

# ANALELE UNIVERSITĂȚII DIN ORADEA



## RELAȚII INTERNAȚIONALE ȘI STUDII EUROPENE

TOM VII  
2015



Editura Universității din Oradea

# ANALELE UNIVERSITĂȚII DIN ORADEA

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The review is issued under the aegis of **The University of Oradea**

**ISSN 2067 - 1253**

**E - ISSN 2067 – 3647**

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## **I. European Space and Discussions on International Relations**

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## THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP: AN EURO – AMERICAN DEBATE

*Vasile PUȘCAȘ\**

**Abstract.** *The two societal communities (US and EU) waited, after the end of the Cold War, for a real shift in mentalities, attitudes and socio-economic statuses, including in the Euro-Atlantic space. The fall of ideological walls, political and communicational alike, was facilitated also by the new information and transport technologies, by the aspiration of achieving a strong bond between citizens, not just between politicians. The present study will present arguments for transatlantic cooperation and partnership, so that two entities will understand the new perspective for their own citizens and for the entire world.*

**Keywords:** *atlanticism, europenism, cooperation, US-EU relations*

### **1. Atlanticism vs europenism – a false dilemma**

In the last decade there have been self-proclaiming “atlanticist” voices, and others, proclaiming themselves as “Europenist”. Such a method of identification is not a problem in itself. Opposing one to the other has meant a distortion of the perceived meaning of most European and US citizens after the end of the Cold War, because it seemed strange and immoral, following the end of the danger posed by the Soviet Union, that such a relationship based on cooperation which has proven its benefits for almost half a century would disappear.

We have witnessed, after 1991, several debates from the intellectual and political American environment which supported the necessity of redefining the transatlantic relations, after the end of the Cold War, suggesting that emphasis would shift from the national and international security perspective to that of the management of globalization, especially from an economic point of view. At that moment, we acknowledged the theses of James Burnham, the promoter of the “neo/conservatory revolution”, theses which were appreciated by Reagan and assumed also by the Presidents Bush and Bush Jr. According to these theses the politics of power had to dominate American politics, not the search for peace. Burnham’s doctrine, a combination of ideas taken from Machiavelli and Hobbes, stated that liberty had to be subjected to security interests and the international courts and organizations would represent for the US a “juridical non-sense” (Modoro, 2004: 37). For those belonging to Central Europe, who grew up in the years of communism with the myth of American freedom, such political beliefs were able to at least raise suspicions. Given all this, at the beginning of the ‘90s, I was convinced that Romania resuming, in December 1993, of the Most Favored Nation Status, compromised by the politics and attitude of Nicolae Ceausescu, and the entrance of Romania in the Partnership for Peace

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(January 1994) meant the commitment of the country on a natural path, not just alongside America, but with the Transatlantic Alliance (Pușcaș, 2006:43).

At the same time, within the context of negotiating and signing/ratifying the Maastricht Treaty, there appeared loud voices in the European Union, which proclaimed the so-called exit of Europe from under the American “tutorship”, the reason being that, once the Cold War ended, the transatlantic cooperation should be replaced with competition, even with the risk of having misunderstanding with the US (Sampaio, 2004: 37). The aspiration towards the “EU autonomy”, was presented as an opportunity for internal development, and, at the same time, to overcome the challenges of globalization, whose champion was considered to be the US. Questions were being raised about the reasoning behind being a NATO member, exactly at the same time the Central-South-East European countries desperately wanted the “transatlantic umbrella”. Once again, the citizens of Central and South-East Europe who hoped to “the comeback to Europe”, through the process of NATO and EU accession (these being perceived as entities resulting also from transatlantic cooperation) (Pușcaș, 2001: 34), were face with a strange dilemma. The more complicated the world got, the more the misunderstandings between states and regional areas grew, and companies and people intensified their transnational relations.

Along came 9/11! Another mortal danger showed itself to state and non-state actors who had believed that Paradise was opened to mankind after the end of the Cold War (Kagan, 2003: 10-11). The Americans were aware that the Atlantic and the Pacific did not make the US an “invincible fortress”, and the Europeans told themselves they do not need “another Stalin to hold them together” themselves and as well the Americans alongside them. It seemed that the US and Europe would stop the “Atlanticism” vs. “Euroopenism” debate, and that “Euro-atlantism” would fortify itself, not just to face the threat of international terrorism, but more than that to propose high societal standards to the different manifestations of the accelerated globalization processes (Heisbourg, 2004: 69-70). Within this context, Romania also positioned itself categorically in line with the Euro-Atlantic world, negotiating its accession to NATO and EU (Pușcaș, 2006: 94-95). It is just that this feeling of transatlantic cooperation did not last very long. The dispute over the Iraq war, rekindled in 2003, proved itself deeper than initially perceived. “The warriors of the Cold War” from beyond the Atlantic made known their option for unilateralism and for a Europe formed from the “Old Europe” and the “New Europe”, and some European leaders without consideration said that they would rather “reform” Europe and even the world without the Americans.

The year 2004 was dramatic for the Romanians who had still believed in the myth of American freedom and rejoining Europe, both expressed in what they aspired to find in the Euro-Atlantic world. Determined also by what it saw happening around it, Romania became a NATO member in that year. The entry of the 10 Central-South-East European states in the EU (1<sup>st</sup> of May 2004) placed greater pressure on the political leaders in Bucharest to finish the EU accession negotiation, of course, as a result of the intensification of the will of Romanian citizens (Pușcaș, 2007: 288). The year 2004 however, also brought obstacles which appeared to be impossible to overcome in the process of concluding Romania’s EU accession negotiations, some being directly connected to the previously mentioned Euro-Atlantic dispute. The children of the “warriors of the Cold War”, settled throughout Europe and Romania, representing European egoism, tried everything in their power to stop Romania from finishing the negotiation on the Treaty of EU accession, so that Romanians could focus only on their role as “the defenders of the Carpathians”. This Euro-Atlantic divergence generated even the paradox of the unfolding of a so called “orange

revolution” in Romania (as it was stated, designed for the area East of our country) just as, in Brussels, the accession negotiations to the EU were concluding and the EU Member States were favoring a formula of the Treaty of EU Accession, which was about to be signed. Actually, it was with this paradox that Romania joined a European Union which was beginning to show, ever since 2005, structural and long-term weaknesses, including the cause of the intensification of a political culture impregnated by anti-transatlantic feelings (Pușcaș, 2009: 18).

## **2. Politicians and citizens regarding transatlantic cooperation**

We owe such a “political culture” to the politicians who, on both sides of the Atlantic, proclaimed themselves the victors of the Cold War, the creators of a “New World Order” (Kennedy, 2004: 135), but who, in reality, were regimented by a framework of thought and some even by the civic and political groups of the “warriors of the Cold War”. These sought potential threats, after the so called disappearance of the Soviet/Russian danger, even within their former allies. Eventually, the conflict will be the one which justifies a (regimented) solidarity of threat, sounding slogans about (Atlanticist) patriotism and (European) identity fortresses! We were thus witnessing a reawakening of a XIX<sup>th</sup> century attitude, when William Penn opposed the “Old and corrupt Europe” to the American “Holy Experiment” (Morodo, 2004: 36). Or to that of a fear of European leaders, such as after the two World Wars, from the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, that the “world policeman” is capable to eliminate the “supremacy of Europe”.

However, the two societal communities (US and EU) waited, after the end of the Cold War, for a real shift in mentalities, attitudes and socio-economic statuses, including in the Euro-Atlantic space (Hamilton, 2004: 146). The fall of ideological walls, political and communicational alike, was facilitated also by the new information and transport technologies, by the aspiration of achieving a strong bond between citizens, not just between politicians. American and European business environments intensified their economic, commercial and financial relations, hoping to eliminate all barriers that stopped the access to the benefits of globalization. European intellectuals detached themselves from the anti-American tone of some political leaders from their countries, showing a predilection manifested towards universities and scientific research centers from beyond the Atlantic. Millions of Americans continued to prefer visiting Europe, maintaining the Euro-Atlantic socialization formula of person - to - person. European youth enrolled massively in the American academic and corporate fortresses, proving availability for socio-professional and cultural mobility as well as for the acceleration of the modernization process of the European continent. Even the opinion polls on the perception of the other proved that most American citizens did not join the anti-Europeanism feelings and neither the European citizens believed in the anti-American thought. Thus, instead of obtaining a detachment of the US and EU from their belonging to Transatlanticism, the self-proclaimed “Atlanticist” and “Europeanist” dividers obtained their own citizens’ disapproval towards their lack of vision and dedication for a leadership directed at the wellbeing of Euro-Atlantic community and a new international system appropriate for the new times.

The Romanian reader might be surprised to find out that in the American press of the end of the XVIII<sup>th</sup> century were inserted some articles about the peasant revolt led by Horea, Cloșca and Crișan (Edroiu, Pușcaș, 1983/1984). The explanation consisted in the justification of the founding American revolution – The New American experiment – through the European conservative realities (the Old Regime), but also the hope of a new European regime. Or maybe George Pomut, who had left his birthplace because the old

regime proved itself stronger in Central Europe and after the revolutionary movements from the middle of the XIX<sup>th</sup> century, was reaching the rank of general during the American Civil War, and after that was the representative of the US to Sankt Petersburg. Or perhaps the Bucharest leaders, who measured themselves along the US, at the beginning of the XX<sup>th</sup> century, in regards to oil exploitation. And nobody, I believe, still contests the fact that the Romanian self-determination movement and the conclusion of the birth process of the Romanian national state, was due also to the political impulses coming from the American continent, belonging to President W. Wilson (Pușcaș, 1998: 4). And the desire of freedom of most Romanians, during communism, had a say: “The Americans are coming!”. What is more, after 1989, the hope of Romanian citizens to join the EU and NATO was massively connected to the attitude of the US.

As is normal, within the dynamic of the evolution of a relationship there are continuities and discontinuities. Referring to the case of the US-Romanian relation, we can recall the rupture caused by the Second World War, prolonged in the post-war period as well. Or the situation of the Most Favored Nation Status (1975-1988), or of the syncope generated by the perceptions of the changes in Romania (1990-1993) (Pușcaș, 2015: 153-158). Just as well, the dialect of the dynamicity of the transatlantic relation had stages of increased or decreased intensity, supported by rational decisions or others contextual-emotional ones. Some political leaders in the US, as well as some in the EU believed, following the end of the Cold War, that they are entitled to the world’s gratitude for the way in which they handled the processes of internal developments and, especially, those of international relations. Owing to this, they expected to be accepted as regional and global leaders and, of course, associated to this wish political or state structures with which they argued their individual desire to prolong their personal or organizational leadership. Such idiosyncrasies cannot, however, justify sacrificing the transatlantic relations which should have affirmed, right after the end of the Cold War, new forms and enhanced objectives of a Euro-Atlantic cooperation, be they competitive.

### **3. The necessity of a transatlantic partnership**

The American professor Daniel Hamilton mobilized renowned American intellectuals so that, together with colleagues from the EU, they could prove that the US needed a Europe which prospered and was open to exchanges of goods, capital, services and ideas; that the US would benefit more if the EU were an area of peace, strongly integrated, without disruptions and nationalistic feelings; that the US should want to promote a long-lasting cooperation with Europe in the form of a consistent and solid partnership, which would sustain the processes of internal developments within the two transatlantic areas, as well as an efficient, globally modernizing leadership (Hamilton, 2004, Hamilton, Quinlan, 2010, Hamilton, 2011). In other words, the Euro-Atlantic relations have a strategic nature for the Americans and Europeans, and the conditions of each party should not be seen as obstacles in the way of intensifying the previously mentioned partnership, but a reason to responsibly negotiate the promotion of mutually high standards at a global level. Such a relationship could evolve towards a true Euro-Atlantic integration based on the North Atlantic Treaty as well as on the future (we hope) Transatlantic Partnership Agreement for Commerce and Investments (which is being negotiated presently), this integration being continued with the objective of a partnership for multilateral management of global interdependencies, so that the Kantian concept of achieving world peace and a long-lasting solidarity of those aspiring to the political, economic, social and cultural development of the world would impose itself as much as possible.

To those who say such opinions are rather idealist wishes, I reply that I am aware of the increased optimism of such projects but, at the same time, I believe in the possibility of their attainment. What do I base my assessment on? First of all, on the fact which I will now argue, that contrary to the opposing ideas to the intensification of Euro-Atlantic relations, expressed especially through some political environments in the US and EU, in the past two decades the substance of the “bilateral” economic and social data shows an ascending path, integrative even, of the Euro-Atlantic relations. The great economic crisis of the present century has proven how important the cooperation of the transatlantic market measures can be.

#### **4. A few arguments**

The 2008-2009 recession was particularly severe and had many lessons and opportunities for the economic ties between the US and the EU. What some authors named “Eurmerica” has shown itself not just as a strongly interdependent market, but as well the largest and most influential economic entity in the world (Hamilton, Quinlan, 2010: 15). To the “surprise” of many observers of the global economic processes, it was noted that the Euro-Atlantic economy was not only the largest, but the most strongly integrated one, with numerous connection in the global market. It was also observed that it was not just the commercial ties which defined the interactions between the two parties on either side of the Atlantic, but also massive investments. The latter became the most dynamic forces of the integration of the transatlantic market. Taking as a reference the data before the outbreak of the Great Economic Crisis, of the quotas of an economic and normal market interaction, we can see that exactly in the decades when some politicians tried to tear the transatlantic community apart, to diminish the intensity and the significance of the political and even military ties, the economic and social dimension of the European and American ties had the greatest success (Hamilton, Quinlan, 2010: 19-31):

1) American companies affiliated in the EU and European companies affiliated in the US had, in 2007 as compared to 2000, an income increased by 21%, contributing substantially to the economic growth of the US and the EU (from the European companies affiliated in the US, the most prosperous ones were those in England, Germany and France);

2) Almost 63% of the assets of American corporations placed abroad, in 2007, were located in Europe (especially in England, the Netherlands, Germany, but also Poland and Hungary). The assets of European companies from the US (2007) totaled over 9 trillion USD (especially from England, Switzerland, France, Germany);

3) American companies affiliated in Europe had employed, in 2007, over 4.2 million workers (most in England, Germany, France), approximately the same number being employed by the European companies affiliated in the US (the biggest European employers being in England, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland). It is estimated that, totaling the workforce directly employed and that indirectly employed by the American and European companies, the transatlantic employees numbered in at approximately 12-14 million in the Euro-Atlantic area, in 2007;

4) In 2007, the American corporations invested in research and development from the EU almost 23 billion USD (mostly in England, Germany, France, Sweden), meaning 66% from the total investments abroad in the respective field. And 78% from the total investments abroad in the US, in research and development, came from European leaders of the market who proved they appreciated American universities and research centers;

5) The profit of the companies involved in the transatlantic economic interaction saw a real boom between 2002-2008. From a global perspective, Europe remained the

most profitable region in the world for American corporations, and the earnings of European firms affiliated in the US grew by 19% in 2008;

6) The area of financial and non-financial services was among the most interconnected ones in our reference time period. Five of the top 10 markets of American global exports were in Europe (2007), among the first being England, Germany, Ireland, France, Switzerland, the American export in Europe nearly doubling between 1998 and 2008. And the American imports of services from Europe doubled in the same decade, from a regional point of view Europe holding 43% of the total US service exports and 44% of the total US imports (2008).

Among the factors that explain this successful evolution of the economic and social transatlantic interaction, Hamilton and Quinlan (2010) mention the fact that the EU continued to be a favored destination of the American corporations thanks to the attractive attributes that it presents to foreign investors; to these were added, in the first decade of this century, the successful policy of EU enlargement especially towards Central-East European countries; last but not least, the characteristics of the EU Single Market and the Euro facilitated a stronger interconnectedness of the US and EU markets.

As was shown, some EU Member States are more active and more present in the flux of economic transatlantic relations, especially the more developed ones. This proves that certain cities, regions, European states profit more from the Euro-Atlantic interaction, but also that the European regional development policies, the economic and social cohesion policies are not yet reaching the expected results by some states and European institutions, the convergence and competitiveness falling in the same category. This indicates the necessity of some corrections of European policies as well as Member State policies. And certainly the more the EU economy will interact more intensively in the world, the more massive restructuring in its economic and market policies will be imposed. And the transatlantic relations are not only a signal of the direction of these restructurings, but also a support for the present and the future. What is more, I believe the two entities – US and EU – have the duty to overcome the “inheritance” of the Cold War, generating an innovative and inspiring partnership for the restructuring of the international system and for new global standards.

And even in the US there are differences of involvement and appreciation of the importance of economic transatlantic relations, but these can be explained, mostly through the diversity of options of the American states, micro-regions, cities and local communities towards the offerings of certain areas in the world (i.e. Pacific area). We do have to admit the fact that the American economy is more advanced than the European one in regard to being anchored in global affairs. This situation would be a good lesson for the need of the EU to understand “Europenisation” not just as a set of internal interactions but also for a more profound approach to the interdependencies of globalization. The EU has the capacity to become a focus point of the capital networks, as well as one of free exchanges of ideas, persons, goods, services, energy, innovations and knowledge in a more tightly interconnected world. The more interconnected the EU, the more its competitiveness will grow, as it is proven by the unfolding of the Euro-Atlantic relations.

### **5. The opportunities presented by the transatlantic partnership**

In this regard, the EU and the US have a huge potential to build a true Transatlantic Market which would make a great difference towards the transatlantic relations of the Cold War period. In addition to this would be a solid and comprehensive Euro-Atlantic partnership, it might be said that the two important entities would bring an

innovative contribution, one which would promote the global development in the XXI<sup>st</sup> century. Such a conduit of the two major actors of the contemporary international system would not be against any current Power or one in development, would not be a threat to existing regional organizations or future ones. On the contrary, it would be a good example of an approach to global interdependencies not from a point of view of the classical balance of power or of competition for supremacy, but one of cooperation and responsible construction of a new type of international relations, through initiating relations and interactions in the global society which would be favorable to the citizens as well. According to D. Hamilton's estimations, such a transatlantic relation would extend its positive effects over the living standards of the citizens as well: it would equal the possibility that to each European and American a yearly extra salary would be awarded during the employment period (Hamilton, 2011: 195).

The positioning of the US and the EU in the negotiations regarding a Transatlantic Partnership for Trade and Investments will show the degree in which the two entities understand to build a new perspective for their own citizens and for the entire world. Personally, I associate myself with those who consider that History offers to the current American and European political leaders a great opportunity to prove their dimension and worth. It is also History which will evaluate them not just through their abilities to face the recent global economic crisis, but also through the vision and determination of leading their countries and peoples towards the future. We hope that the near future history will also note the accomplishment of a Transatlantic/Euro-Atlantic partnership.

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# THE ROLE OF CONCEPTUAL MAPS IN THE ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN NEGOTIATIONS

*Melania-Gabriela CIOT\**

**Abstract:** *The importance of decision-making has increased significantly in recent years in several specialty areas. The psychological approach of this process provides anchors to the understanding and explanation of its complexity and within other disciplines as well, especially in international relations theory. The present article approaches the conceptual maps, as important predictive elements which can be used by the analysts in the international relations. It give as examples three maps elaborated on a study case from European negotiations, namely Romania's accession negotiations.*

**Keywords:** *cognitive approach, decision-making, idiosyncrasies, accession negotiations*

## 1. Introduction

Knowledge is at the heart of international relations (Young and Schafer, 1998: 63) and emphasizes the importance of concepts such as power and interest. But despite the importance, the methodologies of systematic psychological analysis of knowledge have only recently been developed. In research conducted by the authors mentioned above, they attempted to identify the role that knowledge plays in international politics, the challenges raised by the need to assess knowledge and how technology supports the use of these challenges. The essence of their study focuses on operational code analysis, conceptual maps, the theory of the image and conceptual theory (Young and Schafer, 1998: 64). Each area is examined, taking into account the theoretical developments, methodological approaches and the correspondence of predictions with the observed behaviour. The two researchers advocate for understanding the role of knowledge in international phenomena.

Addressing the individual level of the decision-making process, Jackson and Sorensen (2007) draw attention to the influences and constraints that they need to cope with, suggesting different modes of analysis. Quoting Holsti (2004), the authors state that among the cognitive constraints of rationality are also included limitations on the ability of the individual to receive, process and assimilate information about a situation, the inability to identify the entire set of alternative policies and insufficient knowledge connected to the consequences of each option (Holsti, 2004: 27). Basically, these limitations are related to how individuals perceive and process information. The aforementioned authors resort to the research results of George (1980), according to which each individual acquires during his development, a set of beliefs and personal constructs about the physical and social environment (George, 1980: 57). These beliefs provide for the individual a relatively consistent way to organize and make sense of what the world

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would otherwise be—a series of signals and clues collected from the environment. Basically, these beliefs and constructs simplify and structure the outside world.

## 2. Cognitive Approach

Saikaly (2009) believes that cognitive approaches take into account the definition of the situation by the leaders, how they perceive the outside world and how they receive and transmit information, all affecting the decision that they will make (Saikaly, 2009: 212). Leaders can have deeply rooted beliefs, and lives full of experiences that influence how they perceive the outside world (Mowle, 2003: 562). Rosati (2000) criticizes the rational actor model and argues that states are made up of individuals who develop foreign policy. Individuals are those who act, not the states, what matters is human knowledge and the psychological characteristics of decision-makers, with a profound impact on policy outcomes (Rosati, 2000: 53). He suggests several ways in which human cognition (addressed as the process of acquisition of knowledge through the use of reasoning, intuition and perception) and the beliefs of policy-makers matter.

Jackson and Sorensen (2007) have taken the methods mentioned above, considering them as a base from which others can develop (Jackson and Sorensen, 2007: 235):

(1) by the content of policy-makers' beliefs—the study by Nathan Leite is illustrative (1951); he identified the belief system of the Soviet communist elite, synthesized in an operational code, consisting of philosophical beliefs by which the "diagnosis of a situation" is realised, and of instrumental beliefs, contributing to the framing of a course of action. Another interesting study is that of Stephen Twing (1998), which shows how American myths and cultural traditions helped to structure a worldview and a decision-making style throughout the Cold War. Eagly and Chaiken (1993) have studied the cognitive complexity in the international decision-making process, following the influence of beliefs about foreign policy in relation to specific situations;

(2) by organizing and structuring policy-makers' beliefs—the belief system and images of the decision-makers may vary, some belief systems are coherent and comprehensive, while others are fragmented and vague. This latter type is prone to uncommitted thinking, where decision-makers face uncertainty and are located at the intersection of information channels, tending to adopt, at different times, different patterns of beliefs for the same decision problem;

(3) by common patterns of perception (and misperceptions)—there are many ways in which patterns of perception can lead to different visions, one of which is creating stereotypical images of the opponents. Rosati (2000: 54) showed how, during the Cold War, John Foster Dulles rejected new information about Soviet behaviour, which was unrelated to the negative image that he had of the Soviets. Confusing desires with reality (wishful thinking) is another source of bias. During the Vietnam War, American policy-makers were convinced that the United States could not lose the war, and this imposed the path of increasing involvement in Southeast Asia;

(4) by cognitive rigidity (and flexibility) for change and learning—the deeply-rooted images and beliefs tend to resist change. Analyzing beliefs about Kissinger's foreign policy, Harvey Starr has demonstrated a considerable stability of his convictions content before, during and after holding the official position. When core beliefs change, this occurs as a result of strong shocks and setbacks. Mikhail Gorbachev's new way of thinking emerged in a period of severe Soviet economic and political crisis, the image of American leaders about Japan changed dramatically after the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the tragedy of the Vietnam War changed the American elites' image of the role of the US in the world.

In the study he made based on Kingdon's multiple stream model, Saikaly (2009) considered three important elements of the cognitive approach: beliefs, perceptions and contextual interactions (Saikaly, 2009: 138). Some scholars tend to understand the content of beliefs as operational codes, which provide a perspective image of the outside world (Walker, 1995: 697; Marfleet, 2000: 546). Other researchers are trying to understand the content of beliefs as a conceptual map that provides a small set of representations for a specific situation (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993: 78), or are trying to address beliefs as tools for knowledge or an understanding of the social and psychological functions of the action (Jervis, 2006: 642). In addition, some scholars organize beliefs in schemes that provide mental images, shortcuts and simplifications about other players (Fiske, Shelley and Taylor, 1991: 16) or personal meanings of social and historical events (Duncan, 2005: 965).

### **3. Cognitive MAPS**

Axelrod (1976) brings conceptual maps to the attention of the foreign policy decision-making process, with a different meaning from the traditional, psychological one (Axelrod, 1976). A cognitive map (conceptual) is a graphical deployment of the system of beliefs, using figures or numbers (Maoz, 1990: 116). In other words, cognitive maps are diagrams of individual decisions and causal assertions. The arrows represent causal directions that connect points within the cognitive maps. Maoz (1990: 117) provides the example of Kissinger's conceptual map, with its two nodes: "the Soviet concept of the balance of powers" and "foreign policy leadership". Causal arrows go from the first to the second node. The value of this conceptual map is in influencing Kissinger's belief system on the Soviet Union and the overview it offers on the structure of the decision. Conceptual maps support decision theory by exposing the nexus between what the decision-maker states as a choice and the results it expects from these choices.

Conceptual maps are applicable in the following situations: (1) decisions that are vital to national security, such as those involving situations of war, (2) decisions that are made at the highest level by leaders unconstrained by bureaucracy, (3) long-term policy planning, with a high degree of uncertainty, (4) decisions made in ambiguous or uncertain situations, resulting from inadequate information, and (5) where decision-makers are constrained by stress (Holsti, 1976: 30).

Conceptual maps enable a determining of the most satisfactory strategy or other strategic decisions by the decision-makers. The greatest benefit provided by this technique is a "glance" into the structure of beliefs of the participants involved in making a decision.

Valuable research by Findlay and Thagard (2011) has identified emotional change, using a new method of graphic representation, the cognitive-affective map to analyze emotional changes occurring during the negotiations in 1978 at Camp David, which led to an agreement between Egypt and Israel. The two authors have used this technique to model the mental states of the two negotiators Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin, based on details provided by the memoirs of Jimmy Carter. This account has enabled the measurement of the emotional states of the Israeli and Egyptian leaders, generating maps that showed how Sadat's and Begin's attitudes changed during deliberations, eventually leading to a settlement of the major conflict. This method for facilitating the recognition and reconciliation of emotional differences between the disputants can contribute to peaceful agreements. Selecting the concepts which drew the cognitive-affective maps have followed this method:


1. Identifying the main concepts, beliefs, goals and emotions of the person who will be analyzed;

2. Identifying these elements as emotionally positive or negative and representing them through ovals or hexagons. The ovals are positive emotional elements and the hexagons negative ones. The rectangles are neutral elements or those having positive and negative aspects;

3. Identifying the relationships between elements that are complementary, mutually supportive (thicker lines) or conflicting and incompatible (dashed lines);

4. Introducing the resulting cognitive-affective map to others, to see if they understand the presentation of the situation.

The figure below (1) renders these conventions by graphic representation:



**Fig. 1:** Conventions for the cognitive-affective map (after Findlay and Thagard, 2011: 5)

In the international relations field of study, the prospective role of cognitive-affective maps started to gain more territory, because it is important to know how the decision-makers of foreign policy integrate the information into valence, relevance, reliability and redundancy parameters. To answer to this concerns, researchers have introduced the concept of *implicit theory of international relations* (ITIR). This represents knowledge stored and beliefs held by any decision-maker regarding international events. The basis of this knowledge incorporates the perceived relations existing between concepts which describe the international arena. Also, the ITIR concept relates to similar conceptualizations of the international *system of beliefs* (Taber, 1992: 888), *operational codes* (Allison, 1971: 116), *images* (Hermann et al., 1997: 403) and *conceptual maps* (Young, 1996: 129). Basically, the researchers refer to ITIR as a critical source for defining the relevance of the new information and its relation to other elements included in the process. Moreover, beliefs about the source of information and the compatibility of its valence with previously acquired knowledge can be translated into the trust of the decision-maker.

Nowadays, the professionals in international relations, especially on the international negotiations, on crises and conflict management have to train their skills in order to prospect the course of the future actions.

The analysis of decision-making process in international relations, at individual level have to focus on the personal characteristics, as well as on the idiosyncrasies that appear on the decidents. The identification of cognitive idiosyncrasies of the decident will represent important acquisitions for the elaboration of the conceptual/cognitive-affective maps.

The object of the present study case and exemplification is the process of Romania's accession to the European Union (2000-2004), from the perspective of the analysis of the psychological factors which intervened in decision-making at the individual level. It is just a part from a complex research that analyzed the decision-making process at individual level, focusing mainly on the idiosyncrasies that appeared at individual decident level. This paper

brings a new perspective by analyzing the elements of subjectivity which influenced the decision-makers involved, especially the conceptual/cognitive-affective maps. The decision-maker analyzed is Romania's chief negotiator of Romania's accession to the EU, Minister Vasile Pușcaș. Through discourse analysis (political and public speeches, media representations and interviews conducted between 2000-2004), the complex research identified the idiosyncrasies that influenced the decision-making. For this article we will focus only on the conceptual/cognitive-affective maps.

The understanding of the context of the events has a major role for the elaboration of the conceptual/cognitive-affective maps, and this is the reason for which in the following sub-chapter we will briefly present the Romania's accession negotiations.

### **1.1. Romania's accession negotiations process**

The major political decision of Romania's accession to the European Union was taken by the European Council of 16-17 December 2004 and the Treaty of Accession to the European Union was held the following year, in April 2005. Since 1 January 2007 Romania has been a member of the European Union according to the projection of the Accession Treaty.

The European negotiation process remains "still today the foundation of Schuman's scheme" (Pușcaș, 2007: 24). The tendency of the European Union to impose itself in the contemporary international system, to meet the challenges of globalization, and the end of the Cold War, has provoked theoretical debates in theory and impressive casuistry (Pușcaș, 2007: 25).

The subject of the negotiations to the European Union is currently in the public consciousness due to the EU's enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe (Pușcaș, 2007: 26). For the Member States, the accession negotiations had a different shape from others on the international scene, and for countries aspiring to membership in the European Union, they were required to participate in the *process of building trust between the negotiating parties, so that to create a mutual perception about how each candidate will be able to face the challenges of accession*. (Inotai, 2007)

Analysis of the accession process should include contextual elements related to stakeholders, the effect of negotiation guidelines, the negotiating strategies and tactics of the EU/Member States, the impact of the accession criteria on the candidate's internal training, the internal training evaluation and negotiation chapters and the comparative picture of the results obtained by other countries in negotiating accession (Goriță, 2008: 13):

- a high degree of institutionalization (formal and informal rules' framework in which behaviour patterns have evolved);
- the permanent, continuous and interconnected degree of negotiations (the result of a negotiation results in a new negotiation situation, while the actors involved continue to interact);
- the distinctive character and role of the players involved in negotiation;
- the great importance of informal negotiations in close connection with formal negotiations;
- the connections between sectors and levels and between internal and external negotiations.

In the European Union negotiations are closely connected to the preferences and interests of the state and nonstate actors, to the enforcement of institutionalized rules and the "special moments" of the political and economic development of the EU in the direction of deepening integration and enlargement (Goriță, 2008: 34).

An Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) is established on behalf of the European Union for each candidate country, so negotiations are bilateral between each candidate and the Member States in a multilateral framework (Puşcaş 2007: 27). Formal negotiating sessions are held at the IGC, but the most significant take place between the Chief Negotiator and the Member States' representatives, but with other officials as well, even from other candidate countries (Puşcaş, 2007: 27). The exchange of *Position Papers* is realized between the working groups of the Council of Ministers of the European Union and the negotiating team of the candidate state; the European Commission prepares a draft of the common positions for the Council in response to the candidate state's position papers, and also technical documents about the implications of the negotiating positions (Puşcaş, 2007: 28). A significant part of the informal negotiations and arrangements for the implementation of the *acquis communautaire* is carried out with the Commission.

The structures and institutions involved on behalf of the candidate countries are different (Puşcaş, 2007: 28), but they all have a Chief Negotiator; what differs is his position related to government structures. The coordinating role of the Chief Negotiator is essential, and his ability to influence is visible in the final phase of the negotiations and the drafting of the Accession Treaty (Puşcaş, 2007: 28). He works closely with line ministries, involved in working groups on the chapters of the *acquis*.

We emphasize that the Chief Negotiator has the power to take the appropriate data for the preparation for accession and to present them in suitable positions to the momentary goals of the future candidate state. This leads negotiations according to set strategy and tactics, seeking the most appropriate formulas to harmonize the objectives and specific assertion of the national interest stage. He must deal with the tendencies of using the bargaining power of the other party (Puşcaş 2007: 31). It must be noted that, for each wave of accession, the criteria are being reformulated according to the stage of evolution of the *acquis*, European policy development and the European and international context (Puşcaş, 2007: 28).

The accession negotiation steps are: screening, preparing position papers, negotiation based on the position papers, the Accession Treaty, ratification of the Accession Treaty (Goriţă, 2008: 35-36). The principles and procedures of the accession negotiation take into account the objectives of the accession negotiations process and the technical characteristics of European negotiations (Goriţă, 2008: 35-36).

The substance of the accession negotiations is the *acquis*, divided into chapters: 31 for the fifth wave of enlargement and 35 for ongoing accession negotiations, with different degrees of difficulty, and the candidate countries related to them according to the internal stage of preparation (Puşcaş, 2007: 29).


The accession negotiation is based on a win-win formula and is characterized by the fact that: 1) it is a process of discovery, both parties informing each other about what they want, what they intend and what they offer, 2) it is a strategic interaction—parties seek to influence each other and to adapt their behaviour to get the best results, 3) it is an exchange process in which each side tries to read the behaviour of the other (Puşcaş, 2007: 31).

The accession negotiations are conducted through the Accession Conferences at two levels: ministers/heads of delegations and chief negotiators/deputy chiefs of delegations. According to procedure, during a presidency of the EU Council, at least one meeting is held at the ministerial level and one at the level of the deputy chiefs of delegations, with the possibility that the frequency of these meetings can be adapted according to need. The Accession Conferences are held separately with each of the candidates (Friis and Jarosz, 2000: 51).

The completion of Romania's negotiation process in December 2004 led to the possibility of Romania becoming an EU member on 1 January 2007, and also to the emergence of solutions of development, and economic and social management. By the accession negotiations, in addition to the Treaty of Accession, Romania also achieved 50 transitional periods and derogations (most of all former candidate countries)

### 1.2. Conceptual/cognitive-affective map of Romania's positions during accession negotiations

The accession negotiation process involves decision-making at the highest level. For the elaboration of the conceptual/cognitive-affective maps we used emotional elements, specific cultural factors, presented in the political discourse of Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pușcaș. We performed three cognitive-affective maps: first, for the moment the Chief Negotiator took office, second, for the period of exercising the mandate (2001-2004) and the third, for the moment of finalizing the mandate, with further prospects to be continued. It is interesting to follow the graphical layout of Romania's position, of the Chief Negotiator and the European Council, the meaning of these key elements, being the eloquent expression of the effort made by the National Delegation for Accession, coordinated by the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pușcaș. As mentioned previously, the first conceptual map renders the period prior to the taking of office, respectively the moment when Bucharest sent the official request of formal accession to the European Union, in 1995, up to the Chief Negotiator taking office in 2000, namely Professor Vasile Pușcaș:



**Fig. 2:** Cognitive-affective map before taking office by the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pușcaș




Fig. 3: Cognitive-affective map during the mandate of the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pușcaș (2001-2004)




Fig. 4: Cognitive-affective map at the end of term of the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pușcaș (2004)

In all three cognitive-affective maps, the emotional elements were included using a thicker line. The consideration of these factors is a typically Romanian mental feature and the previous schemes highlight the role that they played in the process of negotiating Romania's accession to the EU. The most complex of the three maps is the second, where the organized, rational and focused-on-delivering-results intervention of the Chief Negotiator, Vasile Pușcaș is visible. We mention that achieving these conceptual maps is an innovative exercise, based on psychological knowledge, and, at the same time, a pioneering one, which is meant to pave the way for improvements, in relation to the case analyzed in this research, but also in other cases to be studied by other researchers.

#### 4. Conclusion

The cognitive approach to the foreign policy decision-making process opens a new perspective. Considering personal elements such as the personality traits of the decision-maker, his belief system, images, stereotypes, prejudices, values, but also socio-emotional elements, related to the environment in which he was reared and educated, influence decision-making and explain the decisions which cannot be analyzed through the rational actor model and its alternatives. It adds the explanation of the influence of irrational beliefs, creating a link with the idiosyncrasies involved in the decision-making process. Knowledge of these elements contributes to an increase of the predictive power of decisions to be made.

The individual level of the foreign policy decision-making process is the "beneficiary" of this innovative approach. Although unaddressed so far in the Romanian literature, the current trends in this area support its consideration along with other "established" models of analysis.

As we have seen, the cognitive approach provides great explanatory and predictive power in the field of foreign policy. Although many things still need to be clarified regarding the decision-making process, the field of international relations has become extremely sensitive to the study of the role of beliefs and cognitive processes of decision-makers, but also to how these influence the worldview and the choice of alternatives within the decision-making process. This approach helps us to better understand current political dynamics (Rosati, 1987: 170).

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## IS THE EUROPEAN UNIFICATION PROCESS STILL VIABLE?

*István POLGÁR\**,  
*Alin Ionuț Cornel MOISE\*\**

**Abstract:** *The European Union had a decisively contribution in develop peace in Europe over the previous six decades. The accelerated process of European integration has produced increased levels of opposition, which have been more prominent since the early 1990s. Opposition has taken various forms and at times halted or delayed attempts to enhance European political unity. Every member state from the EU also faces Euroscepticism from both the citizens and the political parties especially during difficult periods like the Euro crisis in 2008 due to the global market meltdown and recently the migrant crisis caused by the civil war in Syria and the EU-Russia relation, but Euroscepticism started way before this with the political figures who were scared for the national supremacy over the supranational one of the EU.*

**Keywords:** *integration, process, European Union, treaty*

The theory about the process of European integration began with the field of international relations. With the integration process in the 1980s and 1990s, the students of international relations have begun to approach the study of the process of European Union, learning to use more general theoretical approaches (Pollack, 2001: 221-222).

The 40% of the world's trade in goods are represented by the EU, whose population is 8% relative to the world population. Still today there are states that want to become a member of the EU, this tells us that the 59 years of the EU process still count even today, leaving aside the problems that was encountered over time.

But his fundamental question regarding a life in a continent where the security and safety will be promoted, still exist even today. One of the many reasons why to do so, is related to the cumulative experience, which EU recorded in the past of this process (Dedman, 2010: 1).

The unifying of the European Union has been and will be a very ample and a political process desirable that over the years was conducted continuously on this continent called Europe. In the process of unifying the countries that joined and who are willing to join the EC and the EU in the future are part of this process. European communities have been very welcoming with the new states, the evidence of formal

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invitation made in the '70s when addressing them to cooperate and even to join the EC, to states that wanted this.

Expansions in 2004, 2007 and 2013 had the same common idea, and to recover the former communist countries that have been caught by the communist regime for almost 5 decades in the central and eastern part of the continent. From here we see that (Bărbulescu, 2015: 261): "EU enlargement and went hand in hand with European unification in general".

All the enlargement and expansion of the EU to be possible also need feedback from each state who wanted to join in this union, here we mention the obligations which they had, to assume, that they will respect the entire period in which will be a member, but not least, the union must be careful, lest they climb too many states in his "boat", and in time, to wake up that no longer has the necessary capacity and to be jeopardized, the whole process which held so far.

The decision to collect as many countries possible under the same roof and the same vision, called the European Union, after the drama of the two world wars, we can say that this decision may enter among the most important decisions taken from these dramas because only when States are united can guarantee the continuity of welfare, freedom and peace on this continent and beyond (Bărbulescu, 2015: 260).

This has not been shown to us only by the two wars and even in Yugoslavia scenario, which confirmed stronger the need for unity to defend peace (Bărbulescu, 2015: 262). "In Europe did not exist more Europe" (Bărbulescu, 2015: 260).

Many leaders over the years have tried to reunite Europe, but only difference is that now the European Union has been unified, and between the two there is a difference in terminology:

"-unification if we want to put emphasis on voluntary consensual;

-reunification if emphasize the fact that, historically, were united European territories, only by force" (Bărbulescu, 2015: 262).

In two treated very well known, are explained for us, the legal steps necessary for accession to the union and the enlargement process, namely in the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of Amsterdam. The unification process of Europe had two major steps along the commencement of his: between 1972 and 1989 (the unification of Western democracy) and the second being after 1989 (a dream gone but not forgotten, namely the unification of East and West now may be possible due to the disintegration of the Soviet empire) (Bărbulescu, 2015: 263-264).

The second phase took place in three phases: the first being the accession of 10 countries, continuing with the 2nd in 2007 and the last took place in 2013. All steps after 1989 took into account the former communist countries and the former this year aimed the states that had (Bărbulescu, 2015: 264): "a common- denominator similarity of economic systems".

The accession of the countries that were under communist domination was an opportunity for both, them and the European Union, and besides this opportunity is a very big challenge for the Union (Bărbulescu, 2015: 263-264).

The expansion, constituting an opportunity and besides this and a necessity from politically point of view was established in December 1995 European Council in Madrid, which was supposed to ensure (Bărbulescu, 2015: 265): "stability and security of the continent".

With this expansion was seen, at the same time, along peace that was wished on the continent, even the growth of economy, unification, the quality life of its citizens, perpetuating democracy. Through this, the role of the European Union as a global actor will be stronger than it was before (Bărbulescu, 2015: 265).

One of the challenges of Europe was a huge gap between Europe Old and New Europe, because in the first place the population of the states which joined the EU from Central and Eastern Europe represent only 29% of the EU and their surface only 33% of the surface on which stretched European Union, and also has a very low GDP (Bărbulescu, 2015: 284).

When talking about unification of the European Union enters into account that the negotiations should not affect in any way the effectiveness. Matters that could affect the EU due to its enlargement would be the number of commissioners, seats in the European Parliament which had to be rescheduled, weighting of votes and the presidency of the Council and improving the European Court of Justice.

Another problem to be solved was that of the official languages of the European Union at the end of 2007 reached 23 languages, hence the cultural diversity for the Union. A limitation to one language or two could not be possible due the national pride of the states. This adherence adds extra issues for the institutions and had to be made and a balance between large and small states (Bărbulescu, 2015: 288-291).

The Migration has affected all countries in the European Union, due to the number of legal and illegal immigrants and even of those who seek asylum. This phenomenon has created an environment conducive to human trafficking and smuggling. The European Union was interested in supporting the legal migration to solve the economic and demographic problems they face (Bărbulescu, 2015: 314). Migration nowadays becoming a political challenge with a high degree on the social security of the European Union and that all Member States must learn how to manage its flow (Moarcăș Costea, 2011: 54).

The countries who apply for membership in European Union and potential candidates in the next period are: Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. All Together if it adheres supplements the European Union with a population of 95 million people to 508 million that the 28 EU member countries they have and an area of 974 000 km<sup>2</sup> to the existing 4.29 million. This would favor both, the EU and the countries that join, but for this to happen, the countries must comply with the conditions imposed upon them by accession (Uniunea Europeană, 2015: 6-7).

### **Rome, Single European Act, Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice**

In the year 1957 was establish the EEC in the Rome Treaty, which it was set with no time limit like NATO whose treaty was for a period of 20 years after they extended the treaty. In the EEC the members who want to leave, they don't have any procedures to sustain their will because in the Rome Treaty didn't appear such a procedure. We can mention hear the Greenland which was an exception because they obtain their independence from the Denmark and whit this independence they leave the EEC.

The both treaties from 1951 and 1957 brought us a framework which regulates the members and the institutions rights, obligations and powers and the treaties created even a new legal system. After organizations were integrated and established begin a tendency that was inevitable because the ECSC 1951 led to more integration that occurs like a domino.

The both treaties of Paris and of Rome they didn't speak about a federation because this term is non-existent (Dedman, 2010: 7-11). In the period of time between 1947 and 1957, the wartime agenda of Resistance was an agenda that had relevance and an enduring logic (Dedman, 2010: 16).

The 6 states so called the "Little Europe" held in June 1955 the Messina Talks, after a period of intense negotiations and the disappearance of the European Defence Community which was an obstacle for this negotiation (Dedman, 2010: 80-81).

The six "Little Europe" states established the European Economic Community which entered in force in 1958. The most difficult negotiations for the Common Market was in the period between 1958 and 1960, but after this period the tariffs were cut from the 30% until they were abolished. What now we call European Parliament and Court of Justice in the past Euratom, ECSC and EEC was shared this Assembly in common.

These communities become one community which had a common suite of institutions since 1967 when the Council of Ministers and Commission appeared, like other's institutions which was shared in common by the communities. Because of the taxes which were abolished from the trade between them and the food production which were under control we can say that the period from 1960 was a good period for EU countries when we talk about economy and the food production.

After this period the number six becomes nine, and the agreement in this point has become more difficult in the Council of Ministers due to the unanimity that is needed after the Compromise from Luxembourg. EEC faces the period of financial turbulence and international monetary crisis, and inspired the EEC in their decision making (Dedman, 2010: 82-108).

The tangible successes of the European Union process began appearing in 1985 with the Single European Act by which held the highest revision of the Treaty of Rome. After periods of stagnation it was launched an integration in an accelerated way.

The EU wanted the end of the 1992 to be the year when common market will be created in the union. This process was called Europe 1992, and from this moment we started to talk about politics and not only about economy. With this process EU started eroding the sovereignty, which began to be seen increasingly better (Goldstein, Pevehouse, 2008: 506-507). "From here it began to "empty of content" the state from the bottom up but even from the top down and postponing difficult issues of political and military integration" (Goldstein, Pevehouse, 2008: 507).

The Single European Act had to rescue the benefits from whereby the EU would profit from the single market. And the qualified majority voting was extended for all agreements (Dedman, 2010: 109-114). "The European Political Community also acquired a "presidency" that rotates every 6 months and a Brussels based permanent secretariat under the Single European Act" (Dedman, 2010: 115).

So called dream, the Economic and Monetary Union, to be true, European Community needed nearly about 40 years (Dedman, 2010: 86). The Single European Act "it is to blame" even for the European Central Banks which was created in Germany and the single currency system (Goldstein, Pevehouse, 2008: 507).

In 1992, with the Maastricht Treaty begin the three pillars of the EU, which was inspired from the French design (Dedman, 2010: 129): "economic and monetary union; internal security; foreign and defence policy". By the Treaty of Maastricht, the European Community began to resemble an organization that would bring even the political objectives besides economic ones (Wolff, Rodt, 2007: 255).

From now on when we speak about the sovereignty of the states will speak about 12 policy areas which was decided at the supranational level, not on unanimity. What was some time ago European Community, now it is European Union. The Maastricht Treaty, imposed as a criterion for entering in the European Monetary Union, the ratios of GDP (Dedman, 2010: 129-132).

The first tests on which it was subjected the Maastricht Treaty in the period from 1992-1993 failed to pass the tests because of two reasons: Germany and currency crises in the Exchange Rate Mechanism, and in this case Monetary Union and cooperation in foreign and security policy have not helped the Maastricht Treaty to pass these tests and they discouraged the states. It has paid great attention to the fiscal and monetary elements in its criteria, other items during this period were not taken in their attention (Dedman, 2010: 136-159).

In 1997 there was a new challenge for the EU, with the Treaty of Amsterdam which was ready to, expand EU to central and eastern Europe. In the first wave of expansion came in sight these states: (Dedman, 2010: 152): "Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Czech Republic and Slovenia, plus Cyprus".

Take into account the size of the institutions within the union, which failed to start because more time was needed. And not in the last time the mechanism of voting by unanimity, was very difficult to obtain. Although there have been some changes in the treaty, the issue to resolve the problems between the member states, did not work.

In this treaty appeared for the first time the idea of expanding eastward, but a long time, the expansion was harder to obtain, from one stage to another of expansion because the states which came out from the domination of the communist regime, were agricultural and poor states. (Dedman, 2010: 166-170).

Treaty of Nissa, since 2001, has brought significant changes in qualified majority voting. Not to affect UK, votes do not cover the most sensitive areas of the state as social security, immigration and taxation. In this, unanimity occupies only 10% of EU law. But large states still have a say, this stems from the fact that (Dedman, 2010: 173): "a qualified majority voting in the big EU-27 states after 2007 required 258 votes out of 342 (75 per cent) and also from states representing at Least 62% of EU's Enlarged Population of 481 million."

In the vision of Baron Frans van Daele, which was the Permanent Representative of Belgium in the year 2001 to the European Union, this treaty was "the worst Treaty we have ever negotiated" (Dedman, 2010: 169).

The Nice Treaty helped EU to grow up from the 25 members, and this is a very good example, that this treaty was efficient in the expansion of the EU. European Union faced some problems in the Nice Treaty, when Irish rejected this treaty in the referendum and in this period was an increase in the anti-EU feeling from the Irish. In 2009 this treaty was yet legally, and the union was working very well with this treaty since it was started. (Dedman, 2010: 173-174).

"The Nice Treaty voting rules would remain in place until 2014, between 2014 and 2017 a transitional phase was to occur where the new (Reform Treaty) QMV rules apply but where the old Nice Treaty voting weights can be applied when a member states wishes so" (Dedman, 2010: 176-177). Only Belgium and Germany want Europe to become a federal United States (Dedman, 2010: 178). In this case we see a part of the idea from Winston Churchill articles, about this term of the United State of the Europe (Dedman, 2010: 14)

### **The European Union as an International Actor**

Neighborhood issue became an idea in which Europe begin to believe because both of them had a relationship of mutual influence. The Neighborhood was for the Europe, enemy and opportunity which is a very important aspect in understanding the process of the European Union.

Without his neighbors, we can't define Europe because the many interactions that occurred in the past between West and East, was homogenized and form what today we call the European identity. After the fall of the communist regime, Europe began to sustain the states from the central and east side of the continent to adopt the democracy.

After this support of the Europe, the states which received this now stay at the same table which is called European Union. After they escaped from communist domination, the states had felt the need for security which can maintain democracy and headed towards NATO (Dolghi, Rouet, Radics, 2009: 5-8).

NATO intervenes in international crises by helping the European Union with all the support he needs. Because the EU is becoming increasingly dependent NATO where its role would decrease, the Union would become vulnerable due to the dependence that NATO has caused (Wolff, Rodt, 2007: 259-260).

The Expansion reach the level of 28 states, in term of membership, and other states want the membership of the European Union, but is the union capable to receive more states in his boat? This is a question for the future of the Europe. Like any actor, he played some international theater pieces very well and in some less.

But the question is if the actor feels in terms of retirement or in the self-improvement because international theater pieces exist (Bretherton, Vogler, 2006: 1): "These include the extent to which the Union has attained a distinctive collective identity that informs the broad direction of its external activities and the extent to which there has developed a capacity and willingness to provide strategic direction for external policy".

### **Ukraine and Republic of Moldova**

The conflict from Ukraine in the 2014, destabilization of the eastern part of the country, the annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol in an illegal manner, put some big problems for the European Neighborhood Policy (European Union, Ukraine, 2015: 2). Ukraine went through a period when he had to take many decisions with a high degree of difficulty. European Union helped Ukraine to remake the judiciary system to be trusted (European Union, Ukraine, 2015: 6).

Ukraine's response for the problem from the east of the country was by taken measures for the anti-terrorist operations, by the bodies who received extraordinary power, by the country. They adopted decentralization reforms (European Union, Ukraine, 2015: 9).

This problem, with the conflict, generated more problems for the Ukraine, the economy has suffered and the rate of unemployment begins to grow. European Union jumped to the rescue by support the period 2015-20 with an agricultural and rural program for development. The Ukraine and European Union trade was improved and the barrier was eliminated. Little progress we see in food legislation and in the animal identification and registration, to be in conformable with the EU rules. (European Union, Ukraine, 2015: 11-13).

Visa Liberalization Action Plan was adopted by the EU and there was seen progress in preventing and fighting trafficking in human being but less progress in national transport strategy (European Union, Ukraine, 2015: 15-16). "In April the gas transportation system operators in Ukraine (Ukrtransgas) and Slovakia (Eustream) signed a memorandum enabling Slovakia to supply gas to Ukraine" (European Union, Ukraine, 2015: 17).

European Commission cooperation with Ukraine on the nuclear safety stress tests, progress we see even in the national environment strategy, in industrial chemicals and pesticides, in the law on higher education and in the problem with the autonomy of the universities (European Union, Ukraine, 2015: 18-19).

Because Crimea is a region with an infrastructure very good and with an geopolitics and geostrategic very important was very easy annexed from Russia. In 2015, Germany and France intervened to bring Ukraine and Russia to the table of negotiation, to stop what it is happening in the East of the Ukraine. This conflict revived, the "Cold War", but not to the same degree of temperature (Țoca, Pocola, 2014: 150-151). "There is much to be said about

the EU-Ukraine relations in the new milenium as much of the active components of this interaction ultimately lead to the situation with Russia today” (Țoca, Pocola, 2014: 142).

We see less progress in the Republic of Moldova when it comes to democracy, the human rights and fundamental freedoms, but we see that the level of freedom of media didn't encountered problems. Republic of Moldova encountered problems in the judiciary system which is corrupted and in the reforms for the gender equality and on the protection of children. They didn't manage so well in the Transnistrian conflict but between them and Romania they make a step in improving energy supply security (European Union, Republic of Moldova, 2015: 2-3), “with the inauguration of the Iași - Ungheni gas interconnector” (European Union, Republic of Moldova, 2015: 16).

Republic of Moldova made limited progress public administration, economic growth were it was slowed with 2%, in functioning of the autonomous region of Gagauzia (European Union, Republic of Moldova, 2015: 8-10). "In May parliament adopted amendments to the law on public debt. The official unemployment rate in the third quarter of 2014 was just 3.3 %. The government adopted the national agriculture and rural development strategy for 2014-20. The EU-28 remained Moldova's main trading partner" (European Union, Republic of Moldova, 2015: 11).

For the period of time between 2014-20, Moldova wants to develop with national strategy their education with a new Educational Code, culture with the adopted "Culture 2020" and public health (European Union, Republic of Moldova, 2015: 18). "Moldova became the first Eastern Partnership country to conclude an Agreement with the European Union on its participation in the Competitiveness of Enterprises and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises programme" (European Union, Republic of Moldova, 2015: 13).

And in Mobility Partnership with the European Union they did it very well. Moldovan citizens that want to travel for free throughout Europe, now they can with the visa-free travel regime, but they need biometric passports (European Union, Republic of Moldova, 2015: 14-15).

Corina Crețu, the European Commissioner for Regional Policy, said following talks with Adrian Candu, speaker of the parliament, that, the European Commission supports Moldova and suggested a stable government to support the EU and for the Association Agreement to be in their advantage must have very strong institutions and on the other side to be stable (Comisia Europeană, 2015).

## **Conclusion**

“The European Union had a decisively contribution in develop peace in Europe over the previous six decades. It closes bond and rapprochement between France and Germany, promotion of democratic development in Southern Europe after the end of dictatorships in Greece, Spain, and Portugal. The integration of the states of East-Central Europe after the end of the Communist East Bloc, promoted the peace in the Balkan region after the wars of the 1990s “ (Wilfried, 2015: 433). “Hence, the "Europe Project" will not lead to the dying off, of nation-states, at least for the foreseeable future” (Wilfried, 2015: 437).

Eurocepticism is not justified because of these two counter arguments, when it is invoked that the European Union has no future projects, "Europe 2020" and "Europe 2030. Challenges and Opportunities". Through these two counter arguments, it is seen the EU projects which is for both, long-term and also on medium-term (Bărbulescu, 2015: 591-592).

"Europe is a future project which does not lack of development strategies. We cannot know Europe than edifying one, but we cannot build without a knowledge and understanding" (Bărbulescu, 2015: 593).

We can say that over the years of the EU's construction, several European countries always manifested some concerns about it, especially in the case of its sovereignty. Euroscepticism is a part of the political DNA of every political parties and political persons in the EU member states, however it is shown differently depending on the actors.

For some EU's is not such of a threat to the sovereignty as long as boundaries are put, for others the EU's is a direct threat to it. The real problem with Euroscepticism in the EU is in the case that the extreme right manage to get a bigger share of the power in member states, such case could happen especially recently with the economic difficulties, the migrant crisis and a feeling of Europe not doing much for the country.

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## LE CONSENSUS EUROPEEN A L'EPREUVE DE LA CRISE UKRAINIENNE

*Aleksandre ZARUBICA*\*

**Abstract:** *The European Union is facing a big challenge with the Ukrainian crisis. It is about time to show its capacity to unite all its member States with a common position to support its neighbour. However, it appears that some member States are not helpful in building a strong political voice for the Union. Here we have a look at some member states representing different behaviour in facing an international crisis, thus explaining the difficulties of the EU in building a common foreign policy: the exclusiveness of France and Germany in the negotiation process, the discretion of Romania, the interest of Poland in a weaker Russia, the fears of the Baltic States, and the specificity of Hungary.*

**Keywords:** *Union européenne – Ukraine – Etats membres - Intérêt national – Préférence nationale*

Aux premières heures de l'Ukraine en tant qu'Etat indépendant en 1991, peu de pays relèveront son importance en dehors de la Russie. Ce ne sera qu'après 1992 que certaines personnalités occidentales commenceront à relever son importance géopolitique et pousseront l'occident à s'y intéresser (de Tinguay, 2000: p16). De nombreuses études seront notamment réalisées par Zbigniew Brzezinski, ancien conseiller du président des Etats-Unis Jimmy Carter. Il les développera en 1997 dans un livre où il décrit l'Ukraine comme « un pivot géopolitique », c'est-à-dire un « Etat dont l'importance tient moins à [sa] puissance réelle et à [sa] motivation qu'à [sa] situation géographique sensible et à [sa] vulnérabilité potentielle » (Brzezinski, 1997). L'Ukraine commencera alors à être perçue comme un élément incontournable de la politique et de la sécurité européenne, devenant un rempart capable de protéger ses voisins européens à l'ouest contre une éventuelle renaissance de l'expansionnisme russe (de Tinguay, 2000 : p18) à une époque où l'espoir de voir naître une Russie démocratique et européenne était encore fort.

Dans le contexte de la crise actuelle, qui a démarrée en 2013 suite au refus du président Ianoukovitch de signer l'Association d'Association avec l'UE, cette dernière a du mal à faire s'exprimer d'une seule voix ses 28 Etats membres. Entre position commune de l'Union et position nationale de chaque Etat membre il est nécessaire de se demander si le système actuel des relations étrangères de l'Union ne met pas en péril sa crédibilité sur la scène internationale dans sa tentative de résoudre ce conflit. Conflit qui par ailleurs est inédit de par sa nature, impliquant directement l'Union européenne au sein des débats internes à l'Ukraine et des revendications faites par une frange de la population. C'est pourquoi il paraît important d'étudier dans un premier temps les moyens et les enjeux de l'Union européenne dans la construction d'une position commune (1), avant d'analyser

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plus en détail la position de certains Etats membres et ainsi leur attachement à une position commune ou au contraire à un rejet du travail de consensus (2).

### **1. De la construction d'une position commune par l'Union européenne**

Réussir à trouver un consensus à 28 Etats membres n'est pas chose aisée. Là où l'Union avait du mal à adopter une position commune avant le grand élargissement de 2004 et 2007, comme la crise en ex-Yougoslavie ou la guerre en Irak, se dégage désormais de plus grands débats et fractures d'autant que la plupart des nouveaux Etats ont des histoires communes avec l'Ukraine et la Russie fort différentes de celles des pays plus anciens de l'UE. Le rôle de l'Union européenne est de parvenir à une position commune la plus solide possible. Il s'agit donc tout d'abord de définir les éléments permettant d'expliquer cet aspect des relations internationales qui est la coopération entre les membres d'un espace intégré en matière d'affaires étrangères (1.1), puis de définir la ligne directrice permettant de dégager la limite entre ces intérêts individuels et la position commune à ne pas franchir si l'on veut pouvoir conserver une position à une seule voix dans le cas spécifique de l'Union européenne et la crise ukrainienne (1.2).

#### **1.1. Intérêts étatiques et intégration régionale.**

Sujet du droit international possédant la pleine souveraineté, l'Etat possède non seulement la responsabilité d'organiser son administration et sa structure interne, mais il a également le pouvoir de gérer ses relations extérieures pour défendre ses intérêts nationaux à l'étranger, de garantir sa sécurité vis-à-vis des autres Etats et d'empêcher leur ingérence dans ses affaires internes. Selon l'approche réaliste des relations internationales dessinée par H. Morgenthau en 1948 les Etats coopérant à une échelle régionale ou internationale, acceptant par là même une diminution de leur souveraineté au profit d'un bloc commun, recherchent avant tout à tirer des avantages individuels, à atteindre leurs intérêts nationaux, mais aussi une plus grande stabilité et une résolution pacifique des conflits (Morgenthau, 2015 : 11). Cette notion d'intérêt national ne peut se faire prévaloir qu'en lien avec celle de la préservation de la souveraineté de l'Etat, ce qui semble alors incompatible avec l'existence d'une organisation régionale où l'intégration politique se fait prévaloir en matière de politique extérieure demandant la recherche d'un consensus de la part de ses membres. Ce consensus demande alors des compromis de la part de chacun des membres d'une telle organisation (Keohane, 2002 : 748).

L'intérêt national désigne l'expression de volonté d'un pays dans le contexte de la mondialisation et des relations internationales (Moravcsik, 1998), c'est-à-dire contrairement aux préférences, les intérêts ne s'inscrivent pas dans une nécessité de compromis pour atteindre une position commune. En revanche, l'idée de préférences nationales est une expression moins utilisée dans l'espace politique mais ayant une couverture symbolique importante. De fait, étant donné que les pays sont liés les uns aux autres, ils doivent harmoniser leurs intérêts. Les préférences nationales sont des solutions de compromis entre les intérêts nationaux des pays afin de renforcer leur voix par le biais d'une instance supranationale. Cette description des relations internationales par le biais d'une intégration régionale telle que l'Union européenne est soumise à une variable importante, l'« interdépendance complexe », concept qui souligne la sensibilité d'un acteur international étatique ou non-étatique (organisation internationale, entreprise multinationale, etc.) aux comportements des autres acteurs (Keohane, Nye, 2000), et vice-versa. Ce qui amène Moravcsik à considérer que les préférences nationales ne peuvent alors fonctionner qu'au sein d'espaces intégrés tels que l'Union européenne, du fait qu'il

n'y ait pas nécessité de compromis, ou du moins de compromis officiellement reconnus par les Etats, au sein d'autres organisations.

Dans le cadre de l'Union européenne, l'action extérieure de l'UE apporte, de l'avis de la Commission européenne<sup>1</sup>, un « avantage comparatif » vis-à-vis des politiques étrangères des Etats membres. Elle présente une valeur ajoutée pour atteindre les objectifs fixés de par sa capacité à mettre en commun les ressources, les compétences et les connaissances des Etats membres. Et le réseau de délégations de l'Union européenne à l'étranger est plus vaste que les réseaux diplomatiques de la plupart de ses Etats membres. La puissance de la politique extérieure de l'Union européenne reste toutefois limitée. Si elle a pu bénéficier d'une étendue de ses compétences en matière de négociation et de conclusion de traités en matière d'accords internationaux, faisant de ce domaine une compétence exclusive de l'Union européenne, d'autres domaines restent des compétences partagées, ou réservées aux Etats membres, telle que celle en matière de défense notamment. La mise en place de la Politique étrangère et de sécurité commune (PESC) en tant que deuxième pilier du traité de Maastricht va permettre à l'Union de gagner en visibilité. Toutefois, celle-ci ne se substitue pas aux différentes politiques extérieurs des Etats membres.

L'exemple européen, véritable laboratoire d'intégration régionale, démontre le changement en profondeur des relations internationales dans le cadre d'un regroupement d'Etats au sein d'une telle organisation intégrée. Afin de mettre en place une position commune, les Etats membres vont devoir trouver un compromis, mettant de côté leurs « intérêts » nationaux mais faisant alors ressurgir des « préférences » nationales, qu'ils vont essayer de mettre en avant lors de la recherche du consensus. La coordination des préférences nationales est compliquée de par leur diversité et de leur étendue qui peut couvrir l'ensemble des relations extérieures des Etats membres, mais y arriver est la meilleure opportunité pour l'Union européenne d'être un acteur important sur la scène mondiale en faisant de sa plus grande faiblesse, la diversité des intérêts, une force en unissant ceux-ci au sein d'une seule et même voix (Ghimis, 2013 : 165).

### ***1.2. Construire la position commune de l'Union européenne dans le cadre de la crise ukrainienne***

Suite au conflit entre la Géorgie et la Russie en 2008, il semblait déjà nécessaire de recommander aux Etats membres de faire concorder leurs préférences nationales afin de renforcer l'image de l'Union européenne en ayant une communication uniforme et commune (Ghimis, 2013 : 165). Autrement, celle-ci pourrait voir sa place affaiblie, voire écartée, de la table des négociations à laquelle participent ses Etats membres.

Cette position commune est un grand enjeu pour l'UE. En effet, participer à la résolution de la crise en tant qu'interlocuteur principal est l'occasion pour l'Union de prouver sa capacité à résoudre un conflit sur son propre continent, à sa frontière et ainsi de montrer qu'elle peut garantir la stabilité et la paix, raison de sa création, sans une aide extérieure : après l'échec des guerres yougoslaves, il est plus que jamais nécessaire pour l'UE de prouver qu'elle a su évoluer et mettre en place un système efficace quant à la gestion de ses relations extérieures. Pouvoir s'affirmer en tant qu'acteur à part entière capable de réunir d'une manière solide et durable 28 Etats est la clé non seulement pour

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<sup>1</sup> Commission européenne, *Communication au Conseil et au Parlement européen relative aux instruments consacrés à l'aide extérieure dans le cadre des futures perspectives financières 2007- 2013*; COM(2004) 626 final

résoudre la crise ukrainienne, mais également pour renforcer la voix de l'UE sur la scène internationale et au sein d'autres conflits et crises, dont celles en Europe telles que l'Abkhazie, l'Ossétie du Sud ou la Transnistrie.

Mettre en place une position commune aux Etats membres de l'UE suppose une excellente communication entre les Etats membres, entre les Etats membres et les institutions européennes, et entre les différents interlocuteurs au sein des institutions européennes. Si l'Union européenne ne participe pas directement aux négociations dans le cadre de la crise entre Kiev et les régions d'Ukraine de l'Est, la Crimée et Moscou, ceci étant laissé à ses Etats membres et à l'OSCE, son rôle dans la coordination et la recherche de consensus est primordial de plusieurs points de vue. D'une part, elle assure, grâce au Service Européen de l'Action Extérieure (SEAE) la coordination des positions des institutions européennes. Elle étudie les différentes politiques et prise de position des Etats membres et donne son opinion sur le déroulement de la situation en Ukraine. D'autre part, la Commission a mis en place une structure spécifique à la crise ukrainienne, le Groupe de Support pour l'Ukraine (SGUA), qui est composée de fonctionnaires européens ayant une bonne connaissance du terrain ukrainien. Ce groupe, même s'il n'est pas impliqué dans la politique de sanction, ni dans celle de résolution de la crise, est un atout majeur car il possède une très bonne compétence technique, qui lui sert à remplir sa mission, c'est-à-dire aider l'Ukraine à mettre en œuvre l'Accord d'Association. Cependant, au-delà de sa mission initiale, ses connaissances lui permettent d'être un interlocuteur privilégié pour les différentes composante de l'Union (agences, Directions Générales) mais également pour les Etats membres qui ont souvent besoin de conseils, de briefing et d'exposés sur l'état économique et social en Ukraine, souvent faute de service diplomatique développé et concentré sur ce pays. Il participe ainsi à la coordination des agences et des Etats membres. Deux autres acteurs jouent également un rôle dans les relations entre l'Union européenne et l'Ukraine : la délégation européenne à Kiev qui assure la liaison entre l'Union européenne et l'Ukraine, et la Direction Générale NEAR qui s'occupe de la Politique Européenne de Voisinage pour la Commission européenne.

L'Union européenne a réussi à aligner la position des Etats membres de l'Union européenne concernant la mise en œuvre des sanctions économiques par exemple. Elle travaille ainsi à la résolution de la crise directement, mais pas uniquement. En effet, l'Accord d'Association conclu avec l'Ukraine peut indirectement aider à résoudre progressivement le conflit si celui-ci continue dans la durée : cet accord doit permettre la modernisation de l'économie du pays, or une amélioration de l'économie et du niveau de vie entraîne généralement une baisse des conflits dans une région. Au contraire, une dégradation de la situation économique et politique du pays pourrait engendrer une aggravation du conflit. C'est donc en travaillant pour améliorer le système interne (économie, anti-corruption, éducation, santé...) de l'Ukraine qu'il sera possible de se diriger vers la stabilité sur le long terme.

Néanmoins, les Etats membres ont tous des relations différentes avec l'Ukraine et des intérêts spécifiques dans le bon dénouement de la crise et de ce fait certains participent plus activement que d'autres à l'élaboration de l'intervention européenne en Ukraine. Cette disparité conduit à une complication de la définition de la position commune de l'UE, car les préférences des Etats membres peuvent ressurgir en intérêts.

## **2. L'attitude des Etats membres de l'Union européenne dans le cadre de la crise ukrainienne.**

Pour mieux comprendre les difficultés que l'UE a dans la construction de la position commune dans le cadre de la crise ukrainienne, il est nécessaire d'analyser au cas par cas certains Etats membres selon la nature des relations qu'ils entretiennent avec l'Ukraine et la Russie. Il est ainsi intéressant d'étudier la France et à l'Allemagne qui sont réputées être le moteur de l'Europe et qui ont mené les négociations amenant à l'accord de Minsk II (2.1), la Pologne et à la Roumanie, pays frontaliers de l'Ukraine qui ont des intérêts communs mais ne les revendiquent pas avec la même force (2.2), les Etats baltes – Estonie, Lettonie, Lituanie – aux portes de la Russie et qui remettent en doute le manque de volonté affiché de la Russie à reproduire le schéma ukrainien dans ces pays (2.3), ainsi que la Hongrie, frontalière à l'Ukraine, mais qui se démarque par une prise de position à contre-courant de celle de l'Union (2.4).

### **2.1. Le couple franco-allemand: à la tête de la diplomatie européenne.**

Souvent décrit comme étant le « moteur de l'Union européenne », le couple franco-allemand s'impose comme le fil directeur de l'UE. Pays fondateurs de l'Union européenne – et membres de l'OTAN – ils ont le pouvoir d'imposer facilement leurs décisions. En effet, selon le mécanisme de prise de décision au sein du Conseil de l'Union européenne, un système à double majorité a été mis en place par le traité de Lisbonne, instaurant une majorité qualifiée de 55% des Etats membres représentant au moins 65% de la population européenne (TUE, 2012 : article 16), et la possibilité d'une minorité de blocage des décisions par au moins 4 Etats représentant plus de 35% de la population. Ce système accorde un avantage particulier à l'Allemagne et à la France, représentant à eux deux près de 33% de la population européenne<sup>2</sup>. Ils représentent également 36% du budget européen et 37% du PIB de l'Union Européenne. Le rôle central qu'ont joué ces deux pays dans le façonnement de l'Europe et de son histoire vient s'ajouter aux deux grandes forces que possèdent ces pays : une économie modèle pour l'Allemagne, et une puissance diplomatique et militaire de premier plan en Europe pour la France.

Avant le début des manifestations de la place Maïdan, l'Allemagne et la France étaient toutes les deux opposées à l'idée d'intégrer l'Ukraine dans l'Union mais pour des raisons différentes (Fortier, 2010 : 27) : pour l'Allemagne, l'Ukraine représentait un risque de concurrence dans le secteur métallurgique alors que pour la France, intégrer l'Ukraine revenait à voir se déplacer le cœur politique de l'Union trop à l'Est de l'Europe. Pourtant, le rôle qu'ont joué ces deux Etats membres pour la stabilisation de la situation en Ukraine et la négociation des accords de cessez-le-feu de Minsk II, assortis de mesures visant à régler le conflit, a éclipsé les efforts des institutions européennes<sup>3</sup> ainsi que d'autres Etats membres tels que la Pologne. Ni Federica Mogherini, ni Donald Tusk n'ont participé au dernier tour des négociations pour cet accord, au « détriment de toute logique institutionnelle ». En effet, ces négociations se sont faites selon le format dit « de Normandie » en référence à la première rencontre officielle entre l'Allemagne, la France, la Russie et l'Ukraine lors de la commémoration du débarquement sur les plages de

<sup>2</sup> Eurostat, Population de l'Union européenne au 1<sup>er</sup> janvier de chaque année.

<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&language=en&pcode=tps00001&tableSelectio n=1&footnotes=yes&labeling=labels&plugin=1> dernier accès le 8 octobre

<sup>3</sup> Robert Aline (2015), *Quand la crise russe fortifie le couple franco-allemand*, Euractiv, 20 février <http://www.euractiv.fr/sections/leurope-dans-le-monde/quand-la-crise-russe-fortifie-le-couple-franco-allemand-312316> Dernier accès le 5 octobre 2015

Normandie. Si l'Allemagne et la France ne sont pas signataires à ces accords, trois autres acteurs y prennent part : les deux régions séparatistes de Donetsk et Lougansk, ainsi que l'OSCE avec le rôle d'observateur du respect de l'accord.

Voir ces pays être propulsés au rôle d'interlocuteurs privilégiés en Europe pourrait alors s'expliquer par différents facteurs outre leur place importante au sein de l'UE. Ce sont des Etats relativement neutres dans le conflit, même si les politiques de sanctions à l'égard de la Russie par l'Europe sont à leur initiative, dans la mesure où ils n'ont pas les mêmes intérêts et enjeux dans cette crise que les pays de l'Europe centrale et orientale (PECO) membres de l'UE comme la Pologne ou les Etats baltes. Ils entretiennent également avec Moscou d'importantes relations économiques, notamment l'Allemagne, et culturelle, plutôt la France qui avait d'ailleurs récemment mis en place une « année croisée France-Russie » en 2010. Enfin, la France a une grande expérience de la gestion des crises, notamment en Afrique ces dernières années. Il ne faut pas oublier que la France et l'Allemagne ont longtemps été ennemis au cours des siècles derniers en étant notamment le théâtre de nombreux affrontements lors des deux Guerres Mondiales et en étant parmi les principaux belligérants. Elles ont pourtant réussi à renforcer leur coopération et leur amitié, permettant la plus longue période de paix et de prospérité ayant eu lieu en Europe jusqu'aux guerres yougoslaves. La réussite de cet apaisement des tensions peut d'ailleurs être symbolisé par les commémorations de la Seconde Guerre mondiale à l'origine du format Normandie, et ainsi être un signe encourageant pour les différentes parties à la crise ukrainienne à respecter le retour à un règlement pacifique du conflit.

La France et l'Allemagne sont des acteurs majeurs de la crise ukrainienne au sein de l'Union européenne. Si elles sont certainement les pays les plus à même de dessiner la position commune de l'UE, elles s'en détachent également en étant en première ligne à la table des négociations, écartant de fait d'autres acteurs institutionnels et étatiques européens qui auraient dû y prendre part. Cette liberté d'intervention montre les limites de la politique extérieure commune de l'UE, et la difficulté qui existe de faire entendre d'une seule et même voix 28 Etats-membres.

## ***2.2. La position des Etats frontaliers à l'Ukraine: les exemples de la Pologne et de la Roumanie.***

L'enjeu pour les pays frontaliers à l'Ukraine, qui autrefois étaient des pays « satellites » de l'ex-URSS, est d'assurer une ceinture de protection entre eux et la Russie, une zone tampon qui réduit la frontière entre eux et ce pays héritier de l'URSS qui exerçait une forte influence dans le bloc de l'est. C'est le cas notamment de la Roumanie, discrète dans ce conflit mais qui possède de nombreux liens avec l'Ukraine, et notamment une forte minorité roumaine dans l'est de ce pays voisin, ainsi que de la Pologne, beaucoup plus engagée et qui partage une longue histoire avec ce pays.

L'élargissement de l'Union européenne à la Roumanie en 2007 a étendu la frontière entre l'Union européenne et l'Ukraine, en en faisant une des plus longues de l'Union, malgré la présence de la Moldavie, enclavée entre ces deux pays. Comme de nombreux pays de la région, l'Ukraine et la Roumanie partagent un héritage historique et culturel commun, qui fut dans leur cas conditionné au cours des dernières années par des relations de voisinages tendues en conséquence de l'attitude très dure de Ceausescu contre les minorités nationales ukrainiennes ainsi que d'un récent litige territorial au cours des années 1990' qui fut réglé par la Cour Internationale de Justice en février 2009.

Les relations entre ces deux pays sont marquées par la présence de minorités nationales roumaines en Ukraine, et ukrainienne en Roumanie, ce qui cristallise des

enjeux spécifiques pour la Roumanie dans l'évolution de la crise. En effet, les roumains sont la troisième communauté en Ukraine, au nombre de 410 000 – voire 500 000 en incluant la population moldave roumanophone – après les ukrainiens et les russes, et partagent généralement leur présence avec les moldaves dans les oblasts d'Odessa, de Chernivtsi et de Transcarpatie (Zakarpattya) principalement (Lavric, 2013 : 172). Cette communauté connaît des difficultés pour se démarquer dans le processus d'Ukrainisation qui met de côté les populations roumaines, les poussant à s'intégrer de plus en plus avec la population ukrainienne (Lavric, 2013 : 172, 179). Cette communauté n'est pas autant soutenue par la Roumanie – et la Moldavie – que la communauté hongroise par la Hongrie qui semble investir énormément dans la préservation de la culture et de l'identité hongroise dans ces communautés. La population roumanophone d'Ukraine se sent délaissée par son Etat d'accueil et souhaiterait plus de support de la part de Bucarest et de Chisinau (Lavric, 2013 : 174-176), alors que l'intégration de la Roumanie à l'Union européenne a permis un projet de coopération entre la Roumanie, l'Ukraine et la Moldavie instauré à travers l'Instrument européen de Voisinage et de Partenariat, et ayant pour objectif de réunir les trois partenaires pour supporter et améliorer les conditions de vie des minorités nationales dans ces trois pays (Lavric, 2013 : 177). En effet, malgré la mise en place de cette plateforme de dialogue, il existe un réel manque de coopération entre ces trois pays mais aussi avec leurs communautés alors qu'une concrétisation de ce projet permettrait de garantir les droits de ces minorités, notamment dans le domaine de l'éducation et de l'accès à un enseignement dans leur langue maternelle (Lavric, 2013 : 180). De même, une minorité ukrainienne vit en Roumanie, notamment dans les régions du Sud Bukovyna, du Nord Dobruzha et de l'Est Banat (Yuriychuk, 2013 : 57-58). Comme la minorité roumaine en Ukraine, la communauté ukrainienne en Roumanie a de nombreux problèmes concernant l'éducation et la préservation de sa langue (Yuriychuk, 2013 : 60-64). Ce reflet de situations entre les deux pays leur permet néanmoins de se fixer des objectifs communs de protection des minorités et donne un intérêt tout particulier à la Roumanie d'aider Kiev à maintenir la stabilité en Ukraine car le conflit actuel n'est pas propice à attirer l'attention du gouvernement ukrainien sur de tels enjeux.

La Roumanie, bien que discrète sur la scène européenne en ce qui concerne le conflit ukrainien, a décidé d'agir en signant un accord militaire avec l'Ukraine juste avant la tenue du référendum criméen, renforçant leurs relations au risque de s'attirer la colère de Moscou qui peut actionner un levier économique en jouant sur la livraison de gaz en Ukraine et en Roumanie, cette dernière recevant 11% de ses livraisons de gaz de la Russie<sup>4</sup>. C'est également un pays stratégique pour l'OTAN, et des bases militaires équipées notamment par l'armée américaine sont construites en Roumanie, ainsi que dans d'autres PECO – Estonie, Lettonie, Lituanie, Pologne et Bulgarie – afin de dissuader la Russie de s'engager plus en avant dans le conflit ukrainien mais également dans l'Union européenne.

