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Address of the editorial office:

University of Oradea

International Relations and European Studies Department

Str. Universității, nr. 1, 410087 Oradea, România

Tel/ Fax (004) 0259 408167. E-mail: brie@igri.ro

<http://www.analerise.igri.ro>

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CITIZENS' REPRESENTATION AND PARTICIPATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FUTURE CHALLENGES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE

*Alina – Carmen BRIHAN**

Abstract: *The present paper focuses on an important aspect of the European Union's becoming in this century, that of the multi – level governance, as it is outlined by the Treaty of Lisbon. The hypothesis used in approaching the subject is that: while the European governance, defined as a multi – level governance because of the many actors involved in the European decision – making process, is facing challenges with regard to its democratic legitimacy, the national government is facing the challenges brought by Europeanization to the Member States – from the point of view of the support, participation in and influencing of the European decision – making process. Therefore, the paper focuses on three aspects: the theoretical framework of citizens' representation and participation in the context of the EU's multi - level governance; the outlining of the mechanisms and challenges of the interaction between the political representatives and the governed, from a theoretical point of view and as it is reflected in the Eurobarometers; and last, but not least, the analysis of the above mentioned relation as applied to first and second years Political Science students from the University of Oradea, as an early barometer of the challenges that their perspectives on this relation generate not only for the academic institutions but also for the labour market – and, particularly, the political representatives, as potential employers, because of the role that they will play in the development of our democratic societies and multi – level Europe, as Political Science graduates*

Keywords: *European Union, multi - level governance, citizenship, participation, representation, democratic deficit, Political Science students*

Introduction

The perspectives of a democratic governance beyond the nation-state, the ability to solve the problems of the national systems of governance and the way in which the latter are transformed by Europeanization, represent some of the European governance's present theoretical concerns.

Besides the advantages that the European multi-level governance generates, the literature brings into question both the European governance's deficit of democratic legitimacy and the efforts that the EU makes in order to overcome this obstacle. After the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the publication of the White Paper on European Governance¹, the European Union sought to develop new modes of governance (Bondar, 2007: 84-85) in order to ground its democratic legitimacy. It is stated that these new modes of governance can either compensate for its lack of democratic legitimacy or offer

* PhD candidate, Assistant Lecturer within the Department of Political Science and Communication Sciences, University of Oradea. E-mail: alina_brihan@yahoo.com

¹ European Commission, White Paper on European Governance, 25.07.2001, COM(2001) 428 final, p. 5.

more participatory and deliberative styles of democratic politics than the traditional electoral and representative forms of democracy associated with the nation-state. In the same time, they are considered to involve innovative, less hierarchical decision-making processes that purportedly widen democratic involvement at various levels (Bellamy & Castiglione, 2011: 101 – 102). Their characteristics are, according to Scott and Trubeck (Scott & Trubeck, 2002: 3-6): the valorization of forms of participatory governance involving consultation of civil society's organization; the full acknowledgement of the multi-level nature of the EU governance; the recognition that legislation needs to adapt to diversity and subsidiarity; the centrality of deliberation in policy-making, both as an instrument for problem-solving and as a form of legitimation; the adoption of soft-law measures, and flexibility in implementation; policy-making processes and mechanisms favoring experimentation and knowledge creation.

Citizens' representation and participation in the context of the EU's multi - level governance

Sixty years after its coming into existence, the European Union can be, therefore, regarded and defined from different perspectives. Considered as a whole, the EU might be defined as an ambitious and difficult political, economic, social and cultural project. Observed from the perspective of the interactions between actors, nowadays Europe can be considered as a *multi - level governance* - based on the negotiation among different actors (EU institutions, member states, regional and local authorities, private actors, NGOs, citizens) (Jachtenfuchs, 2001: 254; Gal and Brie, 2011: 284-285). And last, but not least, approached from its objective's perspective, it is an endeavor aiming at ensuring *democratic and legitimate governance* beyond the Westphalic nation-state (Albert, 2002: 295; Jordan, 2001: 199).

The multi - level governance crosses the traditionally separate domains of domestic and international politics, by highlighting the increasingly fading distinction between the domains in the context of European integration and supranational, national and local governments are interrelated in territorially overarching policy networks (Milio, 2010: 12).

Therefore, some of the questions that arise regard: the form of democracy that the multi-level governance generates (in the literature it is stated that it generates a superior form of democracy, that combines formal and informal decision-making practices with the different *actors* involved in the negotiation process, each of them enjoying different types of *legitimacy*)²; the type of decision-making process produced by it (it is supposed that the multi-level governance aims to produce an innovative decision-making process, less hierarchical, that enlarges the *participation* at different levels – meaning that the forms of *participative governance* are valued) (Sorensen, 2005: 348); the function that the European Union has in the *communication* process among its actors (it is considered that European Union acts as a *mediator* among the different European networks and as a *facilitator* of continuous communication, cooperation and compromise among these networks) (Zielonka, 2007: 203); or the level of EU's *closeness to the citizens* that the multi-level governance brings about (it is asserted that the multi-level governance, by dispersing the power, brings the structure of governance closer to the citizens and citizens' involvement in the EU's decision-making process has become an important *method of governance*). From all these considerations on the multi-level governance, some questions emerged: What form of

² J. Rifkin, *The European Dream*, New York, Jeremy P. Tarcher/Penguin, 2004, pp. 224 - 225. The approach of this subject can also be found in *Public Administration*, vol. 83, no. 1, 2005, p. 203, the article of Adriaan Schout and Andrew Jordan, *Coordinated European governance: self-organizing or centrally steered?*

democracy we have in the European Union? How properly does the decision-making process function? How effective is the communication process between the EU's actors? How involved are the citizens in the EU's decision-making process?

In the framework of the EU governance, the *Treaty of Lisbon* (2007, 2009) can be considered as *a step forward towards democratic governance in the EU*. The reasons for affirming this are that it recognizes and defines the multi-level system of the EU, it explains the relation of the EU institutions with the national parliaments, it describes the principles of representative and participative democracy, it launches the Citizens' Initiative and outlines the citizens' rights and obligations in the EU.

As regards the *multi-level system* of the EU, the *Treaty of Lisbon* explicitly acknowledges the *regional and local levels* in the decision-making process of the EU; also, the *subsidiarity* principle is recognized, for the first time, to be applied to the regional and local authorities and the European Commission is obliged to consult the regional and local authorities before proposing legislative acts and any draft legislative act should contain a detailed statement making it possible to appraise compliance with the principles of *subsidiarity* and *proportionality*³. The EU's principle of subsidiarity is the general principle according to which authorities should perform only those activities which cannot be carried out effectively at a more local level and calls, therefore, for a direct involvement of the levels of governance closer to the citizens (Milio, 2010: 11). In the EU, the subnational authorities interact with each other across national borders, have their own channels of representation in Brussels, several lobbying offices and a role in various decision-making processes⁴. In conformity with the subsidiarity principle, according to which the subnational authorities deal directly with the EU institutions in the decision-making process and, then, in the policy implementation, represents the most adequate way to have an accurate knowledge of the problems at each geographical area across the EU and to respond to those problems in the most efficient way.

The *indirect* participation of the citizens in the *EU's decision - making* process (if we consider only the institutional triangle made by the Commission, the Parliament and the Council), through their representatives, can be analyzed at two main levels: the *European* level and the *national* one. The *European level* comprises the European Parliament (as the body composed of the representatives of the EU's citizens) and the Council (consisting of a representative of each Member State at ministerial level). On the other side, the *national level* consists of the national *executives* – that participate in the policy – making process at the European level (EU Council) and respond, from a democratic point of view, in front of their national parliaments; and of the national *parliaments* – as the Treaty of Lisbon has conferred them a *greater involvement* in the activities of the European Union and by their enhanced ability to express their views on draft legislative acts of the Union as well as on other matters which may be of particular interest to them⁵; and last, but not least, because of the institutional reform at the national parliaments' level (the founding of the Commissions on European Affairs) - certain groups of MPs became strongly motivated to take part in the European multi-level governance.

The role of the *national parliaments*, as formulated in the *Lisbon Treaty*, can be defined along three directions: the implementation of the principles of *subsidiarity* and *proportionality* (that means greater involvement of the national parliaments in the activities of the EU; the sending – by the European Commission – to the national

³ Treaty of Lisbon – Protocol no. 2.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p.15.

⁵ Treaty of Lisbon – Protocol no. 1.

parliaments, of the consultation documents, annual legislative program, draft legislative acts; the sending – by the European Parliament and the Council - of draft legislative acts); the *ex ante* – political control (meaning that the European Commission sends draft legislative acts and a detailed statement; in 8 weeks, the national parliaments/chambers may send a reasoned opinion - to the Presidents of the European Commission, European Parliament, Council - why it considers that the draft in question does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity; the EU institutions shall take account of the reasoned opinions issued by the national Parliaments - 1/3 votes signifies that the draft must be reviewed – the “yellow card” or simple majority of the votes - the “orange card”); and an *ex post* – judicial control (is the appeal opportunity regarding the complying with the subsidiarity principle - the Committee of the Regions and the member states when acting in the name of their national parliaments)⁶.

In the literature, the concept of “*parliamentarization*” of the EU regards, therefore, the increasing of the European Parliament’s attributions in all the EU’s decisions, and the consolidation of the national parliaments as regards their governments. The role of the national parliaments is a complex one, as they have to examine the quality of the impact national evaluations, the transposition of the European legislation in national legislation, or the government’s activity in the Council. As a consequence, the main tasks of the EP and the national parliaments are to participate in the legislative decision-making process and to examine the political options at national and European levels.

For improving the *national parliaments’* involvement in the *EU’s decision-making process*, some examples of “good practices” are considered to be the invitation of MEPs in the national parliaments, to deliver a speech in plenary sessions; the MEPs’ participation to the meetings of the Commissions on European Affairs, or videoconferences between the Commission of the European Parliament and the national parliaments.

As regards the national parliaments’ *Commissions on European Affairs*, the attributions that the MPs have are that they can monitor the government’s European policy and make public the governments’ negotiating position / proposals (as the minister acts as a representative of the electorate); they can cooperate, informally, with the responsible minister during the negotiations on the European issues; or they can establish their own contacts with other actors at European level or in other Member States in order to obtain more and direct information on European policy - making.

Consequently, these institutional reforms of the national parliaments (through the Commissions on European Affairs) may have several positive effects, as they can determine the MPs to participate in the European policies and defend their *constituencies’ interests*; holds the government accountable for its European policies; and, moreover, the parliaments becomes part of the intermediary public arena between Europe and its citizens.

Concerning the principle of *representative* democracy, *Treaty of Lisbon* considers it the basis of the EU’s functioning, every *citizen* having the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union; also, as we mentioned above, it is specified that the *citizens* are directly *represented* at Union level in the *European Parliament*, while the *Member States* are represented in the *European Council* by their Heads of State or Government and in the *Council* by their *governments* (who, in their turn, are democratically *accountable* either to their national Parliaments or to their citizens)⁷.

⁶ Treaty of Lisbon - Treaty on European Union, art. 12.

⁷ *Ibidem*, art. 10.

The principle of *participative* democracy defines, according to the *Treaty of Lisbon*, the relation between the institutions, on one side, and the citizens / their representative associations, on the other side: the institutions shall, by appropriate means, give *citizens* and *representative associations* the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union action; the institutions shall maintain an *open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society*, while the European Commission shall carry out *broad consultations with parties concerned* in order to ensure that the Union's actions are coherent and transparent⁸.

As regards the *citizens' role and place* in the EU architecture, the stipulations of the *Treaty of Lisbon* concerning the citizens' *rights and obligations*, and the Citizens' Initiative are of essential importance: the Treaty confirms the double citizenship and specifies citizens' rights and obligations (as: the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States; the right to vote and to stand as candidates in elections to the European Parliament and in municipal elections in their Member State of residence, under the same conditions as nationals of that State; the right to petition the European Parliament, to apply to the European Ombudsman, and to address the institutions and advisory bodies of the Union in any of the Treaty languages and to obtain a reply in the same language)⁹ and gives the right to one million citizens (nationals of a significant number of Member States) to take the initiative of inviting the European Commission, within the framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties¹⁰.

According to the basic principles of democracy, the *democratic* principle should occur at the *same level* as that where *decisions* are taken (Thomassen, 2009: 7). If the decisions are taken at the European level, the demos have to be defined at the level of European people, so the same normative democratic principles should be applied to the EU as to the nation-state. The EU, through the Treaty of Lisbon, recognizes, as mentioned above, the principle of representative democracy at European level, and two different channels of political representation: the European *citizens* and the *peoples* of Europe.

Despite the advantages that the multi - level governance generates, the measures that the EU takes in order to overcome the *democratic legitimacy deficit* of the *European governance*, can be described as new governance patterns (Bondar, 2007: 84-85). Aiming at innovative and less hierarchical decision-making processes, these new governance patterns broaden the democratic participation at different levels (Bellamy & Castiglione, 2011: 101-102). Thus, they have in common the emphasis on participation, voluntarism and initiative. According to Scott and Trubeck (Scott & Trubeck, 2002: 3-6), the new governance patterns contribute to the valuing of the participative methods of governance – that imply the consultation of civil society, the recognition of the multi - level nature of the EU governance, the recognition of the fact that the legislations has to adapt to diversity and subsidiarity, or the centrality of deliberation in the decision-making process – both as a means of solving problems and as a legitimating form.

Citizens' representation and participation - between national and European governance

In democratic societies, the interaction between the *political representatives* and the *public opinion*, is a rather complex process than a simple one. The reason is that each

⁸ *Ibidem*, art. 11.

⁹ *Ibidem*, art. 20.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, art. 12.

of the two parts react to the *behaviour*, the *values* and the *interests* of the other. The *political representatives* feel, sometimes, constrained to choose those political objectives and actions that are consistent with the public opinion; also, they are in a position in which they can interpret events, targets and means, for their citizens, and they create attitudes, opinions and images. Therefore, what the citizens know about a critical situation or about the actions of their government has its origins in the press conferences, parliamentary debates or political discourses. The *empirical* studies show that the changes in political attitudes follow the governmental actions.

In representative democracies, the understanding of *public opinion* is very important, as the public opinion represents a *linkage* between the citizens and their representatives. On one hand, the public opinion has a certain capacity to control the political representatives. On the other hand, the political representatives can influence the process of public's opinion formation, the content of opinions and the citizens' attitude. In this process between the political representatives and the governed, *mass-media* has an outstanding role (Scotto & Singer, 2004).

Focusing on the *communication process* from the political representatives to the governed, the first have the obligation to inform with regard to their actions and projects, as that the public (citizens and mass-media) to be able to evaluate them correctly. As a consequence, the building of the public opinion by the political representatives is a *strategic* action, motivated by their interest in holding the power (Fuchs & Pfetsch, 1996: 24).

Any communication process has as its objective the *influence* of the citizens' opinions and behaviours, of the targeted publics, so it is a process of social influencing. The communication as a process of social influencing is efficient only if it is accepted by the receiver, and particularly if the receiver credits with prestige and credibility the sender of the message (McQuail, 1999: 167- 168).

In analyzing the way of *attitudes formation* of the governed and, particularly, of the opinion public towards the governmental system, the starting point is the definition of the „public opinion” concept. In representative democracies, the *public opinion* constitutes an instrument used by the political representatives in two directions: to explore the common knowledge and to explore the citizens' towards the current social problems. And this because, in a democracy, politics must be brought closer to the citizens' life, and the political system's procedures and problems must be discussed and put under question by them.

