies that had an essential active role in the social-economic and educational inclusion process of the Roma community members. The

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school field is the first that has been made the object for a long period, from the beginning of 1980, of a systematic work of analyze. This entire process generated offers and proposals as an outcome of the European Council's initiative, and afterwards, the initiative of the European Commission. The Roma situation was only evaluated in a very slow pace along the years and the same trend occurred to the European frame.

Traditionally speaking, the European educational systems did not help nor support Roma people with regard in overcoming the social marginalization. Contrariwise, the school system represented rather an instrument of assimilation and multiplication of the social stereotypes and prejudices, literally, and it also represented an instrument for the perpetuation of social exclusion.

Most of the economic and sociological theories relating to education agree with the fact that the human capital investment represents one of the high importance factors regarding the providing with the wellness level to individual and the whole society.

The first public policy in Romania adopted for this purpose at a governmental level for the wellness of the Roma communities from Romania responded for the educational need identified at a national level and that would be the allocation of special places in universities from Romania. The adopted policy is a reply to a well-done research at the national level, that started from the premise that this public policy will facilitate both the educational level improvement of the Roma community members and also it will facilitate the development of the Roma representatives role models at the community level. (Mariea Ionescu, 2007: 13)

„Roma people had a reputation of well-known magicians and fortune tellers for several decades in Greece, under the name of Atsiganos or Atsinkakos (untouched people or untouchables).” (Jean Pierre Liegeois, 2008: 13)

‘During the interwar time, Roma people used to constitute an heterogeneous group, and using as a maternal language the Rromani language, Romanian or Hungarian, and they were found at different economical and social levels. Generally, as a group, the Roma minority were rather marginalized or, in the best case scenario, they were tolerated, than accepted as a minority. Until today, the social climbing of some Roma usually meant the loss of the ethnic identity. Today, on the other hand, the Roma people are founding organizations with a purpose of <awakening and emancipation of the Roma population>.’ (Jean Pierre Liegeois, 2008: 24)

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The first Roma groups have been discovered in essentially Europe, from East to the West, during the XIV and XV centuries. From that point on, Europe is treating Roma people with wonder, without understanding and also with impatience. These long-haired travelers who cannot identify themselves to the village and city inhabitants, cannot be integrated in any category and they were assigned various names, related to an alleged origin or to a misunderstood identity. The Roma people were perceived as an erotic sect whose members, whom were avoiding the contact with their own kind, had the reputation of fortune-tellers and magicians, that in Greece would be well-known as ‘Atsinkanos’ (untouchable/to not be touched), whilst along this time, up to the year of 1100, an Athos

Mountain monk speaks about a group of 'Atsingans'. It occurred that the name of this sect to be assigned to the travellers group that came from the East and to remain assigned an attached in many countries and languages (*Zigeuner* – in German, *Tsiganes* in French, *Sigoyner* – in Norwegian, *Zingari* – in Italian etc.)

For a better acknowledging of the origin and the language of Roma it was necessary for hundreds of years to pass until the Hungarian Wali Istvan figured out in 1753-1754 that the Romani language is of Indian origin.

The Romani language has a lot of Hindu, Nepali and Panjabi elements, languages that were related to the North of India.

During the time of Maria Theresa, in one of the 1767 decree, the Roma people are supposed to comply to the ordinary administrative system, and in that case the use of Romani language is forbidden along with the specific clothing and activities.

'Through an 59 items order, released on 9 October 1783, it was decided on behalf of Hungarian and Transylvanian Roma, the following:

"La o ordonanta in 59 de puncte, data la 9 oct. 1783, hotara, pentru romi din Ungaria, Transilvania, urmatoarele:

- If you would speak the Romani language, you could have been beaten with 24 bat hits;
- The Roma people were forbidden to change their names;
- The marriages between Roma were forbidden.' (Petre Petcut, 2003: 57)

In regard of the Roma ethnic identity, it is not a recent makeup, precisely because there have always been existing the sentimental difference inside the community since the first step of migrations. These are justified due to the specific cultural characteristics, the marginalization, the discrimination and oppression they faced. During this entire process, Roma developed their own strategies of survival, facts that are creating the differences between them and other ethnicities. The Porrajmos experience (*Holocaust* – translated from Romani) provided Roma the sense of appartenance to the same community regardless of the place they live in.

Along the Nazism era, Marshall Antonescu deported more than 25.000 Roma in Transnistria, Bug and Auschwitz. It is stated that more than half of them died, this phenomenon being due to the horrific life conditions of that time. Being reported, the number of Roma victims compared to the entire population, related to the Jews victims <in 1945, out of approximately 700.000 european Roma, 220.000 were already exterminated> (Grigore Rat, 2013: 33)

Unfortunately, in the history textbooks, it is less known that in Romania along with Europe the history of Roma people is unknown. In order to get to know the Roma history there must be understood a lot of issues that this minority is confronting today.

'The social exclusion consequences affected a very high rate of the Roma population, in absense of individual development resources, and the Roma population was constrained to adapt its life style survival method and to end up being labeled and stigmatized etc. In a new order of Europe, taking into consideration an <common European inheritance>, Roma people became a reflection stimulus towards all the European public institutions, that being taken as an common criteria accession of East European countries,. The only acceptable and sustainable alternative to the Roma exclusion is a logic and supported policy to prevent it on one hand and a policy of inclusion, on the other hand.' (Catalin Zamfir, 1993: 7)

The Roma population represents 2 – 7 % out of the Romanian population and this is the poorest community; in terms of health is is the most unsafe , and horrific housing

lifestyle. The Roma people are forming the most vulnerable social group category, being noticed in a disproportioned and high number in all of the disadvantaged social categories.

After the year of 1990, The Council of Europe started the discussions regarding the extension of the European Union with other countries from the Central and Eastern Europe. In 1993, at a Copenhagen conference, there was signed the European Agreement that established the association of Romania, on one hand, and of the member states, on the other hand. The Agreement went into ratification in Romania through the Law nr. 20 of 1993 and it took its effectiveness in 1995. The 1999 accession partnership submitted by Romania to the European Union in 1995 emphasized the consolidation of the dialogue between the Government of Romania and the Roma community. In regard to the elaboration and the application of a strategy, its purpose had been of improving the economical and social situation of Roma and to provide the minority programs with the suitable financial support. (Mariea Ionescu, 2007: 27)

### *School segregation*

'The school segregation represents the physical separation of the minority from the majority in the public spaces of common interest in the public school frame.' (Doghi Lorena, 2006; 54)

The segregation consequence is the unequal access to quality education for children in Romania and Europe. The separation created in the kindergartens and schools leads to a low quality education compared to the one for the majority population in the school. (Nicolae Gheorghe, 2002; 23)

During 1990 even the authorities from Romania could 'defend' the de-segregational practices, stating that they did not understand the school segregation as being discriminative, despite the fact that since then, the ongoing searches regarding the school segregation have shown the negative impact of the segregational practices applied to the access to quality education of Roma children.

In 2006, the organizations *Romani Criss* and *Agentia Impreuna* from Romania, created and presented a country report alternative to the one submitted by the European Commission, that provides a fundamental perspective to the pattern that the segregation problem has been treated in. A well-known issue admitted officially by the Ministry of Education and Research from Romania, is the segregation of students based on ethnicity and other actors on the educational system frame.

At 20th of April 2004 as a consequence of the civil society and other actors's lobbying, the Public Ministry submitted the Notification no. 29323 that forbid the segregation of the Roma children in the educational system. The Notification condemned the segregation as a 'severe form of discrimination and it has shown that a consequence of it is the unequal access of quality education'. (Eniko Vincze, 2011: 67)

Regarding the school education experience for Roma children in the last 20 years in Romania, it has been proven as being fatal, that in a school from Transylvania (Cluj Napoca, Romania), after the maintaining the classes for Roma children, the desegregation led to driving the Roma children to the school for special needs (before the „desegregated” schools, these classes worked as classes for children with special needs. The demonstration being shown despite the fact that the desegregation had its purpose of eliminating the forms of ethnic discrimination, the practice being conducted by structures for improving the education quality, but it has shown negative effects, for example the Roma children from the „normal school” and enrolling them in institutions

that reproduce the disadvantages even more drastically. The school segregation cannot be eliminated if we do not change other dimensions of the social life style in general (for example -the residential segregation) comparing to the educational system transformations.

The segregation mechanism are functioning as creating parallel classes in a school frame, distinguishing them as A, B and C since the first year of primary school, in accord with the school „quality” (based on the economic status of the families that the children belong to in Romania)

The segregation in Romania, as we mentiones, means differentiated treatment despite to the disadvantaged individual, placing him in the back rows of the classrooms, differentiated or inadequate treatment, to that they are exposed. Also, the evaluation that the subjects are exposed to are generally insignificant and of low quality of education. Those are also other forms if segregation manifestations. The manner that the teachers and schools are evaluated in the educational regime supports the „elite children” and do not promote nor valorise the disadvantaged children and therefore the segregation means the unequal distribution of quality education resources.

We believe that since the ethnic-based segregation in „normal schools” este forbidden, the phenomenon will be produced on the division line from the normal to special schools or by separating the „elite” classes from the weak ones. The education system that places the disadvantaged children socially and not only the children with physical or psychological handicap or behavioral ones in special schools, lowers significantly the chances of Roma students with low life quality – poor, in continuing to high education and to provide for themselves a decent adult lifestyle, at least to thier parents lifestyle level. In regard to distributing the children in special schools, an important role goes to the social working director and the local council child protection direction (Eniko Vincze, 2011: 144).

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## **IV. The Demographic Vulnerabilities of Europe: Migration**

**Anca Anda SÎRCA** ⇔ *Europe's background regarding immigration after 1944 and Immigrant integration policy making in the European Union*

**Vasile ANDRIEȘ, Victoria BEVZIUC** ⇔ *The Challenges of Demographic Situation of the Russian Federation in the Context of THE Migration Processes*

**Claudia Anamaria IOV, Maria Claudia BOGDAN** ⇔ *The Process Of Forming Collective Identities Among Immigrants: Interest, Recognition Or Refuge?*

**Alexander GASPARISHVILI, Nikolay NARBUT, Alexander ONOSOV, Zhanna PUZANOVA** ⇔ *Russian Migration Policy in the Last 25 Years*



## EUROPE'S BACKGROUND REGARDING IMMIGRATION AFTER 1944 AND IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION POLICY MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Anca Anda SÎRCA\*

**Abstract.** *The article tackles a nowadays issue in European states regarding the phenomenon of integration of immigrants in these communities from two perspectives: one of the perspectives is related to the historical part on what immigration is concerned while the second one focuses on the integration policies which European States are implementing in order to ease the burden on what refugee crisis is related.*

**Keywords:** *Western Democracy, Europe, Multiculturalism*

It is well known the fact that Europe is many things. Starting from the geographical point of view, it is acknowledged that is it the oldest continent, the one that faced many changes, the pioneer on what we admire nowadays and last but not least, a continent of diversity, innovation and continuous transformations. To start with, Europe was the land where the notion of democracy emerged (Olsun, 1993: 567). Europe's democratization was difficult but exceptional and achieved with great effort due to the inescapable challenges and trials of history. Through out the centuries due to archeological researches it was clear that the European continent was one of the most desired land for settlement. For instance, in 2014 evidences of the modern native population of Europe descendants were revealed. It is believed that Europeans descent from three different important lines: hunter-gatherers (who lived approximately 45.000 years ago), early agriculturists (who came into Europe approximately 9.000 years ago) and a population of Pontic-Caspian steppe nomads (who contributed mainly to the Indo-European languages) (Gibbons, 2014: 134). Looking at the three main distinct lines of descendants we can notice that diversity was always a part of Europe. For a matter of a fact we can even stress the idea that Europe was/is/will always be the part of the world were diversity was a cornerstone for nowadays society.

As far as democracy is concerned, we can highlight the fact that its raw form emerged with the efforts of ancient Greeks and Romans who are also considered the founding fathers of Western civilization by the 18<sup>th</sup> century intellectuals (Morris, 2013: 78). Nevertheless if we speak about democracy from etymologically point of view, the word is entitled to have be derived from two ancient Greek words: demos and kratos (Dēmoskrátos) which translated means rule of the people (Oxford English Dictionary: democracy). As the years passed, the term and its application changed with every wave of intellectual from each century. If during the Greek empire the notion of democracy would mean rule of the people, during our days it has several meanings. We can notice the fact that as the human kind from all over the world developed the core believes and mostly the questioning of the believes changed. For example Anthony H. Birch in his work titled:

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“The Concept and Theories of Modern Democracy” stated as follows: “It is not possible to arrive at a universally acceptable and concise definition of democracy by simply explaining the intrinsic meaning of the term, as long as it is said to have an intrinsic meaning. There can only be two major alternatives in explaining the meaning of democracy. On the one hand, democracy can be explained by observing the political exercise and its common application that may lead to explanation of democracy in terms of governance and institutions structures, which may as well raise the question of distinguishable justification of intellectual exercise. Secondly, we can begin by explaining democracy by first pointing out what we assume as democratic ideals and therefore measure the extent of its practical implications Birch approaches democracy from two dimensions. One dimension is the empirical one while the later is idealist one. Scholars who solicit to defining democracy based on the empirical approach tends to explain democracy in terms of institutions of governance, government performance, principles of governance, rule of law, and separation of power (Birch, 2007: 111). While on the other hand, scholars who defines democracy in idealist perspectives focuses on the normative sense of democracy, describing what ought to be, and what ought not to be. They see democracy in a classical ancient Greek sense just like Plato, Aristotel, J.J. Rousseau.

The idea of democracy with its 2500 years of history still remains to be the most common form of government. Western democracies tend to approach a liberal democracy. This means that they share certain fundamental political ideologies including those of liberal democracy, the rule of law, human rights and gender equality. According to Larry Diamond, pure liberal democracies must be composed of ten fundamental requirements. To start with, they must provide individuals with “freedom of belief, opinion, discussion, speech, publication, broadcast, assembly, demonstration, petition and (why not) the Internet” (Diamond, 2011: 299). Secondly, All ethnicities, religions, races, and other minority groups “(as well as historically excluded majorities)” (Diamond, 2011: 111) must be given the space and freedom to immerse in their religious and cultural norms as well as equal rights to participate in political and social life. Thirdly, all adult citizens must have the equal rights to vote and run for office. Fourthly elections must comprise of “Genuine openness and competition” (Diamond, 2011: 112). Fifth requisite is a constitution that provides legal equality to all citizens, “in which the laws are ‘clear, publicly known, universal, stable, and non restorative” (Diamond, 2011: 112). Sixth is the requirement of an independent judiciary, which is neutral and consistent. The seventh is a “process of law and freedom of individuals from torture, terror, and unjustified detention, exile, or interference in their personal lives – by the state or non-state actors” (Diamond, 2011: 112). Eighth is the existence of a process of Institutional checks on the power of elected officials by an independent legislature, court system, and other autonomous agencies. Ninth is the existence of a wide range of sources of information and forms of organization independent of the state giving birth to “a vibrant ‘civil society” (Diamond, 2011: 112). Last is control over the military and state security apparatus by civilians who are ultimately accountable to the people through elections.

According to these principals it is clear that a democratic state is based on citizens. Throughout periods of time, people start moving from one part of the world to another one, which lead to a nowadays diverse and multiethnic states and societies. Under the conditions of globalization all nations, states and civilizations are actively interacting with each other, rules and norms of functioning of economic and political systems are becoming closer, but any civilization highly values the cultural foundations on which its very identity depends.

In a war torn apart Europe, people found themselves obliged to search for a better life and higher living standard conditions. After the end of the World War II, the most exposed country for massive immigration was Germany, United Kingdom, France, Spain, Italy (Wolfgang, 2017: 441). In the aftermath of WW II, we can notice four main periods of immigration for the European countries. Starting with the first period which was mainly known for the migration for labor purposes and also for the development and reconstruction of Europe between 1945-1970. For example the first wave of migration which took place between the years 1945 and 1955 resulted in around 12 million people who fled to Germany as a result of the political persecutions in the Soviet bloc countries. According with the Basic Law from 1949 the status of *Aussiedler* (Ethnical Germans) was given to anyone who "who has been admitted to the territory of the German Reich within the boundaries of December 31, 1937 as a refugee or expellee of German ethnic origin or as the spouse or descendant of such person"(Geddes, 2003: 80). During this period, heavy industry, manufacturing, construction and public activities have developed, leading to significant economic growth in the European countries. Migrant workers from Ireland and South Europe (Greece, Portugal, Spain and, to a lesser extent, Italy) - countries that have faced stagnant economies and high unemployment rates - responded to the labor market needs at the outset of Western Europe. The 1957 Treaty of Rome, which laid the foundations for the European Economic Community, was based on certain principles, including the free movement of persons among the six founding states (Treaty of Rome, 1957). As a result, in the 1960s there was a significant increase in intra-Community migration, mainly due to the large number of Italian workers traveling to the other five Member States. But even after the 1968 when legal and institutional framework for securing this freedom was created, migratory flows from third countries remained quantitatively superior to intra-community labor migration (Garson, Loizillon, 2003: 10). During this period, many bilateral labor agreements have been concluded between the six Member States and third countries - for example between Germany and countries like Italy (1955), Greece and Spain (1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965), and Yugoslavia (1968).