Bucarest semble donc plus se ranger derrière la position européenne, restant passive dans le cadre de ce conflit, tout en restant vigilante des possibles conséquences que pourrait avoir cette situation sur la minorité roumaine en Ukraine. De ce point de vue, la Roumanie reste derrière ses préférences nationales, et les rapports qu'elle entretient avec l'Ukraine semblent confirmer cette analyse.

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<sup>4</sup> Chiriac Marian (2014), *Romania risks Russian ire with Ukraine Military Deal*, Balkan Insight, Bucarest, 11 mars <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/romania-ukraine-sign-military-cooperation-agreement> Dernier accès le 28 septembre 2015

La Pologne se détache plus fortement de la ligne de conduite européenne que la Roumanie. L'Ukraine a longtemps entretenu des relations conflictuelles avec la Pologne. A partir du XIV<sup>ème</sup> siècle, l'Alliance entre le Royaume de Pologne et le Grand-Duché de Lituanie ont permis à ces deux Etats partageant des intérêts communs d'étendre leur territoire en Europe orientale et notamment sur les terres ukrainiennes occupées par les hordes mongoles qui manquaient alors d'organisation et de dirigeants puissants (Subtelny, 2005 : 75-77), mais une telle conquête fut difficilement admise par la population ukrainienne du fait de leurs différences religieuses avec les envahisseurs, bien que certains nobles lituaniens étaient de confession orthodoxe. Cette domination de la Pologne a apporté aux communautés ukrainiennes un modèle de gouvernance et d'organisation européennes qui leur était jusqu'alors inconnu (Subtelny, 2005: 83), tout en limitant toutefois leur principale activité à l'agriculture au détriment de l'industrie, poussant la noblesse ukrainienne à quitter la région pour la Pologne, bien plus attractive, suite au conflit religieux et culturel opposant les polono-lituaniens aux cosaques à la fin du XV<sup>ème</sup> et au début du XVI<sup>ème</sup> (Subtelny, 2005 : 102), et à la révolution paysanne du milieu du XVII<sup>ème</sup> siècle permettant à une partie de l'Ukraine de s'émanciper. L'autre événement marquant des conflits entre l'Ukraine et la Pologne fut le conflit entre ces deux nations lors de la seconde Guerre Mondiale, où les minorités polonaises furent martyrisées en Ukraine, entraînant l'un des premiers nettoyages ethniques du XX<sup>ème</sup> siècle, et entraînant suite à la Guerre un transfert des populations entre la Pologne et l'Ukraine (Marples, 2007).

Ce sont cependant les pays d'Europe centrale, et notamment la Pologne et la Hongrie qui prendront conscience en premier de l'enjeu ukrainien (De Tinguy, 2000 : 17-18), et la vision d'une Russie « despotique ou impériale ou totalitaire » (Michnik, 1995 : 469) relègue alors les conflits entre la Pologne et l'Ukraine au second rang. La vision polonaise de la crise ukrainienne pourrait être résumé par cette phrase du ministre polonais Radoslaw Sikorski : « if you don't support [the association agreement] you will all be dead ».

En effet, la Pologne – frontalière à l'Ukraine et à l'enclave russe de Kaliningrad – est certainement l'Etat membre de l'Union européenne le plus engagé dans le soutien de l'Ukraine, et s'était déjà démarqué par le passé en appelant à un rapprochement avec l'Ukraine et la Biélorussie pour un élargissement à l'UE. Elle était aux côtés de la France et de l'Allemagne pour limiter les pouvoirs de Ianoukovitch et par conséquent, a joué un rôle dans le soutien au mouvement de l'Euromaïdan qui a entraîné la chute du président<sup>5</sup>. La nomination de Donald Tusk à la présidence du Conseil européen peut par ailleurs être analysée comme une manière de donner plus d'importance à la Pologne, véritable ambassadrice des PECO, et d'encourager le développement des politiques de défense européenne pour lesquelles il a souhaité engager le débat lors de son mandat de Premier Ministre polonais<sup>6</sup>. La Pologne participe d'ailleurs activement aux différents programmes de l'OTAN et à la Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense commune (PSDC) (Parzymies, 2014 : 48-52) comme les groupements tactiques par exemple, même si cette dernière ne peut pas remplacer l'OTAN selon Varsovie, le ministre des affaires étrangères Sikorski déclarant en 2012 qu' « il résulte des expériences de la présidence polonaise que la

<sup>5</sup> Zaborowski Marcin (2014), *Ukraine, au tour de l'Union européenne d'agir*, Le Monde, 28 février, [http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2014/02/28/ukraine-au-tour-de-l-union-europeenne-d-agir\\_4374973\\_3232.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2014/02/28/ukraine-au-tour-de-l-union-europeenne-d-agir_4374973_3232.html) Dernier accès le 4 octobre 2015.

<sup>6</sup> Puhl Jan (2014), *The Radical Pragmatist: Donald Tusk Provides Strong voices for Eastern Europe*, Der Spiegel, 26 novembre <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/a-1005004.html> dernier accès le 4 octobre 2015

PSDC n'est pas, hélas, réalisable dans le cadre des 27 pays membres. Il faut donc entamer une coopération renforcée, prévue dans le traité de Lisbonne, des Etats volontaires ».

La Pologne souhaite désormais être considérée comme un acteur principal de la politique européenne et la crise ukrainienne pourrait être l'élément déclencheur d'un tel changement. Observant le rapprochement et l'évolution des relations entre l'Union européenne et la Russie, Varsovie accorde beaucoup d'importance à l'Ukraine : « tout comme la Russie ne pourrait accepter une Ukraine membre de l'OTAN, la Pologne ne saurait tolérer une Ukraine russe » (Cadier, 2014 : 42), et par conséquent la crise ukrainienne est factrice de la forte détérioration des relations entre la Pologne et la Russie. Cela implique donc une plus grande détermination polonaise de s'impliquer dans cette crise, détermination qui se traduit notamment par l'opinion publique la plus favorable de l'UE pour soutenir Kiev en envoyant une aide économique, la seule à soutenir l'envoi d'armes, et également en ce qui concerne l'adhésion à l'OTAN et à l'UE de l'Ukraine (Poushter, Simmons, Stokes, 2015), contrairement à d'autres populations européennes, notamment en France, en Allemagne et en Italie, plus réticentes à voir l'Ukraine rejoindre l'OTAN et l'UE.

Cependant, depuis les événements de la place Maïdan, la Pologne a été écartée des négociations diplomatiques avec la Russie. Preuve en est, les négociations pour les accords de Minsk II ont réuni l'Allemagne, la France, la Russie l'Ukraine et les représentants des régions séparatistes de l'est mais sans la participation de la Pologne alors qu'elle a une connaissance particulière en Europe de la Russie et de l'Ukraine<sup>7</sup>. Une telle mise à l'écart fut d'ailleurs douloureuse pour la Pologne (Buras, 2015), résultant notamment du manque de volonté par les autorités ukrainiennes de l'inclure dans l'élaboration de ces accords, préférant la présence de l'Allemagne. Une telle situation a convaincu Varsovie de se tourner un peu plus vers les relations atlantiques, se faisant remarquer en travaillant activement sur le Partenariat transatlantique de commerce et d'investissement, plus connu sous l'acronyme TTIP, mais n'abandonnant pas cependant le processus de renforcement de la position commune de l'UE face à la Russie (Buras, 2015).

La Pologne a donc un intérêt particulier en Ukraine. Elles partagent une frontière commune, ont une culture slave et une histoire qui les rapprochent, et la stabilité en Ukraine semble être une garantie pour la sécurité de la Pologne, qui a peur des ambitions du Kremlin. L'activisme polonais pour renforcer la sécurité et la coopération militaire en Europe et avec les membres de l'OTAN, et donc pour ancrer l'Ukraine à l'Ouest, fait que ce pays place ses intérêts nationaux au-dessus de la position commune. Cependant, il ne semble pas y avoir derrière une volonté d'entraver cette position, mais plutôt d'élever la participation et le poids de l'UE dans ce conflit afin de garantir une plus grande sécurité pour les PECO, qui observent minutieusement les mouvements orchestrés par le Kremlin, véritable joueur d'échecs. Il est donc difficile de considérer la mise en valeur des intérêts nationaux par la Pologne comme pouvant potentiellement mettre à mal la recherche du consensus européen. Néanmoins, l'échec de la Pologne à se hisser à la table des négociations peut refroidir ses ambitions de défense européenne, et voir ce pays se tourner un peu plus vers l'alliance atlantique traduit la difficulté qu'éprouve l'UE à fonctionner d'une seule voix.

La Roumanie et la Pologne, bien que toutes deux frontières orientales de l'UE, ne réagissent pas de la même manière face à la crise. Si elles soutiennent toutes deux

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<sup>7</sup> Gotev Georgi & Kokoszczunski Krzysztof (2014), *Poland's stake in the Ukraine crisis: hawkish or insightful?*, Euractiv, 11 septembre, <http://www.euractiv.com/sections/poland-ambitious-achievers/polands-stake-ukraine-crisis-hawkish-or-insightful-308355> Dernier accès le 6 octobre 2015

l'Ukraine, la Pologne est bien plus engagée que la Roumanie qui préfère ne pas s'engager dans les négociations mais favorise ainsi la poursuite d'une politique commune européenne. Cependant, il est difficile de reprocher à la Pologne de vouloir dépasser l'état actuel de la communication en Europe, car elle vise à une prise de position solide de la part de l'Union européenne, permettant ainsi un plus grand équilibre entre les différents Etats membres de l'Union, mais aussi une base plus importante pour soutenir l'Ukraine.

### **2.3. La crainte des pays Baltes.**

Les trois pays Baltes – Estonie, Lettonie, Lituanie – ont en commun le fait d'avoir été attribués, avec l'Ukraine, à l'URSS à l'aube de la seconde guerre mondiale suite au pacte germano-soviétique, de posséder une frontière avec la Russie, à l'est pour l'Estonie et la Lettonie, et avec l'enclave de Kaliningrad pour la Lituanie, et d'être les seules anciennes républiques socialistes à avoir rejoint l'OTAN et l'Union européenne.

Ces pays ont hérité de l'époque soviétique d'une forte minorité russe : elle représentait près de 6% de la population en Lituanie<sup>8</sup> et 27% de la population en Lettonie en 2011<sup>9</sup>, et 25% de la population en Estonie en 2015<sup>10</sup>. Cette situation attise les craintes dans ces pays de voir les ambitions impérialistes de la Russie reproduire le mécanisme mis en place dans l'est de l'Ukraine et en Crimée, malgré la sécurité qu'apporte l'adhésion à l'OTAN qui assure à ses membres une alliance militaire pour défendre un allié agressé. Ceci d'autant plus que Moscou a annoncé à mainte reprise que la Russie interviendrait pour défendre les minorités russes partout dans le monde si nécessaire<sup>11</sup>, prétexte pouvant amener de nouvelles crises en Europe. En effet, en Estonie et en Lettonie, la minorité russe ne peut pas voter car la langue russe n'est pas officielle et la citoyenneté de ces pays est soumise notamment à un test de langue (House of Lords, 2015 : 41 §128), mais les non-citoyens peuvent voter aux élections locales, ce qui provoque l'ire de Moscou, alors qu'en Lituanie, toute la population a reçu la citoyenneté du pays au moment de l'indépendance, ce qui fait dans ce dernier qu'il n'y a pas de problèmes de ce point de vue-là, mais n'écarte pas d'éventuelles ambitions russes.

Ces trois Etats membres de l'Union européenne sont d'autant plus méfiants que Moscou se montre particulièrement provocatrice dans son discours, notamment le 30 juin 2015 en annonçant que le parquet général russe entamait une enquête afin d'étudier la légalité de la reconnaissance par les autorités soviétiques (les républiques soviétiques de

<sup>8</sup> Département des Statistiques de Lituanie (2011), *Gyventojų skaičius metų pradžioje . Požymiai: tautybė, statistiniai*, <http://db1.stat.gov.lt/statbank/selectvarval/saveselections.asp?MainTable=M3010215&PLanguage=0&TableStyle=&Buttons=&PXSID=3236&IQY=&TC=&ST=ST&rvar0=&rvar1=&rvar2=&rvar3=&rvar4=&rvar5=&rvar6=&rvar7=&rvar8=&rvar9=&rvar10=&rvar11=&rvar12=&rvar13=&rvar14=> Dernier accès le 10 octobre 2015

<sup>9</sup> Centre national des Statistiques de Lettonie (2012), *On key provisional results of Population and Housing Census 2011*, 18 janvier, <http://www.csb.gov.lv/en/notikumi/key-provisional-results-population-and-housing-census-2011-33306.html> Dernier accès le 10 octobre 2015

<sup>10</sup> Centre national des Statistiques d'Estonie (2015), *Population by ethnic nationality, 1 January, years*, 10 juin, <http://www.stat.ee/34278> Dernier accès le 10 octobre 2015

<sup>11</sup> Sabet-Parry Rayyan (2015), *Ukraine crisis: Inhabitants of the Baltic states fear that they will be next in the firing-line*, The Independent, Riga, 29 février <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-crisis-inhabitants-of-the-baltic-states-fear-that-they-will-be-next-in-the-firingline-10058085.html> Dernier accès le 11 octobre 2015

Russie, d'Ukraine et de Biélorussie alors) de l'indépendance de ces pays Baltes<sup>12</sup>. La Russie joue là un double jeu, car si elle reconnaît la souveraineté de Tallinn, Riga et Vilnius et entretient des relations diplomatiques avec elles, et ne compte pas réellement remettre cela en cause, elle adresse ainsi un message clair : elle n'hésitera pas à trouver un prétexte si elle le juge nécessaire pour mettre à mal l'intégrité territoriale de ces pays. Mais cela représente pour la Russie un risque de perdre toute crédibilité tant ses arguments ne sont qu'une façade qui ne peuvent réellement être justifiés, mais également de déclencher une guerre avec les pays de l'OTAN, ce qui n'est pas à son avantage ni parmi ses ambitions, et elle restera certainement au niveau de provocation. La situation ukrainienne a permis à la Russie de montrer sa capacité à soutenir ses intérêts sans pour autant devoir intervenir « directement » militairement, quand bien même des rapports d'investigations de journalistes ou de l'opposition russe prouvent le contraire.

Pourtant, Les Etats Baltes, alors jusqu'à présent peu développés militairement, se sont mis à se préparer à d'éventuelles attaques venant de leur grand voisin de l'Est, augmentant leurs dépenses militaires depuis la crise ukrainienne alors qu'elles étaient jusque-là réduites à cause de la crise économique<sup>13</sup>. L'embargo russe sur les produits européens est d'ailleurs d'autant plus douloureux pour ces pays pour qui les exportations totales en Russie représentaient 11% pour la Lettonie et 16% pour l'Estonie et la Lituanie. Alors que la crise ukrainienne se poursuit, ces Etats commencent à mettre en place des manœuvres et des stratégies de défense, en lançant des exercices de simulation d'invasion ou en érigeant des clôtures et des murs à la frontière russe.

Ces Etats ne vont pas à l'encontre de la position commune à l'Union européenne concernant l'Ukraine, mais ils se démarquent cependant en accentuant les besoins militaires nécessaires qu'ils estiment nécessaires au dénouement de la crise et à leur propre protection. Contrairement à la Pologne qui espère voir une véritable Europe de la défense, les pays Baltes se reposent surtout sur l'appui militaire que peut leur apporter les Etats-Unis. L'OTAN prend donc le pas sur l'UE dans ces pays car cette dernière ne possède pas une véritable union militaire, ni la volonté politique de l'élaborer.

#### **2.4. Le cas particulier de la Hongrie.**

La Hongrie, membre de l'Union européenne depuis l'élargissement de 2004, est une île au milieu de ses voisins, étant le seul pays non-slave de la région – mis à part l'Autriche – et est également un des rares pays européen dont la langue officielle n'a pas de racine indo-européenne, étant héritée de l'invasion de la Horde d'Or. De ce contexte particulier, la Hongrie se démarque par une défense active de son identité nationale et ethnique, et Victor Orbán, premier ministre hongrois, semble déterminé à la préserver même si cela revient à mettre à mal la coopération européenne sur de nombreux sujets dont la crise ukrainienne.

La communauté hongroise a de spécifique en Europe sa très forte présence en dehors des frontières de la Hongrie, et notamment chez ses voisins roumain, slovaque, ukrainien et serbe, pour en tout environ 2,8 millions de personne d'origine ethnique hongroise, soit un quart de l'ensemble des hongrois. Cette présence importante aux

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<sup>12</sup> Vitkine Benoît (2015), *La justice russe enquête sur la légalité de l'indépendance des pays baltes*, Le Monde, 1<sup>er</sup> juillet, [http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/07/01/des-magistrats-russes-mettent-en-doute-la-legalite-de-l-independance-des-pays-baltes\\_4666234\\_3214.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2015/07/01/des-magistrats-russes-mettent-en-doute-la-legalite-de-l-independance-des-pays-baltes_4666234_3214.html) Dernier accès le 12 octobre 2015

<sup>13</sup> Hyndle-Hussein Joanna (2015), *The Baltic perspective on the crisis in Ukraine*, The Baltic Times, 13 février, [http://www.baltictimes.com/the\\_baltic\\_perspective\\_on\\_the\\_crisis\\_in\\_ukraine/](http://www.baltictimes.com/the_baltic_perspective_on_the_crisis_in_ukraine/) Dernier accès le 11 octobre 2015

frontières de la Hongrie fait de la protection de ces minorités une priorité pour les autorités hongroises (Brie, Polgar, 2013; 143). Dans l'optique de rapprocher ces communautés de leur Etat « d'origine », la Hongrie a voté en 2010 une loi controversée accordant la double nationalité aux habitants des pays voisins qui peuvent justifier une ascendance hongroise et qui parlent déjà la langue couramment. Cette mesure a gêné certains de ses voisins qui ont vu par là une tentative par la Hongrie d'entraver la stabilisation de certaines de leurs régions où les minorités hongroises avaient des revendications pour se rattacher à la Hongrie, comme en Slovaquie par exemple. En pratique, elle a surtout permis à la minorité hongroise vivant en dehors de l'UE d'obtenir une citoyenneté lui permettant d'accéder au marché de l'emploi de l'Union européenne. Les opposants hongrois à cette loi y voient surtout un moyen pour le Fidesz-MPSz d'Orbán de conserver sa majorité en s'attirant la sympathie des nouveaux électeurs<sup>14</sup>, plus de 90% des nouveaux détenteurs de la citoyenneté hongroise étant en effet favorables à sa réélection.

Cette priorité de protection de l'identité hongroise semble mettre à mal le rattachement à la position commune par Orbán qui voit dans la crise ukrainienne une opportunité de faire prévaloir certains de ses intérêts nationaux, et refuse de soutenir l'action de l'Union européenne. Par exemple, la Hongrie a su se démarquer de la position commune de l'UE en remettant en cause la politique de sanctions économiques et politiques contre la Russie, sous prétexte que l'embargo de la Russie mettait en danger l'économie du pays, alors que le ministre de l'agriculture hongrois a reconnu que le secteur fermier ne souffrirait pas significativement de cet obstacle<sup>15</sup>. Mais le cœur du problème reste la politique de protection et de rapprochement avec les minorités hongroises d'Ukraine. En effet, celle-ci représente 135 000 habitants en 2011 (Brie, Polgar, 2013 ; 143) et se concentre principalement dans l'Oblast de Transcarpatie, notamment dans la ville de Berehovo qui se situe à moins de 10km de la frontière avec la Hongrie. Cependant, le nombre de personnes obtenant la nationalité hongroise ne cesse d'augmenter, engendrant par là-même une augmentation de la part de hongrois dans un Oblast comportant presque 1,3 millions d'habitants en 2013, ce qui est vu par la presse ukrainienne pro-européenne comme un moyen de son voisin d'aider Moscou à affaiblir Kiev en tentant de détourner son attention de l'est vers l'ouest, ce qui est difficilement possible pour l'Etat ukrainien, et en réduisant le nombre de personnes pouvant être mobilisées dans le cadre du conflit<sup>16</sup>. De plus, alors que l'on pourrait penser qu'avec une part de 10% de la population au sein de l'oblast il n'y aurait pas matière à augmenter l'autonomie de cette région, c'est pourtant le discours que tient Budapest. En effet, alors qu'elle soutient le dénouement pacifique de la crise ukrainienne, la Hongrie y voit un moyen pour la minorité hongroise vivant en Ukraine d'obtenir plus d'autonomie, ce qui revient à mettre à mal l'unité de l'Ukraine et à rejoindre, dans une moindre mesure cependant, l'appel des séparatistes de Donetsk et Lougansk. Si l'obligation de réformer la constitution ukrainienne, présente dans les accords de Minsk II, afin de garantir plus

<sup>14</sup> Simon Zoltan (2014), *Ukraine is Urged to Extend Autonomy for Ethnic Hungarians*, Bloomberg, 12 mai, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-12/ukraine-is-urged-to-extend-autonomy-for-ethnic-hungarians> dernier accès le 13 octobre 2015

<sup>15</sup> Szakacs Gergely (2014), *Europe 'shot itself in foot' with Russia sanctions: Hungary PM*, Reuters, Budapest, 15 août, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/15/us-ukraine-crisis-sanctions-hungary-idUSKBN0GF0ES20140815> Dernier accès le 13 octobre 2015

<sup>16</sup> Globe Paul A. (2015), *Hungary openly helping Putin destabilize Ukraine*, Euromaidan Press 5 mars <http://euromaidanpress.com/2015/03/05/hungary-openly-helping-putin-destabilize-ukraine/> Dernier accès le 13 octobre 2015

d'autonomie aux régions de l'Est ne vise pas en soit à accorder cette même autonomie à d'autres régions où une minorité réside, le texte n'a pas encore été voté et la Hongrie pourrait essayer d'influer politiquement dans la rédaction de ce texte. Cependant, une telle réforme paraîtrait peu rationnelle étant donnée la faible proportion de hongrois résidant en Ukraine, et même au sein de l'oblast de Transcarpatie.

Les prises de position de Victor Orbán tranchent particulièrement avec le reste de l'Union européenne. La dimension particulière des communautés hongroises, alliée à un nationalisme ambiant en Hongrie, remet en cause la dimension unitaire que recherche l'Union car elle relève clairement des intérêts nationaux de la Hongrie. Ces derniers peuvent être considérés comme contre-productifs pour l'UE car atteindre les objectifs de la Hongrie reviendrait à pénaliser l'Ukraine, qui au contraire doit être soutenue par l'UE pour pouvoir conserver son intégrité nationale. Seul pays qui s'écarte autant de la position commune de l'Union, la Hongrie pose donc problème pour assurer la crédibilité de l'unité européenne mais également pour défendre la position commune à l'encontre de la Russie car elle assure au contraire un soutien, indirect du moins, à Moscou afin de supporter ses propres intérêts nationaux.

### **3. Conclusion**

La crise Ukrainienne pourrait bien marquer un tournant pour l'Union européenne qui doit en plus faire face à une crise économique qui a toujours des répercussions et à une crise migratoire qui agite les relations entre ses Etats membres. De la réussite ou de l'échec à mener cette crise géopolitique vers sa résolution peut dépendre le poids de cette organisation régionale sur la scène internationale. C'est-à-dire, devenir acteur politique majeur, en montrant qu'elle peut elle-même assurer la paix et la sécurité sur son propre continent, ou devoir au contraire se contenter de ses compétences en matière de commerce international et laisser ses Etats membres résoudre individuellement ou au sein d'autres organisations (OTAN, OSCE...) les crises. Parvenir à une position commune, à une politique commune européenne, reste le plus grand défi à nos jours pour l'UE quelle que soit la problématique abordée, et l'exemple ukrainien ne l'illustre que trop bien. Les Etats membres étudiés représentent les différents obstacles et situations que rencontre l'UE dans son travail. On peut constater que quand bien même les Etats frontaliers à l'Ukraine et à la Russie ont de plus grand intérêts en Ukraine et enjeux dans la résolution de cette crise, ils se sont retrouvés exclus de la table des négociations au détriment des deux moteurs de l'Union : la France et l'Allemagne. Ces partenaires jouissent d'une plus grande influence et crédibilité sur la scène internationale, la première grâce à sa puissance diplomatique et militaire, la seconde grâce à son importance économique. Ces deux pays peuvent également apparaître plus neutre, plus objectif du moins qu'un Etat tel que la Pologne, beaucoup plus engagé dans l'ancrage de l'Ukraine, mais aussi de la Biélorussie, vers l'occident ce qui est vu d'un mauvais œil par la Russie et pourrait potentiellement porter atteinte à l'élaboration d'accords permettant à la sortie pacifique de cette crise. Il semble désormais un peu tard pour l'UE de pouvoir s'affirmer en tant qu'acteur de première envergure dans le cadre des négociations. Néanmoins, les projets mis en place avec l'Ukraine, et notamment l'Accord d'Association, laissent une part importante à l'Union européenne, et il ne faut pas oublier les ambitions européennes de Kiev, à l'origine de la crise. Alors que l'Union européenne peut paraître faible, trouvant difficilement un consensus parmi ses Etats membres, c'est pourtant sa force qui attire ses voisins, dont l'Ukraine, pour des raisons non seulement économiques, mais aussi à sa capacité à réformer un système corrompu et instable politiquement, et à la sécurité qu'elle représente.

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## **CYBERWAR & CYBERTERRORISM HEADING TOWARDS A CYBER-WATERLOO**

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**Abstract:** *The purpose of this paper is to give an in depth analysis on today's internet threats with particular emphasis on all kinds of cyber crime. The national and international security consequences of malicious use of the internet, represents a struggle for every organisation, state and individual user. In a world where governments rely on network computer technology, a possible cyber-attack is an imminent concern and a guaranteed threat. The present analysis starts with a quantitative evaluation of cyberterminology, giving scientific definitions. It is followed by examples and situation that were created to undermine the power of a nation (i.e. Estonia, Iran with the Stuxnet virus) or government. This article examines a case study about a cyber warfare in the Middle East and furthermore we investigate how a country could be marching to a possible cyber – Waterloo as well as go into details on how the same country could strengthen its cyber safety to prevent such a scenario.*

**Keywords:** *cyber crime, cyber threats, cyber warfare, infrastructure, terrorism*

### **Introduction**

Our world is ever changing, and the way we live our lives has changed more and faster the last 50 years than it did the previous 3 centuries. This includes the way we fight wars and commit crimes. Cyber crime, cyber wars, cyber terrorism, cyber activism, cyber security; these are all new terms that invaded our everyday life. They are terms most of us use or read about, without giving any second thought as to what they actually mean.

The cyber threats are very real and have a serious impact on our lives and also on organization off all sizes or types. We, as a global nation, are increasing also in numbers and it is important to understand the meaning of cyber security and the protection of our data. Only today we are an estimated number of internet population of 2, 5 billion people, which till 2020 will increase up to 5 billion people that will use the internet that is a total of nearly 60 % population online.

It is very important to understand the terms of security that take place in our cyberspace. As stated in *The National Cyber Security Framework Manual*, ISO defined cyber security as the "preservation of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information in the Cyberspace."<sup>1</sup> The Netherlands defined cyber security more broadly, to mean 'freedom from danger or damage due to the disruption, breakdown, or misuse of ICT. The danger or damage resulting from disruption, breakdown or misuse may consist of limitations to the availability or reliability of ICT, breaches of the confidentiality of information stored on ICT media, or

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<sup>1</sup> Alexander. Klimburg, *National Cyber Security Framework Manual*, ISO/IEC 27032:2012, 'Information technology – Security techniques – Guidelines for cybersecurity.', page 12

damage to the integrity of that information.<sup>2</sup> But an even more broadly and scientific definition, it is given to us by ITU, which describes cyber security as:

*"The collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment and organization and user's assets. Organization and user's assets include connected computing devices, personnel, infrastructure, applications, services, telecommunications systems, and the totality of transmitted and/or stored information in the cyber environment. Cybersecurity strives to ensure the attainment and maintenance of the security properties of the organization and user's assets against relevant security risks in the cyber environment. The general security objectives comprise the following: availability; integrity, which may include authenticity and non-repudiation; and confidentiality."*<sup>3</sup>

**Table<sup>4</sup>**

	Today	2020
<b>Estimated World Population</b>	7 billion people	~8 billion people
<b>Estimated Internet Population</b>	2.5 billion people (35% of population is online)	~5 billion people (60% of population is online)
<b>Total Number of Devices</b>	12.5 billion internet connected physical objects and devices (~6 devices per person)	50 billion internet connected physical objects and devices (~10 devices per person)
<b>ICT Contribution to the Economy</b>	~4% of GDP on average for G20 nations	10% of worldwide GDP (and per- haps more for developing nations)

When we speak of "security", it is just natural to try and tackle and deal with the "defence" strategy. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation defines cyber defence (not in a military context) as: *"the ability to safeguard the delivery and management of services in an operational CIS (Communication and Information Systems) in response to potential and imminent as well as actual malicious actions that originate in cyberspace."*<sup>5</sup>

It has been called the "unconventional terrorism" (O. Lepick and J.F.Daguzan call it *le terrorisme unconvencionnel* in their latest book) but it is often the case that all successful terrorism is effective because it is unconventional, and it forces conventional entities (governments, armies and organizations like NATO) to switch to unconventional

<sup>2</sup> Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice, 'The National Cyber Security Strategy (NCSS). Strength through Cooperation,' (The Hague: National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security, 2011), 4., accessed through <https://ccdcoe.org/publications/books/NationalCyberSecurityFrameworkManual.pdf>, on 12.10.2015

<sup>3</sup> Recommendation ITU-T X.1205 (04/2008), Section 3.2.5., accessed through <https://ccdcoe.org/publications/books/NationalCyberSecurityFrameworkManual.pdf>, on 12.10.2015

<sup>4</sup> Angelica Mari, 'IT's Brazil: The National Broadband Plan' itdecs.com, 26 July 2011., accessed through <https://ccdcoe.org/publications/books/NationalCyberSecurityFrameworkManual.pdf> page 4, on 12.10.2015

<sup>5</sup> Geir Hallingstad and Luc Dandurand, Cyber Defence Capability Framework – Revision 2. Reference Document RD-3060 (The Hague: NATO C3 Agency, 2010)., page 13

methods they are not familiar with or ready to employ. These terms are increasingly used in policy discussions, but hardly ever defined.

### **Cyber warfare and the rule of International Law**

The definitions of cyber warfare have at some point become an important issue. This is because these definitions will help determine when an act or an actor, are committing an act of war or if they are to be considered combatants.

Victim-states must be able to classify a cyber attack as an armed attack or imminent armed attack before responding with active defences because, as we discussed earlier in this chapter, armed attacks and imminent armed attacks are the triggers that allow states to respond in self-defence or anticipatory self-defence.<sup>6</sup> Ideally, there would be clear rules for classifying cyber attacks as armed attacks, imminent armed attacks, or lesser uses of force. Unfortunately, since cyber attacks are a relatively new attack form, international efforts to classify them are still in their infancy, even though the core legal principles governing armed attacks are well settled. Consequently, whether cyber attacks can qualify as armed attacks and which cyber attacks should be considered armed attacks are left as open questions in international law. (Carr Jeffrey, 2011)

Since it was ratified in 1945, the justification for the use of war has been based mainly on the Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. This provision directs that *“all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”* Article 51 of the UN Charter provides that *“nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations.”* Although there is debate about the scope of the Article 51 right of defence (self defence), it is generally accepted that Article 51 establishes an exception to the absolute prohibition on the use of force set forth in Article 2(4). Furthermore, it is widely accepted that “armed attack” is understood to be something that rises beyond the threshold of a use of force as meant in Article 2(4). With respect to active cyber defence and the UN Charter, therefore, two major issues emerge. First, for purposes of Article 2(4), are there cyber attacks that rise to the level of a use of force? Second, for purposes of Article 51, can cyber attacks be equivalent to an armed attack that would give rise to a state’s right to use lethal force in response? This latter question relates to the issue of what remedies are available to a state that is the victim of a cyber attack or that faces the imminent threat of a cyber attack. (Carr Jeffrey, 2011)

What the “use of force” and “armed attack” mean has remain vague, and until the inception of the internet, the common wisdom would be the use of weapons in their conventional, nuclear, chemical and biological morphs. This would be understood as something that an army would have physical possession and use of (i.e. a biological agent, a bomb or a nuclear device). This would also include the vessels that would carry such weapons (i.e. airplanes, missiles, ships, tanks etc.)

According to US Lieutenant General Keith Alexander giving evidence to the US Senate, “there is no international consensus on a precise definition of a use of force, in or

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<sup>6</sup> <http://proquestcombo.safaribooksonline.com.libezproxy.open.ac.uk/book/networking/security/9781449318475/4dot-responding-to-international-cyber-attacks-as-acts-of-war/id3048294> accessed, 10.10.2015

out of cyberspace. Consequently, individual nations may assert different definitions, and may apply different thresholds for what constitutes a use of force.”<sup>7</sup>

The interpretation of Article 2(4) and Article 51 in relation to cyber warfare is very important. The definition of self defence and responses by state officials is and will be an issue for debate. This debate is not just academic. It is a matter of time before it will have to come before an international court or tribunal.

In July 2011 the US government publicly articulated a general position on cyber attacks and Article 2(4) and Article 51, and the Department of Defence unveiled its unclassified version of its Cyber Strategy. While the unclassified version was general in its descriptions of DoD initiatives to counter cyber threats, a discussion of the strategy in a *Wall Street Journal* article—in which US military officials were cited as sources—provided the more interesting context to the US position on cyber attacks and the UN Charter provisions. According to the sources, the Pentagon has articulated the concept of “equivalence” to decide when a cyber attack would trigger a conventional response. If a cyber attack were to result in death, damage, or a high level of disruption similar to that of a conventional military attack, then it could be grounds for a conventional response. In releasing the strategy, Deputy Defence Secretary William Lynn stated, “The United States reserves the right, under the laws of armed conflict, to respond to serious cyber attacks with a proportional and justified military response at the time and place of its choosing.” Through its announced strategy, the US government has clarified its thinking on cyber attacks and Article 2(4) and Article 51 of the UN Charter. There could be cyber attacks against the United States and its infrastructure (i.e., the electric grid) that the government would interpret as “armed attacks,” therefore triggering the right to respond with force, through conventional or cyber means. Both academic and policy experts have supported this idea of assessing the legality of cyber attacks based on the effects of the actions taken. (Carr Jeffrey, 2011)

The issue remains as to when an attack is sanctioned by another state or group, when it is definitely an act of war and how is a state entitled to respond?

Let’s examine the hypothetical scenario of Chinese sponsored hackers attacking the National Grid in the United States. This attack to the US infrastructure is not having just financial repercussions. It has multi-dimensional ones. The US will claim (probably rightfully) that these attacks put at risk more than the economy. They put at risk lives, by interfering with anything from hospitals, to traffic lights to water pumping. This may be the casus belli the US needs under international law to start a physical confrontation with China. But what is proportional response? Is sending an ALCM/SLCM (Air/Surface Launched Cruise Missile) with a conventional warhead to blow up a Chinese power plant near Beijing? Is placing nuclear submarines at DEFCON 1 ready to launch nuclear warheads proportional? And who is to judge what is proportional? If 10,000 people die in the US as a direct result of the attack on the national grid, isn’t it proportional for the US to seek an equal loss of life on the Chinese side? Or maybe a proportional number to the population (around 42,000 Chinese casualties)?

### **What are Cyber Governance and Cyber Security Governance?**

The fast development of the internet has led to the creation of myriads of new terms; some of them overlap in etymology or are confusing by their own nature. There are no “official” definitions, so different countries and different groups assign different

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<sup>7</sup> [https://media.blackhat.com/ad-12/Clark/bh-ad-12-legal\\_aspects\\_of\\_cyberspace\\_clark\\_Slides.pdf](https://media.blackhat.com/ad-12/Clark/bh-ad-12-legal_aspects_of_cyberspace_clark_Slides.pdf) accessed 14.10.2015

meaning to different words. Internet Governance and Cyberspace Governance are usually accepted as being the same. One of the definitions I found as more inclusive and comprehensive is the following: “*Internet governance is the development and application by Governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet*”<sup>8</sup>

It is also conventionally accepted that IT Security Governance and Cyber Security Governance refer to the same issue. This is because with the advent of the internet and interconnected devices, the risk of data loss has moved from the physical damage or loss (i.e. the removal of a disk drive or a laptop) to the cyber (interconnected). ISACA’s working group on Cyber Security Governance has come with the following definition: “*IT Security Governance is the set of responsibilities and practices exercised by the board and executive management with the goal of providing strategic direction, ensuring that objectives are achieved, ascertaining that risks are managed appropriately and verifying that the enterprise’s resources are used responsibly.*”<sup>9</sup>

### **What are Cyber Crime, Cyber Terrorism, Cyber Espionage and Cyber Warfare?**

The definition of Cybercrime, cyber terrorism and cyber warfare are easier to come about.

**Cyber crime** is any illegal activity online that results in deception, loss of data, money and other assets and puts people in risk or distress. Forms of cyber crime include online fraud, phishing, pharming, spear phishing, whaling and of course cyber stalking and cyber bullying. The other form of cyber crime relates to hacking, which can be either a direct and focused attack to a computer system or a business or a person, to the indiscriminate carpet attack to any computer on a given network or geographical area.

**Cyber terrorism** is the use of the cyberspace by terrorist groups that want to damage individuals, groups or countries. This includes cyber activism or hactivism, when that is crossing the line of breaking the law.

**Cyber Espionage**, as the name tells it all, is the perfect activity, to filter, penetrate itself anonymously into secret location, to collect data, that is not meant to be public. Cyberspace provides an exceptional environment for espionage because it provides ‘foreign collectors with relative anonymity, facilitates the transfer of a vast amount of information, and makes it more difficult for victims and governments to assign blame by masking geographic locations.’<sup>10</sup> It is considered to be theft of commercial intellectual property and proprietary information, of data with significant economic value, or the theft of government sensitive and classified information.<sup>11</sup>

However it is defined, cyber espionage, particularly when targeting commercial intellectual property, risks, over time, undermining a national economy. Many countries

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<sup>8</sup> <http://www.wgig.org/docs/WGIGREPORT.pdf>, accessed on 07.09.2015

<sup>9</sup> [http://www.isaca.org/knowledge-center/research/documents/information-security-governance-for-board-of-directors-and-executive-management\\_res\\_eng\\_0510.pdf](http://www.isaca.org/knowledge-center/research/documents/information-security-governance-for-board-of-directors-and-executive-management_res_eng_0510.pdf), accessed on 07.10.2015

<sup>10</sup> US Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic Secrets in Cyberspace. Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, 2009-2011., page 16

<sup>11</sup> Alexander Klimburg, National Cyber Security Framework Manual, page 16

use espionage to spur rapid economic growth based on advanced technology, targeting science and technology initiatives of other nations. Because ICT forms the backbone of nearly every other technology used in both civilian and military applications today, it has become one of the primary espionage targets. Of course, military and civilian dual-use technologies will remain of interest to foreign collectors, especially advanced manufacturing technologies that can boost industrial competitiveness.<sup>12</sup>

Cyber warfare is the actual confrontation between two or more nations or a nation and an attacker using cyberspace as their battlefield. This warfare can have different levels of result and repercussions. Nonetheless, the term *cyber war* has a useful academic purpose, in terms that it concentrates thinking on state to state conflict within and through cyberspace, and the ramifications this can have. Accordingly, cyber warfare has become an unavoidable element in any discussion of international security. For example, Russia discusses information warfare methods as a means to ‘attack an adversary’s centres of gravity and critical vulnerabilities,’ and goes on to state that by doing so, ‘it is possible to win against an opponent, militarily as well as politically, at a low cost without necessarily occupying the territory of the enemy.’<sup>13</sup>

When nations begin to discuss cyber warfare, they need to clarify what they mean by cyber attack.<sup>14</sup> The most general definition of a cyber attack is a malicious premeditated attempt to disrupt the confidentiality, integrity or availability of information residing on computers or computer networks.<sup>15</sup> In order of severity, these attacks include the adversary seeing information they are not supposed to (i.e., spying), disrupting the legitimate use of that information to others (i.e., blocking a transmission, or shutting down a service), or changing information without authority (which can range from manipulating personal data to interfering with the control systems of industrial facility, with catastrophic results).<sup>16</sup>

It is crucial, when talking about cyber attack, to take cognizance of the principal of distinction. As stated in the *Tallinn Manual*, a cyber attack is a cyber operation, whether offensive or defensive, that is reasonably expected to cause injury or death to persons or damage or destruction to objects.<sup>17</sup> In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives.<sup>18</sup>

Cyber crime is what affects most of us, and we all have received phishing email, asking for our bank accounts, our login details etc. The Council of Europe (CoE) adopted a

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<sup>12</sup> *Ibidem*

<sup>13</sup> Alexander Klimburg and Heli Tirmaa-Klaar, *Cybersecurity and Cyberpower: Concepts, Conditions and Capabilities for Cooperation for Action within the EU*, (Brussels: European Parliament, 2011), [http://www.oii.ac.at/fileadmin/Unterlagen/Dateien/Publikationen/EP\\_Study\\_FINAL.pdf](http://www.oii.ac.at/fileadmin/Unterlagen/Dateien/Publikationen/EP_Study_FINAL.pdf), accessed on 11.10.2015, page 17

<sup>14</sup> Alexander Klimburg, *National Cyber Security Framework Manual*, page 18

<sup>15</sup> Kevin O’Shea, ‘Cyber Attack Investigative Tools and Technologies,’ in *HTCIA* (Hanover, NH: Dartmouth College, 2003)

<sup>16</sup> Alexander Klimburg, *National Cyber Security Framework Manual*, page 75

<sup>17</sup> *Tallinn Manual*, page 106

<sup>18</sup> *Tallinn Manual*, page 111

Convention on Cybercrime in July 2004.<sup>19</sup> The treaty defined key terms such as "computer system", "computer data", "traffic data", and "service provider" in an effort to create commonality among signatories' existing statutes, but does not define the key term 'cybercrime'. The treaty went on to highlight actions that nations must undertake to prevent, investigate and prosecute, including copyright infringement, computer related fraud, child pornography and violations of network security. For example, it outlined offences against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and systems (i.e., illegal access, illegal interception, data interference, system interference, misuse of devices).<sup>20</sup> But cyber terrorism and cyber warfare are different things.

Cyber terrorism itself is a term that works as an umbrella for many different groups and umbrellas. One of the most easy to understand is hacking of government websites and databases. This hacking can be orchestrated by terrorist groups, individuals but some time it may be state sponsored. It has been the belief of many western countries that many cyber attacks in the USA, UK, Germany and other western countries were sponsored by the Chinese and Russian governments, while some attacks to businesses (i.e. SONY) were orchestrated by rogue nations like North Korea.

### **A bit of History**

In 2008, during the Russo-Georgian war, a series of cyber attacks brought down websites from all sides. This included Georgia, Azerbaijan, South Ossetia and Russia itself.<sup>21</sup> The website of the Georgian President was one of the first victims of this war and ended up with pictures of the Georgian President depicted and compared to Adolf Hitler. Estonia offered help but at the time Georgia stated it did not require it.

On 27 April 2007, Estonia itself had been at the receiving end of a sustained cyber attack. This was the first recorded case of full scale cyber warfare. The attacks were orchestrated by Russia even that was of course denied. A Russian hacker with the handle Sp0Raw said at the time that judging from the sophistication and size of the attacks, individuals would not have been able to sustain them without the help of the Russian government. The Estonian authorities identified the source of the attacks in different Russian jurisdictions and they asked for the Russian prosecutors to assist in their investigations, something that was later rejected.

The consequences of the attack on Estonia's infrastructure were severe. Estonia relied on cyber services to a degree above all other European countries. Government services, tax offices, banking, records; everything was online. And now for the days of the attack the government had to do something, and they did the unthinkable: the last resort. Estonia shut down the internet. This meant that nobody could perform any function with the civil service and government authorities. But it meant no one could use internet banking or debit/credit cards. Estonians abroad were not able to make payments for simple things like hotels and flights.

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<sup>19</sup> Marco Gercke, 'Regional and International Trends in Information Society Issues,' in HIPCAR – Working Group 1 (St. Lucia: ITU, 2010), accessed through <https://ccdcoe.org/publications/books/NationalCyberSecurityFrameworkManual.pdf>, on 12.10.2015, page 14

<sup>20</sup> <https://ccdcoe.org/publications/books/NationalCyberSecurityFrameworkManual.pdf>, accessed on 12.10.2015

<sup>21</sup> <https://en.rsf.org/georgia-russian-and-georgian-websites-fall-13-08-2008,28167.html>, accessed on 07.10.2015

Although a Kremlin sympathising group, Nashi, claimed responsibility, very few people believe that this was not state sponsored<sup>22</sup>. This incident forced western governments to re-think their cyber security doctrines. As a result the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence started operating from Tallinn in Estonia<sup>23</sup>.

Other attacks have originated from the West. The infamous Stuxnet<sup>24</sup> was a joint US-Israeli piece of malware that was targeted to PLCs that controlled centrifuge devices in the Iranian nuclear infrastructure.

Cyber activism is another form of online cyber crime. The group Anonymous has gained the public's support as Robin Hood did once. But that does not mean that its members do not break the law in their respective jurisdictions.

### **The Insider Threat**

And as if the external threats are not enough, there is the Internal Threat. The one person inside an organisation that can betray and expose its inner dealings. This happened with Corporal Manning (US Army) and Edward Snowden (NSA). But the insider threat is not something new. For millennia, castles and fortified cities have fallen because someone opened a small back door.

Today criminals, activists, terrorists and other groups have at their disposal extreme technology that can help them achieve their targets. The fear of attacks to banks and websites has now shifted to the fear of attack in infrastructure: pipelines, power grid and oil rigs. What Stuxnet did at the Iranian nuclear programme, can do anywhere where PLCs are used. That includes trains and rides on roller coasters.

Hospitals and health related industries amount for one third of all loss of private data and identity theft in the US. And in the 2015 UK Government research on computer breaches, government agencies suffered more leaks than private companies. In the same research businesses in the UK suffered almost twice the amount of breaches by their employees than by hackers.

### **A Case Study: Conventional War leading to Cyber Warfare in the Middle East**

On 27 December 2008, Israel started an attack on the infrastructure of Hamas in Gaza. This attack was code named "Operation Cast Lead". After a month of bombing, Hamas announced to the world media that more than 1,000 people died, and published photos of alleged victims and destruction of property and infrastructure.

The anti-Semitism that followed was portrayed in the cyber attacks against Israeli websites or other websites of Jewish interests. In the first month of 2009, it is believed that more than 10,000 websites had been affected in one way or another.

In the two months between December 27, 2008, and February 15, 2009, a lot of high profile websites were defaced or attacked:

YNETNEWS.COM belongs to an Israeli newsgroup. The website was affected by the hackers re-directing traffic destined for the website to a fake one, with their own message. This was achieved by the hackers getting access to the domain registrar who held the domain name. Despite the damage, the actual site was never hacked.

Discount Bank, an Israeli bank, also suffered the same fate.

<sup>22</sup> <http://on.ft.com/1ZXGHZK>, accessed on 07.10.2015

<sup>23</sup> <http://www.networkworld.com/article/2279535/lan-wan/nato-to-set-up-cyber-warfare-center.html>, accessed on 07.10.2015

<sup>24</sup> <http://wapo.st/23mH7I8>, accessed on 07.10.2015

Both cases were orchestrated by the “Evil Team” and were achieved by getting DNS control of the domains through the common registrar, DomainTheNet.

Another website that was defaced was KADIMA.ORG.IL, the official site of Israel’s Kadima Party. An Algerian team defaced it and posted photos from Israeli soldier’s funerals, promising that more Israelis will die. The site was subject to multiple attacks. The first by “DZ team” and the second by the “Gaza Hacker Team”

Other sites include the website of the Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Barak (hacked by Iranian hackers “Ashianeh Security Team” and the he Radio Tel Aviv website. Multinational companies associated with Israel were also victims of this campaign, with companies including VW, Mazda, McDonalds, Burger King, Pepsi etc.

During this cyber war campaign, many different groups acted together or in tandem, or just individually. The hackers seem to originate mostly from Morocco, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Palestine and other Arab destinations. However a security company in Israel (Applicure Ltd) stated that the actors were related or affiliated to Hezbollah and Iranian government agencies. They estimate that most of the attackers were experienced and some of them had been involved in the Sunni-Shiite cyber war in 2008. Applicure, an Israeli government contractor has helped developed Israel’s cyber defence.<sup>2526</sup>

According to Bloomberg<sup>27</sup>, Israel Electric Corp, the major electricity supplier in Israel, reported a few hundred attacks on their infrastructure in 2013 and 20,000 attacks in 2014. These attacks were not successful because the Israeli company and government had invested in the right strategy and infrastructure.

### **The Israeli Answer**

Israel has been investing on Cyber Security heavily since 2002 when the government created the National Information Security Authority to protect critical infrastructure. In 2012 it established the National Cyber Bureau, an agency within the office of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that coordinates and advises on policy. The authority established this year will be responsible for protecting civilian entities such as banks, said Yitzhak Ben-Israel, who helped found it. It isn’t enough just to have sophisticated defences, said Amos Yadlin, a former military intelligence chief who now heads Tel Aviv University’s Institute for National Security Studies.

“You can’t be a good defender unless you understand the offense,” he said. “Therefore, defensive efforts must overlap to some degree with offensive efforts, including those of intelligence collection.” (Bloomberg, 2015)

Israel Electric together with Cyber Control (another IT Security firm) created the “Cyber Gym”, a simulated environment that allows the study of potential attacks against the electricity grid. They now offer the service to companies from around the world!

The Bank of Israel appeared to be the first national bank in the world to define cyber attacks as part of their financial system’s threats to infrastructure.

Another thing that Israel did is something that will be hard to implement at this stage in most western world countries. The policy of “Two Cables”. The state of Israel is connected to the outside world using just 2 cables !!!

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<sup>25</sup> <http://www.science.co.il/SoftwareCo.asp?s=security>, accessed on 02.10.2015

<sup>26</sup> <http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/company/applicure-technologies-ltd02.10.2015>

<sup>27</sup> <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-21/nonstop-cyber-attacks-drive-israel-to-build-hack-proof-defense02.10.2015>

### **How can a Country march to its Cyber Waterloo?**

The conditions for cyber warfare and cyber terrorism change as political conditions and technologies shift. However some principles remain standard.

The main factors that will contribute to a Cyber Waterloo are:

- Lack of preparedness. This includes lack of defence plans, rehearsing and infrastructure

- Lack of political will and vision. Countries that do not see cyber threats for what they are and they do not want to commit the capital, effort and work hours to prepare for a doomsday scenario, will find themselves at the receiving end of ruthless cyber attacks

- Lack of alliances. A country may be small, but if it has strong allies, the assailants will think twice before starting a confrontation.

- Lack of dissemination of information. Experience has shown in the last few years that when government and businesses share information of imminent attacks or attacks as they happen, they may better defend and prepare for future incidents.

- Bureaucracy. This is in my opinion one of the largest threats. Bureaucracy makes things slow, hard to adopt and even harder to make decisions during a crisis.

In order to avoid a cyber-Waterloo, a country must prepare well, create a comprehensive Incident Response Plan and it must explore different scenarios that will help it prepare different responses.

The people in charge for the response must be at a certain level in the government and/or armed forces that will allow them to execute plans and responses without the need for meetings, discussions and without dependence on the political wills of the day.

The cyber threats are more than one kind. They evolve and mutate and we need to keep abreast of these developments. Businesses, charities and governments need to be vigilant. Organisations need to do their due diligence and investigate their weak spots, try to identify and fix problems, and have in place an Incident Response Plan.

Countries need to re-evaluate constantly their cyber strategies, their cyber security doctrines. More than that, they need to establish platforms of cooperation between businesses, academia and state organisations, for fast and efficient exchange of information. Such programmes exist already<sup>28</sup> with EU funded projects like DFET (Digital Forensics Evaluation & Training), the international military organisation - NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (NATO CCD COE) and The Cyber Academy (Edinburgh Napier University) which bring together different countries, universities and police forces. Other regional conferences like Cyber Security Romania<sup>29</sup> are a step forward.

But what needs to be done, is more cooperation, larger budgets and training. There is also a need for national and international frameworks to create standards in training. In the UK, the GCHQ (the “boss” of James Bond) has started accrediting Cyber Security Master’s degrees<sup>30</sup> something that other countries should follow.

There is also need for the public to be informed. Legislation needs to be up to date and fit for purpose. Military and its international organisations like NATO need to invest

<sup>28</sup> The Cyber Academy ([www.thecyberacademy.org](http://www.thecyberacademy.org)), is a platform for Edinburgh Napier University to disseminate information, training and response know how to businesses and other organisations. The DFET programme brings together universities from Edinburgh Napier University, UK, Jozef Stefan Institute, Slovenia, University of Stockholm, Sweden, The Scottish Police, Scottish Drug Enforcement Agency, UK, accessed on 20.09.2015

<sup>29</sup> <https://cybersecurity-romania.ro/>, accessed on 08.10.2015

<sup>30</sup> [http://www.gchq.gov.uk/press\\_and\\_media/press\\_releases/Pages/GCHQ-certifies-Masters-Degrees-in-Cyber-Security.aspx](http://www.gchq.gov.uk/press_and_media/press_releases/Pages/GCHQ-certifies-Masters-Degrees-in-Cyber-Security.aspx), accessed on 25.10.2015

heavily and prepare. Governments need to put plans in place to deal with attacks like the one in Estonia, in order to minimize losses and mitigate risk.

What the case of Israel has taught us is that Cyber Security on a State level is something that needs to be taken seriously, and that it takes time. It took more than a decade for Israel to get where it is now. But it has reached a level of security envied by the EU and the United States. It is not a surprise to many people in the industry that Israel is host to many cyber security and digital forensics companies. In fact there are two major digital forensics platforms for mobile phone forensics in the market, and the one (Cellebrite) is an Israeli company.

It is up to us to face the new reality, the new challenges ahead and to ensure that when we go to war in Cyberspace, we are not heading to a Cyber-Waterloo.

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## THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA-FROM PARTNER TO ASSOCIATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

*Alina Ioana PRISTAȘ\**

**Abstract:** *The European Union through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) wishes to elaborate an alternative method in terms of the EU-neighbouring countries relationship, a relationship based on common values that are shared by both parties of the partnership. At first, the article will present to the reader the influence of the EU, based on the ENP, in its Eastern borders. Then, to observe how the EU relationship evolved during the years with one of the Eastern countries we have chosen to study its relations with Moldova, mainly because this country and its European vocation might represent an example to other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) that would like to approach the European Union. In the end the research will bring forward a comparative analysis of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) and of the Association Agreement (AA) signed by the EU and Moldova.*

**Keywords:** *European Neighbourhood Policy, Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, Association Agreement, Eastern neighbours.*

### 1. The European Neighbourhood Policy in the East

The European Union's aim of bringing the Eastern neighbours closer to the standards and values promoted by it, divided the opinions of the specialist. Some of them considered that the EU exerts its influence to the disadvantage of the democratic and economic development of the Eastern countries, while others see in this influence a beneficial effect that other countries similar to the Eastern European neighbours do not enjoy or consider it is a moral duty for the EU to help develop these countries (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeider, 2005: 3).

The studies have shown us that we can identify two stages through which a state approaching the EU, integrates the values of its rules and standards. Thus, in a first phase, the state must appeal to democratic reforms, then in the second phase to take over the *acquis communautaire*. The European Neighbourhood Policy helps the fulfilment of the first stage, but shows itself limited to the second condition, which is specific to the accession process (Schimmelfennig, Sedelmeider, 2005: 12-22).

Starting with the year of 2004, when the ENP was launched, the EU was more active than ever in the Eastern zone. Moreover, in certain periods of time the EU benefited from more economic exchanges than Russia with the countries located in this area, countries aimed by the ENP – Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Belarus (until the economic crises) (The National Bureau of Statistics of Moldova, 2014). Also, our research showed us that following the energy crisis in 2006 and 2009 the EU increased its energy cooperation with the neighbouring states. It even provided to Moldova and Ukraine the possibility to adhere to the Energetic Community, through which it is desirable

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the aligning of these two states to the European energy legislation. In this regard, both states have assumed the obligation to align their gas prices to the world ones.

On the other hand, the EU has become more involved in the conflict management in the Eastern neighbourhood. Thus, it became a mediator between the Moldovan and Trans-nester dialogue and it ensures border assistance throughout EUBAM.

In plus, a significant number of advisors were involved in the Armenian and Moldovan Government, so it promotes the reforms, and in Georgia a border support team works in direct contact with the stateborder guards. From the launch of the ENP, the EU and the member states have increased their diplomatic activity in the Eastern region. So, from two European delegations encountered in this area at the beginning of the ENP, nowadays we can find six delegations, in each of the Eastern ENP member states.

Moreover, the contractual relations of the EU with its Eastern neighbours have been advanced. The first one hasnegotiated Association Agreements with Moldova and Ukraine and it initiated similar agreements with Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. Besides, the agreement on the visa liberalization was sign with Moldova and Ukraine as well and agreements on visa facilities were started with Georgia, Armenia andAzerbaijan. Also, the financing of the Eastern neighbours has increased along with the southern ones form 8.4 billion Euro in the period of time 2002 – 2006 to 11.2 billion Euro in 2007-2013 (Gnedina, Popescu, 2012: 3).

Despite an increased involvement of the European Union in the Eastern area of Europe, we can also observe that this was limited in the actions. The studies have revealed that not each time the policies were efficient. We could also note a similar situation in the security process and the economic reforms. In this regard, Brussels hasn't always managed to lead its Eastern partners toward an elaborate democracy and great impact reforms in the values promoted by the EU in this area. So, the EU's influence in reforms and democracy trajectories or in external policies aiming to solve the conflicts in the area was marginalized. In other words its presence hasn't automatically transformed in its power over this region. On the other hand, we have observed that once the EU interest in the East is increased, its influence on the political development has stalled.

Behind the EU's failure in transforming its presence in power in the Eastern states we can encounter three structural trends. First, a regional trend, dictated by the increase of the authoritarian and quasi-authoritarian regimes of the neighbouring states. The second, a global trend, a result of the emergence of a multi-polar world, which allows the Eastern states to play an important role for other actors as well. The last trend is an intern one, launched by the EU concern regarding the institutional and economic crises management reforms (Gnedina, Popescu, 2012: 5).

## **2. The European Union's Relationship with Moldova**

Moldova has proclaimed its independence in August 1991. Until 1992 this new independent state has obtained its international recognition and became a member of the United Nation (UN) or other kind of international organizations (The Embassy of Republic of Moldova in Romania, 2014). The Moldovan Government addressed several requests to the European Communities to begin the integration and cooperation process. At first, Moldova had to solve the problems it encountered at that time. We remind in this context the territorial integrity problem, which presupposed the reunification of Moldova with the region of Transistor (region considered by Moldova to be a part of the country, while the Transistor proclaimed itself an independent republic). Another problem found in our research consisted of the presence of the military troops in the region of Transistor.

The third problem that was to be solved by Moldova before it could start its integration process was the reform of the political, juridical, social and economic system (Lowenhardt, Hill, Light, 2001: 613).

The signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union took place in 1994 and it entered into force in 1998. Although in 1999 the implementing of the PCA was postponed due to Moldovan political instability, the integration process couldn't be stopped anymore. From this moment on, Moldova became more and more active and involved in the European actions, became a member of the European Council, of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, of the Danube Commission and other international cooperation structures. Moreover, Moldova has been the only ENP state, member of the CIS, which in 2001 became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Moldova has been one of the neighbouring countries aimed by the ENP and this led to an even tighter cooperation between this state and the European Union. In 2005 Moldova signed with the EU the Action Plan, which set the cooperation direction. This document was charged by the Moldovan authorities as a way toward the European integration and they appeal the Article 49 of the European Union's Treaty, according to which any European state can adhere to the European Union. On the other side, the European authorities saw the document as a means to establish a better neighbourhood (Lowenhardt, Hill, Light, and 2001: 4). The document foresaw several policies and directions that had to be fulfilled in short or in midterm: the opening of a Moldovan delegation in Brussels and of a European delegation in Moldova, the development of the cross-border cooperation and reforms in the judicial system. As we can see, the Action Plan developed the institutionalization of the cooperation relationship between the EU and Moldova. On the other side, the actions that had a long term to complete foresaw the establishment of a commercial agreement between the two, the visa liberalisation, association perspectives and full integration of Moldova to the EU (The Member States, 2005).

In 2006, Moldova and the EU sign an agreement on external assistance. Based on that, over 250 million Euro were directed toward Moldova in the period of time 2007-2013, through the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, Program, which proposed the development of an area based on common values, prosperity and stability, a better cooperation and economic and regional integration (European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument, 2013).

The Eastern Partnership, launched in 2009 addressed Moldova and other states aimed by the ENP as well (Goşu, 2013: 25). The new Eastern cooperation and partnership aroused between the Russian, Moldovans or Ukrainian governors the impression that the European Union seeks to circle Russia. We consider important to mention, however, that at the beginning, in the elaboration phase of the ENP, Russia was one of the countries aimed by the new policy. Russia on the other hand never accepted such a close approach to the European Union (Evenimentul zilei, 2013).

The beginning of the Association Agreement negotiations in 12 January 2010 had known an intense progress during the year. Because this process followed the pattern of the Ukrainian negotiation of the Association Agreement, all the phases were to be anticipated. The new document, signed in 2014, was to substitute the old Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and represents one if not the most important element in the Moldovan legal framework.

We observe that in 2010 the EU- Moldova relationship had advanced on two levels. On the first level, in June was opened a dialogue regarding the free movement of

the Moldovan Citizens in the Schengen space and so the visa liberalization, which in our opinion, represents an important subject that has a great impact on the economy and not only, sector. At the second level, the political dialogue had known a higher point once the negotiations for the Association Agreement were started.

Recently, Moldova and the EU have signed, based on the negotiations and the signing of the Association Agreement, the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) Agreement. This document involves a gradual liberalisation of the goods and services commerce, by customs duties and the technical barriers reduction and the harmonization of the Moldovan legislation with the European one (Evenimentul Zilei, 2013). Thus we can easily state that if the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was based on action plans and intervention in certain fields of interest for both parties, without legal, economic or any other type of constraints, the DCFTA brings the economic integration of Moldova based on legislative regulations.

Moldova had the leading position among the Eastern neighbouring countries in what concern the DCFTA and the Association Agreement negotiations and signing, and also in concern with the Visa Liberalisation Action Plan implementation. Based on that, in our opinion, Moldova continues to be an active and important participant in the relationships established by the EU with the Eastern neighbouring states.

### **3. Moldova – from the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement to the Association Agreement**

To understand better the evolution and the complexity of the Moldova-EU relationship we will present next the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and the Association Agreement between the two, by the exposure of the documents' structures and their differences.

#### ***3.1. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Moldova and the European Union***

The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Moldova was signed in 1994 and entered into force in 1998. This document, along with other similar documents, signed with all the CIS states, except Tajikistan, have replaced the Agreement on trade and commercial and economic cooperation signed in 1989 between the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Bușcăneanu, 2006).

The objectives of the document are defined in Article 2, as follows " Respect for democracy, principles of international law, and human rights as defined in particular in the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, as well as the principles of market economy, including those enunciated in the documents of the CSCE Bonn Conference, underpin the internal and external policies of the Parties and constitute an essential element of partnership and of this Agreement " (The Member States, Art.1, 1994).

The document has been signed for a period of ten years. According to its text the agreement "is concluded for an initial period of ten years. The Agreement shall be automatically renewed year by year provided that neither Party gives the other Party written notice of denunciation of the Agreement six months before it expires" (The Member States, Art.98, 1994).

We underline that the agreement supports a tightened process between parties in many domains such as the political dialogue, trade in goods, capital and payments,

investments and businesses, intellectual activities, competition, industrial, protection and properties.

The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement has 91 pages, 2093 words, 106 Articles and 10 Titles. Within the Agreement, *cooperation* repeat itself for 145 times, *partnership* for 15 times, *politic* for 15 times, *economic* for 53 times, *security* for 15 times and *integration* and *association* not even once. Based on these, in our opinion the main purpose of the Agreement was the cooperation and the economic sector had a more important role than tightening the political dialogue, for example. Of course we must agree that the economic sector is more complex than the political dialogue one and also that the first's impact in other sectors is highly representative.

Further, we will present the body of the Agreement.

#### Title I- General principles

This section presents the main objectives of the document and the CIS states are encouraged to maintain and develop the relationships among themselves, and so, the good neighbourhood to be promoted.

This title doesn't promise that once Moldova will develop and reform its economy, the parties will establish a free trade area (The Member States, Art.3-4, 1994). In our opinion a free trade area between Moldova and the EU will bring benefits for both parties. We also highly support this kind of action, that as we will see further, was already initialled in 2014 once the Association Agreements between the two was signed.

#### Title II- Political dialogue

The research showed us that this title foresaw the development and the increase of the political dialogue between the parties, which will strengthen Moldova's links with the European Community and so, with the democratic nations' community. The economic convergence represents another subject that it was thought to strengthen the political dialogue and the convergence's increase in the domains of international interest will improve the stability and the security (The Member States, Art.6, 1994). In our opinion, this item was fulfilled mainly because the relationship between the parties have evolved from the moment when the PCA was signed until today form a partnership relationship to the associates one. We consider that these kinds of relationships are to be encouraged in future as well.

#### Title III Trade in goods

Under this title we observed that the parties agreed under the most favoured nation treatment on subjects like customs duties and charges applied to imports and exports, including the method of these charges' collection, transit, goods warehousing and shipping provisions, selling and buying regulations, distribution and the use of goods in national market rules. This most favoured nation treatment doesn't apply to create advantages that will help to create a free trade area or to facilitate to other states the border traffic (The Member States, Art.10, 1994). Moreover, the parties agreed to take some articles from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and also that the national goods of one party that is imported by the other not to be subject for supplementary taxation (The Member States, Art.14, 1994).

The nuclear goods commerce will run according to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (The Member States, Art.22, 1994).

In our opinion, the facilities presented above helped Moldova to improve its national economy, so it can become a market economy and also helped the EU to become this country's main economic partner.

#### Title IV Provisions affecting business and investment

This title divides under 4 main chapters:

Chapter I *Labour conditions*, which promises a treatment free from any discrimination based on nationality for the Moldovan citizens working in the EU (The Member States, Art.23, 1994).

Chapter II *Conditions affecting the establishment and operation of companies*, which ensure the same treatment for the Moldovan companies established in the EU as for the third countries (The Member States, Art.29, 1994).

Chapter III *Cross-border supply of services* which fix the provisions for gradual acceptance of the services (The Member States, Art.36, 1994).

Chapter IV *General provisions* which allow for the parties to apply the national law in respect with the „entry and stay, work, labour conditions and establishment of natural persons and supply of services, provided that – in so doing – they do not apply them in a manner as to nullify or impair the benefits accruing to any Party under the terms of a specific provision of the Agreement” (The Member States, Art.40, 1994).

Title V Current payments and capital

The title sets a freely convertible currency for the payments connected with the movement of goods, services or persons (The Member States, Art.47, 1994).

Title VI Competition, intellectual, industrial and commercial property protection and legislative cooperation

We have observed that under this title the parties have agreed on fixing or eliminate the competitive or national restrictive. Besides, Moldova will have to continue to improve its intellectual, industrial and commercial property protection and for that it was set five year restriction from the entry into force of the Agreement, for Moldova to align to the Community standards (The Member States, Art.48, 1994).

Title VII Economic cooperation

This section foresees the development of economic relationships between the parties, with the purpose to contribute to the economic reform of Moldova and the sustainable development of the last one. Thus, the interest domains were industrial cooperation, investment promotion and protection, public procurement, cooperation in the field of standards and conformity assessment, mining and raw materials, cooperation in science and technology, education and training, agriculture and the agro-industrial sector, energy, environment, telecommunications, financial services, money laundry, monetary policies, regional development, social cooperation, tourism, communications and information, SMEs (Small and Medium Sized enterprises), consumer protection, customs, statistical cooperation, drugs (The Member States, Art.51, 1994).

We conclude that the Economic Community's relations with Moldova targeted many domains that would have had a high impact in the economic sector of this state.

Title VIII Cultural cooperation

This underlines the promotion and support of both parties for the cultural cooperation (The Member States, Art.77, 1994).

Title IX Financial cooperation

To ensure the Agreement's objectives fulfilment it was foreseen a financial assistance for Moldova, through the Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) Program (The Member States, Art.78-79, 1994).

Title X Institutional, general and final provisions

Through the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement the relationship of Moldova with the EU were institutionalized by the foundation of three bodies: the Cooperation

Council, the Cooperation Committee and the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee (The Member States, Art.82-87, 1994).

Based on the information presented above, we conclude that at the signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, both parties' intentions were to cooperate in certain domains, especially in the economic one, and also to improve the political dialogue. At that time no mention regarding Moldova's integration to the EU were made. Moreover, we observe that although the Agreement brings mentioning about security and stability this doesn't propose concrete actions. Besides, this document doesn't bring mentioning related to the Trans-Nister conflict resolution as well, although at that time this conflict was initiated.

In our opinion once Moldova evolved over the years and once it was aimed by the ENP, it was necessary to improve this Agreement between the two parties. In this final statement, if we add Moldova's European aspirations, we conclude that the initiative of the Eastern Partnership (a complementary action to the ENP) to change the neighbouring states' status from partners to associates was welcome.

The EU's enlargement towards East and also the launch of the ENP put Moldova closer to the European Community. With the ENP came also the Action Plans which based on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, set the intervention directions so it answers to the new Policy's objectives, to go beyond cooperation with Moldova, to obtain a significant level of economic integration and increase in political cooperation. The Action Plans also responded to the shortcomings of the PCA regarding the tightening of the stability and the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict, it introduces the border management or solutions to fight against the gun traffic (EU/Moldova Action Plan, 2005).

### ***3.2. The Association Agreement between Moldova and the European Union***

The Article 131 of the Rome Treaty foresees the signing of Association Agreements between the European Community and non-European states, with the purpose to promote the economic and social development of the last ones and to establish close economic relations between these and the European Community (The Member States, 1957).

The Association Agreement between the EU and Moldova was signed following several negotiation rounds, in 27 June 2014 as it started to be applied provisionally from 1st September 2014 (European External Action Service, 2014). In our opinion changing the status from partner to associate represented for Moldova an important step, because so it is confirmed that this country reached a good developmental level, which allows it to improve its relations with the European Union.

The Association Agreement will function during its provisionally appliance, along with the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, as it is stated in Article 464, which, according to Article 465, the former will be repealed once the Association Agreement will come into force permanently (The Member States, 2014).

The new document aims to improve the political dialogue and the economic relationship of Moldova and the EU by granting to Moldova a support in reform implementation, economic increase and sectorial cooperation. Moreover, this Agreement promotes the gradual integration of Moldova to the internal market of the EU by signing the DCFTA Agreement between the two parties and so to overcome the relations level set in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.

The Association Agreement comprises common provisions, based on regulations and cooperation beyond traditional agreements, by appealing all the interest areas. Also, the Agreement presents sections that address the parties' involvement in sustainable

solutions identification for the Transnistrian problem, and the joint effort for the post-conflict rehabilitation.

The Agreement includes common values and principles of the parties such as democracy, respect of the human rights, rule of law and sustainable development.

In plus, it introduces comparative to the PCA, a structure for the Foreign and Security Policy, by focusing on regional stability, mass destruction guns, international cooperation in fighting against terrorism, crises management and conflict prevention (European External Action Service, 2014).

The Association Agreement between the European Union and Moldova contains over 753 pages, 7 Titles, 35 Annexes, 4 Dispositions, 12849 words and 465 Articles. Within the document the word *cooperation* repeat itself for 54 times, *partnership* for 30 times, *politic* for 22 times, *economic* for 188 times, *security* for 90 times, *integration* for 23 times and *association* for 157 times. Based on these data, we conclude that AA includes compared to the PCA, a very important component to enhance the relationship between the two parties: the security. This component was not foreseen in the PCA. Besides, we observe that the AA compared to the PCA focuses on integration, while its component DCFTA transcends the simple economic relations and aims the integration.

Once implemented, the Association Agreement will bring to the citizens of Moldova numerous benefits. The examples include a better protection of the consumer, more business opportunities or SMEs, which grant new jobs and so it helps to reduce migration. Other advantages would be the reduction in product prices, better quality for them, transparency, better functioning of the judicial system or efficient use of energy resources (European External Action Service, 2014)

Further on, we will present the Association Agreement's Titles.

#### Title I General principles

This section presents the common values of both parties who commit to respect the democratic rules and the human, market economy and sustainable development rights, the rule of law and the international obligations. Comparative to PCA, the parties commit to encourage good neighbourhood relationships, including the cooperation for common interest projects development, especially in fields that aim the corruption fight and criminal or terrorist activities (The Member States, Art. 1, 2014).

We observe now the enrichment of the common values and principles of the two parties compared to the previous agreement, by introducing the security component.

#### Title II Political dialogue and reform, cooperation in the field of Foreign and Security Policy

Under this section, the parties commit themselves to improve the political association and the convergence of the security policy, to promote the international stability and security, the crisis management, to cooperate in a practical level to obtain peace and security in the European continent, to straighten their respect for their common values and principles and to respect and promote the sovereignty and territorial integrity principles (The Member States, Art. 3, 2014).

The section presents forward issues concerning mass destruction guns which represent a danger for international peace and stability and set action directions in this issues management.

In our opinion the international security subject is very important for the parties' good relations. These subjects that were not encompassed in the PCA enhance the cooperation level between Moldova and the EU. Also, we observe that in this regard action lines were set.

### Title III Freedom, Security and Justice

This section presents the parties' commitment to promote judicial independence and the access to justice and also to promote the principle of the correct process, data protection, to cooperate in domains like migration, asylum, border management and free movement of persons, which are based on the visa liberalization - entered into force in Moldova in 2012, organised crime and corruption prevention and other illegal actions, drugs or money laundry (The Member States, Art. 12-20, 2014).

The above mentioned data allow us to state that both the parties have an increased interest in issues targeting the security.

### Title IV Economic and other Sectorial Cooperation

This chapter presents 28 political areas that the EU and Moldova commit to fulfil. These are: Public administration reform, Economic dialogue, Company law, accounting and auditing and corporate governance, Employment, social policy and equal opportunities, Consumer protection, Statistics, Management of public finances: budget policy, internal control, financial inspection and external audit, Taxation, Financial services, Industrial and enterprise policy, Mining and raw materials, Agriculture and rural development, Fisheries & maritime policy, Energy cooperation, Transport, Environment, Climate action, Information society, Tourism, Regional development, cross-border and regional level cooperation, Public health, Civil protection, Cooperation on education, training, multilingualism, youth and sport, Cooperation in research, technological development and demonstration, Cooperation on culture, audio-visual policy and media, Civil society cooperation, Cooperation in the protection and promotion of the rights of the child, Participation in Union agencies and programmes (The Member States, Art. 21 -140, 2014).

The above mentioned data allow us to conclude that the association with the EU comes along with the adoption of the *acquis communautaire*. This ensures Moldova's integration to the EU. Moreover, the majority of the cooperation issues listed above are negotiated in the same with the issues negotiated by the EU with the states that adhered to the European space in 2005-2007. In our opinion, this will facilitate Moldova accession to the EU, if it will receive the title of candidate state.

### Title V Trade and Trade-related Matters

This title presents all the facilities of goods exchange between Moldova and the EU, in other words the DCFTA Agreement. It sets the criterion on custom duties, free movement of the capital, provisions related to services, issues on competition, transparency, methods of solving trade conflicts (The Member States, Art. 144-412, 2014). In our opinion, this sphere will contribute to a new level of economic relations between Moldova and the EU which will tighten even more both of the parties.

### Title VI Financial assistance, and anti-fraud and control provisions

This section mentions that Moldova will benefit from financial assistance from the EU through financial instruments and mechanisms. Moreover, this will benefit from the possibility to request loans from the European Bank of Investment, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development or other international financial institutions. The financial assistance will be granted to achieve the Association Agreement's objectives and the annual assistance approved by the parties will be reflected in annual action programs, based on multi-annual frameworks that reflect the policy priorities. The section also enunciates that the assistance will be set according to Moldova's needs, its sectorial capacities and its reforms in interest areas fixed by the AA. The title presents also anti-fraud and control provisions for the financial assistance received by Moldova (The Member States, Art. 413-421, 2014). In our opinion the financial assistance offered by the

EU to Moldova will encourage many projects that will help to achieve the objectives encompassed in the Association Agreement and will bring Moldova even closer to the EU.

#### Title VII Institutional, general and final provisions

This last title encourages the political dialogue on any level in problems regarding the sectorial cooperation between the parties. The Agreement creates the institutional framework by setting an Association Council, which will be formed by members of the European Commission and members of the Moldovan Government. The agreement doesn't specify, however a number of members. The Council will function independent of other institutions and will be led by rotation by European representative and one of Moldova's. The Council will have decision power concerning the AA implementing. To approach the Moldovan legislation to the EU's the Council will represent a forum for information exchange between the parties on legislative issues. Beside the Association Council an Association Committee will be established as well. The last one will assist the Council in its activities at it will be assisted by subcommittees. Also the Parliamentary Association Committee will be formed by members of the European and Moldovan Parliament. This will be informed by the Association Committee about the implemented actions of the Association Agreement and will propose recommendations. The Agreement foresees also the creation of a Civil Society Platform formed by representatives of the European and Moldovan civil society (The Member States, Art. 433-443, 2014).

Thus, we conclude that similar to the PCA, to ensure better implementation of the Association Agreement, an institutional framework was to be created. In our opinion, especially the fact that all these institutions are formed by representatives of both parties, which ensures the strength of the political dialogue and the experience exchange, will bring significant benefits to Moldova.

The Association Agreement places the EU-Moldova relationship to a higher level and creates, according to us, the perfect timing for the Moldovan development.

#### 4. Conclusions

The European Neighbourhood Policy through its actions and complementary initiatives like the Eastern Partnership brought the Eastern neighbours encompassed in its objectives closer to the European Union.

Since its launch in 2004 it has helped to improve neighbouring CIS countries' relationship with the EU and even changed some of their status from partners to associate countries. This is the case of Moldova as well and the change was officialised by the signing of the Association Agreement that replaced the old Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.

The above analysis that helped us see the differences between the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and the Association Agreement that Moldova signed with the EU allow us to conclude that along the time the relationship between the two parties have considerably improved. If we saw that the PCA presented a simplistic framework for cooperation, without taking into account common interest factors like the security, AA comes to complete these shortcomings. In our opinion PCA haven't presented a section dedicated to the security issue also because at the signing time of this document the European Union was newly formed in its present form, based on the three pillars, where one of them was aiming the Foreign and Security Policy (The Member States, 1992).

Moreover, while the PCA eliminated the possibility of a free trade area, AA regulates this aspect. The last one also brought substantial additions to the economic parts, foreseen also in the PCA, and extends the common objectives of both the parties.

All in all the study will allow us in future to determine if Moldova managed to fulfil its duties presented in the AA, as she did in the case of PCA, and so to obtain the possibility of becoming a member state, and also to set new action lines in case the future Actions Plans will lack in concrete measures to achieve the Association Agreement's objectives.