B. Hennessy defines „*public opinion*” as the preferences expressed by a significant number of persons with regard to a problem of general importance (Rotariu & Iluț, 1997: 34), while for other authors, it represents the collected attitudes of the citizens with regard to a certain question (Almond & Verba, 1996). Young develops a theory of public opinion according to which public opinion is formed by verbalized attitudes and believes that are, essentially, emotional.

In the political domain, public opinion has two elements: the objects towards which an opinion is formed (political subjects and actors) and the way in which the opinions are expressed – a dichotomous evaluation (good / bad, strong / weak, etc.) or a preference towards problems / programmatic positions of the actors (Fuchs & Pfetsch, 1996: 2).

In order to articulate an opinion regarding the public phenomena, the citizens need *information* that link their values and interests with the political world (politicians, public policies, etc.). Therefore, the challenge for democracy is to provide trustworthy information, so that the citizens be able to develop accurate political opinions (Nelson, 2004: 3).

In the formulation of public opinion, the *political efficiency* (Owen, 1999) - meaning the citizens' belief that they can influence the political process and that successfully reach the

political leaders - can't be ignored. This efficiency is closely linked to the citizens' *political trust* in political representatives. Therefore, those who support the government are those who believe that they can influence the political life (Almond & Verba, 1996: 161 – 163).

According to Janda, Berry și Goldman (Janda & Berry & Goldman; 1989: 156 – 158), the governments tend to react to the public opinion's attitudes, but they do not always do what people wish. The government's answer is related to the way in which the public opinion is distributed in accordance with the options that it has about a certain question. In this regard, the government has to analyze all the answers quantitatively obtained.

The way in which the political representatives understand the public opinion will influence the way in which they will take it into consideration or not when they will make decisions regarding certain policies. An instrument used by the political representatives in order to be informed about the state of the public opinion is the *survey*, that reunites both the active opinions (the active publics are more interesting for the political representatives) and the passive ones (Rounce, 2004: 3-7).

In liberal democracies, the popular *sovereignty* is obtained, formally, through competitive *elections* and, practically, through political representatives' *responsiveness* towards the public opinion (Fuchs & Pfetsch, 1996: 2).

Therefore, the influence that the public opinion has on the decision-making process depends largely on the way in which the political representatives *perceive* the public opinion, while the way in which political representatives try to influence public opinion is done through public relations and *mass-media*. The Standard Eurobarometer 78¹¹ shows that the EU citizens get the news on national political matters mainly from television (84% - EU 27), followed by the press (47% - EU 27), radio (37% - EU 27) and Internet (31% - EU 27). As regards the news on European political matters, the survey shows the same distribution of the media institutions. The level of trust in media ranges from the institutions that are trusted (radio, television) to the institutions predominantly not trusted (press, internet).

As regards the interest of the EU citizens in politics and the satisfaction about the way democracy works, the Standard Eurobarometer 78¹² indicates a moderate interest in politics (46% – EU 27) and a satisfaction concerning the way national democracy works (49% - EU 27) and a dissatisfaction regarding the way EU democracy works (45% - EU 27). As to the level of trust in national and European institutions, the Eurobarometer reveals a lack of trust in national government (68% – EU 27), national parliament (66% – EU 27), regional or local public authorities (50% – EU 27), but also in the European Parliament (45% - EU 27) or the European Commission (44% - EU 27).

These last results show signs of political inefficiency, both at national and European layers, as there can be noticed significant levels of lack of trust in the political institutions, with a higher percentage recorded at national level than at the European one.

Moving the focus from the national governance to the European one, the clarification of the *relations* between the EU and the Member States, the delimitation and classification of the *EU's competences* represent a means to contribute to citizens' knowledge and understanding of the functioning of the EU's institutions, of the decision-making process and to the exercising of their rights as citizens.

As mentioned in the previous pages, the multi-level governance disperses the power and brings the governance structures *closer to the citizens*; in this way, it increases the *participation* and the *responsibility* of the different levels' actors. Moreover, the feeling of

¹¹ European Commission, *Standard Eurobarometer 78*, autumn 2012.

¹² *Ibidem*.

belonging to different social groups from local, regional, national and European levels becomes, therefore, an essential feature of the development of *participative democracy* (Milana, 2008: 209). Among the ways through which the citizens can influence political decision-making at different levels, voting in local/regional elections is considered¹³, by 73% of the EU citizens, as being influential (81% RO), in national elections – by 70% EU 27 (75% RO) and in European elections – by 54% EU 27 (71% RO). While 42% of the Europeans (46% RO) consider that other means are not influential, the other part of them use means as: signing a petition (34% EU 27, 22% RO), express their visions on public issues on the Internet or on social media (28% EU 27, 21% RO), express their views on public issues with their elected representative at local / regional level (24% EU 27, 25% RO), take part in a public debate at local / regional level (18% EU 27, 25% RO), express their views on public issues with their elected representative at national level (10% EU 27, 8% RO), express their views on public issues with their elected representative at European level (4% EU 27, 4% RO), take part in a public debate at European level (1% EU 27, 2% RO). These results show a decreasing level of participation between the governed and the political representatives, from local to European level.

The *Treaty of Lisbon* stipulates the *citizens' rights and obligations* and the main methods through which the citizens and their representative associations can participate to the formulation of the European public policy agenda. Besides, the European Commission considers *active European citizenship* as an important element of the consolidation of the European integration process. The objective of stimulating *active European citizenship* is, therefore, an inherent part of the new role that the EU wants to play, in the XXIst century, on the international arena. A role that, at internal level, comprises: changes regarding the functioning of the EU, the inter-institutional relations, as well as the interaction among the European institutions, the national parliaments and the citizens. President Barroso, in the document called “Political Guidelines for the Next Commission” (2009-2014), considers that the consolidation of the EU’s citizenship and the citizens’ participation are two of the EU’s main challenges (Barroso, 2009).

The European Commission’s document „EU Citizenship Report 2010”¹⁴ focused on the main obstacles that the European citizens may encounter in the enjoyment of their EU rights – as private individuals, consumers, students and professionals, or political actors. There were identified 25 obstacles, based on citizens’ complains, among which it could be mentioned, as relevant for the present paper: lack of easily accessible information on the EU and their rights or the lack of awareness of the meaning of EU citizenship. Following this Report, the „EU Citizenship Report 2013”¹⁵ identified 12 ways of action in order to remove the obstacles identified in the previous Report. One action, for tackling the first obstacle mentioned above, is the effectiveness of Europe Direct and Your Europe web portals or, as a response to the second obstacle, the Report promotes the citizens’ and civil society’s involvement in a debate on European issues, as full participation, at all levels, of EU citizens in the democratic life of the EU is considered the essence of European citizenship. The last action is also mentioned in the context of European Year of Citizens (2013). 20 years after the launching of EU citizenship by the Maastricht Treaty and one year before the 2014 European Parliament elections, 2013 European Year of

¹³ European Commission, *Flash Eurobarometer 373 – Europeans’ engagement in participatory democracy*, March 2013.

¹⁴ European Commission, *EU Citizenship Report 2010*, COM (2010) 603, pp. 4 - 17.

¹⁵ European Commission, *EU Citizenship Report 2013*, COM (2013) 269, pp. 4 - 5.

Citizens¹⁶ aims at enhancing awareness and knowledge on citizens' rights and responsibilities attached to EU citizenship. In a coordinated endeavour of the European Commission, Member States, European Parliament, European Economic and Social Committee, Committee of Regions, local and regional authorities, bodies and associations which represent local and regional interests, 2013 European Year of Citizens includes, among its objectives, raising awareness among the EU citizens, including young people, about how they can tangibly benefit from their EU rights, raising awareness about existing policies and programmes that support the exercise of those rights, exchanging information and sharing experience and good practices among EU, national, regional and local authorities and other public and civil society's organizations, etc.

The *citizens' involvement in the decision-making* process has become, in time, an important element of *governance* in the EU member states (public consultations, polls, partnerships and networks of governance between the public and private sectors, etc.) (Agger, 2012: 29). Therefore, the objectives of *participative governance* are: increasing the state's responsibility and efficiency; design of more correct, participative, deliberative and responsible public policies; transformation of citizens from consumers of public policies in co-producers, responsible for the public governance (Agger, 2012: 30).

Because of the present *democratic deficit* at European level (Albert, 2002: 307), the mobilization of citizens in the EU decision-making process has become one of the important themes of the public agenda; besides the *EU's* endeavor to reach its citizens, the *national decision-makers* have to identify the concrete measures in which they can get to different target - groups and to citizens (Schmidt, 2006: 3-24), by conceiving strategies that stimulate participation, that are adapted to different categories of citizens and that imply different methods of participation; the reason for this is that the Europeanization has brought a *change in the national practices of governance*, as the national interests are part of a European decision-making process that involves a large number of actors involved in a complex set of interactions, with multiple channels of access (a governance "for" and "with" citizens) (Agger, 2012: 41).

The Standard Eurobarometer 79¹⁷ shows that the European citizens feel like citizens of the EU (62% - EU 27, 53% - RO), an opinion that is stable over time, since spring 2010, for example. But, a problem that arises regards the fact that the predominant opinion is that the EU citizens don't know their rights as citizens of the EU (53% - EU 27, 53% - RO), a situation that also affects their level of participation in the decision-making process at the EU level. On the other side, predominant is the opinion that they would like to know more about their rights as European citizens (59% - EU 27; 62% - RO), a situation that requires a common effort of the European and national leaders to develop a communication strategy that increases the EU citizens knowledge of their rights and their participation in the EU decision-making process.

According to the Eurobarometer 78¹⁸, the citizens' intention to use Citizens' Initiative (as a sign of citizens' participation in society) is not very likely / not at all likely - 69% EU 27, a result that might be analyzed jointly with the answer that the people give to the question whether their voice counts in the EU – that scores a negative record¹⁹ (No - 67% EU 27; No – 71% RO) as compared to the question whether their voice counts in their country (Yes - 50%

¹⁶ Decision no. 1093/2012/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Year of Citizens (2013), November 2012, pp. 5 – 6.

¹⁷ European Commission, *Standard Eurobarometer 79*, spring 2013.

¹⁸ European Commission, *Standard Eurobarometer 78*, autumn 2012.

¹⁹ European Commission, *Standard Eurobarometer 79*, spring 2013.

EU 27)²⁰. Another problem regards the fact that the EU citizens consider that the interests of their country is not well taken into account in the EU (52% EU 27). At the same time, both the national and the European public opinion perceive a democratic deficit between the public opinion and the decisions taken by the political leaders: 51% - EU 27 totally agree that this deficit exists and 38% - EU 27 tend to agree with this; the presented trend can be also found with regard to the Romanian citizens, even if it is 20 percentage lower than the one registered at European level (39% RO – totally agree and 33% RO – tend to agree)²¹. An important answer is also the one that regards the fact that the EU citizens support the EU to become a federation of nation-states (44% - EU 27; 37% - RO).

The answers delivered by the European citizens show that they are attached to the European Union – they feel like citizens of this supranational organization and they support a European federation, in future, but there can be noticed some deficiencies regarding the exercise of their democratic rights – both at individual and at national level – as the European citizens consider that they don't know their rights as European citizens and they don't believe that their voice counts in the EU, and they don't feel like using their right of initiating, across borders, legislative proposals (by using Citizens' Initiative). In this situation, it becomes the responsibility of the leaders and organizations from all levels of the decision-making process (as they are defined by the multi-level governance) to inform, debate and involve more consistently the citizens in this process, so that the citizens across Europe become active participants in the EU decision-making process and initiate, as a consequence, their own legislative proposals.

The prospects for participation in the multi - level Europe – the case study of students in Political Science

The analysis of youth participation, in the context of its present dramatic decline, is important because of this social group's importance in the endeavour of predicting *how democracy will look and function in the future* (Tătar, 2012: 47).

The focus on the *Political Science students*, as an aim of the present chapter, may be justified, first of all, by the meanings of a Political Science diploma that are, among others: education for active citizenship, individual and civil responsibilities (Collins & Gibbs Knotts & Schiff, 2012: 87), critical and analytical abilities, lifelong learning, education for public administration, or maximizing the students' ability to analyze and interpret the meaning and the dynamic of the political events and of the governmental processes.

Therefore, this chapter concentrates on the results of the project "*Labour market challenges and optimization of internships*"²², implemented by the Department of Political Science and Communication Sciences (University of Oradea), during May – November 2012, and financed by Oradea Town Hall.

The objective of this project was the identification of the measures of optimizing the Political Science students' integration in the labour market, in the context of the existent high levels of youth unemployment and given that the scientific researches have proven that the academic internships register the best results in terms of efficiency, quality, learning, experience and transition to the labor market.

²⁰ European Commission, *Standard Eurobarometer 78*, autumn 2012.

²¹ European Commission, *Special Eurobarometer 379 – Future of Europe*, April 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_379_en.pdf

²² Alina – Carmen Brihan, director of the research project called *Provocările pieței muncii și optimizarea stagiilor de practică / Labour market challenges and optimization of internships*, may – november 2012.

In Political Science domain, the *academic internships* can be considered as „ground” experiences linked to the student’s education and her/his career interests (Brihan, 2012: 70). The academic internships give students the chance to acquire professional experience, to develop the abilities required by the employers, they represent an entrance to certain professions or a means to acquire practical and active citizenship abilities, etc.²³.

Because of the specificity of the Political Science domain, the congruence among the students’ knowledge, abilities, competencies and the labor market needs is very important, not only for ensuring an efficient *transition* from school to working place, but also for the *role that the Political Science graduates will play* in our European, multi-level and democratic societies. An this because the Political Science program aims at forming specialists that can contribute to developing and implementing public policies, doing political campaign strategies, organizing political events, counselling political actors, managing community projects, and so on.

One of the first steps in acquiring these competences is to organize efficient internship programs during the academic years, as these internships aim at familiarising students with organizations / institutions’ the way of functioning, with understanding the decision-making process inside the organization, with noticing the possible organizational deficiencies, etc. For example, the Political Science Department’s students from University of Oradea can do their internships – at local level - at Town Hall, Local Council, County Council, Prefecture, local branches of parliamentary political parties, local parliamentary offices, NGOs; and – at national level – the Romanian Parliament.

The research was done on 25 students (from the total number of 41 students) in Political Science (1st and 2nd years of study). The students’ answers presented in this chapter regard the subject approached in the previous chapters – namely, the relation between the political representatives and the governed, at local, national and European levels. Therefore, the data presented bellow focus on five aspects: interest in politics and in the current affairs, trust in institutions, the status of political efficiency, the means of political participation or the Political Science students’ career options.


As approached on three levels of the relation between the governed (Political Science students) and the political representatives – *local, national, European* - the survey’s data point out several interesting results. The *local level* registers the highest level, as compared to other levels (national, European), regarding trust and political efficiency, while the students’ participation at this level is only moderate. Therefore, the students in Political Science are first and foremost interested in politics and current affairs at local level (80% - “very interested” and “interested”), and only in the third place they are interested in politics at county level (64%)²⁴. Among the institutions, Town Hall (60%) registers the highest level of trust, and at a big distance – the Local Council (28%), the County Council (24%) or the Prefecture (20%). Regarding the students’ belief that they can influence the political decisions (the level of political efficiency) at local level, the predominant position is that their voice counts in a moderate measure – at local level (44%), while at county level, the predominant position is that their voice counts to a small extent (48%). The means the students would use, in order to make their voice heard, are presented in a descending order: membership in a political party, lobby campaigns, participation to political debates, signing petitions, membership in an NGO and, to a small extent, contacting a politician or of another official or as member of a labour

²³ European Commission, “Study on a Comprehensive Overview on Traineeship Arrangements in Member States”, May 2012, p. 18.