European Commission studies show that, during this period, the forma of labor migration varied considerably, in line with historical circumstances. Thus, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom were able to use the workforce of their colonies or former colonies, and economic, political and cultural relations provided the opportunity to obtain work even without using specific recruitment systems. While countries like Germany or Switzerland did not have access to the "colonial" workforce. That is why they have created recruitment systems to attract temporary foreign workers who have been given permission to stay as "guest workers" being needed their work (Migration in Europe). Between 1945-1975, the dependence of foreign workers on the economies of the Member States diminished the volume of illegal immigration. Combating illegal immigration has become a priority issue for the policies of many Member States following the economic downturn in the mid-1970s, followed by rising unemployment. According to OECD statistics, from the early 1960s to the early 1970s, more than 30 million foreign workers have entered the European Economic Community, including temporary workers and those with multiple entrants. Until the early 1980s, the number of foreigners living in Western Europe tripled from the 1950s to 15 million. In 2000, over 20 million foreign workers lived in the European Economic Area, accounting for 5.4% of the total population, with small variations between countries (Garson, Loizillon, 2003: 13).

The second migration period is the economic crisis of the 1970s and first half of the 1980s. The second period of migration was marked by the economic crises due to the oil price hike in 1973 and 1979. In the years to come, changes in the world economy, the economic revolution, and new patterns of business organization have altered the nature of labor, eroding the traditional way of working. As a result, labor migration has changed (Migration in Europe). Some European countries have reduced or attempted to reduce immigration. Rising unemployment and the escalation of social tensions have led governments to abolish active recruitment policies from abroad. Higher recruitment costs for employers have increased, there have been limited categories of foreign workers that could be employed and annual rates of employment for foreign workers have been established. Governments have also implemented policies to encourage migrant workers to return to their countries of origin. In fact, economic regression in the host countries has not led to a massive return of migrants to their countries of origin. According to the United Nations estimates, only 10% of migrant workers returned to their home countries in the next two years after the 1973 oil crisis, combined with the 1974-1975 civil crisis (United Nations). Although the European Union expanded in 1974, through the accession of Britain, Ireland and Denmark, intra-Community migration stagnated not only as a result of the economic crisis but also of the convergence of wages between Member States.

The third phase of migration that Europe faced since 1944 was diversification of host and sending countries and the increase in the flows of asylum seekers, refugees and ethnic minorities. The third period of migration, which began at the end of the 1980s, is characterized by the diversification of host and home countries. Traditional emigration countries in Europe, such as Spain, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Portugal, are gradually turning into immigration countries. Migrants no longer come from the former colonies, but from a much more diverse group of countries. The number of asylum seekers and refugees increased significantly. This was partly due to political changes in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Regional conflicts, such as those in former Yugoslavia and northern Iraq, have also led to considerable flows of asylum seekers and refugees from affected areas (Garson, Loizillon, 2003: 13).

After the collapse of the communist bloc and the opening of the borders, it has increased the east-west migration flow, especially the movement of ethnic minorities. From the end of the 1980s to the early 1990s, the return of ethnic minorities to the countries of origin was significant and directed towards a limited number of Member States, notably Germany, but also Greece and Finland. Since the early 1990s, border issues, particularly those related to migration, have become major issues of concern in Europe. Third countries do not enjoy privileged access and participation in the European integration process, but they have to cope with the external effects of the Union, including illegal migration. On the other hand, Member States of the European Union and candidate countries face new challenges in border control and migration (Garson, Loizillon, 2003: 14).

The last phase is migration of "preferential" workforce and increased illegal migration. In recent years there has been an increase in permanent migration and migration of the temporary labor force as a result of the intensification of the expansion phase at the end of the 1990s. On the other hand, the development of information and communication technology, health and education, sectors requiring highly qualified workforce. At the same time, demand for unskilled foreign labor grew, especially in agriculture, construction and public works, as well as domestic services (case of Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal). After 1989, migration has increased especially in Germany and Britain, policies on recruiting foreign workers favoring the solution of temporary

foreign workers. At the same time, foreign students have helped to cover the labor force needs in the host countries (Great Britain, Germany, France and Spain). In the 1990s, the share of women among migrants increased. This tendency is particularly noticeable in France, Greece, Sweden, Great Britain and Italy. The trend of "feminization" is noted in all the components of migratory flows, not just in the case of family reunions. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are no longer just emigration countries, but immigration and transit countries, becoming attractive to immigrants from the extreme East. While the population of Central Europe (the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary and Poland) is migrating to Western European countries, the same countries become destination for migrants from Eastern European countries, such as Belarus or Ukraine. At the same time, illegal migration has taken on new dimensions and has become more dangerous. As a result of the development of international trafficking networks and the growth of their role in the international labor force, the Member States' policies on migration and the hiring of foreigners increased the repressive measures against traffickers, employers or immigrants in a situation of illegality.

Since the second half of the 1990s, discussions have been stepping up on the effects of the international migration of highly skilled workers. In Europe, the migration of specialists and students from Central and Eastern Europe to Western Europe has been noticed after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the fall of the socialist regimes since 1989. Countries like Britain, Germany and France have adopted measures to facilitate the entry of highly qualified persons into especially IT specialists, to face the global competition for such workers. The demand for highly qualified workers can be met to a great extent by developing countries, with the direct benefits of "brain migration" being still highly valued. Import of specialists still takes place, even if its significance is lower. However, an increase in the inverse flow of specialists from the rich to the least developed countries can be anticipated as a result of the reduction in the demand for highly qualified personnel due to the growth of economic efficiency in the developed countries. At the same time, equity and direct investment will go to poor countries, attracting specialists from rich countries.

The link between demographic change and migration policies, including the migration of highly qualified people, will be an important issue in the near future. It is to be hoped that some Member States will prefer migration of specialists and to develop regulations and procedures to facilitate it. But, as Belgian Development Minister Marc Verwilghen (2004) remarks, the European Union will have to identify solutions to limit the negative effects of "brain drain" on developing countries of origin (Green Paper on an EU approach to managing economic migration COM/2004/0811).

After the Second World War, Western European countries witnessed a high rate of immigration especially the states that were part of the European Economic Community. These Western states host sizeable immigrant populations, both of European and non-European origin. Over the last decade the negative attitude towards immigrants and immigration recorded an escalation like never before (Marozzi, 2016: 413). There were substantial population movements within Europe throughout the Early Modern period, mostly in the context of the Reformation and the European wars of religion, and again as a result of World War II. Until the late 1960s and 1970s, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom were primarily sources of emigration, sending large numbers of emigrants to the Americas and Australia (International Migration 2009-2010 SOPEMI-report for Norway). A significant number of immigrants also chose to emigrate within Europe in countries such as France, Switzerland, Belgium and Germany. As living standards increased in the western European countries, these states became a

magnet for immigrants mainly from outside the European continent such as: from Morocco, Somalia, Egypt to Italy and Greece; from Morocco, Algeria and Latin America to Spain and Portugal; and from Ireland, India, Pakistan to Germany and Jamaica to the United Kingdom.

Based on the United Nations report Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 2013 Revision. Approximate populations of non-European origin in Europe (about 20 - 30+ millions, or 3 - 4% (depending on the definition of non-European origin), out of a total population of approx. 831 million):

- Turks (including Turks from Turkey and Northern Cyprus): approx. 9 million (this estimate does not include the 10 million Turks within the European portion of Turkey);<sup>1</sup> of whom about 4 million in Germany and the rest in the Netherlands, Austria, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, Italy, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Greece, Romania, Serbia and Norway.

- Arabs (including North African and Middle Eastern Arabs): approx. 5 million; mostly in France, Italy, Spain, Germany, the United Kingdom, Greece, Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Norway, Switzerland and Russia. Many Arabs in Europe are Lebanese and Syrian.

- Black Africans (including Afro-Caribbean and others by descent): approx. 5 million; mostly in France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands and Portugal. (in Spain and Portugal Afro-Caribbean and Afro-Latin American are included in Latin Americans)

- Indians: approx. 2.5 million; mostly in the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, Ireland and Portugal.

- Tamils: approx. 130,000 in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark.

- Pakistanis: approx. 1.1 million in the United Kingdom, but also 60,000 in Italy, Spain, and Norway.

- Bengali: approx. 600,000 mostly in United Kingdom, but also 85,000 in Italy, 35,000 in France, Spain, Sweden and Greece.

- Latin Americans (includes Afro-Latin Americans, Afro-Caribbean, Native Americans, White Latin Americans, miscegenation, etc.): approx. 2.2 million; mostly in Spain (c. 1.8 million) but also in Italy, Portugal, the United Kingdom and some in Germany.

- Armenians: approx. 2 million; mostly in Russia, but also in France, Ukraine, Greece, Bulgaria, Spain, Germany, Poland, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.

- Berbers: approx. 2 million; mostly in France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Spain.

- Kurds: approx. 2 million; mostly in Germany, France, Sweden, Russia, the Netherlands, Belgium and the United Kingdom.

- Chinese: approx. 1 million; mostly in France, the United Kingdom, Russia, Italy, Spain, Germany and the Netherlands.

- Filipinos: approx. 900,000; mostly in the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Austria and Ireland.

- Vietnamese: approx. 300,000; mostly in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Poland, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Russia.

- Iranians: approx. 250,000; mostly in Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom,

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Russia, the Netherlands, France, Austria, Norway, Spain and Denmark.

- Somalis: approx. 200,000; mostly in the United Kingdom, Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway, Germany, Finland, Denmark and Italy.
- Assyrians/Chaldeans/Syriacs: approx. 200,000; mostly in Sweden, Germany, Russia and The Netherlands.
- Japanese: approx. 100,000; mostly in the United Kingdom and Germany. (Cole, 2011: 382)

In order to analyze the integration programs in the European Union, it is necessary to refer to the main theoretical models of integration both at the micro-analysis level (it is the immigrant accommodation strategies from the perspective of cross-cultural psychology) and macro (theoretical models transposed in State-level policies on integration). I will not insist too much on the description of multicultural and intercultural theories, but rather on integration policy models and programs developed in some EU Member States.

Multiculturalism is understood both as a state of affairs, i.e cultural diversity, as a theory and as a model of integration policy. According to the theory of multiculturalism, the state must be neutral towards cultural values and be tolerant of minority cultural life and identities, protecting those marginal cultures by specific measures (affirmative actions for ethnic minorities) (Bourne, 2007: 10). Liberal multiculturalist Kymlicka argues that under the umbrella of multiculturalism, rights should be ensured to ethnic minority and immigrant groups, namely: self-government for national minorities or indigenous peoples, political rights for immigrant groups, and special rights of representation. Policies, in fact, ensure integration into the host society and are not permanent (Kymlicka, 2003: 26). The main criticism of multiculturalism is that it helped to segregate communities, to form closed communities, especially in the case of Asians and Muslims (Bourne, 2007: 11).

The term “Inter-culturalism” is defined as a set of processes through which relationships between different cultures are built. It focuses on communication, education, and the implications of linguistic pluralism, on the interaction between minority and majority populations (Barrett, 2013: 17). The EU's speech on integration policies is an intercultural one.

At an individual level, from the perspective of the theories of cross-cultural psychology, Berry identifies four adaptation strategies, such as: a) Integration or biculturalism - a combination of the immigrant's desire to adopt the dominant values, but also to preserve its own culture. b) Separation, segregation or exclusion - immigrants are very much concerned with their ethnic identity, cultural values of origin and do not find it important to integrate and adapt to the host society, is given the example of the Chinese, who form so-called enclaves or communities closed in the host society. c) Assimilation - Immigrants fully adapt to the host culture, losing their own identity and cultural values. d) Marginalization, individualism - immigrants do not want to have any relationship with the dominant culture group; in reality, this orientation is not actually a personal choice of the individual, but rather a reaction to the discrimination and non-acceptance they feel from the dominant culture (Barry, 2005: 697).

The academic literature on state policy integration classifies three great models of idealistic integration: The multiculturalism model - based on respect and protection of cultural diversity and aims to explicitly guarantee the identity of the immigrant community. The countries that are considered to have implemented this model are The Netherlands and Sweden (Carrera, 2006: 30). The second model is that of assimilationism

(also called the republican or universalist model). Is based on the complete assimilation of the newcomers into the dominant society, France is the classical model (Burbaker, 1992: 71). The third model is exclusionism - which is characterized by rigid legislation and policies to be met by the immigrant to settle in the host country. Immigrants for work under this model are denied their citizenship rights, the countries considered to be excluding are Germany, Switzerland and Belgium (Carrera, 2006: 32). The models presented above are, in fact, ideal models that do not exist. The countries are rather using a mix of multicultural, assimilation or exclusionist measures. Member States attitudes towards immigration and integration policies are constantly changing according to their economic and political interests, EU regulations, international immigration and contemporary realities.

Some Member States apply immigrant integration policies, so integration becomes a one-dimensional process. Whereby responsibility is transferred to the individual, being forced to integrate to gain access to a resident and security status in the host country. The countries that have implemented binding integration programs are: Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium (Flanders), Denmark and Switzerland. In the Netherlands, the Integration Abroad Act (Wet Inburgering Newcomers Act WIP), which introduced compulsory integration programs, was adopted in 1992. Integration programs are largely funded by the Government, Municipalities and from EU funds. This law stipulates that the municipalities implementing national integration policy are responsible for the coordination of integration policies. The role of the state is only to support financially and to stimulate implementation. According to ICMPD, the immigrant must apply within 6 weeks of the residence permit, followed by a period of counseling by two Regional Educational Centers and Center for Work and Income to find the right course or integration program. For the newcomer, an interesting aspect of the integration system is that the offer of integration programs can be provided by any accredited institution and has all the necessary quality certification. Municipalities do not provide these courses directly, but through intermediaries (ICMPD International Centre for Migration Policy Development, 2005: 20). Also compulsory courses for integration in Germany and Austria are paid by the beneficiaries, the amounts are modest, and in Austria those with low financial possibilities are reimbursed part of the amount according to certain conditions (ICMPD International Centre for Migration Policy Development, 2005: 23).

In addition to these mandatory programs, there are also projects, NGO's who organize courses through European funds or public funding to integrate immigrants through various interactive activities. It is currently observed that states are implementing restrictive immigration policies but also stimulate the integration of immigrants already in their territories. More interesting, in some countries, integration is no longer seen as a process taking place inside the host state, but which begins even before the individual migrates from his / her country of origin. If the person who wants to migrate fails to accommodate those pre-integration steps (e.g language learning), admission to the host state will be refused, e.g Netherlands (Fons J.R. Van de Vijver, 2006: 104).

### **Conclusions**

International migration is growing in scope and complexity and has a serious impact - both positive and negative - on the EU and on the Member States. The EU ought to manage the phenomenon of migration in the broad socio-economic context. Europe nowadays is increasingly characterized by a lack of qualifications and labor competition for highly qualified people, an economic system which became increasingly globalized

and a population of rapidly aging from a demographic point of view. Although, the immigrant population generally has the same needs and call for services to address them, there are, however, certain groups of immigrant masses that require special attention. Here we look at refugees and people enjoying international protection, women and immigrants who are part of the second or third generation.

In conclusion, Europe needs young, skilled workers who can pay taxes and who can contribute to today's social security. However, despite a prior confirmation of these findings, many European countries have not implemented integration processes as the growing workforce of well-qualified refugees they host. This is an immediate cost. Once the refugee status has been confirmed, he or she is eligible for the same social benefits available to any local citizen. Which means that the more a refugee is without a job, the more he or she will be a burden on the state. Therefore, the socio-economic integration of refugees must be an intrinsic purpose of the activities started in the crisis.

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## THE CHALLENGES OF DEMOGRAPHIC SITUATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE MIGRATION PROCESSES

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**Abstract.** *This article seeks to realize a research of the Russian Federation demographic situation by its tendencies to harmonize the migration processes. The Russian Federation is a diverse, multiethnic society that has been confronted with a lot of problems regarding the demographic situation. According to the internal and external data the Russian Federation has the lack of labor working persons due to the decreasing number at the population level. To assure the positive result it's important to improve the implication of the both parts: one side, the main goal of demographic politics of state needs to be the protection of identity of that segment of the population and an equilibrate naturalization by accommodation in the community States; other side, the migration processes to be in accordance with the internal conditions of the democratic States.*

**Keywords:** *demography, migration, minority, communities, birth rates, etc.*

In the early '90 of the 20th century, the political situation in Russia has been liberalized, and in this context arose the phenomenon of emigration to the West. At the same time, that process had not seriously affected the demographic situation, the flow being less than 100 thousand individuals annually (Dolgih, 2009). The balance continues to be positive, provided by the immigration of the ethnic Russians from the former Soviet Republics.

We can assert the several stages on the migration processes in Russia and ex-USSR.

1. The first half of the '90 years. The political character of this stage was being marked by the emigration of the ethnic Russian and Slavic population from a number of the independent States. Thus from Kazakhstan went 1.76 million people, from Uzbekistan-812 thousand, from Tajikistan-384 thousand, from Kyrgyzstan-344 thousand, from Turkmenistan-149 thousand, from 412 thousand, Georgia-Azerbaijan-Armenia-403 thousand, 231 thousand, Ukraine-Moldova-400 thousand, 108 thousand, Latvia -120 thousand, Estonia-Lithuania-71 thousand, 54 thousand (Naselenie Rossii. 2003-2004, 2006: 314-317).