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## **II. European Values and Forms of Multiculturalism**

**István SÜLI-ZAKAR, Ágnes PÁLÓCZI, Tibor KÓTI** ⇔  
*Majorities and Minorities: Case Study of Hungary's Romani People*

**Teofil Ioan ŞTIOP** ⇔ *Video Art Intercultural Dimension within the Context of New Technologies. The Video Art Event Project*

**Radu CARP** ⇔ *Religion: inside or outside the Public Sphere? A Debate around the Habermas Model*

**Anca OLTEAN** ⇔ *New Data on the History of Jews from Romania*

**Alexandra-Cristina LOY** ⇔ *The Europeanization of Political Parties in CEE: the Influence of the Party of European Socialists upon the Social Democratic Party in Romania between 1990- 2005*

**Oana-Andreea ION** ⇔ *The Europeanization of Domestic Representation Structures: Operationalizing the Dependent Variable*

**Laurențiu PETRILA** ⇔ *About Moral Crisis of European Values in the Context of Globalization*



## MAJORITIES AND MINORITIES: CASE STUDY OF HUNGARY'S ROMANI POPULATION

*István SÜLI-ZAKAR*\*, *Ágnes PÁLÓCZI*\*\* , *Tibor KÓTI*\*\*\*

**Abstract:** *In their study, the authors focus on the situation of Romani population in Hungary in past and present focusing on the censuses from 1782, 1893, and also providing valid figures for the present days (700.000 of Gypsies in the actual Hungary). They identify three categories of Gypsies: Hungarian gypsies or Romungros, Vlach group that migrated from Wallachia in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and Boyash gypsies that migrated from Banat and Southern Transylvania in 19<sup>th</sup> century. The authors wrote on integration and assimilation of Gypsies considering that the ideal multicultural society has failed, focusing on factors hindering integration and factors favorizing assimilation.*

**Keywords:** *Gypsies, integration, segregation, assimilation, discrimination, marginalisation, migration.*

### Introduction

By the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century Hungary became one of the most homogeneous countries of Europe owing to the Treaty of Trianon, the forced relocation of the Swabians, the Czechoslovak–Hungarian “population exchange”, the option to choose the nationality of Serbians, etc. This homogenization has been disappearing primarily due to the intense population growth of gypsies as a result of which every tenth Hungarian citizen will be gypsy within a few years. However, in contrast of the aging Hungarian society gypsy population represents a youthful group which unambiguously seems more-and-more significant both in political and human resource aspects. It is generally known that a considerable proportion of Romani people in Hungary live on welfare grants. This, besides that the social and economic integration of gypsies, the so-called “gypsy issue” became a hot political issue, also means a serious burden on the society. This is due to the differences in values, their problems in erudition and mode of life, the bias of the majority of citizens against gypsies which can be eliminated or at least reduced by accelerating integration processes. The authors believe that the socio-geographical studies of Romani people, besides the remarkable sociological and roumological achievements so far, can give an efficient tool for identifying and solving the problems.

The growing number and spatial spreading of Hungarian gypsies currently in the state of population explosion increase the sensitivity of most people in the aspect of living next to each other. The shift in proportion in population sharpened and enlarged the differences of the two groups in mode and view of life which led to social stress. Therefore ethnic conflicts occur more often between Hungarian population in majority

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and gypsy population in minority, which are unfortunately generated by party politics, as well. Further escalation of the crisis endangers the social and economic stability of Hungary, which requires the inevitable integration of gypsies as a solution. Since the end of communism in Hungary for such purposes only a few attempts have been made, therefore, it is high time for people from both groups who recognize that accelerating Roma integration cannot be further postponed without serious adverse consequences to meet. To achieve mutual amending intentions is the aim since the most serious social and ethnic conflicts in Hungary nowadays are related to gypsies.

### Gypsy population in Hungary

The first census of gypsy population is dated in 1782 and their number was 43,738. Interesting fact that statistical surveys with such high scientific accuracy about gypsy population were carried out only in Hungary probably even up to now (Kemény I. 1997). From the aspect of accuracy of the statistics the so-called Census of Gypsy Population held on 31<sup>st</sup> January 1983 by the Royal Hungarian National Offices of Statistics (in Hungarian: OMKSH) can be mentioned as a positive example. This census, which was held nationwide except for Budapest and Croatia, was based on not self-declaration of gypsy people but on the judgment of their neighborhood. In 1893 the number of the registered gypsy people was 274,940 in the Kingdom of Hungary, which was more than the estimations in 1873 by 60.000 people (Figure 1). This great number demonstrates that the immigration of the Olah gypsies from Wallachia had been in progress in those decades. At the time of the census the proportion of gypsy people was 1.7 % in Hungary and 5.1 % in the counties of Transylvania (Kocsis K. – Kovács Z. 1999).



**Figure 1:** The proportion of gypsy population in the processes and the cities of Hungary  
**Source:** Census of Gypsy Population 1893

According to the census of 1893 the mother tongue of a considerable number of the Hungarian gypsies, 104,750 people from the total amount of 274,940 was Hungarian, which is 38.1%. However, 82,405 gypsy people (29.9%) had Gypsy language and 67,046 (24.4%) had Romanian as the native language and many of them had moved to the Carpathian Basin only in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Based on this statistical dataset, it can be stated that a considerable part of people speaking Gypsy as their mother tongue, who were in fact itinerant gypsies, lived in counties of NW Hungary (Trencsény, Nyitra, Ugocsa, Zólyom, Árva, etc.) where, however, gypsies do not live at present. It was probably due to that these Vlach gypsies from Old Romania considered NW Hungary only as a transit country while they were migrating towards Western Europe and America. As it is in the census of 1893, 69.2% of male gypsies had a regular job and 36.7% of them were day laborers, 28.9% of them were craftsmen and 3.6% of them were musicians. The proportion of craftsmen among gypsies was significant compared to the total population of Hungary at that time, when the majority of gypsy craftsmen were metalworkers (half of the smiths in the villages were gypsy) and the number of gypsy locksmiths and nailers was high, as well. Among gypsy woodworkers the wooden trough carvers and spindle makers, among gypsy construction workers (mainly mud workers) those who were making adobe bricks and walls were overrepresented (Havas G. 1982).

In the Kádár era gypsies were mainly considered to be people of an ethnic group facing social problems, and according to the report of the Central Committee (CC) of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) written in 1961 assimilation was regarded as the solution for these issues. Therefore the Political Committee of the Central Committee of the HSWP passed a resolution at 20<sup>th</sup> July 1961 with the title of 'Certain tasks about improving the situation of the gypsy population'.

1. Regarding to the resolution the Cultural Association of Hungarian Gypsies (CAHG) was disbanded, and the Ministry of Culture became responsible for the cultural and social tasks. Despite that CAHG could make some good progresses by drawing attention of the councils and social agencies on the problems, it was stated that 'the CAHG was unable to have an important role in the re-education of gypsy population'.

2. Making the living conditions of gypsies better can be achieved by three tools: work, accommodation, and education.

3. The resolution prescribed that gypsy settlements and the re-house of gypsies into the near municipalities. The aim was not only to raise the living standards but the dispersion of gypsies among the total population in order to quicken their assimilation.

4. The resolution fundamentally defined the social status of gypsies: 'Our politics about the gypsy population is based on the principle that despite some ethnographic features gypsies do not form a whole ethnic group.' The main argument against considering gypsies to be an ethnic group was that it might strengthen their separateness and inhibit their integration into the society (their assimilation).

5. The resolution labeled gypsies as a social class to be eliminated which suggests that the gypsy issue was considered to be only a social issue. Havas G. pointed out that this approach was incorrect since 'it increases drag and gives people identity in whom it was not an »immanent« need and since it forms gypsies, who in fact were not a homogenous group in sociological, ethnic and cultural aspects, to be a cohesive minority'.

The resolution established a ternary category system which determined the perception about gypsies until the end of the era. Integrated gypsies, who were no more considered to be gypsies according to the assimilation ideology, belonged to the first category. The second category included gypsies whose integration was in progress but

they still lived separated. Gypsies showing no ability and willingness to be integrated, who were the problematic group, belonged to the last, third category. However, this approach fell in its own trap since it had to face with the dilemma of assimilative politics: “a policy aiming to decrease dissimilarities of a certain group automatically focuses on the particularities of the group thereby implicitly recognizes its dissimilarities.

After this resolution of the Political Committee, the first government decree about the removal of settlements not meeting the so-called social requirements was stated in 1964. However, as a result of socialist industrialization and great construction projects gypsy males could get jobs. 85-90% of gypsy males could work in the mining and industrial districts of Borsod and Nógrád counties while in Szabolcs and Hajdú-Bihar counties gypsy males fit to work were transported to the constructions of the capital and Trans Danube Region by the so-called ‘black trains’. The resolution of the Political Committee of the HSWP’s CC stated in 1961 resulted in significant achievements such as removal of gypsy settlements unfit for human life, increasing number of gypsy children in education and higher employment rates among gypsies. However, the end of communism stopped, moreover considerably set the integration of gypsies back. After two and a half decades we can declare that gypsies were hit the most by the regime change (Kertesi G. 2000, 2005).


Nowadays, the majority of European gypsies with a total number of 10-12 million live in SE Europe (Central Eastern Europe and in the Balkan), and they showed a significant population growth in the last decades. At the first meeting of the delegates of European gypsies held in London between 8<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> April 1971 when the International Romani Union (IRU) was founded the participants estimated the number of gypsies living in the continent to be around 3-3.5 million. According to very moderate estimations at present the number of the gypsy population is around 10 million people in Europe. However, as it is in the discussion paper prepared by the Hungarian Government in 2011 for the acceptance of European Roma Strategy during its presidency for the European Parliament, there is a gypsy population with the total number of 10-12 million in Europe, most of them with EU citizenship. In contrast to nowadays’ Europe with its rapidly aging and decreasing population, gypsy population has shown demographic boom nearly over the whole last decade. SE European countries with the greatest Roma population are already EU members or candidates but their integration to the western market is not trouble-free. In such disadvantageous circumstances the situation of gypsy citizens is especially hopeless in SE Europe, in the actual periphery of EU (Süli-ZakarI., 2012/b). EU members with the greatest gypsy population are those who joined between 2004 and 2007, namely Romania (2-3 million people), Bulgaria (1,2 million people), Hungary (600-700 thousand people) and Slovakia (500-600 thousand people).

In the four decades after the foundation of the International Romani Union (IRU) the number of European gypsies nearly tripled. Gypsy delegates, at the meeting held in London in 1971, said that they were the delegates of European gypsies with a total number of 3-3.5 million, and according to moderate estimations the current number of European gypsies is approximately 10 million. In the report for the EU written during the Hungarian Presidency the number of European gypsy people is estimated to be 10-12 million, also demonstrating that gypsies are in a considerable population growth (BOTLIK ZS. 2012). In nowadays’ Europe gypsies show the greatest natural population growth, even ahead of Albanians.

Authors find the gypsy-Hungarian separation only in the aspect of lifestyle not based on ethnical or national criteria. (Although, the authors experienced that some gypsy leaders would demand for it.) Arguments for the opinion of the authors:

1. every Hungarian gypsy is Hungarian citizen, therefore according to national criteria they are all Hungarians;
2. at least 80-85% of Hungarian gypsies speak only Hungarian, Hungarian is their native language, thus the majority belong to the Hungarian nation based on linguistic and cultural national aspects, as well;
3. according to the self-statements about nationality registered at the latest census most gypsy people are Hungarian, and evidently, the fundamental principle that "Hungarian is who declares himself/herself as Hungarian" applies to their cases, as well. (It is worth noting that most people with dual identity put Hungarian at first place.)

Without appropriate statistical studies it is very difficult to define the place of gypsies in the Hungarian society (Ferge ZS. 2001, Süli-Zakar I.-Czimre K.-Pálóczi Á. 2014). Hungarian gypsies, like underprivileged groups and ethnics in other countries, even very rich countries, are over represented in lower social levels (Figure 2).



**Figure 2** Underprivileged social groups (ethnics) in Hungary (A) and in the USA (B) A: Hungary – Hungarians and gypsies B: USA – white, Afro-Americans, Indians, Hispano-Americans, etc.


Regarding integration and social advancement, the geographical distribution of gypsy population is rather unfavorable. According to the census of 2011, 47.2% of gypsy ethnics live in cities (6.4% in Budapest, 9.5% in county cities, and 31.3 % in other cities). The rest (52.8%) live in strongly segregated conditions of small villages in the most underprivileged periphery in the north-eastern marginal areas, Central Tisza Region and South Trans-Danube Region.

Based on the 2011 census, gypsy population was overrepresented in 31 settlements, however, recent studies from the Department of Social Geography and Regional Development, University of Debrecen based on the telephone interviews with every settlement, indicate that ethnic change took place in 137 settlements, primarily in

Cserehát, Central Tisza Region and in Ormánság (Pénzes J.-Pásztor I. Z. 2014). Number of gypsies has increased in the periphery not only due to demographic boom but location changes thanks to cheap house prices, as well. Boosting economic growth is extremely difficult in such areas due to the settlement pattern of such segregated small towns (Virág T. 2006).

### Special identity of Roma people

Gypsies are a 'hiding' ethnic group; to accurately define their number is almost impossible. Nevertheless, their intense demographic growth can be traced both in census data and estimations (Hablicsek L., 2007). In censuses answers to ethnic questions are voluntary. Formerly one in three gypsies admitted their gypsy roots, while the gypsy population with a total number of 315 600 found in the census of 2011 is only around the half of the number (657 600) estimated by László Hablicsek also in 2011. The data base of the census of 2011 – though the authors agree that only half of the gypsies declared their ethnic status – can be used for representing the geographical distribution of gypsies (Figure 3).



**Figure 3** Geographical distribution of gypsies by counties in 2011  
*Source:* population census from Hungarian Central Statistical Office

Ratio of gypsy population is the greatest in the following counties: Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén (8.5%), Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg (8.0%), Nógrád (7.65%) and also in other NE Hungarian counties (Heves 6.3%, Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 4.94%, Hajdú-Bihar 3.39%), and South Trans-Danube Region (Somogy 5.28%, Baranya 4.54% and Tolna 3.93%). According to the estimations, which represent reality much better, these numbers should be doubled. Estimations of sociologists about the actual number of Hungarian gypsies reflect reality much better than the data base of the population census (Kemény I.- Janky B. 2003, Kertesi G.- Kézdi G. 2009). These estimations were based on that gypsies are considered to be gypsy by the people living close to the person.

Authors believe that at present the number of Hungarian gypsies can be estimated around 700 thousand people based on former sociological assessments. It is very difficult to define who is considered to be a gypsy in mixed neighbourhoods due to mixed


marriages. Living conditions of people in deep poverty have merged so much that it is impossible to distinguish gypsies and not gypsies from each other. István Kemény estimated the number of Hungarian gypsies to be around 320 000 in 1971. He found that for 231 000 people (70.4% of them) Hungarian, for 61 000 people (21.2% of them) Gypsy and for 25 000 people (7.6% of them) Romanian was the mother tongue (Keményi. 1976). At present days Hungarian gypsies with an estimated number of 700 000 can be categorized into three ethnic groups (Erdős K. 1989, Süli-Zakar I., 2012a):

a) The so-called 'Hungarian Gypsies', named 'Romungros' in Romani language, living in Hungary since the Middle Ages are the greatest group with 70% of the gypsies living in Hungary. Their own former language became extinct a long time ago. Hungarian has been their mother tongue for generations. Most of them self-declared that they had been Hungarians not gypsies in population censuses.

b) The so-called Vlach Gypsies migrated to Hungary from Wallachia in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Nowadays they give 21% of the gypsies in Hungary. Their language is the Lovari dialect of the Romani language, which is still spoken by many of them even today. They name themselves as Rom, which means man, husband and its plural is Roma).

c) Boyash gypsies live in the counties of the South Trans-Danube Region who migrated here from Banat and Southern Transylvania also in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Around 8% of the gypsies living in Hungary are Boyash gypsies and belong to this ethnic group. According to our experience, they insist on their mother tongue the most which is the 'Banat' dialect of the archaic Romanian language. The remaining 1% of the gypsies living in Hungary are the small groups of Sinti and Wendish gypsies who live in the western border-lands (Erdős K.1958) (Figure 4).

*Geographical situation, ethnic distribution  
(The ethnic groups of the Roma people in Hungary)*



SÜLI-ZAKAR, István

Estiamtion (2011): approx. 640 000


**Figure 4:** Estimated numbers of gypsies living in Hungary and their ethnic groups by regions (2009)

Geographical distribution of the ethnic groups was determined by using the data base of the population censuses of 2001 and 2011 (Süli-Zakar I. 2012a). this approach is not unassailable which is recognized by the authors. During the population census in 2001 one third of the gypsies said that they had belonged to a gypsy ethnic (Roma, Boyash, Romani). These rates are rather kind of enlightenment. 25,6% of people belonging to

gypsy ethnic (48 685 people) reported that their native language had been not Hungarian (and among family and friends they had spoken Romani and Boyash language instead of Hungarian). In 2011 not Hungarian was the mother tongue of 54 339 gypsy people from the total 315 101, while the national average was 17, 2 %. The ratio of gypsies speaking not Hungarian as their mother tongue by counties shows significant differences. Their ratio is the lowest in Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén county where nearly every gypsy is romungros; there are greater Olah gypsy population only in Ózd and Miskolc. Their ratio is also high in Heves, Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok and Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg counties. It is around the national average in Budapest and Nógrád, Hajdú-Bihar and Békés counties where besides Hungarian gypsies there are a considerable Olah gypsy population, as well.

### Language skills


Usually, speaking an own, common language is an important base of the identity of nationalities (ethnic groups) in Europe. In the case of gypsies common language is missing from the identity forming factors. Less competent experts claim that gypsy (Lovari) language could be the common language.



**Figure 5** Changes in the number of those with gypsy mother tongue according to the two latest population censuses: **a**, Ratio of people whose mother tongue is not Hungarian (48 685 people) among gypsies (Roma, Boyash, Romani) with a total number of 190 046 by counties in 2001. National average: 25.6%. **b**, Ratio of people whose mother tongue is not Hungarian (54 339 people) among gypsies (Roma, Boyash, Romani) with a total number of 315 101 by counties in 2011. National average: 17.2%

However, only Vlach gypsies, giving only 21% of the gypsies living in Hungary consider Romani language as their own common language and language replacement is accelerating in their case, as well. In addition, there are many significant differences in the dialects of gypsy (Lovari) language.

Maps created with the same legend present clearly that assimilation of gypsies in Hungary considering language has become intense in the last decades. Lovari and Boyash languages are spoken only by elder generations, younger gypsies do not speak this language at all. Dataset of the two latest population censuses about native languages of gypsies are compared and it can be declared that Vlach gypsies especially show fast assimilation, with the exception of Vlach gypsy populations in Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg, Pest and Bács-Kiskun counties. Furthermore, native Romanian speaker gypsies show moderate population growth even in comparison with the population growth of Boyash gypsies (Figure 6).



**Figure 6** Changes in the population number of native Romani (Lovari) speaking and native Boyash speaking gypsies (Baranya, Somogy counties) by counties between 2001 and 2011 in Hungary  
*Source:* population census from Hungarian Central Statistical Office

Despite the inaccuracies of the Hungarian population censuses regarding the ethnic data these maps demonstrate the fast assimilation of gypsies linguistically. In 2001 190 046 people and in 2011 315 339 people declared themselves to be gypsy, while 48 685 and 54 339 people said they were native Lovari and Boyash speakers, respectively. These data demonstrate the increasing rate of self-declaration of gypsy identity and decreasing number of those speaking Gypsy/Boyash as their mother tongue.

More people declared their gypsy identity in 2011 than in 2001 by 63%, while the number of native Gypsy/Boyash speakers increased only by 11%. The latest population census also demonstrates that due to changes in the statistical data registration methods self-declaration of double identity (hybridity) among gypsies has become dominant (Tátrai P. 2014). It was demonstrated earlier that increasing divergence can be observed between data about ethnic and native language (symbolic ethnicity) in the case of gypsies living in Hungary. According to the calculations of Patrik Tátrai, the so-called AN-index, which shows the rate of native speakers in 100 people belonging to any ethnic group, is decreasing among the Hungarian gypsies: in 1990 the index was 33.7, in 2001 25.5 and in 2011 17.6 (Tátrai P. 2014). In 2001 31%, while in 2011 nearly three quarters of the gypsies in Hungary declared themselves to have double identity. Authors consider that

efforts for integration are proved by the fact that in 2011 81% those declaring themselves as gypsies selected Hungarian as their first nationality. In their case the correct description is that they are people to the Hungarian identity of whom gypsy identity is associated as well (Tátrai P. 2014).

### **Integration or assimilation**

“Attempts to build a multicultural society have failed... and the dream in which people would live side-by-side happily in a multicultural society did not work” said Angela Merkel, the Chancellor of Germany in 2010. At the beginning of the migrant crisis she said that refugees and migrants have to adapt to the German society, they have to learn German and cannot refuse integration and cannot create parallel societies. Fears of the Chancellor are reasonable since no countries can be politically, socially or economically stable if unable to ensure the integration of groups of people living in their territory.

The social, economic and political relations of the majority and minority are usually extremely complicated and the current situation is formed and resulted by dynamic interacts (Molnár J. 2015). Hence the result of cooperation (or non-cooperation) depends not only on the majority but the minority (gypsy population) as well in Hungary. Mutual intents for advancement are of fundamental importance.

In most cases majority is able to spontaneously assimilate minority. Hungarians assimilated Jász and Kun people and those Swabians and Slovaks who migrated to the Hungarian Great Plain in this way. Assimilation is the process by which ethnic identity is changed by another ethnic identity. Ethnic assimilation is frequently forced (e.g. after the Treaty of Trianon the minority of Hungarians in the successor states were forced to change their identity: re-slovakianization). For centuries gypsies living in Hungary were forced to be assimilated, therefore e.g. calling them gypsies was banned and they had to be called as ‘new-Hungarians’. Latest assimilation attempts by the official politics were made in the 1960s and 1970s in the Kádár era. Nowadays the word ‘assimilation’ is a kind of a swearword thus instead of it the main goal is named as achieving integration in the relation of majority and minority. From ethnical aspects integration means that expanding relationships between certain groups of people (ethnic groups) does not depend on the ethnic identities of the groups any more. Regarding the relation of majority and minority integration refers to union, fusion and cooperation. During assimilation minority give up its cultural traditions and merge with the majority both culturally and linguistically. In the case of integration the establishment of a strong relationship between majority and minority is expected while minority can successfully preserve their traditions, their culture.

One of the main problems of integration of gypsies living in Hungary is that this group of people with a total amount of approximately 700 000 is not homogeneous regarding culture. The most important basis of cultural identity in Europe is common language (despite some counterexamples such as the Scots, Irish, Serbian, Bosnian and Croatian people). In Hungary the mother tongue of most gypsies is Hungarian and contrary to Romungros people not native Hungarian speaking Roma people or Boyash people consider themselves to belong to the gypsy culture (also demonstrated by population census data).

Integration can be obstructed by segregation, discrimination and marginalisation. Segregation is the process when the minority either forcedly or willingly, become separated, set apart from the majority and create or try to create a parallel society. Discrimination is when the majority exclude minority from public goods or opportunities based on racial, ethnic, or religious identity. By marginalisation minority is sidelined to


the periphery socially, geographically and economically, and the relationship of these people with majority is weak and they have a slight chance for social advancement.

From the above mentioned phenomena discrimination is the most serious since it occurs due to the deliberate rejection from the majority. It is based on negative stereotypes about the members of the minority and their culture. In Hungary not every marginalized people is gypsy, moreover it can be stated that most people living in social, economic and geographic peripheries are not gypsy, though it cannot be questioned that they are overrepresented (Süli-Zakar I. 2015). Segregation can be a free decision but also a target for the minority, though according to our research, segregation of gypsies living in Hungary is mainly like a forced compulsion on them also from historical perspectives.

### Factors hindering integration

Achieving social and economic integration for gypsies is hindered most of all by their low educational level. At present days, as well, activation of gypsy human resources is hindered by their poor education (Forray R. K. 2000). Majority of gypsies entered public education only in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and mainly due to the coercive measures of the current state power. Before that education of gypsy children happened within the family according to the requirements of gypsy lifestyle. It meant the transmission of traditions and work experience both orally and in practice. Certain ethnic groups (e.g. Chacho Roms) were afraid of public education since they believed that it could degrade and contradict to gypsy identity and values. Great fear of the parents was that their children would leave gypsy society and become 'gazho' as a result of public education.

Since 2014 kindergarten became also compulsory besides primary school for all children in Hungary and the state penalizes absenteeism by withdrawal of social aids. However, 13-14 years old gypsy girls are often absent from school due to "marriage" (Janky B. 2007). According to a sociological survey, two thirds of adult gypsies in Tiszavasvári did not finish elementary school and the one third of the rest have no higher degree than elementary school. The ratio of adult gypsies with middle and higher educational degrees is less than 5% (Figure 7).



**Figure 7** Distribution of adult gypsy population of Tiszavasvári by their highest educational degree  
*Source:* using data of Fónai M. – Vitál A. (2005)

By today almost every gypsy children is enrolled in the public educational system in Hungary. This has been greatly encouraged by social welfares, school canteen (free of

charge), and governmental compulsion. (After a certain amount of absence of the child from school parents will not get the family allowance, in addition, social workers buy the necessary goods therefore the family does not get any money.) It is frequent and disadvantageous that not gypsy parents take their not gypsy children from schools where gypsy children go, consequently such schools become segregated. Hungarian parents are afraid mainly of illnesses, lice and cabbies and they also emphasize that due to the unruly behavior of gypsy children both the quality of education and the educational success decrease extremely fast.

Nevertheless, education has an important role in achieving integration of gypsies in today's globalised postindustrial society. Children living within the worst conditions learn the fundamental knowledge of hygiene, the use of cutlery and the rules and norms of European coexistence in kindergarten. The educational level of gypsies living in Hungary is so low that it is very far from the expectations of nowadays. Most adult gypsies did not finish elementary school though getting a job is difficult even with a completed elementary school degree. The asked people often say that finishing elementary school is unnecessary since gypsies who finish elementary school become unemployed, public workers or underpaid 'black laborers'.

Unemployment has been hindering gypsy integration for a long time. In the Kádár era after the resolution of the Political Committee the government decision about closing gypsy settlements which did not meet the so-called social requirements was adopted in 1964. After that gypsy settlements in towns and cities became closed and families were moved to empty houses in the geographical peripheries suffering from depopulation in NE Hungary. In the social industrialization and large construction projects resulted in the employment of gypsy men, as well. In the mining and industrial areas of Borsod and Nógrád 85-90% of gypsy men of working age were employed and those who lived in Hajdú-Bihar and Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg counties were transported by the so-called 'black trains' to the constructions of the capital and Transdanubia. The end of communism not only stopped but degraded the integration of gypsies (KERTESI G., 2000, 2005). Many of them became unemployed by the closing of great factories and companies and since they had no lands before they did not get any land compensation either (KERTESI G.- KÉZDI G., 1998).

By the middle of the 1980s 90% of gypsy men of working age had a permanent job in Hungary. Due to privatization and economic crisis after the end of the communism unemployment was devastating among gypsies. Since then most gypsy job seekers have found no permanent job (PÁSZTOR I. – PÉNZES J. 2012). According to official data only 10% of adult gypsy men are employed. Important to note, that about black laborers no statistical data are available, however, their number can be higher than that of who work legally. The number of seasonal agricultural workers (who harvest vegetables and fruits or pick feathers of geese) is especially high and they are employed mainly illegally. Gypsy employees are related to agriculture only seasonally, gypsy peasantry had no chance to develop for centuries. Gypsy people and families who could become farmers assimilated into the Hungarian peasantry. The number of gypsy female employees was never high and due to prolonged demographic growth the majority of gypsy population is dependant.

In our socio-geographic surveys the incomes of households were particularly emphasized. According to our interviews, the incomes of gypsy families are mainly childcare aids and social welfares. As a consequence, it can be stated that having many children in a gypsy family is sadly the result of an economic pressure since more children

mean more aids and such aids are the most important income of most gypsy families (Lengyel G. 2004, Fónai M.-Vitála. 2005).

One of the most significant hindering factors of gypsy integration is that they live in geographical peripheries in small villages near the state borders or in urban ghettos. According to the map created by the study of personal income and personal income taxes, employment rate and investments by settlements, we can declare that mainly Roma people live in pauperized, particularly deprived, extremely peripheral settlements (Süli-Zakar I. 2005). In such peripheral areas of the country companies barely can be found and the only employer is the local government and unemployment rate exceeds 90% (Pénzes J. 2010). 33 free enterprise zones planned by the government, and later actually designated as districts, include the most pauperized settlements thus it can be hoped that tax benefits and aids to job creation will result in economic revival even in such disadvantageous periphery areas. Authors hope that after this world economic crisis economic revival will occur and as a result the number of job offers also for gypsy population can rise (e.g. construction industry, food industry). Fundamental breakthrough, however, cannot be expected due to the low educational level of gypsy population. Slow advancements are expected after younger but more educated gypsy people enter the world of work.

From social aspects the prolonged demographic boom of gypsies is a significant issue of Roma integration. In Hungary demographic growth of gypsies started far later than in the cases of other ethnic groups including Hungarians. In the case of the latter, demographic boom started in the 1870s and 1880s but for gypsies this started in the third decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century when healthcare acts became compulsory extended for every citizen. The following demographic transition has been still lasting in their case, however, among Hungarian citizens it was over by the 1950s and from 1981 natural population decline can be observed in Hungary. (This is an average value which already includes the considerable amount of population growth of gypsy citizens /Kemény I. 1976/). Notwithstanding among the different gypsy ethnic groups there are some differences in demographic aspects, as well. According to the social survey in Tiszavasvári in the case of Hungarian gypsies demographic growth is in declining stage but in the case of Vlach Gypsies it is still in rising stage (Lengyel G. 2004, Fónai M.Vitála. 2005). Age pyramid of Hungarian gypsies (Romungros) shows contracting, aging characteristics while the age pyramid of Vlach gypsies shows an actual pyramid shape which refers to expansion and lots of young people (Süli-Zakar I., 2012b).

For achieving integration it is also important to decrease segregation of gypsy population, also for demographic reasons. Gypsy streets, gypsy settlements cannot receive the following gypsy generations in great number, in addition the cheap land and house prices of the part of towns formerly owned by old Hungarian people is attractive for gypsies living segregated. Our field surveys were focused first of all on streets and parts becoming mixed in ethnic aspects. Gypsies and Hungarians think particularly differently about such environments. Hungarians consider this is disadvantageous mainly since they cannot move somewhere else due to financial constraints. On the other hand, gypsy citizens are optimistic to live among Hungarian since for them it means the end of segregation and it is a kind of improvement. But the reality is that gypsies are in touch with the poorest Hungarian citizens. This is also established by our surveys focusing on mixed marriages. It is interesting that in mixed marriages both the Hungarian and the gypsy partner think about their circumstances positively and promisingly. In the future segregation will be unsustainable not only for subjective but also objective reasons (Gyergyói S., 1990, Virág T. 2006). However, it is noteworthy that in our interviews most

of the prominent people often correct our questions saying that in their town there is no Hungarian-gypsy coexistence but simply coexistence. According to our experience for fading stereotypes positive examples can be found first of all in settlements of mixed population. Close coexistence and what it means in practice help to reduce prejudice, to change people's opinion. Gypsies moved to mixed neighborhoods attempt to become similar to the Hungarians around them. However, it rather means the merging of people at lower social and economic levels.

The most problematic issue of Hungarian-gypsy coexistence is the perception of crime. Ethnographers and sociologists called attention earlier to that Gypsies do not consider actions against the law to be moral sin in order to survive, to sustain themselves (Erdős K. – Vekerdi J., 1989). Democratic fundamentals of prejudice of the majority is the concept of equal rights – equal duties. This concept questions positive discrimination as well, in addition according to the continuously repeated public opinion crime rates are far higher among the gypsy population. It was the reason for the public outrage induced by the explanation of the former Minister of Internal Affairs of the left-liberal government about talking about 'crime for a living'. The majority does not want to tolerate 'crime for a living', however, due to the living conditions of the gypsy population they often have to break the law and this will lead to more serious ethnic conflicts in the future. This situation can be changed only in cooperation: the majority should to give up stereotypes, segregation should be decreased while gypsies have to accept European values and norms (e.g. European norms of coexistence, respect of private properties, taking care of living environment).

Most conflicts between gypsies and the majority and most stereotypes are related to modesty of gypsies about their living environment. For who ever visited gypsy settlements there is no need for further asseveration. There are untidy overgrown gardens and fronts, messy, dirty streets and the walls of houses are crumbling. On the other hand there are also good examples, e.g. in mixed streets gypsy families making efforts for integration plant flower gardens around their houses and take care of their garden. In the periphery of NE Hungary neglecting gardening and stopping horticulture, related to both majority and minority, are explained partly by the increasing number of theft. By all means efforts like that of the 'Give enough food to all children!' Foundation has to be supported in the course of which gypsy families showing willingness to cultivate their garden are given seeds and young farm animals. In spite of the experience of the last years that only a small portion of such families succeeded in farming, this deserves further support and even this relatively small success should be accepted as positive results. Environmental education about how to be demanding on clean, tidy, organized living environment should be part of school curriculum, children should learn about it in schools. In the course of field surveys we experienced numerous times that roof tiles damaged by storms are not replaced even months after the storm and this can easily result in leakage and by time the house become too dangerous to live in.

In our social geographic surveys living conditions and house equipments were investigated. We could conclude that in Tiszavasvári there are significant differences between the two ethnic groups of gypsies related to their living circumstances. In half of the houses of Hungarian gypsies there are piped water, bath room, water cleaning toilet, sewage system which are essential in modern households. However, in the Széles Street which is situated in the gypsy part of the city gypsy inhabitants get water from the public well in the street. (Local government provides opportunity to have a shower in the community centre.) According to our survey about the equipments in houses we can report

that the use of electronic devices, first of all television, washing machine and fridge, is rapidly spreading. Houses of Hungarian gypsies are far well-equipped than the houses of Vlach gypsies. Computers were not registered in any house of Vlach gypsies in our former survey. Further advancements in this field are hindered by the low levels of income. Serious problem is the accumulation of utility bill debts. For this reason power supplier companies often turn off electricity and as a result the number of electricity thieves increases in Tiszavasvári.

Since health situations of gypsies are much worse their life expectancy at birth is less by 10-15 years than that of Hungarians. However, we have to distinguish gypsies who live in gypsy settlements and gypsies who live in different circumstances. While gypsies living in gypsy settlements have a greater chance to be infected than others. For instance, flu epidemic or other epidemics related to respiratory system spread extremely fast through the whole gypsy settlement. They sooner die due to congenital diseases e.g. predisposition to obesity or vascular diseases, hypertonia all leading to heart and cerebrovascular diseases. Unfortunately, gypsy females often die in stroke, while gypsy males often die in heart attack. Pulmonary asthma and pneumonia are also frequently occurring diseases. It is explained by the fact that poor people who live in crowded rooms with unhealthy atmosphere which are unheated in winter season and do not wear adequate clothes and do not eat healthy get sick far sooner. Tuberculosis is again a very serious current disease occurring epidemically often among gypsies living in gypsy settlements. Important to note infectious hepatitis, as well, occurring among gypsies more often than among Hungarian citizens. Occurrence and spreading of diseases depend on how crowded the area is and also on hygienic and social conditions. Sexual crimes and inadequate hygiene result in the spreading of venereal diseases such as AIDS and syphilis. The increasing number of gypsy prostitutes coming from Hungary to Western Europe is seriously concerning. Taking care of children inadequately and their bad hygienic situation often cause skin diseases; lice, scabies and, in some gypsy settlements, even ringworms occur. These spread by contact and their spreading is very fast. In schools children infect each other easily and then the recently infected children can infect the family at home. Health visitors, district nurses give lotions and sprays for lice, antiseptics and advices to such families but their efforts are ineffective since their sense of responsibility is inadequate and they do not try to do everything to stop diseases. Family welfare services can work more effectively with gypsies since repugnance decreases by time and social workers and their partners helping on gypsies become respected. Their precious work is extremely difficult since in some cases a single social worker is responsible even for 50 families. This amount of people is almost unmanageable for one person and this reduces the quality of work.

Due to population growth resulted by the demographic boom of gypsies and to high unemployment rate, considerable amount of gypsies attempted to migrate to western countries. However, their efforts were hindered for many reasons. Desperately hopeless gypsies wanted to move to the wealthy regions of Western Europe and North America from Eastern Central Europe. To hinder this, the targeted countries took inhuman measures. For instance Canada restored visa requirements against the Czech Republic, and recently attempted to do the same against Hungary as well. Italy and especially France send gypsies in great numbers back to Romania and Bulgaria (Kovács A. 2002). In 2013 the most popular politician of the governing socialist party in France was Manuel Valls, Minister of Internal Affairs, who closed illegal Roma settlements all over the country with broad social agreement. The National Front party in France led by Marine Le Pen, the

Lega Nord in Italy, the Vlaams Belang (Dutch for ‘Flemish Interest’) in Belgium and the Party for Freedom led by Geert Wilders in the Netherlands are all getting more popular due to their anti-Roma politics. Gypsy migrants especially from Romania and Bulgaria, who became able to travel freely within EU thanks to their EU member status, were ‘transported’ back to their home countries by e.g. France and Italy quite ruthlessly. By 2015 German leaders are planning to send poor migrants (=Roma people) from Serbia and Macedonia back to where they are from (Süli -Zakar I., 2012a). European Union considers every member states to be democratic and safe countries where there is no racism or Roma persecution. Gypsy migrants living in Canada and having ‘criminal lifestyle’ were obviously transported back to Hungary. The Canadian government started a campaign in Miskolc to stop migration. They decided to do that in Miskolc since 40% of Hungarian Roma migrants with a total number of around 4400 were from Miskolc or its surroundings.

Authors expect that in the future gypsy migration towards the west will be hindered more intensively and the growing population of gypsies will stay in southeast European countries where due to changing ethnic composition coexistence will become more stressful. This will lead to almost unsolvable political problems in countries already devastated by economic problems. It is likely that gypsies will migrate from crowded peripheral gypsy settlements into cities where they will form ethnic ghettos.

Countries in the eastern periphery of EU are expecting financial support from the Union, obviously. Well-known fact is that all former social and economic attempts for the development of the Roma population were undermined by the regime change in post-communist countries. However, the authors believe that executive bodies and leaders of the European Union do not manage the gypsy situation in SE Europe according to its importance, which obviously does not mean they would not respond to atrocities against gypsies. In fact, critics regarding human rights and social situation are offensive against local politics and the majority while ignoring crimes committed by Roma people. However, the problem about the EU’s greatest ethnic minority does not seem to be solved as a common issue. In 2011 during Hungarian EU presidency it was planned to write the Pan-European Roma Strategy. Finally, instead of a common European gypsy strategy, the ‘EU framework for national Roma integration strategies’ was accepted. Not only the titles but especially the essences fundamentally differ from each other. The accepted version made the issue of the integration of gypsies with growing population, with all its financial and moral burden, to be one of the internal affairs of countries which are still in ‘second gear’ and seriously affected by the world economic crisis. According to the authors’ opinion, this policy is unacceptable and countries dealing with the Roma issue should attempt joint applications for EU funds in order to accelerate urgent integration of gypsies (Süli-Zakar I. – Pálóczi Á. – Szabó D.A., 2012).

### **Summary**

‘The rugged path’ of integration of gypsies and their special situation analyzed in this social geographical study do not differ much from what can be experienced in the neighbouring countries (Musinka A. – Kolesárová, J. 2012). In many aspects, such as gypsy self-governments, living circumstances, education, social welfares and supports, Hungary precedes other SE European and Balkan countries. However, cooperation of EU members joined after 2004 in order to accelerate integration of European gypsies would be beneficial. In the preamble of the Pan-European Roma Strategy 10-12 million gypsies are mentioned that means they are the greatest minority in Europe. Focusing on the spatial

characteristics of gypsies it can be stated that the most dense gypsy settlements are in the line of South Balkan, Carpathian Basin and Sudetes disregarding Spain. Great numbers of gypsies live in Wallachia and Transylvania (Romania), in the western and north - Eastern counties of Bulgaria, in NE Hungary and Trans-Danube Region, in Eastern Slovakia and in Sudetes (Czech Republic).

Authors believe the risk of developing parallel societies is high in countries where a considerable gypsy minority is present due to their number and their political strengthening if gypsy integration fails. This would cause a common European problem (Süli-Zakar I. – Pálóczi Á. – Szabó D.A., 2012). Based on our research the following statement can be made:

1. European gypsies, with increasing population, are forming a unique ethnic group. They are not a homogeneous community. The different gypsy groups are on different levels of integration which must be taken into account in further strategies.
2. In case of significant economic growth many gypsies are ready and able to work and identify with the goals of the majority of the society.
3. Demographic trends can be predicted. (By 2050 the number of the European gypsy population will reach 20-25 million, while in Hungary 2 million gypsies and 6 million Hungarians will live.)
4. If integration fails the number of conflicts will increase and the different demographic trends will amplify the contrast between gypsies and Hungarians.
5. Wealthy countries hinder the migration of Roma people more intensively by time.
6. Education have an important role in the integration of gypsies, its main goal is to familiarize them with European values.
7. Stereotypes can be cleared only by positive examples and practices.
8. The relation of gypsy identity and European identity must be defined and we have to find out how these could be harmonized.
9. Gypsy leaders must be the representatives of European values (the Ten Commandments of Moses, respect for private property, taking care of living environment, etc.), as well, and emphasize the importance of integration since integration cannot be imagined without cooperation.
10. Social and economic integration of gypsies is a common European value and mission. It can be succeeded only by intense sacrifices of the EU. (Gypsies probably will not become an official ethnic minority in the EU but for their prosperity in their homelands wealthy countries of Europe also have to make sacrifices avoiding the social division of the EU.)

One of the goals of our research was to help the integration of gypsies. Achieving integration and activation of reserves of the resources can be succeeded only if the listed conditions are met:

1. Kindergarten and school education of gypsy children has to be complete. Teaching them European values and encourage them to keep to the European moral norms is an additional mission of teachers, which should be honoured both morally and financially. In many cases social deficiencies must be made up, which, in normal case, would be a family duty. By expanding the already existing supports and aids, and by new grants and scholarship programs more gypsy children must be encouraged to finish high school and apply to college or university.

2. Based on our research we concluded that gypsies living in Hungary are not a huge homogeneous community. They show significant social and economic differences; in addition their relation to the majority and their willingness to be integrated are also different. The certain gypsy ethnic groups are on different levels of integration and this heterogeneity must be concerned in the planning of the aids and supports they need. Negative prejudice from the majority of the society is generated especially by the extreme behaviour and improper attitude of certain gypsies, but such stereotypes deeply hurt those who aspire to integration and hinder peaceful coexistence. Positive examples and the best practice should be popularized by politicians and media more. The responsibility of the media is especially significant while they just love to report Roma cases in details in the news; however, they are not so eager about small, everyday successes having less newsworthiness.

3. Since the end of communism Hungarian gypsy citizens have been the greatest losers in the labour market. Based on the results of this study, the authors believe that the majority of gypsy people of working age – primarily men of course – would be ready to have a regular job and agree with the goals of the majority of the society. The answer for this issue is usually in the circumstances caused by the world economic crisis and until considerable economic growth begins there is barely a chance for them to have adequate jobs. In the international practice of regional development using spatial preferences is quite frequent. In areas with considerable gypsy population, especially in NE Hungary and South Trans danubia, preferences aiming to get job creation aids in order to create jobs where semi-skilled workers are required should be introduced. For this EU funds and grants should be acquired as well.

4. Aging of the majority of the society and their decreasing number and the increasing number of Roma people characterized by a population structure in which young people are overrepresented can be taken for granted. As a result, due to the imbalance, the number of conflicts will increase. To turn the situation better, reducing the prejudice of the majority against gypsies is required. The only tool for this is spreading positive experience. Here, in NE Hungary more and more gypsy leaders emphasize the need for joint actions and the importance of keeping to the European values. If they could move forward in some cases, such as respect for personal property, taking care of the living environment and respect of labour income, it would be the basis of the success of integration and human resources would be activated.

5. The migration attempts of gypsies towards west have failed, and it is more and more obvious. Thus gypsies of SE Europe stuck in their homelands. However, here, in EU member states in ‘second gear’, where they are still EU citizens, there are limited financial resources for their integration due to prolonged economic problems. In the near future they cannot expect that they can migrate to wealthy countries in great number. Therefore they have to live in their homelands and find out together what the acceptable way of coexistence is. It will not go easy since it is difficult to reconcile the two different lifestyles and it seems even more difficult in the light of further demographic boom. If attempts towards a positive end fail, the result will be that one part of the society will not be able and the other part will not want to live as they used to. Younger generation from extremely peripheral areas, due to unacceptable housing conditions, will have no choice other than migration. If the wealthy member states make migration of people from the periphery of SE Europe devastated by poverty, these Roma people crowded out from villages will target the housing estates losing their values and as a result expanding ethnic ghettos will form in the near future.

6. In the frame of international cooperation the (affected) south eastern European member states should stand together to demonstrate that social and economic integration of gypsies is a Pan-European interest and task. Development of gypsies cannot be an internal affair solely of the poorest EU members; successful integration requires financial sacrifices from the EU as a whole.

7. Activation of the reserves of human resources of gypsies has become a national issue. Within a few decades the aging majority of the society will become retired and almost half of the population in working age will be gypsy. It is crucial whether the income of these people will be only aids and welfares or as productive citizens they will contribute to the prosperity of Hungary.

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## VIDEO ART INTERCULTURAL DIMENSION WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES. THE *VIDEO ART* *EVENT PROJECT*

*Teofil Ioan ȘTIOP\**

**Abstract:** *Today, we are not surprised anymore by the huge monitors that “adorn” urban places. In this sense video art tends to leave the interior, where it was born due to television, getting literally out in the open and in this way approaching to its nomadic nature. Equally, the ideatic and critical aspect need an update in challenging the world of the Internet, a world that calls into question the idea of boundary, the boundary of the private space in relation to the public and the delineation of the sphere of the local area communication in relation to an international one. One of the representative artistic manifestations, to illustrate the movement of the genre focal point from television to internet is the Video Art Event project, an annual international video art event that has been taking place since 2010 in Oradea and Milan.*

**Keywords:** *virtual world, video creation, boundary issues, interdisciplinary dialogue*

### **Video art and new technologies**

The emergence and development of television as a means of mass communication is undoubtedly the decisive element leading to the birth of video art. The art world, unable to remain insensitive to a phenomenon of this magnitude, has taken possession of this "instrument" creating a new form of art. Thus, video art emerged in the late 60s and its debut is closely linked to the widespread availability of video technology. The forms in which it appears are quite varied and often hybrid. Among these: recordings broadcasted on various TV channels, records posted in various public places and alternative performances incorporating monitors, TV sets or projections, etc.. Trying to define the video image, Florence de Meredieu in her book *Art and new technology*, says: "*The video image is an image translated into an electrical signal. This transposition is done point to point and results from a scan lines, odd and even, creating thus a woven tissue.*" (Meredieu, 2004: p. 28)

Occurring within the television world, this *new media* had from the beginning a close connection with it. In this regard we can mention the series entitled *Jazz-images* broadcasted in the 50's on WGBH Boston television station, where abstract images accompany electronic music. Also, 20 years later, the KQED station in San Francisco opened a national center televisual experiment. This example is followed then by other American networks. We can not talk about the beginnings of video art without mentioning the role played in this respect by the Fluxus movement founded in Germany by George Maciunas in the early 60s, involving important names in the history of video art such as

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Nam June Paik or Wolf Vostell who have carried further artistic experiments of *Jazz-images*, enabling video art with a more solid and conceptual ensemble, defining its identity even more clearly. On this already built fundament, artists like Peter Campus, Doris Totten Chose, Norman Cowie, Joan Jonas, Bill Viola, etc. have been creating since the late 60s.

Before outlining the nature of video art as a genre of artistic expression, it is useful to recall the fundamental distinction between its character and traditional arts. It is understandable that art uses video as a medium support stock information multipliers, be it the older analog film method, or the new technology made available through digital era. This multiplying information and reproducible environment makes video art, like photography, to differ essentially from non reproducible environment, based on the principle of unity, of the traditional arts. For here lies a difference of content between the two art forms. One of the most eloquent forms of highlighting this distinction belongs to Walter Benjamin, who says in his book *The Work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction* the following: "*From the moment the criterion of authenticity no longer apply to the artistic production, produced upheavals in the function social art. Rather than rely on ritual, it rests henceforth on another practice - politics.*" (Benjamin, 2000: p. 125)

In order to prove his idea, Benjamin starts from two essential features of the work, placed by him within tradition, namely authenticity and uniqueness. From his point of view, these are lost when art creations face the phenomenon of mass reproduction. The film has, from the perspective of its reproduction and broadcasting potential, a decisive role in the art of communication with the public; even more, through it art may be able to mobilize masses. These masses merge with their own faces when the camera intervenes: the big parade activities or propagandas, in war or sports competitions. This fact was certainly politically speculated and later economically, since from the appearance of the film until today. The Second World War, and not only, gives a strong proof of the manipulation using propaganda material. This is the legacy of the video art, including the issues it has been facing with from its beginnings.

In other words, in revealing the distinction between traditional art's medium of expression and that of art based on new technologies lies one of the basic features of video art defined by the spirit of social involvement, opposing and activist against the political manipulative spectrum that conquered a new technology environment for its own interests. In this regard, television became the first target of the artists. The dialogue of video art with television has been continuously maintained from the beginning despite of other new targets.

We can now see both the autonomous and hybrid character, as compared to the profile of the film in general. Most difficulties in understanding and accepting video art come from the common sense of referring to the moving images from the point of view of some categories, conventions or aesthetic criteria that video art does not take into account. Thus, most often a video creation does not necessarily provide a narrative, barely includes actors and only rarely includes a textual dialogue. In this sense, we can say at first glance that video art is evasive and lacking in rigor and consistency conception in comparison to other artistic forms that use the moving image, a fact that would not necessarily bother video artists if we consider the subversive character of the genre. Even if it does not exclude any of the aesthetic criteria mentioned above, video art embraces primarily, a critical attitude towards a certain fact. Hence the use of direct and effective artistic means to communicate the message, sacrificing the epic conventions of communication. Consequently, video art is not focused on the formulation of a story, as the feature, documentary or short films do, neither marches on an abstract speech focused on

exploring the own ways of artistic expression but rather takes a militant stand, looks and points the finger on a historical, ideological or social flagrant.

The conceptual and activist character of the genre is pointed out, among others, by Cris Meigh-Andrew who says in his book *A History of Video Art: "The general drew on a drive range of art movements, theoretical ideas and technological advances, as well as political and social activism."* Meigh-Andrew, 2014: p. 17) Starting from here, the theorist refers to the intercultural aspect of the genre. "*Video art was also clearly year international Phenomen. From the outset artists working with video have not only drawn from diverse cultural influence, but they have also imported ideas and attitudes across national boundaries, enriching and nourishing the wider fine art practice as well.*" (Ibid, p. 17) This militant attitude does not remain cloister in local areas; it is intended to a widely as possible communication which inevitably leads to interference with other attitudes of the same invoice from different cultures. The storing and reproducible nature of video art support contributes essentially to the possibility of distributing, issuing and presentation of artistic works at such scale.

In the catalogue of the great exhibition project *Changing Channels. Art and Television*, curator Mathias Mihalka emphasizes the critical dimension of the artistic activities specific between 1963 and 1987 and the powerful influence that television has exercised over society in that period but equally indicates a new perspective in approaching the relationship art - mass medium - society in the current context. "*The mass medium of television is undergoing a radical process of Currently transformation, loosing its privileged status as the leading cultural medium to the Internet.*" (Mihalka, 2010: p. 11) Thus, if the challenges of the early video art were related to form and content, from the perspective of visual experiments, if we consider the critical aspect of different forms of manipulation through television, video art today is facing an "updating" of those concerns. Updating the experimental dimension felt a strong impetus from the way it monopolized public space advertising. Today, we are not surprised anymore by the huge monitors that "adorn" urban places. In this sense video art tends to leave the interior, where it was born due to television, getting literally out in the open and in this way approaching to its nomadic nature. Equally, the ideatic and critical aspet need an update in challenging the world of the Internet, a world that calls into question the idea of boundary, the boundary of the private space in relation to the public and the delineation of the sphere of the local area communication in relation to an international one.

One of the representative artistic manifestations, to illustrate the movement of the genere focal point from television to internet is the *Video Art Event* project, an annual international video art event that has been taking place since 2010 in Oradea an Milan. Following this aim, during its deployment, the project was permanently taking in consideration the direct manner, specific to this gender, often unsophisticated and militant. In this respect, the project proposes an intercultural and interdisciplinary form of video art, aware of the background of its art genre to which it belongs but also sensitive to the present world's interest for virtual reality and for the windows opened by the internet towards the *global village* as Marshall McLuhan would say.

### **The Video Art Event project**

Given the profile of video art, the *Video Art Event* project took account of its lines of force, the multiplying and reproducible nature of support, the size of intercultural and activist profile of involvement in the social; even more, it tried to update these artistic considerations based on issues raised by the contemporary sociopolitical context. In this regard, one of the

most notable concerns is to shift the focus from the old television concern for dialogue to the virtual world. If video art from its beginnings was concerned mostly with the television, today, video art is considerably becoming more interested in the internet.

Although the project is focused primarily on organizing exhibitions and screenings of video art installations, the project also involves the dynamics of further dialogues through workshops, symposiums or conferences. The artistic event is organized by the Department of Visual Arts - Faculty of Arts, University of Oradea - in collaboration with the Milan group VisualContainer, a group carrying on a consistent focus on this artistic genre.

Since 2008, Giorgio Fedelli and Alessandra Arnò, both from VisualContainer, have owned an online TV platform<sup>1</sup>, which constantly distributes video art projects in collaboration with institutions and groups from various countries in the world. In this regard we can mention the latest international video art project called *Now & After*, held between 2011-2013 at Moscow Museum of Modern Art (Russia), and in 2014 at The State Museum of GULAG History<sup>2</sup> or the project *Translucent Video Art* in Mumbai (India) held in April this year, an event involving artists from Italy, Korea and India<sup>3</sup>.

The collaboration between VisualContainer and the Department of Visual Arts, University of Oradea, was initiated by the project curator, at that time director of the educational department, Professor Diana Gabriela Bohnstedt Gavrilaş. VisualContainer's interest in various international collaborations and the concern to broaden the institutional skyline regarding academic research of the organizers from the Department of Visual Arts, were reflected in that period in the creation of the master program Painting and Multimedia; it was the binding element of a collaboration that has reached today its sixth edition.

Conceived as an intercultural dialogue under the auspices of an academic forum, the *Video Art Event* project managed to create an opportunity for the local institutional dialogue. Therefore the project has involved in its development institutes of Oradea such as: Muzeul Țării Crișurilor, Artists' Union branch from Oradea, the cultural complex Moara Rășărit, Conflux Cultural Association, the Hebrew Community from Oradea and many others. One of the benefits of the event was the inclusion in the framework of Muzeul Țării Crișurilor Celebration Days program, an already notorious manifestation, which goes back 19 editions. This point of view is particularly important because it contributes efficiently to one of the objectives of the *Video Art Event* project. It lies in the very nature of the video art genre. Perceived as a transgressive gender in relation with art's tradition, implicitly with its exhibition spaces, collaborating with the museum institution of Oradea, the project proposes a reconciliation dialogue between a subversive gender-based nature and the significance of a place established by tradition. Also, by including it in such a program, leads us to a second objective of the project: to familiarize the audience with an artistic genre that is less practiced locally, but which enjoys a wide appreciation across borders. A third objective of the *Video Art Event* stems precisely from this. It consists in the fact that students had the opportunity, alongside already famous artists, to become active participants in the event with their own creations. In this respect, one of the steady intentions at the artistic level that takes the message content, has been seeking a film-painting formula, the temporality of the moving picture is nothing more

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.visualcontainer.org>, consulted on 8.13.2015

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.visualcontainer.org/wordpress/it/portfolios/collective-shadesgulag-museum>, consulted on 8.13.2015

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.visualcontainer.org/wordpress/it/portfolios/cut-into-time-mumbai-india/>, consulted on 8.13.2015

than a way of sequential reading of a single visual frame. The searches in this direction were determined by an inherited external reason, specific to this genre, namely to convey effectively the message of conceptual invoice, without dissolving into a narrative act and an internal reason, contingent, determined by the reality of the Department of Visual Arts, hitherto focused mainly on exploring traditional artistic forms.

Taking account of the intercultural, interinstitutional and interdisciplinary character of the project, the venues of the five editions were designated as appropriate, depending on the specific events, such as dedicated spaces and alternative spaces. Therefore the debate and theoretical scientific dialogues focused on conventional spaces while exhibitions installations and video projections were directed to unconventional spaces. In the first edition, the symposium took place at the Visual Arts Gallery located on the Republicii Street in Oradea and in the third edition, the conference was held in the academic spaces owned by the Faculty of Arts. The video art exhibitions focused on alternative spaces such as: pedestrian zones of the Republicii Street at the first edition, the former mill Pamora (now the cultural complex Moara Răsărit) in the second and fourth edition, the former printing halls Sonnenfeld (currently Moszkva café) on Moscovei street in its third edition, and the former garrison of Oradea (future place of the Muzeul Țării Crișurilor) in the fifth edition. The last showroom of the video work was the virtual space, a former alternativ space and an already established one. It is about the online platform of those from VisualContainer, a place where Romanian artists and creations over the border have fulfilled an intercultural dialogue under the tutelage of an international visibility, which is another, but not the least, objective of the manifestation.

### **A brief history of the *Video Art Event* project**

Since 2010, the project *Video Art Event* has succeeded in holding five editions in Oradea, the sixth will take place in autumn this year. All five editions until 2014 were conducted under the annual program Zilele Muzeului Țării Crișurilor. Each edition proposed a theme by which the works and the guests were selected.

The first edition launched the title theme: *Border(less)*. It was held between 21-22.05.2010 and it contained both a projections section with gender-specific works and a symposium on the same subject. The curatorial text proposed by Diana Gabriela Bohnstedt Gavrilaș considered the issue of the border in the current cultural context, since one feature of the venue is primarily determined by the geographic position held by the city of Oradea. "*Born out of the social reality of a border town anchored in the complexity of interethnic neighbourhood, the project, as stated in the title, is questioning the idea of the border, both physical and metaphysical, which is about to dissolve in the current socio political context.*"<sup>4</sup> Considering the proposals, the event placed the two sections at opposite poles but in the same vicinity. If the symposium was held in the Visual Arts Gallery on Republicii Street, the video projections populated the pedestrian street of the city. Thus the theme of the event discussed the boundary between public space as a place for outdoor exposure and the cymas of the gallery. On this occasion, the space was dedicated to hosting the symposium participants' communications while art was reaching out to the viewer.

To meet and develop the curatorial ideas, the symposium introduced some historians and art critics such as Giorgio Fedelli, Alessandra Arno, Aurel Chiriac, Ștefan

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<sup>4</sup> Diana Gabriela Bohnstedt Gavrilaș, *Border(less)*, curatorial text printed on the event programme, Oradea, 05. 2010

Gaie or Alexandra Titu. If the first two sketched their discourse around the suggested idea, using the profile of the VisualContainer platform, Ștefan Gaie made an overview on the ideatic content of the works selected by the Department of Visual Arts, and Alexandra Titu had a wider peek into the genre of video art, relating to the idea of limit. Speaking about one of the pioneers of video art she says the following: "*When he was asked about the moral supports of his prospective spirit, Nam June Paik attributed it to his Mongol origin. This genetic motivation placed him in the tradition of some nomads whose „spatial anxiety” he attributed, with the historical revery specific of postmodernism, to the impulse to always touch the skyline not to find The Promised Land, which might settle him, but to look beyond this conquered limit towards a new horizon.*" (Titu, 2010: p.1)

In full accordance with the nomad spirit mentioned above, the projections of selected works left their own place of exhibition in search for new formulas to come closer to the eye of the beholder. The issue of the border or, in general, the issue of reaching the limit was reflected by different works in various ways. There were seven Romanian artists selected by the Department of Visual Arts, namely: André Csongor, Rudolf Bone, Andrea Enikő Buzási, Tiberiu Fekete, Diana Gabriela Bohnstedt Gavrițaș, Attila László and Teofil Ioan Știop; there were also twelve artists selected by VisualContainer: Maria Korporal, Luca Christian Mander, Pietro Mele, Patrizia Monzani, Christian Niccoli, Rebecca Agnes, Iginio De Luca, Sabrina Muzi, Natalia Saurin, Lino Strangis, Alessandra Arnò, Matteo Pasin. Here we will refer to just one clear example that managed to creatively approach the idea of the curatorial project.



*Border(less)*, picture by Tiberiu Fekete

The work of André Csongor, *Insecurity*, reflects the relationship between reality and manipulation in the context of a world whose boundaries transgressed the media of mass communication. The plot is about the hands of a character dressed in black, whose face we do not see, and whose clothing bears an inscription with the film's title. The action is represented by the movement of both hands, one wearing a medical glove, in a "theatrical" attempt, as in a number of illusionism, to clean, arrange and care for each other. Ștefan Gaie says the following about this work: "*The fact is that media broke the event from reality and turned it into a spectacle in order to deliver it as a package to the individual who is helplessly assisting, installed in front of the TV with the fingerfrozen on the remote. Csongor André's film uses a minimalist but highly suggestive language about this media manipulation. Today we do not attempt to talk about moral values, but as Jean*

*Baudrillard remarks about the attack on the very principle of reality: rigging the event and forging the truth.*" (Gaie, 2010: p.1)

The action and the development of the project *Border(less)* could be tracked online on the VisualContainer platform in twenty-four countries and internally in the first issue of *Arta* magazine, where art critic Ramona Novicov said that "*Border(less)* was one of the most significant events occurring in Oradea this year." (Novicov, 2010: pp.114-115).

The curatorial proposal for the second edition of the event was the phrase *Microfailure network*. It took place on the 17<sup>th</sup> of May 2011 and merged the idea of the symposium at the opening of video art projections this time hosted by the cultural complex Moara Răsărit. The concept launched by curator Diana Gabriela Bohnstedt Gavrilaş was based on speculation and integrating the idea of system error into the creative field of art. "*The artist will be the advocate of error with all the implications / connotations, negative and positive, integrated by this notion. A mediator of possible paradoxes in the world of virtual image.*"<sup>5</sup> During the opening symposium, one of the most remarkable presences was provided by historian and art critic Alexandra Titu. Taking a broad approach backed by an impressive philosophical foray, the intervention of Alexandra Titu aimed at circumscribing the virtual world whose universe includes fundamentally the idea of error. She affirms in her article *The pressure of chaos - The Error*: "*Territory of reflecting the multiple games of infinite mirrors, symmetry and asymmetry, citing infinity as goal and the mirage as state of fact, this universe of virtuality explores/exploits the error, and builds in its foundations many limited experiences of consciousness caught in its limited infinity.*" (Titu, 2011: p. 3)



*Microfailure network*, picture by Tiberiu Fekete

The generous territory of the virtual world, considered through the notion of error, was capitalized at creative level and assumed by each artist individually. The selection made by the Department of Visual Arts included a total of eight artists, namely: Sándor Antik, Corina Andor, Rudolf Bone, Adrian Bungar, Maria Alexandru Crețu, Diana Gabriela Bohnstedt Gavrilaş, Augustin Ioan Pop and Teofil Ioan Știop. The VisualContainer selection included a total of five artists: Luca Christian Mander, Mariza Moretti, Lino Strangis, Mauro Folci, Francesca Fini.

<sup>5</sup> Diana Gabriela Bohnstedt Gavrilaş, *Microfailure network*, curatorial text printed on the event programme, Oradea, 05. 2011

One of the suggestive works that evoke the parallel between the contingent and virtual reality is the work of Rudolf Bone, *Intersection*, where interpenetration suggests the game between these two worlds. The film depicts an intersection which is reflected in the mirrors that form the wall of a building, closed to a road chosen because of this reason. Even if the film does not have a direct reference to the digital world, it is suggested by the mimetic function and also impalpable mirror symbolism that cuts the reality and presents it, in this case, sequentially or overturned, as a show of "Second Life".

Despite the fact that this second edition of the event was not broadcast live online on the VisualContainer platform, the films shown here were issued during the entire month of September on this website, as well as all the other films from the following editions.

*Sign out* is the phrase launched at the third edition. It took place between 16-17.05.2012. The venue for the projections was chosen according to the curatorial concept aim, namely the space that formerly housed the printing factory of Oradea. If the meaning of the phrase is concerned with the possibility to access any system output, then the choice of this venue illustrates the key of the continuously increasing preoccupation for the virtual reality to offer digital printing instead of conventional printing. Thus, the fact in question may lead to both the ability to access an output from reading the old system and a new input, and vice versa, the revaluation of the old one, returning thus to the printing. In both cases, the ability to use writing, rewriting, and the use of digital means in relation to the classical framework were the subject of this edition.



*Sign out*, picture by Előd Izsák

In addition to the selected films, the edition proposed a conference that had as guests theoreticians as: Giorgio Fedeli, Alexandra Titu, Rudolf Bone and Ramona Novicov. That year, the conference had a special guest, the renowned art historian, Oliver Grau, specialist in digital art and professor at Danube University Krems in Austria. In his intervention entitled *The revolution of images. Media Art's Challenge for our Societies*, Oliver Grau made inroads in the recent history of digital art trying to emphasize the way it influenced the evolution of the contemporary life in perceiving and relating to art. He says: "Never before images have not developed so rapidly and were not exposed to so many different images of the world, which is why the images of today have changed fundamentally. Speaking about the works of William Kentridge, Jeffrey Shaw, Olafur Eliasson, Christa Sommerer, etc. I will show that "Digital Media Art" has evolved over the last thirty years influencing contemporary art, and has become the "art of our time."

(Grau, 2011: p.1) In full agreement with his research in the field of digital art, Oliver Grau illustrated his conception on the importance of digital art in contemporary culture, represented eloquently by the following quote: "*The scale of recent and current encroachment of media and technology into the workspace and work process is far greater upheaval than other epoches have known, and, obviously, it has also affected large areas of art. Media art, that is, video, computer graphics and animation, Net-art, interactive art in its most advanced form of virtual art which its subgeneres of telepresence art and genetic art, is beginning to dominate theories of the image and art.*" (Grau, 2003: p. 3)

The video artworks selected by the Department of Visual Arts and VisualContainer, focused mainly on this important role that the virtual world plays in the contemporary human life. VisualContainer selected the works of ten artists: Alessandra Arnò, Barbara Brugola, Daniela Di Maro, Enrico Bressan, Iginio De Luca, Mauro Folci, Marzia Moretti, Rebecca Agnes, Silvia Campores and Tomoko Nagao.

Starting with this year, the organizing members of the Department of Visual Arts, Aurel Chiriac, Diana Gabriela Bohnstedt Gavrilaş, Teofil Ioan Ştiop, Tiberiu Fekete and Ştefan Gaie founded the Cultural Association Conflux, one of the reason being to provide the project with a chance to grow further towards a more concrete artistic identity. Their selection included a total of twenty-three artists: Alexandra-Bela Szfura, Anamaria Şerban, Sorin Calotă, Andrei Curta, Alexandru Antik, Aura Bălănescu, Cantemir Meşter, Ciprian Ciuclea, Corina Baciu Urzică, Cristina Costolaş, Zsolt Damó, Elena Corina Andor, Előd Izsák, Tiberiu Fekete, Ágnes Gordán, Gabriela Diana Bohnstedt Gavrilaş, Ioan Mihele, Marius Georgescu, Mihaela Tătulescu, Olivia Roşca, Rudolf Bone, Teofil Ioan Ştiop and Teréz Murányi-Matza.

The film that I presented at this edition focused on changing the perception and reading of reality in the presence of the development of the second human nature, namely the digital one. Suggestively entitled *Acrobat*, the film referred to both the reading program in PDF format *Acrobat Reader* and to the contemporary human condition suggested by the title that refers to the wire dancing. Obviously there is a balancing act that is torn between two realities. Thus, the film presents a sky fragment seen from a rectangular indoor yard whose edges form a true natural display, made by the tall buildings seen from the center of the courtyard. Taken from the middle of the indoor yard and put in front of the actual movie, the viewer faces the eagerness to look at a simple piece of heaven. Wanting to recreate the wave of show - common to the digital world, he runs the sky with the help of a cursor similar to that commonly used by the *Acrobat* program thus reading the firmament in a "digital rhythm". The two natures here are not presented as a schizoidreality, on the contrary, they overlap and influence each other. In this context, the inability to cancell the second nature, the impossibility of such a "sign out" commits to taking possession of it. Assuming such a condition is translated into *Acrobat* through the playful attitude, highlighted by the semantic nature of the term designating the title.

The fourth edition of the project focused on the phrase *Liquid image*. It was held between the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> of May 2013 at the cultural complex Moara Răşărit. The challenge of the curatorial text illustrates eloquently the following idea: "*The concept of liquid Image is based on the notion of fluidity specific to water and characteristic to the contemporary art image both in terms of the variety of media expression, and in terms of*

reporting it to a more dynamic reality."<sup>6</sup> Hence, the theme covered a wide range of creative investigations, from the abstract dimension of questioning the unstable criterion of propagation and proliferation of contemporary image, to more concrete facts like the idea of cash or liquidities, engines in producing and selecting images. More broadly, the *Liquid image* concept refers to any type of dissolved, obscure and unstable image that sends us more or less directly to the conceptual sphere.

The VisualContainer selection included a total of twelve artists: Anita Calà Testarossa, Luca Christian Mander, Barbara Agreste, Alfred Dong, Karin Felbermayr, Albert Merino, John Criscitello, Giovanni Zaccariello, Sonia Armaniaco, Di Bernardo Rietti Toppeta, Antonella Spatti and Rebecca Agnes. The Department of Visual Arts, through the Conflux members, selected fifteen artists, of which thirteen Romanian: Rudolf Bone, Dorina Bogdan, Andrei Curta, Cristina Costolaș, Sorin Calota, Előd Izsák, Diana Gabriela Bohnstedt Gavrițaș, Olna Gaiger, Ioan Mihele, Mihaela Tătuțescu, Teréz Murányi-Matza, Alexandra Bella Szfura, Teofil Ioan Știop and two foreigners: Jeremy Newman from the USA and Ollala Castro Rodriquez from Spain.



*Liquid image*, picture by Fekete Tiberiu

Among the films presented here, particularly relevant visually and equally suggestive at the conceptual level was Luke Christian Mander's, *Notturmo*, which refers to a state of anxiety caused by evoking unstable forms arising out of the darkness, turning the fragments of zoomorphic canine forms into a nocturnal landscape. The feeling of fear is here inoculated by the changing shadows and light shapes and by developing a confusion in which reality and nightmare mix.

The fifth edition was named *White Canvas* and was held between the 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> of May 2014 in the halls of the former garrison of Oradea which today represents the new headquarters of the Muzeul Țării Crișurilor, still under development. The concept took as its starting point the reality and the significance of the space and its significance. Its naked walls, in the transition to the future museum still unpopulated with images, could be put in relation to the white canvas of the painter or to the screen ready for a film projection. In this respect, the curatorial concept covered both the relationship between the two ways of visual expression and the reality of the museum in the contemporary culture across. Relevant in this regard is this idea in the curatorial project: "*Proposing a translation of the*

<sup>6</sup> Diana Gabriela Bohnstedt Gavrițaș, *Liquid image*, curatorial text printed on the event programme, Oradea, 05. 2013

*projection screen from the canvas pictorial layer, the concept White Canvas is intended to put in the frame the idea of film-painting. The purpose in discussing the concept is to propose ongoing videos images in order to open to the viewer a whole horizon of interrogations of its own positions, context and interior support both on the video art that he has contact with and the world reflected by it."*<sup>7</sup>

The VisualContainer selection included a number of ten artists: Alessia Zuccarello, Anita Calà, Barbara Brugola, Chiara Mazzocchi, Elisabetta di Sopra, Elena Bellantoni, Giovanni Zaccariello, Katharina Gruzei, Rita Casdia, Mandra Cerrone and the Conflux selection numbered ten Romanian artists: Alexandra Corondan, István Antal, Corina Andor, Tiberiu Fekete, Gabriela Diana Bohnstedt Gavrilaş, Maria Daniela Rus, Mariana Jurj, Teréz Murányi-Matza, Mihaela Tătulescu, Teofil Ioan Ştiop, the Dutch artist Membrandt, an artist from the U.S.A. Jeremy Newman and a group from Hungary, Nancy Brücke, formed by László Csernátóny Lukács and Viktória Traub.



*White canvas*, picture by Smaranda Chisbora (Bihoreanul)

Particularly suggestive in relation to the proposed theme was the film presented by Tiberiu Fekete, *Contrary Timelines*, proposing a game of scrolling time, which has as subject the Baroque Palace from Oradea, the former building of Muzeul Țării Crișurilor. Here time absorbs everything, from the steam coming out of sewage to the people who, through a process of reversal, leave the museum backwards. Alone, against backflow time, the artist, author and character in the film, moves forward but does not enter the museum, he only passes by. The film is a meditation on the fate of museum institutions today and, in this case, its fate in the context of the local cultural reality.

The sixth edition will take place in autumn, this year, and the curatorial concept is the phrase *Hypnotic frames*. The concept targets, almost like all the other previous editions, the questioning of the virtual world only this time it focuses more on the psychological impact that it has on the individual. Relevant in this respect is the following sentence: "*The supreme condition of numbers is the reality lived consciously or unconsciously, transformed into a world of hypnotic mirages or into an abstract, calculated, conscious space.*"<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Diana Gabriela Bohnstedt Gavrilaş, *White Canvas*, curatorial text printed on the event programme, Oradea, 05. 2014

<sup>8</sup> Diana Gabriela Bohnstedt Gavrilaş, *Hypnotic frames*, curatorial text , Oradea, 2015

As a conclusion, we can say that the *Video Art Event* project, from its beginnings, proposes a framework for intercultural, interinstitutional and interdisciplinary dialogue, approaching themes that have been particularly present in the life of the contemporary man. This framework enables local and international artistic creation to meet the viewer and vice versa. Its ultimate goal is not necessarily to provide answers to current problems but rather to bring out urgent topics, make them visible and to ask questions.

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## LINKS:

- <http://www.visualcontainer.org>
- <http://www.visualcontainer.org/wordpress/it/portfolios/collective-shadesgulag-museum>
- <http://www.visualcontainer.org/wordpress/it/portfolios/cut-into-time-mumbai-india/>

## RELIGION: INSIDE OR OUTSIDE THE PUBLIC SPHERE? A DEBATE AROUND THE HABERMAS MODEL

Radu CARP\*

**Abstract:** *This article intends to analyze the role of religion in the public sphere in Habermas' theory. Despite the fact that the concept has been launched in a book published in 1961, only in 2005 the well-known German thinker has dealt explicitly with this issue. Even the critics of his public sphere model do not mention the lack of religion from the whole paradigm. Some of Habermas' writings related to religion prior to 2005 are discussed. The role of religion in the public sphere is, according to Habermas, related with the issue of religious freedom and the State - Church separation, a model opposed to French laïcité. For Habermas, the state must not only be neutral to the religious discourse, but it must also encourage the participation of political organizations to public life. Another issue that is discussed by Habermas is the relationship between religious majorities and minorities. Habermas does assume a middle position between laïcité and the refuse of the modernity-imposed borders, between religion and politics. The article takes an insight into the way Charles Taylor deals with the role of religion in the public sphere, a helpful argument for showing that the debate on this issue is only at the beginning.*

**Keywords:** *modernity; public sphere; religion; secularization; separation between State and Church*

Among all the theories put forward by Habermas, the one with the greatest impact within the history of political thought from the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century is undoubtedly the public sphere. The concept of public sphere - enunciated for the first time in 1961 and taken over several times in the work of the German thinker -, does not help us understand, *per se*, neither the role of religion within the public sphere, nor the nature of secularization, just to name only the most well-known theoretical approaches that attempt to explain the relation between religion and modernity. (Carp, 2009: 11) Only in 2005, Habermas directly addressed the topic of the role of religion within the public sphere.

Note that not even the critics of Habermas' theoretical model regarding the public sphere consider it necessary to highlight the lack of approach on the topic of religion. Luke Goode referred to the supremacy of the printed speech over other forms of communication, Geoff Eley accuses Habermas of ignoring the inequalities of a society, Nick Crossley and John Michael Roberts criticizes the too rational nature of the theoretical approach and Robert Holub considers that the theory is grounded, but cannot be applied. (Luke, 2005), (Geoff, 1992), (Roberts, Crossly, 2004), (Holub, 1991), (Brice, 2010: 5-15)

Even among those accepting the model of public sphere put forward by Habermas, there are authors that change Habermas' work hypotheses, offering different definitions to

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this concept. According to Charles Taylor, the public sphere is “a common space in which the members of society are deemed to meet through a variety of media: printed and electronic and also face-to-face encounters; to discuss matters of common interest; and thus to be able to form a common mind about these”. (Taylor, 2007: 185) Talal Asad argues that the public sphere is not an empty space; it is made of “sensibilities, memories and aspirations, fears and hopes of those who speak and those who listen”. (Tall, 2003: 185) Marianne van de Steeg defines the public sphere as “a space where citizens (in practice an elite of citizens) discuss to each other issues in the presence of a public that has (at least theoretically) the possibility to intervene and become a participant itself”. (Van de Steeg, 2009)

According to François Foret, the public sphere is an “arena for expressions of the commitments and collective confrontations, the place of interaction of these variables with the practices and discourse of power”. (Foret, 2007: 11) In Ruud Koopmans’ opinion, the public sphere is the “deliberate and public articulation of political demands and current or potential criticisms, affecting the interests or integrity of those who claim or other collective actors”. (Koopmans, 2007: 189) Patrizia Nanz considers that the public sphere is “a social space in which members of a society discuss issues of common interest and public opinions are articulated in relation to these matters”. (Nanz, 2007)

Habermas’ text asserting his stance regarding the relation between religion and public sphere was preceded by several statements in which the subject of religion was not totally absent, but was not connected to the subject of public sphere. Such an attitude is to be found in a book consisting of dialogues between Giovanna Borradori and Habermas, respectively Derrida, published in 2003. (Borradori, 2005: 60-62) The topic of the transformation of religion, of the gelatinization of its usage value in the context of secularization, as well as the justification of the place of religion as a founding value of the public space can be found in one of Habermas’ statements from this book, indeed an indirect brief reference. Asked why he considers the fundamentalism as a specific modern phenomenon, Habermas makes reference to the religious fundamentalism. Habermas believes that the beginning of modernity is the moment in which religions cease to be “global”, in the sense that they were coextensive with the boundaries of the old empires. The religious boundaries were mostly political boundaries, while modernity renders possible the emergence of some states in which there are a majority and several religious minorities. Modernity determined the “exclusive claim to truth by a religion” not to be possible any more. Religious fundamentalism represents a form of “nostalgia of the origins” that attempts to recreate the conditions that preceded modernity. Currently, every religion should coexist with other religions, without claiming to be the only officially recognized dogma, and people with religious beliefs should share the same space with those with secular beliefs. The believers that understand the constraints of living in modernity give up violence, whereas the fundamentalists recur to it in the absence of other means that would make possible the imposition of their religious claims. Habermas does not recur to a complex model that includes the public sphere, the guarantee of religious freedom and the separation of State and Church, in order to explain the role of religion, but still does not exclude it within his theoretical model.

The first impression that can be drawn after reading Habermas’ text from 2005 about religion in the public sphere (Habermas, 2005: 119-154) is that the intention was not to exhaust the subject by formulating some final points of view. Long-awaited, Habermas’ text is somewhat surprising: his reflection does not consider religion as such from the historical point of view, as well as whether the transformations that made possible the emergence of the public sphere have a religious side or not.