²⁴ Database of the research project called *Provocările pieței muncii și optimizarea stagiilor de practică / Labour market challenges and optimization of internships* (director – Alina – Carmen Brihan), implemented during May – November 2012 by the Department of Political Science and Communication Sciences, University of Oradea.

union. The first and second years students' participation / involvement, prior to the internship, in the activities of different organizations and institutions, is just "moderate": NGOs - 32%, local public administration institutions (Town Hall, Local Council, County Council, County Hall) (28%) or political parties (20%)²⁵; these results show that, as these institutions represent potential future employers – at local level - for the Political Science students, a strengthen and more efficient relation should be developed between University and these institutions / organizations during the academic years, in order to ensure the students' professional development and their transition to the labour market.

Fig. 1 The career options of the Political Science students



Source: Database of the research project called *Labour market challenges and optimization of internships*, implemented during May – November 2012

²⁵ *Ibidem.*

The *national level* occupies a worrying position with regard to the levels of trust and political efficiency. As a consequence, data show that the students in Political Science are interested, secondly, in politics and current affairs at national level (76%). As we have seen, the local institutions register a higher level of trust than the national ones: the Romanian Parliament – 20%, the Romanian Government – 16%. At the same time, it can be noticed that the trust in NGOs register the highest level (64%) of all institutions – either national or European, while the political parties register the lowest level of trust – 12%, and media is situated at the same level of trust with the Parliament – 20%. Regarding the students' belief that they can influence the political decisions (the level of political efficiency) at national level, the prevalent position is that their voice counts to a small extent (52%), while we can notice an increase of the level of those who think that their voice don't count at all (28%).

The *European level* represents a challenging level, as the students trust the European institutions but, at the same time, they don't believe that they can influence the decision-making process at this level. The survey indicates that the students in Political Science's interest in politics and current affairs at EU level occupies the last place in the students' options (48%). As regards the level of trust in the European surveyed institutions, both the European Commission and the European Parliament register a similar percentage – 56%, that is higher than of any other institution's level, and lower only than of the NGO's percentage. Regarding the students' belief that they can influence the political decisions (the level of political efficiency) at European level, the prevalent position is that their voice counts to a small extent (44%), while we can notice an increase of the level of those who think that their voice doesn't count at all (32%); it results that the level of political efficiency is bigger at European than at national level, but lower than that at local level.

The project results could be interpreted in two directions: firstly, despite the students in Political Science' present low levels of trust in institutions at different levels and of political efficiency, they stated the desire to do internships at institutions / organizations that are either included or not in their current academic curricula, but are relevant for their future careers as graduates of Political Science. Therefore, the survey showed that they would like to do internships in an Europarliamentary office in Brussels (88%), local public administration institutions (Town Hall, Local Council, County Council, Prefecture) (84%), central public administration institutions (Presidency, Government, Parliament) (84%), European institutions and bodies (76%), the representations of the European institutions in Romania (72%), international organizations (72%) or in a local parliamentary office (68%). (Brihan, 2012: 81) Secondly, the questionnaire results illustrate that the Political Science students' desire to follow, at the end of their academic years, a career as: counselor in international organizations (68%), parliamentary political counselor (64%), European assistant (60%), political party counselor (56%), counselor in central public administration institutions (56%), European civil servant (52%), political analyst (40%), civil servant (40%), counselor in local public administration institutions (40%). On the other side, the less attractive careers are: researcher in a think-tank, teacher – at undergraduate / graduate level (24%) or journalist (8%).

These answers indicate that the options of the Political Science students target jobs as political counselors, at different levels and in different organizations, answers that may, also, indicate the need for strengthen partnerships among the academic institutions and this institutions / organizations, from different levels, in order to ensure an optimal balance between theory and practice in students' professional development, as to be adapted to the

needs of the labor market in a multi-level Europe, and last but not least, to enhance their civic and political participation, as active citizens.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we may say that the European states' joining and, particularly – Romania's joining, to the European Union means the integration in a supranational body, characterized by a specific, multi - level decision – making process, that implies not only the interaction between the European institutions and the Member States' governments and parliaments, but also the involvement, in some phases of this process, of different sub-national actors.

In the process of European multi – level governance's consolidation, the Treaty of Lisbon played a crucial role, as it approached the relations between the Union and the Member States to the regional and local levels, and presented them in the form of an explicit set of rules (both of the Union's towards the Member States and vice versa), so that the citizens better know the different levels' responsibilities („who does what”) and to exercise a more efficient control over them.

As the EU represents the political transformation from a hierarchical order, built on the state, to a structure of the international system beyond Westphalia, in which the multi – level governance describes the new modes of the social and political orders beyond the Westphalian system, the perspectives for a democratic and legitimate governance beyond the nation – state, the ability to solve the problems of the national systems of governance and the way these were transformed by Europeanisation, represent some of the challenges that the European governance is confronted with, in this moment.

Therefore, in the attempt to overcome the criticism about the European governance's legitimacy and the present democratic deficit, the Treaty of Lisbon tried to build an European political model based on a double legitimacy – of the Member States (intergovernmental) and of the European citizens (federal).

From the point of view of democratic legitimacy, the evolution of the European Union from the Westphalian system to the post – Westphalian one raises some problems, as the operations of the European institutions are legitimized through mechanisms that are appropriate for the nation – state, but not through mechanisms designed for this new and complex structure, situation that leads to the present democratic deficit.

A democratic deficit confirmed by the most recent European Commission's Eurobarometers that indicate a lack of trust in the national institutions and, despite of the lower lack of trust in the European institutions, as compared to the national ones, they consider that they don't know their rights as European citizens, their voice doesn't count at European level and they confirm the existence of a democratic deficit between the governed and the political representatives. As a consequence, this decade, along with the accomplishment of the objectives that EU has established for 2020 and beyond, the overcoming of the present democratic deficit has to be a priority on the agenda of the national and European leaders, as they have to identify the most efficient mechanisms to make themselves understood by the European public opinion and, in the same time, to be responsive to the European citizens' opinions and make them active participants in the decision – making process. And they should do this with a close look to the young generation as they will be the ones who will contribute significantly to the developing and functioning of our democratic societies and of our multi – level Europe.

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THE IMPACT OF STRUCTURAL FUNDS ON ROMANIAN SOCIETY - BUILDING GOVERNANCE

Răzvan COTOVELEA *

Abstract: *In this paper I analyze the implications of the European Regional Development Policy/Cohesion Policy on the institutional, behavioral and economic transformations associated to such policy in Romania.*

I consider that this paper clarifies to a certain extent this dynamic process. It is an attempt to include in the explanation the increase of the number of stakeholders involved in governance, of political, socio-economical and institutional stakeholders who increasingly complicate the coherence of our political system. This study provides a starting point for the evaluation and understanding of the political, administrative and economical Romanian system, for analyzing and comparing the general trend of reconfiguration, of redefining positions within State, as well for understanding the link between governance, economic performance and structural funds. The empiric evidence demonstrated that certain political systems can better solve public problems, while others do not manage to do so at all. My study is trying to bring a higher degree of visibility of the current transformations. The purpose of the paper is to examine the manner in which a new model of governance is born, and provide a clearer understanding of the factors which are behind of this process. The logic of this methodology is to extract certain basic elements, which might have a significant influence in the discussed empiric problem (governance building). My intention is to isolate certain features, certain factors that channel the change of the Romanian politico-organizational system and to explain them.

Keywords: *structural funds, Romania, public policy, growth, governance*

1. Introduction

The free competitive market, the differences in the competitiveness of the Member States economies can lead to significant disparities. In this case, the intervention of the governments is necessary in order to try to reduce the disparities on medium and long term through a process of redistribution. The distribution of welfare between the different partners within an *integration* process is a major political issue at the level of the European Union. Thus, there are considerable differences between the wealth of each Member State in the European Union. In particular, the recent enlargement of the European Union towards east made the differences in the development of the Member States rise considerably. In general, the new Member States have the level of development much lower than the European average and it must be mentioned that this situation is completely different compared to the previous enlargement waves when the differences between the new members and the old ones were around 30% (while, in the case of the last enlargement, it is considered to be around 60%). Through this intervention, the

* National School of Political Studies and Public Administration, Povernei 6-8, Bucharest.
E-mail: razvancotovelea@yahoo.com

general objective is to inspire the less developed countries to catch up with the rich ones as regards the social economic development. To this end, the factors that determine the location of the large revenue generating activities must be influenced and targeted to other areas, other states. Within the European Union, there is an explicit recognition of the fact that the development disparities are intolerable in any community if we want the notion of “community” to have a real meaning (Bradley, 2005).

2. European governance, European institutions, European programmes

The structural funds as visible programmes co-financed by the European Union were, in many European countries, the main source for the regional social economic development as well as the starting point for using the partnership between the national governments and the subnational authorities (Bache, 2004). There are several actors involved in the cohesion policy but without a strictly hierarchical relation between them. The European Union adopted the principle of partnership, as a set of rules and procedures which provide for the fact that the staff of the European Commission, of the national government and of the regional authorities, together with the representatives of the social stakeholders, namely of the business environment, trade unions or non-governmental organizations, closely and constantly collaborate to develop, implement and evaluate the programmes financed by the European Union.

One of the main objectives of the regional development policy is to *level* the disparities between countries by targeting the support towards the poor areas (Beckfield, 2009). The model underlying the Cohesion Policy / Regional Development Policy of the European Union is the transfer of resources through the structural and cohesion funds from the richer states to the less prosper ones (Bărbulescu, 2006: 267). One aspect is the concern for the unequal distribution of wealth within the European economy but also the solidarity for those who lose as a result of the single market (Bartolini, 2005: 259). The main concern has always been “territorial” in the attempt to remedy the regional and national disparities of the revenue per capita, the macroeconomic and territorial policies being privileged compared to the social policies (Allen, 2005). The conventional approaches to this issue emphasized the different and disparate geography of the European economy based on the analysis of the regional economic performance indicators, especially the Gross Domestic Product (**GDP**) per capita (Smith, 2004). This territorial representation of the regional economies is frequently used by the European Commission to analyze the regional disparities and the cohesion in Europe. The regional economic performance is focused upon the trend of the GDP per capita over time. Other indicators such as the unemployment rate are used for the analysis, but the main indicator remains the GDP per capita. This indicator is used in determining the allocation of the most important regional support programme, the Objective 1 of the structural funds.

A major issue in the allocation of the structural funds is caused by the institutional tension (Mazey, 1995), between the European, national, regional and local institutions, as well as by the impact of the new partnerships (public-private) on the economic development, which raises questions regarding the coherence of the regional development policy (Bachtler and Turok (eds), 1997). Furthermore, as John Bradley (Bradley, 2005) claims, in a more and more globalized economy, elements of the national domestic public policies are yielded in favor of some supranational organizations/entities, producing an increased interdependence (Schmid, 2004: 2). Peters (Peters, 2003: 121-122] states that there is currently an increased need for the political community to participate in determining and influencing the decisions which directly affect it, a request for a

governance closer to the citizen and a stronger rejection of the closed, opaque and hierarchic model, a need for the European governments to use the participative even deliberative tools within the governance. Ash Amin (Amin, 1999) thinks that the economic governance is now ruled by new general axioms, more specifically that there is a preference for public actions designed to strengthen the associative networks in counterbalance with the old measures focusing on individual actors; that the political action must involve a plurality of decentralized autonomous organizations because an effective economic governance expands beyond the limits that the state or the market can reach; that in this new framework of plural and autonomous governance the role of the state, as the first collective organization with legal power, should be to provide the resources, to umpire between the decentralized authorities, to ensure the collective results by setting several strategic objectives and not as a central planner or as a simple facilitator of the market; that the purpose of the political action is to encourage the negotiations more than to encourage a selfish behavior where the individuals follow only their personal aim or a behavior where the individuals comply with the rules in order to ensure a strategic learning and adapting vision; that the solutions must be specific to the context and sensitive to the local historical dependencies; that the intermediary forms of governance built on several local structures including political institutions, enterprises' support systems but also citizen groups must be encouraged. As a consequence of all this, the building of the economic success (and also of the development) is as much a matter of designing several adequate economic policies as it is, especially, a political and social reform which should encourage the development of the social capacities for the common autonomous action. It should be noticed the fact that the studies on "governance" in the European political system are based on a few assumptions. An underlying assumption is that the state no longer possesses the monopoly in the governing functions and it shares it with other actors. Another assumption is that the governance is no longer hierarchical like in the conventional state-centric model and a third assumption is that the governance is centered on regulation. Thus, Rhodes (Rhodes, 2003: 66) claims that the **networks** are the defining characteristics of the governance and that the distinctive features of these new allocation and coordination mechanisms of the public services and resources are: interdependence, reciprocity, trust, diplomacy, relations based on the exchange of resources, cooperation strengthened by shared norms and values. They significantly differ from the characteristics of the other two resource allocation mechanisms, the market and the state hierarchy, because the market is characterized by competition, independence, contract based relations, ownerships, settlement of conflicts in courts, and the state hierarchy is characterized by the relations of authority, dependence, subordination, settlement of conflicts with the support of rules. Majone (Majone, 2003: 297) argues that a distinctive feature of the modern state based on the rule of law is the delegation of most of the powers to politically independent institutions, namely agencies, commissions, courts, central banks which leads to the situation where the elected political leaders do not have the means to impose and implement their own public policies and, in general, where the public actions, the public policies do not have the expected effects, especially in the context of increasing economic and political interdependence (Majone, 2003: 301), as well as considering that a significant part of the competencies of the national authorities are shared with the European institutions (Majone, 2003: 302). This means that the political power is now split, dispersed, delegated and limited in various ways, narrowing the power of majority and the direct political responsibility (Majone, 2003: 311). There are service providers fully owned by the state, there are private companies operating

solely on public funds, there are partial public and partial private agencies, there are nongovernmental organizations with both public and private interests (Stoker, 2008: 497). The coordination of the multitude of actors, the fragmentation of the public policies, the interdependencies that include political-administrative actors together with a large series of economic and social actors, which are also both public and private, all these characterize now the governance. The human, financial, technical and legal resources must be analyzed in order to have a picture as precise as possible. In addition, when the current informal practices are included in the analysis, the picture becomes even more complicated. The entire matter of designing and coordinating the public policies implies various schemes bringing together different levels of governance, but also other actors. These elements are even more important as, in the last 2-3 years, the financial resources available in the new member states are more and more limited and the need for investments (in the transport infrastructure, energy, environment, entrepreneurship, tourism etc.) is increasingly important and essential. These new instruments such as the contracts, the partnerships, and the pacts show the dynamism and the ambiguity of the public policies (Galès, 2003). The outsourcing of the public services towards private actors is a radical change in the contemporary mechanisms of providing the public services, which traditionally (the classic Weberian state) were entirely provided by the state, by the state public sector, meaning that when the government wanted to fulfill a certain task, it should have also entirely provided the related service, it should have been “self-sufficient” (Peters, 2003: 116). The relation between a myriad of actors: public, quasi-public and private that participate in the design, preparation, financing and implementation of the public policies must be identified. A problem that permanently appears is also the need to coordinate so many actors. But the relation itself between the actors is in constant transformation, is dynamic and complicated.