Thus, in the period of 1989-2004 in Russia returned 5,430 thousand of the ethnic Russians immigrants that have been emigrated in the '89-96 years. But in the second half

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of the '90 years the political migration volume dramatically was reduced, that decrease being conditioned on the one hand, by the economic crisis and on the other hand-by the hard legislation in granting citizenship, also by the economic problems and contemptuous, or at least by the intolerant attitude of the authorities. Moreover, in the 1998-2002 years, over two million of those who return have left Russia (Rybakovskogo, 2009: 19-20)

2. The beginning of the early 2000. That period had been characterized by the problems of the economic nature, through the work migration and it was being marked by shifting mostly the seasonal and temporary workers (three months).

In the mid-'90 of 20th century, Russia (in particular the urban centers and central parts) started to be invaded by the migrant workers from the newly independent States. The numbers of migrant workers differ from one source to another. According to the Federal Migration Service, there are included in the figure more than 5 million, and the World Bank report from 2010 was stressed the presence of 12.5 million of the migrant workers, 80 percent of which were illegal (Baškatova, 2010). The number of Moldovan migrants workers has been estimated at 350 000. Beyond the impossibility of regulating migration flows according to the proposed criteria, the federal authorities have not been able to control them.

The financial crisis in 1998, as well as the socio-economic context has dramatically reduced the flow of uncertain foreign workers. According to the Migration Study Center the population growth in 1994 due to the migration criteria was estimated to a million people per year, after which it has been reduced to a half of million workers, and in the early 2000, this number represented only 100 thousand.

The demographic decline was recorded due to the statistic's number. According to the statistical data, in spite of immigration, the number of population in the 2002 year was reduced by 1.8 million in comparison with 1989, where the mortality proportion surpassing the birth rate from four to three (Fedjukin<sup>2017</sup>). Therefore, the new President Vladimir Putin has intervened with the legislative initiative in the 2001 and the concept of demographic development of the Russian Federation was adopted by the year 2015. There were outlined three strategic directions: reducing mortality (especially to that infantile), stimulating the birth rate (by ensuring social package), and the management of migration flows.

In the first two frameworks were recorded some progress, although the radical change has not occurred. Thus, the infant mortality has been reduced from 14.5 cases per 1,000 children in 2000, to the 11 cases in 2006 (in France this rate- was recorded to 4 cases). The birth rate has been increased. If in 1999 at the number of thousand inhabitants were born 8.3 children, then started to 2006 this number has been increased to 10.4 (UNDP, 2009).

In the sphere of migration shall be stipulated the stimulating conditions of migrants from CIS countries, by simplifying the procedures for legalization and adjustment. All these conditions were meant to regulate flows on the basis of several criteria: sex, age, specialty, etc. In this respect were adopted the series of normative acts, the majority of them being non-functional. Their application was diminished by the bureaucracy and technical factors. The police officials, the employers and the representatives of underworld have been gained the fabulous profits of the illegal migrants. Moreover, some of the foreign workers were dispossessed of the identity documents and turned into the slaves.

Therefore, the migration strategies from the period of the 2000-2012, have not contributed to the legalization of the status of foreign workers and have not resolved the demographic problem. According to the data surveys, Russia will continue to lose

population while the neighbor's countries will record the growth of the demographic index. According to UN estimating prognostics, in the 2050 year the population will be of only 116 million inhabitants (Gel'bras', 2001:3-16).

At the same time, it has been estimated for considerable growth in the population number from the countries such as Turkey and Iran, which in 2050 will be achieved the turnover of 97 million. The neighbors would represent a major challenge due to the geopolitical aspect, in terms of the Muslims exportation (Even Turkey during the period of Erdogan gradually abandons the principles of secular state). No less alarming is the increase of the number population of China (1.3 billion). Thus, to the East of Ural Mountains live only 25 million people, and to the East of Lake Baikal only 5 million, while the population number of the three Chinese neighboring regions is equal to the population of the Russian Federation. In the mid-of the '90 in the Russian mass media one of the most popular theme was China expansion on the territories from the Siberia and the Far East. There was popular the idea of the massive penetration of the Chinese people in their regions through the marriage with the Russian girls and the phenomenon regarding the purchase of the land, being estimated an excessive number up to the several million. This concern was stressed even at the official level by the controversial Deputy Prime Minister Rogozin D. and Governor of Khabarovsk Ishaev V. Some even argued that the massive penetration of the Chinese people in the Eastern Russia is nothing more than a secret strategy of Beijing to colonize and to annex the regions (it is true that many Russian women prefer marriage to the Chinese, who are more responsible and moderate in the alcohol consumption).

In reality, the number of the Chinese people in Russia is approximately 300 thousand and these population are concentrated in the Asian side but not in the EU, particularly in Moscow. The Chinese people came initially to this territory as "merchant", they were settled in the Cerkizov square. Professor Ghelibras V. believes that the Chinese migration is not a project of colonization but is a particular form of movement of the labor forces that assigns the trade flows of goods (Gel'bras, 2001:3-16). There it is not excluded that the Russia and Moscow in particular, to be used as a bridge to move to the Europe.

In regards to the Far East, obviously that the China has economic interests in the region and indeed there may be the concerns caused by the demographic supremacy of China and by the illegal trade. But the fear must not be conditioned by the Chinese migration but by the Russians exodus. The process of depopulation of Siberia and the Far East began immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the first post-Soviet decade was marked by the population decrease that has occurred and was recorded being for six times faster than the average in the Federation.

So, Far North and the Far East have lost the 2.5 million inhabitants. The northern part of the territory of European Russia was left by the more than the 1 million people. The population of the Magadan Oblast and Chukotka has been reduced by two-thirds. The Chita oblast and Primorsky Krai, which have bordering with China, were lost over a quarter of a million inhabitants (Trenin, 2012:216).

The created situation was preoccupied more specialists in the field, the loss of geopolitical status was categorized by the Russians experts as a major challenge to their national security. In this respect we will expose some ideas approached by the Dugin A. In his opinion, the Russian people are understood due to the ethnic criteria in the demographic decline, which may lead to catastrophe for both the nation and the Empire. Under the terms of the southern Eurasian demographic growth, there can occur on the removal of Russian Empire Central positions, eroding the nation's homogeneity and

turning it into an ethnic minority. The most serious situation is in the Siberian and Far East regions, which is controlled not only on the political and ethno-demographic level but also there are the danger made by the southern invasion. In order to avoid such consequences, it is necessary to adopt the political demographic growth strategy and to contribute to the uniform distribution of the Russian ethnicity. According to this, particular importance shall be stressed to the nationality criteria and whose principles that are important to be conceptualized. There must not be done the operation just with the political categories, but mostly with the ethnic dimensions, the ethical-religious. The Russians must identify themselves primarily with the Orthodox religion, secondly with the Russian nation and only in the end with the individual (Dugin, 2000:146).

The population census data from 2002 illustrates the percentage decrease (although not dramatically) of Russian Federation ethnics and the increasing Muslim number population in general in the North Caucasus, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan. According to the some studies, the number of representatives of the Muslim peoples in 1959 was 7 million (6% of the total), in 1970 to 9 million (7%) in 1979 to 10 million (7%) in 1989 to 12 million (8%) in 2002 to 15 million (10%). In the perspective if this trend would be maintained in Russia to the 2025 should be estimated 130 million people, of whom 20-million Muslims, and in 2050-110 million, of which 30 Muslims. These prognostics take into account only the demographic increase of the traditional peoples of the Federation, and not the migration factor (Komu vygodna islamizacija Rossii? 2012).

According to the expert's index, if the number of slave population and Orthodox Russia would fall below 100 million Russian people would doom to irreversible degradation (Tiškov' 2008).

At the same time, the mega polis regional and urban centers such as (Stavropol, Krasnodar, and Rostov) are becoming increasingly the multiethnic society, while the ethnic republics are becoming more uniform in appearance. Thus, in the North Caucasus in the 1989-2002 the population number has increased by 25%, while the number of the ethnic Russians in the region decreased by 27%. The exodus of Russians has seen as the mass proportions from a number of Republics. Thus, the Russian population has been reduced from 25% to 2% in Chechnya, from 13% to 1% in Ingushetia, from 9% to 5% in Dagestan and North Ossetia from 30% to 23% (Trenin, 2012:269).

The decreasing of the Russian number and the ethno-linguistic homogenization from the North Caucasian Republics, has been leading to the fragmentation of the indigenous population and diminishing of the cultural and affective ties with the rest of the Federation, which could lead to their disintegration and the formation of a specific identity. For example, Chechnya has already become a closed area and most Russians do not manifest any desire to visit it. Basically, the Republic represents the foreign federal subject, being associated with a neighboring state. At the momentum, on the nationwide level gains popularity, such phenomenon as the xenophobia, the islamophobia and the caucazophobia. Many Russians are beginning to identify the Caucasians, in particular, the Muslims with the foreigners (Dugin<sup>2000: 263</sup>).

In the year 2010, the birth rate in Russia was only 40% of the required number of natural growth, and the mortality index exceeded the global average index with 50%. The men average life has been reduced by 13.5 years to 58.9 years and of the women average life reached the age of 72 years, reducing with 7.4 (Dugin, 2000: 263). The decrease of the population number and in particular of the working able population, including the qualified specialists in the field of new technologies leads to decay. This phenomenon will

have repercussions for the economic development, taking into account the fact that in 2008, the labor productivity in the Russia constitutes only 25% of the U.S. level.

In the 2011 year, Putin has formulated the idea of the creation of 20 million new technological jobs by the 2020 year in order to offset the demographic deficit. Many experts do not consider enhancing productivity could compensate the shortage of workforce, which has been manifested in a number of important areas, such as the metallurgy, the textiles, the wood processing, etc. To fill this failure, Russia would need about 15 million of the foreign workers, which constitutes the 10% of its population.

Until the 2007 the decrease did not seriously affected the demographic category of the working able population, being approximately estimated to the 300 thousand people per year, since 2008 year the mortality level has doubled and was affected the work force. Therefore, the economic system began to record a deficit of working people. Although the various scenarios are formulated to overcome the crisis on the labor market, as well as the restructuring of the economy and the development of the technical progress or supporting the birth rate, the migration factor remains to be the basic source of meeting the require working forces on the market place.

In the 2006 year was released the program for the support of Compatriots (State programmer for voluntary return by supporting the Russian Federation citizens who are living abroad) which provided the return to the homeland of the Russian population. Many experts considered that the project failed, they were coming up with one of the following arguments. Firstly, it had insufficient funding and lack of the implementation mechanisms (housing, employment in the field of employment, financing adaptation process, etc.). Secondly, it was not proposing to the most attractive location regions (over 90% of repatriates have preferred the European zone of the Russian Federation, of which 80%-preferred Kaliningrad oblast). And finally, thirteen arguments were that the regions, in particular at the national republics level have largely refused to accept the repatriation. At the beginning of the 2017 year the seventeen Federal subjects have decided still against this policy (the vast majority of expense was put on their responsibilities) (Šustov,<sup>2017</sup>).

Many analysts shared the opinion that the project of the geopolitical repatriation was rather than, the expression of the no imperial policy (most empires have achieved a political comeback to the settlers). In addition, it was also a component of the electoral strategy, which stressed that the State institutions-were not indifferent towards the homeland of the former citizens, having a populist character.

The idea of repatriation was considered an alternative solution to invasion of Russia by the foreign workers from the CIS countries to the other nationality and which would have the effect of changing the ethnic perspective. Therefore, the migration policy could be focused on the reducing or preventing the unwanted immigration flows and, in particular, the illegal ones. It is considered that one of the Russian ethnic factors that should promote the alternatives for the demographic reduction at the federal level would be the migration policy.

Since the '90 years of XX century, the many ethnic Russians have returned to the motherland, but they have been clashed with the number of social and economic problems. Thus, by the 2000 year, approximately three million Russians who have returned to the country on an individual basis, had an uncertain legal status and could not acquire citizenship. This situation was due to the influx of the migrant labor to the other nationality that was prompting by the Russian authorities in order to adopt a limited migration policy.

During the 2006-2010 years, as a result of the formation of a negative attitude towards the labor migration, the demographic problem have been registered the intensification (including the distribution of uneven demographic), therefore the Russian authorities have decided to apply the repatriation policy. The action was biased and lobbying, by the economic booms. It was intended to attract the 2007-2009 period of about 150 thousand people, but until the 2011 year had returned only 61.2 thousand. The vast majority coming from Kazakhstan (31%), Uzbekistan (19%), Moldova (9.8%), Kyrgyzstan (9.1%), Armenia and Ukraine 8.7% (V demografii Rossii prozvenel trevožnyj zvonok<sup>2012</sup>).

According to data for the period of the 2006-2016 years, there were repatriated approximately 146 thousand persons, of whom about 60 thousand from Ukraine (2014-2016). In addition, to the separatist region Donetsk and Lugansk fled 1.1 million people. Therefore, no policy of repatriation due to an increase in the population number of the Russian Federation, as the number of refugees and the annexation of the Crimea led, with the effect from 1 January 2017 figure to the 146.8 million inhabitants.

At the same time, the natural increase of the population was below on the any level. Thus, in 2016 were registered 1893000 of births and 1888000 for deaths. Therefore, natural increase was only to the 5 000 inhabitants. In addition, comparing to the 2015 year, the births decline was recorded with 51 children. The biggest demographic challenge for Russia is expected in 2023, when the number of women aged between 20 and 29 years will be reduced by about 500 thousand annually, and the mortality index will reach to the figure of 14 persons at 1000 inhabitants (Šustov<sup>2017</sup>).

Evidently the "father of the nation" in 2007 undertook the series of strategic actions and in order to redress the situation. A prime objective was the reduction of infant mortality and must admit that it has been done successfully. Thus, in 2016 were recorded only six deaths from 1,000 children aged up to one year (the EU average is four).

Another objective was to stimulate the births number by increasing the mother's capital program in 2007 year, which consists of the provision of substantial financial support after the first child subsequent births. Initially the given amount of 250000 rubles for birthdays, was the equivalent of 10160\$, being indexed until the year 2016 to the 453000 (approx. 6860\$, despite of the indexation the estimated amount was been reduced approx. with 3300\$) (Baškatova, 2010).

Obviously, in the first five years there were recorded the important changes on the births index of second and third child were increased by 40%, and obtained the certificates of maternal capital about six million families. But the strategy's successes were not enduring, as a low birth rate argument serving for the year 2016. In this respect there is some explanation and critical acclaim (Fedjukin, 2017).

First, the devaluation has occurred, affecting the economic situation of the ruble of the categories, and the average financial support of State became unattractive. In this respect we refer both to the possibility of acquiring the real estate and the maintenance of the child costs (average house prices range from 35,000 rubles per square meter in non-landmark regions to 208,000 in Moscow, therefore, about two square meters in the capital can be purchased on the basis of the state contribution).

Secondly, the increase of the birth rate was recorded mainly in the framework of the family support, becoming the only source of income. According to the some expert's points, this situation can be very dangerous to the nation geophone. In addition, these categories do not use the financial resources as intended (purchase of the real estate, the education, the health care, the retirement fund).

Therefore, from this perspective of the constructing communal facilities currently the Russian authorities examined the question regarding the continuation or the cessation of the project. Therefore, the only source to increase the labor migration population remains the migration from the CIS countries, but this market can still be attractive only for the Asian citizen.

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## THE PROCESS OF FORMING COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES AMONG IMMIGRANTS: INTEREST, RECOGNITION OR REFUGE?

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**Abstract.** *This article seeks to establish a framework for analysis with regard to the formation of collective identities among immigrants. Identity, as a result of a dynamic social process, is developed in a specific context through relationships between individuals. The analysis of this collective identities formation process involves on the one hand, the consideration of the social dimension and, on the other, the cultural one. In other words, this article seeks to analyze the relationship established between the social system which defines identity, and the cultural one, through which identity is expressed and manifested. The article is based on the main hypothesis according to which the construction of collective identities within immigrant communities finds reason to seek recognition within the host society.*

**Keywords:** *collective identity, immigrant, integration, group solidarity*

### Introduction

This article is created on a few general considerations in its attempt to establish a framework for finding an answer with regard to the identity construction among immigrants. The analysis has a starting point in 4 general considerations regarding immigrants and the process of forming collective identities in host societies: 1) the migration process, for economic reasons, leads to the construction of collective identities between individuals sharing the same national origin; 2) the identity developed between immigrants will be a primary one, given the fact that an identification with certain ethnic features occurs; 3) the reasons leading to the formation of a collective identity within immigrant communities find answers in common experiences, in achieving certain – material or symbolic – interests, and in obtaining recognition as a “group” from the host society (by obtaining this recognition, the members of the immigrant community can participate in the host state’s social structure); 4) this primary identity can evolve towards types of cultural identity depending on the newcomer group’s objectives.

Beyond the social importance of the collective identities formation process, this study analyzes three paradigms that explain it: *the rationalist paradigm*, which follows the formation of identities based on the existence of common interests; *the representation paradigm*, which explains identity construction as a way of recognizing immigrant communities by the host society, allowing the former to benefit from the social, economic or cultural advantages within the latter, and the *psychological refuge paradigm* which

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explains the identity construction in response to the uprooting of immigrants as a consequence of the migratory process.