The first issue raised by Habermas is related to the religious fundamentalism, secularization and the relation between tradition and religion. The equality between the last two – practiced in the United States – is in contradiction with the condemnation of the religious traditionalism during the French Revolution. Habermas poses the question of how it is possible for such divergent tendencies regarding the place of religion in society to coexist nowadays and how such coexistence is possible on the long-term. The first requirement for keeping this diversity considered *per se* a legitimate aim is the guarantee of religious freedom, based on the mutual respect of the religious beliefs of all members of a political community. Without directly expressing the idea, Habermas argues that religion in the public sphere cannot exist unless the minimal conditions of religious freedom are provided. Religious freedom for Habermas is not similar to secularism. Habermas advocates another element of the public sphere that makes possible the existence of religion: the separation of State and Church. A separation that can be in contradiction with the assertion of secularism: “the secular claim that the state has to refrain from any policy that can support or... restrict the religious beliefs, thus each community in turn, represents a too restrictive interpretation of this principle” (the separation of State and Church). Habermas thus supports the placement of religion in the public sphere on the basis of tolerance, the respect of pluralism, in the detriment of excesses such as the religious fundamentalism on the one hand, and the secularism on the other hand. It is not possible to achieve a full agreement on religious beliefs, but “citizens must respect each other, despite their constant disagreement on spiritual matters and religious beliefs, as members of the political community with equal rights”.

How does an ideal public sphere from the religious point of view look like? Habermas considers that in such a construction, the state guarantees the freedom of religion and the religious communities admit the separation of State and Church and “the restrictive clause that imposes the public use of reason”, resuming an argument formulated by Rawls. The public sphere is based on a compromise: the religious communities acknowledge the limits of their actions and the state “cannot impose duties that are not compatible with a religious lifestyle to its citizens”.

Can there be a society in which the separation of State and Church is not recognized but would still ensure a public sphere, which can meet all the legitimacy criteria? Habermas considers that this separation is part of a wider “constitutional consensus” without which the state cannot function, but he hesitates to elaborate to which extent the separation of State and Church can be compatible with the model of the public sphere. This consensus is not an artificial one; it is constructed on the idea that “even the religious citizen must have accepted the constitution of the secular state”. Hence, the religious beliefs coexist or should coexist with the belief in the legitimacy of the secular state and with the acceptance of state order. Still, even if an individual does not acknowledge the legitimacy of the secular state, his opinion should not be condemned or forbidden. Habermas is thus more tolerant towards religious beliefs than many other liberal authors, clearly arguing that “the liberal state should not transform the institutional separation of religion and politics into an unbearable mental and physical struggle for its citizens”, but does not develop further in order to have the necessary criteria to decide in extreme situations in which the contradiction between the manifestation of a religion and the public order becomes obvious and can no longer be justified in the name of religious freedom. Thus, Habermas, who could have long been accused that the absence of religion from the initial model of the public sphere does not show indifference, but rather the temptation of including the religion in the category of the exclusively private beliefs, shows that he is in favor of a secular state model, in which religious freedom has the broadest scope and when it enters in contradiction with other

guaranteed rights by the same type of state, not always the other rights prevail. Another proof in this sense is the assertion that the state must allow not only the expression of religious speech in the public sphere, but also to encourage “the participation of religious organizations in politics”. In other words, a proactive attitude of the state towards religion is not incompatible with the separation of State and Church supported by Habermas. Religion cannot claim to hold the only or the most important role in the public sphere, but it must be ensured with more than the mere equality with the other contrary or competing beliefs, be it only with the neutral encouragement that Habermas invokes.

The public sphere has in Habermas’ view certain limitations; it is not a concept which covers all the manifestations of religion. The religious argumentations can play a role in the decision-making process, but prior to the parliamentary debates, for example as a way of manifestations of the public sphere. The religious manifestations precede the public sphere and structure it.

Habermas also tackles the sensitive issue of the religious majorities and minorities within the public sphere. Faithful to the neutrality principle that enables tolerance, he considers that a balance must exist between the majority and the minority, so that the religious majority would never be able to oppress the secular minority and vice-versa, otherwise the “supremacy becomes repressive”. For Habermas it is possible that those with religious beliefs to consider as legitimate a political regime that acts on secular basis, being thus of a contradictory opinion with that of Rawls. The “radical Orthodoxy” of John Milbank that is rooted in Carl Schmitt’s political theology is put forward as an example by Habermas in order to illustrate a debate that can take place within the public sphere and cannot be excluded due to a possible incompatibility with reason, because the “theological statements can be argued against only with theological statements, and the historical and epistemological arguments only with historical and epistemological counterarguments”.

Attempting to answer to any criticism regarding the too high-level of abstraction implied by the debate concerning the place of religion within the public sphere, Habermas states at the end of his analysis that what matters is the stance of those with religious beliefs and of those who are the product of secularization. Only they can appreciate whether the relations between them manifest tolerance, and based on the same model it is decided the partial or total acceptance or the rejection of the religious pluralism. Therefore, the model advanced by Habermas depends very much on the actors’ stance and on the intensity of the religious feelings, which is the reason why he prefers not to give a definition of religion or public sphere and to leave open the question of the definition of these concepts. This late addition to a model which completely lacked religion has for Habermas the role of re-founding the secular principles of religious freedom and separation of State and Church by abandoning the secularization paradigm. The public sphere becomes homonymous with a post-secular society in which religion and the principles and of the liberal state can be reconciled. Habermas adopts a middle stance between that of the secularists and the one which does not accept the boundaries between religion and boundaries fixed since the beginning of modernity. The public use of reason represents the main concept that makes possible the presence of religion within the public sphere. It is yet to be seen whether the rational dialogue is the rule or the exception and whether this explanation will finally prevail over alternative models concerning the relation between the religion and the public sphere.

Concomitantly with this text, Habermas published in 2005 another relatively similar statement as part of a dialogue with Joseph Ratzinger. (Habermas, 2005) The fundamental question of this text is related to the role of religion within the public space, namely whether after the transition to the positive law (the accession to modernity) the political sovereignty

can be derived from a “secularized legitimation”. Habermas’ answer is less favorable to religion than the previous one, arguing that a constitution of the liberal state ensures itself the legitimation needs starting from “the cognitive contents of an argumentation system, which is independent on religious and metaphysical traditions”. As in the text above, Habermas emphasizes the need for coexistence within a political community of those with religious beliefs with those who are the product of secularization. The secular vision cannot be generalized, accepted by all citizens, because in this way it would be incompatible with “the neutrality of the state’s power”. The secularized citizens thus do not have the right to deny the role of religion or to “challenge their religious fellow citizens the right to contribute to the public debates through religious speech”.

Charles Taylor uses, as we have already seen, his own definition of the public sphere, refers to Habermas’ initial theory, but not also to the one from 2005, and therefore does not criticize the way in which Habermas treats the role of religion in the public sphere. (Charles, 2007: 185) Taylor ignores Habermas’ first contribution from 2005, probably because its translation in English was to appear in 2008, one year after his book was published. “The common space”, which for Taylor is related to the essence of the public sphere, is made of persons who most of the time never meet, having access to the same information sources but which are located in areas far away from each other. What is new in Taylor’s conception about the public sphere is a “mutation of the social imaginary”. According to Taylor, common “meta-topical” spaces have always existed, without a specific spatial location, the State and the Church being such common spaces. The novelty brought by the 18<sup>th</sup> century is the birth of a new “meta-topical” common space: the public sphere. The existence of several such spaces has determined them to challenge each other’s legitimacy. In this way, the emergence of a new model of public sphere enabled the marginalization of religion and subsequently the secularization. For Taylor, the whole theory of the public sphere is based on the idea that the political power can be limited by an exterior element, which is not God’s will. Thus, according to Taylor, the public sphere is located aside from the power, whereas Habermas rather supports the political nature of the public sphere. It is possible that Habermas will refer back in his future writings to the topic of the role of religion in the public sphere, a conclusion thus being premature. It is important to remember from the way Habermas structures his discourse that the public sphere paradigm has proven to be a very useful tool, generalized in the thinking of other authors dealing with the role of religion in modernity. What Habermas initially avoided to address, was recovered by other authors and the fact that he later took this topic into consideration represents an attempt to align to a debate that precisely his writings had generated. Beyond the abstractions and the meanders of the texts referring to the role of religion in a post-secular context, it must be noted that Habermas does not ascribe religion and religious beliefs exclusively to the private sphere. In other words, if not even the type of discourse focused on the virtues of modernity, of the positive law and of the political order that is not metaphysically grounded, does not fully exclude religion and even emphasizes the fact that a coexistence between the believers and the secular citizens is more than a simple *modus vivendi*, it is obvious that religion has and must have a role within the public space. Thus, it is revealed that the tradition of thinking that denies any role of religion within the public sphere - but which does not manifest directly against Habermas’ theories - is not grounded. The model of the public sphere put forward by Habermas is opposed to the extreme secularism, even if in an indirect way by the simple assertion of tolerance and religious freedom. As illustrated in the presentation of Charles Taylor stance, the debate concerning the role of religion within the public sphere is only at an early stage, Habermas’ stance is not singular and, as the model of

the public sphere will be extended to other researches, the question of the role of religion in this explanatory model will be certainly raised also by other authors.

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## NEW DATA ON THE HISTORY OF JEWS FROM ROMANIA

Anca OLTEAN\*

**Abstract:** *The present paper brings new information about the situation of Jews of Romania in the time of Holocaust and its aftermath (the years of transition to communism and the first years after the setting of communism). It appears that the Jews from Transnistria were deprived by their fundamental rights under the leadership of Ion Antonescu and many of them were killed in their interaction with Romanian military forces. After the war, the surviving Jews have the right to adjust to the communist regime, and to integrate in the communist state, but they have to close their organizations and the ties with Israel were considered as dangerous, although they continued to dream and search ways for emigration.*

**Keywords:** *Jews, Transnistria, rights, fascism, communism, exodus*

An exhaustive paper is the book of Pavel Câmpeanu, *Ceaușescu, anii numărătorii inverse* (*Ceaușescu, the years of inverse counting*). (Câmpeanu, 2002) From the point of view of the themes approached by me, the history of Jews from Romania and Hungary during communist period, we are interested in the chapter referring to the case of Ana Pauker. (Câmpeanu, 2002: 151-195) Although she had spent a lot of time in Russia (the first half of the years 1930s), she returned in country and, after she was imprisoned by the government Antonescu, only at a half from the initial period of condemnation, she received the approval to return in USSR. So, at only three years after the execution of her husband by NKDV, Ana Pauker came back to Moscow. After the starting of anti-Sovietic war, she really became the leader of emigration of Romanian Communist Party (PCR) in USSR. (Câmpeanu, 2002: 152) In the group of Romanian communists who took refuge to Moscow, there were Leonte Răutu și Valter Roman. After August 23, 1944, with the consent of the Soviets, Ana Pauker returned in Romania, under the secret surveillance of Russian communists. Although helped in secret by Moscow, she was not accepted as leader of the party, because it never fulfilled this role, and she did not enjoy such a prestige in the country also, because she was suspected by the communist leaders from Romania that she makes the games of the Soviets.<sup>1</sup> Once with the returning of Ana Pauker, it was

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<sup>1</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 154. The author (Pavel Câmpeanu) explains in an extremely relevant passage her failure to become a leader of PCR: “Differently from Gottwald, or in a certain extent by Rákosi, (...) Ana Pauker was not sent at home in order to take her place in front of the party, but also to make herself accepted in this role, which she never fulfilled in the past. Her incapacity to justify this pretention through the invocation of a respected authority by future partners of discussions in the country, makes that the first obstacle with which she is confronted in the execution of its mission to reside even in the way of how it was presented: the anonym character of authorities in the name of whose is she talking. Based on a very fragile basis, her initial success will be a short time one (she will remain in front of the party only for a year), owned mainly to the military context”. (transl.)

persistant the problem of whom will possess the political power: the former prisoners from the interior of Romania or the former emigrants in Soviet Union. After the dismissal of the provisory party leadership, Ana Pauker is imposed for a year to power and, after that, even she proposes, that the power of secretary general of the party to pass to Romanian communist Gheorghiu-Dej. The opinion of the author is that, during seven years, Ana Pauker tried to take the effective power from Gheorghiu-Dej and to let him only a formal power, fact that will conduce to her dismissal from Central Committee in 1952. (Câmpeanu, 2002: 164) A severe illness of which she found out in 1950 culminated with her dismissal from power in 1952. What is to be reproached to Ana Pauker was her right wing deviation of taking the land of peasants by the state through collectivization. She tried to respond to the accusations without confessing that she was ill. Not only her was accused by right wing deviation, but also the other political adversaries of the president, Dej. Last, but not least, the author Pavel Câmpeanu wonders if Ana Pauker was not a victim of anti-Semitism. Quoting Robert Levy, Pavel Câmpeanu agrees that the key to Ana Pauker's decline is to be found in the politics started by Stalin against the Jews, which took place in the last years of his life in all the Sovietic block<sup>2</sup>. In order to give an example in order to demonstrate that the victims of Dej were the Jewish communists, Pavel Câmpeanu talks about the process of Pătrășcanu who imposed also the problem of other Jews from the superiour levels of the party<sup>3</sup>.

In the work *Contribuția evreilor din România la cultură și civilizație* (*Contribution of the Jews of Romania to culture and civiisation*), acad. Nicolae Cajal and dr. Harry Kuller, a chapter is dedicated to the Jewish press from the Old Kingdom of Romania and Transylvania in the XIX<sup>th</sup> and XX<sup>th</sup> century. Stopping on the period that folowed after the Second World War, the author notices the presence that is very high of Jewish journalists in the Romanian Press. The author describes this fact, in principle, as dued by two causes: “the rapid publication of the press of all colors and all kinds that followed to the act of August 23, 1944” (Cajal & Kuller, 1996: 410) and “the step by step dissapearance (and, sometimes, for a long time) from the journals’ and magazines’ columns of many compromised names by active collaboration – often in the top of the job sector – to direct fascist press, sometimes only fascizant, and in several occasions simply kind – favorizing the Antonescian regime”. (transl) (Cajal & Kuler, 1996: 410) It was opening now, in the 2-3 years that have been necessary to the instauration of communism, a freedom of words and a chance of the Jews to say the truth about the Holocaust. This press campaign against the collaborators of Antonescu’s regime was gradually pursued with arguments, not in a revengeful way, shows the authors, this unveiling being a current of the respective epoch, not only a Jewish counter- reaction. Nicolae Cajal and Harry Kuller remarked a very important fact, and, namely, that it existed a few years of liberty of the press between August 23 1944 and December 30, 1947. During this period, there were present on the market journals such as “Adevărul”, “Jurnalul de dimineață”, “Semnalul”, “Aurora”, “Lupta”, “Tribuna poporului”, “Victoria”, “Informația”. Among the Jewish journalists of the time, I record B. Brănișteanu, Emil D. Fagure, Liviu Floda, J.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 180. Apud Robert Levy, *Ana Pauker, The rise and fall of a Jewish Communist*, The California University Press, 2001.

<sup>3</sup> Pavel Câmpeanu asserts that: “Besides Koffler that had the same destiny, besides his wife, Hertha, besides his versatile friend Belu Silber, in the process of Pătrășcanu were involved the folclorist Harry Brauner, the engineer Emil Calmanovici, suicided by hungriness, and others. Not being able to modify the origine of the main accused, the trial of so called “national treason” brings in front of the jury as accused, a group made up by numerous Jews” (transl.), p. 185.

Lespezeanu, S. Semilian, Horia Verzeanu, Azra Bercovici, Camil Ring, Sebastian Șerbescu, Marius Mircu, I. Isaia, L. Marvall, Jack Berariu, Sergiu Milorian, S. Massler, Teșu Milcoveanu, Ioan Massoff, S. Alterescu, Liana Maxy, Valentin Silvestru, I. Felea, Ștefan Tita, G. Spina, George Silviu, Adrian Rogoz, Arthur și Alfons Vogel, Ionel Bistrițeanu, F. Brunea – Fox, I. Brucăr, Vlademir Colin, Sandu Koller, Aurel Dumbrăveanu, I. Florin, Scarlat Froda, Ion Golea, Alex. Gruia, Silvian Iosifescu, Ionel Jianu, I. Negel, Sandu Naumescu, Iacob Nedeleanu, A.P. Samson, Eugen Schileru, S. Săveanu, I. G. Severin, Lascăr Sebastian. (Cajal & Kuller, 1996: 411) Nicolae Cajal and Harry Kuller dedicates a chapter to the participation of the Jews to the development of industry in interwar period. After the First World War, the Jews obtained in Romania the right to citizenship. An ascendent evolution until 1938 marked the participation of Jewry to economic life of the Kingdom of Romania. So, according to the census from 1930, they (the Jews) were in number of 728 000, and, in 1938, cca. 850.000. (Cajal & Kuller, 1996: 456) The great number of Jewish employees in the industrial sector (cca. 19 000 at the beginning of XXth century) and of Jewish private firms existent on the market, as it results from the figures of the selling exhibition opened in Bucharest in 1921, shows the important role which the Jews had played in economy<sup>4</sup>. Among the Jewish business men of the time, we remember jews such as Eugen Reisman, Sig. L. Berman, Mohnblatt Brothers, Dr. Hain, Z. Esmansky, Izrael Meyrovitz, Friedman, Leb and Grosz, Grünfeld Armin, Neuberger Brothers, Glück Ignat, Herzfeld Ladislau, Gidali Iosif, Glück Ignat, Herzfeld Ladislau, Gidali Iosif, Glück Rudolf and Ionaș Adolf who detained strong factories on the market in interwar period. (Cajal & Kuller, 1996: 458) Nicolae Cajal and Harry Kuller certifies the participation of the Jews to the societies of actions. Such Jews were: Max Aușnit, O. Kaufmann, Edgar Aușnit, R. Fraenkel, L. Johnson, V. Levy, N.N. Sapira, Mauriciu Blank, Aristide Blank, R. Soepkez, L. Traserson, Osias Nacht, Joseph Nacht, David Schäffer, R. Elias, Jacques Eiser, etc. (Cajal & Kuller, 1996: 459) Among the Jewish bankers of the time we can remember Mauriciu Blank, Aristide Blank, Oscar Kaufmann, N. Ehrenstein, Richard Soepkez, Ardolph Berkovitz, etc. (Cajal & Kuller, 1996: 459) In 1930, 30% from the Jewish population was aggregated in industry. (Cajal & Kuller, 1996: 460) Last but not least, Nicolae Cajal and Harry Kuller make a brief description of Romanian – Israeli diplomatic relations, but also of cultural relations. Official visits of Israeli diplomats to Bucharest took place after the creation of Israelian state and its acknowledgement by the Romanian officials. Among these diplomats we remember: Golda Meir, Abba Eban, Yigal Alon, Menachem Begin, Moshe Dayan, Yitzak Shamir, Shimon Peres. (Cajal and Kuller, 1996: 582) With regard to the cultural relations between Romania and Israel, not only one time left from Romania numerous representations and Romanian singers. These contacts, including the organization of conferences, exhibitions with informations from Romania there were organized, sometimes, conferences, exhibitions with informatios from Romania, there were organized, sometimes, by the Romanian diplomats in Israel, during the communist years. This aspect is proven by the authors that these good relations continued, also, after 1989.

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<sup>4</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 457. Nicolae Cajal and Harry Kuller said that the number of enterprisers of whose owners were Jews was about 700, in 1930: “After the investigations conducted on each branch of great transformative industry, we evaluate that the number of individual enterprises whose owners were Jews, reached over 700, in the year 1930, representing 29-30% from the total of the entire country; increases over this average they were in Metal industry (45, 5%), in the industry of paper and graphical arts (41%), in the history of glass and ceramics (39%)” (transl.).(p.458).

Paul Lendvai, in his volume *Ungurii (The Hungarians)*, (Lendvai, 2013: 7-570) makes a description of the 1000 of years of existence of Hungarians in Central Europe. We stop on the moment 1867, when through Austrian – Hungarian dualist pact, the Austrians and the Hungarians decide to make together a condominium and thus to lead the Austrian – Hungarian Empire. So the emperor of Austria was also “apostolic king of Hungary”. (Lendvai, 2013: 293) Lendvai describes how that state was functioning<sup>5</sup>. In 1910, shows Paul Lendvai, in Hungary were living 50% of Roman – Catholics, 12, 8% of Orthodox, 11% Greek – Catholics, 14, 2 % Calvinists, 7, 2% evangelists, 5% Orthodox Israelites. It followed a Law on nationalities that was mentioning that all the citizens of Hungary were a nation, but it was admitting such liberties as “the use of non-Hungarian languages at the level of institutions of administration and also from the justice of first instance, it assured to the nationalities the education in their maternal language, the right to create national cultural institutions and Apostolic union and acknowledged the autonomy of national churches (by example the Serbian Orthodox Church and of the Romanian one). The official language was not introduced as an object study not even in the primary schools and medium schools and the non- Hungarian languages were opened free way in the churches”. (transl.) (Lendvai, 2013: 305) The moment 1867 offered to the Jews from Hungary the chance to assimilate in the Hungary of the Hungarian culture in turn of full equality in terms of citizenship and politics with the Hungarian inhabitants. The Jews arrived in Hungary slowly shows Paul Lendvai. So, if in 1787 their number was 80 000, in 1840 their number increased to 238 000, and in 1910 they were already 911 000. (Lendvai, 2013: 341) But the Jews continued to be the target of the Hungarians’ envy becoming, gradually more Magyars and Occidental than before. (Lendvai, 2013: 348) With regard to the Holocaust years, Paul Lendvai is not negating it, he acknowledged the Anti- Semitism rising in Hungary during the years 1940 – 1944, the fact that the fault for Holocaust is collective, it belongs also to Hungarian authorities too.

A very important work are the *memories* of Arnold Schwefelberg, a Jewish intellectual who played an important role in the interwar period and even in the first years after the war, in the years of transition towards the communism. (Schwefelberg, 2000) Being a lawyer, with consistent studies in Romania and abroad, close collaborator with Wilhelm Filderman, leader of Jewish Community from Romania, Arnold Schwefelberg represented with success the prototype of exceptional Jewish intellectual who imposed also in professional plan and, also at the level of community, in the interwar period time. Son of a teacher, Schwefelberg inherited from his family aptitudes for study, having, in the same time, an enterprising spirit and organized spirit, being less a religious Jews, as his father. After exceptional high school studies, once arrived in Bucharest, Schwefelberg studied to *Academy of Commercial and Industrial Studies*, where he has been a excellent student. He took part to the First World’s War, he fought in the first line, obtaining, at the end of the war, Romanian citizenship. He activated as a good Jew among the prominent members of Jewish Communities from Romania, when this community had known also moments of tension starting with 1937, once with the coming to power of the government Goga – Cuza. During the rebellion of the legionaries, Schwefelberg and his family are aggressed by a band

<sup>5</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 295. “It was, in reality, an unusual construction: both halves of the Empire had their bicameral parliaments, their own governments, each had a prime minister and diverse ministers of resort; both have been closely linked their own territorial armed forces (...) and an independent financial administration. Besides these aspects, it existed 3 common Imperial ministers (*k.u.k.*), namely for external affairs, for the army and to cover the costs of common activities (for instance, external policy and defence)”. (transl)

of Iron guards, but escaped alive. Leon Volovici, in his foreword to his volume, makes a brief characterization of the activity of Schwefelberg during the Antonescian dictatorship: "During the war, he has been very active in Jewish organizations of assistance, of the ones left without job after the application of the legislation of Romanization of the personnel from enterprises; of helping the refugees from Czechoslovakia; of families of the victims of the pogrom from Iassy, of the ones deported in Transnistria or returned from deportation; in organization of some emigrations in Palestine; in the salvation of some Jews evadated on the eve of deportation and also refugees in Romania". (transl.) (Schwefelberg, 2000: 14) At the end of the war, Schwefelberg involved in Zionist activities, and supported Jewish emigration in Palestine (Israel) and this is the ground of its arrestment in 1952. After the setting free from the prison, he tried to adjust to the conditions from Romania. He wrote his memories in the years 60' with an ending in 1973, reflecting from these memories a detachment from the life enjoyed by the Jews from Israel and an adaptation to the realities from communist Romania.

The volume of Emil Dorian entitled *Cărțile au rămas neterminate. Jurnal 1945-1948*, (Dorian a., 2006) starts his story at the end of the war, in 1945. His quality of writer which is revealed also with the occasion of this volume, alternates with the one of participants of a political world in continuous change in the life of the Jews, but also of the Romanian ethnics, in general. The work is a picture of the postwar years, of transition to communism. Thus the author describes the state of Jewish Democratic Committee, predicting its end since 1947 which represents the communism and its subversions and not the majority Jewish population more concerned about exodus than by the construction of socialism. Antisemitism grows also in the postbelic world, the idea that the Jews are helped by Americans threatened a lot of people. (Dorian a., 2006: 233) Extremely badly seen is also Joint. The communism is also seen by the author as "a moral capitulation", in the continuation to physical capitulation from Iasi which, again, the Jews had to endure.

The second volume of Emil Dorian, having the title *Cu fir negru de arnici. Jurnal 1949- 1956, / With black wire of arnic. Journal 1949- 1956*, (Dorian b., 2013) describes the life of the author, poet and doctor in communist Romania. In the first years of communism, the poet was activating, as much time as it could, as an employee of Jewish Community from Bucharest. In this quality, he had knew, which have been the problems of the Community, and, of its leaders, and, slowly, the more and more visible communization. The Journal is, in the same time, a literary journal, this *ars poetica* that it had been so dear to him. He appears as a prominent intellectual of those times trying to escape from the censorship of time, maybe also through the fact that he wrote a lot of books for children. It is also, a literary diary, being made often references to the literature of the poet or the universal one, a journal of events talking about the cultural and political events of the time. In time, the Jewish identity of the author, so peculiar in communist Romania, is replaced by the quality of communist writer.

An important contribution to the history of Romania is represented by the two volumes of Jean Ancel, *Contribuții la Istoria României. Problema evreiască 1933- 1944/ Contributions to the history of Romania. The Jewish problem 1933- 1944*, (Ancel a., 2003) and a second omonime volume published at Hasefer Printing House, 2003. (Ancel b., 2003) From volume 1, we remember the chapter *The political and ideological basis of Antonescu's regime*. After the defeat of the rebellion of Iron guards from January 24, 1941, and, after Romania joined Germany's camp in the war against Soviet Union from June 22, 1941, little by little, Romania followed its own anti-Semite politics. The author offers a complex definition of the Antonescian dictatorship which was nor a classic fascist

dictatorship, neither a democratic regime. Thus, the author states: “The understanding and classification of Antonescu’s regime does not represent a simple detail, and this from the cause of ideological contradictions which it summed up and, also, because of the great separations between his regime and other fascist regimes from Europe. Apparently, a regime which destroyed the Parliament, joined the Axis states and to the war against Soviet Union, adopted anti- Semite and racist laws, can be defined as fascist. But a series of facts complicates the question: the Antonescu’s regime came after a dictatorial regime of another kind, although weaker, the dictatorship of king Carol the second; he closed a parliament which was not elected in a democratic way and this not expressed the will of the people; he saved about one half from the number of Jews that were under its control; and his inheritance were the anti- Semite laws as, the Status of the Jews, which were on the basis of his future anti- Semite legislation. Antonescu and his ministers did not call themselves or their regime fascist. This regime sent away with violence the Romanian fascist movement, dissolved its party structure, threw them away, oppressed and arrested its members, condemned his methods of terror and, also, presented it as a servant of Nazis. The political and ideological basis of Antonescu’s regime were put, a long time ago, by some intellectuals of the old right movement, nationalists politicians with hated the democratic system in general and its way of application in Romania, organizations and nationalist parties created in the years 1930 and the king himself, who hated Romanian democracy and her politicians also installed his dictatorship” (transl.). (AnceI a./vol.1, 2013: 8) A lot of them regarded Antonescu as a savior, after the authoritarian regime of Carol the second, especially after the defeat of iron guards’ rebellion from January 24, 1941. The nationalist and anti-Semite ideas of the Antonescian regim, were very well fundamentalized by the nationalist intellectual Nichifor Crainic. The author allocates several chapters to the deportation of Romanian Jews in Bessarabia, Bucovina and Transnistria. Chapter 18 is entitled *Concentration camps and ghettos in Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina, September – November 1941*. Although there were a few written evidence for the deportation of Romanian Jews from the Kingdom of Romania, few documents and short notes are standing as proves nowadays. They prove the implication of Antonescu’s regime in atrocities committed against the Romanian Jews. So, Antonescu knows that in Chişinău were still living 50 000 of Jews, among whom, right at the beginning they were killed 10 000. (AnceI a./vol.1, 2013: 144) In their action of deportation, the Jews were forced to work. (AnceI a./vol.1, 2013: 145) Because of the bad conditions, in their way to Nistru, thousands of Jews died; the women were subjected to the violence of the soldiers, and, when they arrived to Nistru, about 400 of Jews were pushed by Romanian sodiers in water and they got sunk. (AnceI a./vol.1, 2013: 147) In September, 1941, shows the author, it existed several concentration camps and ghettos in Bassarabia, respectively to: Secureni, Edineţ, Limbenii Noi, Răşcani, Răuţel, Vertujeni, Mărculeşti, Chişinău, ghettos and smaller camps from the South of Bessarabia (in Cahul, Chilia, Bolgrad). (AnceI a./vol.1, 2013: 155- 156) These are only a few aspects of the persecution of Jews taken into discussion by the volume.

The second volume of Jean AnceI gathers informations about the situation of Transnistria under the Romanian occupation. Antonescu, although he would have had the possibility to annexate Transnistria, under the influence of Iuliu Maniu he did not annexate it, but he occupied it together with the German troupes. (AnceI b./vol.2, 2013: 7-8) 30% of the Jews from Transnistria were living in Odessa, and the rest in small localities and towns of Transnistria. (AnceI b./vol.2, 2013: 8) The author concludes that the events that happened in Bessarabia and Bucovina repeated also in Transnistria. (AnceI b./vol.2,

2013: 9) The governor of Transnistria was professor Gh. Alexianu, a university professor of Romania, antisemite, who did not hesitate to apply the orders of Antonescu. The writer Jean Ancel, was one of the very few Romanian intellectuals who acknowledged that these deportations happened and took place with the involvement of Romanian administration, showing thus that it existed an Holocaust also in Romania.

The present paper brings together interesting information about the Jews from Romania and Transnistria or the development of the Jewish community in interwar period, but also its temporary evolution and continuity in communist Romania. If we sum up, the sources about the Jews of XX<sup>th</sup> century are more and more visible and outstanding improving the knowledge of whose research was obstructionnated by communist regime.

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# THE EUROPEANIZATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN CEE: THE INFLUENCE OF THE PARTY OF EUROPEAN SOCIALISTS UPON THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN ROMANIA BETWEEN 1990- 2005

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**Abstract:** *The paper investigates the Europeanization of political parties in Central and Eastern Europe, focusing on the influence of the Party of European Socialists into the process of reformation and consolidation of the Social Democratic Party in Romania before the country's accession to the European Union. The study argues that the process of Europeanization involved embracing a behavioural model promoted by Western social-democrats in order for the CEE parties to be accepted into their structures. The Europarty's efforts to educate the Social Democratic Party in subjects relevant for its doctrine, the incentives given to prompt change and also the party's desire to gain legitimacy and recognition, facilitated the transformation of the Social Democratic Party in Romania into a genuine social-democratic political organization.*

**Keywords:** *Europarty, European Union, integration, legitimacy, party change*

## 1. Introduction

The Europeanization of political parties in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is a relatively new and underdeveloped research area being connected to the interwoven processes of democratisation, party system consolidation and European integration after the fall of the communist regimes. This research area can also be very generous to scholars as it offers the possibility of theoretical and empirical innovation in terms of the methods and instruments employed to study the process and its effects. While studying the Europeanization of political parties in CEE is quite daunting as causality links can be difficult to trace since the European Union (EU) has no direct impact over party systems and their components, it can be fascinating to analyze the relation between European transnational party federations and their partners and, consequently, the former's role into returning the parties in ex-communist countries back to Europe. In other words, the Europarties acted as agents of Europeanization facilitating the conditions for successor or historical parties to reform, strengthen internally by becoming more institutionalized and stable and last but not least, they helped them achieve domestic and international legitimacy and recognition.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of the Party of European Socialists (PES) upon the Social Democratic Party in Romania (PSD) during its Europeanization process by focusing on the pre-accession period, from 1990 to 2005 – signing of the Treaty of Accession to the EU - which, according to research studies, carries the most

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external influences. On one hand, I chose to study the particular case of the Social Democratic Party due to its relevance for the Euroatlantic integration of Romania, which, during the party's leadership, managed to join NATO (2004) and close the negotiation chapters with the EU that led to the signing of the Treaty of Accession (2005), but also because since 2005 it stands as the sole parliamentary representative of social-democracy in Romania. On the other hand, the Europeanization literature on CEE parties generally focuses on several countries of the 2004 enlargement wave, such as Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic while others, like Romania from the 2007 wave, are quite pristine territory in its politics dimension. Hence, this paper will be a contribution to the literature<sup>1</sup> as well as a platform for further research on the Europeanization particularities of political parties in Romania.

The paper is structured into five sections, each addressing the question of the Europeanization of political parties in CEE more in depth, and it progresses as follows: the first part is an overview of the context the analysis is placed in, the significance of the concept of Europeanization related to CEE parties, the role of Europarties in influencing the partners in the former communist space; the second part tackles with the mechanisms and the object - three dimensions - of Europeanization; the third part delves into the role played by the PES and the stages of its involvement as agent of the Europeanization process; the fourth part addresses the core of the analysis, respectively PES's influence in Europeanizing PSD over the span of more than a decade as well as the transformation of the Romanian party into a genuine promoter of Western social-democracy; the fifth and final part is a summary of the main findings of the paper, such as the fact that by 2005, the persuasion and social learning events PSD had taken part in had finally paid off and the party had become a committed supporter of the PES's strategies and programmes while enjoying full membership of the international social-democratic structures.

## **2. The Europeanization of political parties in Central and Eastern Europe**

The process of Europeanization, conducted through transnational party cooperation, was an important part of the cycle Central and Eastern Europe went through after the fall of the communist regimes in the area. In this context, the Europeanization of CEE political parties will be understood as the approximation of national parties to Western European ideologies based on inter-elite socialization and under EU pressures and promises (Pridham, 2001). Consequently, from a theoretical perspective I choose to place the transformation process in the framework of sociological institutionalism where EU actors - Europarties- act as normative entrepreneurs devising new rules of behaviour for CEE parties.

Anyway, the so-called "comeback to Europe" represented the propelling force for the changes of the '90s and materialised into the states' commitments to undertake economic, social and political reforms all the more reason when at the end of the process existed the possibility of reintegrating into the European family and consequently becoming a member of the European Union. There is no doubt, however, that the states from CEE were always European through their geographical location but they couldn't be classified as "Occidental"; therefore, in this respect, the concept of Europeanization acquired the meaning of "Occidentalization", of identification with EU membership, in the

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<sup>1</sup> The research studies on the Europeanization of political parties in Romania are scarce, with only a few authors analyzing this subject: Preda (2006); Octavian (2008); Toda (2008); Caradaică and Căulea (2009); Ion (2015)

hope that, once the ex-communist states embraced Western standards, Europe would have been more cohesive and not divided into two camps (Lewis, 2012: 7).

Central and Eastern states were presented with the opportunity to establish democratic political systems but they were confronted with the enormous challenge of putting in place new institutional structures and adopting a behavioural model that could allow them to cut down on the differences separating these states from their Western counterparts and ultimately join them in the EU. Although the changes had partially been attributed to the former communist states' desire to embark on the road of European integration, research studies showed that EU pressures<sup>2</sup> had an important contribution to the process of adaptation. Party actors in the EU, especially transnational party federations, influenced the emergence of pluralist parties and party systems that they shaped in Western fashion (Holmes and Lightfoot, 2011: 32). In this context, the influence of Europarties over the partner parties in CEE can be thought of as an example of Europeanization which refers to the impact of European integration on the national level of the states in a top-down manner. Generally, the top-down approach is specific to the Europeanization process in CEE where it is identified with the influence exerted by an actor at European level over an actor at domestic level, which then adapts to the changes brought along by the integration process in the environment in which it operates. In this sense, the arduous and longstanding process of meeting the conditionalities laid down by the EU - the Copenhagen criteria, the requirements for joining the Europarties - had a profound impact upon the nascent party systems in the CEE, especially in matters regarding the competition over integration issues and the ideological stands of the parties (Hooghe and Vachudova, 2009: 179).

However, the process of change stimulated by the EU's influence sometimes seems to not be very clear, thus making the causality link questionable. This aspect has been debated by several authors with diverging views. On one hand, Vachudova (2008) and Chiva (2007) claim that the EU influence came so far as affecting the mechanics of national party systems - the way they interact with each other -, meaning that they acted on purpose to change policies and remove certain coalitions from power as it was the case with the Slovak HZDS - Movement for a Democratic Slovakia party. A three time governing party, HZDS was headed by strongman Vladimír Mečiar, whose authoritarian practices and anti-EU views prevented it from forming any meaningful transnational links with political actors in the EU, thus making the country lag in terms of European integration. As such, testing negative for Europeanization influences and earning international disapproval from actors who wanted it removed from power for keeping Slovakia away from the positive transformations in CEE, the party started to lose domestic support in the 1998 elections which finally culminated with HZDS losing its governing position (Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008: 91-92). Anyway, the same kind of claims was made with regard to the format and mechanics of the party systems in Bulgaria and Romania in the pre-accession period, as well. On the other hand, this kind of leverage has been contested by other authors who attributed the changes in party systems to some internal factors (Henderson, 2006; Haughton, 2007; Szczerbiak, 2009), for instance the successor parties' wish to demonstrate their European competences in order to prove that they had left behind their communist identity and gain legitimacy in the new democratic context (Lewis, 2012: 9). Hence, it appears that questions of causality are quite problematic in this respect.

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<sup>2</sup> For more on this, see Negrescu (2013)

Haughton (2008) however, attempts to find a solution regarding the opposing views over the question of causality, and suggests thinking of the EU as a travel companion and much less as a triggering factor for the changes in the policies and principles of the parties. In its "passenger" position, the Union seeks to influence the others' behaviour through engagement and force of arguments which are also regarded as most suitable by the author in this particular situation. In addition, in most studies concerning the influence of Europarties upon parties in CEE, the authors agree that "the Europarties are the most important vehicle of standardization" (Holmes and Lightfoot, 2011; Öhlén, 2013; Pridham, 2005 and 2014; Enyedi and Lewis, 2006). Actually, the Europarties work as amplifiers, making the pressure of the indirect effects of Europeanization more intense while standing as active actors who directly influence the CEE parties and their activity; the immediate consequence would then be for sudden extensive changes to show up. Therefore, I can state that the Europarties act as Europeanization agents in ex-communist countries (von dem Berge and Poguntke, 2012: 316).

### **2.1 Europarties and their role in the Europeanization of parties in Central and Eastern Europe**

Like many Western actors after the fall of communism, the Europarties, which turned their attention to the East in order to influence the economic and political process, sought to place themselves as best as they could on the newly formed political market. By recruiting emerging parties into their structures, they aimed at strengthening their respective European party family. Moreover, the Europarties wanted to ensure their presence in CEE with the help of the composing parties in the countries that might have joined the EU in the event of an enlargement which corresponded with the necessity to consolidate seat allocation in the European Parliament (EP) (von dem Berge and Poguntke, 2012: 312). The Europarties also derived advantage from a series of facilitating factors for the exertion of their influence in CEE (Borzel and Risse, 2003: 58, 63, 73). Firstly, the painful transitions the states in this area were going through made them more open to external assistance and influence. Secondly, referring exclusively to the party level, the mere transformation of the political system and the process of European integration came with important demands for the parties to fulfil, for instance gaining knowledge about the functioning of modern democratic political systems and the role of the political parties composing them. Thirdly, the party systems in CEE were more open to external influences due to the fact that they were less institutionalized and more fluid and unstable in comparison to their Western counterparts (Lewis, 2006: 8-12). Lastly, in the first years after the fall of communism the parties stated their desire to return to Europe, suggesting they were ready to cooperate with the West and be a part of its political structures by gaining membership in one of the transnational party federations in the EU, the PES and the European People's Party (EPP).

Therefore, the Europarties had a way of playing their role as a supporting and stimulating agent in the democratisation and European integration processes undergone by the parties in the former communist states thanks to several conditions specific to the context in which they began their activity after 1990.

In order to understand the Europeanization process of the CEE parties it is not enough to look at the effects it produced, implying the changes in the three structural dimensions of a party - party system structure, main political orientations and intra-party dimension. We should instead investigate what the Europarties, as agents, intended to "Europeanize" and also the mechanisms employed for the transformation of the party

systems and the composing parties in the 12 states with a communist legacy that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007.

### **3. The dimensions of Europeanization and the mechanisms used by the Europarties**

#### ***3.1. The object - what do Europarties Europeanize?***

When Europarties directed their attention to CEE after the fall of communism, they realised there was the opportunity to move into this space and recruit new members in order to strengthen their political family. However, there was a danger that their internal homogeneity be affected by incorporating actors with a different background of mentalities, policies and institutions during the Eastern enlargement (Delsoldato, 2002: 272). In other words, the Europarties could not tolerate too much variety amidst them as this would have resulted in an interruption of their daily activities and an increase of transactional costs (von dem Berge and Poguntke, 2012: 316). Thus, the Europarties had to maintain a certain level of programmatic and organizational coherence for their own survival and, implicitly, for the efficiency of the groups in the EP. In this particular case, the influence exerted for the development of post-communist parties targeted the latter's approach to the West ever since their early cooperation. This occidentalization was hence visible in the three structural dimensions of a party – the structure of the party system, the main political orientations and the intra-party dimension. According to this, the occidentalization signified that partner parties from the CEE agreed to operate changes in all three dimensions mentioned before (Holmes and Lightfoot, 2011: 32).

However, the question arising is which model did these parties follow in the adaptation process to the political scene of the EU? This model was actually built on formal and informal rules governing the behaviour of parties in Western Europe and was used to evaluate the progress of Eastern party actors. First of all, the imperative of the "protocol" was represented by the commitment to democratic standards – as it was defined by the Copenhagen criteria – and to the ideologies of the greater party families, laid down in the fundamental documents of the pan-European associations such as PES and EPP. Secondly, there was a set of informal rules to be embraced by parties from candidate countries or parties aspiring to join a Europarty: above all, the centre-right/centre-left consensus reached in relation to economic development and the welfare state which helped the states from Western Europe to overcome the crisis period between fascism and communism (Mikulova, 2014: 166).

As a result, I think that the three structural dimensions of the parties constitute the object of Europeanization promoted by Europarties as agents in the process and, what is more, the changes that took place in each of the three followed a pattern made up from attributes parties in the West share and consider as being essential.

#### ***3.2 Europeanization mechanisms utilized by Europarties***

In getting further to the way Europeanization affects political parties, we should bear in mind the logic and mechanisms employed to transform them in the process of joining the EU. Throughout this process, candidate states register progresses using the rationalist logic of consequences and the constructivist logic of appropriateness, based on external incentives and social learning respectively (Mikulova, 2014: 167). The first model refers to asymmetrical interdependences, when the learners – CEE states - must

respect the teacher's rules as to avoid the latter's refusal to award them the attending prize at the end of the EU accession process. Stated otherwise, if we apply this Europeanization mechanism to political parties, we can describe it as informal conditionality since a common *acquis* is lacking. The second model, of social learning, uses social motivation in order for students to embrace the teacher's norms as soon as they find them appropriate and desirable. Applied to political parties, the mechanism is equivalent to socialization conducted through pan-European party associations such as PES and EPP. However, I have to mention that these mechanisms can act together, in which case there is a probability to mistake one for the other; if something like this does not happen however, they should be perceived as individual levels on a gradual scale meant to answer particular situations. While it is true that Europarties can induce change over the CEE partners more quickly and in an extensive manner through the incentive based mechanism, the resulting transformations do not run deeply; they can instead be perceived as a mere makeover in order to obtain the much awaited rewards promised by the Europarties. On the other hand, the changes performed in light of the socialization mechanism are more limited and profound in certain internal dimensions of the party, such as ideology. What is more, they show up only after completing the internalization of Western rules and values, as evidence that the party actors from former communist countries find them appropriate and desirable. Hence, the changes triggered by the socialization mechanism have a deeper and longstanding impact.

#### **4. PES – Europeanization agent for parties in Central and Eastern Europe**

After the fall of the communist regime in CEE in 1989, opportunities started to arise both for party actors from the West and for those in this space. While for the latter the new political environment offered the chance of returning to Europe by creating democratic party systems with Occidental views, for the Europarties, especially for PES, the new conditions in CEE made possible the opening of an attractive political market. PES saw the opportunity to expand to the East and ensure its presence in the former communist countries in the event that these eventually joined the EU. In the first phase of their enlargement to the East, Western-European social-democrats were faced with a dilemma: should they invite the social-democrat historical parties, the successor parties or both? The answer came shortly after and it was clear that inviting both types of parties wouldn't have been accepted by the historical ones. However, feeling that it was its duty to recognize the historical parties and support them as future allies in CEE, after the bad treatment they had been subjected to at the end of the 1940s in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, the PES had to invite them in its ranks although they were poorly prepared electorally, were disconnected from the events in CEE, were underfunded and ideologically traced their doctrine back to the socialism at the beginning of the 20th century (Öhlén, 2013: 189). Anyway, the decision to isolate the successor parties was not only due to an approach based on the logic of appropriateness but also to the fact that in the PES there were divergent views regarding the full inclusion of parties with a socialist background; the main concern was that these, due to their legacy, might prejudice the reputation and credibility of the Western social-democracy. Unfortunately, the first elections in the CEE after the fall of communism showed that historical parties would barely have a role to play, with a few exceptions in the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia. The successor parties had proved instead that they benefitted both from strong and stable party organizations but also from a network outside the party. The PES was then again faced with a dilemma: if it further supported the historical parties and ignored

the successor ones, they faced the great risk of lacking partners in the East; at the same time, the recognition and inclusion of the former communist parties amongst them also involved a great risk for the legitimacy of the Europarty based on the past of its partners (Öhlén, 2013: 191)

Compromise was the solution to this dilemma and it involved establishing an informal organization in 1993, the European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity (EF). The aim of this organization was to approach the successor parties in order to know them better and, implicitly, evaluate their vocation for democratisation and integration in the political scene of Western Europe. PES' initiative was the first attempt of this kind to Europeanize the former communist parties. PES wanted stable and reliable partners in the region, but it doubted the parties' commitment, despite the fact that these were constantly trying to demonstrate their loyalty as best as they could. Therefore, it resorted to educating them on ideological matters, intra-party democracy and gender equality, but also on tactical questions, the next move being to offer successor parties its support under certain conditions. In other words, the strategy was on one hand to assist them and influence them to adapt to the social-democratic model, on the other (Öhlén, 2013: 223).

The second phase of PES' enlargement to the East can be understood in the context of its attempt to balance between the need to ensure its influence in an enlarged Union and the need to take shelter from the toxic influences the successor parties could have brought in the midst of it. However, the second phase is also characterised by another crucial element such as the balancing of the two needs strategy. This refers to the effort deposited by parties in Western Europe to educate and support both successor and historical parties from 1993 onwards when PES acted like a mentor or a normative entrepreneur. For these matters, the education of parties in CEE was based on courses and seminars reaching fundamental questions such as social-democratic ideology and social-democracy as well as issues concerning intra-party democracy, organizational structure, human rights and minorities. Additionally, something I find important to mention is the fact that for the parties in CEE, the influence and success their Western counterparts enjoyed was an incentive to carry on with the social-learning process they were involved in.<sup>3</sup> As such, from the second half of the 1990s, these parties begin to Europeanize, to be more similar to those in the West, which prompted the PES to initiate the stage of incorporating them into its structures. The follow-up consisted of six parties from CEE gaining observatory status in 1995 – two historical parties from the Czech Republic and Slovakia and four other successor parties from Hungary, Slovakia, Poland and Slovenia – while later on, in 1997-1998, the privilege was extended to two parties from Romania and three other from the Baltic states (Öhlén, 2013: 193-197).

Apart from the facts mentioned before, the incorporation phase of the CEE parties marked the beginning of the third stage of the PES enlargement in the area where the Europarty deemed necessary to increase its influence. By 2000 it had already become clear that the main competitor of the PES was the EPP, which had a christian-democratic orientation and was leading an ample recruiting campaign in Central and Eastern Europe. This was undoubtedly connected to the possibility of closing the negotiation procedures for EU accession. When the PES became aware of this, its behaviour changed and it no longer acted based on the logic of ideological appropriateness as it had been the case in the first phase discussed previously, but on the logic of consequences. What I mean is that the main priority of the Europarty was to incorporate new sister parties into its structures

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<sup>3</sup> For more on this, see Negrescu (2010)

regardless of the problems they were afflicted by: as consequence, the Romanian Social-Democratic Party (PSD) was accepted despite the fact that it was troubled by corruption charges and its views were still rooted in communist thought; the Slovak Smer party that promoted a very populist speech was another similar situation (Öhlén, 2013: 230).

All in all, the manner in which the PES managed the dilemmas it had been confronted with revealed that the Europarty maintained a balance between influence and legitimacy in the first and second phases of its expansion to the East, while in the final stage, it was more interested in increasing its influence in the area. In conclusion, the PES transformed its position as supporter of historical loyalties in the first phase into that of agent with the ability to balance between the desire to increase its influence and the democratic legitimacy in the second and final phases. The particular case of PES illustrates not only the way in which parties pendulate between gaining influence and legitimacy, but also the efforts undertaken to convert the former communists into authentic social-democrats; in other words, although the long-term impact of the PES and its network of actors upon the partner parties, in terms of intra-party democracy, ethnic minorities, gender equality, ideology and programmes, etc., is difficult to measure, they contributed to the Europeanization of political parties and to the development of the centre-left party landscape in CEE.

### **5. The influence of the PES in Europeanizing the Social-Democratic Party (1990-2007)**

The period after 1989 was characterized in Romania by a high degree of ideological confusion among the Romanian left which was facing two major challenges: on one hand, getting away from its communist past and embracing a Western European social-democracy and on the other hand, adjusting to the new economic reality that called for a transition to market economy. The governing body set up after the fall of the Ceaușescu regime, the Council of the National Salvation Front (FSN), had a very diverse composition – members of the nomenclature along with collaborators of the deposed dictator, generals involved in pushing back the protests in Timișoara that started the Romanian 1989 Revolution, intellectual dissidents of the communist era as well as other new characters. The FSN, through Ion Iliescu's decision, evolved from a temporary government into a political party that was also the winner of the first general elections in 1990 which indicated the voters' preference for a non-communist direction (Miroiu, 2012: 94). In the following period, the head of the new government, Petre Roman, trying to distance himself from the communist past, proposed the formation of an executive body of elites that had been free from ties with the former regime, as well as the separation from Ion Iliescu and the role he had supposedly played during the *mineriads*. Thus, the FSN began rallying around Petre Roman, consequently causing its rupture and the birth of another party, the Party of Social-Democracy in Romania (PDSR), shaped around the figure of Ion Iliescu. The PDSR would also be the winner of the 1992 elections despite the rumours concerning its leader. In 1993 the successor party to the FSN, the Democratic Party, became together with the PDSR one of the main parties of the left at the beginning of the transition period. If I may add a parenthetical remark, for the purpose of this paper, I will continue to concentrate exclusively on the PSD's progress since the PD, although a left-wing party, had for a very long time been inclined towards a conservative stance when it decided to finally move to the right of the ideological spectrum thus leaving the PSD to be the sole parliamentary representative of social-democracy in Romania. Coming back to what was previously being analyzed, the PSD and PD were soon joined by the Romanian

Social-Democratic Party (PSDR) that claimed to be the successor to the historical left-wing parties (Miroiu, 2012: 95).

For the PDSR, the 1990s involved an effort to gain legitimacy and consolidate ideologically in accordance to the social-democratic doctrine either through an affiliation to the Socialist International (SI) or the Europarties among which the PES had the highest relevance for the left-wing's consolidation. International recognition was a key factor for credibility in the national arena, but this was not the only stake, however; there was also the desire to prove that the party did have the capacity to rule the country successfully. Knowing that international isolation was beneficial neither for the governing party nor for the country, the PDSR sought membership of the international social-democratic and political institutions all throughout the 1990s, but this status had been very difficult to achieve as the party leaned towards populism and left-wing conservatism. In other words, the party manifested a tendency for change at a very slow pace (Külahci, 2014: 147).

Through the European Forum's actions, the PES and the PDSR, while seeking to bridge the gap, evaluated the party's potential to reform as the latter was an assistance for consolidation recipient. Moreover, the party got help to mature and place itself in a more favourable position for the country's modernization. While it is true that the PES interpreted the party's reluctance to the immediate reforms in the first half of the '90 as a lack of commitment to democratisation and integration in the European social-democratic family, the PDSR showed its interest in the European Forum's educational programme for the renewal of attitudes and views inside the successor parties. Through the EF and its network of party actors, the PDSR engaged in socialization activities during the courses and seminars approaching subjects of relevance for the Western social-democracy (Toda, 2008: 13).

First of all, the EF gave special attention to the theme of the welfare state by creating a group, the Economic Forum Programme, aimed at contributing to the CEE transition process towards social market economy. The group's activities took the form of seminars which materialized into publications promoting gradual economic reforms. In addition, the group also functioned as network of left-wing economists and politicians whose mission was to present different options through which the former communist countries could achieve this objective (Öhlén, 2013: 208).

Secondly, the EF prioritized the human rights and gender equality issues. The social condition of the Roma people, who were targeted by discrimination and social exclusion, was addressed on top of other subjects during the meetings and seminars regarding human rights in countries like Romania, Hungary, the Czech Republic, etc., where as a matter of fact were seen as odd. However, the parties that took place in these educational meetings understood that the Roma people's problem was connected to the bigger picture concerning the model for the social market economy and also the fight against poverty and social inequality. For that matter, both discussion themes were part of the Romanian left's agenda in the 1990s (Öhlén, 2013: 220; Miroiu, 2012: 97).

Additionally, the gender equality theme was another subject that received the EF's attention and towards which the PDSR and the rest of the political parties showed little or no interest. For instance, the protectionist policies adopted after 1989, such as subsidizing inefficient industries, disregarded disadvantaged groups. In other words, the subsidized industries invited men and left aside women who had to work in privatized domains; this caused a phenomenon where "men were said to belong to the state and women to the market" (Miroiu, 2012: 97). That is why, in order to correct everyday life aspects like the one in Romania, the EF's strategy actively promoted and offered support to shape a common conscience regarding women's rights and gender equality among the potential

partner parties in the CEE. The strategy was implemented during seminars and conferences in the ex-communist space, although changes regarding this matter were delayed due to a mentality supporting the model of the stay-at-home mother or woman whose activities are tightly connected to her home. As a result, although a woman's position was looked upon with reluctance if related to leadership or office holding by left-wing parties in CEE, the Western social-democrats strived to raise awareness about gender equality; the parties could then only comply with these stances if they wanted to be regarded and taken into consideration as social-democrats in their own right (Öhlén, 2013: 221).

Therefore, achieving the aforementioned status acted as incentive and complement for undertaking certain ideological views by a left-wing that was in full process of asserting and legitimizing itself as honourable and trustworthy partner of the international political institutions.

The socialization process complemented by the incentive-based mechanism and run by the PES through the EF started to pay off when, in 1995-1998, 12 parties from CEE, amongst them the PDSR, proved their progress regarding the democratisation, institutionalization and adaptation to key elements of the SI and PES' manifestos and statutes. The award for the Europeanization the parties undertook was gaining observer and associate status in the Europarty. The Romanian party obtained observer status later in 1998 and associate status in 1999 after it had taken part in seminars, courses and other events of the EF's network of actors in view of institutional consolidation both at international and domestic level (Öhlén, 2013: 215). As such, by the end of the 1990s, the PDSR had reached a certain level of stability and maturity and the question regarding the left-wing's development road in the future did not take much time to arise. According to Agh (2004) the answer to the question was simple: the PDSR was already heading towards a welfare state similar to the one promoted in the West. The Năstase government actually committed to this direction on behalf of the PDSR in 2000.

Moreover, between 1997 and 1999 clear signs that the EU would soon open negotiations with CEE countries in view of enlargement began to show. This decision carried a lot of significance both for the parties in candidate states and also for the Europarties. On one hand, it was necessary for PDSR to prove its European vocation and promote integration through sustainable measures in accordance to the Copenhagen criteria. On the other hand, PES perceived the opportunity to expand towards the East and increase its power potential in the EP and the enlarged Union, by recruiting several powerful centre-left parties that either shared the common set of values of Western social-democrats or were part of a governing coalition. For PES, this meant it had to change the way of dealing with partner parties in CEE which consequently changed the nature of the relation between them. The power relation between the Europarty and its partners became very explicit and similar to the relation based on conditionality between the EU and the candidate states throughout the negotiation period; the only difference was that the Western social-democrats had less formal power during bargaining sessions. However, they placed themselves above the partner parties as long as their acceptance as full members of the Europarty was crucial for their international recognition.

According to a high level official in PES, full membership of the Europarty was a silent aim that allowed PES politicians to impose a series of conditions on candidates. For instance, apart from persuasion tasks performed to convince the social-democratic parties about the appropriateness of internalizing particular programmatic stances, party actors outlined indications for party change and the manner these could have been completed in. Moreover, they presented what the stake of the changes was to CEE parties: EU

membership, the possibility to be part of a representative group in the EP on condition to abide by the programmatic dimension of the Europarty (Öhlén, 2013: 221). The power asymmetry was obvious in the case of PDSR just ahead the 2000 elections. In 1998-1999, PDSR aimed at becoming a true social-democratic party, which meant that all the members of the party were eager to gain the recognition of the social-democratic family; this was a chance for PSE to demonstrate it had the upper hand during negotiations. Jan Marinus Wiersma proposed to Ion Iliescu during an international conference that, in exchange for a better cooperation relation with the Europarty, he met three conditions in case he won the elections – a certain thing by then: a) to get the country ready to join NATO and the EU; b) to involve other actors in the governing coalition if PDSR won the elections; and c) to adapt the gender equality policy to the standards requested by PES. Iliescu agreed to this bargain and ended up to actually respect it (Öhlén, 2013: 223). What Iliescu did on behalf of PDSR highlights the fact that he acted upon the logic of necessity once the possibility of joining the EU was looming in sight and that this was doubled by the tendency of the party to adapt and steady itself at the beginning of the new millennium. This was altogether the moment in which PDSR could demonstrate its reliability and rally around the social-democratic model promoted by PES, which involved the modernization of the party in terms of internal democracy, appropriate ethnic minorities policies, transition to social market economy, and last but not least, the left-wing's unification through a reconciliation between successor and historical parties followed by their merger (Miroiu, 2012: 99).

Otherwise, the first years after 2000 were marked by a moment of social and political mobilisation in view of carrying on the reforms laid out in the periodic report of the European Commission regarding the progress made by Romania in the European integration process. The Romanian state had to pay special attention to the structural reforms in the economy, the weaknesses of the legislative process and the high level of corruption. In this context, PDSR reiterated its commitment to Euroatlantic integration proclaiming itself a "European social-democratic party dedicated to joining the EU and NATO" (Miroiu, 2012: 98; Öhlén, 2013: 226) and sought to prove its loyalty towards PES whose expectations were obvious at that point. As such, PDSR avoided making an electoral coalition for the 2000 elections with the populist and highly nationalist Greater Romania Party, choosing instead to form a coalition - the Romanian Social-democratic Pole - with two lesser parties, of which one was the historical left-wing party. Things happened according to the Europarty's requests and soon after the coalition won the elections and a government was established, PDSR merged with PSDR giving birth in 2001 to the Social Democratic Party (PSD). The merger had accounted for an important step into the process of the party's doctrine development and clarification when PSD became affiliated to the SI in 2003 and a member of PES in 2005.

Moreover, institutional consolidation at international level during the Năstase government was complemented by a consolidated programmatic direction with two important ramifications: the social and the international dimensions. With regard to the social-dimension of the governance policy, it was typical for a social-democratic party and it traced back to the formula of the "balance between competition, collaboration and solidarity" (Miroiu, 2012: 99). The international dimension, on the other hand, concentrated on Romania's integration into NATO and the EU as well as on adopting PSE's ideological stances and programmes. The affiliation to the Europarty resulted into the internalization of certain subjects that had not existed before on the Romanian social-democracy's portfolio – environment, gender equality, and the European Social Model.

This was in part owned mostly to the conditions imposed by PES to PSD while acting as incentives for programmatic change (Holmes and Lightfoot, 2011: 46). Accordingly, the European Social Model offered an attractive framework for social-democrats in the ex-communist space, and the welfare state promoted in the West was advantageous. In addition, while relating to the EU, PSD was able to adopt a left discourse legitimized by the idea of Europeanization. In other words, the social-democrats were free to talk about social polarization and poverty without being accused of coming back to communism as long as they claimed to follow the European policies and strategies in place. The Lisbon Strategy was thus the perfect justification since it supported the idea that "future governments had the duty to shape their policies and programmes in order to follow both the economic logic, but also the social logic of solidarity, cohesion and inclusion" (Năstase, 2007: 273; Miroiu, 2012: 99).

Although the PSD lost the 2004 elections to the Parliament and the Presidency in favour of the Justice and Truth Alliance<sup>4</sup> and its candidate Traian Băsescu, the party managed to strengthen its doctrine from the opposition, a place it occupies to this day. By integrating into its political thought the main points formulated by the European social-democrats, PSD's current policies stem from a modern social-democracy and the party now stands as the sole representative of the Romanian left-wing after PD adhered to christian-democracy in 2005.

## 6. Conclusion

During the two decades after 1989, the efforts to shape social-democracy in Romania were due to a desire to strengthen the left-wing parties institutionally on the national and international level for the transition to democracy and social market economy, but also to a desire to gain internal recognition and legitimacy. In the first phase, Western European social-democracy, promoted by the SI and PES, represented the ideological aim of successor and historical parties despite the difficulties they encountered because of their reluctance to the influences of Occidental party actors. However, through PDSR/PSD's engagement in networks of contact with Western political actors, coordinated by the EF, and in events organized in this framework, the party was involved in a process of socialization and persuasion aimed at embracing the norms, values and programmes of the social-democratic family until these were embedded into its political vision. Hence, the representative of the Romanian left became bit by bit more open to external influences and also to the possibility of change brought about by them. For that matter, this first stage was marked by the Europarty's lower level of influence upon PDSR/PSD. The consolidation and achievement of a certain degree of internal coherence were carried on by PDSR/PSD during the second stage when the external objectives of Romania were growing more ambitious: it had to prove its commitment to integrate into the EU and NATO. Therefore, PDSR/PSD continued the learning process through the EF's activities and sought to join PES and the SI more and more in order to prove its loyalty towards the social-democratic doctrine and legitimize the progress made for

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<sup>4</sup> The Justice and Truth Alliance was a political alliance formed in 2003 between two parties – the centre-right National Liberal Party and the Democratic Party – that ran against the National Union PSD+PUR. Set up solely for the purpose of the 2004 elections, the Union lost the presidential race in favour of the Alliance, but achieved most of the seats in the Parliament. However, after the Humanist Party of Romania (PUR) decided to join the Alliance, together with the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), the Union lost majority in the Parliament and PSD the possibility to rule the government.

Euroatlantic integration. The educational effort of PDSR/PSD paid off at the end of the 1990s when the party achieved observer and associate status to PES, followed by the granting of membership of the IS and PES in 2003 and 2005 after the party carried out the programmatic and structural reforms required by the Europarty. This phase was, thus, marked by the process of unification and consolidation of the Romanian left which was prone to accept influences from PES as the Europarty held a more influential position in the framework of the EU enlargement and its own expansion to the East. Then again, as I was previously mentioning, PSD remained the only representative of modern social-democracy on the political scene in Romania and it continued to carry on, from the opposition, its pro-European orientation by rallying to the programmatic dimension of the IS and PES up to the moment of EU accession in 2007.

However, despite the fact that this party clarified and strengthened its ideological views, that it intensified its efforts to legitimize as a genuine social-democratic party, that it related its discourse to international social-democracy and integrated into the relevant socialist organisations at the European level, there are several critics who claim that these changes were nothing more than shallow evidence aimed at proving the party's conformism in order to join the EU (Miroiu, 2012: 99). In other words, the Europeanization of PSD might have changed the party's facade, but altogether, it was nothing more than a retouch process upon PES' pressure, which left the internal roots unchanged (Agh, 2006: 90). In brief, this assumption can be simplified through a "declining influence" scenario where the Europarty positively influenced PSD in the period preceding the EU accession only to fall short of it afterwards (Holmes and Lightfoot, 2011: 34). Undoubtedly, the truthfulness of this scenario regarding PSD after the EU accession remains to be tested and, in my opinion, I think an analysis of the programmatic dimension of the party would provide answers to validate or invalidate the critics' claim. Nevertheless, until further research on the matter, there are certain aspects in this paper which reveal that, at least for the pre-accession period, the Party of European Socialist exerted its influence upon the Romanian Social Democratic Party in a decisive manner: it not only offered support for its consolidation and legitimization on the national and international level, but also kept persuading it to change according to a behavioural model accepted by social-democrats in the West. Although there had been cases in which PSD, like other parties from former communist countries, was adamant to embrace some of the fundamental views of the Europarty because of mentalities still rooted in communism, it gradually grew to accept and adopt them. The transformation of PSD between 1990-2007 was certainly challenging, but it was shaped both by the party's eagerness to join the Western European family of social-democrats and their representative institutions, and also by the Europarty's efforts to receive amongst its ranks a partner that would always remain committed to its tenets and programmes and not threaten its reputation under any circumstances. Hence, despite the occasional misconduct of the Romanian party, by the time the country joined the EU, it stood as a genuine representative of social-democracy having achieved its ultimate goal of integrating with a full membership into PES.

All in all, I think that this paper will be a valuable addition to the literature on Europeanization, especially to those studies focusing on parties in CEE, as it brings an updated view on the Europarties' role as agents of the process in a space with a particular political background on party system emergence and development. Last but not least, the paper also offers a detailed view on how the Party of European Socialists contributed to the Europeanization of the Social Democratic Party in Romania in the pre-accession period.

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# THE EUROPEANIZATION OF DOMESTIC REPRESENTATION STRUCTURES: OPERATIONALIZING THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE

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**Abstract:** *In this article it is explored the Europeanization of national political parties, as domestic representation structures. The author argues that Europeanization studies focused more on policies cases, at the expense of researches oriented towards polity or politics items, and that this domain of the academic literature should be filled out with more comparative approaches. The interest of the author goes towards designing and/or explaining a specific set of indicators that could be used for operationalizing the party dependent variable in order to analyse if the European factors determined specific changes within the domestic political parties, changes that can be seen as an “Europeanization” effect. In the article, there are analyzed: (a) the concept of Europeanization (working definition, domains, magnitude and direction); (b) the indicators used by scholars for assessing the Europeanization of political parties; (c) the outcomes outlined in the existing literature (a critical perspective); and (d) the research methods applied in this field, with specific mentions for the differences existing between Western and Eastern case studies. The findings indicate a series of domains that should be further exploited via counterfactual reasoning or process tracing techniques in order to better grasp EU’s influence on party politics, with the final goal of improving the functions parties perform in national and European democracies, and reducing the democratic deficit associated to European issues presented and debated in member states and at the European level.*

**Keywords:** *democratic deficit, Europeanization, methodology, political parties, representation structures*

## 1. Introduction

The interest of the European Studies for Europeanization is rather new, the first analyses using this concept and approaching the bottom-up and/or top-down influences between the European and the national governance dimensions being no older than 20 years. Nevertheless, scholars agree that this period experienced different orientations in the Europeanization studies: (a) either the researchers’ interest for bottom-up processes (overlapping the meaning of European integration; for example, investigations on the emergence and consolidation of so-called European parties and the way they perform on the EU stage, especially within the European Parliament) or (b) the analyses of top-down

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processes and their influence on member states<sup>1</sup>, (c) and the most recently simultaneously addressing the two (or even three, for not ignoring the horizontal dynamics) directions by reflecting on the constant dialogue and mutual impact between the European and national political and decisional levels<sup>2</sup>. During all these phases, the researchers' focus for the *policies-politics-polity* triad (basically, all the elements that can be subject of Europeanization are covered here) vary significantly, from a very high interest in the first case, to an occasionally one for the last case, excepting the studies on national systems for coordinating and implementing European policies and the studies on the impact European factor has on domestic inter-institutional relations; in other words, besides policies, the Europeanization literature does not appropriately operationalize and address state-structure (polity) items and even the policy-making system as such (the politics dimension, then, not the policies one) (Bursens 2008, 116).

In this article I focus on the Europeanization of representation structures, more specifically, political parties; I am locating my contribution in the Europeanization of a polity area. Following the Europeanization meaning I will further explain, the independent variable is the European level, whereas the political parties are the dependent one. My interest here goes towards designing and/or explaining a specific set of indicators that could be used for operationalizing the dependent variable in order to analyse if the European factors determined specific changes within the domestic political parties, changes that can be seen as an "Europeanization" effect. My approach is part of a larger postdoctoral research where I try to identify and analyze a possible causal relationship between the existence of a high degree of Europeanization of political structures (national parliaments) and structures of representation (political parties), and reducing the democratic deficit associated to European issues (with study cases from Central and Eastern Europe).

## 2. Europeanization: working definition, domains, magnitude and direction

Europeanization<sup>3</sup> has become an extremely widespread concept, even "fashionable", we might say, with supporters and objectors: it is understood as "process of structural change, variously affecting actors and institutions, ideas and interests. In a maximalist sense, the structural change that it entails must fundamentally be of a phenomenon exhibiting similar attributes to those that predominate in, or are closely identified with, 'Europe'." <sup>4</sup> Minimally, 'Europeanization' involves a response to the policies

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\*\* Fellow within the project "Doctoral and Postdoctoral Fellowships for young researchers in the fields of Political, Administrative and Communication Sciences and Sociology" POSDRU/159/1.5/S/134650, financed through the Sectorial Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund.

<sup>1</sup> For Peter Mair, these are in fact the real studies about the Europeanization of domestic party systems and political parties in the light of the "impact of Europe – European elections, European policies, European alliances – on the organization, programs, or strategies of political parties in the domestic arena" (Mair 2008, 156).

<sup>2</sup> See a whole range of authors writing in the last decade, for example, from Radaelli 2004 until Ion 2015.

<sup>3</sup> For a more detailed analysis on the Europeanization process, see Ion 2015. The arguments about the existing meanings attributed to Europeanization, the working definition presented, as well as the domains subjected to Europeanization, are based on Ion 2015, 2-10.

<sup>4</sup> In this case, Vink and Graziano (2008, 7-12) use the term „regional integration“ where they take into account political and economic interactions between states that are geographically close, an interpretation unfocused exclusively on the EU.

of the European Union” (Featherstone 2003, 3). In the EU focused literature the minimalist sense of Europeanization (EU-ization) prevails, namely the influence that the European Union has in the Member States (see also Flockhart 2008, 4-7). Even a broader perspective on Europe or on the international system is filtered from the same point of view: what is the impact of the EU on candidate countries? What is the impact of the EU on third European countries? What is the impact of the EU beyond the borders – formal or otherwise – of Europe? It would be, therefore, an interest for *what* is changing, *how* does Europeanization occur and *why* (Olsen 2002). Thus, from now more than a decade, there is less important to find an answer to the question “what is Europeanization?”, but one which shows how the concept can be “useful for understanding the dynamics of the evolving European polity”, focusing on options for managing this system, the necessary institutional design, as well as “how authority and power should be distributed, exercised and controlled” (Olsen 2002, 922). Analytical interests related to Europeanization, even in this minimalist vision, rest different and cover a broad spectrum, often not well defined and clear; there are investigated as follows: political, economic and social domestic adaptations to the integration process; pre-accession impact on the dynamics of domestic politics and connections with the process of democratization; horizontal transfer of best practices between Member States and the formation of policy networks and epistemic communities; influence of European integration on defining identities and interests of domestic actors; external and internal factors generators / facilitators of change; types of effects of change; etc. In general, however, the focus is on the implementation at Member State level of the policies adopted at the supranational level (Featherstone 2003, 19-20; Grabbe 2006, 4-5; Vink and Graziano 2008, 3-7).

In light of the above considerations, it becomes easy to understand that one cannot identify the ‘definition’ of Europeanization and that one operates with more attempts to determine the content of this concept, even in the area of the *European Union studies*. However, some definitions have acquired over time more followers than others. One of the most popular such approaches is that of Radaelli for whom Europeanization refers to “processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things', and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies” (Radaelli 2003, 30); this interpretation would have the advantage that focuses on institutionalized changes - in organizations or individuals – from the Member States or from third states, although researchers must be careful not to concentrate exclusively on the legislative influence exerted by the supranational level and not to equate any type of change observed with a direct effect of this supranational level (Radaelli and Pasquier 2008, 36 – 39). Thus, the evolution of the Europeanization studies prompted a change of the research question: “The issue is no longer whether Europe matters but how it matters, to what degree, in what direction, at what pace, and at what point of time”, becoming important therefore to identify the causal relationship of this process (Börzel and Risse 2003, 59-60).

Another important aspect is to identify areas that are or may be subjected to Europeanization. In this case, Claudio Radaelli, on the one hand, Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse, on the other hand, offered a series of somewhat similar answers. From my point of view, I think a combined version of these two illustrations of Europeanization domains has an increased capacity to indicate areas where we can search for the impact of this process:

**Table 1.** Domains of Europeanization

<b>Policies</b>	<b>Polity (institutions)</b>	<b>Politics (processes)</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <u>Objectives</u> [standards, policy problems]</li> <li>• <u>Instruments</u></li> <li>• <u>Actors</u></li> <li>• <u>Problem-solving approaches</u></li> <li>• <u>Policy paradigms, frames, and narratives</u></li> <li>• <u>Resources</u></li> </ul>	<p><u>1. Political structures</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Political institutions [including the relations between them]</li> <li>• Public administration</li> <li>• Intergovernmental relations</li> <li>• Judicial structures</li> <li>• Economic institutions</li> </ul> <p><u>2. Structures of representation and cleavages</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Political parties</li> <li>• Interest groups</li> <li>• State-society relation</li> <li>• Societal-cleavage structures</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interest formation</li> <li>• Interest aggregation</li> <li>• Interest representation</li> </ul> <p><u>Cognitive and normative structures</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Public discourses</li> <li>• Norms and values</li> <li>• Political legitimacy</li> <li>• Identities</li> <li>• State traditions — understanding of governance</li> </ul>

*Source:* author's vision of the contributions of Radaelli 2003; Börzel and Risse 2003.

<b>Magnitude and direction of Europeanization</b>
<p><b>Direction of change</b></p> <p>retrenchment inertia absorption accommodation transformation</p> <p style="text-align: center;">&lt;-----&gt;</p> <p style="text-align: center;">-      0      +      ++      +++</p>
<i>Source:</i> author's vision of the contributions of Radaelli 2003; Börzel and Risse 2003.

In this article I focus on the Europeanization of representation structures, more specifically, political parties. Technically, accordingly to the above mentioned scheme, I am locating my contribution in the Europeanization of a polity area<sup>5</sup>. Following the Europeanization meaning I use, the independent variable is the European level, whereas the political parties are the dependent one. My interest here goes towards designing and/or explaining a specific set of indicators that could be used for operationalizing the dependent variable in order to analyse if the European factors determined specific changes within the domestic political parties, changes that can be seen as an “Europeanization” effect<sup>6</sup>.

Why do I consider such an initiative? Because I argue that the effects of the Europeanization of the political parties will reflect, in the end, in the European integration process as a whole, in terms of providing or altering the democratic legitimacy. In other words, I think that political parties can be considered as actors performing on the EU political scene, actors that are shaped and that are shaping the institutional and political framework of the Union, and that they need to be analyzed accordingly to this status. Moreover, in order to provide “robust comparative evidence concerning the impact of

<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, for some authors (see Ladrech 2010, 131 for example), this subject can be also see as a politics research subject, through the focus set on changes occurred in “the absence of a direct relationship between authoritative EU legislative output and the actors mentioned” (parties, interest groups, social movements, public opinion).

<sup>6</sup> In fact, there exist several Europeanization outputs that vary according to the direction of change and its impact. Following Radaelli (2003) and Börzel and Risse (2003), I opt for the below description of different effects of the Europeanization process (see also Ion 2015 for details regarding each of these effects):

Europe on parties at the national level, and the role of Europe in party competition” (Mair 2008, 162), as well as the role of these parties in Europe’s political architecture, there is a strong need for applying a unitary methodology to a greater amount of domestic parties and party systems<sup>7</sup>.

### 3. Methodological concerns

#### 3.1. Looking for a party Europeanization grid

The interest for investigating party Europeanization is not very old and, also, it is not very wide spread. Scholars usually used to pay attention to mainly, on the one hand, political groups working within the European Parliament (e.g. structure, political ideologies, voting systems, especially after the 1979 EP first direct elections) and to the transnational party formations operating on the European political arena, and, on the other, to the domestic parties positions towards European issues (Ladrech 2002, 390) at the domestic level. Usually, the determinants of change within political parties were looked for at the domestic level only (Ladrech 2009a)<sup>8</sup>. The Europeanization approach of political parties looks for either direct or indirect effects (structure, procedures, policies, internal or external rapports, etc.) of an independent variables located at the European level, even if, at a first glance, it appears that national political parties experience a very limited influence of the European factors (besides the EP elections periods).

After a brief literature review, I have seen that researchers usually look for changes related to: the old/new political cleavages, the emergence of new political parties, the evolution of political programmes, the stability of the party system, the connection domestic parties have with European political formations, the voters’ attitude towards EU issues, etc. In the end, I have decided to conduct my analysis (finally meant to contribute in operationalizing the party dependent variable for a research focused on the causation relation between magnitude and direction of Europeanization, and recorded level of democratic deficit) starting from five indicators mentioned by Robert Ladrech (2002, 2008, 2009a, 2012b) in seminal contributions to the study of the Europeanization process of the political parties. These indicators could be seen as “broad areas where one may recognize [direct or indirect – A/N] changes that reflect a process of Europeanization” (Ladrech 2002, 396), that is changes determined by the presence of an EU-related factor. These areas are:

1. *programmatic change*. It refers – as one may easily understand – to changes occurred in the content of the party programmes/campaign manifestos; moreover, measuring this item is rather an undemanding task that can be pursued with either a quantitative or qualitative methodology by analyzing the number of new explicit EU related language units or, respectively, by interpreting the role and image EU is offered by

<sup>7</sup> There are several classifications of the European parties accordingly to their territorial representation and activity area. For example, Ladrech (2012a, 314) mentions four categories – national; sub-national or regional; transnational, and parliamentary groups in the EP –, while Lord (2010, 7-8) divides them in parties organized at the EU level (transnational federations, for example) and / or performing in the EU framework (i.e. EP represented parties) and national parties performing in the member states, but in an EU shaped political environment. Irrespective of the chosen classification, my interest focuses here on the national party actors.

<sup>8</sup> For a short history of the studies focused in political parties and the newest Europeanization focus (moreover, for party federations, for example), see Ladrech 2010, 129.

the party in aspects regarding policy-making designs, etc. (Ladrech 2002, 396), and even if the crystallization of new opinions regarding the EU-influenced policies (Ladrech 2012a, 321). Since the appearance of the first references to this indicator, several studies have revealed that, in the context of a second order image associated with EU debates and elections, there are rather few changes observed here “either in direction, that is anti to pro or vice versa, or in the development of more detailed content, or simply in quantity”, with the exception of the post communist states where political parties did include EU connected collocations in their programmes - for the most part, with a “in favour” predisposal - (Ladrech 2008, 140), especially with a legitimising stake. Briefly, there are few EU references and even fewer with a concrete content (Ladrech 2010, 135);

2. *organizational change*. This second indicator is oriented towards observing modifications within the internal regulations, practices or power relations, i.e. new positions determined by the EU member status of the country or by the relations the party has with the EU bodies or with the transnational party organizations (EU secretary, for example); type of relation with the party’s EP members (their rights/responsibilities in the party debating and managing structures) etc. (Ladrech 2002, 397; Ladrech 2012a, 321). Focus lies, therefore, on items like national organization of the party (“party in central office”); its members dealing at national or European level – MPs – with European Affairs, if it has (“party in public office”); other elements regarding the “party on the ground” activities (Ladrech 2010, 136). EU determined changes of the internal structure would be linked to strong incentives regarding “vote-maximization, office-seeking or (...) policy changing behaviour” - cases that rarely occurred in Western Europe, as he points out – or to dramatic changes in the environment of the party that induce adaptation pressures – such as, for example, Eastern Europe’s need to cope with EU’s negotiation demands (Ladrech 2008, 141; see also Ladrech 2009a, 12 for mentions of some indirect EU effects regarding changes in party funding regulations and in ‘EU non-questionable’ party competition).