In democracy, the “elected ones” are forced that at every four years “meet” with their constituents and that is why the politicians are obliged to have results, to have public policies generating economic growth. According to the new paradigm of the development, the role and functions of the state must be redefined and the state should become a stimulating factor for those forces of the society and economy that can accomplish things by themselves (Amin, 1999), As Molle (Molle, 2006: 288) points out, there are at least three theories that analyze the process of economic integration and that claim completely different things when trying to answer the question: does the economic integration leads to convergence in the welfare of the population in that particular system or on the contrary to divergence. Thus, the neoclassic theory states that once the custom union and the single market are created, the levels of economic development will converge. Other theories claim the fact that the initial development differences may lead, on the contrary, to an aggravation of the imbalances due to the tendency of the investment to concentrate exactly in the areas where there is already a technological advantage. The work force tends to relocate towards the areas with the greatest chances of success in order to obtain a well-paid job which is usually found in areas already economically developed. This dispute of the supporters of the convergence or divergence is overlapped by the new theory of economic growth that takes into consideration many more factors, namely: good governance, institutional efficiency, human capital, access to the marketplace, international competitiveness, technological changes, scale economy etc. This last theory claims, in exchange, that certain countries have an increased capacity to influence these factors and manage to develop faster, while others do not have the vision or the inspiration to modify these characteristics and lag behind, therefore not being able to develop in the

same pace. This fact is not solely due to the initial position of that country, region (more economically advanced or lagging behind) but exactly to the capacity to master the optimal combination of factors favoring the economic growth, the capacity to adapt to the new economic system. This means that the result of the process cannot be established beforehand but it depends entirely of the transformation process itself.

In this context, there are certain views of several politicians, like Leonard Orban (Orban, 2006), who argues that Romania entered the EU pre-accession process completely unprepared, the Romanian administration lacking the capacity to perform impact studies or sound evaluations that support the future reforms, the national public policies or its position in the relation with the European Union and that, after a period of passive politics, the increasingly more active pressure from EU has led to a change in the economic and political trajectory of Romania, impelling the transformation into a slightly more competitive political system.

I will try to analyze further if the economic integration of the European Union determines, in case of Romania, has a tendency of convergence with the rest of the European countries or if, on the contrary, Romania does not have that optimal combination of factors which can produce economic growth and welfare for its population. To this purpose, I will analyze the capacity of the Romanian administration to access European funds and the capacity to generate welfare by attracting these funds, taking into consideration the fact that the responsibility of a more efficient use of structural instruments lies with the government, as well as with the managing authorities, the intermediary bodies and the beneficiaries. One should not forget the fact that the structural funds do not finance anything else but Romania's own model of development or, simply said, what allows in addition the access to the European funds is a level of public investment slightly higher than it would have been possible if all the public expenditure would have been financed only from the national budget or external loans. This means that if a certain project cannot be justified as financeable from national/domestic funds, it should not be financeable from structural funds either. The financing priorities should remain the same, as well as Romania's development model, of course.

I want to observe to what degree the implementation of this process has been accomplished successfully (or on the contrary) and to what degree the necessary actions to achieve a coherent policy for the economic growth have been taken. To this purpose, I will analyze several evaluation reports of the operational programmes drafted until now in order to extract relevant information for describing the entire process, as well as information that will be analyzed so that the specific characteristics of the Romanian institutional system and governance overall can be deduced. However, the existence of these evaluation reports itself, as well as the obligation to evaluate the operational programmes (imposed by the European Commission) during their implementation represents a decisive change in how the governance and the implementation of public policies are conceived. It must be mentioned that prior to the implementation of these operational programmes, in Romania, there was no culture of evaluating the consequences of the public interventions or an impartial and public evaluation of the consequences of the public reforms. The analysis of the viable national investment programs was entirely missing. The results of this fact are visible and easy to notice. Therefore no systematic research of the national political initiatives (other than the operational programmes) has been made prior to the obligation imposed by the European Commission to perform an impartial and public evaluation of the consequences of the public reforms. The consultation with the social partners, the transparency of the process, the obligation to

monitor and evaluate are new to the Romanian government system and getting used to these new practices and rules might permanently change our political culture.

3. Evaluation of the operational programmes

According to the analyzed evaluation reports, the implementation of the operational programmes has begun quite slowly, with a set of difficulties, political bottlenecks and inadequacies. The programming process was relatively successful although in certain sectors further analysis would have been necessary. This fact is shown by several statements in the evaluation reports according to which a number of areas in some operational programmes deal with similar and in the same time different issues of the same sectors, and a major problem is caused by the lack of sectorial strategy (which should have been there long before the drafting of the operational programmes) and *horizontal* coordination. As it is outlined in the reports, certain *areas within* the operational programmes are lacking a fundamental strategy and, in a certain way, the Operational Programmes are themselves the “Strategic Approach” (Ministry of Public Finance, 2011) – fact showing the difficulty, the importance and the complexity of the process of preparing nationally integrated public policies. This would be the case of the Sectorial Operational Programme Human Resource Development (SOP HRD) but also of the Sectorial Operational Programme Increase of Economic Competitiveness (SOP IEC). These programmes are considered not to be based on a well justified vision or not even on a certain vision, strategy. And for the rest of the operational programmes, the underlying strategies are regarded as rather weak or it is thought that there is no consistency of the operational programme with the strategy which it should be based on. Other problems identified in the programming phase are likely to be the overlaps between programmes (the Regional Operational Programme (ROP), SOP IEC and OPTA in the case of the growth poles and the economic competitiveness). The lack of a global national strategy that includes the programs financed from the state budget through coherent actions is seen as a major difficulty with extremely negative and direct consequences on the implementation of the operational programmes. For example, the fact that the growth poles’ strategy did not exist prior to the preparation of the Regional Operational Programme (ROP) caused a significant delay, difficulty and multiple bottlenecks in the launching of this key area of intervention. Also, the evaluation reports show that the lack of a clear strategy in certain relevant fields such as competitiveness, foreign trade, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) brought significant prejudices to the Sectorial Operational Programme (SOP IEC) or that the lack of a strategy on the human capital development made the Sectorial Operational Programme Human Resource Development (SOP HRD) to be regarded as a strategic declaration and implicitly as one of Romania’s development strategy, although, normally, this programme should have been designed based on a pre-existing strategic vision.

Some key areas of intervention (like KAI 4.2 or even KAI 1.1) did not raised the interest of the beneficiaries and the number of the projects submitted for financing was very low. This aspect may be also considered a programming mistake. Not including the public-private partnerships among the eligible applicants for the European funds and the existence of an insufficient legal coherence or the lack of legal approximation in the public-private partnership field made that a number of beneficiaries would not be able to access European funds, although they had the will and the capacity to do so. Another example of a programming mistake was to define too broadly certain concepts used in the tender documentations (as it was the case of the business support structures), which made some

projects to be declared eligible although they actually did not fulfill the requirements of the operational programme, thus diverting the interventions towards unsatisfactory projects.

The implementation process of the operational programmes is in itself a major challenge for the relevant governmental authorities. Some problems risen in this process are related to the programming phase because it is stated that the key areas of interventions and the operations presenting difficulties are those that were not actually prepared at the time of launching the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) and the operational programme, namely the growth poles, energy and cross-border cooperation. Other problems would be caused by the weak performance of the public administration system given the fact that the public sector plays both the role of project manager for the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) and the role of its main beneficiary. Thus, the NSRF interim evaluation performed in 2009 calculated that at the end of June 2009 the “public” beneficiaries were 75% out of the total number of approved projects while the “private” ones were only 25% (although the state owned companies were forcibly classified as “private” beneficiaries which means that the percentage is clearly in favor of the public sector). Another interesting aspect which shows the weak performance of the Romanian public system is the fact that the public structures are precisely the ones that encounter the greatest challenges in absorbing the European funds. More exactly, it was noticed (Ministry of Public Finance, 2011) that the operational programmes which target mainly the public sector have much lower performances than those which target companies or NGOs and this fact contradicts the *a priori* expectations in the context of an economic crisis which should have caused problems for the private sector. Following the analysis of the evaluation reports, I was able to identify numerous problems in the project implementation phase. Problems appeared because of the faulty preparation of the applicants’ guides which provide guidance to a potential beneficiary of European funds on how to apply for these funds. The guides are regarded as too complicated for the potential beneficiaries with limited human resources, even if they are quite clear for the consultants. Certain instructions are not clear and certain criteria can be used abusively by the applicants in order to get a higher ranking in the evaluation grids, certain provisions are difficult to implement etc. The technical and financial evaluation grids provide for the possibility of a biased appraisal from the evaluators.

The interim evaluations have shown many difficulties in the implementation mechanisms of the operational programmes, difficulties which are both general and specific to the operations. A very large duration of the projects selection, evaluation and contracting process is registered, the main phases that cause delays being the technical and financial evaluation of the projects and the contracting phase. The excessive formalism of the procedures in general and the communication related to the operational programmes are listed among the causes.

4. Conclusions

In the nineties, the planning of the national development in Romania was deemed to be a part of a previous conception, a fallen and unwanted regime (nobody has ever wanted to hear of a five year plan!) and the economic liberalization was seen as an optimal solution where the state withdraws itself from the economy and leaves room for the private sector which would become the driving engine for the national development. However, the role of the economic planning has evolved both in Romania and in the European Union (Bradley, 2005), and the development planning and the public policies programming have become nowadays a common, usual way, especially due to the

cohesion policy of the European Union. Based on the analysis of the effect that the implementation of this public policy has in Romania, one can state that our country has still an undeveloped institutional system and a fragile economic system, which make it unable to take full advantage of the benefits brought by the economic integration of the European Union. Although we have a relatively centralized public administration system, which should be more effective, more efficient and easier to coordinate than a decentralized one (that may cause nuisances when specific results need to be obtained), unfortunately the current structures and the mechanisms put in place for the implementation of the development policies have not led to the expected results. There is no implementation system prepared at all levels for spending the funds, a *sine qua non* condition to at least have a good absorption rate of the European funds. Not even through the intervention of the cohesion policy, was Romania able to modify significantly the factors that lead to economic growth, welfare, sustainable development, competitiveness. Although the NSRF has managed to dominate the entire programming process of the interventions in the public sector in Romania and the matter related to the absorption of the European funds has become a hot topic on the public agenda of the citizens and the politicians, the implementation of the cohesion policy has not yet produced the expected structural changes such as: rapid and sustainable economic growth and a real convergence with the rest of the Europe.

However, it should be noticed that a fundamental change has taken place in how the public policies are conceived in Romania, meaning that it has shifted from the exercise of some simple short term measures (and annual budget) taken in response to various immediate problems, to a development model where there is a concern for a long term development process (7 years) including strategies, conception, programming, monitoring, evaluation. Also, following this process, the partnership principle has entrenched so that the idea of working hand in hand with the representatives of the European Commission as well as with the representatives of the local administration or with private beneficiaries has been understood and accepted as such. Furthermore, the obligation to implement a monitoring and evaluation process for the operational programmes generated a complex process of developing activities related to collecting and analyzing data, setting performance indicators, verifying if a particular project has brought an increased efficiency in the economy, briefly a process to quantify, to observe the causality chain between the applied structural measures and the targeted objectives, which means to closely monitor the designed and implemented public policies. The obligation to transparently monitor and evaluate the programmes financed from the European funds has led to the participation of both the European Commission and the social partners in this process opened to everybody. Analyzing the aggregated impact of the structural funds on the economy, the investment programs, implicitly the state interventions, measuring the public interventions in attaining the set objectives and targets have become almost a routine work. And this is a real progress in how the governmental measures and even the governance as a whole are conceived and analyzed but it mainly modifies the way in which society relates to its governors and the governance process. Now there is an increasing pressure from the social partners, the civil society as well as from the international partners, the European Commission, for the governmental interventions to have clear and positive results and if this does not happen the public criticism and attention is drawn on the governors.

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HEALTH CARE DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

*Cristinela-Ionela VELICU**

Abstract: *The case of undertaking health policy analysis has been made by a number of academics and practitioners, however there has been given less attention to how the health care decisions are made, what theories and methods best inform policy making processes. This paper aim to conceptualize a theoretical framework in order to describe decision-making models in six Central and Eastern European countries: Romania, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia.*

Keywords: *policy analysis, agenda-setting, CEE countries, incrementalism, institutions.*

Introduction

Health care systems and health organizations within those systems are faced with a common dilemma: as resources are scarce and limited, choices have to be made about what priorities and core services to fund and what not to fund. Public health systems are commonly defined as “all public, private, and voluntary entities that contribute to the delivery of essential public health services within a jurisdiction.” These systems are a network of entities with differing roles, relationships, and interactions. All of the entities within a public health system contribute to the health and well-being of the community or state (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 2007: 3). The challenging task of making choices in health care is complicated by a number of general factors such as the burden of diseases or the ageing of the population; but also by organizational problems including: a lack of understanding of formal approaches to priority setting, limited information to support trade-offs, a diverse set of stakeholders and the competing values of those groups and the often non-rational behaviour of organizations. Therefore a theoretical framework based on agenda-setting and decision-making theories should be a useful tool in order to analyse the reform of health care systems in Central and Eastern Europe, the financing trends and priority setting in the manner of health care professional’s mobility. The framework is used to describe decision-making processes and institutions in six countries: *Romania, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia.*

This theoretical study aims to explore and understand those different factors which influence the agenda setting process, both drawing on and refuting parts of existing theories about the structure of agenda setting and decision making processes. My argument is that typical modelling in political science of how agenda setting works is inadequate, since it does not take into account the structure in which those decisions occur in the health sector.

* PhD. Candidate, National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Faculty of Political Science. E-mail: velicucristina@gmail.com

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Moreover, in the health care systems literature is used a reductive idea of reform by reducing the complex rationale for the social action of decision-makers to the exclusive economic interests; this approach tends to reduce the reforms effects to a series of more or less significant changes in the models of financing, management and delivery of the health care services and generally explaining them according mostly to the convergence hypothesis (Chernichovsky, 1995). A definition of reform, officially accepted by the WHO is the one suggested by Cassels (1995) who argues that reforms are series of activities with the purpose to change both the health policies and the institutions through which they are implemented. Thus, in order to analyse the variety of the policies conceptualized as reforms, I have used a conceptual framework which, in accordance with Walt (1999: 365–384), includes the four fundamental components of the politics of these strategies: the context, the actors, the content of strategies, and the process (including the events).

The governance of public health in Central and Eastern Europe is complex and multifaceted. The organization and delivery of public health systems involves many distinct institutions and professions within the health sector. The services and activities it includes are broad and varied. Before 1990, health systems in the CEE region were organized largely according to the highly centralized sanitary-epidemiological system designed and set up as a part of the Semashko model of the health system broadly known as the Sanitary-Epidemiological System (Sanepid). The political and the economical changes in the post-communist countries across CEE countries analysed, led to weakened, complex transitional status within their health systems (WHO, 2009: 2). The shift from planned to market economies has been the principal driver of health system reforms, which proved to be insufficient to maintain proper preventive programmes, such as child vaccination, and to provide universal access to basic health services. Former communist countries had to face a threefold challenge: first, due to transition problems, second, owing to the poor health status of the population and dynamic demographic changes and third, owing to inadequate or ineffective health care sector reforms.