### 1. Identity and collective identities in the migration process

Before looking for explanations on the formation of collective identities in these three paradigms, we will review the concepts of “identity” and “collective identity”, which will help us carry out this analysis. The term “identity” was included in the field of social studies in the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century, along with Erick Erickson’s works. In sociology, collective identity is conceived as a component that articulates and gives consistency to social movements in the works of Alain Touraine and Alberto Melucci (Maldonado, Oliva, 201: 231). Melucci uses “collective identity” both as an “analytical tool” and “as a “thing” to be studied” (Melucci, 1995: 46), as this is an umbrella term that supports a series of definitions depending on the context and actors involved. According to him, “collective identity” is

*“[a] process of “constructing” an action system. Collective identity is an interactive and shared definition produced by several individuals (or groups at a more complex level) and concerned with the orientations of action and the field of opportunities and constrains in which the action takes place”* (Melucci, 1995: 44).

In the current social context characterized by the numerous implications of globalization, the term “identity” has become one of the most commonly used words, not only in the language of scientific researchers or academics, but also in the political discourse, arts, etc. In her paper *„Construcción de identidades colectivas entre inmigrantes: interés, reconocimiento y/o refugio?”*, quoting Calhoun, Nuria del Olmo Vicen argues that, in his opinion, “identity” is defined “as a relatively stable construct in a continuous process of social activity” (del Olmo Vicén, 2003: 31).

For Bill McSweeney “identity” can be an act or structure. As an act, identity refers to the individuals’ ability to preserve the idea of “collective self”, while as a structure, it is related to the history, myth, legends and traditions underlying the individuals of a community in the process of building a group identity (McSweeney, 1998: 137).

For Buzan and Weaver *“society means identity, the way of self-understanding of communities and individuals who identify themselves as members of a community. These identities are distinct but, at the same time, intertwine with the explicitly political organizations concerned with governance”* (Buzan et al., 2010: 172).

The process of globalization generated, on the one hand, the birth of new identities as a result of the opening of borders and, on the other, the claim of the immigrant groups’ own identities, groups who refused to abandon their own culture to prevent losing their culture/identity or being assimilated. As a result, nation states start facing a new ethno-cultural challenge: finding a national framework that would allow the cohabitation of the majority culture alongside the minority<sup>1</sup>.

The dominant approach with regard to the study of immigration is mainly characterized by the unilateral nature of the socio-cultural settling and adaptation processes. Immigrants are generally treated as passive objects of transformations that

<sup>1</sup> Culture represents a system of collective beliefs, values, norms, symbols and practices learnt and shared by the members of a community. This set of common traits builds a framework for their social relationships. For more details, see Mercado Maldonado, A. and Hernández Oliva, A. (2010), El proceso de construcción de la identidad colectiva, *Convergencia, Revista de Ciencias Sociales*, núm. 53, p. 241 (retrieved from <http://www.scielo.org.mx/pdf/conver/v17n53/v17n53a10.pdf>)

result in interactive dynamics. Within these dynamics, the definition of collective identity gains a new component. For the field of intercultural/transnational relations, immigration is one of the main factors triggering intercultural contact. Collective identity is not a static phenomenon, but the product of interaction between the members of a community, and, in order to become successfully integrated within the host society, the immigrant must shift from being a simple passive object to becoming an active subject of social transformation within the host society (Blanco Fernández de Valderrama, 1994: 41).

## **2. Paradigms explaining the formation of collective identities**

### *2.1 The rationalist paradigm: identity based on a common interest*

In trying to find an explanation regarding the formation of collective identities, a first paradigm that stems from theories on the collective action is based on the common interest of the members of the community. This paradigm, called the *rationalist paradigm*, considers the individual as a rational being capable of calculating the advantages of disadvantages of a choice, trying to obtain as much profit as possible at the lowest costs (del OlmoVicén, 2003: 31). The existence of a common interest implies that it can underlie the formation of a collective identity. “The state itself is testimony to the role of collective identity in human affairs” (Wendt, 1994: 386). Such an example is the debate around the “European identity”, which brings to the forefront the idea of a multiple identity that the citizens of the European Union assume. In the identity hierarchy, national identity is the one that usually comes first, hence, for any EU citizen, being German, French, Italian, Spanish or Romanian is much more important than being a European, Catalan, catholic or Banate (Romanian province) citizen. According to the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union citizenship completes the national one without substituting it, making it possible to exercise some Union citizen’s rights in the territory of the Member state in which he/she resides. With Muslim immigrants, the religious identity creates stronger collective identities than the national or ethnic ones.

Once there is a common interest, the question that arises is: how do these individuals perceive this interest and how do they identify with it? Coleman defines this identification as a form of physical organization with strong implications in social organization (Coleman, 1990: 517-519), explaining the identification process as an extension of the *object self* (Coleman, 1990: 517-520). For our analysis, a person identifies with another when both have been or are affected by the same circumstances and facts (of economic, social or military nature) that triggered their migration from a point A to a point B (just like the case of the refugee crisis which has been affecting the solidarity of the EU Member states since 2015 – 2016).

In his paper “Interests and Parties in Pluralism”, Pizzorno talks about the symbolic and material interests, underlining the fact that while the former have a tendency to perpetuate identity, as they strengthen the group’s solidarity, the latter, once achieved, can be enjoyed individually by the members of the group without reference to the collective identity (Pizzorno, 1981: 250). Among the Muslim immigrants in the European Union, symbolic interests are represented by the preservation of the group’s religious identity and are relevant only if they are manifested in communion with the group. Such an example are the Muslim actions in Europe to continue building mosques, one of the latest projects being that of the mosque in Bucharest, founded for the Muslim community in Romania. On the other hand, material interests (whether finding a job, starting a business, graduating courses, buying a house, a car) are not relevant to the group’s identity, nor do they influence the evolution of its solidarity.

From the aspects mentioned above, we can conclude that the individuals who share the same conditions, marked by the migratory experience affecting their social relationship, start to develop a collective identity whose objective is to obtain certain interests, material or symbolic, which will eventually place them in a less disadvantaged position.

## 2.2 *The representation paradigm: identity as a form of recognition*

With regard to the *representation paradigm*, it explains the identity construct as a means of recognizing an immigrant community in the destination country. Different actors have emphasized the cultural diversity of the contemporary societies. Postindustrial societies based on knowledge provide countless options that shape the formation of identities, bringing to the fore their negotiation. This negotiation implies the existence of certain social actors<sup>2</sup> that have the role to bargain on this identity and achieve the minority group's recognition. The social actor is defined as a central source of action, whose construction develops in a situation of danger or "challenge". In other words, an identity appears by means of an action. If we accept this premise, action precedes identity and such action is bounded by the emerging identity (del Olmo Vicen, 2003: 35). For the French sociologist, Touraine, the collective actor (community) can defend its interest only after its identity has been defined. Otherwise, the collective actor (the community) will not be able to constitute a pressure group and, as a direct result, its action will be limited (Touraine, 1993). There is a consistent debate around this issue: does identity precede action or is it the other way around? Pizzorno is the one who tries to shed light on this matter through his criticism. He argues that there are cases in which the collective action precedes the collective identity; moreover, according to him, the formation of an identity occurs during the collective action's development, because in such situations of collective action, the stake is not to obtain a benefit, but to achieve – or rather – recognize a certain identity (Pizzorno, 1989: 33).

Nuria del Olmo Vicen argues that, from the perspective of a rational explanation, it can be stated that the collective identity appears during an action; this action is developed by a community/group of people in a situation of conflict<sup>3</sup>. In other words, identity appears during the process of responding to the situation of conflict. However, this is not enough to explain why the formation of a new identity is necessary to overcome the situation of conflict and why such an action aims at to create a new identity, if what is actually sought after is the overcoming of the situation of conflict (del Olmo Vicen, 2003: 37). The same author asserts that the situation of conflict can be solved by obtaining symbolic or material benefits, and that only the identity which is based on "symbolic goods" will be sustainable.

<sup>2</sup> The notion "social actor" is used to denote the subject, the group of individuals or the entity assuming the representation of certain interests, with an objective to achieve them. The social actor can generally be any person, group or organization actively participating in political, cultural, etc. processes. In this research, the role of the social actor is played by the group, the community that has a certain identity and ability to act, which allows it to interact within the society.

<sup>3</sup> Although there are several stages to reach a situation of conflict (*tense relations between the majority and minority or between the host state's citizens and the immigrants*), in her paper del Olmo Vicen, N. (2003), *Construcción de identidades colectivas entre inmigrantes: interés, reconocimiento y/o refugio?*, *Reis: Revista española de investigaciones sociológicas*, No. 104, directly refers to the situation of conflict.

In order for the formation of collective identities to occur among immigrants, we must, first of all, take into consideration a main element, namely a category, a group, a community with certain interests – symbolic interests<sup>4</sup> – a community behaving as a social actor that develops an action to search for these symbolic interests.

A highly important element to be taken into account when explaining the formation of certain collective identities is the *group's solidarity*, which is the premise of the formation of these identities. In other words, only a well-established group can preserve its identity or fight for recognition from the host state, by means of its social action. Recognition is all the more important as through it, the social actor (the community) can hope for a successful social inclusion process, access to medical services, the educational and social care systems or the labour market of the destination country. *Recognition* by the host state's population is achieved through awareness of identity differences, which can be linguistic, cultural or religious. *Acceptance* means becoming aware of the different identity elements which enrich the culture of the host state. In states that are attractive from a migration phenomenon point of view (e.g. Spain, Italy, Germany, France, the Nordic states, etc.) the success in managing diversity is ensured through the protection of the immigrants' specific rights by developing and evaluating appropriate public policies along with the allocation of resources.

Sometimes, individuals may not identify themselves with their social category, depending on certain interests they wish to achieve. For example, an immigrant identifies with his/her national community (as they share the same set of values, speak the same language, have the same history, culture, religion, etc.), but not in the sense that this group can help them achieve material goods or better integration within the host society. The immigrant can achieve these things, for example, by joining NGO's or mediation agencies that help immigrants integrate more easily into the society. In this situation, the role of immigrant associations is taken by NGOs, namely the mediation agencies. For example, in Castellon de la Plana (a Valencian Community in Spain), Romanian immigrants firstly resort to Romanian associations to start the integration process within the Spanish society. When they want to benefit from a better type of integration process they address, for example, the Mediation Agency for Integration and Social Coexistence (AMICS) – which first of all promotes interculturalism, having special offices for immigrant integration. This does not mean however, that the immigrant associations<sup>5</sup> do not contribute to their placement on the labour market or help them obtain a house, etc.

For example, in Spain, more exactly in the Valencian Community, the large number of immigrant associations is explained by the fact that, through them, the immigrant communities become visible in the destination country. Most of the times,

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<sup>4</sup> We must specify that we are referring to symbolic interests because, as some authors also argue, for example Alessandro Pizzorno, once obtained, these types of interests tend to perpetuate the collective identity, strengthening the solidarity of the immigrant community.

<sup>5</sup> By association we understand the tendency or behaviour through which a group of people unite, creating an organized structure to achieve a common, previously established objective. This structure becomes an association, which must be perceived as a form of stable and institutionalized cooperation, which, in most cases, is formally constituted as a private entity with legal personality. For example, for an association to be legally constituted and recognized as such in Spain, it must be registered in the registers corresponding to each Autonomous Community. For more details, see *Evolución del asociacionismo en Bizkaia (1996-2005)*, Bolunta, Agencia para el voluntariado y las asociaciones, p. 17 (retrieved from <http://www.bolunta.org/docs/publicaciones/asociacionismo96-05.pdf>).

these associations seek, on the one hand, to make the host society acquainted with their culture, values, traditions and customs, or better said, want recognition, and on the other, wish to create a connection, a network that would help them defend and protect their identity, and also integrate to avoid marginalization or complete assimilation.

As an intermediate conclusion, the rationalist paradigm explain the formation of collective identities among immigrants according to the existence of certain *common interests*, while the representation paradigm explains the formation of identities as a means to achieve *recognition*, inside a system in which, without it, the community may be excluded.

The beginning of this article set a general research hypothesis: collective identities among immigrants are formed due to the existence of a common interest, a wish for recognition from the host society or, simply put, finding refuge in it. Given that the first part has already been analyzed, we will continue to focus on explaining the identity construct in response to the immigrant's uprooting situation from the origin country. In this situation, the immigrant hopes to find refuge in the new collective identity. In this respect, we will start from the idea of ethnicity.

### 2.3 *Primordialist and circumstantialist trends of identity formation*

Classic research on ethnicity is focused on the study of ethnic identity. In „*Hacia una explicación de la construcción de identidades colectivas entre inmigrantes*” (del Olmo Vicen, 2000), Nuria del Olmo Vicen argues that ethnic identity can be understood as a form of collective identity that originates in a set of social and cultural traits, and its choice was not made by the individual, but was transmitted hereditarily.

Two trends, *primordialists* and *circumstantialists* dominate studies on this subject. The former defend the nature of ethnic identity based on the affective relationships that are born between individuals carrying the same traits. These traits or primordial symbols as they are also called, can be expressed as *fundamental values* (parental relationships) and as external symbols (language). In other words, human actions within a society are directed / governed by these values. The emotional power of individuals, a result of their relationships based on common culture, customs, traditions, etc., determines the solidarity between them, which further leads to the formation of ethnic groups (del Olmo Vicen, 2003: 42-44). Primordialists have underlined the fact that “disoriented people refuge in those aspects of their shared lives that most fundamentally define for them who they are” (Bentley, 1987: 26). For this group, identification (in the sense of belonging to a well-defined group) is a psychological safety net (Roosens, 1989: 16).

Concluding, it can be said that the formation of an ethnic identity is based on the common traits that give rise to affective relationships and solidarity between the members of a group. It can therefore be deduced that human actions are guided by emotional factors; the formation of an ethnic identity can be thus explained as the development of a sort of psychological refuge. In other words, the identification of the individual with certain traits allows him/her to recreate those aspects in his/her life that give him/her a certain security against the adversity of others whom he/she does not identify with. For example, for most immigrants, the religious factor is of great value. For a lot of people, religion is the pillar used to rebuild their lives, to reconstitute a feeling of security and refuge they need in the societies hosting them. This is also the case of the Roma in France who embrace the Pentecostal religion. Through the symbolic baptism within this religion, they are offered the opportunity to achieve "a positive social visibility" (Peyron, 2009: 76), and "the old gipsy" considered a thief, a mugger, a nomad, an outcast, becomes "the

new gipsy", a man who is dedicated to God. La Mission Évangélique Tzigane de France and the solidarity of the Pentecostal confession adepts facilitate the creation of a "symbolic family" (Régis, 2010: 69), to replace the one abandoned when they decided to leave the state of origin, which eases the phenomenon of social inclusion within the host society.

Religion and culture seem to make up a combination that feeds the immigrants' collective identity. The assessment of the religious component in the life of immigrants is heading towards the notion of respect. In other words, religion is one of the "fundamental pillars" (Vidal Fernández, 2006: 153-159) in the life of immigrants, although this is not explicitly expressed (here, we refer to the fact that although many of them are not attending church on a frequent basis, they still consider religion a nucleus around which other activities take place). The importance of the religious factor also arises from the fact that this is a bearer of the community identity's central components. Religion is portrayed in the lives of certain immigrants as the motherland of their childhood, as the story that carries the family community regardless of distance; it is the support of the intergenerational community. In other situations, religion is the story that rises above all generations, in which the individual not only transcends his own existence in a certain way throughout history, but does so as a link in a great chain that goes beyond the generations of history, which binds all generations, from the beginning to the end, in one, singular body (Vidal Fernández, 2006: 180). In other words, for most of us, religion is part of our identity; it is that basic element that makes it possible to redefine those aspects in the lives of immigrants that offer them security against the adversity of others.

The second trend addressing the ethnic phenomenon – the *circumstantialist* trend – states that human actions are rationally oriented towards practical purposes, underlining that ethnic identity derives from a manipulation of culture aimed at obtaining political or economic interests. Nuria del OlmoVicen argues that, because of this, the development of an ethnic identity is circumstantial (del OlmoVicen, 2003: 44).

*What is the reason why an ethnic group wants to preserve those traits that make it different from other groups within the society in which they are established?* Different actors have proved that ethnicity offers benefits within the socio-economic structures of the host society. The development of an ethnic identity allows the preservation of a positive image and, over time, demonstrates that being culturally different is a necessity (Roosens, 1989). Hence, ethnic identity turns the immigrant community into a pressure group, favouring thus the position of its members in the socio-economic structure. What helps in creating these positions is the system of values, culture, language, customs, traditions, etc.

Melucci points out that ethnic identity – ethnicity – has become the only tool with which a minority can oppose the cultural monopoly of the dominant group. Ethnic identity tends towards a "symbolic identity". Moreover, according to Melucci, ethnic identity generates a type of solidarity with the historical heritage (Melucci, 2001), namely the cultural solidarity that consolidates the group solidarity to the highest extent. In other words, in order to develop a group solidarity, both the dependence between the members of the group, as well as the ability to control them are necessary (del Olmo Vicen, 2003: 49). The past shared by a group of individuals strengthen their interaction, leading to the creation of new behavioral patterns. Social interaction puts individuals in touch with a set of common norms and values.

## Conclusions

A first conclusion arising from this research is that there are three paradigms that explain the formation of collective identities among immigrants. The first two paradigms: the *rationalist* – which explains the formation of collective identities according to the existence of certain common interests – and the *representation* paradigm – which explains the formation of collective identities as a means of recognition of the group of immigrants within the host society – stem from the research on the collective action. The third paradigm, of psychological refuge – proves that the individuals sharing the same common traits develop an identity, identify themselves with these traits when dealing with the situation of being torn away from their country of origin and need refuge, need to return to a past that can provide psychological security.