3. *patterns of party competition*. This third indicator (little exploited, accordingly to Ladrech, but – I argue – with research potential after 2014 EP elections) is oriented towards questions such as: are there new parties emerged as an answer to EU membership or issues (especially Eurosceptic parties)? Is there a new political cleavage between supporters and challengers of different items from the EU agenda or it overlaps with the classic left-right one, for example? Are the parties’ positions regarding EU issues rather similar or not? Is there a public debate (involving parties, media, different interests groups, citizens) on EU themes? How much institutionalized is the party system and what values takes the electoral volatility? (see Ladrech 2002, 397; 2008, 142-143; 2009a, 10; Ladrech 2012a, 321).

4. *party-government relations*. The fourth indicator may reveal that the involvement of the executive in the EU decision-making mechanisms could harm its relation with the domestic supporting party/parties, considering that the EU level discussions are dominated by various bargains and package deals that are not so easy to understand or accept by the domestic party members, especially when they differ significantly from the party programme or when a strong EU presence/immixture, even if supported by the Treaties, would negatively impact upon the party’s voters. Putting it differently, “the assumption here is that the expanding policy competence of the EU may lead to tensions between the party in public office and the party on the ground, with the party in central office playing (or attempting to play) a mediating role” (Ladrech 2009a, 10; see also 2002, 398; 2008, 144; Ladrech 2012a, 321).

5. *relations beyond the national party system*. This indicator serves answering questions regarding the impact or influence of the EU level (in this case transnational party federations and EP political groups) on the domestic parties (programmatic objectives, ideological positions, campaign strategies, etc.) (Ladrech 2002, 399; 2008, 145), but also – recently – the input national parties have in the EP groups and transnational party federations (Ladrech 2012a, 322).

These five indicators are rather clear defined and one can expect to measure without difficulties specific changes determined by the Europeanization process in:

- a. the political parties as such (*programmatic change* and *organizational change*, but also a set of *relations beyond the national party system*);
- b. the party system as a whole (*patterns of party-competition* and *party-government relations*, and also another part of *relations beyond the national party system*).

However, if one looks at what scholars label as „Europeanization effects” in this situation, the discussion becomes more nuanced.

### 3.2. *Europeanization: indicators and effects*

One of the most cited contributions in this context of Europeanization effects belongs to Peter Mair. He sustains a line of interpretation that combines two directions of Europeanization (top-down and bottom-up) with two types of effects (direct and indirect); as direct effects, he includes the alliances and coalitions formed in the EP as a result of the existing rules in this institution, and the way the European elections influence at national and European level the definition of policy options; as indirect effects, he mentions the restriction/modification of internal confrontation area as a result of transferring a set of competences towards the European level, the institutionalization of other forms of interest representation / democratic participative actions at the expense of political parties, etc. (Mair 2008, 156-157).

**Table 2.** Europeanization and party politics: four outcomes

	<u>Mechanism</u>	
	<i>Penetration</i>	<i>Institutionalization</i>
<u>Impact</u>		
<i>Direct</i>	1. Emergence of new anti-European parties, or anti-European sentiments within existing political parties	2. Creation and consolidation of pan-European party coalitions
<i>Indirect</i>	3. Hollowing out of national party competition, constraints on domestic decision making, devaluation of national electoral competition	4. Emergence of alternative and non-partisan channels of representation, diffusion of “Europe” in domestic discourse

*Source:* Mair 2008, 157

From my point of view, the scheme is rather confusing, mixing two distinct views on Europeanization (a top-down and/or a bottom-up process) with different types of direct or indirect effects. I consider that methodologically it is more useful to combine Mair’s possible outcomes with Ladrech’s previous indicators.

Mair’s output no. 1. *Emergence of new anti-European parties, or anti-European sentiments within existing political parties*. The detailed explanation Mair’s provides in his analysis is more nuanced than the synthesis presented in the table where the focus seems set, erroneously, only on the appearance of anti-European parties; these new parties

can thus be both Euro-sceptic and Euro-optimistic (pro-European). In addition, also in this category, Mair includes the possibility of identifying new cleavages emerged on European issues, superimposed or not over the existing ones, irrespective of their classic or modern interpretation (about general cleavages, see Lipset and Rokkan 1990, Deegan-Krause 2007; for EU member states applications, see also Ladrech 2009a); Mair's (2008, 158) own expectations in this case indicate that the emergence of a new European dimension in party competition depends to a very large extent on the national specifications of the party systems.

For both Mair and Ladrech, this emergence of new parties or new cleavages represents a direct effect the EU can have on national parties and national party systems. Following Ladrech's previous detailed indicators, it would be linked to no. 3, *patterns of party competition*, with the specific mention that "in the end, the importance of this line of research for parties lies in the attention it brings to the conditions in which parties operate, rather than what occurs within parties" (Ladrech 2009a, 9). In other words, the analysts' focus lies on the system in the detriment of parties.

Mair's output no. 2. *Creation and consolidation of pan-European party coalitions*. Even if it is considered to be also a direct effect of Europeanization, in my view we have here a different type of outcome, following a bottom-up process. In this respect, the emergence/institutionalization of European party coalitions is relevant for analyses pointing towards the way national parties follow or not a European logic, sometimes at the expense of domestic interests. But, as I argued, this is not Europeanization, according to the definition I use. This may be a part of the way Europeanization effects (that is, EU influences on domestic political systems) return at the EU level within the constant process known as *EU integration*. The relation between national parties and their European-based counterpart could be extremely relevant for Europeanization studies if it points towards the influence transnational party federations have at the EU member states level (for parties or party systems). And here is Ladrech's indicator no 5, *relations beyond the national party system*.

Mair's output no. 3. *Hollowing out of national party competition, constraints on domestic decision making, devaluation of national electoral competition*. It is based on confinement of the *policy space* left for national political parties after the transfer of different policy competencies from national to supranational level (corollary, there are little options for voters and basically a limited competition, in the context of pressures for adaptation), on the scarcity of *policy instruments* left in this context, on the more open attitude EU institutions have towards European citizens fostering "a more generalized acceptance of being governed by institutions which are neither conventionally representative nor electorally accountable", and, not less important, on European Parliament's democratic deficit criticisms (Mair, 2008, 159 - 160). As Ladrech also points out, this indirect effect of the EU level represents, in fact, a depoliticization of the political competition with "impact on internal features and behaviours of parties" (Ladrech 2009a, 9; see also Ladrech 2012b, 187). This output can be seen as an effect in three of Ladrech's cases: *programmatic change*, *organizational change*, and *patterns of party competition*.

Mair's output no. 4. *Emergence of alternative and non-partisan channels of representation, diffusion of "Europe" in domestic discourse*. In a "political system that cannot be reached or accessed adequately by means of elections and parties, and that is open to all sorts of actors and organizations while being relatively impenetrable to voters" (Mair 2008, 163), this openness towards new interest aggregation and representation forms is tagged as lack of political accountability (as it is accompanied, more or less in a

paradoxical manner, by citizen disengagement from politics) as an indirect effect of Europeanization and, in my view, it can be associated with Ladrech’s no. 3 indicator *patterns of party competition*.

If we try to associate Ladrech’s indicators with Mair’s outcomes (observed in several studies), it can be seen that there is a significant discrepancy between researches focused on changes occurred specific at the party level in comparison with the analyses of the party systems.

**Table 3.** An attempt to connect Robert Ladrech’s indicators with Peter Mair’s outcomes

Ladrech’s Europeanization indicators		Mair’s Europeanization outcomes
Party level	Programmatic change	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (partial) Hollowing out of national party competition, constraints on domestic decision making, devaluation of national electoral competition</li> </ul>
	Organizational change	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• (partial) Hollowing out of national party competition, constraints on domestic decision making, devaluation of national electoral competition</li> </ul>
Party system level	Patterns of party competition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Emergence of new anti-European parties, or anti-European sentiments within existing political parties</li> <li>• (partial) Hollowing out of national party competition, constraints on domestic decision making, devaluation of national electoral competition</li> <li>• Emergence of alternative and non-partisan channels of representation, diffusion of “Europe” in domestic discourse</li> </ul>
	Party-government relations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• -</li> </ul>
Party and party system level	Relations beyond the national party system	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Creation and consolidation of pan-European party coalitions</li> </ul>

In my opinion, as mentioned at the beginning of this section, Mair is mixing two distinct views on Europeanization (a top-down and/or a bottom-up process) with different types of direct or indirect effects. Therefore, even if his contribution to the general framework of party analysis is remarkable, his particular input in the study of Europeanization effects on parties is rather questionable. He does not offer a concrete explanation for combining two Europeanization directions (top-down or *penetration*; bottom-up or *institutionalization*, in his terms) which led to similar not very clear direct and indirect effects. Moreover, as one can see by looking at the indicators identified by Ladrech, there are some items (for example, no. 4, *party-government relations*) already proven by researchers as interesting subjects, but which are completely missing from Mair’s attention. But even more important, Mair can be criticized for the rather negative image he attaches to the identified impacts (“anti-European”, “hollowing out”, “devaluation”, etc.). As I previously argued (see Ion 2015, but also a previous footnote in this article, on magnitude and direction of Europeanization), Europeanization is a process of change and it may have different types of results; of course, these results can be further

analyzed and linked to the general European integration studies, but they are not *per se* good<sup>9</sup> or bad Europeanization results.

In the light of these arguments, for deepening my general research project (to identify and analyze a possible causal relationship between the existence of a high degree of Europeanization of political structures - national parliaments -, and structures of representation - political parties, and reducing the democratic deficit associated to European issues, with study cases from Central and Eastern Europe), I decide to further investigate Ladrech's indicators no. 1 and 2. First of all, the other dimensions refer mainly to party systems (*patterns of party competition; party-government relations*)<sup>10</sup> or they also cover a bottom-up dimension (*relations beyond the national party system*); moreover, on these subjects there is already a more or less incipient literature. My interest for *programmatic change* and *organizational change*, however, can make a difference due to a shortcoming of significant studies in this realm that is particular set on party change.

A specific difficulty in addressing this subject is linked to the lack of comparative potential at the EU level, as several studies have indicated during the last period that the Europeanization process known by Western parties is nothing but different from the Eastern cases. East – West comparative analyses are therefore considered rather fruitless in this research realm; EU has in general a limited influence above Western party politics, while the Central Eastern post communist parties have had a different experience where EU was more present in their structures and activities<sup>11</sup>. In this latter category, it is worth

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<sup>9</sup> Comparative analyses meant to reveal if Europeanization has produced more changes at the domestic level, in the line requested / preferred by EU, in the policies subjected to exclusive EU competences or in the other mix and supportive areas where national politics prevails. Especially after the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the clear enunciation of the set of competences simplifies such an attempt.


<sup>10</sup> There have been investigated: the type of the party system (by- or multi-party structure), its configuration (stability of core parties; existing cleavages: left-right, pro/anti-European, traditionalism vs. modernism, etc.) and other features (such as: government is assured by monochromatic parties, either left or right, or are they left-right/other type coalitions? How solid are the ruling coalitions/parties in comparison with the opposition, etc.? Is there a prevailing party? If yes, does it have a specific feature/history: transformed communist party or anti-communist party etc.?); the role of political leadership; the public opinion (pro/anti European waves), etc.

This research line has started to be exploited during the last decade, and not only on case studies selected from EU member states. For example, a 2007 special issue of *Politics in Central Europe* focused on the “Democratisation and Europeanisation of Political Parties in Central and South-Eastern Europe”, and especially on items from ex-Yugoslavia states. As a common denominator, the following factors were considered to contribute in reaching different Europeanization outcomes: i. institutionalization of the party system (which “enables political actors to have clear and stable expectations about the behaviour of other actors” – Fink-Hafner 2008, 169); ii. degree of European socialisation of national party elites within EU transnational party federations (seen – simplistic, I would say – as a top-down pressure for adaptation); iii. electorate's attitudes towards EU integration (the corollary bottom-up pressure) (Fink-Hafner 2007, 5-10).

<sup>11</sup> See, for example, the studies pointing the influence of the transnational party federations in Western Europe and, respectively, in Central and Eastern Europe. While parties from the first category did not interfere too much with the supranational structures, parties from the second category experienced – mainly in the pre-accession years, but also after their countries became EU members – a significant input from these transnational federations in aspects regarding crystallizing the ideological identity, designing the party programme, establishing competition and campaign frameworks, regulating party funding, etc. (Ladrech 2009a, 12). In other words,

to investigate if there are significant differences between EU’s pre-accession influence determined through Copenhagen-defined political conditionality mechanisms and the post-accession years where these formal criteria are allegedly fulfilled and EU’s presence is not presumed to be so constraining (Ladrech 2008, 2009a).

**The influence of Europarties on Central and Eastern European partner parties**



Source: von dem Berge and Poguntke 2013, 317

Nevertheless, the main argument here is that I sustain the idea of rather distinct Europeanization research fields and that the member states relations with the EU largely depend of the moment they have started these relations; or, in other words: “the EU for the 2004 enlargement candidates was a much different entity—more powerful in relative terms—than for the 1986 and 1995 candidates” (Ladrech 2008, 147)<sup>12</sup>. Moreover, one of

“Europarties (...) play a crucial role in integrating CEE parties into EU party politics in the process of EU enlargement” (von dem Berge and Poguntke 2013, 312).

<sup>12</sup> This argument can be reinforced if one mentions the findings of some studies focused on the Europeanization theme applied on specific case studies, either from Central Europe (Mikulova 2014 – Poland and Hungary), or from the South-Eastern Europe (see *Politics in Central Europe*. The Journal of the Central European Political Science Association, 2007. Democratization and Europeanisation of Political Parties in Central and South-Eastern Europe. 3/1-2). In general, “the literature on the impact of the EU on post-communist transition and consolidation, and parties in particular, has concerned itself with questions of democratization, the transfer of EU norms to political actors, party development factors deriving from EU political conditionality in general, and the contribution of transnational party federations in particular” (Ladrech 2012a, 326).

Especially, the last item was rather much explored in comparison with other subjects. In this case, the influence of Europarties on the CEE member/partner parties is justified different by analysts. For example, following a sociological institutionalist logic, Europeanization occurs through socialization. In a different view, rational choice institutionalists argue that changes occurred in national parties are caused by an exchange of resources with their European-based counterparts in the context of an asymmetric distribution of these resources. For example, CEE parties bring: EP seats for Europarties; more weight in Council of Ministers/European Council negotiations (as are targeted, in general, governing party partners); legitimacy for the European-based federations,

the main ideas of the studies focused on the Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe political structures is that they experienced only shallow Europeanization (Ladrech 2009b) or even “Potemkin Europeanization” (Mikulova 2014), in the context of a “post-accession malaise” (Batory 2010).

And, for the sake of the discussion about democratic deficit at national and European level, this is a subject to reflect upon. As I have already pointed out (Ion 2015), I am not worried if I do not see immediate “positive” effects of Europeanization, even in the case of party politics, for example. Being a process of change, even in this situation, there would be some direct on – rather – indirect effects that national parties but especially party systems will have to face. But I am worried about a specific type of effect: the before mentioned de-politicizing one. In the specific context of post-communist states, with shy democratic experiences, what could be the results of – deliberately or not – confining the action realm of political parties, in a more or less general public lack of interest towards European issues<sup>13</sup>?

During the last decades, the national politico-institutional contexts where the political parties used to operate were significantly affected by the EU membership; there have been observed effects on “recruitment, election campaigning, interest aggregation, interest articulation, party government roles”; without “privileged or intimate relationships with authoritative EU actors”, without receiving EU funds or getting directly involved within EP (Ladrech 2002, 394-395), without being “legally obliged to interact with either EU institutions or operate at the EU level” (Ladrech 2009a, 8), it would appear as a natural consequence, therefore, that parties are interested in finding ways to strengthen their presence at the European level. However, the situation from the field is different, despite the modifications brought by the Treaty of Lisbon where the empowerment of national parliaments was considered to boost the national parties’ interest for European stakes. And then, there is the question: how can we study the effects of the Europeanization process on parties?

### 3.3. *Method vs. methods*

Robert Ladrech doubts that all Haverland’s Europeanization research methods identified by him (process tracing, counterfactual reasoning, non-EU cases analyses) or the classic *misfit* factor are suitable for studying the specific case of political parties, were – as I have detailed in a previous section – there is hardly a “statutory or direct impact” of the EU; for example, if counterfactual approaches could be used rather easily to see, for example, if the wording of the party programmes changed in order to capture EU’s competences in certain policy areas, in other cases it is more difficult to follow process tracing techniques, as the “cause” is not easy to identify; nevertheless, at least for the post

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etc. In turn, Europarties provide material and especially financial resources, as well as political know-how and technical expertise (which was indeed used by national parties “improve the chances of their countries’ EU accession”, for example), but also legitimacy, strengthening through this European recognition the domestic position of their partners. Moreover, Europarties are interested in partners that adapt to their rules, without altering – too much or too soon - the existing internal balance of power; their interest is “to maintain their capacity to act cohesively and therefore ensure organizational survival” (von dem Berge and Poguntke 2013, 313-328).

<sup>13</sup> For relevant findings about Eastern European political culture defined by “passivity with respect to political activity of parties, elites and institutions, political apathy or lack of reaction to anti-democratic actions, scepticism or distrust in institutions, scarce participation to social movements”, see also Voinea 2014.

communist parties, the presence of non-EU cases would serve to reveal if the cause of party change (irrespective of the specific item) is indeed EU related or it could have alternative explanations, i.e. democratization, globalization, etc. (Ladrech 2009a, 7-16). In general, the author seems to adopt rather a pro counter-factual position at the expense of process tracing techniques where he argues that EU can be rather difficult dissociated from other intervening variables; for him, following counter-factual reasoning, the emergence of some new party positions is a clear consequence of the EU presence (Ladrech 2010, 144).

And, how does Europeanization take place? Ladrech follows with moderation the explanations build in accordance with the misfit hypothesis (Ladrech 2012a, 320). Indeed, a degree of misfit between EU *acquis* and the politico-institutional design of the national parties exists, a “party-policy misfit tension” that can be felt in the programmatic dimension (how explicit should be made EU references in the context of a specific public knowledge about the EU and taking into consideration the whole configuration of the party system), party-government relations (in sensitive areas, if the party is less pro-European than the governmental position, there are significant sources of internal fictions), and other party areas subjected to Europeanization. However, this tension, as it has been called, can barely produce direct changes “as a result of coercion, normative pressure, regulatory competition (...) how an individual party responds depends on a variety of factors, both party structural as well as the pattern of party competition” (Ladrech 2012a, 322-323). Moreover, in the Europeanization process, the author seems closer to rationalist explanations focused on the maximization of the interests of the envisaged national parties: “the exploitation of opportunities to advance interests and/or measures taken to resist the spillover of EU issues interfering and thus complicating party leadership goals and activities” (Ladrech 2010, 134). And, as it has been also pointed earlier, what would be these opportunities, in the context of scarcity of EU funds for party or direct political weight in EU politics? Resuming the aim of this article, I think that for investigating EU determined programmatic and organizational change, both process tracing and counterfactual reasoning may be used.

Of course, for a refined analysis, there are some items to be taken into consideration: (a) specific party features (party in public office, party in central office, party on the ground; relations with other political actors etc., following Mair 2008, 155; Ladrech 2012b, 191-192); (b) government or opposition party; evolution of pro / anti (even if moderated) European positions depending on the party’s electoral support (votes percentages gained during the latest elections); (c) internal cohesiveness of government and opposition parties - another important factor in determining the viability of different party strategies (see Tzelgov 2014); (d) ideological position (left-right, other cleavages) and position towards European integration (a scale from 1 to 5, for example, accordingly to some indicators; from against to supportive opinions); (e) connection between the assumed national party ideology and the one promoted by MEPs; (f) involvement in parliamentary debates or in European affairs committees; (g) themes of national election campaigns; (h) in which contexts it is Europe mentioned (if it is) by parties – as opportunity or pressure?, etc. Even if the analysis will focus on the party level, the investigation has to be aware that “each political system represents a bundle of national-specific factors that condition party responses” (Ladrech 2002, 401) as “there are innumerable other sector variables, or even policy-specific variables, which influence the processes of Europeanization at the micro level, as proven by the case studies” (Giuliani 2003, 138): voter patterns, party-state relationship (Ladrech 2009a, 13), party system

(two-party, multiparty etc.), orientation of public opinion (presence/absence of Eurosceptic positions), tendencies to have single party or coalitions governments, etc. (Ladrech 2002, 401), the size of the country and its political weight among the other European Member states, economic development<sup>14</sup>, years of EU membership (Giuliani 2003, 138).

There are also other items to be taken into consideration for a correct analysis or for future researches. For example, firstly, in longitudinal analyses, it is important to control time effects (*a.* possible changing interest points on European integration, from common currency at  $t_0$  to EU enlargement debates at  $t_1$  and *b.* specific context that can influence the evolution or the outcome of this process), as well as identify domestic specific factors allowing to better explain inter-state integration differences. Secondly, it is important to eliminate alternative hypothesis, that is to correctly identify the specific impact of the European level in comparison with other factors, either real, such as democratization<sup>15</sup> or globalization processes, or declared - “Brussels wants this”; irrespective if “Brussels” has intervened or not, this applies to those cases where domestic political leaders perform an action they desire following „a consciously chosen strategy whereby vulnerable political leaders externalize their political costs and seek to evade both accountability and responsibility” (Mair 2008, 163). Last but not least, in a third place, one should not mistreat an observed change for an EU-determined one, instead of a change deliberately undertaken by parties for different other political reasons. For example, even if the change - associated with a specific party (emergence of intra-party different EU opinions) or with a entire party system (emergence of new parties, for example) – has been influenced by the EU, this is at most a necessary but not a sufficient condition in completely determining that specific change, and this is why it has to be further investigated how much has there been an EU presence or a domestic party decision in operating a series of modifications. Ladrech argues, for example, that organisational change can be also a result of a mere imitation or institutional isomorphism, instead of an EU pressure towards adaptation. And in this context where the supranational level comes as the second explanatory factor, what has been more important at the domestic level: a party feature - e.g. ideological profile - or the configuration of the party system - stability, number of actors, political culture, etc. (Ladrech 2012b, 181-185)?

#### 4. In conclusion...

Yes, parties are important through the functions they perform in national and European democracies (representing specific interests, contesting elections, drafting

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<sup>14</sup> Parties' contestation on European integration is also understood in the light of several economic determinants that can shape the political spectrum; in fact, back in the 1950's, the EU nucleus emerged from specific areas of economic integration and, in my opinion, economy can no longer be treated as a “low politics” item, in Hoffman's terms. In this respect, studies dealing with hypotheses pointing that “advances in European integration are subjected to the economic development of its member countries and the economic benefits that member countries obtain from integration” (Esteve-González and Theilen 2014, 10), are nothing but relevant for completing the analysis on partisan competition in EU member states. Relevant because they reveal the lack of salience of EU benefits for larger public, as – for example, states benefiting from EMU experience a decline of public support towards the EU, while “poorer” countries keep recording positive attitudes towards Brussels.

<sup>15</sup> See for example Baun et al. 2006 for the alternative causes that explain the pro-European vote Czechs had given at the accession referendum.

legislation, forming governments, etc.); and yes, an institutionalized party system (that is, predictable, stable, legitimate) is a similar beneficent asset<sup>16</sup>. But in the context of rather precarious interest (a) of the academic literature for the majority of Ladrech's dimensions of party activity, (b) of the media in reflecting and debating EU issues (except for some meetings of the European Council), and (c) of the citizens for the supranational political and institutional structure which nevertheless seriously affects their lives, "it would then seem that a paradox exists, with the substantial increase in the influence of the EU having little to no impact on most national parties or party systems" (Ladrech 2010, 139).

I argue that this impact exists and it should be further analyzed. The most important question, in my opinion, is to identify solutions for strengthening EU issue voting. Currently, EP elections are labelled as second order ones. And the main problem is not absenteeism (considering that many non-participants still value EU institutions, as surveys indicate), but of the positions of the parties and of the voters (Lord 2010, 16): domestic important themes, desire to punish incumbent parties<sup>17</sup>, incentives not very high to induce for a rational voter the tactical voting behaviour of maximizing its preferences<sup>18</sup>, lack of salience regarding EU questions (usually, voters take for granted the positions on EU issues of the parties they support at national level<sup>19</sup>), etc.

So, what would be such solutions for better profiling EU themes during EP campaigns? Changes within the European electoral logic (EP seats distributed – at least partially – at a EU level circumscription; candidates placed on open lists; consolidating the relation between EP as co-legislative body and the appointment of the Commission as executive body, a measure that actually was taken into consideration during 2014 EP elections) or within the national parties who should feel the "encouragement (...) to clarify their relationship with the EU party" (Lord 2010, 22) and not only<sup>20</sup>? Both, I would

<sup>16</sup> See Bale 2013 for more details about functions and roles parties and party systems can/should play in current national and European politics.

<sup>17</sup> National electoral calendars are extremely influential on the strategies party are adopting and on the EP results; for example, if EP elections are set very close before national elections, the national issues would predominate in the party campaign messages as a test for the "real" national competition; on the contrary, if the European elections are set after important national contests, then interfere both mainstream parties lack of interest, as well as electoral fatigue which determines voters to opt for alternatives. As a paradox effect, voting for national opposition in EP elections uses to determine different ideological positions of the Council and of the EP, at a general level, but also when mirroring national representatives.

<sup>18</sup> This is a very interesting argument raised by Lord (2010). Therefore, one might say that in EP elections there are higher chances for sincere votes to appear than in national standard elections.

<sup>19</sup> So, another question points towards the capacity of political parties to play an aggregating function of the interests of their voters (Lord 2010, 6). For more details about cross-cutting issues in national elections, especially in mainstream parties (i.e. how new EU items can alter competition for leadership in already established left-right cleavages), see also Parsons and Weber 2011.

<sup>20</sup> Strengthening EU issue voting can be achieved through "clarity of responsibility", argue de Vries et al. (2011). Their research following data from 2004 European Election Study has also indicated the fact that the national political and institutional architecture is a major factor in determining what Europeanization effects can be reached; in their case, using electoral system ("predominately proportional, mixed, or predominately majoritarian"), majority status of government, opposition influence ("strength and inclusiveness of the formal committee structure in a given country"), and party system concentration ("effective number of parliamentary parties"), the authors created an index for measuring voting behaviour (de Vries et al. 2011, 348). Their findings point to the conclusion that EU issue voting is indeed influenced by clear lines of responsibility between national and supranational actors and especially between the internal players.

say, considering that national parties are not eager to move in this direction, in order not to give up some secure short-term domestic benefits for some long-term hypothetical European ones<sup>21</sup>. A question here is, therefore, if parties succeeded in improving democratic performance when promoting a set of specific interests. As researches have revealed, few parties engaged in reforms meant to improve the control on their members acting in different EU-related structures or to increase party know-how on European issues: “This ‘democratic deficit’ inside parties may lead to further discrediting of the legitimacy of party government (Ladrech 2009a, 11)”. Another issue is linked to the actual influence a national government political party (*party in central office*) exert over its political figures from the executive (*party in public office*) when they take part on EU Council or European Council meetings with controversial agendas. Is there only cooperation or are they cases of different opinions<sup>22</sup>? Any existent influence would be proactive or retro-active? Do political figures negotiate strict mandates or they are only requested to inform national parties? If it is the case of such connections, how do they influence the outcomes of the Europeanization process?

I argue that a further research focused on both Europeanization of political structures and structures of representation will reveal that a high degree of Europeanization (embodied in absorption, accommodation, especially transformation) of these items leads to a reduction of the democratic deficit associated with European issues presented and debated in a state. From my point of view, you cannot just talk about a democratic deficit located in an abstract EU; it is also necessary to investigate how European citizens and national structures of representative democracy get involved in and interpret European issues. I will present also a number of solutions to reduce the incidence of this deficiency and its effects on national and European order but my approach is geared towards identifying some general explanations of the relationship between Europeanization and the democratic deficit in the EU Member States or the entire political system of the EU.

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<sup>21</sup> That fact that EU issue voting is encouraged by governments only after strategic opportunistic decisions has been further analyzed, investigations pointing to the conclusion that information about positive outcomes reached by national authorities during Council negotiations, for example, are largely disseminated in view of electoral benefits; in fact, national leaders are eager in reaching a deal at the EU level, as any agreement is considered to be better than no action seen as a mark of inefficiency (see Schneider 2013).

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## ABOUT MORAL CRISIS OF EUROPEAN VALUES IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION

*Laurențiu PETRILA\**

**Abstract:** *This paper aims to introduce you to the analysis of the relationship between the social phenomenon of globalization and social values, more precisely, European social values. In other words, we will look at the effects and implications of globalization, and the challenges of this phenomenon of social globalization on the European cultural scene.*

*In the first part of the paper we will focus on the importance and timeliness of this topic about values and society and in the second part we will describe the social phenomenon of globalization, clearly, without any claim of comprehensibility in movement. Then, we'll present the social values and their transition to the European space as a cultural and valuable space, emphasizing in the end the importance and necessity of the European values for the big European project. And, finally, we are going to highlight the links between globalization and social value systems, considering the crisis of values based on cause and effect.*

**Keywords:** *Globalization, European Values , Culture, Sociocultural, Ethics*

### **Introduction**

Globalization is a socio-economic and cultural phenomenon that has made its mark on everything in society. Globalization has the ability of institutional, cultural, economic, technical and political diffusion. Moreover, globalization universalizes, and this implicitly leads to identity relativity within a society, thus creating a global culture, that becomes the measure of all things. The field of social values was shaded in this era of globalization. Amid deepening the idea of human rights, some social values that were non-negotiable, today not only did they become questionable but sometimes do not even matter.

The role of beliefs in determining the behavior and actions was first formulated and proved by Max Weber in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. The author proposes the premise of the influence of ideas in lifestyle and, in particular, in the emergence and development of rational Western capitalism: *the ethical ideas of duty based upon them, have in the past always been among the most important formative influences on conduct* (Weber, 2003: 11). Weber's conclusion was *One of the fundamental elements of the spirit of modern capitalism, and not only of that but of all modern culture: rational conduct on the basis of the idea of the calling, was born—that is what this discussion has sought to demonstrate—from the spirit of Christian asceticism, that is, from spiritual values* (Weber, 2003: 189).

The importance of values was highlighted by sociologist Ilie Bădescu, which emphasizes the fact that humankind has always existed under certain (voluntary) spiritual

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and value constraints, which have taken different shapes in society, or by means of which a society is governed at a given time.<sup>1</sup>

This idea foreshadows the influence of values in the stability and coherence of a society. Durkheim called this instability given by the crisis of values *anomy* (Durkheim, 2008) and the society characterized by this condition, an anomic or non-functional society. For Durkheim anomia is directly related to the weakening of the moral strength of a society, because that moral strength is the means by which a society maintains order. But the moral strength of a society can be weakened by disturbances. These disturbances can be: a sudden increase in economic prosperity, certain disasters or a decline in economic power. In a special sense, anomia appears as everything that is instability between our inner forces (desires, passions, sensitivity) and external forces (the amount of economic goods, respectability, appreciation, influence, prestige). To prevent the occurrence of this instability, Durkheim argues that the passions should be limited, because this is the only way someone is able to harmonize with the existing possibilities, that is, attainable. If nothing within an individual can set limits, then an outside force is needed. This external force is to Durkheim the society (Durkheim, 2002: 142).

### **The Phenomenon of Globalization**

Globalization is a social phenomenon that cannot be understood outside of the context of the modernism that causes it (Jones, 2011: 50). The apparition of a phenomenon takes place within a context, and to be able to understand and explain it, a settlement is needed, be it spatial, historic or cultural. Anthony Giddens (Giddens, 1990) considers that this context is actually modernity, which *itself is globalizing and this is evident in most of the basic characteristics of modern institutions. Modernity is a dynamic and transforming form of social life. It can be distinguished from previous societies by the rate of social change. The purpose of this change is the proliferation and development of modern institutions to the point where it transforms time and space* (Jones, 2011: 55). Globalization is thus seen as the product of modernity, a feature of it, and one of its consequences.

Durkheim considers that that social disturbances determine the decline of the moral power of a society, a crisis of values, Giddens emphasizes that modernity has led to sudden changes in the societies, which then became global changes. If those changes can trigger a crisis of values and anomy, and if globalization requires and involves changes, then a correlation between the globalization phenomenon and relativity or the crisis of values can be made.

The contextualization of the globalization phenomenon is explained by Andrew Jones by presenting its origins. He identifies three academic origins of the current use of the term. The first root is identified in the business and management theory from the '60s. Members of U.S. business schools have theorized ways to improve the competitiveness of American multinational companies. In the 70s the point where people actually argued that firms should rather expand their global activities rather than the national ones was reached. This process was called by many management thinkers *globalization* and in the 80s the term has become one of the key concepts in both academic management literature and in business literature (Jones, 2011: 56).

Academic contributions to the social and cultural theory, which also date back to the 60s, represent the second root. The main point in this theory is that of Marshall McLuhan, The Global Village, an idea that expected modernism to develop a global society through

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<sup>1</sup>Ilie, Bădescu, <http://roncea.ro/2010/08/06/prof-ilie-badescu-geopolitica-si-religie-insurectii-religioase-in-secolul-xx-insurectia-euxiniana/>, 12.11.2015.

some form of communication (McLuhan, 1990). *The medium is the message* is the phrase associated with his theory, a theory that at first was contested and considered avant-garde but which was ultimately praised and regarded as a breakthrough and an anticipation of the transcension of boundaries by means of communications. McLuhan anticipated that all types of communication will have an impact on the social order.

The third and the last root is given by the political economy and social science literature which contained records of the results of the analysis of the economic development and international policy after the Second World War. For example, the *development as modernisation* paradigm that emerged in the '60s was inspired by classic social, political and philosophical theories of Marx, Weber and Durkheim.<sup>2</sup>

The fact that the phenomenon of globalization involves changes through the impact that it had on individuals and firms is highlighted by the sociologist Anthony Giddens who is among the first analysts who, since the early 90s, has presented a series of comprehensive arguments about the implications of the contemporary processes of globalization on mankind. There are specific arguments about the implications on individuals, organizations, nations, companies, governments, policies and politics in general, arguments centered on three four dimensions on which the implications of globalization are highlighted (Jones, 2011: 57-59).

The first dimension concerns the way of life, as a whole: we are going through a period of radical historical transformation. Globalization restructures the way we live very deeply, starting from our daily life, to economy and states life. The most important facet of the present globalization is the fact that it represents an unavoidable reality. The following arguments concern the traditions of societies and especially religion. Globalization depicts both an opportunity and a threat. Traditional societies have already collapsed, and the traditional values are next to follow. One implication of globalization is that other traditions, such as religion, go through a major transformation as well. Giddens suggests that religious fundamentalism is a reaction to this collapse of traditions and it must be understood bearing that in mind. Globalization promotes cosmopolitanism, considering that in this globalizing world, we frequently encounter in our lives people who think and behave differently. This has caused and continues to cause conflicts given that fundamentalists in areas of religion, nationalism and ethnic identity find a refuge in the renewed and purified tradition, as well as in violence (Jones, 2011: 58-59). The natural deduction that comes from this, which is also a third argument, is that, in the face of such circumstances people have to react. It is not possible to remain inert in the contemporary world, and these processes of transformation require a response. Companies must remain competitive, workers need to adapt, and governments must address new security risks and challenges. Present globalization rather requires an acute need to be proactive and tackle transformations (Jones, 2011: 58-59). The fourth and final implication, that Giddens addresses, is about institutions. Globalization brings with it and determines the continuous need to rebuild and adapt institutions so that they can address the new challenges of globalization. These include national and international institutions of governance, but family, work, tradition and even nature too. Globalization has undermined and transformed the circumstances in which they exist and they are therefore unsuitable for the duties they have to perform. Nations today face risks and dangers rather than enemies, which leads to major changes in their nature. The helplessness that people feel in the face

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<sup>2</sup> Teoriile sociale sunt tratate de Anthony Giddens in *Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber*, Cambridge University Press, 1973.

of globalization is therefore not a sign of personal failure but rather the unqualifiedness of institutions (Stiglitz, 2003). The degree to which institutions will adapt to globalization will determine how the processes of globalization will appear in the upcoming decades.

Globalization has had an impact on faith and culture in different ways, transforming them, but also reawakening in a new form the cultural and religious sentiment (Beyer, 2007: 40). The fate of traditions and religions in the globalized world is symptomatic. Traditions and values in the context of globalization have become either an essayist ethnocentric speculative theme, or folklore or the object of ethnographic science or commodity and entertainment, being degraded to the form of handicrafts, tourism folklore or folklore performances for private use by a community that sees in them a guarantee of its ethnic and historical consensus. I therefore believe, considering this background, that globalization has two directions of impact in terms of culture and values. Firstly we deal with the increasing relativization in society, and on the other hand I think we're dealing with a cultural value resurgence. In a first stage globalization has brought a relativization of values through the changes and the contact between cultures, by models and strategies that extend the multinational areas. But this has led to a crisis of identity, both individual and collective, an alienation and anomy which led to a return to values, belief systems which are supposed to bring personal meaning and social coherence. Religion is either retiring, in collective, identity based and anti-modernist extreme movements of fundamentalist type (in this context we are talking about an acute resurgence of religion on a global scale (Moysen, 1991: 1), of radical, exclusivist and polemic nature, or is dissolving in a diffuse and individual religiosity, eclectic, relativistic, anonymous and syncretic, thus disengaged socially and politically (Ică, Marani, 2000: 489).

Globalization creates tremendous opportunities and brings progress in some areas while producing high expectations in various areas of the world. But this progress is far from being homogeneous. In addition, globalization can create tensions within social and economic structures that cannot adapt quickly. These static and dynamic differences can cause major conflicts. The big challenge for globalization, and humanity, is how to reduce the sources of fragmentation, the weakening of social cohesion, the feelings of frustration within groups and communities, and misunderstandings between civilizations. In this context, the problem of ordering international systems, under the interplay of centrifugal and centripetal forces has risen. The phenomenon that we call globalization deserves to be examined deeply, in order to understand its complexity - all dimensions and facets - to try and create opportunities and benefits while reducing costs.<sup>3</sup>

There is more and more concern these days about the social duality of global and local, that we are facing a cosmopolite affiliation that we like, yet the sentiment of nationalism and segregation is growing (Taylor, 1999: 222-244). In this context we can discuss the phenomenon of multiculturalism that allows coexistence and cooperation of various cultures with similar degree of organization. But not even this kind of social compromise is an option, Merkel herself argues that European multiculturalism failed.<sup>4</sup> Following this idea, Habermas and Ratzinger, starting from the global ethos project of Hans Kung, and the principle of interculturalism, claim that *in the process of meeting and intermingling of cultures, ethical certainties that until now drove people have been destroyed.* (Habermas, Ratzinger, 2005: 111).

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<sup>3</sup> This information was taken from the web page of Romanian Centre of Economic Policies, <http://www.cerpe.ro/pub/study51ro.htm>.

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/17/angela-merkel-german-multiculturalism-failed>, 10.01.2015.

### About Social Values

In the previous point I described the globalization phenomenon because I wanted to present the currently social space in a broadened manner. Judging by the fact that globalization is produced by the modernity we can tell that the globalization affects all the social values. Giddens was talking about globalization as a product of modernity and Bauman considered the modernity structure a liquid one (Bauman, 2000). That means we can talk about the globalization impact in all the domains of our society but we need to focus more on social values because they imply moral considerations.

We will briefly mention the social values in order to determine whether globalization has affected the local and European values which have built the current European society.

Defining values implies an additional challenge which consists of the term „value” having a couple of meanings but in this context we will focus on the values of the individual which respond to a broader system of orientations which corresponds to the life philosophy of a human being (Boudon, 2001).

The most general definition of the term *value* belongs to Kluckhohn and states the following: *the value represents a concept, explicit or implicit, distinctive for a human being or a characteristic to a group of persons, includes what's desirable and influences the selection of goals and the ways to achieve them* (Kluckhohn, 1951: 395). The author also defines the concept of *orientational value* which is about *organized and generalized ideas* that influence the behavior of the human being, the environment he lives in and his desires. Values are defined by being associated with the action, the practical component of a person's life.

Milton Rokeach defines value as *a belief, a conscious impulse which someone feels that dictates him a certain way of life or a purpose of existence regarding the personal and social context* (Rokeach, 1973: 5). Values don't have an individual existence as they form a complex value system which represents a guide for one's existence. They dictate aspirational goals and reasons for a human being's life. If a change in the system of values occurs, it might affect the priorities in someone's life. Based on this observation we can conclude that the system of values dictates the way of an individual, collectivity or a whole society.

Values are latent realities and cannot be observed without looking at the moral paradigm of the individual (behavior, decisions, attitudes). We refer to them as system of values in order to understand the ethical tendencies from a certain community. Because of that, the social values will always be present in politics and political strategies (Rokeach, 1973).

From a cultural point of view, the major value orientation is now pointing towards postmodernism having as a core the material aspect of life and an excessive desire for the quality of life (Inglehart, 1997: 4). The relationship with the culture can raise a few issues regarding the approach because there are some sociologists who treat culture and values the same, whereas the most influential researchers consider that the central element of culture represents the values of the individual (Voicu, 2010: 260).

### The European Area as a Cultural and Value Area

When we talk about the European area, we have to take into account not only the geographical or historical aspects, but it is necessary to take into consideration the cultural and value dimensions as well, because the European Union is built by cultural affiliation. This consideration allows us to find European cultural elements not only in the strictly geographical and historical European area, but also in other areas as well (Marga, 1998: 25).

The *Europe* concept began to exist because of a conjectural unity, a unity that pursued both the comparison with the exterior and especially, the exterior defenses. In

*Aufgang Europas*, Friedrich Heer considers that it is only from the 12<sup>th</sup> century that we can talk about Europe as it is seen today. The specificity of European history became observable through political, social, economic, and especially religious similarities (Heer, 1949: 15). It is important to know that until Luther's reformatory actions, at the beginning of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, Europe was often *confused* with Catholicism (Marga, 1998: 27). The scissions of Protestantism or French revolution did nothing other than give a more and more certain contour to what Europe is today (Marga, 1998: 27). The European cultural superiority is given by the fact that, beyond any political-administrative rationality, Europe has the capacity to group by itself from its own spirit of individuality and freedom of concomitance (Sandu, 2009: 25). Edmund Burke said that a European cannot consider any other European country as his exile (Burke, 1912: 84).

*Durkheim argues that values direct the activity of individuals, giving them a set of ideal references, thereby becoming the bases, foundations, and the fundament of social activity.*

The perspective that the experts have on the development of a society is related to values, because the importance of the values orients to their empirical side of the impact that it determines at both the individual and society. *The values are nothing but the collective preferences that arise into an institutional context and that, because of the way in which they are assessed, contribute to the regularization of that particular context* (Boudon, 2000: 664).

The values may differ from one society to another, from one culture to another or from one group to another within the same society, which is a fact that could lead to conflicts. *The conflicts are established between the values of two or more societies/communities or in the same society, especially when the reality is too far removed from the values of citizens. In the worst case, the first type of conflict can lead to wars (civil wars, between the nations and at present, between civilizations), the second type of conflict can lead to revolutions or, in democratic countries, to the overthrow of the government.*<sup>5</sup> (Nicolae Păun, *About European Values In A Global World*)

The concept of *value* is related to the concept of *European culture of diversity*. It was considered a hybrid construction between *Western Christian culture* and other subcultures. In a plural-value context, as the European area is, it raises the question of a possible conflict in values. The European area is a context in which *the crises of values are sufficiently expressed through the nations, as the confusion that an ordinary citizen could have between European and national policy is known* (Nicolae Păun, *About European Values In A Global World*).

In another vein, the goal of European integration was a target and a challenge for every nation that has been accepted in the great family of the EU. This integration targeted, by excellence, the observance and implementation of a set of socio-economic and political strategies, the cultural and value aspects of each nation being ignored. *The current crisis shows that the limits of the rational and institutional integration, either sober or artificial, were probably achieved. Only the common goals and values might involve citizens in a political project* (Nicolae Păun, *About European Values In a Global World*).

Based on this ascertainment of the limits of a *sober* integration, many studies about the values that should guide the European construction were completed. Therefore,

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<sup>5</sup>Nicolae Păun, *About European Values In A Global World*, Global Jean Monnet Conference, The European Union and the World Sustainable Development, Bruxelles, 2007, p. 2, articol disponibil pe Internet [http://ec.europa.eu/education/jean-monnet/doc/forum07/paun\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/education/jean-monnet/doc/forum07/paun_en.pdf), 18.08.2015.

the idea can be captured that *any attempt to encode the European values is bound to face a variety of national, regional, ethnic, sectarian and social divergent understandings. This diversity of interpretation cannot be eliminated by a constitutional treaty, even if it is supported by legislation and judicial interpretation* (Michalski, in Europe's Constitutional Crisis: International Perspectives, 2007: 96).

The European integration is increasingly approached from the cultural and value perspective, taking into account the fact that Europe is *a multilingual and multicultural area. The European Union is a voluntary union of states with their own history, with their own social, political, economic structures, with their own cultural heritage, with their own language, or rather, with their own languages. Nobody disputes the fact that our continent is the cradle of an exceptional civilization. This civilization is marked both by common cultural characteristics as well as outstanding diversity* (Reding- in Europe's Constitutional Crisis: International Perspectives, 2007: 96).

At this point, Europe appears to face an identity crisis with multiple causes and effects. We are dealing with an increasingly secularized society, and the feeling of appurtenance to a system of values and principles is decreasingly low, even though, at the beginning of the European construction, Adenauer, Schuman or Gasperi banked on the spiritual dimension and the role of religion in the construction of the European civilization. Schuman argued that *the democratic ideal on which the future of Europe depended owns its origins to Christianity only* (*Religion in Europe. Contemporary perspectives*). Moreover, Schuman thought that *democracy will be Christian or not be at all*, (Schuman, 1964: 50-80) and Jacques Delors warned that it takes a soul or spirit of Europe. Amid globalization and social fragmentation, this analysis is especially required unless cultural and value identity of Europe has become relative or fragmented.

### **European Social Values**

The initiative of a research to investigate the values that different European countries share among appeared in 1978, when the European Values Study Group was born. The initial objectives of these socio-value researches were the comparison of the value systems of the countries that adhere to the European Community and an in-time analysis of the values orientation within the European realm. For this approach, a questionnaire was used which included an increased number of items referring to attitudes and behaviors that allow the study of values. The questionnaire covered a few values, as follows: religion, politics, labor, family life, social relationships, sexual relationships etc. Special attention was paid to religious values, since one of the declared purposes of the research was to compare religious values among different European countries, as well as longitudinal analyses of their evolution. The first research took place in 1981; the second took place between 1990 and 1991, and the third wave between 1999 and 2000. The objectives were the same, targeting transversal, intercultural and longitudinal comparison.<sup>6</sup>

The Atlas of European Values (2005) which analyses the results of surveys within *The Study of the European Values* emphasizes a series of observations regarding the perception of the values considered common at a European level. Some of these values are: *democracy, solidarity, labor and competition, sustainable development, non-discrimination and tolerance* (Păun, About European Values).

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<sup>6</sup>Mălina Voicu, Bogdan Voicu, Studiul valorilor europene: un proiect de cercetare internațională [European Values Study: an international research program], Calitatea Vieții 2002, 1-2. Mălina Voicu, Bogdan Voicu. 2002. Studiul valorilor europene: un proiect de cercetare internațională [European Values Study: an international research program], Calitatea Vieții, 2002, 1-2.

Results on democracy shows that there is a support for it in all the European countries, thus, within each EU state, an overwhelmingly majority agree with the following statement: *Democracy may have its problems, but it is better than any other form of government. The problem seems to be the difference between wishes and realities of the European Union, often criticized for its democratic deficit* (Păun, About European Values).

The idea of *European solidarity* is reflected in the Community's willingness to be a Europe of citizens. *The conclusions of the reflection on the spiritual dimension group was that solidarity is identified as one of the links that needs to be sufficiently strong in order to cope with the pressure imposed by the inevitable divergent opinions between the immediate economic interests of the citizens and the states: Solidarity – a genuine sense of civic community – is vital, because dominant competition gives rise to strong centrifugal forces* (Final Reflection Group's Report, in Europe's Constitutional Crisis: International Perspectives, 2007).

*Economic values such as: work, competition and free market, sustainable development, represent an important matter in the debate within the member states regarding the Constitutional Treaty. The story of the Polish plumber who is ready to work more and harder and earn less in compensation than the French plumber has convinced a majority of the citizens. The Study of the European Values examines the values that are part of the economic matters, especially work and competition, and confirms that there is a gap between old and new member states citizens* (Final Reflection Group's Report, in Europe's Constitutional Crisis: International Perspectives, 2007).

The idea of building *the common European values* was a goal proclaimed at European debate forums, raising the issue of inclusion in legislative treaties to which all countries would adhere. *The second article of the European Constitutional Treaty establishes that: the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and human rights. These values are common to the member states in a society of pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity and non-discrimination* (The European Constitutional Treaty) Beyond postulating these values in legal form, there was found a difficulty to their actual internalization, understanding, and applicability on the different types of societies. *The second article is ambiguous. There is no concise expression, which may be easily learned, memorized, possibly written in an official document of EU, which might express the fundamental values of the EU citizens. The phrases are difficult, because they cannot be used in political speeches, cannot be used in the media, and should be studied carefully* (Păun, About European Values).

Thus, for a strong, genuine integration within the European realm, it is necessary to strengthen European values in the context of globalization and to formulate a paradigm of integration that would take cultural value into consideration.

### **Conclusions and closing arguments**

More than ever, our society is fragmented, and the moral crisis of values has its unquestionable reality. Gilles Lipovetsky considers that our world is not re-established on the former morals, on the contrary, it is far away from it. More than that, in the context of moral absence, not only that the standards have disappeared, but also we have got to inherit a vacuum in our social life (Lipovetsky, 1992: 8-20).

Moral crisis indicates the *sunset of values* and human condition, as they have been understood through the light of moral principles. Modernity and globalization are factors which generate this social and moral crisis. Lastly, the discussions of the modern world malady (Bauman) are growing increasingly, and Hans Kung considers that nowadays, the

crisis of the ruling powers of Occident has become a moral crisis in the context of tradition and the destruction of social order.

Through globalization, modernity brings incontestable benefits to our world, but also a cultural dilution and relativizing of values. European Union has a supplementary mandate in the process of consolidation and integration, that of understanding secularization and *moral deficit*, which is not part of its identity, but an effect of postmodernism, that should be treated to such an extent, in order that its own internal cohesion should not be *diluted*. The challenge of maintaining the unity of European values is not an easy task, and Europe needs to prove that multicultural identity has to be its strongest point, a benefit and not a social vulnerability.

The given situation implies, almost imperatively, a reestablishment of values in the context of migration, diverse challenging and globalization. So, the construction of real and well-set socio-politic values systems, the presence of socio-cultural references, represents not only desirable objectives, but also restraints, on which the profound cohesion of European project depends.

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### **III. Determinants of European Regional Development**

**Florentina CHIRODEA** ⇔ *The Role of Universities from the North–Western Romania in the Development of Regional Knowledge–based Economies*

**Dragoş DĂRĂBĂNEANU** ⇔ *Collective Expressing and Role of Public Opinion in European Society Development*

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# THE ROLE OF UNIVERSITIES FROM THE NORTH-WESTERN ROMANIA IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMIES

*Florentina CHIRODEA* \*

**Abstract.** *The knowledge-based economy requires that research–development activities contribute to the creation of added value. Innovation, another important component of this type of economy, constitutes, in turn, an indicator of global competitiveness. In the national and supranational processes and strategies to implementation of regional knowledge-based economy, a leading role is played by universities, turned into spaces of the integrated approach of the triangle education–research–innovation. The study aims to analyse the involvement of higher education institutions in the North–West Development Region in the transformation of the local economy. The data collected will allow us to highlight the mechanisms through which partnerships involving academic communities fail to transform knowledge from publications, patents and prototypes in technologies and “services economically and socially assimilated”.*

**Keywords:** *universities role, knowledge-based economy, North–West Development Region*

## 1. Introduction

Technological, informatical and communicational evolutions, manifested in the last decades of the twentieth century and early twenty-first century, stand at the basis of an underlying trigger of a complex process of transition from an economy based mostly on material resources in a knowledge economy. Knowledge revolution, we are witnessing now, is founded on strategic intangible resources such as human capital, the information and knowledge. Knowledge, thus, becomes an essential factor of production, key to competitiveness in local, regional, national and global level (Luț, 2012: 1). The economic progress was permanently under the influence of technological changes determines changes and transformations in society, the development of peak areas of technology, information technology being an emergence of societal precondition. The dynamics of competition in competitive sectors had a direct influence on the actors involved; attention is now focused on knowledge as a resource indispensable and ubiquitous, and the formation of skills involving a high level of knowledge for human resource (Roja, 2011: 10,103).

Knowledge can be treated as a process that starts from storage and investigation of objective data and conversion into capital operative in many fields. Knowledge has been defined for a long time by limiting the workforce to qualify as a public or private good rather than a societal level coordination mechanism (Anton, 2013: 6). Increasingly, many

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academics, business people and government people, view that mankind is moving towards a knowledge society supported by a knowledge-based economy. Paul David and Dominique Foray identified the factors that contributed to the development of this type of society as being: accelerating knowledge production, increasing productivity of intangible capital at the micro and macro-economic innovation - the dominant activity with variable resources; revolution tools use knowledge (David, Foray, 2003: 20-49). The four factors determine the main features of this new society: the expansion and deepening of scientific knowledge, management and use of existing knowledge in the form of technological and organizational knowledge, production of new technological knowledge through innovation, the emergence of an economy, the innovation process is crucial; unprecedented dissemination of knowledge to all citizens through new media (internet, e-book, e-learning) shape the global community, producing a cultural revolution based on knowledge, need for environmental sustainability by rapid technological adaptations (Drăgănescu, 2001: 26-27). The new economy developed in such society is an economy of information and knowledge society, being subject to the influences of globalization, the widespread use of information and knowledge, internet access, and increasing workforce knowledge-intensive (Neșțian, 2007: 28-30). In addition, the research focuses on the discovery, acquisition, use and dissemination of knowledge, while education on the formation of that mass communicators and receivers which define an open society, both standing at the national or regional innovation system (Jessop, 2008: 1).

As an important source of knowledge and innovation, the higher education institutions of the twenty-first Century may occupy an important place in the process described above, the three fundamental functions they fulfil being: research, teaching/learning and community service. The regionalization of economies, a natural phenomenon due to concentration of investments, services and production in area type NUTS II, generated the regional competitiveness (Șoproni, 2013: 60) and economic performance is determined by a mixture of elements. Besides natural resources, infrastructure, business dynamics, regional labor market structure, regional tradition and history, the availability of education, there are several factors that traditionally academic aims: workers' skills and opportunities related to lifelong learning. The university sector was not excluded from any strategy aimed at regions, being considered even a catalyst for their development and reducing disparities. By joining the EU, Romania has assumed the Community strategic objectives and instruments for achieving them, starting with reforms towards a knowledge-based economy and competitive regions.

The study aims to analyse the involvement of higher education institutions in the North–West Development Region in the transformation of the local economy. The data collected will allow us to highlight the mechanisms through which partnerships involving academic communities fail to transform knowledge from publications, patents and prototypes in technologies and “services economically and socially assimilated” (David, 2006: 3). The research also aims to analyse the degree of implementation of the proposed models of knowledge transfer specialists or examples of good practice in the field.

## **2. The trinomial education - research - innovation in regional economies based on knowledge**

In a society and a knowledge-based economy there is increased the demand for diversified expertise, accompanied by changing organizational, methodological and disciplinary borders of this knowledge. The result is very dynamic and rapidly expanding the demand and supply of knowledge, which translates into a short life cycle of products,

a rapid and global process of standardization, new forms of production organization, new producer–consumer relationships and new requirements about the risks and safety. Universities must anticipate and meet those needs through a dynamic and active process of knowledge transfer to the economy and society as a whole. Based on these requirements, the international organizations allocated to higher education institutions tasks in the new economy and reserve a central place in sustainable economic development programs, for universities that promote research excellence.

OECD considers that the role of universities in contemporary society is not built by a traditional linear innovation model, where they only provide highly skilled manpower in different areas or forms of knowledge, but attract and generate talent, formal and informal supports, specialized expertise, facilitate research and development companies, mediate their access to knowledge (even if it comes from global networks that universities have gained access to, or developed networks with other social partners) (OECD, 2009: 15-16). Moreover, these institutions are not isolated from the community, but become “community players” the contribution made to the processes of formation and development, dissemination of knowledge in the network of innovative companies, attracting, and retaining talent generation (Şerbu, Pruteanu, 2009: 3-4).

In turn, the World Bank stresses that education for the knowledge economy means fostering flexible and highly skilled human capital necessary for competition in the global market through the following instruments:

- 1) Building a strong human capital based through access to labor skills and high-level skills, which involves fostering lifelong learning and certification of qualifications in accredited institutions;

- 2) Creating a national innovation system by building networks between companies, research centres, universities and think tanks, working with societal needs for assimilating and adapting or creating new technologies.

Higher education is, in these circumstances, a “centre of creation of intellectual capacity to produce and use knowledge” (World Bank, *Education for the Knowledge Economy*). Furthermore, the World Bank experts have developed a methodology for assessing national economies in order to determine the overall readiness of states to transition to a knowledge-based economy. According to this methodology, there are used aggregate indicators covering economic incentives and institutional regime, education, innovation and ICT respectively. The ranking presented by the World Bank in 2012, Sweden is situated on the first place, followed by Finland and Denmark, five European countries being mentioned among the top 10, which demonstrates the strategic importance of investment directed to the four pillars of knowledge mentioned above, that the directly concern academic work two (World Bank, *Knowledge Economy Index (KEI) 2012 Rankings*).

Moreover, with the declaration of Lisbon, the European Union has defined strategic orientation towards a knowledge society and a knowledge-based economy, and in 2004 the European Commission proposes four ways to transfer knowledge, aimed at involving higher education: 1) unlimited distribution–knowledge produced in universities publicly accessible to all, the end user is not identified due to its high degree of diffusion, 2) marketing–knowledge produced in universities are purchasing through conventional tools, linking universities context of industrial production, 3) the transfer by interactive forms of cooperation between universities and companies aimed at sharing skills and expertise, 4) transfer through the creation of autonomous organizations that are key factors of our knowledge human capital formed in universities (European Commission, 2004: 22-23). Therefore the traditional universities that dominated European countries 20–30 years

ago have undergone to meet the new demands of national economies. His past, thus the production of culture and knowledge through research and education, regulated academic standards and national standards, to focus training activities and research results for developing highly skilled workforce and strengthening research and innovation capacity (Regini, 2011: 2). Working more closely with the private sector, adopting practices associated with it, the growing importance of private sources for funding universities, developing performance indicators that reflect the educational and research–innovation activities are evidence of entrepreneurial tendencies of higher education (Trani, Holsworth, 2010: 6-7). In this context, cross–border flows of ideas, knowledge, information, technologies, products, people and financial capital are factors amending European universities operating environment (Marginson, van der Wende, 2007: 5). At the same time we are witnessing the transformation of universities in key actors to develop and implement European Union policies through various mechanisms for probing, testing and research, the possibility authorized to issue or offer solutions designs and patterns illustrating features of EU citizen and intercultural dialogue (Horga, Brie, 2009: 232).

The active involvement of national governments and the European Union to establish and implement the regional and cohesion policy did not exclude the university sector, the role it plays in developing being one of the pillars of Community and national strategies. The regional engagement of higher education institutions is carried out on several levels: the creation of knowledge through research, innovation and technology transfer; the transfer of knowledge through education and development of human resources; cultural and community development. Thereby, it creates a framework for partnership between regions and universities, where higher education institutions make their contribution by: 1) the creation of knowledge in the region by exploiting the results of research and innovation (spin off, technology platforms, science parks, specialize companies in which researchers and business people working together and consulting); 2) formation of intellectual capital and knowledge transfer (location learning through internships, employment of graduates in the region, continuing education, professional development activities and lifelong learning); 3) contributions to strengthening social cohesion and sustainable development. In turn, the local community can support: research and innovation objectives of universities, student recruitment, increasing the number of students coming from the local population, supplement income by working with regional business. For factors responsible for regional development, universities can attract investors, generate new business, strengthen local human capital, provide advice and expertise in different areas or participate in cultural programs (OECD, 2007: 22-32).

### **3. Possibilities of academic environment implication in the regional development**

The regional and cohesion policy guarantees a smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, promoting at the same time, the harmonious development of the Union and its regions through a reduction of economic, social and territorial disparities. For less developed regions the objectives aims creating new jobs, increasing human capital, competitiveness, economic growth, improving the quality of life and sustainable development. “Europe 2020” aims to reduce the proportion of early school drop below 10%, to increase the number of people aged between 30 and 34 years who have graduated university courses, to investment of 3% of EU GDP in research and development, employing 75% of the segment of the population between 20 and 64 years. European Regional Development Fund, European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund, representing

more than a third of the overall budget, are designed to provide the necessary resources to achieve the objectives, of these funds are financed sectors in which universities play a central role: developing new technology, cutting edge research, business development, skills and trainings (European Commission, *EU Regional Policy*, 2013).

At the level of local communities or European regions, the partnership relations with academic environment are based on common interests, largely economic. Transition to a more ingenious development that focuses on entrepreneurship and innovation, has determined increased efforts in order to remove the barriers to the application of research results, the development of technological innovation capacities and the facilitating of the interaction between universities and the private sector, or local community. The recent changes in regional policy aimed to transforming each university into an engine of growth by strengthening the role of superior education in regional innovation system and develop the participation of universities in cluster initiatives (OECD, 2007: 14).

The mutual influence between the regional economic environment, technological progress and social transformation of local communities have created a favourable frame for the emergence of innovation networks, which are composed from organizations, communities, professionals, higher education institutions and research institutes. Stimulating innovation and research through the project's collaborative, important element in enhancing regional competitiveness, requires collaboration between academic environment, private companies and regional administrative factors. In this partnership, the universities lies another traditional tasks, to provide skills for the regional labor market. In this context, designing human resource training programs focuses on key or complementary areas, specific to the activities within innovation networks (Roja, 2011: 1-3).

Clusters, on the other hand, require the existence of interaction between involved actors, the results being outsourced as highly skilled workforce available locally, lower transport costs, external economies of scale, transfer of know-how, etc. Known in the literature as the pole of competitiveness, industrial cluster or industrial district, this type of association is conditioned by territorial proximity of the actors. Regional clusters do not exceed, in importance, the boundaries of the area in which are located the entities involved and getting priority objective economic performance. The success is influenced by access to human resources, knowledge and specialized technologies, by the opportunities, by the collaboration between entities and by the regulations (Luț, 2012: 3-6). Depending on the type of knowledge held, in practice are found two types of clusters (Neșțian, 2007: 1):

I) Technological clusters, oriented to high-tech, well adapted to the economy based of knowledge, have universities and research centres as a central point of development;

II) Know-how clusters, based on more traditional activities, maintain competitive advantage over a long period of time.

There are other types of agreements for research-development-innovation that firms can enter directly with research institutes or universities. The research results, commonly defined as "intellectual property", have both symbolic and economic value. Teachers and researchers can create companies to fund their own research and to commercialize the results or to assume managerial responsibilities by involving in the Advisory Board or the Board of Directors. Members of the academic community have the ability to produce goods required by the local community in science parks or in incubator type facilities, and at institutional level, university can open technology transfer offices or may contract with corporation for research funding in exchange for the license rights on technology that is generated (Etzkowitz, 2012: 1-6). Another element that defines the

regional economy based on knowledge, human capital, lies to the European Commission, which encourages through grants or projects financed from structural funds, educating a large number of individuals in the area, ensuring that they are engaged when they finish education. Higher education plays an important role here as the answer to the demand for new skills to local employers by providing training courses for continuing professional development or attracting talent from outside the region (OECD, 2007: 16).

The regional development doesn't refer only to the economic prosperity but also to the development of local community, socially and culturally. Even in this field, the universities can collaborate with numerous stakeholders to generate solutions in order to combat long-term unemployment, to contribute to the reducing of public health problems, to draw different creative talents and contribute to development of creative industries. Also, the higher education institutions can increase the degree of internationalization of the regions, emphasizing their characteristics related to diversity and multiculturalism, as an example of good practice in this respect (OECD, 2017: 16).

#### **4. Social–Economic Characteristics of the North–West Development Region**

The North–West Region (Northern Transylvania) is one of the eight development regions in Romania, consisting of six counties (Bihor, Bistrita–Năsăud, Cluj, Maramureș, Satu Mare and Sălaj) and having an area of 34,160 square kilometres. A gate from Hungary and Ukraine, the region has 403 common 15 municipalities and 28 cities and has more than 2 million hectares of farmland (the North–West Regional Development Agency, *Descrierea generală a Regiunii Nord–Vest*: 1-6). The most important cities are Cluj–Napoca, Oradea, Baia–Mare, Zalău, Satu Mare and Bistrița, which are both regional poles of economic development and the city with a great cultural and historical heritage. In this region there are two metropolitan areas, organized around Oradea and Cluj–Napoca (official site of the North–West Regional Development Agency).

Northern Transylvania is considered to be a developed region with high average national economic performance and a high potential growth, both regional GDP and the per capita increasing from year to year. The sectors economically significant are, in order, services, industry, construction and agriculture. The industry of the region has a relatively low value-added and low high-tech degree, the development relying on cheap labor and imported materials. In Cluj County are reported the growing importance of competitive industries oriented to foreign market, in other administrative entities operating mainly traditional industries. The tertiary sector is the most heavily represented, in 2008 a rate of 46.15% being held by commercial services (trade, hotels, restaurants, transport and storage). These are followed by the financial, real estate, and public services (the North–West Regional Development Agency, *Caracteristici socio–economice ale Regiunii Nord–Vest*: 1). In 2010 there were 67,871 active local entrepreneurs (majority are micro), geographically distributed especially in Cluj and Bihor (National Institute of Statistics, *Territorial Sustainable Development Indicators: Number of Active Entrepreneurs*). Their activities are circumscribed to extractive industries, food, leather and footwear, furniture, and non-metallic mineral products, metal, machinery and metal products, transport of goods by road. Other areas in which these companies are: research–development, production software and IT services, pulp and paper, pharmaceutical, rubber and plastics, electrical equipment, devices, appliances and instruments, production and supply of electricity, construction hotels, restaurants, financial intermediation, insurance and real estate (the North–West Regional Development Agency, *Caracteristici socio–economice ale Regiunii Nord–Vest*: 2).

Research–development–innovation activity is supported by 8 research institutes, of which 2 have legal personality and 6 are subordinated to Romanian Academy. Besides these works 7 public universities (4 of them with advanced research) and 9 higher education institutions with private financing, totally 111 faculty works with a valuable human capital and research (official site of the North–West Regional Development Agency). At the region level operates over 7 research–development units’, of which 67 are private units. The number of doctoral schools is quite high, Cluj and Oradea being the most important universities in scientific research and technological development. In the region operates 3 technology transfer centres’ and 3 for information technology, the number of patents situating the region on 4<sup>th</sup> place in Romania. In the field of creative and cultural industries, in the region operate very small companies vulnerable to economic shocks. The activity of these companies is concentrated in Cluj County, other administrative entities do not having significant contributions in this domain (the North–West Regional Development Agency, *Caracteristici socio–economice ale Regiunii Nord–Vest*: 3-5). In addition to these data, the National Institute of Statistics has defined indicators to measure the achievement of the knowledge society; the data collected in 2005–2010 in the North–West Development Region are shown in Table 1.

**Table 1.** Indicators for achievement of the knowledge society in North–West Development Region

Indicator	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Employees in RDI activities at the end of the year (number of people)	2690	3484	3923	4146	4185	4018
Turnover from innovation (% of total turnover by economic sector)		19.1		15.3		21.7
The innovative enterprises having placed on the market new or significantly improved products (number)		949		506		496
Total R & D expenditure as GDP share (%)	0.26	0.29	0.38	0.43	0.34	
GDP share of R & D expenditure of business enterprises (%)	0.1	0.1	0.11	0.07	0.1	
GDP share of R & D spending on in the public sector	0.16	0.19	0.27	0.36	0.24	
The share of people with higher education (%)	9.1	9.6	11	12.1	12.1	13

*Source:* National Institute of Statistics,

[http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/IDDT%202012/index\\_IDDT.htm](http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/IDDT%202012/index_IDDT.htm), accessed in November 2013

The region is characterized by a high share of the population graduated from high school and a large number of students (second position on national level), the rate of school dropout being low. The problem facing the region is the loss of highly skilled population, a phenomenon evident in the specific level of specialization such as medicine and informative, affected by the more attractive external offers. The civil active population is concentrated in 50% in Cluj and Bihor, urban activity rate being significantly higher than that recorded in rural areas. The job offers are concentrated in urban environment, the rural unemployed do not having available a large area of

employment, occupations and industries (the North–West Regional Development Agency, *Caracteristici socio-economice ale Regiunii Nord–Vest*: 3-5).

### **5. The contribution of universities from the North–West Development Region on the knowledge–based economy**

Since 1999, the universities or research institutions from Northern Transylvania are involved in preparing the regional profile and social programming documents provided by the EU candidate countries (the North–West Regional Development Agency, 2001: 18). The Regional Development Plan, developed in order to identify priorities for national or European funding programs, is based on evidence provided by the Regional Planning Committee. In this structure there are six groups of experts, in which activates specialists co-opted from major universities or research institutes in the region. Also, we find members of the academic in Regional Consortium, an organization that works under the Phare 2001 TVET component–technical, vocational and educational training. Together with representatives of the County Agencies for Employment, the County Councils, the County School Inspectorates and the Regional Development Agency (RDA), the higher education institutions are called upon to identify measures of integrated education and training, and to initiate pilot projects in this regard (the North–West Regional Development Agency, 2002: 59). Furthermore, since 2002, five universities from the region will be part of the coordination structures of working groups of the Monitoring Committee of Regional Development Plan (the North–West Regional Development Agency, 2003: 62). For contributing to the work of these bodies, in 2005, two representatives of the regional academic environment received the title of Honorary Member of RDA North–West. We refer to Gabriel Bădescu, Head of the Department of Political Science, University “Babeş-Bolyai” Cluj–Napoca and Stelian Brad, coordinator of the Centre for Research in Innovation Management and Engineering, director of the Office of Technology Transfer, Technical University of Cluj–Napoca (the North–West Regional Development Agency, *ADR Nord–Vest....*, 2006: 11).

In the same year, was completed a database with all universities and research centres from the region (the North–West Regional Development Agency, *ADR Nord–Vest....*, 2006: 17), thus having a complete picture of local human and material resources with potential involvement in activities of research–development–innovation (RDI). The information gathered aims ability, orientation, degree of cooperation, and experience of RDI structures. Considering all these factors, the universities are situated on the first place, followed by research, development and innovation institutes, and companies working in the area. Also, most of the research structures functioning in public institutions, a small part being developed within national companies or agencies. If we use as performance indicators, the number of ISI articles and patents, until 2006, Cluj–Napoca is a top regional leader, followed by Oradea and Baia Mare. Regarding the patents registered at State Office for Inventions and Trademarks, they were obtained mostly by individuals (The North–West Regional Development Agency, *Analiza ofertei de CDI*, 2007: 1-5).

The closure of the European budget exercise 2000–2006, was an opportunity for all actors to balance regional development and to plan action for 2007–2013. Based on experience in previous years, and on the strategies launched at European level concerning the construction of the economy based on knowledge, there are now set regional targets which stimulate increased valuing of strategic partnerships, both external–with regional neighbours and internal–with local government, universities and business sector

associations. Therefore, it is intended to raise the involvement of expertise of local academic, and to stimulate the innovative potential of the region. One of the first collaborations is initiated with the Faculty of Geography, University “Babeş-Bolyai” Cluj–Napoca in order to update the chapter of intra and inter–regional disparities to develop planning documents for 2007–2013, the academics being providers results of studies and analyses presented at the international conference “Regional disparities: typology, impact, management”. Another area which requires the expertise of the university is the urban regeneration, for it is signed a “Strategic University Partnership” to provide data needed for the development of regional and sectorial programming documents for 2007–2013. In fact, there are elaborated terms of reference for the feasibility studies necessary to integrated projects of sustainable urban development in Northern Transylvania (The North–West Regional Development Agency, *Raport anual...*, 2007: 21).

With the start of the European financial exercise 2007–2013, at the level of North-West Development Region, are reinforcing previous partnerships with local academics and researchers, those are referred to as areas of excellence in the region, distinguished by their innovative potential and the capacity in higher education, adult education and training, recognized internationally. Thus, in the composition of the new Regional Committee for Strategic Assessment and Correlation enters also academics (Ioan Horga–University of Oradea, Paul Şerban Agachi–“Babeş-Bolyai” Cluj–Napoca, Mircea Lobonţiu–North University of Baia Mare), which with delegates from unions and business represent the regional socio–economic environment (the North–West Regional Development Agency, *Raport anual ...*, 2007: 14–15). Another important step to increase the competitiveness of the region was made with the establishment of Regional Institute of Education, Research and Technology Transfer (RIERTT). Organized as a joint stock company, its main objective accounts the engagement of competent human resources in “knowledge triangle”. Among the founding members there are also important institutions of higher education, namely: “Babeş-Bolyai” Cluj–Napoca, Technical University of Cluj–Napoca, University of Agricultural Sciences and Veterinary Medicine Cluj–Napoca, University of Medicine and Pharmacy “Iuliu Haţieganu” Cluj–Napoca, University of Art and Design Cluj–Napoca, University of Oradea and North University of Baia Mare. A bridge between public authorities, academic and business environment, the Institute provides education, research and technology transfer, such as: document drafting for recognition and accreditation of new occupations; development of curricula focusing on adult education; vocational training and retraining for the jobs required in the labor market; joint development of new service packages for post-graduate education; development of a regional platform for e-learning, technology transfer and innovation support through new products, materials and services (official site of Regional Institute of Education, Research and Technology Transfer).

Regarding the implementation of the regional strategy for innovation, in October 2005 the GREENET project is started, funded by the research program of the PNCD CEE X I, which aimed mainly the construction, development, integration and consolidation of innovative network of excellence research. Together with other partners, Procema Research Center Cluj–Napoca, contributes to identifying ways to ecological and sustainable management of mineral resources for the construction and exploitation of the eco - industrial North-West Development Region (the North–West Regional Development Agency, 2008: 20). A year later it is launched the REGIS-NW, to increase the attractiveness and competitiveness of the region by creating a support system for regional

innovation and promoting a culture of innovation. In the project actions (analysis of regional needs in terms of technology transfer, development of the Regional Innovation Strategy, identifying pilot projects aimed at implementing the Action Plan and support structure for regional technology transfer) were included, both members of local academics for advisory activities and research centres that have signed collaboration contracts (the North–West Regional Development Agency, *Raport anual...*, 2007: 30).

In 2008 it is launched the project BISNet Transylvania, in which are partners the Technical University Cluj-Napoca and the Technology Transfer Center Research Institute for Analytical Instrumentation, Cluj. Coordinated by North-West RDA, the project creates a network support for business and innovation in Transylvania macro-region, which provides services particularly for the regional SMEs. Increased competitiveness and innovation capacity thereof is encouraged by tools like: information; business cooperation and internationalization; innovation, technology transfer and know-how; assistance to SME participation in the Framework Program for Research of the European Commission. The methods of delivery and development of these services will ensure access and geographic proximity to European instruments for the development of networks and resources. Opening Science and Technology Park in Cluj Metropolitan Area is another example, in which academic involvement is directed towards specific targets aimed at increasing regional capacity for research and innovation. “Babeş-Bolyai” University Cluj–Napoca, Technical University of Agricultural Sciences and Veterinary Medicine Cluj–Napoca, University of Medicine and Pharmacy Cluj-Napoca, University of Art and Design Cluj–Napoca and Research Institute for Analytical Instrumentation Cluj, along with 6 other institutions and organizations offering their support for achieving an agglomeration of highly specialized human capital and for hosting and running of activities that comprise services and high competitiveness technology. Pole of competitiveness thus created will be the basis of a polycentric concept for support of innovation through the establishment of excellence pole in Oradea, Baia Mare and Satu Mare (the North–West Regional Development Agency, 2001: 36-37).

The expertise and innovation capacity of regional academic and research environment is put again in value by CLUSTHERM project funded by the European Commission through 7 Framework Program. Coordinated by Great Plain Northern Hungary Innovation Agency, the thermal energy cluster brought together 12 partners from 4 countries (Hungary, Romania, Croatia and Austria), along with, the University of Oradea runs activities to gathering and centralize data in the field of thermal waters use (the North–West Regional Development Agency, 2010: 20-22). The project will be expanded in 2010 through the establishment of Water Cluster in Romania, those 16 partners (local authorities, universities and firms in related fields of water) joining forces aiming to exploit water and attract funds to finance research projects in field (the North–West Regional Development Agency, 2011: 41). Professors from the Faculty of History, Geography and International Relations, University of Oradea, Faculty of Geography, University “Babes-Bolyai” Cluj–Napoca are co-opted to the Plan4al project to harmonize spatial data under the INSPIRE Directive. The 24 partners from 14 European countries aim to create an European network of best practices for interoperability of spatial planning data that is made available to investors and decision-makers for the harmonious development of real estate sector and to create a favourable and attractive investment climate (official Site of the *Plan4all* Project).

Another dimension of academic staff members' involvement is materialised in programs aimed cross-border, transnational and territorial cooperation. One such project

is being developed by 11 countries in Eastern Europe and funded by the INTERREG IVC Program. NEEBOR—*Networking for business in the eastern border of the European Union* aims to promote cross-border business cooperation and development of innovative partnerships, the universities being involved in study the challenges, elaborate strategies and identify key actors who influence the development and innovation processes in the SMEs located the partner regions. The three representatives of public universities from Northern Transylvania, invited to participate in roundtable discussion at the annual conference NEEBOR, have brought their contribution to improving the implementation of regional development and innovation (Official site of NEEBOR Project). Area of renewable resources is another domain in which there were used the infrastructure and the human resources of the research centres from the region. Along with business representatives and public authorities, Technology Transfer Centre of the National Institute for Analytical Instrumentation Cluj established a *Transnational Cluster in Renewable Energy Field* in order to create a platform for collaboration between actors attracted or interested to produce energy and use alternative methods based on the principle of sustainable development. The project provides concrete opportunities for the implementation of research results and the inclusion of innovation into production, while being an opportunity to facilitate internationalization (The North-West Regional Development Agency, *Servicii pentru dezvoltare regională*).