During transition CEE countries implemented health policy reforms with varying emphasis and over different time spans; these reforms can be summarized under four target headings: 1) autonomy for the health sector at the regional level and more autonomy for health care units within the public system; 2) separation of the health sector from the integrated system of budget planning and introduction of employer and/or employee contributions; 3) privatisation of isolated health care services; 4) reorganization of financing mechanisms. The concrete reforms and the timeframe of their realization after 1989 differ between the CEE countries, depending very much on the specific conditions at the start of the reforms and during their implementation. However it is very difficult to assess the level of success of any reform measure. Experts, but mainly politicians always want to show reform outcomes from their political (professional) point of view. Frequently their opinion on the same problem dramatically differs as values used and goals of evaluation normally differ.

Cross-national studies of public policy agenda-setting and decision-making processes are rare, as are studies that trace changing political attention to issues across time. The fact that such studies are scarce means that we know little about the extent to which issue politics transcend national boundaries. Although it seems likely that health care issues are larger than any particular political system, few if any studies attempt to compare how these issues affect health care systems across the CEE countries. The study of agenda setting is a particularly fruitful method to begin to understand how decision makers' power and the agenda interact to set the boundaries of political policy debate in public

health. I argue that agenda setting, like all other stages of the policy process, does not occur in a vacuum and that it is necessary to see it in the context of the health systems, the multitude of factors that impact on health and development, the sources of knowledge available to tackle health problems and the constraining values. The likelihood that an issue will rise on the agenda is a function of the issue itself, the actors that get involved, institutional relationships, and, often, random social and political factors that can be explained but cannot be replicated or predicted (Fischer et al., 2007: 77). The required characteristics of the agenda setting process are demanding, challenging and complex. This process should be open and explicit and the involvement of the all the stakeholders is preferable. It is also held that evidence from research and needs assessment should play some part in the decision-making and nevertheless that the process should be based on an ethical framework.

The definition of alternative issues, problems, and solutions is crucial because it establishes which issues, problems, and solutions will gain the attention of the public and decision makers and which, in turn, are most likely to gain broader attention; and it is important to contextualize the health policy environment in order to understand the challenges to methodology and theory. Priorities in health care, as well as the processes used to determine them, have become subject to both public and academic debate. The agenda setting literature firstly seeks to explain this limited success for some issues and solutions, secondly stresses on competition to define issues, the participants' resources and their socio-economic conditions and thirdly describes the context of public health policy, media and public preferences and the links to power and decision-making. Thus a potential contribution of this analysis is to provide a new comparative policy perspective which points to changes in political attention as one explanation for policy developments across the CEE region.

I. Why is public health a political issue?

Public health involves governmental actions in order to produce outcomes. As Gostin argues a political community stresses of health, welfare, and security, while members subordinate themselves to the welfare of the community as a whole. Public health can be achieved only through collective action, not through individual endeavour" (Gostin, 2000: 57). Health policy was interpreted in different ways. One of the simplest ways of defining "health policy" is as "authoritative statements of intent, probably adopted by governments on behalf of the public, with the aim of altering for the better the health and welfare of the population" (Lee & Mills, 1982: p.28) Therefore, health policy can be described as series of governmental decisions about what type of care is to be provided for the betterment of the health of its population and how it will be done. Heidenheimer et. al. (1990: p.59) argue that health policy is about the "choice of governments, direct or indirect, regarding which kinds of personnel may provide what kinds of medical care". Health policy should not be limited to health care provision; Walt (1994: p.41) focuses on the social, economic and organizational effects on health and provides a broader view about health policy by indicating the involvement of different actors and factors in achieving policy goals.

How governments manage health care programmes clearly has important consequences for policy and politics. In any political system, how policies are initially formulated and packaged has a strong impact on eventual outcomes. This explains why agenda dynamics are so politically charged and highly competitive: the institutions and actors successful in placing their issue on the agenda, and capable of sustaining support for that issue over time, can influence policy outputs even when they do not hold the formal power to take decisions.

Health is the sort of policy issue that is especially attractive to politicians with regard to vote-seeking. No politician will oppose health or access to health care. Illness is generally perceived to be something beyond the control of the individual (Stone 1989). Therefore, the public's affected by health care policy decisions are more likely to be seen as deserving than may be the case for other issues (Schneider and Ingram 1993; Oliver, 2006). Thus, health care politics tends to focus on "connecting solutions to problems" instead of debating whether the problems themselves deserve a response (Baumgartner and Jones 1993: 150–71). Politicians have incentives to offer solutions, and will try to avoid blame for problems or inaction (Weaver 1986).

II. Models of Decision-Making

The decision-making process is at the core of public policy. The intensity of interest in a policy area is in direct proportion to the desire for or against change in the existing policy settings. In the case of policy networks of the iron-triangle type, the routinized and predictable nature of these relationships and the balanced nature of power that they reflect, suggest there is little possibility of change in these cases. To the extent that change does occur in these circumstances, it will be of a relatively major and systemic kind. In the case of mixed scanning, however, a change in policy settings is more likely, but will be of a more minor variety. It should be noted that a decision not to alter an existing policy may be just as important as a decision to institute changes formally (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963).

Four conceptions of decision-making are considered here with assumptions that give varying weights to the conscious choice of the decision-makers. These models describe policy processes and offer alternative perspectives on how these processes may be rationally organized. Rationalistic models tend to posit a high degree of control over the decision-making situation on the part of the decision-maker. The incrementalist perspective presents an alternative model, referred to as the art of "muddling through", which assumes much less command over the environment. Other policy theories describe diverse aspects of policy-making based on empirical analyses, for example, of: agenda setting; policy networks and advocacy coalitions; policy formulation; and implementation (John 1998; Kingdon 1995; Parsons 1995; Sabatier 1999).

Lindblom, Simon, and early contributors to empirically-based theories of decision-making started their assumptions from the recognition that human problems are extraordinarily complex, while our analytic capacities and resources are limited (Simon 1955; Lindblom 1959). Thus, rational decision-making postulates the selection of the alternative which will maximize the decision-makers values, the selection being made following a comprehensive analysis of alternatives and their consequences (Simon, 1957). The ideal rational model involves the prior specification of ends and the identification of means of reaching these ends. Simon proposed a theory of decisions in terms of alternative behaviour possibilities and their consequences, in which, the task of decision involves three steps: the listing of all the alternative strategies, the determination of all the consequences that follow upon each of these strategies; and the comparative evaluation of those sets of consequences.

2.1 Incremental models of decision making: more realistic; but too conservative?

Lindblom and other scholars have outlined a strategy of disjointed incrementalism which seeks to adapt decision-making strategies to the limited cognitive capacities of decision-makers and to reduce the scope and cost of information collection and

computation. Influenced by the free competition model of economics, incrementalists reject the notion that policies can be guided in terms of central institutions of a society expressing the collective good (Etzioni, 1967: 387). Charles Lindblom (1959) first described this incremental model of decision-making as the “science of muddling through.” He argued that administrators spend more time muddling than in systematic means-ends analysis; thus, Lindblom¹ proposes that successive limited comparisons may be the only feasible approach to systematic decision-making when the issues are complex, uncertain, and conflict based.

The incremental theory has a number of features that distinguish it from the satisficing model. Setting objectives and generating alternatives are not separate: a priori objectives do not guide the analysis and direction is not fixed by the process; therefore, the more complex the problem, the more likely objectives will change as decisions evolve. Lindblom framework reduces alternatives and the process is a slow evolution based on outcomes that decision makers agree are acceptable. In conclusion, the incrementalist model postulates that good solutions are those upon which decision makers agree regardless of objectives, outcomes are dramatically reduced by considering only alternatives similar to the current state of affairs, and, nevertheless the analysis is limited to differences between the existing situation and proposed alternatives.

Incrementalism was regarded by Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963) not only as an assessment of the policy-making process within organizations, but also an ideal-type prescriptive model of policy-making in pluralist societies. It has been argued that this style of decision-making, the incremental model, is both a better description of the policy process as it is, and a reasonable guide as to how policy should be conducted (Detels et. all, 2012: 61). There are two reasons why incremental decisions are likely to be the norm. Firstly, there is the inertia of existing arrangements and power relations, such that it is more likely both to achieve agreement and to secure a shift in resources at the margin, and in smaller scale, than in a major and thorough-going fashion. Secondly, the incremental model follows much more closely the traditional way in which bureaucracies work, and it is officials who usually have a determining role in setting the policy agenda. The majority of the decisions in the health sector are of the incremental type. The typical decision is one that lies at the margins, for example the extension of an existing service, a new service opened in a small way, a shift in enforcement of current tobacco control legislation, or extending infectious disease control initiatives to a new arena. The problem with such a style of decision-making is that, while it may accurately describe the way in which the great majority of decisions are made, it does little to maintain or ensure the overall coherence of policy. (Detels et. all, 2002: 61) Thus a series of incremental decisions, each clearly justified in its own light as achieving a limited objective, may in the aggregate actually undermine larger policy goals. For example, incremental public health initiatives, while improving health overall, may at the same time deepen social inequalities in health.

¹ Lindblom summarized six primary requirements of model by arguing that:

- Decision maker focuses only on those policies which differ incrementally from existing policies, rather than making an appraisal of possible alternatives;
- A small number of policy alternatives are considered;
- Only important consequences of policy alternatives are evaluated;
- The problem is continually redefined;
- No decision or solution is right but a “never-ending series of attacks” on the issues at hand through serial analyses and evaluation;
- Disjoint incrementalism is rather focused on to the alleviation of present and solving concrete social imperfections than to the promotion of future social goals.

On the other side one may focus on the impact of disjoint and uncoordinated decisions. This rational strategic approach is likely to occur only in circumstances where decision-makers are provided with a relatively unconstrained and simple set of policy circumstances, for example a major opportunity for political change. The model also assumes that decision-making processes are stable over time, and that future decisions are a linear function of the past. In reality, what are known as “shift-points” or a fundamental rethinking about the course of policy development occur which defy such incrementalist equations (Lane, 2000: 76). This model remains attractive to those involved in public health policy-making, at least as an organizational tool for policy appraisal. Nevertheless, the most effective policy approach is likely to be “mixed scanning”², involving a mix of rational planning and incremental adjustment (Etzioni 1967).

Even if CEE countries have on paper formalized and transparent decision making models, in practice policy formulation is not grounded on evidence based methodologies. For example, Romania has a regulatory basis for a modern policy-making process. Government Decision 775/2005 regulated the formulation and monitoring of public policies while Government Decision 1361/2006 covered the preparation of substantiation notes. As in other areas, however, the quality of health policy-making continues to be comparatively poor with other EU countries, and health policies are rarely based on field evidence. Neither the NHH nor any other major stakeholder contributes input or evidence to decision-making and what data do exist are not sufficiently used in negotiating the National Framework Contract. No unit, department, or directorate within the Health Ministry (MoH) is responsible for health data analysis. The 30-strong analytical unit at the NHH is mostly dedicated to checking the quality of financial information submitted by health care providers. Thus the absence of formal and systemic policy formulation has negative effects, including engendering a sense of instability in the sector. A significant example is the amendments on the Romanian Health Care Law 95/2006 which has been modified 43 times, mostly through secondary, ad hoc, last-minute legislation; secondary legislation has become the norm rather than the exception and a legal way of limiting stakeholders from contributing to policy-making.

III. Actors in Health Policy Making

Kingdon (1984) distinguishes between visible and hidden participants. Senior political and administrative officials including prime ministers, legislators, ministers of finance, and leaders of international donor agencies are likely to be more visible, moving large problems and issues on to the agenda, such as lack of health care access for the poor and the reform of national health sectors. Nevertheless specialists including scientists, doctors, and civil servants may play less visible role proposing policy alternatives that can address these problems. This distinction is not clear-cut and often specialists, as part of large policy networks – take on visible roles, contributing to the emergence of broad issues on to national and international health agendas (Carrin, 2009: 18).

Governments have the resources and legal authority to implement public health policies and focus public health missions that private actors generally lack. Accordingly, the focus of the discussion of the Central and Eastern European countries health systems will be on the government agencies and other organizations. Therefore, we should not lose sight of the fact that government frequently partners with other actors - academia,

² Such decision-making is “a mixture of shallow and deep examination of data - generalized consideration of a broad range of facts and choices followed by detailed examination of a focused subset of facts and choices” (Thomas, 1984)

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), professional associations, philanthropic organizations, the private health care delivery system, as well as business and media - in developing and delivering public health services. The inclusion and exclusion of actors is affected crucially by the institutional decision-making arenas in a political system. These arenas are never neutral as to the actors they include or, in broader terms, the interests to which they are receptive. However, the analysis of actors' role in health policy change must take into account two factors: First, is the relationship among actors that are negotiating for health care features change and power relationships. Secondly, negotiations over policy change have critical implications for the internal politics and organization of actors. I consider that health reforms negotiations two-level games in which each actor is making bets about internal repercussions of proposed changes.

In CEE region, the power resources of the medical profession were dramatically lower than in the West. Officially, doctors did not enjoy professional monopoly due to the fact that medical profession was incorporated in the state and there was no market. In practice, however, doctors profited from under-the-table gratitude payments from patients and it was doctors working for state institutions which judged the conduct of and set routines for other doctors. Furthermore, doctors were well represented in both Parliament and government. Many MPs were doctors and often the Ministry of Health was the "ministry of the medical profession" (Barr 1996: 27). Nevertheless, the medical profession in itself may still have been incapable of acting as a homogeneous interest group, since the interests of health professionals varied according to organization and medical specialisation (Velicu, 2012: 273-274). One issue worth analyzing is how, during post-Communist transition, the medical profession established its autonomy from the state and whether new organizations of the medical profession managed to influence health policy change to their advantage. Also, it is important to explore whether health care providers, health insurance companies, and other organized interests influenced post-Communist health policy change.

The question that deserves a proper answer is if the main actors in the health care sector supported or not effective health care reforms and their implementation? In order to answer it I analyzed the strategies and interest of the actors in the matter of health care financing mechanisms. Thus the actors' constellation shows that:

- *Hospitals* are normally unconstrained by hard budgets; their managements are able to channel part of their finance into private pockets, and official salaries are low;
- *Medical professionals* are unconstrained by hard budgets and they can use the chance for supplier induced demand in dimensions such as extra treatments, equipment or drugs. Nevertheless health care personal has control over the under the table payments to compensate for low official salaries;
- *Politicians* can benefit from providing their voters with universal coverage;
- *Bureaucrats'* power can increase with more resources.
- *Patients* in the CEE region are not well informed and hence can be persuaded to opt for more expensive drugs or treatments, even if they are not needed. For example, more than 75% citizen in Slovakia evaluated 2004 necessary reforms as bad (Pazitny, 2008);
- *Insurance companies* in most CEE countries insurance companies are not really independent and do not serve as regulators, but only as resource distribution channels. Thus, for them more resources means a higher level of overheads for their own use.

In addition to domestic actors, supranational organizations might have influenced health policy change in CEE region. Some argue that, in the 1990s, "global social policy" became reality, as Washington-based supranational organizations set right-wing social

policy agenda in Hungary, Bulgaria and the Ukraine (Deacon *et al.* 1997). However, in the beginning of post-Communist transition, supranational organizations were not concerned with social policy and, therefore, domestic policy-makers had to put in place new solutions for social services in “an idiosyncratic manner that reflected momentary alignments of intellectual and political recourses and historical conditions in a particular country” (Orenstein, Haas 2002: 14). Apart from the World Bank, BIRD or other international organization, I argue that the European Union played an important role and influenced health policy change in CEE countries. This influence took the form of the “soft regulations” regarding EU accession, funding and technical assistance for programmes, and training of the state bureaucracy. External factors profoundly affected the health care system across the CEE region. The public sector had to face new challenges, design and implement new strategies for an efficient spending of public money. In the Romanian case several reform decisions have been adopted at the request of international financing institutions (Cucu, 2012: 249-250).