Based on their own experiences and knowledge, immigrants interpret the host state's social system in a personal manner. Desiring either integration into the host society, or an obviously different preservation from it, they try to adapt their cognitive and normative structure to the existent realities through a re-socialization process. To a higher or lesser extent, the decision to integrate or self-segregate within the host community will determine a change in their fundamental values. Cultural differences are important factors in the process of social interaction, marking a border or a bridge between the majority and the minority population. These cultural factors are highlighted mainly through language – the element that triggers the socialization process – and religion.

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## RUSSIAN MIGRATION POLICY IN THE LAST 25 YEARS

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**Abstract.** *The article considers the most common approaches to the definition of migration policy in the broad and narrow senses of the word, analyzing its goals, content and effectiveness. Migration policy has the following dimensions: social, economic, geopolitical, national security and demographic. This calls for a comprehensive approach to migration policy in various aspects of social life. The authors formulate the main principles of Russia's state migration policy and trace how its dominant trends changed over the past 25 years. The article analyzes the legal framework that currently underlies migration processes. It notes that in the 1990s the country lacked some basic migration laws. The first attempt to conceptualize the state migration policy was marked by the adoption in 2003 of the Concept of Regulating Migration Processes in the Russian Federation. In 2006-2007 Russian legislation was for the first time set the task of regulating migration and preventing its illegal forms not by tough restrictions, but by giving migrants greater freedom of movement and removing obstacles in the way of registration. In 2015 more amendments were made to the Russian migration legislation which does not always correspond to the current and future needs of economic, social and demographic development of Russian society.*

**Keywords:** *Migration processes, migration policy, labor migration, migration legislation, migrants.*

### Introduction

Today one of the key areas of Russia's state policy is migration policy which is closely intertwined with economic, scientific-technical, social, demographic, nationalities and cultural policies. In the last 25 years it has evolved and adapted to the current challenges. Actually, conceptualization of the migration policy in Russia starts in the early 2000 with the adoption in 2003 of the Concept of Regulating Migration Processes in the Russian Federation. In the 1990 the country not only lacked basic migration laws, but had no more or less formulated deliberate migration policy. In 2006-2007 Russian migration policy was oriented towards regulating migration by liberal methods giving migrants

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greater freedom of movement and removing some bureaucratic obstacles of registration of foreign migrants. In 2015 more amendments were made to the Russian migration legislation which does not always correspond to the current and future needs of economic, social and demographic development of Russian society.

### Discussion and Results

Analysis of the goals, content and effectiveness of migration policy reveals disparities in the interpretation and definition of this sphere of governance. One of the most common approaches considers migration policy as a system of measures. However, in the opinion of some analysts, this “instrumental” approach is too narrow<sup>1</sup>. L.L.Rybakovsky defines migration policy as “a system of generally accepted governance ideas and conceptually related means with the help of which the state above all, as well as social institutions, observing certain principles corresponding to the concrete historical conditions, seek to achieve certain goals corresponding to the current and the future stage of social development.”<sup>2</sup> O.D.Vorobyova stresses that the aim of migration policy is to maintain the size and composition of the population of the country as a whole and its individual parts by influencing the direction and composition of migration flows, balancing the national or regional labor market by bringing in temporary labor migrants or securing their employment outside the region.<sup>3</sup>

The following aspects of existing definitions of migration policy need to be singled out:

- ~ migration policy as the product of the political system;
- ~ migration policy is worked out and implemented not only by the state, but also by social institutions;
- ~ different social institutions may have different ideas concerning the goals, tasks and means of migration policy;
- ~ migration policy as the process of coordinating the interests of the political and economic elites of the state, political parties, non-governmental organizations and migrants in the sphere of migration regulation at the federal and regional levels;
- ~ migration policy as the process of interaction between states involving a change of jurisdiction because migrants leaving one society enter another<sup>4</sup>.

Some authors distinguish migration policies in the broad and narrow meanings of the word. Migration policy in the broad sense is the state concept of regulating migration processes and areas of state policy determined by the character of the state structure as well as the goals and tasks pursued by the state. Migration in the narrow sense is the

<sup>1</sup> E.Volosenkova, P.Kabachenko, E.Tarasova. *Migration Policy. Managing Migration Processes// Methodology and Methods of the Study of Migration Processes*. Ed. Zh. Zayonchkovskaya, I.Molodikova, V.Mukomel. Moscow, 2007 p.218 (In Russian).

<sup>2</sup> L.Rybakovsky. *Population Migration: Forecasts, Factors, Policy*. Moscow. Statistika , 1987. p. 167 (In Russian).

<sup>3</sup> Population Migration: Theory and Politics. Moscow. *Economicheskoye obrazovaniye*. 2012, p.333 (In Russian).

<sup>4</sup> E.Volosenkova, P.Kabachenko, E.Tarasova. *Migration Policy. Managing Migration Processes// Methodology and Methods of the Study of Migration Processes*. Ed. Zh. Zayonchkovskaya, I.Molodikova, V.Mukomel. Moscow, 2007 p.218 (In Russian).Moscow, 2007. p. 219.

activity of state bodies aimed at changing the size, composition, direction of movement, settlement and integration of migrants.<sup>5</sup>

The most commonly emphasized dimensions of migration policy are economic, demographic, social, geopolitical and national security-related. This is because the management of migration processes is defined by three different goals: economic, state security and human rights<sup>6</sup>. An effective migration policy should ensure the achievement of these three goals and thus meet the interests of the state, society and of migrants. In reality though this is hardly possible.

In the opinion of some authors, Russia over the past 25 years has seen a succession of periods when migration policy was determined by humanitarian considerations and human rights (the first half of the 1990s), the period when national security interests were paramount (2002-2007), and the period when economic and business interests came to the fore.<sup>7</sup>

What makes the goals and tasks of migration policy complex and contradictory is the fact that it touches upon problems that have to do, on the one hand, with economic policy and on the other hand with the culture, peculiarities and traditions of society. Therefore the issues of migration policy call for a comprehensive approach that takes into account socio-economic, demographic, humanitarian, cultural and foreign-policy aspects of social life<sup>8</sup>.

During the quarter century since the collapse of the Soviet Union Russia created a solid legal framework regulating migration processes. Russia's migration laws are anchored in the norms of international law which the state has officially acceded to and has committed itself to observing. The legal framework of Russia's migration policy includes federal and regional laws as well as multilateral and bilateral international treaties and agreements of the USSR and the Russian Federation that regulate the relations of states in the sphere of external migration.

In accordance with universally recognized norms of international law the basis of migration processes is human rights and freedoms which are recognized and guaranteed under the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Article 27 of the Constitution establishes the right of citizens to freedom of movement, choice of the place of stay and residence and the right to freely leave the Russian Federation and, for Russian citizens, the right to freely return to its territory. Under Article 62 (Part 3) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, foreign citizens and stateless persons enjoy the same rights and have the same obligations as the citizens of the Russian Federation unless otherwise provided for by the laws or international treaties of the Russian Federation.

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<sup>5</sup> E. Volosenkova, P.Kabachenko, E.Tarasova. *Migration Policy. Managing Migration Processes// Methodology and Methods of the Study of Migration Processes*. Ed. Zh. Zayonchkovskaya, I. Molodikova, V.Mukomel. Moscow, 2007 pp.218 219-220 (In Russian).

<sup>6</sup> I. Ivakhnyuk. *Prospects of Migration Policy in Russia: Choosing the Right Path*. Moscow. MAKS Press, 2011.p. 32 (In Russian).

<sup>7</sup> I. Ivakhnyuk. *Prospects of Migration Policy in Russia: Choosing the Right Path*. Moscow. MAKS Press, 2011.p. 33 (In Russian).

<sup>8</sup> A. Gasparishvili, A.Onosov. *The Migration Policy of Moscow Authorities and Muscovites' Public Opinion*. Bulletin of Peoples' Friendship University of Russia. Scientific Journal. Series Sociology. Moscow. November 2016, Vol. 16, N 3, pp. 808-816.

In the early 1990s, faced with the problems of post-Soviet forced migration, Russia passed the law On Refugees<sup>9</sup>. This law sets forth the grounds and procedure of granting refugee status on the territory of the Russian Federation, establishes economic, social and legal guarantees of the rights and legitimate interests of refugees. It is based on the 1951 UN Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees, the Protocol on the Status of Refugees of 1967. There are two bedrock provisions of the Convention that brook no reservations: they are the definition of the concept of “refugee” and the so-called “principle of non-refoulement.” The latter means that no state which has signed the Convention has the right to expel the refugee from its territory or return him to the territory where he has reason to fear persecution against his will.

Having acceded to these fundamental international acts aimed at protecting refugees, Russia has enlarged its national immigration legislation by adopting a series of laws regulating the legal status of this category of RF citizens. In 1994, Russia ratified, in the framework of the CIS, the Moscow Agreement of September 24, 1993 on assistance to refugees and forced migrants. The Agreement offered additional guarantees of help to refugees and forced migrants and was the first and humane reaction of a state aimed at helping its population in the context of armed conflicts.

The refugee problem took on added relevance in connection with the dramatically increased flow of migrants to Russia from Ukraine, especially the residents of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions who had become de facto refugees but on arrival in Russia had not applied for refugee status or even temporary residence in the Russian Federation.

In the 1990s Russia lacked some basic migration laws. The Federal Law on the Procedure of Exit from the Russian Federation and Entry into the Russian Federation was passed in August 1996<sup>10</sup>. In 2002 two key laws were passed which enshrined the new priorities of the Russian migration policy. They were the Federal Law of May 31, 2002 № 62-FZ On Citizenship of the Russian Federation<sup>11</sup> and Federal Law of June 25, № 115-FZ On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation<sup>12</sup>.

Great expectations were pinned on the adoption of the law on the legal status of foreign citizens. It was hoped that it would regulate the status of millions of migrants who came to Russia from the former union republics after the break-up of the USSR and were left without any legal status. However, in reality it created additional problems in the way of obtaining Russian citizenship. While introducing unduly complicated procedures of hiring foreign labor, it narrowed the legal channels for labor migration, which at the end of the day further increased illegal labor migration and worsened corruption in the migration sphere<sup>13</sup>.

<sup>9</sup> Federal Law of February 19, 1993, № 4528-I On Refugees. URL: zakonbase.ru/zakony/4528-1-ot-1993-02-19-o-bezhencah (view date: 01.03.2017).

<sup>10</sup> Federal Law of 15 August 1996. № 114-ФЗ On the Procedure of Exit from the Russian Federation and Entry into the Russian Federation. URL: <https://rg.ru/1996/08/22/vjezd-vyezd-dok.html> (view date: 01.03.2017).

<sup>11</sup> Federal Law of May 31, 2002 № 62-FZ On Citizenship of the Russian Federation. URL: <http://www.zakonrf.info/zakon-o-grazhdanstve/> (view date: 01.03.2017).

<sup>12</sup> Federal Law of July 25, 2002 № 115-FZ On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation. URL: <http://xn--11adkk.xn--p1ai/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/FZ-115.pdf> (view date: 01.03.2017).

<sup>13</sup> See: I. Ivakhyuk. *Introductory Article. An Instructive Story of Conceptualization of Migration Policy in the Russian Federation // Migration in Russia 2000-2012. An Anthology in 3 vols.* Vol. 2. Moscow. Spetskniga, 2013. (In Russian)

The law on citizenship sets out the principles of Russian citizenship and the rules regulating the relations connected with citizenship of the Russian Federation. It formulates the grounds, terms and procedure of acquiring and terminating the citizenship of the Russian Federation; establishes the rules whereby citizenship is denied to persons with criminal links, those who have no command of the official language and those who are unable to pay their way in their country of residence. The law contains a provision restricting the granting of dual citizenship in cases stipulated under federal law or international treaties.

On the whole these laws were restrictive. The cumbersome procedure of obtaining a temporary or permanent residence permit were harsh and made it very difficult to obtain citizenship for the majority of law-abiding migrants. Equally difficult was the registration of immigrants, a procedure which had to be completed within three days. For the majority of citizens who came to the country under a visa-free regime the requirement was very difficult to comply with because of the limited number of registration offices and red tape. In combating illegal migration the emphasis was on turning a foreign citizen out of the Russian Federation.<sup>14</sup>

A positive example of prompt reaction of various federal bodies and officials concerned to current (and at the time undesirable) change of trend in one migration sphere – external education migration whose dynamics would objectively have reduced Russian influence on regional and world humanitarian, spiritual, cultural and other processes – is the drafting and adoption of the Federal Law of July 23, 2013 № 203-FZ On Introducing Amendments to the Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation and Some Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation For the Purpose of Creating Favorable Conditions for the Study of Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons in the Russian Federation. The law was drafted when signs emerged of annual reduction of the number of foreign citizens studying in the Russian Federation and pursued three macro-goals:

1) offering foreign students the most favorable conditions for work in the Russian Federation (without any quotas or similar quantitative restrictions), which can be seen also as a form of additional, if indirect, material support on the part of the Russian Federation;

2) allowing the migrants who had initially entered Russia as labor migrants, to be trained in our country without having to leave our country for that purpose or obtaining any additional permits for the new purpose of their stay in the Russian Federation;

3) identifying additional aspects of targeted invitation to study in the Russian Federation for foreign citizens and stateless persons, in the first place those recognized as fellow-countrymen under Federal Law of May 24, 1999 № 99-FZ On State Policy of the Russian Federation with Regard to Compatriots Abroad.

Federal Law of July 23, 2013, № 203-FZ introduced important regulatory changes not only to the sphere of education, but also labor migration although in quantitative terms its main thrust has to do with the former.

The law establishes additional “opportunities for attracting foreign citizens and stateless persons studying in the Russian Federation on a day basis at a professional education organization or higher education organization under the basic professional education program that has state accreditation”<sup>15</sup> to work activities in our country.

<sup>14</sup> M. Denisenko, O. Kharayeva, O. Chudinovskikh. *Immigration Policies in the Russian Federation and in the Western Countries*. Moscow, 2003. pp. 27-28.(In Russian)

<sup>15</sup> Federal Law of July 23, 2013 № 203-FZ On Introducing Amendments to the Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation and Some Legislative Acts of the Russian

Although admitting foreign students to such activities still required a permit, the procedure was simplified as much as possible (including through the issue to foreign students of work permits in the Russian Federation over and above the existing quotas).

The first attempt to conceptualize migration policy was the Concept of Regulating Migration Processes in the Russian Federation of 2003. Initially planned as the Concept of State Migration Policy, it shifted its focus to national security as government priorities changed in connection with the aggravated international situation even as work on the draft proceeded. The Concept sets forth measures to regulate internal and external migration that are largely restrictive in character.

Shortly after the Concept was approved it became clear that it is not conducive to creating a rational and effective system of managing migration processes and a fundamentally new model is needed that would stress the role of migration as an important resource and condition for Russia's development. The development of the new Concept of Migration Policy began in 2005, but due to various objective and subjective reasons it took seven years to draft and was only approved by President Putin on June 13, 2012.

During the development of the Concept in 2006 new legal documents were adopted which dramatically changed the migration regime in the country<sup>16</sup>. Federal Law of July 18, 2006 № 109-FZ On Migration Registration of Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons in the Russian Federation and substantial changes in the law On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation (introduced under Federal Law of July 18, 2006 110-FZ), which came into force as of January 15 2007, demonstrated that our country had made robust efforts to liberalize its migration policy. To this end new rules were introduced for migrant registration and the issue of work permits to foreign citizens, which increased the number of legal channels for temporary employment of CIS citizens. Thus the Russian authorities demonstrated that Russia's main migration partners are CIS countries with which it has a visa-free regime.

After the coming into force of the laws that drastically changed the system of migrant registration and employment of CIS citizens the number of citizens legally coming to and working in Russia increased substantially. In 2007 alone about 7 million CIS citizens were registered as migrants, Russian migration services issued more than 1.7

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Federation For the Purpose of Creating Favorable Conditions for the Study of Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons in the Russian Federation: <https://rg.ru/2013/07/25/obrazovanie-site-dok.html> (view date: 01.03.2017).

<sup>16</sup> Federal Law of July 18, 2006 № 109-FZ On Migration Registration of Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons in the Russian Federation; Federal Law of July 18 2006 № 110-FZ On Introducing Amendments to the Federal Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation and on Declaring Null and Void Certain Provisions of the Federal Law On Introducing Amendments and Additions to Some Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation; Federal Law of July 18 2006 № 121-FZ On Introducing Amendments to Some Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation on Improving Management in the Migration Sphere; Federal Law of November 5 № 189-FZ On Introducing Amendments to the Code on Administrative Offences; Federal Law of January 6 2007 № 2-FZ On Introducing Amendments to the Federal Law on the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens in the Russian Federation and on Declaring Null and Void Certain Provisions of the Federal Law on Introducing Amendments and Additions to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation.

million work permits to foreign citizens, 70 percent more than in 2006 and 2.5 times more than in 2005<sup>17</sup>.

Thus, in 2006-2007 Russian legislation for the first time set the aim of regulating migration and preventing its illegal forms not by harsh restrictions, but on the contrary, by giving migrants greater freedom of movement and unimpeded legal registration.<sup>18</sup>

The tightening of migration legislation since 2014, according to the Federal Migration Service, diminished the flow of migrants by 20 percent since the beginning of 2015 compared with the same period of 2014<sup>19</sup>.