In figures, the involvement of universities from North-Western Romania in regional economies based on knowledge would materialize as (The North-West Regional Development Agency, 2012: 1-47):

- of those 6 accredited entities for activities of innovation and technology transfer, 3 are technology transfer centers and 2 centers for technology information, which operating within academic and research environment in region;
- of those 4 regional structures of State Office for Inventions and Trademarks, one is hosted by the Technical University of Cluj-Napoca;
- of those 4 scientific and technological parks, national accredited in 2011, in the North-West Development Region there is none, the project, started in 2011 at Cluj-Napoca, is in process to obtaining accreditation;
- in 2010 were published 1326 ISI articles, most authors originate from among teachers affiliated to university centres Cluj-Napoca and Oradea;
- 12 regional journals are ISI, of which: 3 have real profile (mathematics and computer science), 4 are in the chemistry-biology field, 1-regional studies, 1-public administration, 1-psychology, 1-medicine, 1-religion;
- 8 of the 12 ISI journals are published in Cluj-Napoca, 2 in Oradea and 2 in Baia-Mare ;
- in the period 2007-2011, in total there were 223 patent registered on State Office for Inventions and Trademarks, of which 125 were issued to Cluj County, followed by Maramureş and Bihor;
- on the two calls (2007 and 2008) of *Program 4-Partnerships* , part of applied research national programme, were submitted and implemented a number of 161 projects and have attracted 304.4 million lei in the region, a particular interest being manifested in the fields of agriculture, food safety and security, health, materials, processes and innovative products. All projects were conducted by teams of professors and researchers from Cluj-Napoca;
- on the *Program 5-Innovation*, Module 1-*Developing of product-system with role in supporting technology transfer of technological research results and innovation*

and supporting recovery patents by companies, were won and implemented 29 projects, all in partnership with RDI structures, Technical University of Cluj–Napoca developed most collaborations in this regard;

- in a ranking of the number of funded projects by *CEEX Program*, University of Medicine and Pharmacy, Cluj–Napoca is the regional leader;

- Technical University of Cluj–Napoca and the University of Medicine and Pharmacy Cluj, are leading in the ranking projects developed through *Impact Program*;

- university centres from Cluj–Napoca and Oradea attracted most funds through grants funded by National Research Council;

- universities from Cluj–Napoca have managed to attract about 73 million lei by the *Sectorial Operational Program “Increase of Economic Competitiveness” 2007–2013, Priority 2–Increasing economic competitiveness through RDI*, most of the projects being research in partnership university–enterprise, respectively high scientific level research–development with the participation of specialists from abroad;

- 2 projects of international consortium type, funded by the European Commission *FP6 Program*, were coordinated by the “Babeş-Bolyai” University and the Technical University of Cluj–Napoca.

- in all the municipalities County residence act Universities, Cluj–Napoca being the most specialized university centre in the region;

- at the level of the year 2012 there were declared 5094 university graduates and of postgraduate education.

## 6. Conclusions

The knowledge society is a complex concept, which covers all aspects of the contemporary economy, and where research and development activities contribute to the creation of added value. Innovation, another important component of this type of economy, constitutes, in turn, an indicator of global competitiveness. In the national and supranational processes and strategies to implementation of regional knowledge–based economy, a leading role is played by universities, turned into spaces of the integrated approach of the triangle education–research–innovation. Flexible and at the same time open to the external environment, the higher education institutions are important partners for innovation and technology transfer. In an area limited to the regional level, the existence of an infrastructure for research–development–innovation, appropriate to the needs of emerging local economy constitutes a factor to improve the national, European or international competitiveness. The results of the efforts made by universities, companies and local authorities to increase regional competitiveness have finality in society, by increasing the standard of living and welfare of the region's population.

In this context, the North–Western Development Region has 4 advanced research universities, 70 research and development units, of which 67 are private entities, two university centres of scientific research and technological development (Cluj–Napoca and Oradea), technology transfer centres, centres of information technology. There is an increasing attention given to the preparation of the high level of human resource in the region operating 31 doctoral schools where trained 26% of all doctoral students in Romania area. The University tradition is doubled by the scientific one, in 2010 being recorded 12 ISI Journals, a rate of 17% of ICI Romanian articles and a significant number of patents. Cluj–Napoca is the most important university centre of the region, focusing a large part of the infrastructure of the RDI and the largest number of educators and researchers involved in NGOs engaged in such activity. The second pole of excellence is Oradea, where function the

6 research centres within the University, and the third Baia–Mare. That order is kept also in funds raised through projects financed with the research and development component. However, the degree of innovation and technology transfer remains under the regional academic potential. Other weaknesses are not harmonizing application data with the offer of RDI, low productivity of SMEs with research and development activities, small number of innovative enterprises and reduce level of expenditure on innovation. The lack of high-skilled labor in the areas with a potential for cluster is another issue that must be addressed with the help of academic expertise. To this is added the lack of partnerships between companies and providers of training courses which lead to a lack of connection between demand and offer on the training market. Regarding indicators of standard of living and welfare, they are still below the EU average.

The solutions are not simple. We face with an inadequate use of the universities capacity of involvement in regional development, with a concentration of excellence research in few university centres (Cluj–Napoca, Oradea, Baia–Mare) and with mismatch between the supply and the demand of regional business environment. Examples of good practice provided by developed European countries, where the infrastructure and human resources in universities and research centres are utilized to their true capability, can be adapted to the realities of the North–West region and successfully implemented. They're all solvable at the strategic level by increasing partnerships between the actors of regional knowledge-based economy.

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## COLLECTIVE EXPRESSING AND ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION IN EUROPEAN SOCIETY DEVELOPMENT

*Dragoș DĂRĂBĂNEANU\**

**Abstract:** *This material contains in its first part a presentation about the social phenomenon of public opinion. We try to analyze the role that public opinion plays in contemporary organization of global societies in general and the European Union in particular. Also we show that public homogeneity and social support for global societies depends on social representations of European citizenship status. Paradigm of spiral of silence, initiated by German author Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann is a starting point for explaining the differences between Romanians and European's average, related to the intensity with which they are involved in politic matters. The conclusions of this work focuses on the role of opinion polls in the development and evolution of the European Space.*

**Keywords:** *collective mentality, public opinion, social control, European Union, global society, collective behavior*

Notion of public had and is having different meanings today. So in the lately past notion of public represented an adjective for all human groups that had similar behavior in some situations, from the perspective of similar reactions that groups are manifest when different stimuli are acting on them. Further, after mass communication development, the public idea was rather transformed in a subject of interest, thinking that the public quality become something permanent, getting a unitary consistence. Today the publics are understand to be social aggregates with own needs and own characteristics. The interest for the study of publics was motivated mainly by the desire to control and influence them. This need for control was found in more and more areas. So the first institutions that used the public were the economic institutions, because they used the new financial ideologies imposed since the late 19th century and which was based primarily on the idea profitability by mass consumption. It thus created a middle class increasingly in financially capacity, mostly in the developed industrialized countries. Perhaps it is not too risky to say that power consumption had strong reflection on the relationship between the masses and political and administrative structures. It is whether we want a model of relationship similar to what happened in France the 18th century, with the rise of bourgeois class, increasingly stronger financially, which ended up crushing authority, unchallenged until then, the French aristocracy. Such as today's political legitimacy in dealing with the masses is a necessary condition for the effectiveness of political activities and the existence of sufficient authority in the management of contemporary societies. It is a fact that this mechanism not works everywhere with sufficient effectiveness to make visible positive effects on the quality of public life, but the direction of majority social development is that we mentioned earlier.

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Various researchers have studied the public and tried to describe it. So Robert E. Park, representative of the Chicago School, understands the public as representing a preliminary stage of the establishment of formal groups (Park, 1967). These groups have specific rational discourse and opposition viewpoints. Nature of public require to its members, the ability to think and to resonate with others. Herbert Blumer presents the public as an amorphous category of individuals and engaged in an effort to reach an action (Blumer, 1951). It is therefore, obliged to create their own actions. The number of individuals that make up an audience varies, depending on the problem that is the reason for group formation. From this we can conclude that the existence of publics is beneficial not only has its external interested, but also in terms of individual because the membership of a public answer some needs that are related to the specific human being. We could mention here the satisfy belonging need, the facilitate of interpersonal communication process, problems shared representing an excellent social binder and need of information; so a problem with how experienced a greater magnitude in terms of public debate, the more fully presented by the various means available. This is why the creation of its own shares is going to maintain group cohesion and hence public status. Vincent Price makes distinction between masses opinion as the general state of affairs and public opinion, characterized primarily in interested debates on an issue. For example we can talk about a clear distinction between voters and all citizens eligible to vote. Meanwhile, speaking about electorate, we can distinguish between the interested public, which is about half the electorate and active public that is politically engaged. It is approximated that electorate represent about 70% of the voting population in America (Price, 1992). This is certainly an approach of different categories of public in terms of political participation. Apart of political field there are many cohesion factors that cause formation of publics. At the same time one person usually belongs to a multitude of publics, depending on the scope and nature of the problem around which is constitute.

Expressions of opinion are another way of relating to understanding aspects of public opinion. This may manifest in different ways. Among those who have studied this issue is Leonard W. Doob, which brings into question characteristics of latent public opinion. Septimiu Chelcea considers that latent public opinion is "a contradiction in terms", meaning that public opinion generally occurs after public disputes and is a form of social expression (Chelcea, 2002). In other words, if an issue is debated, how can be at the same time latent? We disagree with the cited author because a social problem can be at one time a topic of broad and intense interest, but at some point the public attention can be diverted to certain events most spectacular and exciting (like such a war in the Gulf). After these exciting events are no longer a topic on public agenda, attention of collective debate can head back to the previous problem, which is actually closer to the everyday reality of people and affect their lives more directly. This problem existed in the collective consciousness throughout the space forestalling the events exciting the public debate, but in a latent form. It's just one of the ways in which opinions can present in a latent state. There are cases when, more or less forced, a public opinion issue stands as latency even few years.

An issue of particular interest in this regard is the question of whether there is at the community level a limited space for expressions of public interest issues, so it is not possible to have too many problems to make the subject of public debate. Does this number depend on the nature or size of its public? Here are some problems whose full response would certainly contribute to knowledge of the business under discussion.

Ferdinand Tonnies presents public opinion in contrast to the three forms in which water is found in nature means gas, fluid or solid form. Gaseous opinion means the moment

when it is not sufficiently crystallized, with an uncertain existence in terms of its adoption by a sufficient number of individuals and considered as a subject of public debate. Liquid public opinion corresponds latency thereof situation in which is hidden, concealed or forgotten for a time; as after it returns in the solid state which involves plenary manifestation of it in the public debate and spaces for public expression (Tonnie, 2001).

From the perspective of the significance that has the number of people involved in the debate on an issue of general interest, force penetration of opinion in this issue does not arise from the individuals who make up the audience, but mainly from the intensity of how opinion is manifesting. First it should be noted that in relation to the different areas of activity which are involved of social life, there are specific and individualized groups of authority. These are recognizing from the perspective of social representations related to the area concerned. To be clearer, for instance in business fields those owners and managers who have succeeded will have pronounced authority, if they could prosper and grow significantly using means permitted by law and society. Of course their opinion about an issue related to this sector will have a penetrating power in public opinion more than an ordinary citizen opinion. The same is true in terms of attention to certain facts or phenomena. Authoritative characters have more chances to impose a problem in the public agenda. By this I show that certain small groups, in many cases, have the opportunity to impose a topic to the attention of the means of information expression, which means that public opinion can be induced by small groups of people who enjoy authority and trust in a given field. Certainly the view defended and nature of issues subject we have in discussion must remain within reason, that means there have to be not very strong dissonant with beliefs and value system of society.

### **Public opinion, communication and exercise of social control**

A major theory, regarding the influence of mass media in attitudes and behavior of society members, focus on the activities of media consumers, dividing them in two categories. Such active consumers differ from those passive in that they constantly seek public information, are aware of all issues of common interest and get involved emotionally and physically in solving them. Passive consumers are inert to public information, being less interested in issues of general interest. Active consumers are assumed to be less exposed to the influence of mass media; they are following their own beliefs rather than ideas transmitted by the media. On the contrary, public liability is influenced by the media information without realizing it. Since ancient time public opinion was understood in terms of influence it can exert on individuals belonging to a society, like unwritten law or informal social control mechanism. This way of reporting on public opinion can be seen in the Old Testament or over time in the works of great writers as were John Locke, James Bryce, Floyd Allport, Alexis de Tocqueville Jaques Ellul etc. (Chelcea 2002).

A developed approach on public opinion interpreted as a mechanism of social control was conducted by Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, founder and director of the Center for Public Opinion Research of Alensbach, Germany and a research professor of communication at the University of Mainz (Neuman, 2001). Neumann presented the public as referring to "opinions on controversial issues to express themselves in public without the express them to isolate themselves by it." By this point of view Neumann puts special emphasis on the process of communication to explain the phenomenon and the effects its having. Since the 70 studies they are translated into English and distributed to the scientific community, so that it becomes increasingly more pronounced interest of researchers on model approach to public opinion. It develops a lot of social tests and

checks on Neumann's theory, thereof sparking some criticism. Evolution of research in this model has faced strong involvement with the phenomenon of different personalities and policy area as it develops, what brought about many difficulties especially in drawing conclusions impartial and widely accepted. Research based on the model initiated by Noelle-Neumann diversified and have branched into three main areas: media and mass communication; individual and interpersonal communication and the implications for individual and public opinion. In the following we will try to present each of these lines of research that ultimately make up the spiral of silence pattern. Neumann assigns particular importance to the mass media position in contemporary society. The starting idea is based on the fact that mass media are omnipresent and at the same time consonant with each other, because they are transmitting the same kinds of information. It is very difficult for an ordinary person to imagine a day without being exposed to the media in one form or another. This exhibition begins with listening a morning radio program, or continuous with press or magazine reading and ends with watching TV or a movie night. Unable to escape exposure to the media is after German specialist, a potential issue amid general agreement to which mass communication tends to transmit information. It is jeopardized the democratic ideal of information diversity from mass media in which the individual can choose what he wants, where we can talk about this strange forms of agreement in which informations are transmitting in a similar content and presentation. The combination of ubiquity mass communication and the existing agreement about the form of information dissemination leads to creating a monolithic climate of mass information that comprises the majority of individuals from a society and leads to a homogeneous mass denial of social reality. The individual renounces its surrounding reality in favor of a reality that is understood by facilitated means and homogenized for most people who are exposed to forms of mediation of reality.

Representing individuals in connection with social reality is distorted because of the depth of the ideology that forms the content of this reality presented by the mass media. Manufacturers information table and journalists in particular tend to be more open, more reformers or free thinking than the rest of society. They will now have a more unprejudiced, traditional values or group norms, when treating issues of common interest. In this outlook is a function of liberal values and norms shared by a journalist, serving to strengthen relations journalist critical position it has with the government and political power. Referring to this ideology depth of journalist Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann shows that on average it tends to be content himself liberal, ie devoid of prejudices imposed by traditional conservative values or social normativity. But this whole communicational society characterized not covered, just by removing or circumventing these social norms and traditional values. The result is a set of communication at social level that is invented by publicists minded liberal who surround the individual in society, exposing it to a continuous presentation of society and social goods of this liberal perspective that says is its own ideology professional journalist.

### **Collective mentality role in building the European space**


Global society can be understood as an evolved form of human society. Global societies have found forms of social construction that rely on persuasion rather than coercion. Extensive social spaces are built from the inside, through the will of the majority and based on democratic principles. Thus it is expected that modern global social spaces to be more durable than the old empires as forms of construction of expanded social spaces. Will of the majority and the principles of democracy involve continuous dialogue

between the political structures of global society and public opinion. In this context, the role of public opinion and opinion surveys increases significantly. In European Union concerns about the survey of public opinion occurred on early stage of construction of the European Community. Eurobarometer is a series of public opinion polls conducted frequently by the European Commission since 1970. These surveys studying a wide range of issues related to the European Union and its Member States.

The Standard Eurobarometer was established in 1973. Each survey consists of approximately 1000 face-to-face interviews per country. Reports are published twice yearly. “Standard Eurobarometer 83 survey (EB83), was carried out between 16 and 27 May 2015 in 34 countries or territories: the 28 European Union (EU) Member States, five candidate countries (the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania) and the Turkish Cypriot Community in the part of the country that is not controlled by the government of the Republic of Cyprus. The survey includes topics such as the European political situation and the economy. It analyses how Europeans perceive their political institutions, both national governments and parliaments, and the EU and its institutions. It also examines whether EU citizens feel that their voice counts in the EU. It looks at the main concerns of Europeans at national and at European level and considers how respondents perceive the current economic situation, what they expect for the next twelve months and their opinions of the euro. Finally, it addresses the question of European citizenship, while the fifth part focuses on Europeans’ opinions on priority issues: investment, industry, energy, trade and migration” (European Commission, 2015).

The integrity of European Union is depending on how people from European states are thinking about this form of global society. We made analyses on the database of Eurobarometer 83 survey made in 2015, and we tried to compare public opinion from Romania with public opinion of whole European Union, in terms to see the intensity of public concerns regarding social problems and public matters.


**Graph 1.** On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?( percent)



There are significant differences between Romanians life satisfaction and the medium of whole Europeans people life satisfaction. This can be explain by the fact that

Romania is one of the poor state from European Union and because of this professional activities and labor market didn't bring enough satisfaction for Romanian people. Anyway in the graphic 1 we can see that there is not a big difference between Romanians and Europeans that are fairly satisfied and this category is the biggest one, around 50%. This can be a good sign for European social cohesion.

**Graphic2.** When you get together with friends or relatives, would you say you discuss frequently, occasionally or never about national political matters? (Percent)




It is interesting to see that Romanians are not so good in political discussion about national matters, because there is a common law according to which people from Romania are very talkative and interest in political matters. It seems the social research is contradicting this common law. We can explain this situation by the fact that Romanians are forced to be interest in public life because of the social conviction that poverty is an effect of corruption and they have to explain why they are in not a very good financial and material position. But this is not a true preoccupation on national political matters and that's why Romanians are saying in a lower proportion than European average that they are interested in political discussions about national matters.


In another point of view this situation can be explain by using the paradigm of spiral of silence. If an individual concludes about his beliefs that they are shared by the majority of individuals that he is in contact with, he will be encouraged by this and would like to express these beliefs. In the contrary, if the individual believes that his opinion is a minority point of view, he will have a reason to be held in public expressing his opinion. There is another common law according to which is somebody is affiliating with a party is a way for a good job and a good living. Many people are open to anything can help in this matter, but they cannot see an exact political affiliation and that's why they cannot assume a political side. On the other side there isn't an immaculate political organization that means every political group has bad points. This also is creating confusing in public trust and this confusion stimulates people to have retained position in sustain political discussions about national matters. At the same time as we can see from the charts below

the situation is alike regarding political discussions on European matters and on local matters:

**Graphic3.** When you get together with friends or relatives, would you say you discuss frequently, occasionally or never about European political matters? (Percent)



**Graphic4.** When you get together with friends or relatives, would you say you discuss frequently, occasionally or never about Local political matters? (Percent)



Political discussions and collective problems are the base of socialization process, that's why, is normal to be these discussions parts of day by day life. Seeing these constant lower levels of Romanians political discussion, comparative with the average of

European Union, we can think that the effect spiral of silence is a widespread phenomenon in Romania. There are two situations in which personal beliefs, despite perceived as minority, will not refrain from public exposure. The first such case is the situation in which the individual realizes that he have minority viewpoints, but believe it would gain his view, that this view is viable and that the future will be shared by most individuals around him. In this situation, despite the situation, individual will want to make their opinion public.

European Union as a form of global society depends to a large extent on the creation of a European space that is compatible with all forms of social organization with their national specific features. The public opinion pools provides indispensable information about social areas where it need to work in the sight of making compatible, but also the geo-social areas requiring special policy in this regard. Barometers of opinion also identifies problems and offers solutions oriented action strategies in order to maintain positive social representations related to the global society. Moreover, in the absence barometers of opinion, social issues come to be discovered when practically is later, because these issues can mobilize social forces and may cause unrest or char undesirable changes in terms of social space globally, which may be jeopardized. Reality shows that global society is a vulnerable building that faces periodic threats and barometers of opinion were forecasting a role in trying to prevent adverse situations and contexts operation and evolution of the European Union.

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# THE MAIN FOREIGN INVESTORS IN THE ROMANIAN ECONOMY. DIPLOMATIC REASONS AND ECONOMIC FACTS

*Elena RUSU\**

**Abstract.** *Since the country's return to democracy and market economy, the Romanian economy can still be defined as a developing economy, its attractiveness being influenced mostly by the country's EU membership. Attracting foreign investors contributes to the development of the State and apart from the economic rationale, the investors are also influenced through the channel of economic diplomacy. This paper focuses on identifying the main foreign investor in the Romanian economy during the last 10 years, both at the country level, but also as concrete examples of investments. Thus, a picture of these actors is created after identifying the main reasons to invest in Romania, both in terms of economic benefits and also because of the actions undertaken within relations of economic diplomacy.*

**Keywords:** *international company, foreign capital, economic benefits, diplomatic relationship, economic diplomacy.*

## 1. Introduction

Foreign policy efforts made simultaneously and in accordance with the ones aimed at ensuring economic welfare for citizens, determines the function of foreign policy known as economic diplomacy. In our case, the objective is to use foreign policy tools in order to support the economic interests of the Romanian state and Romanian entrepreneurs<sup>1</sup>. Offering support for attracting foreign investment is only one component of economic diplomacy, which in addition to this promotes economic objectives abroad in the context of an effective institutional cooperation. Specifically, it seeks to achieve and maintain a pro

lific cooperation at the level of international economic organizations, and to develop an economic expertise from the state that wants to attract foreign investment. Diplomatic actions are determined by the preferences of interest groups or institutions that defend the state interests (Bayne, Woolcock, 2011: 32).

The actions developed by a state at the international level determines its character and its position in a decision-making structure with global influence. A country is considered developed and competitive on the international scene by its technologic advancement, a solid defence, but also by being an economic power. Therefore, the way to reach these attributes is reinforced by a series of actions and individual efforts in a global context.

Some countries, such as Romania, in order to grow, are preoccupied with directing part of the efforts towards attracting foreign capital. Increasing the attractiveness for foreign investments is a challenge for every state and is performed in a significant extent through

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<sup>1</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Diplomația economică*, accessed on 17 November 2015, <http://www.mae.ro/node/1418/1>

diplomacy. According to the definition given by the Romanian National Bank, foreign direct investment involves a long-term investment relationship between an entity and a non-resident entity; it usually implies a significant influence in the management of the investee company by the investor<sup>2</sup>. Romanian government has created a Department for Foreign Investment and Public-Private Partnership, responsible for attracting foreign investment, having the main aim to develop large investment projects, and also being the interface between investors and Romanian authorities<sup>3</sup>. The existence of such a department proves the state's commitment to boost the growth of the FDI volume, given the undertaken actions to promote the Romanian business environment, but it also assists international companies in the implementation of investment projects.

Following an analytical approach, the aim of this paper is to determine Romania's main advantages in an attempt to attract foreign investors, advantages which are grouped into two broad categories: economic and diplomatic. Moreover, the main advantages of Romania's attractiveness for foreign investment will be analysed taking into account the current geopolitical context, the return to democracy and market economy, as well as the membership status in international structures, like the European Union. However, Romania has the disadvantage of not being a Member State of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development yet, which could bring the country in the club of developed economies and would determine an international recognition of the status of a functioning market economy, having immediate consequences for the growth of country's rating and for the foreign investment. In addition to the analytical dimension, our study will also present the main investors at the state level from the last 10 years, with their trajectory and concrete examples of their impact on the Romanian economy. The methodological approach includes a combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods, intertwined with a brief comparative approach, realized in order to exemplify the route during the last 10 years of the major state investors. The combining method of qualitative and quantitative research instruments is reflected through a quantitative data analysis from a qualitative perspective, in order to provide clear and comprehensive explanations. The qualitative approach in this paper is primarily illustrated by the use of document analysis and case study.

## 2. Why choose to invest in Romania?

From a general perspective, Romania presents many strategic, economic and social advantages for being a favourable destination. The economic environment offers an advantageous tax system with a single rate of 16%, a decreasing inflation, and a slight but sustainable growth. Confidence in Romania's ability to manage foreign investments effectively is determined by its status as a member or as a partner in international financial institutions such as the IMF, the EBRD and the World Bank<sup>4</sup>.

A business company can be freely registered in Romania by individuals and legal entities, even if they are organised in partnerships. To first step would be the registration at the Trade Register of Romania and at the Tax Administration<sup>5</sup>, provided that certain legal

<sup>2</sup> National Bank of Romania, *Investiții directe – principiul direcțional*, accessed on 17 November 2015, <http://www.bnr.ro/Investitii-directe---principiul-direc%C8%9Bional-12332.aspx>

<sup>3</sup> Department for Foreign Investments and Public-Private Partnership, *Investiții Străine*, accessed on 17 December 2015, [http://dpiis.gov.ro/new\\_dpiis/investitii-straine/](http://dpiis.gov.ro/new_dpiis/investitii-straine/)

<sup>4</sup> Department for Foreign Investments and Public-Private Partnership, *Dezvoltarea Afacerii*, accessed on 17 December 2015, [http://dpiis.gov.ro/new\\_dpiis/investitii-straine/dezvoltarea-afacerii/](http://dpiis.gov.ro/new_dpiis/investitii-straine/dezvoltarea-afacerii/)

<sup>5</sup> National Trade Register Office, *Înmatriculări*, accessed on 18 December 2015, <http://www.onrc.ro/index.php/ro/inmatriculari/persoane-juridice/sucursala-unei-sc-cu-sediul-in-strainatate>

formalities are met, without any specific approval from the authorities. Under the current legislation, there are many types of companies recognised in Romania, such as limited liability companies (responsibility of the social associates is limited to the contributions to the share of capital that is subscribed and paid), joint stock companies (shares must be held by minimum two shareholders) or partnerships. Frequently, foreign investors register as limited liability company (LLC) as this implies fewer administrative requirements, greater flexibility over other types of companies and a reduced capital. On the other hand, investors who intend to list their companies on the stock exchange prefer registration as public limited company (SA)<sup>6</sup>.

To attract foreign direct investments each state tries to create a favourable environment; history and its results have proved that this environment must be determined by four key factors (Bonciu, 2009: 15-16):

- resources: investments are made to obtain access to natural resources or other measures of a higher quality or a better price than in the home country of the investor;
- market: direct investments are made closer to the destination markets and in order to improve cultural links or other aspects with respective markets (here comes the influence from a foreign policy perspective);
- efficiency: investments are made to reorganise existing business units with the aim of improving productivity, widening the range of products, and strengthening market positions;
- strategic assets: investments are made for the acquisition of complementary assets toward the existing ones, as well as to reduce risks, to obtain reduced costs and enhance the ability of multinationals to compete in the global market.

These factors show that the attractiveness of a country for foreign investment is not a manufactured product. Investors are taking into account most often these premises, either together or separately, the proof being that most of the extensive investments have been and are realised in areas where the above conditions are met. What is important for the receiving state is the negotiating strategy, conducted in order to determine a mutually acceptable investment.

Romania's qualification as an actor of international relations is closely used with its advantages of the economic market – it has a good geostrategic position as it represents the eastern border of the EU, which holds a single market with more than 500 million consumers; it is located nearby in the Balkans, closer to the Middle East and North Africa, being crossed by three pan-European transport corridors, i.e. 4, 7, and 9. Thus, in the EU of 28 member states, Romania ranks on the 9<sup>th</sup> position for its dimension and on the 7<sup>th</sup> position for its population, aspects that characterise it as a country with a significant market potential.

Romania promotes an equal national treatment for both domestic and foreign investors, by allowing the development of foreign investment in all sectors, providing the ability to manage the company freely, with full ownership rights, guaranteeing the return of all the capital and profits, providing total protection against expatriation and nationalizations, and giving access to incentives and funding provided by the European Union and Romanian legislation<sup>7</sup>.


Another important aspect worth mentioning is the considerable source of highly qualified personnel, which is receiving very low wages compared to markets in Western

<sup>6</sup> Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Bucharest, *Tipuri de societăți comerciale*, accessed on 18 December 2015, <http://www.ccib.ro/ro/CCIB/4/48/123/tipuri+de+societati+comerciale.html>

<sup>7</sup> Department for Foreign Investments and Public-Private Partnership, *Dezvoltarea Afacerii*, accessed on 17 December 2015, [http://dpiis.gov.ro/new\\_dpiis/investitii-straine/dezvoltarea-afacerii/](http://dpiis.gov.ro/new_dpiis/investitii-straine/dezvoltarea-afacerii/)

Europe. Although the last fact may be beneficial for investors, it also brings serious harm to the long-term development of the state where the citizens do not have motivating salaries, which is favouring corruption, black market, reduce the purchasing power and thus reduce the consumption.

Romania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs ensures representation of the country in international organizations with economic, commercial and financial character. This is visible by coordinating the activities of the Romanian state in addition with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, and promoting the economic interests to international economic organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development<sup>8</sup>. By developing and maintaining diplomatic relations with 177 countries out of 191, and by taking advantage of its membership in the EU, the Organization North Atlantic Treaty, the World Trade Organization or the United Nations, Romania proves its ability of being a strategic and involved partner in developing international relations and upholds the principles of democracy and human rights. All these actions are directly related to supporting national and local bodies responsible for promoting Romania's economic interests.



**Figure 1.** Investors in the Romanian economy from 2009 to 2014  
Own processing after data provided by [www.bnr.ro](http://www.bnr.ro)

Although at a first glance, Romania seems to be a good destination for investments, moving beyond the general aspects, it can be observed that in reality Romania is still going through a stage of poor recovery from the effects of the economic crisis (see Figure 1), recording a total of 2 421 million euro of foreign investment in 2014, whereas in 2006 it recorded 9 059 million euro, and in 2009 a total of 3 488 million euro. Moreover, Romania does not have a functioning infrastructure for the current competitiveness standard (only 245 km of highways – in different stages, from design to execution works<sup>9</sup>), and is still struggling with an overly bureaucratic administrative system and a frequent change of legislation which affect the stability in the implementation of an investment plan.


<sup>8</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Cooperarea cu organizații economice internaționale*, accessed on 17 November 2015, <http://www.mae.ro/node/1657>

<sup>9</sup> Ministry of Transport, *Proiecte infrastructură rutieră*, accessed on 18 November 2015, <http://mt.gov.ro/web14/domenii-gestionate/rutier>

The period of the past 10 years is considered relevant for this work in order to identify the major foreign investors at the country level. The ratio of FDI for 2015 has not been developed yet and, therefore, we have used only estimated data and this year is not included in graphs. Thus, we have seen that the first four places in terms of the share of total foreign direct investment each year is occupied by the same 4 countries, holding approximately the same position, respectively Netherlands, Austria, Germany and France. This hierarchy is unchanged from 2009 (National Bank of Romania, 2013). The information was collected from reports on direct investments in Romania developed by the National Bank Romania in collaboration with the National Institute of Statistics, and the distribution was carried out according to the country of residence of the direct holder of at least 10 percent of the capital of foreign direct investment enterprises in Romania.

**Table 1.** The major foreign investors in the last 10 years  
Own processing after data provided by www.bnr.ro

Country	Value (millions euro)									
	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	Total
<b>The Netherlands</b>	5 887	6 988	8 402	10 907	10 903	11 982	13 229	14 624	14 224	97 146
<b>Austria</b>	7 942	9 161	9 186	9 037	9 346	9 667	10 920	11 438	9 694	86 391
<b>Germany</b>	3 473	5 020	7 509	6 718	6 398	6 272	6 499	6 744	7 482	56 115
<b>France</b>	2 766	3 759	4 294	4 259	4 384	5 042	5 272	4 568	4 119	35 697



**Figure 2.** The major foreign investors in the last 10 years  
Own processing after data provided by www.bnr.ro

A graphic representation of the data contained in the above table is illustrated in Figure 2. We can see that although the Netherlands did not have first place in this ranking at the start of the period, it is now the main foreign investor in Romania, registering steady increases almost every year except the years 2010 and 2014. With minor differences from one year to another, the main investors are the same from year to year, a new hierarchy in the rankings is starting at levels 5, 6 and 7. The 5<sup>th</sup> place proves to be dynamic, though

mainly reserved for Italy (2006, 2008, 2011, 2012, and 2013), in 2014 the 5<sup>th</sup> position is held by Cyprus and in 2007, 2009, and 2010 it is occupied by Greece. Even if the data show stability and growth in foreign direct investments field, this applies to the main investors – overall, the segment of the Romanian economy based on the contribution of foreign investment was strongly influenced and affected by the economic crisis, as it was shown in the graph of Figure 1.

Most of the foreign investments are made by high technologized and modernized companies, which are generating a high profit. According to the data collected by the National Institute of Statistics and computed by the Romanian National Bank, almost half of the GDP is determined by foreign companies, although they have only a quarter of the employees in Romania. "There were questions if the foreign direct investments contribute to GDP and how much, if they are profitable, what percentage they share in the average number of employees or in the turnover in the whole economy. I present you in premiere these data. ISD companies give only 24% of employees, but realize 41% of turnover and 39% of gross value added (GVA - n. Red.)"<sup>10</sup>. Foreign investors do not have yet the necessary capacity to hire a significant number of people, not only because they develop good tech business or are insufficiently developed, but also because that they encounter difficulties in finding work force well trained in their of activity fields<sup>11</sup>.

There was a total number of 5 369 new companies established with foreign capital in November 2015, according to data from the National Trade Register Office<sup>12</sup>. The forehead is kept by the same companies, which proves the stability in the implementation of their investment. We have noticed that during the economic crisis, when due to the existence of an efficient business system, these companies have not experienced significant fluctuation in the created balance, compared to the most of foreign investors in Romania.

### 3. The main investors in the Romanian economy from the last 10 years

The Netherlands is the main investor in Romania since 2009, each year being recorded an impressive number of new companies with Dutch capital. The main areas that have been targeted by the Dutch investments are shipbuilding industry, food industry, chemical industry, logistics, agriculture and banking sector. Among the most important Dutch investments include: Unilever, ING, Philips, FrieslandCampina, Heineken, Den Braven or EVW Holding<sup>13</sup>.

Unilever is a Dutch company present on the Romanian market since 1995 and deals with the production of consumer goods. From the Unilever portfolio of brands we remind household and personal care products like Dero, Omo, Cif, Domestos, Coccolino, Dove, Rexona, along with alimentary products as Delma, Delikat, Knorr, Algida, Napoca or

<sup>10</sup> Ziarul Financiar (2013), Medrega, Claudia, *Companiile străine dețin 40% din afaceri și PIB, dar au doar 24% din salariați. Cifra de afaceri pe salariat la multinaționale a depășit în 2011 nivelul de 100.000 de euro/persoană, dublu față de restul economiei*, 20.02.2013, accessed on 18 November 2015, <http://www.zf.ro/companii/companiile-straine-detin-40-afaceri-pib-au-24-salariati-cifra-afaceri-salariat-multinationale-depasit-2011-nivelul-100-000-euro-persoana-dublu-fata-restul-economiei-10574547>

<sup>11</sup> According to the Ministry of National Education and Scientific Research, the number of graduates in areas with a restricted access to the labor market is very high, which is forcing them to engage in other areas than those in which they studied.

<sup>12</sup> National Trade Register Office, *Societăți cu participare străină la capital*, accessed on 19 December 2015, <http://www.onrc.ro/index.php/ro/statistici?id=254>

<sup>13</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Republica Austria*, accessed on 20 November 2015, <http://www.mae.ro/bilateral-relations/1684#801>

Lipton. Since 1995, when it started investing in the region, Unilever has invested a total of EUR 140 million in Central and South Europe. Unilever South Central Europe employs 650 people throughout the region, of which 600 employees are in Romania<sup>14</sup>.

One of the first private transport companies from Romania was founded in 2002 in Cluj-Napoca: E van Wijk S.R.L. Partnering with a Western European company (50% Dutch capital, 50% Romanian) was unique at the time<sup>15</sup>. EVW Holding has subsidiaries in 9 cities in Romania: Cluj-Napoca, Arad, Bacau, Brasov, Bucharest, Constanta, Craiova, Iasi and Gilau Cluj county - which is also the company's headquarters.

ING Bank is the first financial institution which opened a branch in Romania after 1989 in the context of the return to a free market, respectively in 1994<sup>16</sup>. This is part of the ING Group, an international financial institution with Dutch origin, which is offering banking, insurance and asset management services to over 84 million individual customers, companies and institutions.

Based on an extended European cooperation, Romanian-Austrian diplomatic relations are older more than 100 years and are manifested equally through substantial economic exchanges. In the recent years, Austria holds mainly the second place among the foreign investors based the invested capital positioning itself as one of the main actors on the Romanian economic market. The advantageous collaboration for both parties provides a potential for further cooperation at highest standards. The latest example of the bilateral collaboration is the EU Strategy for the Danube Region. Danube Strategy's goal is the economic and social development of the Danube region by implementing interconnection projects, environmental protection, and transportation. The strategy is currently in the application phase and Romania and Austria have intensified their bilateral dialogue about this aspect, watching the integrated development of the Danube area. Romania coordinates with Austria the shipping sector<sup>17</sup>.

Regarding the Austrian capital investments, the most visible element is represented by OMV Petrom S.A. OMV Petrom is the largest integrated oil and gas producer in South-eastern Europe. In Romania, OMV Petrom is the main leading oil producer and provides about half of domestic gas<sup>18</sup>.

The Austrian capital is present in the Romanian financial sector through Erste Group and Raiffeisen Bank. Romanian Commercial Bank, known by the acronym BCR, is a member of Erste Group being one of the most important financial actors in Romania by assets and by number of customers; it offers savings and credit segment. In 2006, the Austrian bank Erste Bank finalizes the acquisition of the Romanian Commercial Bank by acquiring a 61.88% of the shares<sup>19</sup>. The evolution of Raiffeisen Bank in Romania begins in 1994 by opening a representative of the Austrian Bank in Bucharest. Raiffeisen Bank

<sup>14</sup> Unilever Company, *Unilever în România*, accessed on 21 November 2015, <https://www.unilever.ro/about/who-we-are/unilever-in-romania/>

<sup>15</sup> EVW Holding Company, *Istoric*, accessed on 21 November 2015, <http://www.evwholding.ro/despre-noi/istoric>

<sup>16</sup> ING Insurance Company, *Despre noi*, accessed on 20 November 2015, <https://www.ing.ro/ingb/ing-in-romania/despre-noi.html>

<sup>17</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Republica Austria*, accessed on 20 November 2015, <http://www.mae.ro/bilateral-relations/1684#801>

<sup>18</sup> OMV Petrom Company, *Despre OMV Petrom*, accessed on 21 November 2015, [https://www.omvpetrom.com/portal/01/petromcom/petromcom/OMV\\_Petrom/About\\_OMV\\_Petrom](https://www.omvpetrom.com/portal/01/petromcom/petromcom/OMV_Petrom/About_OMV_Petrom)

<sup>19</sup> Romanian Commercial Bank, *Istoric*, accessed on 21 December 2015, <https://www.bcr.ro/ro/despre-noi/istoric>

Romania resulted from the merger, completed in June 2002, of the two entities owned at that time by Raiffeisen Group in Romania: Raiffeisenbank (Romania) and Agricultural Bank Raiffeisen SA, which was founded in 2001 after taking over the Agricultural Bank, a state bank, by the Austrian group. In addition, it is important to mention the insurance companies such as Uniqa S.A. and Generali S.A.

One of the most controversial companies, due to its activity – woodworking – related to the lately massive forest logging, is Holzindustrie Schweighofer, which is part of Schweighofer Group that has its origins in an Austrian family business. In 2003, it opened the first production factory in Sebes, member of the Schweighofer Group, followed by a second sawmill factory in Rădăuți in 2008. In 2009, Schweighofer acquired the manufacturing of glued panels in Siret, followed in 2010 by the panel factory from Comanesti, and in 2015 is open to third sawmill at Reci<sup>20</sup>.

The important volume of the Austrian capital is supported not only by the quality standards used in the implementation of the business, but also by the potential of the chosen area. In this regard, we add STRABAG to the presented companies, a company that operates in all construction sectors, particularly in road construction and civil engineering, but also in the special construction segment<sup>21</sup>.

Germany is the third investor in the Romanian economy, with 7.5 bln. Euro (BNR statistics for 2014), meaning 12.4% of the total investments. Bilateral economic relations are coordinated at the institutional level by the Council of the Romanian-German Economic Cooperation, which organizes working groups in the fields of energy, industrial cooperation and investment, trade, agriculture, tourism, communications and IT, finance and banking, legislation and fiscality<sup>22</sup>.

We begin detailing the German capital in the Romanian economy through commercial companies, such as Kaufland and Metro Cash & Carry. Kaufland has an important segment of the retail market in Romania, operating on the market since 2005. This, along with Lidl, is a division of the German group Schwarz-Gruppe<sup>23</sup>. Metro Cash & Carry is a division of Metro Group and is the first company that introduced the cash & carry sale system to the local market, opening its first store in Romania in October 1996<sup>24</sup>.

One of the largest German investors in the industrial sector is Continental, one of the biggest automotive suppliers worldwide, which is operating in Romania since 1998, with branches in over 6 locations. The company was born in Hanover, Germany. It manufactures a variety of products, from tires to brake systems, providing a significant number of jobs (160,000 employees in all locations) and having an impressive turnover<sup>25</sup>.

With ambitions of becoming the first brand that offers complete telecommunications and entertainment services for the Romanian market, Telekom joins the

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<sup>20</sup> Schweighofer Company, *Despre noi*, accessed on 21 November 2015, <https://www.schweighofer.at/ro/societatea/despre-noi.html>

<sup>21</sup> Strabag Company, *Bine ați venit*, accessed on 21 November 2015, <http://www.strabag.ro/>

<sup>22</sup> Ministry on Foreign Affairs, *Republica Federală Germania*, accessed on 20 November 2015, <http://www.mae.ro/bilateral-relations/1704#815>

<sup>23</sup> Kaufland Company, *Concern*, accessed on 20 November 2015, [http://www.kaufland.ro/Home/05\\_Compania/004\\_Concern/index.jsp](http://www.kaufland.ro/Home/05_Compania/004_Concern/index.jsp)

<sup>24</sup> Metro Company, *Povestea METRO Cash & Carry în România*, accessed on 21 November 2015, <https://www.metro.ro/descopera-metro/povestea-metro-in-romania>

<sup>25</sup> Continental Corporation, *Concernul Continental*, accessed on 22 November 2015, [http://www.continental-corporation.com/www/pressportal\\_ro\\_ro/themes/basic\\_information/about\\_continental/facts\\_channel\\_ro/facts\\_ro.html](http://www.continental-corporation.com/www/pressportal_ro_ro/themes/basic_information/about_continental/facts_channel_ro/facts_ro.html)

local market starting with September 2014, through the common rebranding of Romtelecom and Cosmote Romania. It started the process of adopting the brand Telekom following the decision of the Extraordinary General Meeting of OTE Shareholders from April 30, 2014, Romtelecom and Cosmote Romania, controlled by OTE Group in which Deutsche Telekom holds a share of 40%.<sup>26</sup>

German Allianz Group is one of the largest financial service providers globally. Allianz Tiriac Insurance currently offers a full range of products and protection services, financial planning in all the segments of insurance – auto, property, liability, life, health, and in private pensions<sup>27</sup>. Allianz-Tiriac is the largest player on the Romanian market.

A big win for the labour market in Transylvania is the opening of a Bosch Group factory in Cluj, in 2015. Bosch is expanded worldwide and it is specialized in providing technology and services, being divided into four areas: automotive technology, industrial technology, consumer goods and technology for energy, and construction equipment. It operates in Romania since 1994, with companies in the following cities: Bucharest, Cluj, Timisoara, and Blaj. The total number of employees for Bosch in Romania is around 2,000 people<sup>28</sup>.

Henkel Romania launched in Romania in 1994 as a subsidiary of Henkel Central Eastern Europe, based at the headquarters from Düsseldorf. Since then, it has gathered in its portfolio more than 30 brands, which include cosmetics, detergents, commercial and professional adhesives, as well as various technology. Henkel products on the Romanian market include: Persil, Pur, Rex, Perwoll, Silan, Perwoll, Clin, Bref, Somat – of detergents; Fa, Palette, Taft, Gliss, Schauma, Syoss, Perfect Mousse – of cosmetics; Ceresit, Thomsit, Moment, Super Attak, Loctite, Teroson and Bonderite – of adhesives and technologies<sup>29</sup>.

Analysing their domain of activity, we can conclude that German investors are primarily driven to the commercial sector, industrial sector, production of cosmetics and hygiene products, financial services, and telecommunications.

France is one of the most important trade partners for Romania, being constantly on the top. Economic relationship between this two countries has a special nature due to the diplomatic relationship between countries with Latin origins. Thus, in Paris, exists the Romanian Cultural Institute, and in Romania, the French Institute (Bucharest) and the French Cultural Centre in Cluj, Iasi, Timisoara. France is not only an important investor but also a large trading partner, the 4th trading partner, accounting for 6.20% of total trade (respectively, 6.8% of exports and 5.9 % of imports)<sup>30</sup>.

The success of the French capital is due to investments in modern, highly technologised industries, but more than that, due to the fact that capital is directed in key areas of the economy. Here, we can mention investments in the automotive industry - Dacia Renault, telecommunications - Orange, the commercial sector - Carrefour, Auchan,

<sup>26</sup> Telekom Company, *Cine suntem. Istoric*, accessed on 22 November 2015, <https://www.telekom.ro/despre-noi/telekom-romania/istoric/>

<sup>27</sup> Allianz-Tiriac Insurance Company, *Despre Allianz-Tiriac*, accessed on 21 November 2015, <https://www.allianztiriac.ro/companie/Despre-Allianz-Tiriac>

<sup>28</sup> Bosch Company, *Bosch în România*, accessed on 20 November 2015, [http://www.bosch.com.ro/ro/ro/our\\_company\\_12/locations\\_12/location\\_9986.html](http://www.bosch.com.ro/ro/ro/our_company_12/locations_12/location_9986.html)

<sup>29</sup> Henkel Company, *Henkel în România*, accessed on 20 November 2015, <http://www.henkel.ro/despre-henkel/henkel-in-romania-948.htm>

<sup>30</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Republica Franceză*, accessed on 22 November 2015, <http://www.mae.ro/bilateral-relations/1702#813â>

Decathlon and Leroy Merlin (a new entrant on the market), banking - BRD Groupe Société Générale, food - Lactalis or in construction - Lafarge.

Automobile-Dacia S.A. is the leading automotive manufacturer in Romania and was founded in 1966; two years later it produced the first model Renault - Dacia 1100, under the license of Renault 8. In 1999, Renault purchased 51% of the capital after the privatization process, and currently holds 99.43% of the capital of Dacia.<sup>31</sup> Currently, Dacia is one of the most important companies in the Romanian economy and the second brand of the Renault group.

Orange Romania S.A. is the brand under which France Telecom provides mobile communications services, Internet and television in our country.<sup>32</sup> The company provides telecommunication services to individuals and legal entities.

BRD- Groupe Société Générale is one of the leading financial services groups in Romania. This is the former Romanian Bank for Development, using the name of BRD- Groupe Société Générale from 2003, after its listing on the Bucharest Stock Exchange. One year later, Société Générale bought the residual package of shares from the Romanian state and increased its stake from 51% to 58.32%.<sup>33</sup>

French company Lactalis Group is the largest manufacturer of dairy products and the leader on the global cheese market. Lactalis buys over 14.7 billion liters of milk per year, and by the volume of raw milk collected is the largest dairy producer in the world after quantities of purchased milk<sup>34</sup>. In Romania, the group Lactalis owns LaDorna and recently purchased Albalact group, becoming the strongest player on the domestic market of dairy products.

#### 4. Conclusions

In the context of a globalized world, characterized by dynamic, innovative and rapidly implemented decisions, each democratic state tries to develop and assert itself on the international scene through various actions and features such as the competitive economy, a business-friendly environment, ensuring rights and freedoms, resulting in a high level of attractiveness of the state in the international structures.

Foreign direct investments are like a catalyst for development, being an integral part of a functioning economic system that enables interaction between different fields, such as the diplomatic, in order to create a functional structure at the state level. Because of the multiplier effect, foreign direct investments have the ability to expand the effects beyond the economy, but also for the society.

The contribution of foreign direct investments varies not only from country to country and not just from one period to another, but also from one investor to another, with different rhythms. In the Romanian economy, they are not far from being the primary source for growth (holding 40% of GDP), as it provides both quantitative and qualitative elements, which enhancing, stimulate and mobilize the development factors.

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<sup>31</sup> Dacia Company, *Dacia, cel mai bun ambasador al economiei românești*, accessed on 22 November 2015, <http://www.dacia.ro/despre-noi/marca-dacia/filosofia-dacia/>

<sup>32</sup> Orange Romania, *Despre noi – Orange este ceea ce suntem și ceea ce facem, în fiecare zi*, accessed on 22 November 2015, <http://www.orange.ro/about-body-ro.html#m=100-4-6>

<sup>33</sup> BRD - Groupe Société Générale, *Istorie*, accessed on 22 November 2015, <https://www.brd.ro/despre-brd/profil/istorie/>

<sup>34</sup> Lactalis Group Company, *Lactalis Group*, accessed on 22 November 2015, <http://www.ladornagroup.ro/ro/about/Lactalis-Group->

Recent history has shown that investments based on a consolidated business model and technology are developing continuously and are not influenced by the economic or the social crisis. From the analysis conducted in this paper we have seen that the main contributors to the country-level foreign capital in the Romanian economy were and still are the Netherlands, Austria, Germany and France. They coordinate the largest strategic investment, which gives them stability and ability to evolve.

Therefore, we noticed that foreign investors are motivated primarily by elements of economic nature when are to choose the country in which to invest, but diplomatic relations and status like membership in international organizations, represent a business card for the state that wishes to increase investment attractiveness level.

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## CROSS-BORDER POLICE COOPERATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

*Alin Ciprian GHERMAN\**

**Abstract:** *The paper aims to undertake an analysis of a less researched area that of cross-border police cooperation in the European Union. We will track the way how police cooperation followed the European construction process: police cooperation in the European Community; the birth of the TREVI Group; police cooperation and the Schengen area; police cooperation within the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon, finishing with the analysis of the intergovernmental arrangements at EU level and the attention given to cross-border police cooperation.*

**Keywords:** *cross-border police cooperation, Schengen, TREVI Group, EU, terrorism, crime*

### **Introduction**

The existence of efficient police cooperation at EU level plays a major role in the transformation of the EU into an area of freedom, security and justice based on respect of fundamental rights. Surprisingly, the Community Treaties do not contain an exhaustive definition of the concept of *police cooperation*, and the last treaty in force, Lisbon, provides only a vague description of the term in question, description which rather relates to the composition and the reason for its constitution, than to its conceptual delimitation, stating that: "the Union shall establish police cooperation involving all the Member States' competent authorities, including police, customs and other specialised law enforcement services in relation to the prevention, detection and investigation of criminal offences" (TL, 2009: 85, C 83/83).

In Article 89, the Treaty of Lisbon provides for a European legislation on cross-border law enforcement, stating that in accordance with the special legislative procedure the Council of Ministers sets out the conditions and limitations under which the competent authorities of the Member States provided under the Articles 82 and 87 (*Ibidem*: 81, C 83/79) may operate on the territory of another Member State in liaison and with the consent of the authorities of that state. The decisions of the Council are taken unanimously after consulting the European Parliament (*Ibidem*: 86, C 83/84). Article 88 describes the function of the European Police Agency, Europol, a result of the institutionalization of police cooperation at EU level, which has the mission to support and strengthen the action of the police authorities and of other law enforcement services in the Member States and their mutual cooperation in preventing and combating serious crime affecting two or more Member States, terrorism and other forms of criminality, which affect a common interest covered by an EU policy. In conclusion we can say that the cross-border dimension of cooperation between public agencies, such as the police, customs and other services of

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public order, target the prevention, detection and investigation of offenses throughout the European Union. We are talking about an enhanced cooperation, particularly in the case of serious crimes, such as organized crime, drug trafficking, human trafficking, cybercrime and terrorism.

At EU interstate level police cooperation can take various forms. Among the feasible ways and means of organizing police cooperation, we list the *traditional cooperation*, such as mutual requests for assistance concerning exchange of information or arrests; *formal cooperation* which is based on networking as the European Judicial Network, or *ad hoc forms of cooperation* like the setting up of contact points for combating corruption; *co-active cooperation* which provides for the establishment of joint investigation teams or organizing deliveries of common control, even on an ad hoc basis in time ad crisis; *cross-border cooperation*, such as cross-border pursuit or surveillance, or exchange of CBC information, due to increasing cross-border cooperation particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime; setting the basis of common institutions such as Europol, Frontex, Tispol and/or establishing common databases such as the Schengen Information System (Schengen SIS), Eurodac etc.; cooperation based on mutual recognition, which currently operates as the European Arrest Warrant (Glass, 2010: 29-30).

From the perspective of the degree of formal cooperation and institution building three categories of police cooperation can be distinguished at EU level: *horizontal* (traditional), *vertical* and *vertical hybrid*.

British researchers from the Centre for Public Opinion highlight other forms (Popescu, 2015: 347-348) of police cooperation, referred to as *macro cooperation* (which regards to constitutional and legislative issues), *micro cooperation* (which discusses joint actions for the prevention and repression of specific infractions and crimes) and *medium cooperation* (this one can be found at the level of the structures, practices and procedures of police agencies, such as Tispol).

Seeing the multitude of the existing forms of cooperation, ranging from mutual assistance in criminal matters, the establishment of national/community mixed frameworks and *hybrid institutions*, such as Europol and Eurojust to the principle of mutual recognition, we identify the lack of a coherent model of European police cooperation. However, despite the lack of a common coherent model at Community level, with regard to cross-border cooperation in the fight against crime certain trends can be distinguished. In this area can be identified *traditional* forms of cooperation (only between states) and *vertical* ones (cooperation within the EU, including cooperation between national and EU agencies). According to Sabine Glass between these forms there is a so-called grey area (Glass, 2010: 33) of cooperation, the third pillar JHA, opening the door on a wide range of unlimited possibilities. JHA has been developed in such a way that in the case of certain areas, where we can talk about a common framework, such as the cooperation in the Schengen area, allows Member States to *opt in* or *opt out*, i.e. to participate or not at all Schengen measures (or measures concerning police cooperation).<sup>1</sup>

### **1. The origins of international police cooperation in Europe**

Even if at Community level the first initiative of creating a common framework for police cooperation is represented by the *Trevi Group* (informal group set up in order to

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<sup>1</sup>For example even though the UK doesn't participate at all Schengen measures (not being part of the Schengen area) it has requested to cooperate in certain aspects of Schengen, like police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, fight against drug trafficking and SIS.

ensure the fight against terrorism) on the European continent there are attested early forms of police cooperation from the beginning of the 19th century. Thus, it can be ascertained that the idea of under taking of some transnational policing activities is not a contemporary initiative but it dates back to the formation of modern states (Corciu & Baloi, 2006: 12). John D. Occhipinti affirms that the principle of a multinational approach to police control and surveillance has been prevailing for more than a century on the European continent (Occhipinti, 2003: 29). These early forms of police cooperation were more political in nature, and were limited in time, lacking entirely the framework of an international organization. With the creation of the structural condition of institutional autonomy in the offices of national police, we observe the formation of the first police organization with representation at international level. The first steps of cooperation between different European police institutions were reduced only to an exchange of concepts on the development and control of international crime, in the 19th century, initiatives on police cooperation being focused on the protection of the established autocratic political regimes. (Corciu & Baloi, 2006: 12-13).

At the International Criminal Police Congress in Monaco in 1914 saw the daylight the first proposal to establish an international police organization with non-political purposes. Although, the motivation of the congress consisted in combating crime in Europe, in the end it was doomed to failure, leaving the suggested new institution only at the level of a proposal. The fact that at the discussions participated only politicians/lawyers and not technocrats (representatives of national police) contributed to the failure of the plan (Corciu & Baloi, 2006: 17).

The interwar period witnessed the creation of the first organizations of this kind in 1923 at the International Police Congress at Vienna, denominated as the *International Criminal Police Commission*, composed of 34 nations, entity, which today is known as the Interpol. This organization is of major importance because it is the result of independent initiatives of the representatives of the national police agencies from various countries, especially from Europe, not of a proposal born behind diplomatic desks, its establishment being favoured by the increasing crime rate in the nation states (Occhipinti, 2002: 29). After the Second World War the Interpol's headquarters was fixed in Lyon, France, and today it has 190 members (Interpol official site).

## **2. Police cooperation in the European Community. TREVI group**

The development of police cooperation at intergovernmental level had to row a long way from the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) till nowadays. Consulting the founding treaties of the European Community, we realize that neither in the Treaty of Paris of 1950, which consolidated the ECSC, and later nor in the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which established the European Economic Community, no reference was made to any cooperation in this area, provisions focusing more on specific economic issues such as customs and economic union, the implementation of a common external tariff with third countries, creating a single market and common policies, such as common agricultural, trade and transport policy (EurLex -Rome, 1957). When the ECSC and the European Economic Community (EEC) were founded no one had expected that the merger of economic activities in certain sectors, such as coal and steel to spread, causing integration in other fields too.

By consulting the specialized literature it can be ascertained that until the '70s we cannot talk about viable initiatives in terms of police cooperation in the European Community, the only progress in this area being the organization of informal meetings and

clubs (Bern Club created between the intelligence services, the Vienna Club specialized in espionage and migration, Pompidou Club specialized in the fight against drug trafficking) of a secret nature, which gathered dominant political leaders of that era. (Bigo, 2008: 94)

It can be seen, that even though today police cooperation in the European Community is one of the greatest achievements of the United Europe project, originally it had nothing to do with the European integration process, cooperation in this area emerging as a response to the globalization of criminality and cross-border crime (Lachmayer, 2009: 90).

In the late '60s police cooperation within the EEC knows an important leap with the founding of the *Group to Combat Drug Abuse and Illicit Traffic in Drugs* within the Council of Europe. The so called Pompidou Group was composed of ministers and civil servants, and their main concern was to study educational programs about drugs and collecting data on drug trafficking and money laundering. However, we should mention that the organization of this group can be listed among the *informal* and not *ad hoc* initiatives, because even though the French President Georges Pompidou supported collaboration in this area with neighbouring countries, he remained adamant when it came to expanding cooperation on internal security beyond the established limits. This attitude reveals a rather state-centric, nationalist-intergovernmentalist approach, than a supranational or neo-functional one. (Occhipinti, 2003: 30). During that period police cooperation was regarded as the exclusive competence of the national state, and the initiation of an extended collaboration in this field was perceived as a threat to national sovereignty.

Despite fears of loss of national sovereignty, the increase of terrorist threat in Europe has led to the strengthening of cooperation in criminal and police matters. Awareness of the terrorist threat, fuelled by attacks at the Munich Olympics in 1972, together with the accentuation of issues related to drug trafficking played an important role in creating an informal group called the TREVI Group (Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extrémisme et Violence Internationale) (Fijnaut, 2010: 21-22) in order to ensure cooperation in the fight against terrorism (Puntscher Riekman, 2008: 19-20). For the first time in the history of the European Community, the new French president, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing proposed the establishment of a European judicial area in criminal matters. Due to the opposition of the Netherlands, which preferred to maintain the monopoly of the Council of Europe regarding judicial cooperation, the proposal never took shape, remaining for decades on a purely conceptual level (Corciu & Baloi, 2006: 20-21).

Need for more effective management of the terrorist threat at Community level was the reason for creating a multi-level intergovernmental forum under the aegis of the *European Political Cooperation*. Creating the group itself was preceded by several intergovernmental meetings on terrorism in the period 1971-1972. The TREVI Group was founded on 1 December 1975 at the European Council in Rome following the proposal of the British Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan to set up a special working group to combat terrorism.

The proposal was formalized only on 29 June 1976 in Luxembourg at a meeting of the interior ministers of the European Community. Also within this forum was decided that at the future meetings the national ministers will be accompanied by experts in police activities, as well as high-ranking officers and officials from the security services (Bunyan 1993: 1). The group was composed of EC Member States, and the nature of the cooperation inscribes among the exclusively intergovernmental collaborations. Due to this interstate character, the concerned Group was formed and operated outside the formal institutional architecture of the European Community, although it included all EC members. Its intergovernmental nature is reflected through the minimization of the

importance of the Commission, the Court of Justice of the EC and of the Parliament, which played no role in this matter, the European Council and the Council of Ministers being the only institutions which dictated the rules (Occhipinti, 2003: 31-32).

The structure of the group reminds us of the *troika* within the current Council of Ministers, constituted of five working groups that reported to the TREVI Group formed of Senior Officials, who in turn had the responsibility to prepare and present reports, initially at the annual meetings of the TREVI Ministers, formed of the interior ministers of the EC Member States. The TREVI troika consisted of three sets of senior officials from the current EC presidency, the last and the next Presidency. The responsibility of this troika was to provide assistance to the current Presidency and officials (Bunyan 1993: 1).

Within the TREVI Group five working groups are distinguished. Comparing the performance of the five groups, it may be concluded that the group specialized in the fight against terrorism has been the most effective and operational of all (Occhipinti, 2003: 32). Among the duties of this group should be emphasized the realization of regular joint review of the terrorist threat both inside and outside the Community, providing an overview of strategies and tactics used in the fight against terrorist groups operating internationally, allowing Member States to mutually inform each other and to draw attention to the threat characteristics in relation to which some form of interstate cooperation would be necessary. Within this group were laid down the foundations of a secure communication network for transmitting information between national authorities about terrorism (Bunyan 1993: 2).

The second working group was responsible for ensuring an exchange of continuous, unabated information on police training, equipment, forensic and public order. The third group had to ensure the safety of air transport. In 1985 the third working group was reshaped, dealing with issues related to the management of international organized crime, including drug trafficking, money laundering, bank robbery and vehicle theft. The fourth group was meant to ensure the safety of nuclear facilities and their transport. The last group was given the responsibility to secure cooperation in the field of civil security (disasters, fires) (Occhipinti, 2003: 32).

Even though Trevi is the result of an informal intergovernmental cooperation, often criticized for lacking an institutional organization and clear purpose, we can say that later it had a considerable impact on the police practice in Europe after its incorporation into the institutional structure of the third pillar of the European Union, highlighting the importance of the practice of informal forums concerning the sound development of certain strategies and policies at Community level (Hufnagel, 2013: 25-26). Moreover, the TREVI Group is considered the institutional predecessor of the third pillar of the European Union, Justice and Home Affairs (Occhipinti, 2003: 31). According to the researcher Frederic Lemieux, Europol can be considered the result of efforts to institutionalize police cooperation at the highest level (Lemieux, 2013: 4).

### **3. Police cooperation and the Schengen area**

As the TREVI Group, also the creation of the space of free movement (Schengen area) was the result of an intergovernmental approach, initiated by the former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand, former French President at an informal meeting held in Saarbrücken in July 1984. This meeting finalised with the signing of a bilateral agreement, the parties mutually pledging to gradually eliminate checks at the common borders between their countries.

According to the agreement, between the two countries was foreseen the total elimination of control on persons, also implementing the relaxation of checks on vehicles, transferring these controls to the external borders. On the list of the proposed measures there are the harmonization of the visa policy, strengthening of police and customs cooperation and harmonization of legislation on foreigners, drugs, weapons, and passport (Zaiotti, 2011: 68-70). Shortly, also the BENELUX countries have expressed willingness to become part of this structure. Consultations between the five states were held on 14 June 1985 in the Luxembourgish town of Schengen, but the *Schengen Agreement* that was signed then, cannot be identified as an exhaustive project but rather an outline of a future program (*Ibidem*: 70).

The *Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement* drawn up five years later in 1990, contained a detailed action plan on the establishment and implementation of the regime of free movement, stipulating the principle of abolition of internal border controls (JOUE-Schengen L 239/19: 184). Regarding the work of police forces, the Convention stresses that the removal of checks on persons at internal borders will not jeopardize in any way the exercise of police powers throughout a Contracting Party's territory by the competent authorities under that Party's law, or the requirement to hold, carry and produce permits and documents provided for in that Party's law (*Ibidem*).

In the field of police cooperation the Schengen Convention has brought some changes, these include the appointment of *liaison officers* between signatory states, which were responsible for coordinating the exchange of information on illegal migration, organized crime, drug trafficking and terrorism (Corciu & Baloi, 2006: 23-24). Moreover, the document provides for the possibility of seconding for a specified or unspecified period, of liaison officers from one Contracting Party to the police authorities of another Contracting Party. The secondment of these liaison officers is aimed at strengthening cooperation between the law enforcement authorities of the signatory states by providing assistance: in the form of exchange of information to combat crime through both prevention and law enforcement; executing requests for mutual police and judicial assistance in criminal matters and in relation to the tasks of the authorities responsible for external border surveillance (JOUE -Schengen, Art 47 (1), (2): 197)

The Convention also introduced the right to pursue suspects on the territory of the other signatory states. According to article 40 if one of the Contracting Parties who, as part of a criminal investigation, are keeping under surveillance in their country a person who is presumed to have participated in an extraditable criminal offence shall be authorized to continue their surveillance in the territory of another Contracting Party. But this cross-border pursuit in the territory of a third country is only possible holding the latter's consent obtained in advance following a request (*Ibidem*, Art 40 (1): 193) The possibility of detaching liaison officers from one Contracting Party to the police authorities of another Contracting party is among the forms of cross-border police cooperation within the European Community.

To ease the task of national authorities, the Convention provide for the establishment of an information and tracking system called the *Schengen Information System (Schengen SIS)* aimed "to maintain public policy and public security, including national security, in the territories of the Contracting Parties and to apply the provisions of this Convention relating to the movement of persons in those territories, using information communicated via this system" (*Ibidem*, Art. 93: 205). After 10 years since the signing of the 1985 agreement, on 26 March 1995 entered into force the Schengen Convention, eliminating controls at the internal borders of the signatory states. The abolition of internal borders somehow had to be compensated,

which has led to the strengthening of controls at external borders of the Union and the implementation of safety tools. Among these measures enrolls the implementation of the *Schengen Information System-SIS I and II*. Jordan Gheorghe Bărbulescu underlines the quintessence of this system when he mentions that in fact this is nothing but "a computer network established so that any police station or consular agent of a member of the Schengen group can access any time information about people, vehicles or goods that were lost or stolen."(Bărbulescu, 2009: 668). Finding persons, property or vehicles is done by entering these data and searching the database, operating as hit/no hit, that provides the user a response, or positive (hit) or negative (no hit) (SIS 2010: 15).

In this database are stored information on: persons wanted for arrest for extradition; strangers against whom was issued an alert for non-admission; missing persons or persons to be temporarily placed under police protection for their own protection or to prevent threats; minors and persons who must be interned in medical institutions; witnesses, persons who received subpoenas to appear before judicial authorities in criminal proceedings; persons or vehicles for the purposes of discreet surveillance or specific controls; objects sought to be confiscated or used as evidence in criminal proceedings (*Ibidem*: 20).

Concerning the right to access and search the data from SIS, the Handbook of the Ministry of Home Affairs is very explicit, enumerating the authorities with competences in this area, among which we find: the authorities responsible for border control; authorities responsible for other police and customs checks within the Member States and those responsible for the coordination of such checks; the national judicial authorities (ie those responsible for initiating prosecution and criminal investigations); authorities responsible for issuing visas; the central authorities responsible for examining visa applications; the central authorities responsible for issuing residence permits and the administration of legislations of third country nationals; the European Police Office; national members of Eurojust and their assistants; the authorities responsible for issuing registration certificates (direct access for those who are government authorities and indirect access to those authorities which are not governmental) (*Ibidem*: 22).

In our country, the entities authorized to directly search the data contained in the second generation of the Schengen Information System are: the Romanian Police, the Romanian Border Police, the Romanian Gendarmerie, the Inspectorate General for Immigration, Directorate for Personal Records and Managing Databases, General Directorate for Passports, Directorate for Driving Licences and Vehicle Registration, National Authority for Customs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Justice and courts of law, Public Ministry (OJEU- Notices from the Member States, 2015: 112-118).

The *European Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice- EU-LISA* is responsible for the operational management of SIS II since 2013, and according to statistics from 2014 there were 55.970.029 alerts, of which the most on issued documents 43.552.428 (this category includes both passports and identity cards, driving licenses, residence permits and stolen travel documents). Referring to vehicles, 3.298.541 alerts were issued, while on documents concerning registration of vehicles there were 2.657.355 alerts (EU-LISA, 2015: 1).

From 01 January- December 31, 2014 the number of hits in SIS by the competent authorities from Romania was among the greatest of the EU and Schengen member states which are connected to SIS II, reaching 107.976.233 hits, representing 5.4 % of the total hits in the partner states, of which 1.337.593 were alerts. Analyzing the volume and distribution of alerts, from our country came 7.218 alerts on vehicles, 1.168.314 alerts on issued documents. Surprisingly, while there were 152.649 alerts on vehicle registration

documents, there was no alert on license plates. In comparison with the volume of the number of hits and alerts, the one of the hits was considerably lower, reaching only to 128.598 of which at the level of Member states connected to SIS II there were recorded 14.103 hits on vehicles, 791 on registration certificates for vehicles and 2337 hits on license plates. The document elaborated by the EU-LISA contains no data on the distribution of hits on countries (*Ibidem*: 7-13).

#### **4. The Treaty of Maastricht and police cooperation under the auspices of the third pillar**

The Maastricht Treaty has historic significance from several perspectives: first because it laid the foundations of the European Union, and the second time due to the incorporation of police cooperation under the third pillar JHA (Justice and Home Affairs) (Horga, 1998: 122). JHA related provisions were listed under Title VI of the third pillar, stating "Provisions on cooperation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs" and under Article K.1 were listed the areas of common interest within the JHA: asylum policy; rules governing the crossing by persons of the external borders of the Member States and the exercise of controls thereon; immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of third countries; combating drug addiction; combating fraud on an international scale; judicial cooperation in civil matters; judicial cooperation in criminal matter; customs cooperation; police cooperation for the purposes of preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of international crime, including if necessary certain aspects of customs cooperation, in connection with the organization of a Union-wide system for exchanging information within a European Police Office (Europol) (TUE, 1992: 219-220).

Analyzing how decisions are made under JHA and implicitly in case of police cooperation, we observe that the intergovernmental method prevails. Even though Article K.4 (2) (*Ibidem*, 223) of the Maastricht Treaty emphasizes that the *Guardian of the Treaties* (European Commission) shall be fully associated with the work in the areas mentioned above, in reality it is authorized to initiate legislative proposals only in the first six of these areas. Thus, under the auspices of the Maastricht Treaty, the Commission was not entitled to initiate proposals concerning judicial cooperation in criminal matters, customs cooperation and police cooperation, the Council of Ministers acting unanimously, except on matters of procedure and in cases where Article K. 3 provides for other voting rule, ie two-thirds majority (Occhipinti, 2003: 36).

Also, the role of the Parliament is minimized to the status of a mere consultant, the Council Presidency together with the Commission having the duty to inform the European Parliament regularly about the activities in the areas referred under Title VI, and implicitly about activities related to police cooperation. Likewise, the Council has the duty to consult the European Parliament on the main aspects of police cooperation, and to take care that its views are duly taken into consideration (TEU, 1992: 223). We must not forget that the whole structure of TREVI Group was incorporated under the third pillar of the European Union.

Even if the predominant decision making method under the third pillar and therefore police cooperation is the intergovernmental one, the exhaustive analysis of the treaty reveals the existence of a legal loophole under Article K.9, which provided the possibility of transferring the existing domains in the future under the third pillar to the sphere of influence of the first pillar. This provision made possible the transfer of

competences within the first six areas listed under the auspices of Article K.1 in case of a unanimous vote of the Council.

This loophole is important because it creates a legal precedent, investing the Council with the power to transform any time the nature of the cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs from intergovernmental to supranational, for example by enhancing the role of the Parliament through co-decision. This loophole was used later by the Treaty of Amsterdam, allowing the transfer of most areas of the third pillar, with the exception of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters under the first supranational pillar (Occhipinti, 2003: 37). Among the innovations of the Maastricht Treaty we also find the establishment of the European Police Office (Europol), a law enforcement agency of the EU, with the role of improving and strengthening cooperation between the police authorities of the Member States in the collection, storage, analysis and exchange of information.

### **5. The Treaty of Amsterdam and the status of police cooperation**

The Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force on 1 May 1999 instituting a lot of changes regarding police cooperation within the European Union. In order to achieve the free movement of persons, the Treaty proposes the establishment of an area of freedom, security and justice (TA, 1997: 8.) In this equation police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters appear as means of creating this space of freedom, security and justice (Vermeulen et al., 2012: 42). Amsterdam reshuffled the pillars of the European Union, moving certain areas from the third intergovernmental pillar to the first supranational pillar. We can observe a change in the nomenclature of the third pillar, transforming into "Provisions on police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters" (TA, 1997: 27). Transformation of the third pillar and changing the nomenclature denotes the award for the first time in the history of European integration of an enhanced attention to the area in question.

The Amsterdam Treaty gives us a precise description of the joint action on police cooperation of which portfolio covers the powers already formulated by Maastricht concerning: operational cooperation between the competent authorities, including the police, customs and other specialised law enforcement services of the Member States in relation to the prevention, detection and investigation of criminal offences; the collection, storage, processing, analysis and exchange of relevant information, including information held by law enforcement services on reports on suspicious financial transactions, in particular through Europol, subject to appropriate provisions on the protection of personal data; cooperation and joint initiatives in training, the exchange of liaison officers, secondments, the use of equipment, and forensic research; joint evaluation of particular investigative techniques in the detection of serious forms of organized crime (*Ibidem*: 28).

Amsterdam follows the footsteps of its predecessor, Maastricht, stressing the importance of the operational cooperation between competent authorities and cooperation through Europol, emphasizing the indispensability of information sharing for effective cross border police cooperation and the fight against crime. To achieve its objectives and facilitate the fight against various forms of criminal acts, we witness strengthening the role of Europol and increasing its powers. The decision making method had remained the same as in case of Maastricht, the Council of Ministers still prevailing as the main forum of decisions, authorized to take action in this field and promote cooperation in order to contribute to achieving the EU objectives. The Council acting unanimously on the initiative of any Member State or the Commission may: adopt common positions defining

the approach of the Union to a particular matter; to adopt framework decisions for the harmonization of laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States. Framework decisions are binding upon Member States as regards the result sought, leaving national authorities the choice regarding form and methods (*Ibidem*: 31).

Having analyzed the Treaty of Nice signed on 26 February 2001 and entered into force on February 1, 2003, can be noticed a lack of provisions which deal with the issue of police cooperation at Community level, focusing attention on the forms of judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Instead of Europol, another agency under the name of Eurojust (European Judicial Cooperation Unit) appears in the foreground. Under this treaty Europol appears only once, in connection with Eurojust, highlighting cooperation between the two agencies in the investigation of cross-border crime (TN, 2001: 15).

## **6. Intergovernmental commitments at EU level and attention given to cross-border police cooperation**

In addition to an inspection of the chronological development of police cooperation at EU level, with reference to cross-border cooperation under the basic EC/EU Treaties, we also have to highlight the observations and innovations brought to the area in discussion, laid down in various multiannual programs, action plans, intergovernmental commitments and presidential conclusions incorporated later in the Community framework.

The first document analyzed represents the presidential conclusions adopted following the *Tampere European Council*, meeting that brought to the negotiating table the heads of state/or government of the Member States of the European Union on 15-16 October 1999. The purpose of convening the meeting was to establish an area of freedom, security and justice in the European Union. It highlights the importance of the fight against crime and terrorism, also foreseeing measures of crime prevention at Union level and specific actions in the fight against money laundering. The existence of efficient police cooperation is indispensable to achieve the basic objective of creating an area of freedom, security and justice. The document gives increasing importance to Europol, which is mandated to support the European Union in the task of preventing and fighting against crime. The Tampere European Council stipulated the creation of a European entity specialized in justice, called *Eurojust*, with the task of facilitating the proper coordination of national prosecuting authorities and of supporting criminal investigations in organized crime cases, notably based on analysis made by Europol (EC Tampere, 1999).

The second document examined is the *Hague Programme*, elaborated on 13 December 2004, which following the trend set by Tampere, aimed at strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union. It reiterated the importance of combating cross-border crime and terrorism, and in this endeavour to Europol and Eurojust is reserved a key role. The effective combat of transnational organized crime and of other serious crime and terrorism requires intensified practical cooperation between police and customs authorities of the Member States and also with Europol and a superior use of existing instruments in this field (EC-Hague, 2005: C53/9). Among the innovations of the programme concerning the researched field we identify the establishment of joint investigation teams supported by Europol and Eurojust. Special attention is reserved for border areas where closer cooperation and better coordination is the only way to deal with crime and threats to public safety and national security.

The Hague Programme emphasizes the role of a new actor *CEPOL*, a European Union agency, which was established to provide training and learning opportunities for

law enforcement agents on fundamental issues to the security of the Union and of its citizens. The Council and Member States had the duty to develop in close cooperation with CEPOL standards and modules for training courses for police officers of the Member States on the practical aspects of cooperation in the field of EU law enforcement. Under the aegis of cross-border cooperation the Commission was invited to develop side by side with CEPOL by the end of 2005 systematic exchange programs for the law enforcement authorities for better understanding of the functioning of the legal systems of organizations in the Member States (*Ibidem*).

We can find some similarities between the Schengen Agreement/Convention and the next document investigated, namely the *Prüm Convention*, both results of informal deliberations born after some multilateral intergovernmental meetings, later transposed into the EU framework. The Prüm Convention was closed on the 5<sup>th</sup> of May 2005 between seven EU member states<sup>2</sup> that have proposed the enhancement of cross-border cooperation between police and judicial authorities of the EU member states for the effective fight against terrorism and cross-border crime (Bellanova, 2008: 203). The provisions of the Convention targeted the automated exchanges of information referring to major events that have a cross-border dimension, the combat of terrorism and other forms of cooperation of law enforcement agents at a cross-border level (EurLex, Intensificarea cooperării transfrontaliere, decizia de la Prüm).

Among the new measures proposed, there is the obligation of the EU Member States to create national files containing DNA database to investigate crime and to make such data available to other Member States for conducting automated searches. The automated access to DNA profiles, fingerprint data and vehicle registration data at national level and the transmission of this information helps to speed up cross-border police and judicial cooperation between EU countries in criminal matters. The possibility to conduct joint patrols and joint operations by the police officers for the prevention of crime and the maintenance of public order and safety on the territory of a particular EU member country is also on the list of proposals launched by the Prüm Convention (Bellanova, 2008: 203).

The transpose of the Prüm Convention in the Community framework was among the priorities of the German Presidency of the Council in early 2007. The German strategy has proved to be successful, managing to convince the ministers of interior of the Member States at the JHA meeting to integrate into the legal framework of the European Union parts of that Convention, the Council decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on cross-border cooperation, particularly on combating terrorism and cross-border crime came into force on 26 August 2008 (JOEU, 2008/615).

The Stockholm Programme is the last document investigated in this chapter. The program has a visionary nature, even a futuristic one, as it sets the priorities of United Europe concerning the area of justice, freedom and security for a period of four years, 2010-2014, in the same time targeting the management of future challenges that could jeopardize the consolidation of the area of justice, freedom and security. Among the recommendations of the Programme we find the elaboration of an internal security strategy for the EU, with the objective to strengthen the protection of citizens and the fight against organized crime and terrorism. Strengthening police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters was about to be among the basic points of this security strategy. The initiative was materialized through the development of the *Internal Security Strategy for*

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<sup>2</sup> Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria.

*the European Union. Towards a European Security Model* (EC-Stockholm, 2010), during the Council of Justice and Home Affairs meeting on 25 and 26 February 2010, and was approved by the European Council on 25 and 26 March 2010 (EurLex, Programul de la Stockholm, 2010). The *Stockholm Programme* was implemented through an action plan entitled *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Delivering an area of freedom, security and justice for Europe's citizens*.

In conclusion we can say that due to the globalization of delinquency and cross-border crime, cross-border police cooperation is the most effective and at the same time the only way to combat transnational crime. The paper aimed to undertake an analysis of a less researched field that of police cooperation in the European Union. We have seen how police cooperation followed the European construction process.