3.1. Multi-Dimensional Actors and Institutional Analyses

Current analysis on policy development from a historical institutionalist perspective are focused on the regularities and promote continuity in the policy making process. Concepts such as policy legacies and path dependence provide a powerful correction to the implicit behavioralist assumption that each decision constitutes a new roll of the interest group dice (Weir, 1992; Pierson, 2000).

Figure 1: Responsibilities in decision-making

Country	Setting the level of taxes which will be earmarked to health care						Setting the basis and level of social contributions for health				Setting the total budget for public funds allocated to health				Deciding resource allocation between sectors of care					
	Parliament	Central/federal gov.	Regional/state gov.	Local/municipal gov.	Collective social health ins.	Individual health ins.	Parliament	Central/federal gov.	Regional/state gov.	Local/municipal gov.	Collective social health ins.	Individual health ins.	Parliament	Central/federal gov.	Regional/state gov.	Local/municipal gov.	Collective social health ins.	Individual health ins.	Collective providers	Individual providers
CZ		X						X												
HU	X						X						X							
PL	X						X						X	X	X	X	X		X	
RO																				
SL																				
SK	X						X											X	X	

Source: In Paris, V., et al., (2010), "Health systems institutional characteristics: a survey of 29 OECD countries, author's adaptation.

What role do actors play in this change or continuity process in the health care arena? How should we conceive of actors? In order to understand how health policies lose support and whether new reform alternatives take hold we need renewed attention to the role of actors as mechanisms of change. The actor-oriented institutionalism framework suggests that policy change must be explained as a process of interest redefinition that occurs within organizations and networks. Thus, policy change emerges from changes that are peripheral

to the policy in question (Palier, 2002). However, the analysis of actors' role in health policy change must take into account two factors: First, is the relationship among actors that are negotiating for health care features change and power relationships. Secondly, negotiations over policy change have critical implications for the internal politics and organization of actors. I consider that health reforms negotiations two-level games in which each actor is making bets about internal repercussions of proposed changes.

Figure 2: Responsibilities in decision-making

Country	Determining resource allocation between regions					Setting remuneration methods for physicians					Defining payment methods for hospitals											
	Parliament	Central/federal gov.	Regional/state gov.	Local/municipal gov.	Collective social health insins.	Individual health ins.	Parliament	Central/federal gov.	Regional/state gov.	Local/municipal gov.	Collective social health insins.	Individual health ins.	Collective providers	Individual providers	Parliament	Central/federal gov.	Regional/state gov.	Local/municipal gov.	Collective social health insins.	Individual health ins.	Collective providers	Individual providers
CZ											X	X	X							X	X	X
HU						X								X								
PL	X				X					X									X			
RO																						
SL																						
SK					X					X									X			

Source: In Paris, V., et al., (2010), "Health systems institutional characteristics: a survey of 29 OECD countries, author's adaptation.

4. Health care and incrementalism: drivers and patterns of reform

It is imperative to know how health policy change was initiated, what forces drove it, and why certain policy changes succeeded and others not. Now that we have discussed the theoretical rationale for incremental policy making, the next step is to determine if health care policy reforms in the CEE region are inherently incremental or nonincremental activities.

When explaining early post-Communist health policy change in CEE, it is problematic to distinguish clearly between the theoretical approaches mainly because, after the collapse of Communist rule, the explanatory variables employed in both approaches changed. Furthermore, explanation of subsequent health policy change in terms of the changing policy conditions is challenging taking into account that health policy-making institutions were in flux. Nevertheless, theoretical concepts developed in the context of Western Europe and North America may not fully apply to the Central and Eastern European context. However, if treated as "sensitising concepts", they can help reduce the complexity of the phenomena under investigation by setting parameters to data collection and the organization of evidence (Ragin, 1994: 87-89).

When discussing about reform of health care systems in the CEE countries we have to focus on answering four main questions: what type of reform are we dealing with: The reform of public health administration? The reform of the state or the reform of public

health management? In the post-communist countries analysed most discussions referred to the reform of public administration; Romania, similar to other CEE countries, operates under a legalistic approach to public services (continental model) (Verheijen, 1998; Hințea, 2008). Thus, public administration translates mostly into the implementation of the law rather than the creation/development of the law/regulations.

Incrementalism, as opposed to dramatic change, is conventionally lauded in law as the prudent path of change - a path that gives credit to history and precedent. It is important to examine in detail whether post-Communist health policy change took a distinctive path immediately after 1989 and whether earlier policies determined subsequent ones and if the supranational institutions influenced the reform of health care systems in the CEE countries. It is important to point out the fact that the transition incrementalism was encouraged by the presence of multiple sources of law, and where lawmaking is an interactive venture. Legislatures, courts, executive officers, administrative agencies, and even voters interrelate, and incremental lawmaking is often the strategy most respectful of the other players' roles in the CEE countries. Thus, I argue that incrementalism, or muddling through in health care involves making small adjustments to existing strategies rather than reviewing all strategies for achieving policy objectives; incremental decision making tend to lead to conservative policies because the power of organized interests is strengthened, and the interest of small groups is neglected. In the CEE region health care arena incrementalism rather than innovation has been the norm in policy development.

After the collapse of Communist CEE countries replaced a centralised, integrated state health service with a decentralised model of contracted public health insurance, reduced non-essential health services covered by public health insurance and introduced patient co-payments. This policy change did not result in any substantial efficiency and solidarity gains; rather, it increased health care costs, fragmented the health care system and amplified inequality. My research evidence suggests that the reformers were not interested in history, but used it as a rhetorical device to justify their policy choices *post hoc*. For example, my explanation for the introduction of health insurance stresses the inherited policy problem, strategic interaction of policy actors, and their time-specific costs and benefits, rather than the structural impact of institutions or path dependency.

Firstly, I argue that health policy change was driven by an opportunistic logic rather than an "accidental logic" (Tuohy 1999). The opportunistic logic stresses the time-specific conditions, or window opportunities and self-interest seeking of policy actors. The policy actors who designed and implemented health care reforms did not actively seek policy change before regime change but, when it happened irrespective of their will and action.

Second, health policy change resulted from muddling through (Lindblom, 1959), rather than "recalibration" (Ferrera *et al.* 2000; Pierson 2001) or similar processes which presuppose ideological or fiscal engineering. The concept of "tinkering" further stresses opportunism and brings to the fore the problems of bounded rationality, limited computational abilities, and incomplete information.

This theoretical framework defines health care reform as planned changes towards the better organization, financing, provision and regulation of the public/private mix leading to more accessible, efficient, cost-effective, and fair and quality health care goods and services. CEE countries have undergone starting with 1989 at least through four different stages of the administrative reform with great impact on public health (Hințea, 2011: 181): (1) Legislative reform, more pronounced immediately after 1989. There are two main reasons for this stage: the real need for the development and the legalistic tradition; (2)

Reform at the level of formal structures and procedures: new forms of organization, new working procedures intra and inter institutions. Decentralization, the settling of the new relations central-local (Dragoş, Neamţu, 2007), the monitoring, control and evaluation mechanisms of performance represent such models; (3) Reforms at the level of public policies: reform efforts targeting the human resources, financial mechanisms, and the formulation of public policies; (4) Structural reforms: the redefinition of the dimensions of the state and of the areas of priority intervention, the effort to make rational its action regarding the macroeconomic and administrative behaviour.

There are two separate yet mutually reinforcing parts to disjointed incrementalism that are particularly relevant in the application of the concept to health care reform in Central and Eastern Europe: one is incrementalism and the other is disjointed. By incremental Lindblom described a method of “successive limited comparisons”. This is a “branch” method of analysis which proceeds by “building out from the current situation, step-by-step and by small degrees” in contrast to the rational comprehensive method which, like the “root” method of analysis, proceeds by “starting from fundamentals anew each time, building on the past only as experience is embodied in a theory, and always prepared to start completely from the ground up” (Good, 2011: 41).

Since the beginning of the 1990s, with foreign support, health care reform projects have taken place in most of the former communist countries. The aim of these projects is to provide support for the design and implementation of health care reforms. The projects are carried out with money and expertise from the western industrialised countries. Generally, they deal with the financing and organization of health services; with an area of special concern is the development of primary care and general practice. Initially, running these projects was a new experience and the necessary knowledge had to be built up: there was no historical experience of project implementation in central and Eastern Europe, where the difficulties of system wide transformation were aggravated by a severe economic crisis.

It is particularly interesting to observe how policy change in the health sector took place in the context of an unprecedented transition from one-party rule, a highly centralised administrative system, and a planned economy to democracy, decentralised government, and a market economy. These reforms have fundamentally changed the actors, institutional context, and political process of health policy-making. Health policy change has been influenced by conflicts of interests involving doctors, trade unions, employers, medical and pharmaceutical industries, and political parties, different levels of government and its agencies, and other health policy actors. It is, thus, imperative to study how the transitional changes have affected the system of health policy-making and its capacity to provide effective solutions to health policy problems.

The transition countries had a fragmented system of policy-making and a political situation in which “(a) there were more than one or a few policymaking groups in the government, and (b) they displayed different points of view as well as specialized functions”. While there are disadvantages to fragmentation there are also advantages as “many different centres of decision-making marked by many different interests and attitudes stimulate a diversity of analytical attacks on policy problems”. Fragmentation in politics is therefore helpful “because the different points of view taken by different groups in government serve to make each group something of a watchdog for certain variables against others” (Lindblom, 1958, p. 306). The model of social protection adopted by the decision makers determines the population quality of life (Chipea, Stanciu: 2010: 214).

In health care provision, the main policy changes were focused on decentralisation. For analytical purposes, it is helpful to distinguish four types of

decentralisation: deconcentration (transfer of decision-making to lower administrative levels), devolution (transfer of decision-making to lower political levels), delegation (transfer of decision-making to policy actors at lower organizational levels), and privatisation (transfer of decision-making and ownership to private firms) (Mills 1990). The decentralization of health systems generated a more flexible and a rapid response to the changing environment, greater effectiveness in identifying problems and opportunities, openness to innovation, and higher morale and productivity (Saltman & Figueras 1997: 52-53). The reform experience in the CEE region showed that decentralization lead to fragmentation of health services weakening of central health departments and public sector. Screening reform trends in the CEE region led to an approach based on mixed models starting from dominantly incremental and legalistic reform models in beginning of nineties and slowly changing to the mixed type with radical new public management switch in the post-2006 period. Researchers have argued that governments vary in what they take from the bundle of reforms (Brudney, Hebert, and Wright 1999; Hood 1996; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000) and have provided evidence of transformation in both the meaning and content of reform strategies from one country to another (Christensen, Laegreid, and Wise 2002; Laegreid 2000, 2001; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000). Still, as Pollitt (2001) has observed, the claim of global convergence of reform initiatives persists.

Czech Republic is characterized dominantly by incremental and legalistic reforms during the entire evaluated period and only few new management reforms after 2000. The “Conception of public administration reform” from 1999 planned for complex changes, but only administrative measures were really implemented. The Polish case is the typical representative of prevailing legalistic approach to the reforms. Poland is continuously reorganizing management systems in the public health sector. New Public Management (NPM) had a limited impact on Polish administration, by providing ideas and demands for recognition of the need to modernize administration and at the same time reducing its size. In Slovakia before 2003 the reform was dominantly incremental and legalistic, with few new public management ideas realized. During the second election period of the liberal prime-minister Dzurinda government (2003-2006) radical NPM changes were realized, such as massive decentralization and introducing performance financing schemes.

Concerning effective internal and professional policy formulation in the former communist countries I can argue that policy-making capacity, national knowledge and skills represented a major inconvenient in reforming health care systems in the region. In the 90s when most of the reforms were started there was a general lack of and specific expertise to set effective health reform policy; persons responsible for health reforms were medical doctors, with limited economic background, and in some case protecting interest of medical profession.

After the incrementalist phase post 2000 in the CEE countries the EU had considerable impact on the health sector reform strategies. There is agreement in literature about the relevance of the countries’ candidacy and later membership in the European Union for their social welfare transformations, but at the same time authors argue that EU’s role in social policy shaping is considerably weak (Popa, 2012: 302-306). Orenstein and Haas (2003) estimate its influence as strong enough to prevent the overall deterioration of people’s welfare – especially when comparing the social situation in the New Member States with countries from the region staying aside (mostly post-communist republics).

Sengoku (2006: 239) analyzes the structural causes when speaking about the weak social dimension of the European accession and enlargement and that economic issues have had primacy over social issues: 1) The EU has not required specific conditions or

“hard laws” as to the social policy of accession countries; 2) There are few specific mechanisms that could be used by the European Commission to enforce the CEE countries to adopt the European standard of social policies; and 3) The EU has no “model” or “template” concerning the welfare system of the candidate countries

However I argue that the EU imposed a new model of governance and a new set of soft tools and six innovative mechanisms that are utilized to resolve the health care enigmas: 1) alternative sites; 2) consumer and patient participation; 3) different roles for government; 4) redesigned organizational forms; 5) alternative methods for dispute resolution; and 6) new regulatory tools. The history of systematic preparation of the candidate countries for accession started with the launching of the Copenhagen Criteria of Accession (1993)³. Thus, in the health care sector the Community *acquis* played an important role in the CEE Member States law harmonization. Building robust and reliable institutions and adjust their legal and administrative systems to *acquis communautaire* were necessary conditions to become a MS. The absence of the EU direct influence on welfare state and health sector reforms should not redraw our attention from the transformations associated with the European integration processes which influenced domestic discourses on social and health policy making, set up new agendas, approaches and policy instruments (Horga, Brie: 2010). For example, the Czech Republic and other New Member States entered the European Union with their health, social, and employment policies not developed enough to cope with the legitimate demands of this strategic policy documents. Therefore it was an urgent need to reduce the discrepancy between the MS status quo and the EU priorities such as, capacity building in health and social services, alleviation of poverty, and strengthening social cohesion in it (Popoviciu, 2010: 38-40; Brie, Polgar, Chirodea: 2012). The new approach to health care systems reform suggests that new organizational forms and levers enabled systems to safely move the status quo and sustain their improvements efforts. In a recent article on health care reforms, Coeira (2011: 1) argues that system inertia is a fundamental reason why reforms frequently fail to meet expectations. He defines system inertia as the “tendency for a system to continue to do the same thing irrespective of changes in circumstances.”

The EU has created two major programmes for aid and development for the CEE countries: Phare and Tacis. The Tacis programme is directed to the countries of the former Soviet Union; the Phare programme to the Baltic states, Poland, Czech republic, the Slovak republic, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania. In addition, there are funds and programmes established by the individual EU member states.