More amendments to the Russian migration laws came into force since 2015. Thus, CIS citizens can now enter Russia only with foreign passports (except the citizens of Belarus and Kazakhstan and the citizens of Ukraine which is engulfed in crisis and civil war in the south-east with regard to which the former procedure was retained), the system of issuing quotas for non-visa countries was replaced with a patent system. Instead of quotas formerly granted to legal persons and work permits issued to foreign citizens, as well as patents for work for physical persons, now they have to obtain a work patent for one month with possible extension by a year. Migrants have to buy medical insurance, which diminishes the load on the Russian health service. Besides, foreign citizens have to prove their knowledge of the Russian language, history and laws<sup>20</sup>. Foreign citizens from visa countries obtain work permits under the old procedure: there are quotas for legal persons and work permits for foreign citizens.

The Russian law-makers have introduced tougher sanctions for breaking the rules of registration<sup>21</sup>. They have criminalized fictitious registration, ie registration on the basis of patently false documents or in living space where the person never intended to live. Fines have been increased for living without registration for migrants, for owners of living space where people live without registration and for officials who have unlawfully registered citizens.

Speaking about conceptualization of migration policy the adoption of the Concept of State Migration Policy of the Russian Federation to 2025 was a progressive step.<sup>22</sup> The Concept accords with the legal acts of the RF and the universally recognized principles and norms of international law. The Concept proceeds from Russia's economic and demographic interests, and identifies the goals, tasks and main areas and principles and mechanisms of state migration policy. The document officially states that "resettlement of migrants to the Russian Federation for permanent residence is emerging as a source of increasing the population of the country as a whole and its regions and attracting foreign

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<sup>17</sup> See: Analytical Report on the Results of the International Scientific-Practical Seminar Migration on the Post-Soviet Space: Trends, Consequences and Perspectives (December 2-3 2011, Moscow, Lomonosov Moscow State University). p.11 (in Russian).

<sup>18</sup> Zh.Zayonchkovskaya. Russia's New Migration Policy: Early Results // New Migration Legislation of the Russian Federation: Law Enforcement Practice/ Ed. G.Vitkovskaya, A.Platonova and V.Shkolnikova. Moscow 2008, p.75 (In Russian).

<sup>19</sup> *Rabochij moment*. URL: <http://www.newizv.ru/politics/2014-06-24/203664-rabochij-moment.html> (view date: 01.03.2017).

<sup>20</sup> *Migrants in Russia: What Will Change Since 2015*. URL: <http://itar-tass.com/obschestvo/1648164> (view date: 01.03.2017).

<sup>21</sup> Federal Law of December 21 2013 № 376-FZ On Introducing Amendments to Some Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation. URL: <http://rulaws.ru/laws/Federalnyy-zakon-ot-21.12.2013-N-376-FZ/> (view date: 01.03.2017).

<sup>22</sup> Concept of the Migration Policy of the Russian Federation in the Period to 2025, URL: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/15635> (view date: 01.03.2017).

workers in priority professional and qualification groups in line with the needs of the Russian economy is necessary for its progressive development.”<sup>23</sup> That settles the arguments as to whether or not the country needs migrants.

The main principles of the state migration policy include: ensuring human rights and freedoms; inadmissibility of any forms of discrimination; compliance with national and international law; interaction between government bodies, local self-government and civil society institutions; protection of the national labor market; taking into account the features of regional development and scientific validation of the decisions being made.

In accordance with the goals and tasks of the state migration policy its main areas are as follows: providing broader possibilities for resettlement to the Russian Federation for permanent residence; developing proper mechanisms for recruiting and using foreign labor; contributing to territorial mobility of the Russian population; stimulating education migration to the Russian Federation; meeting humanitarian obligations to forced migrants; helping migrants to adapt and integrate, fostering mutual tolerance between migrants and the local population; and counteracting illegal migration.

World practice attests that the state cannot pursue an effective migration policy without the support of the civil society. Therefore in dealing with migration problems the Concept of the State Migration Policy in the Period to 2025 is the basis for constructive interaction among the executive government bodies, local self-government bodies, civil society institutions and business entities. The Concept of Migration Policy breaks new ground in raising the question of integrating migrants into Russian society. One of the tasks of the state migration policy is helping migrants to adapt and integrate into society, counteracting xenophobia, fostering tolerance, constructive cooperation between migrants and the host community with an important role played by civil society institutions which must organize corresponding work both with migrants and with the local population.

For the first time the Concept of State Migration Policy to 2025 names among migration policy priorities attracting migrant investors, and introduction of a simplified procedure of obtaining Russian citizenship for this category of citizens on condition that they invest in the national economy. That part of migration policy should be built in conjunction with the state policy of creating a favorable investment climate in Russia and making Russian regions more competitive.

Of course a massive influx of entrepreneurs from the West is unlikely to happen any time soon, but for citizens of the CIS and Southeast Asia this strand of Russia's migration policy may turn out to be very attractive, especially when it comes to the development of the Far East and Siberia<sup>24</sup>, considering that at the third stage in the implementation of the Concept of migration policy there is to be an influx of migrants to the regions of Siberia and the Far East by 2026.

Although the Concept of State Migration Policy in the Period to 2025 breaks new ground, it has to be noted that its main thrust is to regulate immigration, while emigration issues are barely touched upon. And yet emigration is a highly sensitive issue. Liberalization of the regulation of migration processes gave Russian citizens freedom of movement and freedom to choose where to live, access to foreign education and opportunities to work abroad. At the same time free travel outside Russia, increased

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<sup>23</sup> Concept of the Migration Policy of the Russian Federation in the Period to 2025, URL: <http://http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/15635> (view date: 01.03.2017).

<sup>24</sup> New Concept of Regulating Migration to Russia. URL: <http://www.mgimo.ru/news/experts/document234490.phtml> (view date: 01.03.2017).

emigration accompanied by “brain drain” have had some negative consequences for the country.

The Concept has to clearly identify the agents of migration policy: the state, business entities, the expert community, non-governmental organizations, diasporas and their organizations, expat communities, the media, etc. It is also important to highlight the participation of different branches and levels of state power, regional structures in implementing migration policies, and the issues of inter-agency interaction of the bodies concerned, the mechanism of cooperation on the basis of public-private partnership.

### **Conclusion**

To sum up, current migration policy and legislation in Russia in the sphere of international migration concentrates on such areas as resettlement of compatriots to Russia for permanent residence, economic migration, and accommodation of refugees and forced migrants. Considering that Russia is not only a country of entry, but also a country of exit of migrants, more attention needs to be paid to developing the legal framework regulating migration processes in this department.

It has to be said that at this stage Russian migration legislation falls short of the current and future needs of economic, social and demographic development of Russian society. Russian law-making and executive structures are taking steps to improve it developing new laws and passing additions and amendments to the existing laws. Their enforcement will help to tap the potential of migration processes, speed up social and economic development and ensure growing prosperity of the population.

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## **V. Event**



## **INTERNATIONAL ROUNDTABLE ON ACHIEVEMENTS, CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES AND PERSPECTIVES IN THE EVALUATION OF CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION**

*Constantin – Vasile ȚOCA \**

The Department of International Relations and European Studies of the Faculty of History, International Relations, Political Science and Communication Sciences, University of Oradea, organized on June 6-7, 2017, the International Roundtable on Achievements, Contemporary Approaches and Perspectives in the Evaluation of Cross-border Cooperation, within the framework of the European Jean Monnet European Module "The Evaluation of Cross-border Cooperation at the Frontiers of the EU", coordinated by lecturer Ph.D. Constantin Țoca.



The round table addressed the issue of cross-border cooperation assessment as a fundamental benchmark for national and European cross-border authorities. The event was divided into 3 workshops as follows:

- Achievements in the field of cross-border cooperation
- Contemporary approaches to cross-sectional cooperation evaluation
- Perspectives of cross-border cooperation evaluation

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The opening of the event took place on Tuesday, June 6, starting at 10.00 am in the Oradea Citadel Conference Hall, Building A. In the two days dedicated to the analysis of the cross-border cooperation process, there were lecturers, PhD students and students from France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Hungary, Moldova, Ukraine and, last but not least, universities in Romania (UBB Cluj-Napoca, SNSPA Bucharest, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi and University of Oradea).

The event was attended by professor Andrei Marga, former Minister of National Education, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and former Rector of "Babes-Bolyai" University of Cluj-Napoca. The manifestation hosted also the launching of professor Marga's book "The Future Order of the World".

The International Roundtable debate had as impact an increasing degree of interactivity in the border area between universities, research centers and innovation, investors and government representatives in order to ensure sustainable cooperation and development of innovative ideas.

Another important result of the event is represented by the strengthening cooperation between the universities and the research centers, which can offer the framework for innovation in the border area, ensuring its future economic and social development.

Due to the participation of the representatives of the business and administration environments, the international round table has increased the degree of interactivity between the three pillars of frontier's development: academic, public and business environments.

## **VI. Honoured Personality**



## IN MEMORIAM ISTVÁN SÜLI-ZAKAR

*POLGÁR István*<sup>\*</sup>  
*Pénzes János*<sup>\*\*</sup>



**August 16, 1945 – March 09, 2017**

Prof. Dr. István Süli-Zakar was born on 16th August 1945 in Algyő where he completed primary school. After attending the Radnóti Miklós Secondary Grammar School in Szeged he completed GCSE in 1963. After leaving the grammar school he worked for Hungarian Railways for one year as a heaver (11/09/1963 – 09/08/1964). Following a successful university entrance examination he became a soldier. Following his discharge in 1965 he enrolled into history – geography training at the Faculty of Arts, Kossuth Lajos Science University. István Süli Zakar was linked with the University of Debrecen from 1965 – with a brief break – until his death, via his studies (between 1st September 1965 and 22nd June 1970) and education work (since 1st February 1975).

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\*\* University of Debrecen, Hungary.

As a university student his marks were always very good or excellent therefore he received Educational Scholarship of the Peoples' Republic. István Süli Zakar started research at the end of the 1960s – as a university student – as a member of Scientific Students' Association. On two National Scientific Student's Association Conferences he was awarded first prize two times. He spent the academic year 1969-1970 at the State University of Tbiliszi as an assistant so that his qualities were respected already as a student.

Besides his education work István Süli Zakar completed his economic geographical research which he started as a student and received PhD with "Summa cum laude" qualification at Kossuth Lajos Science University (KLTE) in 1973 (17/02/1973). From 1972 as a visiting lecturer and from 1st February 1975 as a senior lecturer he was employed by the Department of Economic Geology, KLTE and he worked for the Department and its legal successors ever since. From 1970 he carried out village geographical, population and settlement geographical and regional development studies in the counties of Northeastern Hungary the results of which provided the basis for his dissertation for a candidate degree (Village geographical studies in the eastern part of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén county) defended on 11th April 1984. Working for the research group of György Enyedi he took part in national scientific orders from the ministry. He was appointed associate professor in 1988 at the Department of Economic and Regional Geography, KLTE. In 1990 he was awarded a one year long scholarship to the United States at the Indiana State University at Bloomington. While in the United States he completed his tender to apply for the foundation of a new department which was supported by the Rector's Council at KLTE. István Süli Zakar became the Head of the newly founded Department of Social Geography and remained its head for 20 years.

In 1992 István Süli Zakar organised the Debrecen Group, ATI, of the Regional Research Centre, Hungarian Academy of Sciences led by him as a scientific chief between 1st November 1992 and 31st March 1998. The Róna-Régió Regional Development LTD was founded by him on 5th December 1998 which was led by him as a managing director.

On 6th December 1995 István Süli Zakar completed the habilitation process successfully and received CSc degree on 4th March 1996. On 29th February 1996 he received the "Pro Regione Alföld" prize of the Nagyalföld Foundation and the "For Hungary with knowledge" prize of the National Scientific Students' Association Council for organizing the National Scientific Students' Association Conference (Natural Sciences) in Debrecen. Three recognitions were awarded for his educational work and at two times he received Rector's Honour and on 29th September 1997 he received Széchenyi Professor Scholarship and was awarded with the prize of the Debrecen Regional Committee of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1999. In 2005 he received the "Pro Regio Bihar" medal.

On 14th December 1998 István Süli Zakar defended successfully his Academic Doctorate thesis entitled "Social Geographical Bases of the Regional Development of Northeastern Hungary". He was a doctor of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences from 19th March 1999 and also a professor at the University of Debrecen from 1st July 1999 heading the Department of Social Geography and Regional Development between 1st December 1990 and 30th June 2010. Between 2004 and 2007 he was member of the Senate of the University of Debrecen. He was working as a professor between 1st July 2010 and 30th June 2013 and as a professor emeritus from 1st July 2013. Apart from these, Professor Süli Zakar was the president or member of numerous organisations and foundations of which he told tales frequently with pride.

In scientific books, monographs, international and national journals, conference proceedings, research reports more than 400 papers were published under his name and also he was involved in numerous domestic and international conferences as a speaker.

His main fields of research included: geopolitical, regional development and regional research; social and economic issues of regional development in national and international relations. Studying cross-border social and economic relationships and inter-ethnic relationships with special attention to the regions in Hungary along the northeastern border, i.e. focusing on the area of the Carpathians Euroregion and the Hajdú-Bihar-Bihar Euroregion. Research and comparative studies of small regions and local governments. Studies focusing on the regional historical and political geography. Studies giving the basis for the development of the Debrecen-Nagyvárad Eurometropolis (DebOra Project). Studies founding the social-economic integration of the Roma population. Education development research, writing lecture notes and books.

Prof. Dr. Süli-Zakar István, was a professor at the University of Debrecen (previously Kossuth Lajos University), Head of the Social Geography and Regional Development Department, doctor CSc of the Hungarian Academy of Science, honorary member of the Société de Géographie, „Doctor Honoris Causa” of the University of Oradea.

Member of national and international scientific organizations: Hungarian Geographical Society, Hungarian Urbanism Society, Regional Scientific Committee of the Hungarian Academy of Science, IGU Political Geographical Working Committee, IGU Village Geograpy Committee, Regional Studies Association.

Hungarian Academy of Science Committee - Co-Chair of the Committee on Social Sciences, Chair of the Working Group on Local Science and Regional Development, member of the Debrecen University Council. Member in the Regional Council of the Interregional Alliance of the Carpathian Euroregion, co-director of the Institute for Euroregional Studies "Jean Monnet" European Center of Excellence (IERS) (Oradea - Romania).

For three decades, he has been researching the socio-economic issues of north-eastern Hungary, the socio-geographical foundations of regional development, the geopolitical role of borders, and the possibilities for developing cross-border relations.

He was the head of the PhD Program in Social Geography and Regional Development within the Doctoral School of Earth Sciences.

These results all reflect the diligence, persistent and enthusiastic work of Professor Süli Zakar that did not fade until the last day of his life. He regarded education as the most important task of his professional career. He loved teaching and his students always admired his interesting lectures. He regarded the science of geography as his profession giving his best at every lecture. In recent years he gave lectures in Political geography and social geography, Regional development basics, Geopolicy and globalisation, Regional policy and he was also a lecturer at various faculties of the University of Debrecen. Professor Süli Zakar focused on developing those who were in disadvantageous conditions in recent years. He was always ready to give a helping hand to the BSc, MSc and PhD students he supervised and as a result, several hundred works and theses were created under his guidance which is an exemplary achievement.

Due to his profession he was on the road a lot. Apart from official delegacies he devoted a lot from his own resources to travel as getting to know the world was also his hobby. Via his travels and as a delegate he visited more than 100 countries. His further hobbies included photography, collecting and studying old geographical atlases and

gardening around his weekend house at Telekföld beside the Eastern Main Canal near Balmazújváros.

Professor Dr. István Süli Zakar got unwell during a lecture on 9th March 2017 and passed away with tragic suddenness at his home. We keep his memory forever and say farewell with hearts of sorrow. Rest in peace Dear Professor!

with profound respect,  
Polgár István, Péntzes János

### Professional Experience:

- 2014- Professor emeritus
- 2004-2008 Senator, Council of the University of Debrecen
- 1999- Member, Planning Council of North Great Plain
- 1997- Founding member, Regional Council of North-East Hungary
- 1996- Member, Geography Scientific Committee (MTA, Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Hungarian Geographical Society
- 1995- Member, Doctoral Council of the University of Debrecen
- 1995-1996 Member, Institute Council of KLTE TTK
- 1994- Member, Council of the Carpathian Euroregion Interregional Cooperation
- 1994-2005 President, Coordination Council of the Institute of Geosciences, University of Debrecen, leader of Self-Evaluation Group preparing for the accreditation at the University of Debrecen
- 1993- Member of leaders, MTA DAB (Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Academic Committee of Debrecen)
- 1993- Member, Alföld Programme Council
- 1992- Member, Regional Scientific Committee of MTA (Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Member, Regional Council of the Carpathian Euroregion
- 1992- Member, Regional Council of the Carpathian Euroregion
- 1991-2010 Member, Coordination Council of the Institute of Geosciences, University of Debrecen
- 1990-2010 Head, Department of Social Geography and Regional Development Planning
- 1985- President, Settlement Scientific and Regional Development Working Commission of the MTA DAB (Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Academic Committee of Debrecen)
- 1984-1985 Commission of the MTA DAB (Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Academic Committee of Debrecen)
- 1981-1989 President, Nature Sciences Section of the OTDK (National Scientific Student Conference)
- 1978-1990 President, Council of Scientific Student Association (Lajos Kossuth University)
- Member, Educational Committee of the KLTE TTK (Lajos Kossuth University, Department of Sciences); president, Educational Council of the Institution of Geosciences

**List of Publications:****1972**

- 1., **Süli-Zakar I.:** A Föld és Magyarország energiagazdálkodásának legfontosabb jellegzetességei. – Acta Academiae Paedagogicae Nyíregyháziensis. Tom. 4, Nyíregyháza, pp. 391-404.
- 2., **Süli-Zakar I.:** A magyar szénhidrogénipar földrajza. – Egyetemi doktori disszertáció. Kézirat, Nyíregyháza, 259. p.
- 3., **Süli-Zakar I.:** Földrajzi fényképezés. – Főiskolai jegyzet. Tankönyvkiadó, Budapest, 88. p.