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## POLYCENTRIC DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES IN ROMANIA AT THE FIRST LOCAL LEVEL OF THE NUTS SYSTEM (LAU1)

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**Abstract:** *Polycentric development has been in the focus of the European Union (EU) for more than two decades now, as an engine for social, economic and territorial cohesion, though its roots go deeper in time. It is a concept that is normally linked to the urban environment. However, in this study, the first local level of the NUTS system will be discussed, the equivalent of which, in Romania, would include both urban and rural administrative units.*

*In this paper, two opposing initiatives, which aim at imposing a polycentric evolution at the discussed scale of analysis, will be presented and analysed. The first one implies a voluntary, inside-out construction, sustained by the current legislation, while the second one implies a non-voluntary, outside-in construction, based on multiple-criteria analysis.*

*The first part of the study provides an overview of polycentric development and some of the different conceptual views that have been proposed over time. A few characteristics of it are emphasized and the concept is put into the perspective of our case study. The second part of the study provides an overview of the current administrative system of Romania and of the ranking system used to categorize the urban and rural hierarchy of the country. The third part of the study presents the two initiatives, a legislative one and a regional one, and compares them against each-other and against the territorial realities of Romania.*

*The findings suggest that, while the regional initiative seems to have died out without producing any effects, the legislative one has the potential for balancing out and raising the level of development of the less developed areas while, at the same time, deepening the economic disparities between the developed and the less developed areas.*

**Keywords:** *Polycentric development, Romania, Territorial Planning Units, Metropolitan Areas, Intercommunity Development Associations, NUTS4/LAU1*

### **Conceptualizing polycentrism<sup>1</sup> and polycentric development**

The origins of polycentricism were identified in the emergence of the concept of central-place theory in the first half of the twentieth century, proposed by Walter Christaller (Nordregio 2006a, 17), as well as in the ideas of Joseph Shumpeter, that inspired François

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<sup>1</sup> *polycentricity* seems to be the term spread and widely accepted in the European speciality literature to define this concept and that's the one we'll use further on, though, *polycentrism* is the term dictionaries attribute to the presence of more than one centres of importance in an area.

Perroux to define the theory of growth poles (see Peptenatu et al. 2009 for more details). Though different European countries made polycentric development their goal, France being one of the first to do so, within the European Union (EU) this concept has gained prominence in the 1990s (Nordregio 2006a; Meijers 2008). It is not considered a goal in itself, but a means for obtaining economic, social and territorial cohesion.

The concept of polycentricism, critically analysed by quite a few authors, as was emphasized by Burger and Meijers (2012, 1127, 1128), will not be tested for its validity in this study as to what its effects are. However, some conceptual clarifications are needed and will be provided during the initial stages of the paper, especially regarding the scale and the extent of the area to which it applies. In the words of Meijers (2008, 1314) pushing forward policies based on a concept that has not yet proven its validity is both “surprising and alarming” so clearing out such aspects is crucial.

What is clear about polycentricism is that it refers to the presence of more *than one centre of development in an area*. Kloosterman and Musterd (2001) identify polycentric patterns of development at two scales: intraurban and interurban. Based on the examples provided by the two authors mentioned earlier and the characteristics they have identified for such territorial configurations, the intra-urban scale seems to involve the loss in importance of the city centre or the raise in importance of other areas in a city, due to the particularities of modern life, while the interurban scale seems to involve the presence of two or more cities with a more or less balanced level of development, in a relatively restrained area (Kloosterman and Musterd 2001, 628). As a consequence, the aim of the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP) for imposing balanced regional development (see Meijers 2008 for more on the subject) would be somewhat in contradiction with the definition of polycentric urban regions provided above (interurban polycentricism), as such polycentric urban areas seem to have the effect of *concentrating development in a relatively small area*, even if that area consists of more than one urban centre, while ESPON proposes a *balanced development of the territory*.

Another debate revolves around whether polycentricism should be evaluated based on morphologic or functional features or both. The ESPON 1.1.1. research project also includes location as a significant factor in the evaluation of polycentricism and considers that equal spacing between centres is beneficial in this respect (Nordregio 2006a, 60). Even if this might be true, the natural configuration of the territory is a factor that cannot be ignored and that might impede a balanced distribution of the urban hierarchy. Such a configuration might correspond to an ideal situation. However, as the concept refers to geographical areas, spatial distribution of the urban hierarchy in the evaluation of polycentricism should not be ignored though, we would assume, that an ideal distribution is highly improbable. A more realistic and desirable outcome could be a *balanced distribution of development centres relative to lower ranked localities*.

Whether one, two or all three dimensions are to be considered in evaluating polycentricism still needs to be confirmed. The fact that European Union policies link it to economic and social welfare and territorial cohesion and competitiveness as well, makes it very important to select the appropriate indicators and dimensions for its evaluation. Sometimes sustainable development is also mentioned in relation to polycentric development and territorial cohesion, however, it feels like the ecological side of sustainability is always left aside.

Taken individually, we could assess that a territory is either morphologically (e.g. the size distribution is balanced), functionally (the relations between the nodes is balanced) or spatially (the distribution of nodes in the territory is balanced) polycentric or any

combination of the three is possible. For all three dimensions, the presence of more than one node is essential in considering a territory polycentric. The opposite of a polycentric configuration would be a monocentric one.

Our assumption is that polycentric development is not essential for the purposes for which the European Union and many European countries invoke it, at least not in all situations and it all depends on the scale and extent of the analysed area. However, to provide an unequivocal verdict, an assumption is not sufficient. A comprehensive analysis of different territorial configurations is necessary in giving an answer to such a question, though an overarching analysis will not be provided here.

As it was mentioned above, scale and extent of analysed territorial unit(s) is very important when trying to assess an area's polycentricism because a shift of scale and extent could give very different results. If we follow the EU policies in assessing polycentricism, an appropriate size and number for first level urban centres (relative to scale of analyses) in a study area should be taken into consideration.

As stated in the title, the focus in this paper will be on the LAU1 (Local Administrative Unit) territorial level of the NUTS (Nomenclature d'Unités Territoriales Statistiques<sup>2</sup>) hierarchy, which is not present in the administrative system of Romania, but that has received some attention from a legislative point of view and also from some of the regional entities from Romania. Since the scale of analysis involves the local level, contrary to most polycentricism studies rural settlements will also be taken into evaluation.

The aim of this study is to outline how polycentric development is being implemented in Romania at the LAU1 level. As such, the main inquiry is not how polycentric Romania is at this scale of analysis but, rather, how polycentric development is being pushed forward and with what results.

We shall conclude the first part of the study with the following in mind:

- Polycentric development implies the presence of two or more centres of importance in an area,
- EU promoted polycentric development, as opposed to the polycentric regions described by Kloosterman and Musterd (2001) that levels up development, is actually a construction built mostly on monocentric urban areas (Functional Urban Areas - FUA),
- Scale and extent of analysed areas are key elements in the interpretation of the effects of polycentricism,
- Level of development of first level urban centres is also of major significance.

The second part of the paper focuses on Romania's administrative system, the ranking system of the localities and an overview of polycentric development at regional and county levels, based on a cartographic analysis, which presents the distribution of urban centres.

The third part of the paper concentrates on two different initiatives that could trigger a polycentric evolution at the scale we assumed for the article. On one side the configuration of already formed Intercommunity Development Associations (IDA) and Metropolitan Areas (MA) are analysed and on the other, the proposals for Territorial Planning Units (TPU) will be analysed as well. Conclusions will be then provided based on the findings of our analysis, in the final section of the paper.

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<sup>2</sup> The French acronym is used in most publications.


### The administrative and ranking systems of Romania

Romania has a two tier administrative system that includes the county level and the local administrative level (commune/town/city), which correspond to the third and the fifth NUTS levels, respectively.

Though Romania covers four out of the five NUTS levels, the first one, the macro regions, are only there as statistical territorial units, while the second one, the regions (also called development regions), besides being statistical territorial units, they also provide the frame for the development, implementation and evaluation of regional policies, without having any administrative functions (*LEGE Nr. 315 Din 28 Iunie 2004 Privind Dezvoltarea Regională în România* 2004).

Romania defined a ranking system of its localities, which was approved by Law no. 351/2001. It consists of six levels, the top four for urban localities (0, I, II, III) and the bottom two for rural ones (IV, V), though the third level (II) includes localities with different levels of importance and could be divided in at least two levels. This ranking system is based on several indicators that provide the classification criteria of the localities. Population numbers, economic structure, social and infrastructure endowment indicators are some of the areas covered by these indicators. (Preda 2007, 12).


The administrative organisation, still in the shape put in place by Law no. 2/1968, has created a net of county seat cities, that range from rank 0 to rank II (*Lege Nr. 2 Din 16 Februarie 1968 Privind Organizarea Administrativă a Teritoriului Republicii Socialiste România* 1968). The ranking system provides a relatively good frame for analysing the level of development of the network of localities and, since it covers such diverse criteria, it seems suitable for analysing polycentricism for the purposes for which the EU is promoting it.



**Figure 1.** The distribution of urban localities, by rank, at national, regional and county levels (data source: Vasile Crăciunescu 2007).

Continuing the reasoning of the EU in regard to polycentric development, the classification of urban centres into different levels of FUAs is of great significance. Different ranking propositions have been made. Pepteneanu (2009; 2012) mentions several decision levels<sup>3</sup>, as part of a polycentric development model of Romania's urban hierarchy, while the Territorial Development Strategy of Romania mentions nine such levels just for urban localities ("Strategia de Dezvoltare Teritorială a României - România Policentrică 2035 - Coeziune și Competitivitate Teritorială, Dezvoltare și șanse Egale Pentru Oameni" 2014, 59).

As mentioned above, we find the ranking system approved by the Romanian legislation to combine many of the necessary indicators for analysing economic, social and territorial cohesion, with the observation that, to give a more accurate picture of polycentric development, rank II could be divided in two separate ranks. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the first four levels (the urban ones) of this ranking system within Romania's territory. This map shows a rather polycentric configuration at national and regional levels, in concordance with the ESPON findings (Meijers 2008, 1322). The county levels show much more variety in this respect, though.



**Figure 2.** Polycentric development representation using Hot Spot Analysis (see more at: ESRI, n.d.), based on ranking and number of inhabitants (data sources: Vasile Crăciunescu 2007; "Baza de Date TEMPO - Serii de Timp" 2015).

However, a much deeper scale is of interest to us in this paper. Figure 2 gives an insight to the level of polycentrism at such levels showing that the counties are rather

<sup>3</sup>Most probably referring to *growth poles*, many of those levels lacking administrative decision power.

monocentric, being developed around a county seat. Even though Figure 1 shows a much more polycentric picture at county levels, by combining rank with number of inhabitants with the purpose of providing some kind of proportioning, a different picture is drawn.


In the next section of this paper we will cover the initiatives that, by addressing the NUTS4 level, should actually induce a more polycentric evolution to county level.

### Inside-out and outside-in polycentric development

Romania is one of the countries that, at least declaratively, made polycentricism, at different scales, a national goal, with implications for both larger cities and smaller urban centres (“Strategia Națională Pentru Dezvoltare Durabilă a României. Orizonturi 2013-2020-2030” 2008, 113, 128, 129). In ESPON 1.1.1. (2006a, 18) it is stated that polycentricism has different meanings for different scales (micro, meso and macro), as was shown by other authors mentioned above as well, though it is always linked to the urban environment.

However, since Romania is still a very rural country, to impose a polycentric evolution, the rural localities have to be taken into account as well, especially at this scale of analysis.

The density of the network of localities in Romania is, obviously, influenced by the landscape, recreating the Carpathian Arc (Figure 3). Taking into account Romania’s ranking system, along with the density of localities, a balanced number and distribution of development centres can provide for economic, social and territorial cohesion.



**Figure 3.** Distribution of the density of the network of localities in Romania (data source: Vasile Crăciunescu 2007).


We will further analyse two of the initiatives that have an effect on this territorial scale. The first one is a legislative one and comes in the shape of two laws: Law no.

351/2001, already mentioned earlier and Law no. 286/2006 that changes Law 215/2001 on the local public administration.

These two laws give the local administrations the possibility to create associations in the form of Metropolitan Areas (Law no. 351/2001 and Law no. 286/2006) and Intercommunity Development Associations (Law no. 286/2006).

Law no. 351/2001, doesn't give the Metropolitan Areas the possibility to take the form of a legal personality and none of the changes that the Law has suffered since, do. Though, since the enactment of Law 286/2006, the Metropolitan Areas became a special form of Intercommunity Development Areas that can be formed around development poles of rank 0 and I, which means that, just as all Intercommunity Development Areas, in contradiction with Law 351/2001, they gained legal personality. Since 2011, all county seat municipalities gained the right to form Metropolitan Areas as well. Currently, around half of the Metropolitan Areas created in Romania are built around rank I municipalities and the other half are created around rank II, county seat municipalities.

One interesting particularity of the Metropolitan Areas is that they, based on Law no. 215/2001, Art. 7 (3), can elude the territorial boundaries of the local administrative units that formed them, though none of them have.




**Figura 4.** Distribution of Metropolitan Areas in Romania and the ... around the development poles (V. Crăciunescu 2009).

IDAs can be formed either for the joint development of projects that impact an area larger than their individual boundaries or for providing public services that target their collective territories. The Map in figure 5 shows the number of IDAs per county formed thus far in Romania. There seems to be extreme randomness in these numbers, some having

more than 40 such associations (Cluj – 52, Mureş- 46, Braşov – 44 and Iaşi – 42) while others less than 5 (Ialomiţa – 4, Satu Mare – 3, Brăila – 2, Suceava– 2 and, understandably, Bucharest – 1). In some cases, IDAs cover the entire territory of a county, while in others, IDAs have no local administrative units as members at all and sometimes IDAs overlap territorially. The legislative definition of the IDAs, mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph, has generated this situation. IDAs formed for the development of joint projects might have a very short life cycle, while those formed for providing public services should normally have a long life, though they are very specialized. This means that integrated, long term strategies are not really applied to such entities.

On the other hand, Metropolitan Areas are created for developing and implementing long term, multi-sectoral strategies.



**Figura 5.** Map showing the number of IDAs created per county (data sources: Vasile Crăciunescu 2007; “Asociația de Dezvoltare Intercomunitară - Baza de Date” 2012).

There is significant difference in how regular IDAs and MAs influence the development of the territory, the former only having the purpose of endowing the territory, in many cases, with basic infrastructure, such as sanitation, sewerage network and water supply, while the latter having the purpose of developing the member local administrative units in an integrated manner, around a development centre.

A second scale analysed from the perspective of initiatives that should affect the NUTS4 level, as far as polycentric development is concerned is the regional level. To this end, we analysed the Plans or Strategies of the eight Development Regions of Romania for the 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 time frames. A summary of the contexts in which polycentric development is mentioned in these documents is presented in Table 1.

For the first time-frame, most Regional Plans and Strategies treat rather marginally the subject of polycentric development, if at all. The only region to have a clear initiative in the direction of imposing a polycentric evolution to its territory is the North-West Region, through the concept of Territorial Planning Units (TPU) that will be discussed in a little more detail.

**Table 1.** Summary of polycentric development initiatives, presented in the Regional Development Plans or Strategies of the eight Development Regions of Romania, for the 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 time frames

<b>Time-frame Region</b>	<b>2007-2013</b>	<b>2014-2020</b>
<b>North-East</b>	No mention	The structure of the system of settlements in the region is analyzed from a polycentric perspective according to the ESPON 2006 - 1.1.1 and of the National Strategy of Territorial Development 2014
<b>South-East</b>	Mentioned as a result of the proposed development strategy	The structure of the system of settlements in the region is analyzed from a polycentric perspective according to the ESPON 2006 - 1.1.1 and of the National Strategy of Territorial Development 2014
<b>South Muntenia</b>	Mentions the existence of development poles to support polycentric development	Polycentric development is seen as an opportunity and a declared objective to be achieved through international cooperation along the Danube and transversal, horizontal and urban-rural cooperation. Development of the transportation infrastructure, to achieve cooperation objectives, is targeted
<b>South-West Oltenia</b>	Mentions that the region doesn't have enough poles of development to make the region polycentric	Polycentric development seen as an opportunity; Metropolitan Area of Craiova as a pole of national and cross-border importance; Used to describe the structure of settlements in Gorj County
<b>West</b>	In relation with the reorganization of public transportation to support polycentric development	No mention
<b>North-West</b>	Identification of Territorial Planning Units around existing or potential development poles (34 TPUs)	The Draft proposes a reconfiguration of Territorial Planning Units around existing or potential development poles (32 TPUs) though the final version eliminates them
<b>Centre</b>	Mentions as a strong point in that it has a polycentric urban development	Polycentric development is mentioned as an opportunity to be sustained through projects developed in partnership (type of partners not defined) and through the potential of major cities as development poles
<b>București Ilfov</b>	Polycentric development mentioned as a must for the future development of the Region without further details	No mention

The contexts in which polycentric development is mentioned or analysed in the two timeframes, reveal it as either a goal to be achieved or a configuration of the system of settlements in the region. Besides the North West Region, the West region is the only one to mention an initiative (reorganization of public transportation) that should impose a polycentric evolution to the region. In the second time frame, more attention is given to the concept though the same two perspectives seem to be applied to it.

The North West initiative to propose a territorial configuration that should support polycentric development is the only one that gives the concept attention, beyond what the ESPON 1.1.1 and National Strategy of Territorial Development 2014 provide in this sense. The existing or proposed development poles around which the TPUs were built, occupy different positions in the national ranking system, covering both urban and rural environments. Of course, this and the fact that there is also a legislative initiative that provides the frame for cooperation between local administrative units, made the initiative very hard to sustain. In fact, as Table 1 shows, in the second time frame, a reconfiguration is proposed in the Draft version of the Regional Development Plan yet, in the final version, the Territorial Planning Units are no longer present. The reason for their removal is based on a request from the Satu Mare County to only include one TPU for that county which equates to its entire territory, because the proposed projects for an integrated development for 2014-2020 target the entire county.

The propositions for the configuration of the TPUs, for the two time frames came from county level. Two extremely different propositions were given for the first time frame by the Cluj County with only 4 TPUs and the Bihor County that proposed 11 TPUs. If in the case of Cluj county, the TPUs were the result of the current configuration of the hierarchy of settlements and their influence in the territory, in the case of the Bihor County, the TPUs seem to reflect an objective for the future.

In the draft of the Regional Development Plan of the North-West region for 2014-2020, the TPU configuration is significantly different for the Bihor County and only slight changes are provided for the Cluj County. Attention should be given to the fact that the Cluj County overlooks county limits in the way it structures the TPUs. The real configuration of the hierarchy of settlements seems to have prevailed, even if briefly.

### Conclusions

From the polycentric regions of Kloosterman and Musterd (2001) to the polycentric development concept of the ESPON 1.1.1 and 1.1.4 research projects, polycentricism basically differs in one aspect. The former is based on a “natural” evolution that generated a *concentrated* area of development centres and the latter is trying to impose a *balanced* network of nodes, throughout the EU. However, the question is, to what territorial units do we apply these concepts? And does this really generate the desired effects of economic, social and territorial cohesion, especially in a sustainable way?

Different ranking systems show the fact that nodes of different magnitudes make up the hierarchy of settlements of any territory, providing a way of layering the nodes based on the level of importance.

The NUTS4 level is normally one that implies the cooperation between local administrative units. The Romanian legislation provides the frame for two types of cooperation at this level: *the metropolitan area* and the *intercommunity development associations*. While the MAs are usually created to provide an integrated and consistent development, the IDAs are usually either very specific in their purpose or are short term developments.

Though the benefits of MAs are evident for the member administrative units, they actually add up to the disparities between them and lower ranked administrative units. The benefits of IDAs are that, by grouping with the purpose of implementing projects that creates basic infrastructure and endowments, they raise the level of living in the areas they cover, creating the environment for further improvements, either economically or socially. The voluntary nature of such associations makes them create disparities between development regions in Romania.

The only initiative worth mentioning from the Plans or Strategies of the Development Regions of Romania, as far as an integrated evaluation and implementation of polycentrism is concerned, is that of the Territorial Planning Units, though they can only be mentioned in the past tense. What made them different from the IDAs and MAs is that they were not voluntary configurations. They were either the result of the reflection of the ranking and influence of the hierarchy of settlements or the reflection of a vision for the future. The conceptual differences within the counties that make up the North West Region and already existing legislative initiatives targeting cooperation between local administrative units, made them obsolete.

One question still remains though: are inside-out (IDAs and MAs) or outside-in initiatives (TPUs) the better option? For a balanced polycentric configuration of the territory the obvious answer would be the latter, though that would limit initiative power.

Potential faced with the magnitude and configuration of the hierarchy of settlements should meet at midway and, from this point of view, polycentric development does not necessarily seem to be a prerequisite for economic, social and territorial cohesion, at least not at this scale.

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## POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION IN POLAND: A SPECIAL CASE OR A GENERAL RULE?

*Tadeusz KOŁODZIEJ\**

‘If we want things to stay as they are, everything will have to change.’  
(Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa)

**Abstract:** *The goal of this work is an attempt at ascertaining the actual and not alleged architects-beneficiaries of transformation and later integration with the EU. The first hypothesis is that the transformation was possible, and even unavoidable, thanks to the change of the fundamental purpose (role) of Polish economy, inspired, stimulated, and accepted by the Soviet Union from the role of a supplier of the Soviet arms industry to a natural goal of the free market economy, that is obtaining profits by satisfying needs. The second hypothesis is that the architects and the beneficiaries of changes in the political system of Poland – the so-called political transformation – was not as much Solidarity as the elites (old and new – whatever it means) originating from the People’s Republic of Poland,<sup>1</sup> and the invited – to use Comrade Lenin’s handy phrase – “useful fools”. The initiated changes were eagerly supported, and still are supported and even guaranteed by the international capital operating in the shadow of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the institutions of the European Union, perceiving new opportunities of expansion therein.*

**Keywords:** *People’s Republic of Poland, PRL, Polish Third Republic, III RP, secret service, Polish Round Table*

### Origin, course and essence of the transformation<sup>1</sup>

#### 1. Origin: internal reasons: the breakdown of centrally controlled economy

Although the system of planned economy introduced since 1944 knew how to use methods of repression to enforce low level of consumption and high accumulation in the society, it was, however, incapable to use this accumulation effectively. The inefficacy of the centrally planned economy was manifested in the increasing economic imbalance, both internal and external. The external imbalance hinged on the exponentially growing foreign debt and the deepening technological gap. The ever-growing debt and the increasing technological gap raised concern of Western loan givers about the realistic possibility of recovering the money lent. They were slowly ceasing to believe in the methods of increasing the efficiency of centrally planned economy by the ‘reformers’ including the whisky-loving Yuri Andropov and the French-speaking Edward Gierek. For that reason, the international

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<sup>1</sup> One of the many attempts at a generalising approaching the Autumn of Nations (which can also be defined as “the harvest of secret service, led by the KGB”) is Dragos Petrescu’s *Rewolucje 1989 roku. Schemat wyjaśniający*, *Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość*, 2, (18) 2011, pp. 53–81. The essays lays its main emphasis on the actors (perpetrators and beneficiaries) of the transformation.

capital was interested in significant reforms improving the poor condition of the debtor. Slowly, the communist rulers of the People's Republic of Poland (PRL) began to realise that incurring new loans and/or rolling the old ones is impossible without fundamental changes, that is sharing power with the opposition. This is how the strategic alliance of the communist leaders threatened with the loss of power, with the international capital was born.

The internal imbalance was visible in the ever deepening maladjustment of supply and demand, which led to a constant inflation pressure. Inflation was administratively dampened by enforcing rigid prices. The symptom of inflation in the realm of consumption were the eternal queues, shorter or longer, before the shops. Towards the end of the 1970s they were an imminent symbol of communism.

Superimposed on the permanent economic crisis was a political one: the loss of the remnants of civic support for the communist authorities. Moreover, the increasing inefficiency of the system went hand in hand with the progressing loss of idealism in people operating in the apparatus of power. The new 'people's authorities' installed in 1944 in Poland – a country whose elites had been decimated – thanks to the bayonets of the Red Army recruited mostly from among the representatives of lower classes.<sup>2</sup> 'Most of the key and most influential communists were primitive, uneducated, and vulgar people, without a specific passion for the ideals (...). A communist taking over reign over Poland was therefore rather a villain and thug than (...) an armed prophet. He was honed by the reality of Soviet communism and not the Western clubs and associations, where the political dreamers devised plans for transforming the world. (...) The villain and thug provided perfect material for completing the work they were entrusted with, and which meant the destruction of those remnants of civic and cultural substance that survived the days of war' (R. Legutko, 2008, pp. 35–37). Ideas very quickly began to fade among the 'red dynasties' of the new establishment in Poland, which was paired with an increase of attractiveness of the model of power combining violence with legal wealth, as the process was visible already at the beginning of de-Stalinisation in the latter half of the 1950s. The goal of the Communist Party, which was building communism in Poland, began to be exchanged for the goal of maintaining power that allowed legal, and legally endorsed gathering of wealth. The awareness of the problems that Poland faced, and whose removal was impossible within the existing system without losing power, aggravated with signals coming from Moscow about the imminent end of Moscow's guarantees for Polish communists, resulted in a consolidation of efforts by people holding the actual power in Poland so as to continue holding it in the uncertain future. Moreover, the necessary reforms and moves were not only to make it possible to retain power, but also to lead to the introduction of a system that would allow wielding real power in Poland twined with legal accumulation of wealth. *This required seeking new forces and allies inside the country, that is expansion of the support base.* The task of maintaining power was implemented in Poland in three phases. The first phase was the approval of the establishment and existence of Solidarity Independent and

<sup>2</sup> One of the jokes popular in the PRL was: What is the difference between the Party and Aphrodite? The expected answer was: Aphrodite emerged from the foams of the sea, and the Party from the scum of the society. A remark reinforced by Rafał Ziemkiewicz: "The destruction of the elites of the nation, the best people, makes the more dishonourable element dominant within." (R. Ziemkiewicz, 2014, p. 35) Already in 1919, Leonid Andreyev, a Russian writer, wrote: "Lenin became like a magnet attracting filings: whatever is spoilt, lacking sharpness, and viciously brutish. (...) No leader of the people has managed to gather under his standards so many thieves, murderers, evil degenerates: such a colossal army of buttheads and beast heads." Quoted from G. Górny, 2013, No. 47, pp. 91–93. (See: E. Korwin-Mańczewski, 1921)/

Self-Governing Trade Unions (Niezależne i Samorządne Związki Zawodowe Solidarność, or NSZZ Solidarność). It let the communists assess the scale of social dissatisfaction and identify the leaders of the mass movement. 'The efficiency of the Polish second phase, that is the introduction of the martial law made it possible for the communists to extend permanent control over the Solidarity movement and ensured a state of internal political consolidation in the Party. The packing of Solidarity with agents made the task easier' (A. Ścios, p. 53). Repressions and chicanes of the 1980s forced thousands of Poles into emigration, which meant getting rid of people of radical, anti-Communist views. 'The third phase were the attempts aimed at the formation of a coalition government gathering representatives of the communist party, reactivated Solidarity, and the Church. Also a number of liberals could find themselves in this government.' (A. Golicyń, p. 482, first published in English in 1984 (sic!)). In this context, there was a need for a breakthrough: an event that, finishing the second phase, would at the same time open the preparations to the 'historic compromise' that paved the way to the third phase (A. Ścios, p. 15). This event was the Round Table, envisaged for Poland only.

### **External reasons – 'the new thinking' in the USSR vs relations with the dependent communist countries**

The phenomena of inefficiency of the communist system, growing lack of ideals, and especially the dominant role of secret service in fact ruling the country were especially sharply visible in the Soviet Union.

In the case of the USSR, the beginning of the opening and the launch of actions – performed mostly by secret service – aimed at the transformation of the 'sistema' are connected to the name of the former long-term head of the KGB, Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 12 November 1982. When he was embracing the post, however, he was already a gravely ill man, bitter, and full of deep pessimism. Knowing the catastrophic situation of the country, he perceived a remedy in the takeover of Russia's natural resources by the 'CheKa' Emergency Committee that is the KGB, and the introduction of a new system: an intermediate between ultra-liberalism and authoritarianism. (D. Kartsev, No. 1157, 3–9 January 2013). A controlled rolldown of the 'external' empire was considered to reinforce the internal empire, that is the Soviet Union itself. There is much to suggest that Andropov was the first to treat the dependence of USSR's satellite countries not as much in political as in economic categories.

These reflections of Andropov correlated with the quickly progressing fading of idealism among communists holding power. The pursuit of money and consumption 'as seen' among the capitalists in the West, or the exchange of *Das Kapital* for capital became widespread.

The circumstances of the potential transformation were buttressed when a 'young', i.e. only 54-year-old Mikhail Gorbachev, a compatriot and protégé of Yuri Andropov, claimed the power in the USSR. In the internal realm, Gorbachev began an attempt at invigorating and rebuilding Soviet economy (Perestroika) following the model of Lenin's NEP. Attempts at mitigating the system by democratisation of communism, the so-called glasnost, followed the claims for 'socialism with the human face' from the Prague Spring of 1968.

The new leader of the Soviet Union presented a programme of gradual reforms liberalising the communist system, at the same time encouraging other countries of Eastern Europe to start similar policies. To run changes in the system (the system itself?) that brought more trouble than benefits to the powers that be, one however needed to find new

faces: among the old elites there was nobody capable of taking up this task.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, it was also essential to develop staff understanding market economy ready.

The first moves of the new General Secretary on the external plane was the announcement of the concept of the so-called 'new thinking' (M. Gorbachev, 1988), that is a revision of the Soviet policy towards the US, Western Europe, and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe subordinated to the USSR since the end of the Second World War.

On 26 April 1985, during a meeting of the leaders of the states of the Soviet bloc in Warsaw, Gorbachev said among others, that 'each of the brotherly parties defines its policy independently, and is responsible for it before its nation' (A. Dudek, 2013, p. 17). While visiting Poland in July 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev personally informed the Polish communist leaders that they have 'a free rein in internal policy'. The new quality in the foreign policy of the Kremlin became generally known when in his speech before the UN General Assembly in December 1988 Gorbachev said that 'everyone should have the freedom of choice left, and there may be no exceptions from the principle'. This was the official resignation from 'Brezhnev doctrine' (M. Dobbs, 1998, p. 264).

One needs to emphasise as strongly as possible that the consent to a greater liberty of satellite countries was caused by reasons of economic nature. They demonstrated that maintenance of the status quo, i.e. dominance over Central Europe to use its potential for the needs of the USSR military production – at the cost of the consumption by the people of these states – is already physically impossible and financially uneconomic.

The reasons for the economic problems of the USSR in their relations with socialist countries were explained by the doctrine of Marrese and Vanousa. (M. Marrese, J. Vanous, 1983; see: J.P. Hardt, R.F. Kaufman, 1995, M. Lavigne, 1990).<sup>4</sup>

The doctrine gained great popularity in Gorbachev's team. Moscow recognised that global market prices need introducing, and that clearing settlements must be replaced with transactions in free currencies. The main champion of that view was Alexander Yakovlev, a friend and adviser to Gorbachev, director of the prestigious Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences, who pressed on the swift

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<sup>3</sup> One of these was Yegor Gaidar, who – after the ascension of Boris Yeltsin to power – became his adviser and later the acting prime minister. In interviews, he frequently mentioned that the open discussions about changing the system at the USSR began early in the 1980s at the Moscow National Institute of Research of Systems. It was the Soviet copy of the International Institute for Applied System Analysis (IIASA) set up in Vienna early in the 1970s. The institute was perfectly well furnished with foreign literature. Like in Poland, these were academic discussions, nevertheless there is no least doubt that they were conducted with the information and consent of the KGB, if not inspired by that institution.

<sup>4</sup> Early in the 1980s, they presented a claim that by subsidising satellite countries, the USSR maintains them, and therefore should liberate itself from them. This resulted from their analyses of the structure of trade within the COMECON, and changes of prices in COMECON's internal trade. The average prices of fuels in internal COMECON exchange were lower than in the global market. Being the main provider of fuels and other raw materials, the Soviet Union therefore sold its produce cheaper than it could have sell it in the global market (ipso facto it was as if it subsidised these). Moreover, the USSR was COMECON's main importer of industrial products, and bought them from other socialist countries paying more than they potentially would in the global market, not to mention their definitely lower quality. Hence the double subsidisation of COMECON member states by the Soviet Union. The problem emerged with all keenness after the oil crises of the 1970s, when the prices of fuels skyrocketed. Economists calculated for Gorbachev that the costs of maintaining stability in Eastern Europe amounted approximately to USD10 billion a year, while some considered that the additional subsidies draining Soviet economy may amount even to USD 30 billion.

revision of the doctrine about the significance and irreplaceability of satellite states for the USSR, whom he in turn defined as ‘the parasites of socialism’ (V. Sebestyén, p. 158).

Other economic factors that forced Gorbachev and the Kremlin to concentrate on saving the centre of the empire against the aggravating crisis included the very costly ‘star wars’ programme imposed by Ronald Reagan. Yet of decisive significance was the consistent US policy of purposeful and long-term reduction of global oil prices. The US managed to inspire a drastic lowering of the global oil prices from USD30 per barrel in 1985 to USD12 in 1986. For the Soviet Union it was an economic disaster. Mikhail Gorbachev therefore decided that the ‘socialist brothers’ would have to start paying their bills themselves. In July 1986, referring to the states of Central and Eastern Europe at a session of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, Gorbachev stated that ‘they can no longer be carried on our shoulders. The main reason – is the economy’ (A. Dudek, 2013, p. 18).

It must have taken plenty of time for the dictators, officially holding the posts of the first secretaries of communist parties in Eastern bloc states, to realise that the support and guarantees from the Kremlin are coming to a close. Their power was not awarded by the society, it was Moscow that elevated them to the highest posts in their respective countries against the will of the local communities, and it was only with its support that they could hold them. Initially, they did not treat Mikhail Gorbachev warning them that they ‘have to take a greater responsibility for their countries’ seriously, considering his words ritual declarations of the Kremlin.

In November 1986 (i.e. only five years after martial law was imposed in Poland), Gorbachev summoned the leaders of satellite states to Moscow to a summit that shook the communist world. During the meeting, he announced revolutionary changes in the principles governing the economic relations between Moscow and these countries that had been in force from the days of Joseph Stalin. The Soviet leader announced that trade would follow the laws of the market so that both parties drew benefits, and also announced that the Soviet Union would no longer guarantee loans from Western banks.<sup>5</sup> For communist leaders, this meant that an easy life based on the supplies of cheap oil, gas and crudes, and guarantees of Western loans was drawing to an end.

At least since 1986, Moscow warned the Polish comrades that it not only favoured reforms necessary to normalise the situation after the end of martial law, but also that it was plainly interested in them being deep, which would give an opportunity to pave the way to a new reality.<sup>6</sup> Yet for the local ‘governors’ nominated by Moscow,<sup>7</sup> the new situation meant

<sup>5</sup> Years later, it is clearly visible that the agony of communism began when Western banks and other financial institutions began to award loans to communist states.

<sup>6</sup> In an interview conducted after 1995, General Wojciech Jaruzelski shared the following information: “A month after Gorbachev was elected secretary general, I met him after the meeting of all the secretaries of communist countries. Our meeting was a private one, and we agreed that the decisions and arrangements reached there will be kept secret from other secretaries of communist parties. We decided that Poland would be the laboratory of the perestroika and the laboratory of changes.” Quoted from: A. Zybertowicz, *Służby specjalne w czasie transformacji – perspektywa polska*, [in:] P. Kuglarz, *Od totalitaryzmu do demokracji*, Kraków, 2001 General Jaruzelski is rumoured to have conducted his first talk to Mikhail Gorbachev without witnesses and interpreter. It lasted for five hours.

<sup>7</sup> How else could “Polish” “politicians” be called, after becoming familiar with the fragment of a telephone conversation between Leonid Brezhnev and General Wojciech Jaruzelski, after the general was appointed the First Secretary of the Party: “I want to tell you openly that I agreed to embracing this post with great objections and only because I knew about your support, and that this is your decision.” Quoted from: R. Vetter, 2013 p. 133.

the end of the external support that let them stay in power. The new situation meant the need for independent confrontation with the Polish society, and this in the face of the progressing bankruptcy of the Polish economy.

This is the origin of Moscow's concession to the Round Table in Poland: an experimental ground for reforms of significant consequences for the socialist system. The official position of the USSR in the matter of normalisation processes in Poland had been highly moderate since 1988. It turned out that the Soviet Embassy in Warsaw was ordered to prepare a complex Who's Who-type database of Polish opposition (A. Dudek, 2004, p. 238). This meant that Moscow not only accepted the operation of the opposition, but clearly endeavoured to start talks with it.<sup>8</sup> Early in 1989, the Kremlin approved not only the agreements concerning the far-going changes in the People's Republic of Poland but also ruled out an option of intervention being a way of guaranteeing its interests.<sup>9</sup> (A. Paczkowski, No. 6/2014). Therefore, the Polish comrades were aware that they had little time left for taking steps that would let them hold the power independently, without the support of their employers in Moscow. This became the most strongly guarded secret, still not only in Poland, which is supported by the facts that during the Round Table negotiations, *and actually to this day*, the opposition and the society were entirely convinced that the start of the negotiations was only and solely an act of goodwill on behalf of the powers that be. No one realised that the negotiations were in a way 'enforced' by the new course (new thinking) introduced in the USSR by Mikael Gorbachev. One must admit objectively and express appreciation if not esteem for the contemporary Communist authorities in Poland as they used their last options perfectly, falling back in an exceedingly intelligent and cunning manner only on their own machine of repression and media coverage. The Round Table with the selected representatives of the so-called constructive opposition (discussed below) was organised quickly and efficiently. The first result of the Round Table was a partially free election in June 1989, which was de facto won by Solidarity. The reaction of Moscow to the opposition winning the June elections was very careful and balanced. It allows to put forth a claim that, without withdrawing its support for the Communist Party, Moscow conducted secret talks with selected opposition activists, concerning their potential takeover of power in Poland.

The first foreign guest who paid a visit to the new Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki on 26 August 1989, that is only a few days after the government was formed, even before the making of its opening statement, was the head of the KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov. Forestalling further reflections, one can mention that in 1988, when it had already been known that the sharing of power is unavoidable – whether in the form of the Round Table or another ritual – Kryuchkov, (former subordinate of Yuri Andropov, whom he succeeded on the post of the head of the KGB) travelled around the countries of Central Europe: it was then that it was decided which part of the opposition is constructive, and which part consists of the alternative forces that need not be invited to talks or put in the

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<sup>8</sup> General Pavolov, a resident of the KGB in Poland in the mid-1970s received an order from Moscow not to build the Soviet network of agents in the party holding power but among the opposition who may take it over in future.

<sup>9</sup> Four expert opinions were commissioned by the Political Bureau of the Soviet Communist Party: the first by the Foreign Department of the Party, the second by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the third by the Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System, and the fourth (confidential to this day) by the KGB. The first three confirmed the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc and remarked that maintaining countries within the realm of Soviet influence was no longer possible with the application of the current and past methods.

structures of power. During the audience, Kryuchkov heard two messages. First, Poland will be a state friendly to you, and therefore you need no communists. Secondly, we will be a sovereign country. This was enough for Moscow, aware that the place of ideological and military guarantees that let Polish communists stay at power for over 40 years, was now taken by new cards to be played in the game for Poland: the German card (guarantee of the border with Germany), oil being the economic weapon, and agents of influence.

**2. The course of the transformation:** the leading role of the secret service in preparing and implementing transformation in Poland.

With numerous signals coming from the Kremlin about the support for the groups governing the satellite states, it was recognised that the main function of the secret service<sup>10</sup> will be to ensure a soft landing both to the secret service itself and for the political class for which the service worked. A soft landing can be considered in reference to at least two tasks: precluding a legal clearing of the crimes of the *ancien régime*, and ensuring such forms of business institutions that the political class of the old system could retain its privileged position. (A. Zybortowicz, Kraków, 2001). ‘The key role of secret service in the processes of property transformations in the late years of communism and after 1989 is doubtless and ever better documented. (...) Only that service could provide specific knowledge, logistics, and operational support necessary to transform the elites of the former system into the avant-garde of the new business system opened to the integration with world’s economy they found beneficial. Neither the party authorities nor the secret services of individual states of the bloc were autonomous decision-makers. Like the strategy of the Round Table, this had to be agreed by the governmental party (that is practically the Ministry of Interior Affairs) in Moscow, so there is plenty to suggest that the entire concept of controlled change had been worked out by KGB experts, which does not mean that later everything followed the intended scenario. All the elements that I mentioned earlier were present also in the other countries of the bloc with the difference being that the Polish elites were most efficient in blocking the attempts at conducting vetting and decomunisation, a radical cleansing of police forces and the judiciary, and a symbolic and legal dissociation from the *ancien régime*’ (M. Łoś, 04.03.2009).

Let’s start from the definition of the part of the political class for which these forces worked. The contemporary Polish political class comes from two sources. The first are of the decimated traditional, patriotic circles, brought up according to the conservative canons of love of fatherland, faith, tradition, following the God – Honour – Fatherland triad. The other are the communist circles, both these connected to the prewar, wartime, and post-war communist movement and those connected to the Soviet and Polish secret service. The politicians hailing from the latter current and shaped by it dominated (*and continue to dominate*) the first, which was among others, a consequence of the extermination of the elite of the Polish nation. There were plenty of reasons for this. The most important was the impact of the Gestapo-NKVD conferences organised in Brześć, Przemyśl, Zakopane, and Kraków in 1939–41. They aimed at exchanging information and experience in fighting the Polish resistance and elimination of the Polish intelligentsia and leading elites in the territories incorporated into the Third Reich and the USSR after the September 1939 campaign. The extermination was continued by forced deportations to Siberia, the Katyń crime, extermination of the landed gentry and the bourgeois, fight against the ‘cursed

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<sup>10</sup> During communism, secret service usually included external intelligence, counterintelligence, political police, and special military forces.

soldiers', pauperisation of the remnants of the prewar intelligentsia, the Soviet 'perekovka' of the souls (B. Urbankowski), etc. 'All the higher classes who survived and who had previously instilled social life with its shape – aristocracy, bourgeois, intelligence – were replaced by people from the margin.' (R. Legutko, 2008, p. 37). As the process of transformation and later the construction of the Polish Third Republic,<sup>11</sup> the politicians of the latter current certainly exceeded the patriots with shrewdness, cynicism, and knowledge of techniques of governance. In this way, they were predisposed to hold the functions of 'professional politicians'.

It goes without saying that politicians formed by the values from the first source, by nature, had to be in the opposition, called 'independence' and later 'extreme'. The latter current in the broadly construed opposition are the 'Żydy', that is young Marxists who moved to the positions of revisionism and later opposition against communism.<sup>12</sup> In other words, they are former Stalinists and their progeny, who in the 1940s and in the 1950s introduced communism, and later – for a variety of reasons, also related to nationalist considerations – not only fell out with the Party, but even stood up against it. Never, however, did they reject their left-wing views. 'The youth hailing from the families of all communists, the gravediggers and assistants of gravediggers of Polish independence, stood up against the government made by their fathers, yet – at least in the initial period – claiming the ideals their parents once used to preach' (R. Legutko, 2008, p. 61). These circles of *dissidents who later called themselves 'the secular left'* were fairly coherent, which in most cases resulted from the shared worldview, whose source was vested in the family traditions of the so-called Judeo-Communism (*żydokomuna*) and the leftist beliefs. The dissidents did not question the communist system, the goal of their activity was its improvement and streamlining, the support of 'reformer' tendencies of the communist party, and promotion of the idea of understanding and collaboration. They were extremely efficient, which was manifested in the ease of promotion of their message and publications – often written in prison cells (sic!) – with numerous unobstructed contacts with the Western

<sup>11</sup> The Third Polish Republic – successor of the PRL.

<sup>12</sup> The notion was coined by a journalist, Witold Jedlicki, who described the struggle between the factions of the PZPR (Polish United Workers' Party) between the Natolińczycy group (named so after the mansion in Natolin, where high-ranking party and state activists gathered), referred to as "Chamy", and the Puławianie group (whose name comes from Wedels' House in Puławska Street in Warsaw, where many of them lived), referred to as "Żydy" in his essay "Chamy i Żydy" (literally: "The boors and the Jews" *Kultura*, Paris, 1962, No. 12 (182), pp. 3–41). The "Chamy" later evolved into communist apparatchiks of the young generation, much of less dogma-prone, whose main ideology was no longer Marxism but power. The hallmark figure and symbol of that circle of communism-crates was later the former president of the Polish Third Republic, Aleksander Kwaśniewski. Natolińczycy opposed the liberalisation of the system and believed the socialist one to be good yet vulnerable to "error", and preached nationalistic slogans to win power within the party. They were mostly of peasant and worker origin, ethnically Polish, unlike Puławianie, who originated from the intelligentsia, largely of Jewish origin. Characteristic of the Natolińczycy was a strong anti-intelligentsia syndrome and support for authoritarian power, and eagerness to reform the system only slightly. The Puławianie orientation gathered mostly intelligentsia. Many of them, yet not all, were of Jewish origin, which Natolińczycy used in propaganda, referring to Puławianie as "Jews". As leading Stalinists in Stalin's time, they held high positions not only in the party, but also in the party's press and institutions connected to the authorities of the PZPR. After the death of Stalin, according to the "wisdom of the stage" they were the first to preach the slogans of liberalisation of the socialist system. In 1968, the fight between the fractions ended – yet not definitely as the Round Table and the Third Polish Republic proved – in the domination of "the boors".

left, and good social contacts with members of the Party (A. Ścios, p. 104) they could hardly be described as an opposition to the system, in fact, this was *an opposition within the system*.

To reach the goal set, that is to stay in power, the politicians wielding it in Poland had to expand their social base, that is enter talks with the opposition.

Yet entering talks with the opposition raised the question: *specifically – who with?* How to find partners ready to enter, by co-opting, into the governing system on the side of the demonised opposition? That meant a great work to develop ‘*own, controllable*’ opposition who – when let to access power – would faithfully observe the status quo, with its legacy content yet changed in its form. The first step in that direction must therefore have been a precise recognition and analysis of the situation within what was broadly construed as opposition; the following – development of a strategy of further action and its implementation.

At the time, a particular ‘system holding power’ developed on the side of the party. It was composed of the closest collaborators of Wojciech Jaruzelski. It played the dominant role in Poland until the late 1980s and early 1990s. Its members were mostly the military who took over many positions in public administration and party apparatus after 1981. The attempt at replacing the weakened party apparatus by military and secret services undertaken by Jaruzelski after the introduction of martial law brought about a gradual deregulation of the entire decision-making centre, which split into rival bureaucratic groups. ‘Under the reign of Wojciech Jaruzelski, the Political Bureau and the Party Secretariat became forums for discussion and not for the making of the most important decisions.’ (J. Gardawski, 2010, p. 337). The decisions were made mostly in the Ministry of the Internal Affairs (MSW) and the Ministry of Defence (MON).

Advisers to Jaruzelski, the so-called group of wise men, set up in 1986 by the Central Committee of the PZPR forecasted the development of the political and social situation. In the spring of 1988, they presented two memos which recommended embarking on economic and political changes that would assure that PZPR maintained its current holdings for the longest possible time; they included the suggestion to hold the ‘Round Table’ with participation of the opposition and the initial concepts of the Party’s position and potential concessions for the opposition. For that reason, the assumptions and strategy of the necessary changes that later became the foundations of the new order in Poland for nearly 30 years already began to be adjusted at the time. Similar conclusions were also reached by prime minister Mieczysław Rakowski. In June 1987 he presented Wojciech Jaruzelski with a report in which he suggested a change in approaching the opposition: ‘perhaps an oppositional movement organised enough to enforce acceptance and participation in the elections will emerge from among the numbers opposition factions?’ (P. Bączek, 27 July 1995). This is what the foundations of the permanent agreement of some opposition elites with communists were to be like.<sup>13</sup> And concepts were followed by actions.

After the failed referendum on social and economic reforms of 29 November 1987, the people of real power decided that the opportune time has come to carry on with the plan and share power with the so-called constructive, i.e., moderate, part of opposition. The

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<sup>13</sup> This is how, at the cost of the anti-Communist “extreme” that is the independence-supporting opposition, taken between hammer and anvil, a potential, credible, neo-Solidarity partner was built; one that in future could be a party to the true epoch-making deal: the “Round Table” and the conflict-free transition from the PRL to the post-communism in the Polish Third Republic, one from the styrofoam of Solidarity to the salons of power, and for the others – from the secret police to the Office for State Protection (UOP), from the PZPR to Socjaldemokracja RP, and from the Central Committee to the board of a bank (S. Cenckiewicz, 18.10.2013).

initiative was taken over by politicians more or less strongly connected to secret service. 'In 1981, the uniformed party, having at their disposal the army and the police, moved to the spearhead of system defendants. Never again would the civilians regain the position they lost. (...) It was not as much the PZPR creating the Round Table but its uniform-wearing segment, and these were its ministers, and not just party-members, who were included in the cabinet of Mazowiecki' (W. Kuczyński, 1st ed., p. 140). What, however, played the central role in the designing of the concept and tactics of the talks with the opposition was as special team of the Operation and Command Group of the Head of Security Services (Grupa Operacyjno-Sztabowa Szefa Służby Bezpieczeństwa), officially known as the Ministry of Interior Analyses Team (Zespół Analiz MSW) set at the ministry in 1985, that is a year earlier than the so-called 'group of wise men' of the Central Committee of the PZPR. The MSW team was interested in the elites of the opposition 'that have any potential to control even a section of that movement' (D. Kania, J. Targalski, M. Marosz, 2015 p. 272). That is why groups of leaders were analysed in the search for a partner who could guarantee that he will fully control his supporters. Solidarity uncontrollable after being allowed to conduct political activity was feared, and the belief that the only opportunity for further wielding of power is sharing that power with *personally* selected opposition was reinforced.

The opposition was divided into three categories: 1) radicals, decidedly opposing making arrangements with the Party; 2) undecided; 3) pragmatics: the KOR circles controlled by the secular left,<sup>14</sup> representatives of the intellectual milieu of the Catholic Intelligentsia Clubs (KIK, the so-called church advisers), and a certain groups of advisers to Solidarity. It must be emphasised that this division concerned not as much the party and opposition groupings as specific individuals. The year 1989 was the time of devising the scenario for the Round Table with participation of carefully selected and/or chosen part of the opposition, in accordance with Lenin's adage 'the best way to control the opposition is to lead it ourselves'. It was also the time of waiting for the most opportune moment for starting the operation; therefore, it can be guessed that it was believed that an appropriate partner to negotiate was found (formed?) among the opposition circles. How did it come to that? Let's take a closer look at the evolution of the situation among the opposition, discreetly steered by secret service, and certainly dominated by Solidarity and its legendary leader.

After the imprisonment of the leader of Solidarity, Lech Wałęsa, in December 1981, the authorities started talks with him to elicit from him hints concerning the further fate of himself and Solidarity. In this way, it was discreetly suggested already at the time that Lech Wałęsa, as a certain symbol, together with his milieu may be a partners in the talks. In the mid-1980s, the authorities felt strong enough to announce amnesty and free all political prisoners in September 1986. Immediately after the aforementioned amnesty, Lech Wałęsa – released from the prison earlier, in November 1982, set up an openly operating Temporary Council of Solidarity (Tymczasowa Rada Solidarności, TR'S'), which he presided over and nominated its nine members. Its task was to marginalise the secret Temporary Coordination Commission (TKK) of Solidarity, set up in 1982, which was increasingly more difficult to control due to the personal changes and the access of activists from the second rank to the

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<sup>14</sup> Workers' Defence Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotników) was set up by a group of opposition activists bringing various forms of aid to the workers persecuted after the protests in Radom and Ursus in June 1976. KOR demanded not only release of the imprisoned but also the punishment of the perpetrators. After August 1980 (institution of Solidarity), former members of the Committee joined the work of the Solidarity Trade Union as experts and advisers. KOR was often nicknamed "the pink salon" due to the friendly relations between some of its activists and communists from PRL's apparatus of repression.

seats vacated by the imprisoned ones. The setting up of the Temporary Council was not only a move that was in line with the interests of the authorities, but an actual coup d'état sanctioning the removal of people opposing talks and bargaining with the communists from the management of Solidarity. This is how the concept of building an entirely new Solidarity began to be implemented: 'from top downwards', without 'those stupid' and 'extreme' as Lech Wałęsa said in his talks with communists. (S. Cenckiewicz, 18-10-2013). Appointment of the Temporary Council was tantamount to the opening of a process of selection of future partners to talks among the opposition .

In October 1987, Wałęsa called to life a new centre for governing the trade union – the National Executive Committee (Krajowa Komisja Wykonawcza, KKW) of NSZZ Solidarność, at whose helm he stood, in the place of the underground TKK and the open TR'S'. This is how the division of Solidarity into 'old and 'new' was sanctioned. The KKW appointed its own secretariat and a body of advisers composed of Bronisław Geremek, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Jacek Kuroń, Adam Michnik, and Andrzej Celiński (R. Vetter, 2013, p. 203). Decisive role in the KKW of the 'new' Solidarity was played by the Warsaw 'secular left' having at its disposal good advisers and perfect contacts with the Western media, which made its operation well known also internationally.

The second instrument that the authorities used for the 'proper formatting' of the consensus-prone opposition accepting negotiations with communists were incessant attempts undertaken by the officers and agents of secret service to aggravate the disputes within the Solidarity-independence camp operating underground.

The third condition useful in the 'modelling' potential partners for negotiations on the opposition side, was a gradual change of nature of Solidarity. Falling back only on advisers of various provenance, due to the martial law and later repressions, disenchantment, intended disinformation, and other devious activities of the powers that be, it began to change into curbed professional activists losing its worker character from a mass, 10-million-strong civil movement that independently decided about the course of the Carnival of 1980/1989. The complicated situation of the 1980s, repressions, and chicanes, required constant presence of weathered consultants, negotiators, and visionaries – let's call them 'advisers' – who began to take the upper hand and later dominated the Union. The situation in the 'new' Solidarity did not raise any doubt who actually decided about the nature, goals, and strategy of the Union. The 'new' Solidarity was becoming a political centre, as it proved years later, fighting for access to the system of power. 'Growing up into the place of Solidarity leaders who ceased to be most important was the influence of Bronisław Geremek and – to a lesser degree – of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, who found the backstage and negotiation policy their environment. Fitting perfectly well that world of inconspicuous meetings with the highest party leaders were also such advisers to the Primate Bishop of Poland, Cardinal Józef Glemp as Andrzej Stelmachowski, Andrzej Wielowieyski, and church diplomats. Wherever the talks in cosy cabinets dominated, the crowds of the young generation of Solidarity, which lost the understanding of what was being negotiated, began to be perceived as a dangerous power that both the parties should neutralise' (P. Semka 2013, p. 140). Moreover, 'the opposition elites gathered around Lech Wałęsa were eager to play their game with the government, as they believed that only they had the right to reach a compromise with communists and reap its fruit. Another open proof for the increase of significance of the advisers, at the account of the historical, worker activists of Solidarity, were the later talks in Magdalenka, which as it turned out later, had a decisive impact on the history of Poland. Although some trade union activists still participated in them, yet their tone began to be set by the 'masters of diplomacy' like Bronisław Geremek, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, and Andrzej Stelmachowski. Setting advisers in

the role of main actors of negotiations with the government, and putting aside the Union, Lech Wałęsa himself was pushing the worker Solidarity to a side track,' (P. Semka 2013, pp. 142, 143). Thus it was 'Wałęsa who divided his advisers into 'the secular left' which gave him a positive publicity in Western media and the church advisers who ensured him with the support of the Church and good communication with Pope John Paul II. Against this background, Wałęsa did not associate the right-wing of the opposition with any skills he could find useful to the construction of his personal position. He had the support of the right-wing Catholics for free anyway, because who else would they support' (P. Semka 2013, p. 148). This was aptly portrayed by Krzysztof Wyszowski, a creator of independent trade unions from which Solidarity 'hatched', when he said that there was an overarching naïve belief that the advisers were only searching for solutions, and everything would have to be approved by the Union. In practice, however, the logic of negotiations marginalised former worker stars. The political opening of 1988–89 was the time of ambitious politicians – advisers from the 'secular left' and advisers from the Church side. Majority of followers of Solidarity did not know and did not understand this division within the Union, yet they instinctively believed that the right to decide about the line taken by the Union – or, more broadly, entire opposition – belongs to Lech Wałęsa and his advisers. And the strongest role at the side of Lech Wałęsa in the 1980s – in the place of Solidarity leaders who had ceased to be the most important – was obtained by Geremek and Mazowiecki. The advisers became 'representatives', the hallmark of Solidarity.

To sum up, mostly *but not only*, activists of conformist and compromise-seeking attitudes became 'opposition' partners, ready to talk to communists seeking a wider legitimisation of their power. They were on the one hand, the so-called 'open Catholics',<sup>15</sup> and on the other – dissidents, former members of the party,<sup>16</sup> who themselves defined themselves as 'Marxist schismatics'; the best known of these being Jacek Kuroń and Adam Michnik. The so-called 'democratic opposition' (was?) developed from the amalgamation of these circles. The media they had at their disposal later made Polish people believe that that group of 'representatives of the nation' contributed to the 'defeat of communism and winning of independence'.

In 1988, once both the sides were already ready for negotiations, waves of strikes shook Poland. The fact that the first proposals of the authorities emerged after the first, weak wave organised in April proves that the proposals had nothing in common with the strikes, they were not enforced, and the authorities simply began to implement their scenario. Yet the first wave proved too weak to legitimise the transformations, and therefore a stronger

<sup>15</sup> In *Kościół, lewica i dialog* (literally: "The Church, the left, and dialogue" written in prison in 1977, Adam Michnik pointed to the "division" continuing in the Polish church into the so-called "open" Church, that is one "permeated with the spirit of the Second Vatican Council" and the Church "mistrustful towards the world", that is "closed". According to Michnik, the latter was embodied in the person of the Primate Bishop of Poland, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński. This is how the future editor of *Gazeta Wyborcza* daily defined the lines of an alliance within the broadly construed democratic opposition between the "secular left" with the "open" Church on the one hand, and with "progressive" Catholics. At the beginning of the so-called transformation, both the "secular left" and the "progressive" Catholics standing close to it were the fundamental repository of the personnel for the "Solidarity camp" taking over the government of Poland. Representatives of the "progressive" Catholicism not only provided the staff for the cabinet initiating the Polish "transformation" but also unconditionally supported its course in their magazines and papers, from the beginning subscribing to the claim that there is no alternative to that path.

<sup>16</sup> Should we assume that the oppositionist is a person that opposes someone or something, and a dissident is a person who moved away from a group he or she belonged to, we can claim that this was not an anti-systemic opposition, but one operating within the system.

one was necessary in August, as something to justify the talks with selected opposition was needed. That meant that the 'Round Table' could have taken place without strikes, yet then the programme of enfranchisement of the nomenclature would not have been legitimised. What needed creation was a picture that Solidarity is strong enough and hereby it makes arrangements with the authorities, and the changes are the result of 'the will of people' and not a top-down reform. To achieve that a conviction that the 'natural' process of weakening of the communist system is continuing, and all the changes are of spontaneous and of independent character was developed in the Polish society. The most important stage of the plan the powers that be had – the expansion of the political base with the selected members of opposition – was entering the phase of implementation.

The first secret meeting, commanded by Wojciech Jaruzelski, with representatives of the Warsaw Catholic Intelligentsia Club, adviser to Lech Wałęsa – Andrzej Stelmachowski and Andrzej Wielowieyski was held in January 1988. The successive talks took place in March and April, yet brought no visible results. In confidential talks with representatives of the church, Father Alojzy Orszulik and Andrzej Stelmachowski, conducted in June and July 1988, a member of the Political Bureau Stanisław Ciosek presented specific proposals of reforms, namely setting up the office of the president, proclaiming the Senate in which the opposition was to obtain a majority, and awarding 40% of seats in the Sejm (lower house of the Parliament) to the opposition.

On 26 August, in his television address, the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, General Czesław Kiszczak hailing from military intelligence, invited 'various social and worker circles' to talks. 'They could assume the form of 'a round table'. I'm not making any preconditions (...) Yet I exclude, nonetheless, the option of participation for people who reject the legal and constitutional order of the People's Republic of Poland' (K. Dubiński, 1990, p. 4). Thanks to his efforts, the matter of starting talks with NSZZ Solidarity, gathered around its president, Lech Wałęsa, was accepted by the 8th Plenary of the Central Committee of the Party.

On 31 August 1988, the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, general Czesław Kiszczak met Lech Wałęsa for the first time. During that meeting, the general explained in detail the proposed principles and goals of the dialogue: first, we do not ask who comes from where, but what he comes with, what the intentions are; secondly, we invite to the 'Round Table' people of Solidarity yet without Solidarity. These talks resulted in a decision to start talks between the government and the opposition, which were later called the Round Table.<sup>17</sup> The decision was made personally by Lech Wałęsa, without consultations with the strike committee of the Gdańsk Shipyard being on strike. On 16 September 1988, in a villa of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Magdalenka near Warsaw, a meeting between Wałęsa and Kiszczak was held (in the presence of 20 people). Finally, in **September 1988** a decision to start confidential negotiations concerning the material matters of the 'Round Table' with some NSZZ Solidarity activists gathered around its president Lech Wałęsa was reached. Yet this was only a minority share of activists and leaders of the de facto 'new' Solidarity. The opponents of this form of negotiations with communist authorities were the historical leaders of Solidarity from the years 1980–81, members of the National Commission (Komisja Krajowa) elected at the 1st Congress of the Union in 1981.

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<sup>17</sup> In the international dimension, entering talks with the "constructive" opposition in August 1988 was necessary for the credibility of the PRL and for conducting talks with the IMF and the Paris Club creditors concerning debt. Without Solidarity, the operation of salvaging the regime on the international arena could not have succeeded.

The confidential talks with the authorities ended in January 1989 by reaching a preliminary understanding concerning the consent of communist powers to re-legalise the activity of Solidarity. Now a show for the society, that is the spectacle of the 'Round Table' could begin.

### 3. Essence of transformation – the Round Table

As has been mentioned repeatedly above, the idea of the 'Round Table' was born in the 'uninformed' party. These were the people from the communist secret service, mostly the military, who prepared, conducted, and finalised the concept of talks between selected representatives of the authorities with selected representatives of 'the opposition'. The session was preceded by highly confidential meetings of representatives of the communist authorities with several leaders of underground Solidarity.

The first step on the path of preparations on the side of the 'opposition' to participate in the 'round table' was to proclaim the Civic Committee (*Komitet Obywatelski*) by president of Solidarity Lech Wałęsa,<sup>18</sup> on 18 December 1988, which the society construed and treated as authorised representatives not only of the *whole Solidarity, but rather the entire opposition*. The list of the 135 people invited to the meeting was decided by the team cooperating with Lech Wałęsa, with Bronisław Geremek being the dominant voice. They can be said to have been the first to make the actual and open division into better (i.e. moderate – acceptable by the powers that be) and worse (radical, rejecting talks with the authorities – not to be accepted by the powers that be) opposition. The Civic Committee was developed on the ground of the so-called group of sixty,<sup>19</sup> whose core were the advisers of the union, some Solidarity activists, and 'generally respected intellectuals and artists.' (P. Śpiewak, 1991, p. 200). Essentially, however, it was a self-appointed political elite that nominated themselves the only representative of both Solidarity and political opposition. In selecting this new, self-appointed political elite, secret service, whether civil or military, must have participated (S. Cenckiewicz, 19-20 October 2013, p. P6). This meant inspiring the creation of own, subjugated opposition and elimination from the political stage of these leaders and activists of Solidarity and other groupings of political opposition who opposed that formula of arrangement with the authorities of communist Poland – that is the independence option. Speaking in favour of that is the complete *propaganda and media support* of the communist authorities *for the Civic Comity Committee (an illegal formation in the light of contemporary law – TK's comment)*, with an imposition of outright media censorship in matters concerning other efforts of Solidarity leaders and activists and the political parties of the opposition. The core of the Civic Committee were on the one hand activists of the group of Solidarity around Wałęsa, and on the other hand, *experts* (advisers) of the Union, associated with the cosmopolitan wing of the 1970s Workers' Defence Committee (KOR), that is the 'pink salon'. Besides them, represented in the KO were the union groupings from rural territories, representatives of political milieus supporting Wałęsa's group and arrangement with communists, representatives of the secular and clerical catholic elites and 'those respected and trusted by the society' – writers, film and theatre directors, actors, and journalists. Key role in the Civic Committee was played by the group of Jacek Kuroń. The Committee 'played the function of a centre of authority, having only indirect legitimation and legality. These came primarily from Wałęsa, and also from

<sup>18</sup> Later name: Komitet Obywatelski Solidarność.

<sup>19</sup> The group who in May 1987 signed the joint appeal for dialogue with the authorities before the visit of the Polish Pope.

the position and authority of other members of the KO. Nonetheless, KO proceeded as if it were the nation or its fully authorised representation. On the behalf of the nation, the KO signed political obligations and declarations. Representatives of the political parties of the opposition that were either not part of Solidarity or were around its margins were not invited to the work of the KO” (P. Śpiewak, 1991, p. 201). Thus developed, the self-appointed Civic Committee presented itself as the only representative of social and political opposition, without any alternative. “The Civic Committee operating by Lech Wałęsa, whose members were, after all, never elected democratically but they were selected according to an informal and political key, became the political cap above the entire Solidarity. (...) Instead of the ‘extremists’ – that is the legal authorities of Solidarity, elected in democratic election of 1981, communists finally created a constructive partner” (S. Cenckiewicz, 19-20 October 2013, p. P6). This constructive partner, created without a doubt with key participation of communist secret service acted as the ‘Solidarity and opposition party’ in the negotiations with the ‘government and coalition party’ within the framework of the so-called Round Table.<sup>20</sup> Apart from the KO, there were also other groupings of opposition: the Confederation of Independent Poland (Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej), Fighting Solidarity (Solidarność Walcząca), Liberal Democratic Party “Independency” (Liberalno-Demokratyczna Partia ‘Niepodległość’), and the Polish Independency Party (Polska Partia Niepodległościowa).

According to the analysis of the composition of the KO performed by the MSW Analyses Team, dialogue could be conducted with 67 people, as that was the “constructive” opposition, 40 were radicals, 22 were considered insignificant, and the remaining ones were probably informants. In the preparations to the ‘Round Table’ the secret service intervened in the composition of the “opposition” to the last moment. Especially subversive, but colourful and attractive for the society was the case of participation of Adam Michnik and Jacek Kuroń, the architects of the Round Table on the part of the opposition, in the negotiations, as it was “undecided to the last moment”. Recapitulating this question, one can conclude that it was the ‘moderate’ fraction of the opposition, saturated with Secret Service (SB) spies, that called for negotiations. And it was this faction that the authorities sat down to talk with in February 1989.

The façade negotiations of the ‘Round Table’ began on 6 February and lasted to 5 April 1989, and participating in them were 54 representatives of the ‘government and coalition’ and ‘Solidarity and opposition’ parties. Out of the 26 representatives of the Solidarity and opposition side, there were only five workers who turned up in the public life during the strikes of 1988; to a low degree only did they decide about the strategy of the Solidarity side (P. Semka, 2013, p. 133). In fact, debates were only conducted twice by the famous round piece of furniture<sup>21</sup> standing in the Palace of the Viceroy in Krakowskie Przedmieście (the seat of the tsar’s governor in the first half of the 19th century – history likes to repeat itself, and teaches that it has not taught anyone anything!) made especially for the purpose: on the inauguration and completion of the talks. The actual talks continued at tables of traditional shape. Participating in the talks were altogether were 452 people. The very number of participants in the sessions was to prove that the arrangements of the ‘Round Table’ were developed in an exceedingly democratic manner, and the issues discussed

<sup>20</sup> “Many years later, the roll of the then members of the Civic Committee” reads like the shadow cabinet of the Government, Parliament, and many other leading institutions of the state.” (R. Vetter, 2013, p. 275)

<sup>21</sup> It is characteristic of the Round Table that symbolically it brings together rather than separates, which was confirmed by the results of the Round Table.

concerned the entire society. In fact, it was only an officially directed grand spectacle: the “games” for the masses. For the “Round Table” provided the necessary show, and discussions around it to a great extent concerned matters that were decided elsewhere, and about details. Certain subjects of fundamental importance for the state – foreign policy, defence, the apparatus of security, and the judiciary – did not have their tables or sub-tables; they were excluded from the talks.

In fact, the key questions were decided beyond these structures, during the confidential meetings of heads of delegations. The true and critic decisions, *rather not made in writing*,<sup>22</sup> were reached during talks in very narrow groups, mostly in the villa of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Magdalenka near Warsaw. To quote from the memoirs of Lech Kaczyński: “that side (i.e. communists – author’s note) from the start aimed only at mixing (socialising). Kiszczak (the actual architect of the Round Table) started the first evening from a declaration that there is plenty of vodka, and there is a rule here that you have to drink the first 30 rounds, and later only those who feel like drinking go on. The general approached everyone, and drank to them... First, there was no response to such a mood, yet with time many responded. (...) It cannot be forgotten either that this was an attempt – on the side of these politicians who represented our side (i.e. of Solidarity – author’s note) to ‘free the image of Solidarity elites from a spell’ among the communists; (...) There were, however, also other goals of socialising. The most intelligent representatives of the left wing of Solidarity already noticed a new ally. (...) They perceived an opportunity of taking over the party’s assets. (...) From my point of view, from Gdańsk, the intellectual resources the PZPR fell back on seemed weak, because the most precious people left the party after 1981. Yet there were still plenty of such people at the disposal of the communists in Warsaw at the time. Especially in the media. A question arose: who within that game would take over and manage these socially influential groups. I believe that Michnik succeeded in that to a great degree. (...) I treated these talks (of the Round Table – author’s note) as a chess move: the most appropriate at that specific time. Others treated the Round Table as a fundamental agreement between two elites, and this is an approach I cannot agree to” (S. Cenckiewicz, J. Kowalski, A. Chmielecki, A.K. Piekarska, 2013, p. 375).

As many as 13 of these confidential meetings were held, of which number, eight were working meetings and five – the meetings of co-chairs of the working teams. Two took place from September 1988 to February 1989, and the remaining 11 while the negotiations of the “Round Table” were already underway. “If on top of that one adds permanent organisational contacts and technical talks, one finds out that the confidential current of ‘Round Table’ negotiations was as extensive and intensive as the open negotiations. It goes without saying that this current was decisive for the successful finish of the Round Table” (K. Dubiński,<sup>23</sup> 1990, p. 13). It was at that time that the most important directions of the political transformation that followed were decided. Altogether 42 people were participating in the talks conducted there, yet actually significant were only several of them, with the decisive voice being that of the head of the MSW, General Czesław Kiszczak – the godfather of the “Round Table” on the side of “the uniformed party”. To a certain extent, also General Wojciech Jaruzelski was its participant: although he never actually visited Magdalenka, he steered his delegation from a distance through the numerous telephone conversations. On the “Solidarity-opposition” side, the key role (as far as participation in the changing negotiating teams and activity during the talks are concerned) were played not by

<sup>22</sup> It is explained further why this was not necessary.

<sup>23</sup> Dubiński was the secretary of the government-coalition party at the talks in Magdalenka.

union activists but “advisers”: Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Bronisław Geremek, Adam Michnik, and Jacek Kuroń. In the light of the above, this means that participating in the true negotiations of the “Round Table” (that is in Magdalenka) was not the government-and-coalition party, but the “uniformed party”, and on the other side – the “new” Solidarity in the persons of “advisers” – members of the Civic Committee and a handful of members of the NSZZ Solidarność Executive Committee; the contribution of the latter to the achieved consensus was decidedly smaller than that of the “advisers”. As construed by the members of the Civic Committee, the “Round Table” was a meeting of the “constructive” opposition with the reformer wing of the PZPR; the Committee was dominated by the conviction that the future of Poland needs building on the ground of a compromise with the PZPR. According to Adam Michnik, both the sides were weak, which is why they had to agree at a compromise: the powers that be were too weak to destroy the opposition entirely, and the opposition was too weak to overthrow them (*Gazeta Wyborcza* of 04 April 2006).

Unlike in the confidential agreements in Magdalenka, the “spectacle for the masses”, that is the negotiations of the “Round Table” at the Viceroy’s Palace were conducted in three main working teams, the so-called tables: for political reforms – 9 sessions (least of all, as the decisive talks were conducted in Magdalenka), for economy and social policy – 13 sessions, and for trade union pluralism – 10 sessions. The main political goals of the negotiations for the party-and-government side (or rather for the “uniformed party”) was to achieve the consent of selected representatives of the opposition, with the approval of the Church, for the replacement of the PZPR monopoly with the power of its leader holding the post of the President of the Republic. As far as the results of the negotiations at the “Round Table” are concerned, the greatest and in fact the only watershed agreement was achieved in the team for political reforms (which, let’s reiterate, held the least meetings) deciding about certain transformations of the previous constitutional system. These included: the restitution of the Senate and majority elections to the Senate; the quota elections to the Sejm (lower house of the Polish parliament) where 65% (constitutional majority) of seats were to be guaranteed for the ruling coalition and post-communist organisations of Catholics. Competing for the remaining 35% in free elections were candidates from beyond the party; the instituted the office of the President of the People’s Republic of Poland, elected by the Parliament for a six-year term; and a symbolic axis of the opposition to the media. The following must be mentioned as the achievements of the remaining teams: the concession to a change of the law on associations that would make it possible to re-legalisation of Solidarity and agreement of the “Position on social and economic policy and system reforms” yet without anything specific concerning the economic reforms. The decision about that was reached by the obedient “voting machine” in the Sejm, that is outside the “Round Table”. Little was achieved in matters concerning the reform of law and justice, limitation of the impact of the party nomenclature in economy, and constructions of the foundations for an actual local and regional self-government. Similarly, the success in the breaking of the PZPR monopoly in mass media was limited. All the systemic changes discussed above were approved with great haste on 7 April 1989. That is just 2 days after the conclusion of the Round Table talks by the last Sejm of the People’s Republic of Poland. This unusual haste of the “voting machine” proves not only the actual position and role of the Sejm in the People’s Republic of Poland but primarily is a proof that there were neither winners not losers in the wake of the round-table negotiations. Which means that the government-coalition party (the “uniformed party” in fact) achieved the assumed goal of negotiations.

Perhaps the most important achievement of the “uniformed party” at the Round Table, the foundation of today’s system and the source of political and business elites operating in the Polish Third Republic was the unwritten agreement which is still hardly present in the general perception. You do not trouble ours, we do not trouble yours.<sup>24</sup> Thanks to this quasi-constitutional decision, despite the passage of years, neither communist criminals nor the masterminds of the illegal martial law were brought to justice. Quite the contrary, they are honoured by state funerals with military assistance. The successive proof are the many of over-extensive investigations, the best known of which is the one concerning the aeroplane crash in Smolensk in 2010, in which elites of the Polish State died, conducted for five years by the direct descendants of the high-ranking staff of the secret service of the People’s Republic of Poland, and which is more and more reminiscent of the report of general Tatiana Anodina of the Russian Interstate Aviation Committee. (D. Kania, 08.04.2015)

In the political plans of generals Wojciech Jaruzelski and Czesław Kiszczak, a compromise with the selected representatives of a part of opposition, which they opted for under the pressure of the economic collapse of the country and the withdrawal of the Soviet support, did not at all aim at the construction of a true democracy and a true free-market economy. The key was only a partial reform of the system with the maintenance of a controlling interest in the hands of the authorities.<sup>25</sup> Obviously, there was a risk that the situation could get out from under the control while carrying out such a plan. Yet even if that happened, Kiszczak and Jaruzelski had a guarantee of impunity, which leaders of a part of the opposition agreed to in Magdalenka. “If just a captain of secret service was in possession of files which made him a millionaire and ensured the financial future of his relatives for a number of generations, what files must have been there in the hands of his superior colonels, and in the hands of their superior generals, and in the hands of generals Kiszczak and Jaruzelski, and finally what files could be found in Moscow? How many cabinets such as the one that belonged to the captain are there in Poland and Russia? How many people who influence the life of the whole country and make the decisions that are crucial for it live in the fear of the past being disclosed and behave as puppets bereft of any free will, drawn by the strings, and following of the will of the one who holds their ends?” (W. Sumliński, 2015 p. 173). Thus, even if the opposition did not want to honour its obligations in future (whether written or spoken) towards the people of the “government-coalition party”, entering the play were the biographies of its leaders with all their weaknesses and life’s mistakes that were fully known to general Kiszczak, the head of the MSW.<sup>26</sup> This was the essence of the controlling interest of the establishment. This knowledge efficiently paralysed the opposition, which due to this fact was incapable of

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<sup>24</sup> In one of his later appearances at the court, Jaruzelski mentioned that and suggested that if the past of some activists of the opposition were vetted, many would have lost their glory.

<sup>25</sup> A phrase Jaruzelski used in a conversation with Egon Krenz, leader of the GDR on 02.11.1989.


<sup>26</sup> The best proof is the night of 4 June 1992, when the cabinet of Jan Olszewski was abolished not to preclude vetting and decommunisation. This is one of the accounts, by one of the authors of the film *Nocna zmiana*: “to this day I cannot forget that horrifying atmosphere of a drama that accompanied the events of 4 June at the Sejm. The sense of previously unknown mechanisms and the force of addiction of politicians to the sins of the past coming to the surface was incapacitating. The people with – as it seemed – immaculate pasts behaved as horrified victims of blackmail. Journalists of no prominent political affiliations suddenly turned into automatons reciting texts somebody else had written. Handful of moments portraying the fervour of Tomasz Lis and other journalists preparing viewers for the abolition of the government says today more than hundreds of articles” (P. Semka, 2013, p. 235).

conducting farther going political and economic changes, while the leading leaders of the opposition – a party in the negotiations, frequently repeated the slogan *pacta sunt servanda* as justification. Thus, the Round Table is a symbol of compromise conducted under the impact of the “catches” in its participants’ dossiers.

From today’s perspective, we can say that taking active part in the negotiations of the Round Table were the first three presidents of the Polish Third Republic, five future prime ministers, four future deputy prime ministers, six future speakers (marshals) and deputy speakers of the Sejm and Senate, more than 75 future ministers and vice ministers, around 100 future MPs, a handful of future presidents of the Supreme Court and other courts, and editors-in-chief of newspapers. It would be impossible to comment upon it in any other way but ascertaining that this time, the co-opting was successful. This can be explained by the fact that solidarity of many former oppositionists with communists had informal roots, as many of them were connected with a variety of ties of family, friendship, and other nature with those governing the People’s Republic of Poland. Eventually, the former links and schemes proved stronger than the solidarity with “the working people” who brought them to power. Instead of building a coherent society, the dissatisfaction among the people was reduced by the recruitment and co-optation of former activists and cooperators of the Solidarity Trade Union to the camp of power.

The most important figures of the “Round Table” were beyond doubt Lech Wałęsa, who trusted his advisers Bronisław Geremek and Tadeusz Mazowiecki, and a representative of the Church – Andrzej Stelmachowski. He carefully observed a balance between the advisers of the “secular left” and the intellectuals enjoying the trust of the Church. At the Round Table, he was playing a big game, as a politician of international standing with specific political ambitions rather than a worker and trade unionist. Actually, from the night of 31 August 1988 when, having returned from the first meeting with Kiszczak, Lech Wałęsa only informed the shipyard workers on strike in Gdańsk that he was taking a seat at the “Round Table”, Solidarity lost any influence on the developments. Although the autumn talks in Magdalenka, preparing the “Round Table” were still authorised by Solidarity, yet after the institution of the Civic Committee, trade unionists did not play a major role in it. The only “trace” of trade union activity was the repeated claim to re-legalise Solidarity. The closer to the end of the negotiations, the stronger was the position acquired by Adam Michnik and Jacek Kuroń – the representatives of the “secular left” who very quickly became the best chums of the young communist reformers, notably Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Leszek Miller, that is the *Chamy*. The submissiveness of the leaders of Solidarity’s left-wing, and especially of the “advisers” to “Lech” in return gave them absolute control over the development of the civic movement of Solidarity. On the power of decision of the KKW of Solidarity of 4 April 1989, the organisation of the elections and the arrangement of candidate list for the June election was entrusted to the secretariat of the Civic Committee, headed by Bronisław Geremek. A few days later, the committee set up a 14-person-strong electoral team, whose management was taken over by Jacek Kuroń. These key positions were used by the Solidarity controlled by the “secular left” to push through majority of the candidates. The KO approved a list of 161 candidates of the opposition on 23 April. This is how, after 20 years, the conciliation between *Chamy* and *Żydy* was being born.