Phare originally stood for “Poland Hungarian Assistance for the Reconstruction of the Economy, the Phare programme became the single most important source of assistance to the candidate countries. In 1999 it accounted for 36% of total development assistance to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (OECD DAC 2000). Here we shall limit ourselves to the aims and procedures of the Phare programme, which aims to help these countries to rejoin the mainstream of European development and build closer political and economic ties with the EU the Phare project “primary health care financing in the Slovak republic”, which was carried out from January until November 1997 by a

³ To join the EU, a new Member State must meet three criteria: political: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; economic: existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; acceptance of the Community *acquis*: ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. For details about the Copenhagen Criteria please visit: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhagen_en.htm

multidisciplinary team of Dutch (external) experts, directed by NIVEL, and in close collaboration with a team of Slovak (local) experts. The aim of this project was to contribute to the quality and cost-effectiveness of the primary health care services (the focus was on the general practitioners) (Brie, 2010). In order to achieve this, a number of goals were set in four project areas: remuneration, pharmaceutical cost containment, quality of care and the information system. Most of the Phare programmes funds were redirected for twinning arrangements (supporting cooperation between similar institutions in candidate countries and MS). In particular, twinning supported the adoption of health related *acquis* such as occupational health, phyto-sanitary control or food safety (McKee et. al, 2004: 15). Thus, the key focus was on transposing the *acquis communautaire* into national legislation and additionally Phare contributed to the participation of candidate countries in EU public health and research programmes. Another major player in reforming health care systems in the CEE region was the European Investment Bank which provided long-term investment from closing the income gap between rich and less advantaged regions in the CEE region. The EIB started to invest in CEE in the early 1990s with a total of 15 billion, seeing it as a major and growing area for lending. Its increasing focus on the public sector encompasses health, where capital requirements are high, especially in CEE (European Investment Bank 2001). The World Bank had a vital role in supporting health sector reforms in the CEE (Preker and Feachem 1996). Besides technical analysis at the beginning of the transition, World Bank loans supported health services development, hospital restructuring, primary health care, decentralization; and the pharmaceutical sector. The main recipients of the World Bank's US \$561 million health portfolio over the 1990s were Romania, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Estonia and Latvia. The International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private sector arm of the World Bank Group supported as well, at the beginning of the 90s, health care projects such as diagnostic imaging, haemodialysis centres, medical services companies and distribution of medical supplies. Nevertheless, the WHO Office for Europe provided international support for institutional capacity building and the development of decision-making function of national health organizations.

The most important challenge for the CEE countries after the transition and the incrementalist phase was the process of harmonization of health care legislation, the pressure on health care expenditure and the need to improve population health as a means of reducing demand on health service. The *Regular Reports* monitoring countries' progress towards accession, published by the European Commission, focused mainly on the hard *acquis*⁴, but noted that most countries lagged behind in health care reform, especially with regard to economic sustainability of health systems. The 2000 report on Hungary states that weak financial structures in the health care system continue to place a heavy burden on public finances (European Commission, 2002).

The Romanian case is particularly relevant in explaining the EU's impact on drastically reforming health sector's regulatory system. The radical transformation of the health care system took place in 2000 mostly regarding economic, quality regulation of health care services and health professional's regulation. The economical regulation addresses financial dimensions for example, how new providers' enter the market, how prices are set, how competition is promoted or maintained, how financial monitoring, intervention, and market exit are designed, and the assessment of the cost-effectiveness of

⁴ Hard *acquis* covers areas such as health and safety at work, phyto-sanitary health, food safety and consumer protection.

clinical interventions. On the quality regulation side the policy-makers had to ensure that services are effectively available to patients, to protect patients from sub-standard providers), and to enable patients' voices to be heard. Thus, reforms aimed at improving health system performance and transformed relationships among institutions in the health care sector. The key role of the Health Insurance House to administer and regulate a health insurance system, the use of a framework contract as the basis for developing individual contracts with health care providers, and the establishment of a national hospital accreditation commission were some of the major steps taken in recent years.

Another important aspect of the Romanian integration in the EU was the impact on the pharmaceutical regulatory framework. The accession of Romania to the EU and its participation in the Collaboration Agreement between Drug Regulatory Authorities in EU Associated Countries (CADREAC) has facilitated the establishment of EU standards of drug regulation in Romania.

Conclusions

A variety of policy models, frameworks and theories represent tools to evaluate and understand the determinants of health policy, how it is made, the drivers of implementation and its performance. This article discusses agenda-setting theories and decision making models in order to establish if the policy environment in the CEE region is one conducive to a relatively comprehensive rational approach of health care reforms and to evaluate their outcomes.

The rapid change in health care today makes traditionally based organizations less adaptive and flexible in complex environments. Theories on decision-making depend on rational participants to validate the models; the reality of health systems and public health organization suggests that the individual and group preferences change as underlying variables associated with the decision vary. Reality in the CEE countries health systems suggests that preferences of participants in the decision-making process often vary in illogical and emotionally dependent ways.

Health policy making rests on the accumulation of power by those involved in the policy process and I argue that health policies are on-going and dynamic and therefore are subject to change, particularly in response to problems arising out of implementation of a decision. Thus, policy making is the process by which governments translate their political vision into programmes and actions to deliver "outcomes" and desired changes in the real world. One can conclude that health policy need not necessarily be about innovation and change but can also be about maintaining the status quo. However, the governmental priorities in the post-communist countries were centred on reforming the health care systems in the context of fundamental reorientation towards a market-based economy, but also a process of institutional change.

Health reforms are considered "process-oriented" in the CEE countries. Reforms ultimate goal was to apply a political process in order to restructure relations between public and private sectors, managers and policymakers, and providers and consumers. Along with economic motivations, health reforms in Central and Eastern Europe responded also to political processes, post-communist countries represent the most dramatic examples of the way in which sweeping political transformations are reflected in the health sector. Genuinely related to political processes are the ideological reasons for reform, as recent doubts about the effectiveness of state intervention and a belief in the superiority of markets have led former communist countries to reconsider the optimal public/private mix in health care. Health system reform can be defined as "changes produced out of explicit intention on the

part of government or political groups to transform, for the better, the health sector” (Frenk, Gonzalez-Block, 1993). Berman proposes that the essence of reform is “sustained, purposeful change to improve the efficiency, equity, and effectiveness of the health sector” (Frenk, 1994). Concerning Central Eastern Europe, these theories would point out that they had “premature welfare states”, they spent more on health care than other states at similar income levels (Kornai, McHale, 2000).

In practice, many social and health policies have been design and implemented as residual to the priorities of economic policies and have been often labelled as compensatory programmes in order to alleviate the social cost of economic measures. When analysing the health policy decision making processes policy makers should assess not only the substance of a specific policy, but also the organizational processes and decision-making structures that are involved in initiating and implementing that policy. In turn, an appraisal of the organizational structure of the health care system, that is its hierarchical and regulatory structures, its division of labour, information processing systems and more, is also an important prerequisite for health policy analysis.

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MODELS AND INSTRUMENTS OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN ROMANIA. THE LEADER APPROACH - LOCAL ACTION GROUPS IN NORTH WEST DEVELOPMENT REGION

*István POLGÁR**

Abstract: *Research undertaken in the present work aims to identify and present in a more unified and synthetic manner the theoretical and conceptual foundations of rural development policies, and to present the development of Romanian rural area in the period 2007-2013 as a result of its accession to the European Union and implementation of the National Rural Development Programme and to analyse the effects and influences that were generated by the implementation of this rural development program in Romania.*

Keywords: *policy, rural, regional, development, national*

The new European Union policy places special emphasis on rural development. The concept of rural development is a subject of continuing debate, especially with regard to the importance of its sectorial and territorial size. Different nature of the relationship between urban and rural areas in different regions and countries cause difficulty in defining exactly rural areas. (Angelescu & Stănescu, 2001: 89)

The importance of agriculture and rural development in the European Union is determined by the fact that rural areas today cover about 91% of the EU and represents the place of residence for 56% of the population of the 27 EU Member States. This makes the rural development policy, an area of a great importance for the European Union. Livestock farming and forestry remain crucial for land use activities and natural resource management in rural areas of the EU, representing at the same time, the basis for the economic diversification of rural communities. Therefore, strengthening the rural development has become a priority for the European Union.¹

An important feature of Europe's rural areas is their great diversity, both in terms of geographical features of the landscape and heritage, as well as from the perspective of the challenges they must face (Angelescu & Stănescu, 2001: 89). Rural space problems are numerous and cover a wide area from the restructuring needs of the agricultural sector, to those generated by distance, isolation, population, different degrees of services assurance and negative effects of population on the environment.²

Rural development, with agriculture as an essential part, is one of the topics in the debate at the European level, with emphasis on sustainable development, food safety, improving the living conditions of the population, protecting and preserving the environment.

* PhD., Lecturer, Department of International Relations and European Studies, Faculty of History International Relations, Political Sciences and Science of Communication, University of Oradea, Romania. E-mail: isti_polgi@yahoo.com

¹ <http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rurdev/> accessed in 22.07.2013

² Comisia Europeană, "Politica agricolă comună-Un parteneriat între Europa și agricultori", pp. 1-2 http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-overview/2012_ro.pdf, accessed in 10.07.2013

New information and communication technologies modernized the rural areas and have influence in producing a favourable environment to make possible greater economic diversity. The rural area is not only the specific field work, also finding here other economic activities such as tourism, agriculture, handicrafts, food industry.³

In the new accession context, agricultural and rural strategies of the new EU countries aimed at overcoming a double gap: the first is about the gap between the general level of development of the countries in this region and most of the EU member states and in second, a much larger gap existing between urban and rural areas in the applicant countries, compared to specific member states. (Bărbulescu, 2001: 187)

Romania plays an important role among the E.U. countries from the perspective of both the natural and human potential. (Țoca, 2009: 76)

Romania is a relatively large country in the EU, with particularly good farmland. Romania is a predominantly rural country, with 60% of the country classified as rural. A large part of the population lives in rural areas, with 47% of the population living in rural areas since 2008, much higher than the EU average of 15%.⁴

The vast majority of economic resources (raw materials for industry, agricultural resources, forestry, tourism and resorts) are found in rural areas. In rural areas there are valuable elements of human potential (large work force, partially qualified in non-agricultural activities, which ensure the regeneration of youth), land potential (farmland with superior production qualities, allowing diversification of crops and getting some major productions); forest, nature reserves and nature monuments. (Mateoc – Sârb, 2004: 221-222)

Although these valuable elements of potential major disturbances occurred in the rural space in recent decades they have affected all the components of economic and social life; they have changed the economic relation, the system of values and individual behaviour, fundamentals of rural community life. (Mateoc – Sârb, 2004)

Thus the entire Romanian rural area is characterized by a high degree of underdevelopment, deepening the gap between urban and rural areas and especially towards the European space. (Țoca, 2009: 77)

Upgrading of roads, irrigation systems, processing plants and other related domains are an essential part to make farming a profitable and desirable activity. Romania, like other new Member States, is in great need of this money for rural development for modernisation of many aspects of rural areas and to make them more efficient for farmers.

To be able to effectively support the development of rural space and the process of removing the gap towards the Member States of the European Union is a concentration of financial support of the state and that of the European funds in several directions of action, such as: improving the landmarks of their agriculture, forestry, fisheries and the food industry; improvement of infrastructure in rural areas and promoting the creation of micro and small enterprises; the creation of alternative employment opportunities and income for the rural population; reducing pressure on the environment, looking for opportunities to create non-polluting economic activities.⁵

³ RNDR, “Înființarea și Organizarea Grupurilor De Lucru LEADER și A Grupurilor De Lucru Tematice”, Publicația Tematică Nr.1, p. 6.

⁴ D. K. Knight, “Romania si Politica Agricolă Comună”, Ecoruralis, 2010, pp.6-7 <http://www.ecoruralis.ro/storage/files/Documente/RaportPAC.pdf> accessed in 19.07.2013

⁵ <http://www.fonduri-structurale-europene.ro/pndr/disparitati-furnizare-servicii.html>, accessed in 20.07.2013

The objective of "The National Rural Development Programme 2007-2013" research is to analyse the extent to which implementation of the program has contributed to the sustainable development of Romanian rural area. (Bărbulescu, Rapan, 2009: 520)

The Leader Approach. Local Action Group Tövishát

LEADER approach was launched in 1991 with the aim of improving the development potential of rural areas by exploiting local initiative and skills, promoting the acquisition of knowledge on local development, and disseminating this knowledge to other rural areas (Mateoc – Sârb, 2004: 73-74).

There were three generations of Leader: Leader I (1991-1993), Leader II (1994-1999) and LEADER + (2000-2006).⁶

Leader I: It marked the beginning of a new rural development policies based on a territorial vision, integrated and participatory. Received a positive response from the private sector which get involved in investments.

Leader II: Continue the Leader I experienced a considerable expansion and putting emphasis on innovative aspects of the project. Add an increased importance to the innovative character of the project. It was intended to stimulate innovative activities conducted by local agencies in all activity sectors of the rural world.⁷

LEADER +: Maintains his function of discovery and experimentation of an integrated and sustainable development that will influence the rural development policy of the European Union. It has a strong focus on partnership and networks of exchange of experience. The objectives was not that the program to be just a continuation of the phase II, but to strengthen the integrated strategies with a high level of quality in the rural space from four perspectives⁸:

- The use of new knowledge and technologies
- Improved standard of living
- Recovery of local products
- Utilization of natural and cultural resources

Axis 4 LEADER is a novelty and a challenge for the Romanian rural area in all its dimensions: rural economy, education, culture, demographic potential.

Although in the previous programming period 2000-2006, Romania has not implemented LEADER actions, have been identified at the national level, a number of development initiatives, such as Local Initiative Groups (LIG), micro-regions and other LEADER partnerships. All of these are partnerships between non-governmental organizations (NGOs), local government, church, school, medical and dental offices, and micro-regions.⁹

The actions implemented by these partnerships include: the development of local strategies, renovation of schools, dispensaries and cultural units, improving roads and bridges, and promoting analysis of the rural environment, establishment of centres to inform citizens, training courses for their members, writing projects, which contribute to solving local problems (Brie, Pop and Polgar, 2012: 111-121; Mateoc – Sârb, 2004: 73-74).

⁶ "LEADER and Cooperation", in EU Rural Review, no. 11, 2012, p.6
http://enrd.ec.europa.eu/app_templates/filedownload.cfm?id=C5783D0F-93AD-1BC6-83B6-2869BA396C36,
 accessed in 15.08.2013

⁷ <http://www.xplorasolutions.com/Leader/origini.aspx>, accessed in 16.08.2013

⁸ <http://www.tordaszentlaszlo.ro/somes-nadas/leader.html>, accessed in 20.08.2013

⁹ *Programul Național de Dezvoltare Rurală 2007-2013*, versiunea a X-a, decembrie 2012, p.379
<http://www.pndr.ro/>, accessed in 14.08.2013

Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development selected in 2006 a total of 120 representatives of territories (areas) sub-regional, with a population between 10,000 and 100,000 inhabitants, territories which covered 37 of the 42 counties in pursuit of LEADER structures and activities¹⁰.

In the programming period 2007-2013, LEADER is the fourth axis of the European Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) programming.

Establishment of a local partnership known as "Local Action Group" (LAG) is an important feature of the Leader approach. In 2009 there was a first selection of Local Action Groups. Local action groups are entities that represent the public – private partnership, made up of representatives of the public, private and civil sectors, nominated from a rural homogeneous territory, who will have to meet a number of requirements concerning the composition, the territory covered and which will implement an integrated strategy for the development of the territory.¹¹

LAG has the task of identifying and implementing a local development strategy, make decisions on the allocation of financial resources and manage them.