**1973**

- 4., **Süli-Zakar I.:** Kőolaj- és földgáztermelés Magyarországon. – Acta Academiae Paedagogicae Nyíregyháziensis, Tom. 5. Nyíregyháza, pp. 81-97.

**1974**

- 5., **I. Süli-Zakar:** Economic Geographical Investigations of the Crude Oil Processing Industry in Hungary. – Acta Geographica Debrecina 1973. Tom. XII. Debrecen, pp. 149-164.
- 6., **Süli-Zakar I.:** Szabolcs-Szatmár településföldrajzi vázlata. – Szabolcs-Szatmári Szemle, IX. évfolyam, 2. szám. Nyíregyháza, pp. 87-103.
- 7., **Süli-Zakar I.:** A hajdúszoboszlói földgáztermelés gazdaságföldrajzi jelen-tősége. – Acta Academiae Paedagogicae Nyíregyháziensis. Tom. 6. Nyíregyháza, pp. 89-98.
- 8., **Süli-Zakar I.:** Magyarország kőolajfeldolgozó ipara. – Acta Academiae Paedagogicae Nyíregyháziensis. Tom. 6. Nyíregyháza, pp. 75-87.

**1975**

- 9., **Süli-Zakar I.:** Tanyák, falvak, városok. Szabolcs-Szatmár megye településföldrajzi vázlata. – In: Szabolcs-Szatmár megyei földrajzi olvasókönyv. (Szerk.: Frisnyák S.), Nyíregyháza, pp. 93-104.

**1976**

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- 11., **Süli-Zakar I.:** Bővítsük földrajzi diatárunkat. – Földrajztanítás. XIX. évfolyam, 4. szám. Budapest, pp. 116-119.

**1977**

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**1978**

- 15., **Süli-Zakar I.:** A lakásállomány és a lakások felszereltsége Szabolcs-Szatmár megyében. – Szabolcs-Szatmári Szemle, XIII. évfolyam, 1. szám, Nyíregyháza, pp. 42-62.

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### 1979

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- 19., **Süli-Zakar I.:** A nyírségi falvak átalakulása (Vaja példáján). – In: Szabolcs-Szatmár megyei földrajzi olvasókönyv II. kötet. (Szerk.: Frisnyák S.), Nyíregyháza, pp. 150-158.
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### 1980

- 22., **Süli-Zakar I.:** A Hegyköz népmozgalma. – Területi Kutatások 3. MTA Földrajztudományi Kutató Intézet. Budapest, pp. 59-70.
- 23., **Süli-Zakar I.:** Tokaj-Hegyalja és környékének népmozgalma 1787-1970. között. – Borsodi Levéltári Évkönyv III. Miskolc, pp. 35-76.
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### 1981

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### 1982

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- 38., **Süli-Zakar I.:** Melléktevékenység egy bodroghközi mezőgazdasági nagyüzem-ben (Karcσαι esettanulmány). – Borsodi Szemle. XXVIII. évfolyam, 2. szám, pp. 30-40.

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- 42., **Süli-Zakar I.:** A bodroghközi népesség foglalkoztatottsági problémái. – In: Az Alföld gazdaságföldrajzi kutatásának eredményei és további feladatai. IV. Népesség és település. Békéscsaba, 1984. pp. 67-84.
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### 1985

- 44., **Süli-Zakar I.:** A termelőszövetkezeti melléktevékenység, mint népességmegtartó tényező Karcsaan. – A falu. I. évfolyam, 1. szám, pp. 75-84.
- 45., **Süli-Zakar I.:** Az agglomerálódás népességföldrajzi vonatkozásai a borsodi iparvidéken. – Borsodi Földrajzi Évkönyv. Miskolc, pp. 47-66.
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**1986**

- 47., **I. Süli-Zakar:** Vazsnyejsie voproszú razvityija provincialnüh aglomeracij v Vengrii. – In: Problemü razvityija rasszelenyija v uszlovijah intenzivnovo proizvodstva. Teziszü dokladov konferencii. Vilnius, Lithuania, pp. 78-79.

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- 50., **Süli-Zakar I.:** Megyehatár menti elmaradott térségek terület- és településfejlesztési feladatai az Alföld ÉK-i részén. – 2. Alföld-ankét. Tudományos konferencia. Békéscsaba, pp. 34-52.
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**1988**

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- 55., **Süli-Zakar I.:** Határmenti területek társadalomföldrajzi viszonyai Borsod – Abaúj – Zemplén megye keleti részén. – In: A sajátos helyzetű térségek terület- és településfejlesztési problémái. MTA RKK és a Ts-2/2 Program Iroda kiadványa. (Szerk.: Erdősi F. és Tóth J.), Budapest, pp. 72-79.

**1989**

- 56., **I. Süli-Zakar:** Agglomerationsprozesse und Ihre Fragezeichen in dem Borsoder Industriegebiet (NO-Ungarn). – Acta Geographica Debrecenia 1985 - 86. Tomus XXIV-XXV. Debrecen, pp. 199-211.
- 57., **Süli-Zakar I.:** A Rickl-ház (A Lábasház történelmi dokumentumai). – Das RicklHaus (Historische Dokuemnte "des Hauses mit Torbögen"). Alföldi Nyomda, Debrecen, p. 76.
- 58., **Süli-Zakar I.:** A történelmi Erdély népességföldrajzi vázlata. – Erdélyi Tükör I. évfolyam, 3. szám Debrecen, pp. 14-15.
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**1990**

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- 61., **Süli-Zakar I.:** A Rickl-ház történelmi dokumentumai (Historische Dokumente des Rickl-hauses; Historical Documents of the RicklHouse). – SZÜV LICIUM, Alföldi Nyomda, Debrecen, 192 p.
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- 63., **I. Süli-Zakar:** Socio-economic Problems of the Rural Settlements of the NE Border Region in Hungary. – International Conference on Rural Areas and Socio-economic Development. IGU Commission on Changing Rural Systems, Ljubljana. Slovenia, pp. 10 – 21.
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- 65., Béres Cs. - **Süli-Zakar I.:** Bihar: Térbeli hátrányok – Társadalmi problémák. – Területfejlesztés 1. HB. megyei Tanács, Debrecen - Berettyóújfalu, 159 p.
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## **VII. Book Reviews**



## THE BALKANS. A HISTORY ABOUT DIVERSITY AND HARMONY

*Emilia Nicoleta SCHIOP\**

**Review of:** Baruch Watchel, Andrew (2016), *Balcanii. O Istorie Despre Diversitate și Armonie*, Bucharest: Corint.

The Balkans represented from the beginning, more than a simple geographical notion. The connotations of terms have proven to be loaded with negative political motivations for legitimacy and justification of the powers that have invaded this space. The evolution of concepts of Balkan, Balkanism, Balkanization supported the West's instigators to form a picture of the disadvantages of the Balkan society, becoming a mark of disgrace associated with a particular circumstance of the history of the Balkan space. The concept of the Balkans has an autonomous textual existence that multiplies its sense and significance in the West. This influenced the eastern states during time in its economy.


The Balkans become an arbitrary construct, and Balkanism is an Eurocentric discourse of the inferiority of a certain part of Europe. The Western Balkan speeches were different from those of the real Balkans, which can be defined by a profound historical evolution.

In the present, the economic crisis from Greece, the migration crisis, the terrorism and the stroke of state from Turkey are just some events from the last three years that influenced the western civilization.

Beside these facts, the Balkans offers us different subjects, for example, multiculturalism. It was, also, a period when the Balkan Peninsula was a space of multicultural and multilingual cohabitation. The process of the recovery of gaps to Europe had bad effects on this society with a variety of cultures. They are occidental, because they aspire to the western society. In the same time, the Balkan people they claim a past not very concrete.

The territory is vast and ambiguous. The layers of it highlight the influence of the heterogeneous past for present. The layers have Greek elements, but also Macedonian, Roman, Byzantine and Turkish elements.

The great powers have interests in this area and some of the interests are divergent. The Balkan Peninsula became a vulnerable point. The author, Andrew Baruch Watchel, wants to highlight a clear version about the Balkan history, a geographically close space, but far from the point of view of interest.



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The book starts with a general introduction about this space, then he shows the beginning from prehistory until the Byzantine Empire. He, also, emphasize the details of this area in the Middle Ages and under the Ottoman rule.

During the Ottoman rule the Balkan people, especially Albanians were convinced to renounce at their religions for islam, using different ways. One way was the promise of lower pay. Another way was the lack of discrimination for the converts.

The Ottomans classified their citizens not according to nationality, but according to religion. The effect was to dissolve the national conscience for the local population. Even if they did not like each other in a special way or even if they did not like their Ottoman leaders, the Balkan people lived relatively in peace. It can be seen as an effect of the long and intense interaction that in different Balkan languages are common words, even grammar characteristics. Also, anthropologists observed mutual traditions, like the ritual of bringing rain, in which a young women dressed in a leaf costume sings and dances in the village: this ritual was practiced by Greeks, Albanians and Slavic people in the entire region and it is not clear who borrowed it from whom. The studies from the northern Albania, Kosovo and Montenegro indicates the fact that the national costume from these areas includes muslim, Christian and Jewish symbols regardless of the religion of the popular port carrier.

The author insist to show the 19th century and the close period near it (1775 - 1922). An important moment was the national liberation. In the last chapter it is presented the process from the Balkans to the South-Eastern Europe.

The Balkans is an interesting space in which different peoples left a mark. Unfortunately, the model of Constantinople left poverty for population, but luxury palaces for the leaders, for example.

The area is characterized by complexity and tragedy. The beginning of the first world war has its origins in Balkans, when a young nationalist, Gavrilo Princip, killed the successor of the Austro-Hungarian throne.

The book is part of "New Oxford World History" – a well documented, dynamic and actual history, but, also, innovative in comparison with "the old history". The book has more descriptive paragraphs and highlights the relations between cultures.

The Balkans are closer to the culture of Europeans. For example, Bosnia and Herzegovina is as close as a culture of Christian peoples, although it is Muslim. There are more similarities between it and the Balkan states than between itself and the Muslim countries. The Bosnian state is an interesting case of variation in attitudes and the relationship to religion throughout history. But a strong component is characterized by general perception and behavior towards religious diversity.

In the case of the conflicts in the Balkans it can be said that they had religious influences, the differences between Christians and Muslims becoming ever more prevalent.

In order to integrate in the European Union, the states from the Western Balkans has made efforts both by adopting legislative measures to harmonize with the *acquis* and through various projects and actions in cooperation with the EU. There is still a need to develop many aspects that are currently being adopted or has to be adopted. These countries has political will for membership, but at the same time it still needs to make permanent efforts to bring it closer to the European Union.

The Balkans has not renounced at the European values with deep roots from history and offers the opportunity for both christians and muslims to promote their values,

showing tolerance and being a model of good coexistence in multiculturalism, even that in the past the area was affected by the conflicts with ethnical and religious reasons.

The Balkan countries have a much stronger capacity to promote their culture in different forms (both internally and internationally) in comparison with the past.

The book is well structured and offers a clear image about the Balkan world. Usually people are spending holidays in that area, for example in Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, Muntenegro or Croatia. On the other side, the Balkans are associated with a stigma and are not known well from all the perspectives. Beside the institutional regression or the lack of democracy, the area hide a rich and beautiful culture (traditional music, dances, national costumes, architecture) that gives it a special charm beside the picturesque landscapes.

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


## CULTURE AND INTEGRATION IN THE MULTICULTURAL EUROPE

Anca OLTEAN\*

**Review of:** Dana Pantea, Ioan Horga, Mircea Brie, *The image of the other in the European Intercultural Dialogue*, Lambert Academic Publishing, Saarbrücken, 2017.

Dana Pantea in the article *Image, Culture and Communication* from the present volume points out the fact that in contemporary world, boundaries became more and more diluted, losing their traditional significance of barriers (mental, ideological, economic, cultural, etc). Thus the issue that arises in the present day context of migrations in Europe is the perception of the “other”, the migrant coming with a different background in the European Union. New problems arise though, as the issue of “prejudice”, “discrimination”, “stereotype”. Globalization process brings forward the issue of “otherness” is the opinion of the author. Other issues emphasized by this volume are “culture”, “gender”, “race”, “ethnicity” of different populations that inhabit today the European continent being involved in the complex process of intercultural communication.



The volume continues with the article Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro entitled *National and European cultural institutions–Dialogue and the idea of Interculturality*. Right from the beginning, the author points out the issue of European diversity in our Europe. This cultural integration imposes to foreigners to adjust to European values, norms and cultural backgrounds from the European landscapes. The European citizen should, thus, be aware of the “common cultural heritage” of Europe. The opinion of the author is that “national and regional cultural identity coexists alongside the <<European cultural identity>>”. Another key subject brought forward by the author is the issue of “cultural centres” that serve as mediators between the represented country and the host country. Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro mentions such institutions as Sociedad Dante Alighieri (1889), Aliance Française, Association Française d’Action Artistique, Office des Relations Publiques et de la Propagande, in Germany-Goethe Institut, Istituto Italiano di Cultura, British Council, Centre Cultural Calouste Gulbenkian (Paris translations from Portugal), Institut Polonais Paris, Institut Franco-Allemand Polonais (Warsaw), Centre Cultural Roumain. National policies influence, all in all, the nature of European cultural politics. Council of Europe, UNESCO, other networks that are independent are impacting on national cultural politics. In the opinion of Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro, the trip towards the “European identity” is a complex and difficult journey. (Tavares, 2017: 20) Communication policy is, in the opinion of the author, an important tool in promoting the European culture and values. Moreover, the author

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underlines that EU's information and communication policy is a mean that can very well promote the "European diversity".

George Contogeorgis, in the article *From the Nation of the State to the Nation of Society. The political change of the emergence of a cultural polysemy of collective identities*, considers that the idea of nation implies a correlation with a cultural community. The idea of nation is to be found in the ancient Hellenic city-state considers the author. In the modern world, it was imposed the "society of the state" where the political power of the state was governing. Cultural homogeneity was pursued by the states in order to prevent other cultural communities to assert their projects of dominance. (Contogeorgis, 2017: 27) The perception of "otherness" as enemy and alterity followed according to the politics of national states. Modernity brings with itself the idea of citizen's rights from the sphere of individual freedoms. The idea of pluralist states where the "other" is not regarded with animosity, but as a political partner, is emphasized by the author. In the present day states, economy and communication, in the context of globalisation, escaped from the statal narrow framework and knew a process of emancipation. It arise a sort of "constitutional patriotism" (Contogeorgis, 2017: 31) around whom are gathered the majority and the minorities (ethnic minorities, working migrants) in the context of globalisation of work, services, education and research that convive together in multicultural societies.

Ioan Horga, in the article *New narration of the EU frontiers*, writes about the special importance of boundaries throughout the history, although they started to be studied only in recent times. (Horga, 1997: 38) The importance of borders is given by the fact that they "serve as demarcations of both the territory and sovereignty of one state as well as of its identity". The concept of "identity" and "borders" are inter-related, they are impacting on EU policies and bilateral relations of European states. EU's integration is characterized by widening (the continuous expansion) and the deepening (the approfondation of the integration process). The author quoted an EU enlargement Commissioner that considered that deepening a widening are complementary, not contradictory processes. In economic terms, points out the author, widening implies the transfer of the four economic liberties over new territories. The phenomenon of de-bordering in the European Union areal coexists with Europeanization and affirmation of the concept of European citizenship. Deepening and widening of the EU goes hand in hand with globalisation, considers professor Ioan Horga. (Horga, 2017: 45) The issue of international migration on the territory of EU countries is strongly emphasized by the author. In the part of conclusion, the author points out that, former historical enemies are working out to solve their problems, in order to reach the objective of European integration and perhaps this is the merit of this present day Europe.