The first conflict between the National Executive Committee and the Civic Committee started relatively quickly, as still before the second round of the elections. Beyond doubt, the leaders of Solidarity began to sense that the political gravity among the opposition began to shift strongly from Solidarity towards the Civic Committee.



Crowned with the decisions of the Round Table, the process was certainly “a controlled revolution” that is the beginning of the systemic changes in Poland, where from the earliest days, the element of *top-down control and control* of changes conducted by the old elites and carefully selected view ones took the upper hand over the lively character of the dissatisfied society and limitation of its spontaneity to the minimum. (A. Dudek, p. 335)

According to a legend of Solidarity, Andrzej Gwiazda, (A. Gwiazda, 6 February 2014), after Mikhail Gorbachev announced the perestroika and the military doctrine of Brezhnev was called off, the fall of communism in the entire eastern block was imminent. “The Round Table was a consent to the introduction of capitalism in Poland by General Czesław Kiszczak, and Poland playing the role of a training ground.” This means that since 1986 communism in Poland can be said to have been maintained only by the will of the Polish. The former opponentist believes that “the manner of rejecting communism in Poland was a moral, political, and economic catastrophe. The Round Table happened only in Poland – there was none in any other country, and yet communism also ended there without bloodshed. That is why I can only repeat the remark that meeting at the Round Table were case officers with their secret collaborators”.<sup>27</sup> The selection of negotiators at the Round Table is as a rule

<sup>27</sup> One of comments to the conversation found online: 6 February 2014, wPolityce.pl.: “The round table – it is a solid slap in the face of thousands of authentic oppositionists, who fought for free Fatherland. The round table – this is the green light for mobster post-communist arrangements in all fields of economy, and in consequence to the robbery of the achievements of many generations of

clearly assessed by the so-called “non-constructive”, that is pro-independence, opposition. “I’d like to take a look at the so-called ‘breakthrough’. The one who set at the Round Table, because I believe that there were actually never two parties. There was one. If one took a look at the biographies of the ‘solidarity and opposition’ side and how majority of its representatives found themselves at home in the contacts with the ‘governmental side’, how perfectly well they managed to reach agreement with the representatives, [one would see that] sitting actually at that Table were chums. Sitting there were the progeny of those who were moved away from the power in October 1956 and March 1968 – that is the *Żydy* with those who removed them from the power – that is the *Chamy*. Both groups enrolled a handful of useful idiots. And we have what we have” (A. Zaorska 06.05.2013).

To sum up, the “Round Table” is actually a collusion of two factions. The first are the “reformer wing” of the PZPR that originated among the *Chamy*, that is the “uniformed party” – more acutely and realistically assessing the dynamics of the political situation in the aspect of their future history and remaining at power. The other are the *Żydy*, who renamed themselves to the “secular left” which “melded” into Solidarity when it perceived an opportunity to return to power by allying with the “party’s right wing” at the cost of resigning from the ideals of fighting for the full independence of Poland and the construction of a new economic and political system. (See: A. Macierewicz, w *Sieci* 9-15 September 2013). As it has been repeatedly mentioned, this was a consequence of the presence of two currents in Solidarity, reflecting two currents of opposition and more broadly – of the political establishment. The first, oriented at the nation and independence, which fought for the free, democratic, and Christian Poland, and the other, which in the eyes of many did not identify with Solidarity, is the revisionist-communist current; its goal was to channel the energy of the Union on the removal of “the errors of communism” through the worker committees and local trade unions. The “Round Table” was an opportunity to join the communist team currently holding power. In one of TV programmes in mid-1989 Adam Michnik remarked ironically that as some see it the red agreed with the pink at the “Round Table”. Although the intention of his statement was to mock and to disavow some positions – already at the time divergent – finally, after 25 years of the Polish Third Republic, it is seen *that these were the reds (i.e. the “uniformed party”) who reached an understanding with the pink (“secular left”) disregarding the third party (the independence current)*. A telling corroboration of this statement is the fact that the independence current (as an entire current and not certain politicians connected thereto) won the parliamentary elections and for a short time took over full power, *not earlier* however than in 2005. Thus, the “Round Table” is a classical political deal of one with another, bypassing (at the account?) of the third. In its result, the communist nomenclature – without being made accountable for the nearly 50 years of government – smoothly passed from the People’s Republic of Poland to the Polish Third Republic (frequently called PRL revisited) where it plays the role of comprador bourgeoisie. In the Polish Third Republic, those governing the PRL transformed into politicians and influential businesspeople drawing the puppets by the strings. It is in this way that the joint effort of the authorities of the PRL and the “new” Solidarity, “reformed” and created from top to bottom, started after the announcement of the “new thinking” in the Soviet Union, and accepted and even supported by the West (interested in keeping peace in Poland and regaining the money lent), led to the presentation of the operation of the “Round Table” to the Polish people as a historical act of “*crushing communism*”.

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Poles, by their recent oppressors. The round table, is the date of the greatest dishonour and the greatest scam in the past century.”

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## **IV. Honoured Personality**



# LAUDATIO

à l'honneur du Professeur Georges CONTOGEOGIS de  
l'Université Panteion d'Athènes

**Georges CONTOGEOGIS**, né en 1947, docteur d'Etat (Université de Paris II) et agrégé de Science Politique (Université de Thessalonique) est professeur à l'Université Panteion d'Athènes et au Master en Etudes Européennes de Sienne (Italie). Il est également membre correspondant de l'Académie Internationale de la Culture Portugaise.

Titulaire de la chaire **Francois** (1991-92) à l'ULB et **Directeur de Recherche au CNRS** (2000), il a enseigné dans plusieurs Universités: à l'I.E.P. de Paris et aux Universités de Montpellier I, de Dauphine, de Toulouse, de Louvain la Neuve, de La Rochelle, des IEP de Bordeaux, de Lille et de Strasbourg, à l'Université de Québec, de Tokyo, de la Sapienza de Rome, de Cesare Alfieri de Florence, de Genova, Genève, de l'Autonome de Barcelone, de Madrid, de Salamanca, de Grenade, de Coimbra, de Lisbonne, de Ponta Delgada, de Siegen, de Berlin, de Hanovre, de Pékin, de Shanghai, de Taiwan, de Sofia, d'Oradea, de Tirana, de Maribor, etc.



Il fut également membre-fondateur et premier Secrétaire Général de l'**Association Hellénique de Science Politique** (1975 - 1981), **Recteur de l'Université Panteion** d'Athènes (1984 - 1990), membre du Conseil Supérieure et du Conseil de Recherche de l'**Institut Universitaire Européen de Florence** (1985-1994) (ainsi que du Comité pour sa réforme constitutionnelle), membre directeur du **Conseil National de la Recherche et de la Technologie** (Grèce) et du **Conseil scientifique de l'École doctorale de l'Université de Coimbra**.

Président - Directeur Général de la **Société Hellénique de RadioTélévision Publique (ERT)** à deux reprises (1985, 1989), **Ministre de Service** chargé de la communication et des médias et porte-parole du gouvernement (1993), éditorialiste à la **presse quotidienne** d'Athènes, membre du Conseil d'Administration de la **Fondation Nationale des Bourses (IKY)**, membre du **Conseil National de l'Éducation Supérieure** (1984-1990) et du **Centre Universitaire d'Interprétation** (1982-1985), membre du **Barreau d'Athènes**, etc.

Il est membre de plusieurs **associations scientifiques**, grecques, nationales (y comprise l'**Association française de Science Politique**) et internationales, ainsi que membre du **comité scientifique** de la revue de science politique `Pôle Sud` (Université de Montpellier), correspondant scientifique de la **Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée**, Membre Honoraire d'**Eurolimes**, du Comité Editorial du **Journal Southeastern Europe**, membre du conseil scientifique de la **Revue Science politique** (Université de Crète), de **The Romanian Journal of International Relations and European Studies**, de la **Tribune des sciences sociales** (Université de Thessalie), de la **Revue des recherches sociales (EKKE-Centre National des Recherches Sociales)**. Il est aussi membre du conseil central de **Conseil National de Recherche et de Technologie ESET** (Athènes, 2003-) et de la **Fondation Hellénique de la Culture EIP** (2005-).

Depuis 1987, il est coordinateur de plusieurs programmes d'échange **ERASMUS** et pour plus de quinze ans **experts de la Commission Européenne** sur des questions universitaires et responsable académique de programmes **SOCRATES-ERASMUS** pour son Université. Enfin, il est membre - fondateur du **Réseau Européen de Science politique** dont il

fut parti du **Comité d'Administration** (de l'**EPSNET**) 1996-2001. Il fut également fondateur du **premier DEA/Master européen de science politique à l'IEP de Paris**, (avec la participation de l'IEP de Paris, de l'UCL et de Panteion) pour lequel la **RIPC** a consacré un numéro (1/1998) et membre du **Master en Études Européennes de l'Université de Sienne**, auquel participent 14 universités. En 1996, il a été **au comité d'organisation d'une grande Conférence à l'IEP de Paris sur la situation de la science politique en Europe**.

Son mandat de **Recteur** fut lié à la **réforme universitaire** qui a abouti à la **transformation des cinq Grandes Écoles, y compris de Panteion, en Universités**, la création de plusieurs départements et centres de recherche, l'ouverture de l'université vers la société et le monde étranger.

Il a organisé ou participé à un grand nombre des colloques nationaux ou internationaux tandis que beaucoup de ses œuvres sont publiés dans plusieurs pays: **France, Italie, Portugal, Belgique, Espagne, Allemagne, Roumanie, Bulgarie, USA, Japon** etc.

En tant que **PDG de l'ERT** il effectua la **réforme institutionnelle et l'ouverture démocratique des médias** en Grèce. En vertu de cette qualité il fut à l'origine du projet pour la création de la **première Grande Autorité Hellénique**, chargée des affaires de **médias**.

**Principaux domaines de recherche actuelle: Gnoséologie cosmo systémique.** La construction d'un nouveau système de connaissance scientifique qui vise la reconstitution du cadre conceptuel et méthodologique des sciences sociales ainsi que l'élaboration d'une approche de la cosmohistoire en termes de son évolution cosmosystémique. Cette démarche cosmosystémique en sciences sociales permettra à la «modernité» de dépasser sa période scientifique «pré-historique» afin de redéfinir des concepts fondamentaux (tels que la démocratie, la liberté, l'égalité, le statocentrisme, etc) en fonction de leur propre contenu, d'établir une typologie des phénomènes socio-économiques et politiques en harmonie avec leur propre nature et de soumettre notre époque dans le sillage évolutif de la cosmohistoire. Cette démarche permettra à la «modernité» de se poser la question de son avenir en perspective.

Concernant ses relations avec l'Université d'Oradea, elles datent depuis 2003, lors de la participation de notre université dans le réseau du Master Européen «Building Europe». Il a participé à Oradea en 2004 au colloque intitulé *Mass-Media and Good Governance in the context of EU Enlargement*. Grâce aux bonnes relations avec les collègues du Département de Relations Internationales, matérialisées dans la présence à Athènes des étudiants et professeurs d'Oradea a travers le programme Erasmus, en 2012 a été traduit en roumain le livre *Democratia greaca la Rigas din Velestino (La démocratie grecque a Rigas de Velestino)*, qui a été lancé après à Cluj, Bucarest et Craiova. Du 2011 à 2013 le professeur Contogeorgis a fait partie comme membru du projet *Initiative and Constraint in the Mapping of Evolving European Borders (ICMEEB)*, financé par le programme Jean Monnet, Key Activity 1 (2011-2013) coordonné par professeur Ioan Horga. De nouveau il est présent à Oradea début juin 2013 lors de la clôture du projet et de la dissémination des résultats du projet. Egalement, il a été parmi les personnalités présentes à cette occasion pour l'anniversaire de 10 ans d'existence du Département de Relations internationales et Etudes Européennes à Oradea.

Aussi il a été très actif en ce qui concerne la publication dans les revues du département, en *Eurolimes* 5 articles et en *Analele Universitatii din Oradea, Seria Relatii Internationale. Studii Europene* (Les Annales de l'Université d'Oradea, Série Relations Internationales et Etudes Européennes) 1 article.

Suite à cette prodigieuse activité scientifique et didactique, à sa contribution qui a fait valoir l'activité des collègues d'Oradea dans le monde scientifique international, le Sénat de l'Université d'Oradea a décidé dans sa séance du novembre 2014 à lui conférer le titre de Docteur Honoris Causa de l'Université d'Oradea.

## **Recommandation**

Concernant la recommandation à décerner le titre de *Doctor Honoris Causa* de l'Université d'Oradea à Monsieur le Professeur dr. **Georges Contogeorgis** de l'Université Panteion d'Athènes, Grèce.

Monsieur le Professeur, **dr. Ioan HORGA**, le doyen de la Faculté d'Histoire, Relations Internationales, Sciences Politiques et Sciences de la Communication, Université d'Oradea, je fais les appréciations suivantes en appuyant le décernement du titre de *Doctor Honoris Causa* à Monsieur le Professeur dr. Georges Contogeorgis de l'Université Panteion d'Athènes, Grèce.

Parmi les nombreuses collaborations avec des universités de l'étranger, que notre Université, surtout la Faculté d'Histoire, Relations Internationales, Sciences Politiques et Sciences de la Communication entretient après 1990, l'Université Panteion d'Athènes, Grèce se situe parmi les premières institutions d'enseignement européen avec des anciennes traditions, par continuité, conséquence et intérêt scientifique.

Dans ce sens, la personnalité qui a fait possible le développement des relations roumaines-hellènes et, spécialement l'Université d'Oradea et l'Université Panteion d'Athènes, Grèce, a été Monsieur le Prof dr. Georges Contogeorgis, Docteur de l'Université de Paris II Sorbonne, qui est professeur de sciences politiques dans le cadre du département de Sciences Politiques de l'Université de Panteion.

Tout au long de son activité académique et publique, il a occupé une série de fonctions prestigieuses. Il a été Recteur de l'Université Panteion, Président et Directeur de l'ERT (La Radio et la Télévision publique de Grèce) et le Ministre de la Presse et Mass-média.

Il est membre fondateur de plusieurs réseaux européens, associations européennes, conseils, tels que : membre fondateur du *European Political Science Network (EPSNET)*, membre du Conseil Supérieur et du Conseil de Recherche de l'Institut Universitaire Européen de Florence.

Tout au long de son activité éditorialiste, dans le domaine des sciences politiques, il a publié une série de livres, plus de 200 articles et chapitres.

De ses nombreux livres qui ont été publiés dans des langues de circulations internationales, le livre *La 'Démocratie Hellénique' de Rigas Velestinlis*, Patakis, Athènes, 2008 a été traduit en roumain inclus et publié en 2012 sous l'égide de l'Institut d'Etudes Euro-régionales. Ensemble avec le livre publié en roumain, nous mentionnons d'autres livres, tels que : *Systèmes économiques et liberté*, Sideris, Athènes, 2010, *De la nation et de la continuité hellénique*, Athènes, 2011, *L'Europe et le Monde*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2011; *De l'Europe politique*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2011. *Particratie et État dynastique*, Athènes, 2012; *Les Oligarques*, Athènes, 2014; *Le cosmosystème hellénique. t.2. La période de la construction œcuménique*, Athènes, 2014.

Vu la longue et consistante contribution, concernant le serrement des relations universitaires et scientifiques entre nos pays, le décernement du titre de *Doctor Honoris Causa* de l'Université d'Oradea à Monsieur le Professeur dr. **Georges Contogeorgis**, personnalité marquante du monde académique contemporaine dans le domaine des sciences politiques, est un geste qui récompense la longue collaboration entre l'Université

Panteion d'Athènes, Grèce et l'Université d'Oradea. L'effort de Monsieur le Professeur d'initier et de continuer cette collaboration est une garantie du maintien et du développement des liaisons académiques par les jeunes générations d'universitaires grecs et roumains dans les années à venir.

Oradea,  
Prof. univ. dr. Ioan HORGA

## **V. Book Reviews**



## INTERCULTURALISM IN FOREIGN POLICY

*Eduard Ionuț FEIER\**

**Review of:** Melania-Gabriela CIOT, *Book entitled „Idiosyncrasies and interculturalism in Foreign Policy Decision-Making”*, Editura Academia Română. Centrul de Studii Transilvane, Cluj-Napoca, 2015, ISBN: 978-606-8694-16-0, 170 p.

One of the main objectives of EU is human rights promotion, domestically and globally. Human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights are values of the EU. Since 2009, with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter of Fundamental Rights brings together all these rights in a special act.

Therefore, I chose to study this issue in detail. *Book entitled „Idiosyncrasies and interculturalism in Foreign Policy Decision-Making”*, the author is Associate Professor Melania Gabriela Ciot, complements our sphere of interest.


Associate Professor Gabriela Melania Ciot teaches courses in *International Negotiations, European Negotiations, Idiosyncrasies in Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process, Psychology of Decision-Making*. She holds a PhD in Educational Sciences from Ghent University Belgium, and one in International Relations and European Studies from Babes-Bolyai University. Gabriela Ciot has an intense scientific and research activity, which includes books, articles and studies in international and national journals.<sup>1</sup>

In this volume, the author manages to describe topics such as local Identity, regional and national Transylvania, globalization and regionalization in the European Union. Other exciting topics which she has brought to our interest are negotiation process for joining the European Union or speaking about the people with disabilities but eliminating social barriers. Precursor ideas of the present volume are anchored in European integration theories.

The book is written in six chapters in order to be read easily. This book is published in 2015 at the Romanian Academy Publishing, 170 p.

Introduction and Chapter I through which the author of the book presents the theoretical framework resorting to classic political science but also to its own concept that identifies the subject and key concepts: **nationalization, regionalization and local identity** in Transylvania in the process of European integration.

In an interesting article written by author William L. Benyon (2012) there is reference to European identity and the author distinguishes two important elements: first element is that various European civilization were hybrid creations and the second element was that the concept of Europe is inherently oppositional.



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<sup>1</sup> <http://euro.ubbcluj.ro/studii-europene-si-guvernanta/conferentiar-univ-dr-gabriela-ciot/> , accesat la data de 02.02.2016

The author Benzon in his article spoke about another notion which is layered identity and this new notion is more acceptable than multiple identities.

Academician David Prodan said that Transylvania is considered a land of tolerance and noted a fundamental element which is the inter-confessionalism.

In the second and third chapters notions such as **globalization, regionalization** and **people with disabilities** are the key concepts of these chapters. To justify these concepts, the author of the book tells about the opportunities of this new trend - **globalization**. This globalization brings many benefits to the society but creates new risks such as financial instability.

Globalization seen as a more general process that includes globalization, is "characterized by multiplying the acceleration and intensification of economic, political, social interactions and cultural relations between actors in different parts of the world" (Tardif, Farchy, 2006: 107-108) . This cultural globalization, is a generalized one, and has the same influence across Europe. <sup>2</sup>

Chapter three examines the disabled and giving up social barriers. In the context of globalization, the European Union had to find a solution for the diversity management. The process of eliminating barriers, walls or lines that divide countries may be one of the accession process, the candidate country is engaged in a process of harmonization to apply Community *acquis*.

Nelson says in 1996 „ people with disabilities are portrayed as *different* or as people who may not fit within the mainstream. This affects the public view about the disability.”<sup>3</sup>

Vasilescu said in 2003 that we live in a world of discriminations. In some particular cases caused by language, sex and religion leads to various conflicts.

Chapter four is an integral part of this volume where it is identified and analysed the negotiation process for accession of Romania to the European Union. The author of the volume, describes this in detail though the European Council took a major decision for the accession to the European Union on 16th-17th of December 2004. The EU Accession Treaty was signed one year later in April 2005 and Romania joined with full rights member on 1 January 2007.

The accession negotiation is based on a win-win formula: process of discovery (it means that the parties say exactly what they want, what they intend and what they offer), strategic interaction (the parties influence each other), and exchange process.

Two important elements in negotiation are: technical level and political level.

In chapter five, the author of the book relates issues such as idiosyncrasies in the foreign policy decision-making (emotional idiosyncrasies).

One of the important areas in the foreign policy is the decision-making of research because the way in which decisions are taken can determine o possible choice to fail. An important actor can reach the result depending on how the decision was taken. The author of the book writes that „some decisions are carefully calculated, while others are intuitive”<sup>4</sup>.

Jackson Robert and Georg Sorensen in the book *Introduction in international relations. Theories and approaches* (2007, p.234) they write for the individual decision-

<sup>2</sup> Ioan Horga, Mircea Brie, “*Europe: Internal Cultural Frontiers or Union Cultural Area*”, *Moldoscopie* nr.3, 2010, Chișinău, p.123-143

<sup>3</sup> Melania Gabriela Ciot “ *Idiosyncrasies and interculturalism in foreign policy decision-making*” Romanian Academy Centre for Transylvanian Studies, Cluj-Napoca 2015, p.63

<sup>4</sup> Melania Gabriela Ciot “ *Idiosyncrasies and interculturalism in foreign policy decision-making*” Romanian Academy Centre for Transylvanian Studies, Cluj-Napoca 2015, p.109

making level, the limitations are related to the way in which information is perceived and processed.

The last chapter of the book presents the enlargement process and the dividing lines of Europe. Enlargement of the European Union is a historic opportunity to unite Europe peacefully after generations of division and conflict. Enlargement will extend the EU's stability and prosperity to a wider group of countries, consolidating the political and economic transition that has taken place in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989.

A successful enlargement demands the active involvement and support of people both in the member states and the applicant countries. In all the applicant countries, there are likely to a referendum on membership, and in the EU the accession treaty will need approval by the European Parliament and ratification by national parliaments.

The author writes that the EU represents a supranational institutional and procedural ensemble, which proposed to realize common objectives and values. The European Union in the context of globalization had to find a good solution for the diversity and to erase the existing dividing lines from the interior. The same author asks if the enlargement policy was meant to increase the competitiveness of the European Union?

To write some personal conclusions, the European integration can be considered as a mechanism of intergovernmental negotiation, whose core elements are the formal States. They have harmonized EU interests for the engine to operate, and when they failed to reach a consensual agreement, a true paralysis of the function occurred. States therefore have diverging interests, by putting them at the negotiating table, Europeans no longer dispute the differences on the battlefield.

A great addition was brought by the present study, and is also the incontestable quality of Mrs Associate professor, it is a thorough analysis on inter-culturalism in foreign policy.

The author expresses vehemently views on this, recognizing that PE is not a neutral institution but in the centre are interests that represent democracy.

In my opinion, the book is very good to read because you develop a general culture of intercultural dialogue that is the most important current and interest topic for debate today. All along, the book there are also discussed topics such as globalization and regionalization in the European Union.

Overall the author of the book discovers new horizons for intercultural dialogue in foreign policy decision-making.

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


## EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND HIS POWERS IN FULL PROGRESS

*Alexandra RADU\**

**Review of:** Corina Turșie, *Jocuri de putere în Uniunea Europeană: Actori, mecanisme și efecte ale creșterii puterii Parlamentului European*, Editura Universității de Vest, Timișoara, Aula Magna Collection, 2015, ISBN 978-973-125-455-5

The European Union is built through a **unique institutional system in the world**, the member states delegating certain sovereignty attributes to some supranational institutions, which together represent the common interests of the union<sup>1</sup>. This paradox through which the member countries mandate some of their competences (for which they have fought along centuries) to the European institutions, especially that of the European Parliament<sup>2</sup>, is for us, personally, a subject of maximum interest. Especially for that, we have chosen to study in detail this aspect, and the work “*Power Games in the European Union: Actors, Mechanisms and effects of the power’s growth in the European Parliament*”, comes to complete our sphere of interest.



**Corina Turșie** is a teacher who through her work brings a plus to the university centre in Timișoara, on a national level and even international one. She is a university lecturer at the Faculty of Political Sciences, Philosophy and Communication Sciences from the West University of Timișoara, and along her career she has benefited of prestigious research stages at well known European Universities, such as Universite Libre de Bruxelles. At the moment, she is the beneficiary of a postdoctoral research scholarship at the West University of Timișoara, with a study applied on the program European Cultural Capital. Her preoccupations are generally linked to the wide subject of the European integration, reason for which she has published volumes such as *The Politics of the European Union*, but also specialty articles.

**The problematic of the present volume** represents in fact the institutional changes, the complex attributes offered to the European Parliament, competences that can be regarded as essential elements of the potential parliamentisation process of the European Union. Thus, the paper can be framed in the broad field of *International Relations and European Studies*.

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<sup>1</sup> *Instituții ale Uniunii Europene*, <https://dreptmd.wordpress.com/teze-de-an-licenta/institutiile-ale-uniunii-europene/>, accessed in 14 of February 2016

<sup>2</sup> Flore Pop, *Uniunea Europeană: Drept, instituții și politici comunitare, Note de curs*, Universitatea Babeș Bolyai Cluj Napoca, 2013-2014, file:///C:/Users/Alexandra/Downloads/Institutiile%20politice%20UE%20(1).pdf, accessed in 14 of February 2016

The precursory ideas of the present volume are anchored in the theories of the European integration and the cleavage lines between them. The substantiating of the working hypotheses have been structured on three indicators **actors, mechanisms and effects**, these standing at the basis of the whole process.

Once with the creation of the European Community of Coal and steel, the term European Parliament doesn't exist. There is only a proto-parliament<sup>3</sup>, the Common Assembly, organism seen by the great paleontologists of the time as being without too many chances to succeed. Nevertheless this embryo created following the Treaty of Paris starts to shape through the new attributions and competences offered by the treaties of the European Union. This institution was to meet an exceptional institutional destiny, having as defining feature, the slow but continuous conquering of new powers, which lead him toward a parliamentary organism of modern democracies.

The European Parliament has the most spectacular route, becoming an institution with complex competences, resulted from the states' decisions, legislated through the treaties that stood at the base of the European construction, but also from the MEP's actions. The Treaty of Lisbon offers this organism attributions and power levers without precedent<sup>4</sup>, and through the present volume, it is being tried to show the way in which this institution is an indicator, a condition of the parliamentisation process. In the same time, the author has turned her attention on the analogy between the classic scheme of power separation in the state and the sharing of the institutional power in the EU, but the union's institutional structure can be a particular one, totally new, a clear delimitation between the powers of the institutions being absent.

Thus, we can speak about **a power and interests game on a European level**, the balance being able to change by changing the rules of the game.

Another preoccupation of the present work is the mechanisms/levers by which institutional changes of the EP take place in the direction to parliament the EU, starting from de Institutional Analysis Development (IAD) model, structured in three different rule levels: *the constitutional level, that of the collective choice, operational*, with the mention that changes from a level affect the other levels.

There arises the problem of the circularity of institutional changes in the European parliament, thus, the sense **of the changes from top to bottom**, from states that influence the normal behavior of MEP, and the movements **from bottom to top**, from MEP through the informal practices, affect the member states.

Many from the customary rules have been prescribed through the treaties when it could put pressure on other institutions. It can be understood here that the blocking of the legislative process when his own interests have not been satisfied. This scenario is one of the factors that have contributed in the ascension of the EP's power.

The volume is structured into **four big parts**.

**In the first** part of the volume, we find *The Introduction and Chapter I* by which it is presented the theoretical part used along the way, calling for the classic political

<sup>3</sup> Corina Turşie, *Parlamentul European și Tratatul de la Lisabona. UE către un regim parlamentarizat?*, Sfera Politicii, <http://www.sferapoliticii.ro/sfera/147/art07-tursie.html> , accessed in 15 of February 2016

<sup>4</sup> Ioan Horga, Cristina Dogot, *Le Parlement Européen et la Démocratisation du Processus Décisionnel Européen*, in *The Romanian Review of European Governance Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1, June 2009, pp.23-24, [http://reviste.ubbcluj.ro/rregs/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/No.1\\_Art.2.pdf](http://reviste.ubbcluj.ro/rregs/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/No.1_Art.2.pdf) , accessed in 16 of February 2016

science but also for an **own concept** through which the study matter and key concepts are identified: **parliamentisation** that has at its base three big criteria (*the democratic character of the EU, the EP's powers and the modification of the institutional forces report*) and **the growth of the EP's power**. This institution is seen as a unitary actor preoccupied by the European integrity, where the major beneficiary is itself, and preferences of the member states vary according to the subject. In what concerns the negotiations between the states, these are seen as a *zero-sum game*. Regarded through the first lens of study, the pattern conceived by the author in a proper manner, the states have given powers to the European Parliament in order to combat de democratic deficit, being a result of the institutional mimesis<sup>5</sup>.

Further on in **Part II** we find the *second and third chapters*. **The actors** are the key concepts **of the second chapter**, seen through the participation in the growth of the EP's power. In order to argument the hypothesis, according to which, this growth of the power is the result of the states' voluntary action, the *Community law*, the treaties being its origins, they being seen as a result of the inter-governmental negotiations. The novelty in the domain of European studies but in the same time plus the reside value from the analysis of the European Union's member states integration *vision* in what concerns the European integration and the growth of the EP's power. The main factors that have influenced the states' vision on the growth of the EP competences have been *the political beliefs regarding the method, intensity and finality of the European integration*. In addition, the fact that the European institutions have adopted the competences of the national ones is considered as useful in the combat of the democratic deficit. According to this conception, the growth of the EP's power is the solution that the states have found in order to solve the problem of the democratic deficit. It has also been analyzed the manner that the member states use the growth of Parliament's power as a strategic exchange currency in the intra and inter-institutional negotiations.

**Chapter three** analyzes the parliamentary discourses of the MEP and also their vision on the evolution of the EP and the EU integration, as well as the EP relations with other institutions from the beginning of the 50s until now, in order to analyze their evolution. Their study has brought to light the fact that the European Parliament is seen as a greedy institution, found in full gradual changing process, but suffering due to the community treaties that have proved to be incomplete. Besides, there have been take into consideration the informal factors such as *opinions, values and behaviors* manifested by European leaders, heads of state, ministers from intergovernmental negotiations in order to identify the vision of each states in what concerns the growth of the EP power and the parliamentisation process. Following the analysis of discourses, we can say that the MEP have established the following causal link, that is the EP does not serve the interest of the Europeans it represents unless this fact brings with it the growth of the personal influence in the European political system.

**Chapter four** is integrated part of the **third part** of the present volume where the **growth mechanism of the EP** is identified and analyzed. These are developed in an explaining manner with reference to the **circularity of the EP ascension** and though an analytic model on two levels that regard the reform of the treaties and the level of the current European politics where MEP have the important role of precursors of the European integration advancement. This duality explains the hypothesis of the growth of

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<sup>5</sup> Corina Turşie, *Jocuri de putere în Uniunea Europeană.. Actori, Mecanisme și efecte ale creșterii puterii Parlamentului European*, Editura Universității de Vest, Timișoara, 2015, pp. 82.

the EP's power, being identified three mechanisms in this sense, which is *the claim, the change of the internal rules of the EP and the inter-institutional agreements*<sup>6</sup> Behind the conquering of new attributions, the EP's powers are restricted by treaties, that offer the institutional frame of the European construction, and the role of this chapter is to show the levers by which this institution has expanded its competences in order to implement its own vision.

**The last part** presents the effects of the ascension of the EP's power, having at its base the subject of the European Union's parliamentisation. Its is arisen the problem of the directions toward which the European democracy heads, taking into consideration the fact that and informal governance means less transparency, so less democracy. Still in the last chapter it is presented the binominal parliamentisation – democratization of the EU. Despite the direct choice and growth without precedent of the own prerogatives, the European Parliament doesn't manage yet to mobilize European citizens, enjoying a limited notoriety. In the same time, although there can be noticed a tendency of the EU's parliamentisation, it is only one of the progressive logics of the European construction. In fact, the parliamentisation's logic is associated with the presumption of the birth of a European political system inspired from national realities, and the European democracy is associated with a replica on European scale of the national free-democracy. These are the effects of the approaches through which Europe tries to build its own model of democracy, but which has at its base matters of national applicability. Their transposition at the trans-national level is being tried, where we find participation instruments in embryo stage and which valorizes the cohesion, the solidarity, the diversity and deliberation.

It is thus aimed the *identification of the actors, EP- European Committee and mechanisms causality, institutional changes* in the EP regarded as a growing vector of power in the matter of the European construction's growth in a parliamentized regime.

### Conclusions

European integration can be regarded as an intergovernmental negotiation mechanism, whose central and formal elements are the states. These have amortized their interests so that EU's engine works, and when they didn't manage to reach a consensual agreement, real functional paralysis have occurred. Thus the states, have divergent interests, by sitting at the negotiation table, the Europeans no longer dispute the differences on the battlefield.

The evolution of the European Parliament's powers is seen as having a participating role in the informal governance of the European Union.

A big plus brought by the present study, being in the same time the uncontestable of madam lecturer, is the thorough analysis of the MEP official discourses. This valuable resource seems to be forgotten by the great researchers of European integration, maybe also because certain factors. The author expresses her point of view concerning this fact, admitting the fact that *“the EP is not a neutral institution, but one of the representative democracy's central interest, reason for which MEP will show their own reality in conformity to personal interests”*<sup>7</sup>. Personally, we consider that through the analysis and

<sup>6</sup> Corina Turşie, *Jocuri de putere în Uniunea Europeană.. Actori, Mecanisme și efecte ale creșterii puterii Parlamentului European*, Editura Universității de Vest, Timișoara, 2015, pp. 448

<sup>7</sup> Corina Turşie, *Jocuri de putere în Uniunea Europeană.. Actori, Mecanisme și efecte ale creșterii puterii Parlamentului European*, Editura Universității de Vest, Timișoara, 2015, pp. 478

use of this instrument of investigation of a specific vision, the author has opened the doors to some new case studies that can be developed on this trajectory.

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## RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE NEW CONFLICT OF RELIGIONS


*Mirela MĂRCUȚ\**

**Review of:** Sandu Frunză, *Fundamentalismul religios și noul conflict al religiilor*, Ediția a II-a, revizuită și adăugită, Editura Școala Ardeleană, Cluj Napoca, 2015

The recent meeting between Pope Francis and the Russian patriarch Kyrill has sparked worldwide conversations of the unity of Christianity, given the fact that this has been the first meeting since the Great Schism of 1054. Pope Francis was quoted saying to his counterpart: “We are brothers” (The Guardian, 2016). Moreover, there have been recent conversations related to the possibility of a worldwide ecumenical movement, in the midst of intercultural and interreligious dialogue sparked by the increased interactions between cultures as a result of globalization (Brie, 2008).

In the midst of all these conversations and the resurgence of religious and moral aspects in the socio-political conversations, Sandu Frunză’s provides a different perspective of religion and unity, namely religious ideology, sparked by different mutations of man and society in the modern and post-modern era. While the Pope talks about unity and the brotherhood of Christians, news stories talk about fundamentalists and terrorists killing in the name of a perverted view of Islam. The book provides a perspective on the other side of ecumenism, namely religious fundamentalism and religious ideologies, which generate conflicts. Even if these two are indeed opposed points of view on religious manifestation, they do have a crucial thing in common: they are basic facets of the way people have perceived Christianity, in this example, first as a single religion, and then as a mission to spread it across the world with any means necessary (see the Crusades).

In this respect, the purpose of the book is to provide a comprehensive view on how modern world has affected religions, myths and symbols and how the world we live in has created its own myths and ideologies. Likewise, it analyzes with clear-cut examples the resurgence of fundamentalism in contemporary times. One of the most fascinating aspects of this book is not only the connection made between religion, ideology and modern times, but rather the analysis of religious fundamentalism, made with coherent arguments and examples from modern times. As opposed to the modern perception portrayed in the media that fundamentalism refers strictly to Islamic extremists and fundamentalist ideologies, the author emphasizes both Christian and Jewish fundamentalism in modern times, starting from the assertion that the term ‘fundamentalism’ has roots in American Christianity, as “any traditional militant religious movement”, with a positive connotation (Frunză, 2015).



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The second edition of *Fundamentalismul religios și noul conflict al ideologiilor* [Religious fundamentalism and the new conflict of ideologies] is structured into six main parts, centered around the main themes of the book, namely: part one, focused on myth, religion and identity; part 2, entitled Ideology as a secularized religion and religion as ideology; part 3, aspects related to Christian fundamentalism; part 4, aspects related to Jewish fundamentalism; part 5, on aspects related to Islamic fundamentalism; part 6, on religious ideologies, multiculturalism and global ideology.

The first parts of the book are focused on theoretical aspects related to myth, religion and ideology and the author uses numerous theoretical background to decipher the role of myths and symbols in modern times. The profane character of modern society can deconstruct myths, altering man's relation to reality, hence its identity. But the author postulates that the modern world has created its own myths, for instance as "the tendency of any ideological body to create a complete mythology around individuals who hold on to power" (Frunză, 2015). Regarding the relation between myth and power, he asserts that he who holds power "enjoys a certain degree of purity, which separate him of the common condition and places him at the limit between the sacred and the profane". The connection between myth, power and ideology is made by the author by stating that "in modern political theory, the ideological support of power is made through mechanisms and behaviors taken from theological thinking". In modern times, myth and symbols have been replaced or rather have been subsumed in ideologies, defined broadly as "a world view which has become the foundation for the essential order of a human being and that is manifested as a theological system expressing integrality and total prestige". Also, its imagery is poorly constructed, but it bears the same roles as the imagery of a myth, "it calls to action".

Then, the author discusses the theoretical level of the connection between religion, ideology and modern society, by accepting the fact that ideology has moved more to the political sphere, while the church still remains influential, but the "call to action" specific to ideologies has faded in modern society. Discussing religious and secular ideology, the author focuses on their attempts of recovering conscience by the critique of religion (for instance, in the case of Marx), as well as its revolutionary character. Then, the main part of the research focuses on fundamentalism, specifically religious fundamentalism, which has risen in part due to the rejection of the mythical view of religion, specific to Western mentality: "the secularization of modern world causes religion to be expressed only as a form of social connection or, more simply put, a form of celebration of the community" (Frunză, 2015). We see in the book that the rise of fundamentalism has also other causes, such as the critique of secularization and globalization.

The basic feature of fundamentalism is its militant character against "any thing threatening their identity" or, otherwise, fundamentalists tend to defend a specific world view. Moreover, the author also lists some features of fundamentalism, such as: a community meant to defend authentic tradition, it refuses to harmonize tradition and rejects Western ideologies, it has an ambiguous attitude regarding science and progress, in the sense that they disapprove modernity, but they use the tools of modernity, such as the Internet, to achieve their purpose.

Getting back to religious unity promoted by Pope Francis and his Orthodox counterpart, the aim of these types of initiatives and interreligious dialogue is almost the same as the aims of fundamentalists, but the means are different. The examples presented in this book are focused on analyzing the means used by fundamentalists to achieve their aim of instituting their religion worldwide.

According to the author, fundamentalism initially had a positive connotation, but it has been since degraded, as the first fundamentalists reacted to the crisis brought about by modernity in religious community and their proposed the return to “the fundamentals” of the Scripture. What is fascinating about Christian fundamentalism and the examples presented in the book is the ambivalent relation fundamentalists have with violence in its social endeavors. Some examples are given in the book related to crimes against medical doctors that had performed abortions. Also, across the years, their *modus operandi* has evolved to promote sabotages of the legislative process in order to include their world view into law, especially in the case of pro-life movements. Their one truth is the Scripture and they abide by it with any means necessary. American fundamentalists are the most prominent ones, but they are now called Evangelicals, due to the negative connotation that fundamentalism has received across the years. American Christian fundamentalism also proclaims that the United States is new Israel and its mission is to expand Christian theocracy globally, which is actually not a big chance in American foreign policy in general, considering its role at the “world’s soldier” and its civilizing mission assumed especially during the most recent Bush presidency.

On Judaic fundamentalism, the author provides a theoretical and historical background of the coagulation of the Jewish population into a political community and national ideology, especially considering the fact that “Judaism is not a monolithic religion”. Focusing on the issues of Zionism, as well as Jerusalem, the center of three major religions, he emphasizes the evolution of the Jewish political community that culminated with the creation of the state of Israel. Zionism, the main Jewish ideology, is defined in the book as an ideology that militates for the secularization of social and political life, in order to adapt to the ages. Secular Zionism, whose main goal was to create the state of Israel, awoke certain fundamentalist ideologies, namely the conservative fundamentalism and innovative fundamentalism, whose main enemy is indeed secularization. However, they have different means of tackling this, some of which are very interesting and merit an emphasis. For instance, *Naturei Karta*, a conservative group, considered that the Zionists influenced destiny when they created Israel, and they feel that the state of Israel would be legitimate only when it would be the result of the Messiah’s actions. Hence, the state of Israel will bring more evil to Judaism and will threaten its existence. In this sense, their view is similar to the Muslim points of view, which is fascinating. On the same issue of the existence of the state of Israel, the radical or innovative fundamentalists have a different view, in that they respect the state as a creation of God. This difference in world views is prevalent for other issues, but what is clear is that they both oppose secular Zionism.

On Islamic fundamentalism, the authors delves into the insides of groups, such as ISIL, to explore its manifestations. In this sense, the chapter relies of current issues that appear almost daily in the news to explore fundamentalism in its Islamic form, which is extremely useful for the reader. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism or political Islam is connected to the failure of secular modernization of the society in Arab states, such as Egypt. Once again, political Islam is opposed to Western values, which are focused on secularization. Especially in the media, Islam is portrayed as being extremely violent, which has determined certain misconceptions, which the authors tackles when he refers to violence. Violent Islamic fundamentalists represent the minority and do not represent their religion as such. Indeed, fundamentalists invoke Jihad when they refer to violent acts, but Jihad refers mostly to a continuous process of spiritualization, which can take place inside a human, but it can also refer to taking action against unjust leaders. In terms of violence,

Jihad is the most important political weapon fundamentalists have against the West. The author discusses and analyses fundamentalism starting from the Iranian Revolution at the end of the 70s and focuses on two terrorist organizations and how they exploit their fundamentalist ideologies to pervert the meaning of Jihad. Firstly, there is Al-Qaida, which focuses on Jihad as a political and economic destruction of the West, while organizations like ISIL use Jihad as a show for the Western civilization. The author argues that, in this case, the Western media and ISIL are feeding each other's attention; as the media maintains its focus on ISIL and shows their violence, the media show increases, while ISIL continues its assault with violence.

Christian, Judaic and Islamic fundamentalism have in common the use of violence in order to convey their points. Moreover, the rise of all these forms of fundamentalism responds to a perceived threat mostly from the Western civilization. This can be corroborated with Huntington's theory on the clash of civilization, which lists globalization and the increasing contact between cultures as one of the reasons for this clash. In this context, the last part of the book focuses on multiculturalism, globalization and tolerance as secular tendencies, which have transformed modern society and the influence of religion in society. Religion can become politicized, which has indeed happened, according to the author. It is perverted into an ideology that uses violence to make its point, like Jihad has become a form of political communication nowadays.

Concluding, this book offers a comprehensive view on the relation between religion and ideology, emphasizing how the perversion of religion can become fundamentalism. Globalization offers the global stage for these manifestations, but it has become more of a battlefield for religious ideologies that fight themselves under the umbrella of a single religion, such as the opposition between Judaic fundamentalists, and between different religious ideologies and the Western civilization. In this context, discussions about religious unity seem rather futile.

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
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## EUROPE BETWEEN GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY

*Alina-Maria BALAJ\**

**Review of:** *Europeanization – Governance Studies and Security*, coordinated by George Angheloiu, Published by C.H. Beck, Bucharest, 2015, ISBN 978-606-18-0436-8

The volume tries to offer to readers a complex of points of approach concerning the Europeanization theme. In the same time this version tries to check the critical and analytical spirit and the capacity of scientific contribution of youth Romanian authors. The contributors of this volume were advised to be firstly authors and secondly meta-theorists. They tried to keep the personal character of every approach, the only editorial red line being defined by continental style of citation and also by unlimited exposure of assumed theme. So, the readers would have the occasion to identify different definitions and utilizations of the term of *Europeanization*, in order to understand easier the analyzed phenomenon. Therefore the



contributors of this volume: Oana-Andreea Ion, Radu Sebastian Ungureanu, Mihail Caradaică, Dacian Duna, Simona R. Soare, George Angheloiu, Ana-Maria Costea, Mihai-Bogdan Popescu, Miruna Troncotă, Radu Cucută, Radu Dudău, Mihaela Răileanu, Adrian-Claudiu Popoviciu, Adriana Almășan, Ștefan Bogrea, Alina Bârgăoanu, Loredana Radu, Victor Negrescu, Ioana Roxana Melenciuc and Alexandru Mihai Ghigiu tried to give to us a definition of the concept of *Europeanization*, from several perspectives.

The volume contains eighteen researches written by the contributors which were remembered earlier, but in the same time the volume contains the answers of these questions: What is the definition of the concept of Europeanization? What is the background of Europeanization? Can this concept impose changes with similar results in all space? The process of Europeanization is limited by the space of European Union or by the space of Europe? What means Europe in this case? That changes are temporary or lasting ones?

### ***Europeanization: a single process, more questions***

In this research, the author **Oana-Andreea Ion**, speaks about the minimalist acceptance of the concept of Europeanization, in version of EU—ization. The author supports the fact that this process is not a new one, and also the fact that it is absolutely necessary the focalization over the methodological practices and applications that were circulated. There are analyzed by one: the unidirectional and multidirectional perspectives, the relations between Europeanization and European integration, the definitions of this concept, the theoretical backgrounds that were used, the fields that could be subject of the process, the Europeanization impact, the facilitators factors of this process of change, and so on. The conclusions show us several pillars that could help in the process of consolidation like: the

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multiplying of studies for comparative analysis at the level of the member states, but in the same time at the level of third states, all this for the triad polity-politics-policies; the introduction of new theoretical backgrounds in the study of Europeanization; the investigation of different models of Europeanization inside and outside of EU<sup>1</sup>.

***An approach about the international security made by European Union: the specificity of normative and nonwestphalic power and the postimperial responsibility.***

This research made by **Radu-Sebastian Ungureanu** show us the *unidentified political object*<sup>2</sup>, very hard to be identified in the conceptual registers, through the European Union defines its particular role in the process of international security problems management. This study shows us, the relations between European security and european sovereignty. In the same time it is underlined the implication of violence, through EU is remarked in the international space, concerning the security factor. For understanding the causes of this proper, the main goal of this research is given by the definition of this political entity. Through normative character of the policies from the security field, the supra-/transnational dimension of EU and through the fact that the Union is vulnerable, it would be correct to define the Union as a *nonwestphalic empire*<sup>3</sup>. If the relations between the EU members would be easier understood by being reported to the concept of security community, the utilization of force by EU in the international space would be unthinkable to accomplish. The action sphere is defined through the taking of the imperialist past of some today's EU members. The implication of some new states in the problems of security, would be a result of the special relations of those states with megalopolises. The position is shared with another set democracies, but mainly with the other EU members. So, the normative dimension of the European Union implication in the problems of security, in international level, is, through this research, a consequence of the sovereignty management of European Union.

***The European integration through the ideological spectrum of neoliberalism***

The research made by **Mihai Caradaică** takes part in critical European studies and tries to demonstrate what are the mechanisms of European integration, all seen through a neo-gramscian perspective<sup>4</sup>. He tries to fit the concept of neo-gramscianism in the puzzle of theories about European integration, claiming that the intergovernmentalism, the neo-functionalism or average theories, do not have the required accuracy to conceptualize the power relations that compose the structures of capitalist market.<sup>5</sup> The goal is to study the

<sup>1</sup> Oana Andreea Ion, „Europeanization: a single process, more questions” in George Angheloiu, *Europeanization – Governance Studies and Security*, Published by C.H. Beck, Bucharest, 2015, pp. 1-16.

<sup>2</sup> Formula used by *J. Delors* apud *J. Zielonka*, *Europe as Empire. The Nature of the Enlarged European Union*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, p.4.

<sup>3</sup> Radu Sebastian Ungureanu, „An approach about the international security made by European Union: the specificity of normative and nonwestphalic power and the postimperial responsibility” in George Angheloiu, *Europeanization – Governance Studies and Security*, Published by C.H. Beck, Bucharest, 2015, pp. 18-28.

<sup>4</sup> The neo-gramscianism appeared after applying of the Antonio Gramsci's concepts in the transnational level

<sup>5</sup> Mihai Caradaică, „The European integration through the ideological spectrum of neoliberalism” in George Angheloiu, *Europeanization – Governance Studies and Security*, Published by C.H. Beck, Bucharest, 2015, pp.30-43.

process of integration through the globalisation, and also to show which were the neoliberal reforms taken by EU since 1980. Also, the significant part of this research is concentrated by the activity of European Round Table and Industrialists, an organization that have the goal to form and to disseminate the position of the Great European Capital (Mihail Caradaică 2015), which through its strategies managed to inspire a neoliberal logic of the European projects, that followed after the Maastricht Treaty: The Economic and Monetary Union and also the access for the East side of Europe.

### ***European Union between the norms of power and the power of norms. The external action of EU in the context of Ukrainian crisis***

In this research, the author **Dacian Duna**, shows the position of European Union concerning the Ukrainian crisis from 2014. The Union is, in this way, seen like a civil and normative power that face indirect a very important actor: The Russian Federation. So, the research underline a new conflict between Occident and Russia, an ideological one, that was seem to be over at the end of Cold War. This situation is a challenge for EU and for other global actors, to manage the situation concerning the annexation of Crimea and the politics of Kremlin, a supporting policy of Russian minorities from Europe. This crisis can be seen like an opportunity for the development of European hard power, that would make able the European Union to became a major global actor, a supporter of normative power, kantian one. But all this elements depends by the European identity, by the way of how the Europeans define and understand their common interests.<sup>6</sup>

### ***The Smart Power of European Union? A research on the East Partnership***

The research written by **Simona R. Soare** analisys the way of utilisation of smart power by European Union, in a context of economical an political crisis, but also the institutional changes made in community level. The research defines de theoretical dimension of smart power, but also argues the fact that European Union must build a propitious framework to use this type of power in international level. Although its ability of implementation a foreign policy, based on the smart power is inevitable limited. This smart power is limited either by European institutional construction, by the intentional utilisation of European institutions, by the focus of foreign policy wrong understood, either the deeply democratic spirit of the European project<sup>7</sup>. The Europeanization have to be seen a project of use the smart power by European Union. So, the European Union has to become as soon as possible, a normal power, concerning the systematic transition of power and also the strategical competition.

### ***The Dilemma of Europeanization of Turkey: Accepting in European Union or Resisting through Neo-Otomanism***

The research written by **George Anghitoiu**, tries to answer to many questions like if the membership of Turkey in EU can represent a state desire or only the opportun justification to many internal reforms designed to mask the change of regim? Turkey, that

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<sup>6</sup> Dacian Duna, "The European Union between the norms of power and the power of norms. The external action of EU in the context of Ukrainian crisis" in George Anghitoiu, *Europeanization – Governance Studies and Security*, Published by C.H. Beck, Bucharest, 2015, pp.45-60.

<sup>7</sup> Simona Soare, „The Smart Power of European Union? A research on the East Partnership” in George Anghitoiu, *Europeanization – Governance Studies and Security*, Published by C.H. Beck, Bucharest , 2015, pp.63-95.

was called by tzarist diplomacy the *Cobble of Europe*<sup>8</sup>, can be considered defined by Europeanization? Is the Europeanization the main factor between Ankara and the other states from Asian space, that shortly time ago, took part from Otoman Empire? Is the access of Turkey in EU, an important goal for Union for gaining their end at mondial level? This research tries to give an answer to these questions in order to define better the turkish strategical complex.

### ***Russian Federation- main factor for europeanization of CFSP?***

The research made by **Ana-Maria Costea**, underlines the fact that European Union is a global actor<sup>9</sup>, through the geographical interests of member states. Concerning the foreign policy of European Union, this becomes a vulnerable chapter, speaking the political power of European Union to design its interests at international level, in a unitary way<sup>10</sup>. This global character of this organisation is limited of being a strategical desideratum, concerning the dynamics from East Europe, and the ineficient relation between this organisation and Russian Federation<sup>11</sup>. The article analyses the regional dynamics concerning the effucency of EU's foreign policy in relation with Russian Federation, through the Europeanization of CFSP, having the example of Ukrainian crisis or the Georgiats war. The conceptual approach underlines the decisional process inside EU, concerning the vulnerable parts that EU must consider in the process of the construction as political giant, in the international level.

### ***The Europeanization of the economical institutions in Armenia, Azerbaidjan and Georgia***

Using premiss from theories of statehood in the post-soviet space, and also the approach of neo institutional, this article written by **Mihai-Bogdan Popescu**, tries to analysis the Europeanization of economical institutions from South Caucasus area. Known by the name of Transcaucasia, in the Russian area, the area that include Armenia, Azerbaidjan and Georgia is a very complex and uncertain one, in the same time. The South Caucasus term has almost a political conotation and became known after which three states from this area, obtained their independencies in 1991<sup>12</sup>. The article focuses on the role of EU found in the Neighbourhood Policy and also in the Eastern Partnership. Firstly there are some factors linked with the internal aspects of those states like: the political regime, the quality of political capacity, the communist and precommunist heritage, the administrative capacity of the state, the role of the civil society. Secondly there are factors that are linked with the political type initiated by Brussels, like were the

<sup>8</sup> George Anglițoiu, „The Dillema of Europeanization of Turkey: Accepting in European Union or Resisting through Neo-Otomanism” in George Anglițoiu, *Euopeanization – Governance Studies and Security*, Published by C.H. Beck, Bucharest, 2015, pp. 98-131.

<sup>9</sup> A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, Burussels, 12 December, 2003, p. 1, <https://www.consilium.europa/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>.

<sup>10</sup> Ioan Horga, Ana Maria Ghimis, “Romania – part of the EU’s Eastern Frontier: opportunities versus responsibilities, in “ *Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai*, Series *Europaea*, Cluj-Napoca, LIX, 1, 2014, pp 101-113

<sup>11</sup> Ana-Maria Costea, „Russian Federation- main factor for europeanization of CFSP?” in George Anglițoiu, *Euopeanization – Governance Studies and Security*, Published by C.H. Beck, Bucharest, 2015, pp. 133-146.

<sup>12</sup> *The Caucasus: an Introduction*, Thomas de Waal, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010, p.7.

credibility, the clarity and the power of negotiation of EU, that is superior, but also the role of others international or regional powers from the area<sup>13</sup>.

***The Europeanization of West Balkans. Political experiments and unlearned lessons*** The main goal of this research made by **Miruna Troncotă** is to research the contextual framework of the Europeanization process in the integration of West and East Balkans in European Union. The analysis describes the period of the last decade (2003-2013), starting with the moment when the doors were opened to the states of former Yugoslavs and Albania, after the European Council from Salonic, till now. The article is divided in three sections: first is about the theoretical background, and starts with a constructivist definition of Europeanization, the second one describes the evolution of those 6 states from West Balkans, in the process of Europeanization. In the same time, there are evaluated the ways through EU tried to fix their policies concerning the specifics of every state, but also the actions of the state as a result for the postponement of Europeanization. The article ends with the conclusion that the process of Europeanization is almost the result of some institutional and discursive interactions, material and symbolical, and the postponement of accession is a consequence assumed by the both sides<sup>14</sup>.

***The European Union and the Arab Spring. The limits of foreign policy***

The research made by **Radu Cucută** tries to analyse the EU's reaction about the events that took place in the Middle East, especially the Arab Spring, through the analysis of some factors that influenced those actions. The author inquires the internal debate of EU, concerning its own nature, and underlines the fact that the internal tensions have a special role in the construction of foreign policy's goals. In the same time, the institutional structure of EU is important for the regional policies, as the definition of European project in geopolitical terms. The inability to predict the revolutionary fact represent an additional difficulty. The relation of EU concerning the Middle East and the South Neighborhood is the expression on the interaction between a postmodern project and the political expressions of modernity<sup>15</sup>.

***The Ukrainian crisis and the strategical answer of EU: aspects of energetical security*** The study made by **Radu Dudău** analyses the recent European Strategy of Energetical security, made as an answer to the Russian's intervention in Ukraina, at the informal propose made by Doland Tusk, the ex MP's of Poland. The strategy is about the consolidation of a European *Energetical Union*, that would be able to negotiate all the external acquisitions of natural gases, for the member states. In a large sense, the Ukrainian crisis is a new test of internal coherence for EU<sup>16</sup>. The energetical problem is in the

<sup>13</sup> Mihai Bogdan Popescu, „The Europeanization of economical institutions in Armenia, Azerbaidjan and Georgia” in George Anglițoiu, *Europeanization – Governance Studies and Security*, Published by C.H. Beck, Bucharest, 2015, pp.148-167.

<sup>14</sup> Miruna Troncotă, „The Europeanization of West Balkans. Political experiments and unlearned lessons” in George Anglițoiu, *Europeanization – Governance Studies and Security*, Published by C.H. Beck, Bucharest, 2015, pp.169-194.

<sup>15</sup> Radu Cucută, „The European Union and the Arab Spring. The limits of foreign policy” in George Anglițoiu, *Europeanization – Governance Studies and Security*, Published by C.H. Beck, Bucharest, 2015, pp. 198-211.

<sup>16</sup> Ioan Horga, Ana Maria Costea, „The Ukrainian crisis: between national preferences/interests of EU member states and EU security” in *Eurolimes* 18/2014, pp. 175-188

spotlight of economical and political relations between Europe and Russia. Besides EU will continue to be addicted by the natural resources of Russia, the member states will continue to make pressures concerning the process of integration in their national markets of energy, becoming in this way more diversified.

### ***The vulnerabilities and climate ambitions of EU***

In this research, **Mihaela Răileanu**, defines the idea that there exist a scientific consensus concerning the climate change. The climate models will be crucial for the way of understanding the climate science. The people have to be conscious that the Earth is only one, and there is no possibility, for the present, to give up this hospitable house, and finding another better. The relation between the humans and the climate is, according to the autor, defined as being a bidirectional one. On the one hand, the climate influence the humans social evolution<sup>17</sup>, and on the other hand there are proofs that the humans have contributions concerning the climate changes<sup>18</sup>. EU has the merit to understand very well the danger of climate changing, and took measures concerning the reduction of GES. The Europeanization, in the field of climate policies, could be a realist approach in the context of international and political cooperation<sup>19</sup>.

### ***European Union through the employment and social policy***

The research made by **Adrian-Claudiu Popoviciu** shows the fact that the European Union is defined by the involvement of economical and social policies, all in one, whose main goal is defined by the third article (3) of TUE<sup>20</sup>. Even the economical crisis had a very big contribution at the failure of The Lisbon Strategy, its effects determined the development of national and social policies in the member states.<sup>21</sup> The unemployment, especially of youth, the inertion of labour market, there were signals that remodeled the vision of EU concerning the importance and the necessity of strategies reinforcement, of legislative measures, and of concrete actions contained by the social European strengthened quadrilateral<sup>22</sup>

<sup>17</sup> For example in areas with an extreme climate people have to organize their way of life concerning the climatic conditions

<sup>18</sup> IPCC, Climate Change 2013, The Physical Science Basis, 2013, <https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wgl/>.

<sup>19</sup> Mihaela Răileanu, „The vulnerabilities and climate ambitions of EU” in George Angheloiu, *Europeanization – Governance Studies and Security*, Published by C.H. Beck, Bucharest, 2015, pp. 229-248.

<sup>20</sup> Their confirmation concerning the fundamental and social rights defined by the European Social Charter, that was signed at Torino at 18 October 1961, and also the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Labor from 1989, (...). Determined to promote the economic and social progress of the states, taking into account the principle of sustainable development, and in the background of internal market achievement, of strengthening and environment protecting, but in the same time to apply policies that ensure a progress in the field of integration and in other ones. (...). Determined to facilitate the free movement of persons, ensuring the safe of states through the security and justice that are in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and of the Treaty concerning the EU functioning.

<sup>21</sup> Ioan Horga, Adrian Claudiu Popoviciu, *European Union between the Constraint of the Borders and Global Competition*, Published by University of Oradea, 2011, 263p

<sup>22</sup> Adrian Claudiu Popoviciu, „European Union through the employment and social policy” in George Angheloiu, *Europeanization – Governance Studies and Security*, Published by C.H. Beck, Bucharest, 2015, pp. 251-262.

### ***The European Sources concerning the Romanian Competition Law***

In this research, **Adriana Almășan** and **Ștefan Bogrea** analyses the phenomenon of Europeanization as claiming for an arrangement of the social sciences, especially of the jurisdictional field. All the subfields of internal law were affected from the accession of Romania in EU, including the competition law. The European sources of competition law are, in the same time, internal sources for competition, and the knowledge of this is very important in the process of understanding and application of this law, in Romanian system. The main categories of laws managed by EU are antitrust law, the abuse of dominant position and that of economic concentrations. This big influence of EU's law over Romania, will make the process of Europeanization in this country more intense, for the next years<sup>23</sup>.

### ***The Cohesion Policy of European Union concerning the post-crisis period***

The chapter written by **Alina Bârgăoanu și Loredana Radu** analyses the evolution of Cohesion Policy concerning its own development concepts. The analysis underlines two essential processes. Firstly, the Cohesion Policy was transformed from a redistributive policy into a structural policy. Secondly, the economic crisis determined the moving of the interest of this policy from the cohesion goals to the competitive ones. The chapter underlines, in the same time, the role of Structural Funds and Investment in the process of implementation of Cohesion Policy, and its role in the process of development, in diluting of gaps between states, the areas and EU citizens, but also in the process of border managing, that have been associated with EU<sup>24</sup>.

### ***The Europeanization of Assistance Policies for Development***

In this research, **Victor Negrescu**, underlines the fact that the Cooperation Policies for Development were managed by the national interests, being considered in the same time, mechanisms of action for soft power policies. The evolution of EU generated the appearance of assistance policies for development through the appearance of some pan-European mechanisms and goals (Victor 2015). Besides of this, the institutionalization process at EU level is poor defined, and the diversity of the models that already exist, reduce the capacity of one European commune action. The article presents a analysis in the field of national policies and European ones, concerning the definition of the concept, concerning the level of Europeanization and also concerning the outlooks of this field, at European level<sup>25</sup>.

### ***The Europeanization and the emergence of an evaluation culture: between imitation, mosaic and pop-art***

In this research written by **Ioana Roxana Melenciuc**, there is analysed the bidirectional relation between the Europeanization process and the emergence of an

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<sup>23</sup> Adriana Almășan, Ștefan Bogrea, „The European Sources concerning Romanian Competition Law” in George Angheloiu, *Europeanization – Governance Studies and Security*, Published by C.H. Beck, Bucharest, 2015, pp.263-280.

<sup>24</sup> Alina Bârgăoanu, Loredana Radu, „The Cohesion Policy of European Union concerning the post-crisis period” in George Angheloiu, *Europeanization – Governance Studies and Security*, Published by C.H. Beck, Bucharest, 2015, pp.282-294.

<sup>25</sup> Victor Negrescu, „The Europeanization of Assistance Policies for Development” in George Angheloiu, *Europeanization – Governance Studies and Security*, Published by C.H. Beck, Bucharest, 2015.

evaluation culture in European area. There are associated factors with the process of Europeanization that led to the process of crystallizing of culture, but in the same time, that led to the development of the European culture. There is presented a convergent influence of Europeanization and of globalization, that brings in the spotlight the role of intercontinental factors in the process of forming the European public agenda of assessment<sup>26</sup>. The multiple influences and pressures exercised both vertically and horizontally, are the reasons of asked the existence of European specific, and there is disputed the nature issue in the clash between imitation and syncretism<sup>27</sup>.

### ***European Union- a possible model for Latin America?***

In this research, **Alexandru Mihai Ghigiu** speaks about the interregional relations promoted by European Union, in different areas, at different levels. From all interregional relations promoted by Brussels, the Mercosur one, between Latin America and EU, is the most constant and functional one. The reasons are historical and cultural ones, but in the same time, are determined by the economic interest and the pressures made by USA in area. The interregionalism is defined, in fact, by the way through EU made its model of governance an external one (Alexandru Mihai 2015). The spread of European norms and standards through the multiplication of dialogue between areas, remain the more advanced instrument in the process of European influence at global level, the Latin-American space, being a laboratory for the regional and interregional model proposed by EU.<sup>28</sup>

### **Concluzii**

Therefore the Europeanization through EU-ization has to face a lot of internal and external obstacles, but may be characterized as being like that one that generates higher political relations concerning the nationalist, secessionist, revisionist, irredentist, racist, xenophobic, inquisitorial, genocidal, extremist, absolutist, totalitarian past since the fall of Rome. The map of European Union overlaps with that of Rome Empire, having in the same time, durability arguments, as long as that *Nemesis of creativity*, described by Toynbee, will be protected by the democracy, pacifism and rationalism of the European society. (Angheloiu, Europeanizarea- Studii de Guvernare și Securitate 2015)

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<sup>27</sup> Ioana Roxana Melenciuc, „The Europeanization and the emergence of an evaluation: between imitation, mosaic and pop-art” in George Angheloiu, *Europeanization – Governance Studies and Security*, Published by C.H. Beck, Bucharest, 2015, pp.309-318.

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
## THE INFLUENCE OF THE POLITICS ON THE ECONOMICS: THE CASE OF EU AND NATO

*Dan APĂTEANU\**

**Review of:** Costea, Ana Maria. *East versus West: When politics collide with economics*. Tritonic, București, 2015, ISBN 978-606-749-056-5.

The study of the nature of the decision making process in shaping the policies of international organisations, so that these policies can be successful, is a topic of great importance. In matters such as security and foreign policy, it is very useful to be aware of the extent to which states still are the main actors in formulating the strategies or the international organisations can be viewed as having the leading role. The issues tackled by the international organisations, such as EU or NATO, are very important, as they relate to themes such as territorial integrity, energy security, or nowadays, humanitarian aid, as in the case of Syrian refugees.

The book analyzes the foreign and security policies decision-making process of European Union and NATO, especially those that regard the Eastern Europe. This is due to the fact that there is a lot of instability and insecurity in the area. Also, the EU and NATO relationship with Russia does not function well, being rather a conflictual one. The main theoretical assumption of the author, Costea Ana Maria, is that the foreign policy is still formed at the national level, by the states<sup>1</sup>, not by the international organisations. Another assumption that was tested is that the interdependence and the shadow of the future will lead to a greater probability to cooperate rather than to defect. The author asserts that the EU and NATO options, are, in fact, the ones expressed at a national level, by one or a small group of states; likewise, Romania promotes its national values, in the foreign policy<sup>2</sup>. If, usually during peace, states formulate their policies based on their economic interests, in times of war, the political will is forming the national preferences; also, the geographical proximity may have the same effect. In order to analyse the EU and NATO decision-making processes, the author have used the levels typology formulated by Andrew Moravcsik<sup>3</sup>: domestic, inter-state and supranational. Furthermore, she adds a political-strategical dimension, that complements the economical one. The research is focused on Ukraine, Moldova and the Russian Federation, the choices being justified with several reasons.



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<sup>1</sup> Burian, Alexandru. *Introducere în teoria relațiilor internaționale*. Institutul de istorie, stat și drept al Academiei de științe a Moldovei. Chișinău, 2007.

<sup>2</sup> Balaban, Constantin. *Politica externă a României*. Editura Universitară, București, 2009.

<sup>3</sup> Moravcsik, Andrew. *Preferences and power in the European Community: a liberal intergovernmentalist approach*. Journal of Common Market Studies, 1993, vol. 31, issue 4, 497 - 498.

In the first chapter, named *National preferences within international debate*, the author employs the Andrew Moravcsik concept of national preferences that is framed by the institutional neoliberalism, having an economical approach, where gains are viewed in absolute, rather than relative terms, so that the importance of the security issues are rather low, states tend to cooperate, to rely more on the role of international organisations in order to promote further cooperation. The concept of national preferences is not fixed, as it can vary over time, being influenced by different societal actors.

Also, the preferences have to be negotiated at supranational levels. The concept is analysed from a bottom-up approach, starting with the domestic level, continuing with the inter-statal one and ending with the supranational level. There are two different approaches, first the „outside-in” that asserts that states are being influenced by the international context, and secondly, the „inside-out” approach, according to which states act according to their domestic policies. In the view of Moravcsik, what is most important is the bargaining power of a state. States choose to be part of an international organisation, because they believe they can influence their policies, and achieve goals, that can not be achieved only on their own.

However, it is possible that states anticipate the international context trend, and adjust to it, their internal policies, hence being very difficult to establish a causal link for the formation of national preferences. It is given the example of the relationship between Germany and Russia, after Crimea annexation, in deciding to impose sanctions on Russia, after the influence of the international geopolitical context.

The domestic level for the formation of national preferences is analyzed first. Moravcsik considers that the state does not have fixed interests, but rather it is like a transmission belt for the preferences of national actors. According to Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow<sup>4</sup>, a state can influence the intra-national debate of another state, modifying its strategies before they become policies, which is the opposite view of Moravcsik, that believes that national strategies are independent from the influence of another state.

After the preferences are established, states develop their strategies, that have to be adjusted according to the international context, where three types of situations can emerge: harmony, zero-sum and win-win. After the preferences are formulated they are negotiated at the international level. Moravcsik identified three main assumptions about interstate bargaining: voluntary cooperation between states, the environmental aspect and the transaction costs of intergovernmental bargaining are low. In order to achieve a specific agreement, states use different bargaining strategies as: unilateral policy alternatives, alternative coalitions and the potential for compromise and linkage. The third level of analysis is at the supranational stage, where is analyzed its impact on the national preferences. For Moravcsik, the role of supranational institutions is limited. However, Costea gives an example that supranational institutions can modify the national preferences and policies.

According with Waltzian neorealism, the analysis of international relations should not take into consideration the attributes of a state, but rather its capabilities. Because the international arena is an anarchic system, the state either rule, or are being ruled. In this case, the national interest is given by external factors, being rather fixed. Neorealist scholars assert that the state is a central concept of the international relations. In international organisations, states follow their national interests. Costea analyze critically

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4 Allison, Graham, Zelikov Philip. *Esența deciziei. O explicație a crizei rachetelor din Cuba*. Polirom, Iași, 2010.

the model proposed by Moravcsik, to identify the nature of the national preferences, to see if they are only economically grounded, or if there are other attributes, such as strategic, security or political ones, to evaluate the role of the international institutional framework and the rationality character of the states behaviour.

In the second chapter, *The European Union: national versus supranational; economic versus political*, the focus is on EU and its member states preferences in the case of Ukraine, Moldova and Russia. The chapter is organized on a top-down approach, as starts with the EU decisions and continues with the national preferences and strategies, such as the EU political character, the European Neighbourhood policy, the Eastern Partnership, Moldova and Ukraine scores within EaP, the EU-Russia relationship, the Ukrainian crisis and the issue of energy security.

European Union positions itself as a global player, because of the geographical interests of the member states. However, EU needs to reconfigure its policies in order to be viewed as a single power. The different national preferences of EU states member create difficulties in communicating a unitary view in the relationship with nonEU states. This issue has been tried to be resolved in 2009 in the Lisbon Treaty, that stipulates that the president of European Council ensure the representation of the Union in its foreign policy and names a High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; however, in practice, states still have the veto power.

With regard to Russia, after 2000, it started to regain its status and prestige in the international arena. President Putin affirmed its exceptional national identity as Eurasian. Its executive agent changed the national preferences, as it reestablished the state power over the energy resources. Russia has asserted its right to be among the international powers and perceived all the conflicts where it was engaged as having a defensive nature. In its history, Russia adopted different types of policies toward the West: cooperative, defensive and assertive. Putin believed that the international balance of powers should change, as he did not accept American supremacy, and that it should have its own independent policy. The negotiations between EU and Russia have started after the USSR dissolution, searching for a minimum common denominator. The Common Strategy was an EU instrument to encourage the trade with Russia. Because EU wanted to be a global player, it had to create a stable and secure regional environment.

After the last enlargements, the new EU Eastern frontier has changed, presenting new opportunities and threats<sup>5</sup>. Regarding the national preferences, it has been a win-win situation for old and new member states. These have been influenced by three domestic groups, the executive, the economic players and the public opinion. In 2003, European Commission launched the Communication *Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours*, while in 2004, the European Neighbourhood Policy was launched, to encourage their advantageous mutual cooperation. Russia developed a bilateral partnership with EU through the *Partnership and Cooperation Agreement*, as it did not accept the ENP, mainly for political reasons. Also, Ukraine has not been satisfied with ENP, considering that it should receive more from it, mainly to be accepted as an European state, with EU membership perspective. ENP did not prove to be very successful because of its ineffective strategy *one size fits all*. From the point of national preferences, ENP reflects France preferences in the Mediterranean region.

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5 Horga, Ioan, Brie, Mircea *Europe between exclusive borders and inclusive frontiers*. Studia Universitatis, Babeş-Bolyai, Seria Europea, Cluj-Napoca, 2010, pp. 63 - 86.

After the Georgian war, the Eastern Partnership<sup>6</sup> program has been launched, focused on Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and also the Association Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas Agreements. However, taking into regard the national preferences, they created some incoherence at the EU level external policy, because of the two levels negotiations. EaP middle way was countproductive for both parties involved, not fulfilling their expectations. The author presents the results of EaP in terms of regional security, by analysing the status of Ukraine and Moldova, synthesising the results in the European Integration Index.

The 2008 Georgian war influenced the entire regional security as it implies that this situation might appear in other states. EU responded fast and in a unitary manner at first, but their preferences diverged soon, regarding the Georgian territorial integrity. Russia preferences have not changed, but its strategy did, because it was provoked, as Russia considered, by US, that sustained the enlargement of the NATO in the region. It can be said that there have been five types of groups according to their relation with Russia: the trojan horses, the strategic partners, the friendly pragmatics, the frozen pragmatics and the new cold warriors.

An important issue on EU agenda is the energy security; the Early Warning Mechanism has been formulated in order to solve this issue. The International Energy Agency published a report that presents the impact of a raise in energy consumption. The different visions of the two regional players lead to a failure in assuring the energy security, as the EU approach was economical, while the Russian was a political one and as they are parts of a heterogenous system.

The Ukrainian energy crisis showed that defecting, under the independence assumption, will lead to different negative outcomes for the parties involved. The crisis proved that Russia used its economical resources as a political instrument. EU is dependent of energy imports from Russia, as it is its main supplier. However, even if some small states largely depend on Russian energy, they have political reasons to oppose its policy. The problem is that EU is still responding slowly to the energy security issue.

Even if EU claims itself a global power, it did not manage to resolve the regional crises, as the situation in Ukraine, since the national preferences prevailed over a common EU interest toward Russia. These can be classified in two groups, one that is political-strategical grounded - the hawks, and another one, economically grounded - the doves. States that have an economical approach tend to cooperate, while the ones that are politically related, would rather oppose Russia policy.

Another factors that influence the bilateral relationship is history and geographical proximity, the closer to Russia, the more political-strategical is the approach. In the first group are Lithuania, Romania, Poland, while in the second are Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, Spain and Austria. The national positions have been expressed in the Geneva agreement, that was the minimum common denominator between EU members and US, but it did not succeed in solving the conflict. As the economic sanctions proved to be inefficient, EU moved to the political ones, changing its strategy. After the break of the first Minsk agreement by pro-Russian rebels, Germany supported more the political sanctions. The Eastern frontier states are donors, in terms of EU foreign and security policy in crisis situations, but otherwise, given the heterogenous national preferences, the more moderated view will prevail.

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<sup>6</sup> Eastern Partnership [http://www.eeas.europa.eu/eastern/index\\_en.htm](http://www.eeas.europa.eu/eastern/index_en.htm).

The third chapter entitled *NATO - between military and economic preferences* applies the same theoretical framework of Moravcsik to NATO, in analyzing the security issues in the non-EU Eastern Europe. It is presented a top-down approach, as it starts the decision process at the NATO level and continues with the analysis of its sources, to see the extent in which exist the national preferences, and if they are politically or economically grounded. Similarly as in the case of EU, the national preferences influenced the strategies of the organisation. Even if the security issues are only partially transparent, the public opinion and the interest groups have a considerable influence over the decision of governmental actors. These decisions are subject to an intensive bargaining process. Regarding the nature of the preferences, these can be both economical and political. Economical preferences arise from private groups and from institutions that receive funding for research and development, while the political ones, from the officials.

NATO had to redefined itself, as after 1990, the USSR has disbanded and the Germany reunited, and they stated that the former communist states did not represent a threat anymore. Its members choose to cooperate further to face any possible danger, because its members had a high level of trust between them, EU members for financial reasons, as these were supported by the US, and the new conflicts issue, such as ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes. The Strategic Concept has been created that allowed the Alliance to respond across a whole range of military operations. Also, a new institutional form has been created, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, that included also the former Warsaw Pact members, to promote their cooperation with the old members and the Partnership for Peace, to create joint task forces.

The US preferences over the enlargement were strategic, as it established a new area of influence, that used to belong to the adversary and to be recognized as a superpower, especially through the use of the ABMDS. The Eastern states wanted to join NATO, as this will provide national security, and this was very important as they used to be under the influence of Russia. The NATO preferences were constant, as it had limited competence and jurisprudence, especially over military matters, laying the premises for higher chances to reach a common position, and also most of the member states desire increased security. The source of national preferences in the case of NATO is not represented by the sum of its member states preferences, but one or a few members, the usual leading role belonging to US.

In the last chapter, "Case study: Eastern border of EU and NATO: views from Poland and Romania", it can be summarized that Eastern frontier states, may be donor in terms of security and foreign policy, uploading their national preferences at EU and NATO level, if they succeed in transforming their national vulnerability into an asset. Such examples are Romania and Poland with the Black Sea Synergy and Easternship Partnership. However, their donor capability is in an inverse relationship with their political-hostile attitude toward Russia.

After the fall of communism, the East-Central European architectural security framework has been restructured, moving toward the EU and NATO. Even if the Russian Federation did not oppose to these trends, it stated that Romania should not join a regional security system where Russia is not a member. For Romania, joining NATO, was the safest way to guarantee its national security, view that was expressed by the domestic actors, such as officials or the public opinion. The fact that Romania joined EU and supported also the integration of Moldavia, it is a host for ABMDS, resulted in a negative relationship with Russia. This is reflected also in the Romanian National Defense Strategy, other national programmes or in official declarations. Stil, Romania did not felt a

direct threat from Russia as it lacked common frontiers, does not have large Russian minorities and is only indirectly affected through Moldova, as it relates to the territorial integrity; Romania is not economically dependent upon Russia, even if we consider the gas imports. Because the Romania granted its citizenship to a large number of Moldavians, it attracted criticism from Russia, as it affects its interest in its near abroad territories. The Black Sea region is an area of a heterogenous type because of the actors involved and has a low security level.

After 1991, Poland had somewhat good relations with Russia as it signed a Friendship Treaty, Putin visited Warsaw, the economic trade had increased; it seemed that if in the case of Romania, Russia used the stick strategy, in the case of Poland the carrot strategy was employed. Also, Poland was different from Romania, regarding their national defense strategies. Nevertheless, after the start of the Ukrainian crisis, Poland changed its approach toward Russia, criticising it for not respecting the territorial integrity.

The author, hence, recommends a moderate approach in order to win the support of the EU member states in adopting the security policy. The Romanian and Polish preferences are clearly political in nature, as they are influenced by their past - history and present - the necessity to keep a buffer zone, Moldova for Romania and Ukraine for Poland, from Russia.


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
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


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


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
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
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
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


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


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
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


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
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
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


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


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


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
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
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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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


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


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


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


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
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
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
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


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


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


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
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
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


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
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


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
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