Ludmila Roșca writes the article *Freedom-a condition for positioning of the individual in Society: Legal and Moral Issue*. The author quotes the German philosopher Hegel that wrote that the human individuals are material entities, but they also have a spiritual side and aspirations. People are following their intellectual paths based on individual rational choises. Another author quoted by Ludmila Roșca is Kant who wrote on "transcendental freedom that arises from the worldview of the person" (Roșca, 2017: 64) and which is impacting on individual's destiny and professional path. According to Hegel quoted by Ludmila Roșca, the individual have desires (the need to eat, the need to study) that are generated by the individual nature of each of us (Apud Roșca, 2017: 65) Mihai Ralea, quoted by the author, sees the individual in ensamble, having his emotions, considering that human existance "is more than the ability to think". (Roșca, 2017: 66)

According to Rădulescu Motru, freedom means to approximate and to adjust to the norms of social life of a certain society. Ludmila Roșca brings into discussion the international official documents mentioning for the first time in history the individual freedom, such as the British Document, Magna Charta Libertatum in 1215 or Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, the American Declaration of Independance in 1776, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen in 1789. In the XX<sup>th</sup> century, she mentions Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. In the opinion of Ludmila Roșca, the university is the ideal place where individual spirit can evolve because, in this framework, it is developed “a philosophical sense of truth” (Roșca, 2017: 72) In the university, the individual learns that he has a responsibility. The undertaking of responsibility is liberating the individual. (Roșca, 2017: 72) In the part of conclusions, the author states: “Realization of own potential depends on individual’s ability to valorize capabilities, to define priorities, to get skills, required in various fields of professional/ social useful activity”. (Roșca, 2017: 73)

The authors Lutz Michael Büchner and Liubov Ilieva in the article *European Social Dialogue, a hidden phenomenon of the intercultural dialogue in Europe* underline the importance of intercultural dialogue between people pointing out that European social dialogue is mentioned and set as a priority in the Lisbon strategy. Communication is not merely a “a simply exchange of data” is the opinion of the author (Büchner, 2017: 77), it encodes feelings and thoughts of the emitent person embodied under the shape of „sounds, words and action”. The author asserts that several system of patterns can be identified in „language, behaviour, emotions and customs” that embodies, in fact, the ellements of our culture” (Büchner, 2017: 78). The stereotypes formed in the mind of individuals, mainly during the interval 12-30 years, there are very hard to be changed, is the opinion of the author. Cultural standards impact and influence the process of inter-cultural communication, points out the author. To improve work and living conditions of from European Union is a big challenge and I think that the values, conceptions upon life, attitude towards work and performance should be in a continuous process of evolution in order to achieve a social and economic cohesion on the territory of the European Union countries.

Mircea Brie and Daniela Blaga, *Image of the Other: the Perspective on Ethnicity*, refer to the term of „race”and „ethnicity. „Ethnicity” implies solidarity towards an ethnic group and differenciation from other groups, be them ethnic or not. (Brie & Blaga, 2017: 94) The majority of nation states are multiethnic, point out the authors, including several ethnic groups where minorities are either assimilated, either integrated. The melting pot idea based on multiculturality and on the principle of „unity in diversity”is the best present-day model of organizing societies. In what concerns the policies of EU, the authors quote Andrew Moravcsik that separates three distinct levels of decision making (internal/ domestic, inter-state, supranational) (Brie&Blaga, 2017: 96) In the opinion of Mircea Brie and Daniela Blaga, identity is not necessarily something given by birth, but „the expression of the awareness of belonging to a cultural community”. The authors mention the divide white versus black ethnicity. In the opinion of the two authors the lack of education or its low level is the main ground for discrimination in Romania, nowadays. They notice in the Romanian society some negative traits such as the lack of tolerance in society, corruption that favorize discrimination. Discrimination is encountered in the life of usual people. Mircea Brie and Daniela Blaga quote the Survey of the National Council for Combating Discrimination. It seems that mental disability and old age of people are reasons for discrimination. Another survey quoted by the authors conducted by INSCOP reveals that 65.3% from Romanians disagree with potential Asian migrations in Romania

and only 26.5% are in favor of Asian emigrants. (Brie&Blaga, 2017: 104) In the part of conclusions, the authors underline the ascension of the “national” sense of belonging in the detriment of the “unity” and “solidarity” promoted by the European Union treaties.

Gabriela Goudenhooff in the article *Image and communication: the Strawberry pickers and the Representation of Transnational Experience* defines diaspora by quoting Vertovec (Apud Goudenhooff, 2017:112) as including “immigrants, guest-workers, ethnic and ‘racial’ minorities, refugees, expatriates and travellers“. Another author, quoted by Gabriela Goudenhooff, is Castells who considered that “ethnicity, religion, language and territory” can not determine the creation of a nation. The author points out the broader meaning that has the term *diaspora* nowadays. Diaspora differs from “migration” and “exile through its globalization and networking. The author notices that defining Diaspora, we have a spatial dispersion phenomenon. Other characteristic of nowadays diaspora is the preservation of identity. (Goudenhooff, 2017: 116) Quoting Robin Cohen, the author points out different diaspora stances: “victim diaspora”, “imperial diaspora”, “trade and business diaspora”, “homeland diaspora”, “cultural diaspora”. The author tries to picture Romanian diaspora, as it appears in Romanian newspapers. Last but not least, she focuses on the case of Romanian strawberry pickers working abroad, reflected by the international bibliography and newspapers articles. These strawberry pickers are oscillating between “identity” and “prejudice”, considers the author (Goudenhooff, 2017: 121)

Edina Lilla Mészáros, in the article “Hannibal ante portas” or the Role of the Perception about the Irregular Migrant in the construction of a common European identity”, points out the idea of identity as a belonging to a group given by individual’s consent, qualities beliefs, values. To the traditional notion of identity, as the author points out, it appears nowadays the idea of “European identity” which generates both “divergence” and “coexistence”, setting up a communication desired for the purpose and consistence of European Union Project. The treaty of Lisbon, quoted by the author, mentions the idea of “unity in diversity” which leads to the idea of peaceful coexistence of European peoples and communities. This idea of “unity in diversity” has to be implemented by European Constitution Project that was rejected by French and Dutch vote, points out Edina Meszaros (Meszaros, 2017: 135) The author considers that the immigrants, by their otherness, played an important role in shaping the European identity. She identifies the perils of immigration as aspiring to the indigenous population resources and threatening their subsistence. The author makes distinction between economic emigrants who want to adjust to better values, life-styles and to gain some economic benefits and refugees without resources who came in a desperate struggle for surviving. Other distinction is the one between authorized (legal) migration and irregular (unauthorized) migration. In the part of conclusion, the author underlines that the problem of otherness brought elements of novelty and change for the European identity.

Mariana Buda in the article *Catalan, Basque and Galician. Regional Languages at the Borders of Spain. The culture of Region*, quotes Samuel Huntington that considered that conflicts are likely to emerge between different cultural entities. (Apud Buda, 2017: 177) The author’s opinion is that, in the case of states with various linguistic, religious or ethnic groups, the path for peaceful cohabitation is the dialogue and not the recourse to violence. (Buda, 2017: 178) The case study in this paper is the analysis of the existent differences between autonomous communities in Spain. According to Mariana Buda, there are 17 autonomous community groups in Spain. (Buda, 2017: 179) and these communities were granted autonomy by the Spanish Constitution of 1978. Spain is an example of regions based state where the autonomous communities enjoy extended powers and

“legislative, financial and administrative autonomy” (Apud Buda, 2017: 181) The author points out that, the Spanish Constitution did not state the limits of the autonomy of Spanish inner communities. Mariana Buda focuses on the issue of linguistic diversity in Spain as an element of multinationality. Concerning the major spoken languages in Spain, Mariana Buda points out the Castilian, the Catalan, the Valencian, the Galician, the Basque. The author concludes that Spain has a particular resemblance and history as a country of the European Union being called “Little Europe” and that Spanish regions existed before the nation-states and the variety of languages besides the official language (Castilian) can be viewed as a sign of differentiations of the Spanish communities.

Anca Oltean. in the article “*The image of Israel in published documents regarding the biateral politics of Romania-Israel during the years 1948-1969*” (Oltean, 2017: 197), approaches the emigration of Romanian Jews in Israel during the years 1948-1969, as reflected by the collection of documents *Romania-Israel. Diplomatic documents 1948-1969* published by Daniela Bleoancă et al<sup>1</sup> in Romanian language. She points out the very beginnings of the diplomatic relations between Romania and the state of Israel created in 1948. The relations were influenced by the problem of the emigration of Romanian Jews in Israel, a continuous process that manifested during communist period. Also, the persecution of Zionist leaders in Romania during the first years of communism after 1989 affected these diplomatic relations of the two states. The emigration of the Romanian Jews was conditioned by the development of economic relations between the two countries. Almost all the Romanian Jews (approx. 400 000) emigrated in Israel during the communist years) (Apud Rotman, 2004).

Cosmin Chiriac, Cătălin Ghemiş and Liviu Bucur in the article *Challenges in Extracting Spatial Features from Old Maps and Engraving Prints of Oradea* (Chiriac, Ghemiş & Bucur, 2017: 233) The authors focused on graphical representations of the city of Oradea (maps, engraving prints) that they found at the Oradea Criş County Museum and at the personal collection Zgardan. The old maps and engraving prints referring to Oradea (used by the authors) date back to XV-XIXth centuries. The author provides images and analysis of these maps. The author offers details about hydrographic elements that appear on these medieval and modern maps.

Huszarik Mihai-Răzvan, in the article “Mixed marriages in Nădlac” (Huszarik, 2017: 251), focuses on the subject of mixed marriages in Nădlac, a city situated in the Western part of Romania, near Arad, inhabited by several ethnic groups that cohabited for more than 300 years. The author provides us the year 1699 when the Peace of Karlowitz was signed, placing Hungary from Ottoman dominance to the dominance of Habsburgs monarchy. The need for workers in Agriculture determined the migration of Slovaks from Upper Hungary (Felvidek) to Lower lands. Official statistics together with the Church documents offer important data about Slovak community from Nădlac. They were, in majority, Lutherans. First Slovaks were colonized in Nădlac in 1803. 200 families of Slovaks moved to Nădlac in this year. In 1805, other 600 Slovaks came here. In 1850, points out the author, there were living in Nădlac minorities such as the Slovaks, the Serbs, the Magyars, the Germans, the Greeks, the Bulgarians, the Roma and the Hebrews. Until 1912, the Slovak population doubled in Nădlac (Huszarik, 2017: 256) The magyarization of Slovaks happened in the context of the distance from the territories of Slovakia and because of the 19th century process of magyarization. (Huszarik, 2017: 259)

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<sup>21</sup> The original title of the volume is Daniela Bleoancă, Nicolae- Alexandru Nicolescu, Cristina Păiuş an, Dumitru Preda, *România-Israel. 50 de ani de relații dipomatice*, volume I, 1948-1969,

Mixed marriages had a positive impact on the evolution of Nădlac, most of them being concluded between Slovaks of Lutheran religion and Magyars of different religion or, also, Lutherans. (Huszarik, 2017: 261)

Aurelian Lavric, in the article *The role of the Intercultural Dialogue in preventing separatism at EU Eastern Border: the Moldovan case*, considers that, in the vicinity of EU borders, in Eastern European areal, there are potential emerging conflicts and one of the issues that arise can be the diversity of ethnicities. In order to prevent such conflicts, the intercultural communication between ethnicities, in this part of Europe, is a necessity. (Lavric, 2017: 269) The author includes in this Eastern European areal, states such as Belarus, Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, pointing out that the population of the Republic of Moldova has a multithnic structure. On the left side of the Dniestr, there is located a strong community of Romanians and Ukrainians. In the Southern part of the Republic of Moldova, there is a territorial unit belonging to Găgăuz community (Lavric, 2017: 269) Bulgarians are to be found in Taraclia rayon, while Ukrainians live in the rayons of Briceni, Ocnița, Edineț. The main ethnic groups in the Republic of Moldova, are the Moldavians, the Romanians, the Ukrainians, the Russians, the Găgăuz, the Bulgarians. The problem is to integrate ethnical minorities in the culture of majoritarian population. (Lavric, 2017: 378) There is an important Russian speaking minority in the Republic of Moldova due to Russification from the years 1940-1941 and 1944-1991. There were disputes between the majority of the population (the Moldavians) and the Russian speaking minority from Transnistria region, and, another conflict, was between Găgăuz minority from the South and Moldavian population (Lavric, 2017: 378). Like Ukraine and Georgia, also the Republic of Moldova signed the agreement of Association with EU. In this context, Russia is a destabilizing power who puts in danger the process of integration of the Republic of Moldova into EU. Russia impacted negatively in the Republic of Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine, by revisionist actions. The author remarks the separatist tendencies in the Republic of Moldova and not only in the case of Transnistria. (Lavric, 2017: 378) Separatism can appear in a state where there is not a strong “unifying principle” according to Barry Buzan (quoted by the author) or “when prosperity or central authority diminishes” (Buzan Apud Lavric, 2017: 274) The author thinks that the authorities of the Republic of Moldova do not have a strong state project to overcome these issues of insecurity (Lavric, 2017: 276) Last but not least, the author focuses on the case of Transnistrian separatism and in the issue of Găgăuz problem from the Republic of Moldova.

Liubov Melnychuk, in the article *European identity in the context of wider Europe*, defines the term “identity” that is an awareness to geographical, linguistic, cultural communities and wonders if national and European identity are able to coexist. European narratives came as a solution after the ravaged by war Europe, trying to rebuild the continent starting from cultural and history related affinities. Woodrow Wilson and Jacques Delors are mentioned by the author as visionary minds who dreamed to unify Europe. The 21<sup>st</sup> century, with its scarcity of resources, undermined the European construction process, underlines the author. (Melnyciuk, 2017: 295) Rejection of EU constitution and the delay in the ratification of Lisbon treaty were signs that show the weakness of the present-day integration process (Melnyciuk, 2017: 295)

Simion Roșca, in the article *The impact of Europeanization on the quality of democracy in the Republic of Moldova* (Roșca, 2017: 313), asserts that European societies are nowadays the cradles of European values and these values can guide political actions. The author has in view the Republic of Moldova, but also the other candidate states,

analyzing the implementation of European values. „Europeanization and quality of democracy” are vague ideals in the Republic of Moldova, nowadays, considers the author. The author provides different scientific explanations of the term “Europeanization”, focusing later on the term “quality of democracy”. Democracy means firstly the responsibility of political and decision-making factors in front of the citizens. Also the term “democracy” implies active involvement of citizens in political and social life, but also in the decision-making process, and, last but not least, democracy implies competition between organisms and organisations, but also between governors. (Roşca, 2017: 318) The author focuses on the coordinates of the quality of democracy (political control in the sense of constitutionalism, necessity of electoral competitions, the right to vote, the right to self-expression, the right of being informed or to look for alternative sources of information, to right to association). The author Simion Roşca sets as priority of analysis, the quality of democracy existent in the Republic of Moldova. Former Soviet Union, Russian Federation and in the Republic of Moldova pose problems in the issue of implementing democracy (Roşca, 2017: 320). In the Republic of Moldova, democracy is on the way of being implemented, starting with the mid-90s, knowing a success in the domain of political transformation, including by the periodical change of the president. In all these evolutionary processes, the political elite of the Republic of Moldova had to fight with the communist opposition. He makes a painting of political leaders and evolution in the Republic of Moldova in post-communist years. Corruption is another factor that is an impediment to European integration of the Republic of Moldova, points out the author. The quality of democracy should be reflected also, in the political life of the county (Roşca, 2017: 328) Objectives of the association agreement of the Republic of Moldova and EU must be on agenda of the political parties of the Republic of Moldova, concludes the author.

Polgár Istvan and Denis Bortiş, in the article *The EU seen as the other in the UK*, defines the term “Euroskepticism” vis-à-vis EU, used for the first time in the newspaper “The Times”, in November 11, 1985. (Polgár & Bortiş, 2017: 333) The idea of supranational structure as EU it might be seen as a threat to national self-determination in UK, point out the authors. Labour migration caused by European integration is another factor of concern for concern for the national ethnics. And, last but not least, it is a disappointment after the post-communist crises of the EU citizens which push them towards national stances. (Polgar&Bortiş, 2017: 334) This negative trend started to manifest in EU after 2008. Euroskepticism can be a reaction of a too much diversity, asserts the author. (Polgár and Bortiş, 2017: 336) The author focuses on the Brexit of 2016 when UK decided to separate from EU. In the author’s opinion, the main reason for UK’s leaving EU is that it wants to conclude preferential economic agreements with states such as “China, Brazil, Japan and India” and the EU’s legislation is not allowing to do so. In the field of immigration, the foreign policy of UK wants to reduce the number of foreign workers also in what concerns the EU citizens, as well people outside EU, points out Istvan Polgár and Denis Bortiş (Polgar and Bortiş, 2017: 345) With the Brexit, UK will come out from “EU umbrella” and its role in international politics might be diminished.

Carlos E. Pacheco Amaral, in the article *Social contract and state sovereignty: crisis, regional autonomy and integration*, asserts that at the foundation of Europe, stay many fondatory myths basing their stories on migration phenomenon (especially Asian migration) (Amaral, 2017: 354). The social contract has as finality the state, considers the author. The social contract considers all citizens as equals and makes distinction between

citizens and foreigners (Amaral, 2017: 361) The actual crisis reappraises the idea of “sovereign state”, being influenced by the reminiscences of “social contract”.

Luminița Șoproni, in the article *Media communication and country image. The case of Romania in EU*, asserts that mass communications happened in the context of a mass-media landscape with a systemic and industrial character. It arises a society formed by cultural industry. The author identifies the functions of the nowadays mass-media “information”, “interpretation”, “instruction”, “diversion”, “bonding” (Șoproni, 2017: 369) The author focuses on “Romania’s image and international media coverage”. Luminița Șoproni underlines the cases reflected by international mass-media when Romanians were criticized for their behaviour abroad, and finally for their mental universe. The lack of action coming from the Romanian authorities makes problematic the brand of the country, abroad. Her opinion is that a great brand is sold, firstly, internally. (Șoproni, 2017: 376)

The present volume present international researchers’ views in the so debated issues of migration and integration, presenting how “our Europe” is evolving further becoming a values based union. The articles gathered in this volume are a very interesting lecture for teachers, researchers and students.

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
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


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


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
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
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
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


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


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
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


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
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
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


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


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


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
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


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
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


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


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
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
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
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


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


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


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


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
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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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


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


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
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


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


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
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


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


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


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
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
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