These groups can effectively stimulate sustainable development because they:

- gather and combine human and financial resources available in the public, private and civic sector;

- associate local players around collective projects and multi-sectorial actions with consequent improvement of economic competitiveness of the area;

- strengthen cooperation between different rural actors, who often have little experience of cooperation by reducing potential conflict and facilitating negotiated solutions through consultation and discussion.¹²

Local Action Groups allow private initiatives and public officials go hand in hand, a partnership that allows City Halls, agricultural organizations, environmental groups, business people to develop their own territory future.¹³

In the period 2010-2013, during the two sessions of the selection of LAGs were allocated a total funding of 226.989.389,72 Euro in the first session and 198.205.189,80 Euro in the second session. In the first session were selected a total of 81 LAGs, and in the second session were selected 72 LAGs.¹⁴

Local Action Group Association Tövishát is a Romanian organization, non-profit, non-governmental, autonomous and independent, formed as a result of the combination of a number of rural communities, of which 8 are in Sălaj County and Bogdand, Supuru and Hodod are located on the territory of Satu-Mare County – with representatives of the socio-economic sector and civil society in areas previously embodied in order to develop the area in question through the development and implementation of an Integrated local development Strategy and, implicitly, through the absorption of EU funds and grants linked to the agricultural sector and rural space, in full accordance with the normative acts in force.¹⁵

The Association is legally constituted since January 2012, its operation is governed by OG No. 26/2000 on associations and foundations, with subsequent

¹⁰ http://leader-romania.ro/index.php?pag=leader_pndr, accessed in 18.08.2013

¹¹ <http://www.apdrp.ro/>, accessed in 20.08.2013

¹² <http://www.xplorasolutions.com/Leader/rolul.aspx>, accessed in 27.08.2013

¹³ http://leader-romania.ro/index.php?pag=leader_pndr, accessed in 29.08.2013

¹⁴ <http://www.apdrp.ro/>, accessed in 25.08.2013

¹⁵ http://tovishat.ro/?page_id=1279, accessed in 23.07.2013

amendments and the provisions of all other laws in force, and not least by the provisions of the Constitutive Act.¹⁶

Local Action Group Tövishát Objective

Local Action Group Tövishát Association has set priorities in relation to rural development projects in the area. At this stage have been involved all key actors of the territory.

Planned programs aim is to protect the natural environment, improving the image of the territory, keeping local products and support initiatives that strengthen existing resources.

The overall objective of each measure is the creation of viable new revenue, strengthen regional identity, use of sustainable natural resources, developing partnerships and strengthening integration.

To develop the vision for the future of the territory were considered the following priorities¹⁷:

- a) Profitable economic life and employment;
- b) Protected local natural resources and sustainably used;
- c) Cultural heritage promoted unconditionally, preserved and enhanced;
- d) Community Cultural Identity exploited on micro-regions;
- e) Citizens involved in community development, interested and challenged to help improve the lives of the village, the village appearance;
- f) Community capacity and authority to draw funds, financial resources, high ability to attract investors;
- g) Development of the social assistance;
- h) Diversified educational process, stimulating, developed and maintained;
- i) Schools equipped and modernized, upgraded and equipped school libraries with topical and actual books and also with computers;
- j) Establishment of recreation centres;
- k) Agricultural land operated, worked, producer groups;
- l) Organic Farming;
- m) Prosperous economic life and jobs existence;
- n) Young stimulate and attracted by rural area, satisfied by the conditions found, set in the village;
- o) Recreation facilities.

The above mentioned priorities focus on supporting local development plan that is focused on preserving and developing local values.

Key actors for the program are young people and businesses that are capable of preservation of existing and developing innovative initiatives for local economic development. As a result of the project will be able to set local values which will have a definitive role in future planning.

Starting from the analysis of the situation, natural resources, economic environment, the existence of human resources could be successful only with an integrated program based on partnership and focusing on resources. (Párvu, 2007: 47)

¹⁶ *Ibidem*

¹⁷ http://tovishat.ro/?page_id=1295, accessed in 07.08.2013

Eligible Area of Tövishát LAG

LAG Tövishát territory is identified in the North West Region, in Salaj and Satu-Mare Counties, in the northern part of the Salaj County and the southern part of the Satu-Mare County. It consists of 11 rural communities considered also local development poles covering an area of 641.59 km² in the northern part of Salaj County and the southern county of Satu-Mare. Gal Tövishát Microregion occupies about 8% of the Salaj county area and about 4% of Satu Mare surface.¹⁸

LAG Tövishát territory localities are in number of 51 villages, as follows:

Village Bocşa: Borla, Câmpia, and Sălăjeni; Village Bogdand: Babţa, Corund and Ser; Village Crişeni: Garceiu and Cristuru-Crişeni; Village Coseiu: Archid, Chilioara; Village Dobrin: Doba, Deleni Naimon, Sâncraiu-Silvaniei, Verveghiu; Village Hodod: Giurtelecu Hododului, Lelei, Nadişu Hododului; Village Hereclean: Badon, Guruslău, Bocsita, Panic and Diosd; Village Şamşud: Valea Pomilor, Village Şarmăşag: Ilişua, Lompirt, Moiad, Țărmure, Poiana Măgurii; Village Salatig: Bulgari Mineu, Noţig and Deja; Village Supuru: Supuru, Dobra, Racova, Sechereşa, Hurezu Mare, Giorocuta.

The nearest city is Zalau which is located at a distance of 4.5 km from the Crişeni village and 10 km from the Hereclean village.

From the geographic point of view the territory is mainly hilly with many areas of lowland territory totalling 641.59 km².

The hydrographic network of the country is dominated by the river Salaj, Crasna. There are numerous streams, including river Valea Salajului.

The total population is 34,476 inhabitants; all are concentrated in rural areas with the entire area density of 53, 74 inhabitants / km².¹⁹

Across the territory, the population is multicultural: Romanian, Hungarian, Roma and a lower percentage Germans. The highest percentage represents the Hungarian population which holds 57.3% of the total micro region population. Romanians are fewer, representing 38.4% of the total. Roma represent a lower percentage of 3.9% but still higher than the number of other ethnic groups present in Tövishát LAG territory. Although ethnic mix is obviously there is no conflict on this consideration, coexistence is supported by the parallel use of the two languages, Romanian and Hungarian in some micro-region villages.²⁰

Socialization of agriculture and strong industrialization of urban area caused major and profound long term effects, that of exodus of the rural population. Territory population decline is due to negative natural balance in most villages in the territory. The causes can be found in the aging population, coupled with the departure of the young people in the city, where comfort is enhanced and where they found superior financial perspective.²¹

The natural dynamics of population in Lag Tövishát follows, therefore, a downward curve, the causes are related to a poor health care, and especially to the aging population, the modest standard of living and to the low economic development. In order to avoid rapid depopulation of the territory is required to take measures to counter the causes of this negative trend. It is necessary, for the purpose of detention and even attracts

¹⁸ http://tovishat.ro/?page_id=1293, accessed in 14.08.2013

¹⁹ Capitalul uman – Demografie în Analiza situaţiei existente: elemente din profilul socio-economic al Regiunii Nord-Vest, 2012, http://www.nord-vest.ro/Document_Files/Planul-de-dezvoltare-regionala-2014-2020/00001309/2cgxb_Demografie%20-%20noiembrie%202012.pdf, accessed in 12.08.2013

²⁰ http://www.salaj.insse.ro/phpfiles/comunicatRPL2011_salaj.pdf, accessed in 28.08.2013

²¹ http://tovishat.ro/?page_id=1293, accessed in 10.08.2013

young population, improve living conditions, access to information, economic development and the creation of professional perspectives of affirmation.²²

Emigration and departures normally affects only the surplus population. In certain social or economic conditions manifests the rural exodus, characterized by massive migration of population from rural to urban areas.

Measures financed:

In order to be sustainable, development strategy of the micro-region must rely on local resources and capitalize on the greatest possible opportunities. The system of measures has been drawn up on the basis of existing problems in the territory and of the objectives and the priorities²³.

Planned programs aim is to protect the natural environment, improvement of the image of the territory, keeping local products and support initiatives that strengthen existing resources.

Financial Allocation for the Tovishat LAG projects

Table.1

Measure name	Measure extent in the financing plan		Total cost		Public contribution EAFRD		National contributions		Private contributions	
	% of total cost	% of EAFRD contribution	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%
M. 111	1%	87%	50,000 €	100%	43,250 €	87%	6,750 €	14%	0 €	0.00%
M. 112	4%	92%	131,000 €	100%	121,000 €	92%	10,000 €	8%	0 €	0%
M. 121	5%	38%	200,000 €	100%	76,000 €	38%	4,000 €	2%	120,000 €	60.00%
M. 123	16%	42%	600,000 €	100%	250,000 €	42%	50,000 €	8%	300,000 €	50.00%
M. 142	2%	67%	60,000 €	100%	40,000 €	67%	20,000 €	33%	0 €	0%
M. 143	4%	82%	140,000 €	100%	115,000 €	82%	25,000 €	18%	0 €	0%
M. 312	16%	68%	600,000 €	100%	410,000 €	68%	10,000 €	2%	180,000 €	30%
M. 313	14%	58%	503,800 €	100%	289,800 €	58%	63,000 €	13%	151,000 €	30%
M. 322	21%	74%	756,000 €	100%	562,300 €	74%	153,700 €	20%	40,000 €	5%
M. 421	1%	89%	45,000 €	100%	40,000 €	89%	5,000 €	11%	0 €	0%
Technical Assistance	15%	80%	561,660 €	100%	449,328 €	80%	112,332 €	20%	0 €	0%
TOTAL	100%	65%	3,647,460 €	100%	2,396,678 €	65%	459,782 €	13%	791,000 €	22%

Source: Tovishat LAG


The overall objective of each measure is the creation of viable new revenue, strengthen regional identity, sustainable use of natural resources, developing partnerships and strengthening integration²⁴.

The measures financed during the period 2012-2013 in the framework of the Tövishát LAG are part of the 1, 3 and 4 axes of PNDR 2007-2013, financing for these measures reaching a total amount of € 3,647,460.

²² *Ibidem*

²³ http://tovishat.ro/?page_id=1295, accessed in 3.08.2013

²⁴ Raport Final De Evaluare Intermediară A PNDR, pp.35-38, http://old.madr.ro/pages/dezvoltare_rurala/Raport-Final-de-Evaluare-Intermediara-PNDR-2008-2010.pdf, accessed in 5.08.2013

Figure. 1 Financial allocation for the measures accessed in Tovishat LAG territory

Source: Tovishat LAG

Measure 111-Vocational training, information and diffusion of knowledge²⁵

The objective of this measure is the acquisition of relevant information and knowledge to allow sustainable management of agricultural land and to stimulate local entrepreneurship by those involved. Also this measure encourages the sustainable use of agricultural land, environmental protection and promoting organic farming through training, information and diffusion of innovative knowledge for adults who are working in the territory of the association.

From the analysis of the territory and public debates resulted in a shortage of specialists in agriculture and among entrepreneurs. This measure addresses the development of agriculture, stimulation of local entrepreneurship in terms of increasing the level of knowledge and skills among workers in agricultural holdings and in the sector of SMEs.

Under the measure 111 investments were made to support young farmers and promotion of organic agriculture:

- Training programs of short duration (initiation, training and specialization), with periods of training differentiated according to the theme of the course, the target group and the existing level of preparedness of applicants for training to improve and perfect knowledge of managerial and technical agriculture, forestry and agro-food, introduction of new technologies and innovation, environmental protection and organic farming, knowledge and respect of cross-compliance conditions.
- Information and dissemination of knowledge on CAP support schemes, of the implementation of rural development measures.
- Diversification of agricultural holdings, improvement of product quality, hygiene and food safety, creating conditions to ensure animal welfare and plant health, work safety, use of fertilizers in agriculture in line with EU standards;
- Projects that promote improved environmental knowledge;

²⁵ http://tovishat.ro/?page_id=1297, accessed in 28.08.2013

- Support the introduction of new information technologies, the introduction of innovations, dissemination of research results and sustainable management of natural resources;

- Sustainable management of agricultural and forest lands;
- Developing innovative agro-food chain;
- Financial support for participation of farmers in different thematic meetings, fairs, exhibitions, successful projects, events that may contribute to their information.

*Measure 112-Setting up of young farmers*²⁶

The objective of this measure is to improve and increase the competitiveness of the agricultural sector by promoting young farmers and supporting the modernization and compliance with the requirements for environmental protection, hygiene and animal welfare, safety at work.

The territory analysis and public debate resulted in a shortage of young professionals in agriculture. This measure addresses the development of agriculture in terms of raising the level of knowledge and skills among farm workers.

In measure 112 is aimed at supporting young farmers involved in agricultural activities:

- Construction of buildings used for agricultural production at farm level;
- lease purchase of new tractors, harvesters, machinery, plant, equipment and accessories, equipment and specialized software;
- Acquisition of animals;
- Planting and replanting perennials;
- Purchase of land for farming;
- Support to improve farm management;
- Projects that help improve the overall performance of the farm;

*Measure 121-Modernisation of agricultural holdings*²⁷

The objective of this measure is to increase the competitiveness of the agricultural sector through a better use of human resources and production factors and promote investment in agricultural holdings in the vegetal and animal husbandry to achieve new construction and / or modernization of existing agricultural buildings within these and related utilities, purchase of machinery and new equipment, the establishment of plantations.

Financing provided by the measure 121 aims:

- the introduction and the development of new processes and technologies, diversification of production, to adjust the profile, level and quality of production to market requirements, including the ecological, and production and use of energy from renewable sources;

- Supporting the members of producer groups or other associative forms in order to encourage the phenomenon of association.

- Supporting investments aimed at equipping with modern machinery and equipment, as well as investments on the adaptation of agricultural structures for compliance with community standards and competitiveness of agricultural exploitation.

²⁶ <http://www.apdrp.ro/content.aspx?item=2003&lang=RO>, accessed in 3.08.2013

²⁷ http://tovishat.ro/?page_id=1301, accessed in 29.08.2013

- Establishment of cultures of the forest species with short production cycle (up to 5 years) and regeneration about vegetative crops such as poplar, willow, locust trees, to produce renewable energy;
- Construction or modernization of buildings used for agricultural production at farm level;
- Construction and modernization of internal road access in agriculture;
- lease purchase of new tractors, harvesters, machinery, plant, equipment and accessories, equipment and specialized software identified as necessary in the feasibility study or Justification;
- Establish nurseries vines, fruit trees and shrubs, other trees;
- Investments for the establishment of forestry species with short rotation and by vegetative regeneration, the production of renewable energy.

*Measure 123-Adding value to agricultural and forestry products*²⁸

The objective of this measure is to increase the competitiveness of the agro-food processing and forestry by improving the overall performance of the enterprises in the sector of processing and marketing of agricultural and forestry products, through a better use of human resources and other factors of production.

Funding from Measure 123 aims:

- Development of new products, processes and technologies
- Promoting investments for production and use of renewable energy,
- New construction and modernization of buildings used in the production process, including building for environmental protection, internal infrastructure and utilities;
- Purchase or lease of new equipment, facilities, equipment, and installation costs;
- investment to improve the internal quality control of raw material, semi-products and by-products in the processing and marketing;
- Investment for production and use of renewable energy;
- Leases of new specialist vehicles needed for production and marketing.
- New construction and modernization of all types of places and spaces for production and storage of forest products;
- Purchase of new plant, machinery and equipment for harvesting and primary processing transportation of forest products and investments to upgrade existing skills and technology.

*Measure 142-Setting up producer groups*²⁹

The goal of this measure is to increase the competitiveness of primary agriculture and forestry sectors, through the balanced development of relations between the producers and the processing and marketing sectors, as well as the adaptation of production in terms of quality and quantity to consumer demands.

Financing provided in the measure encourages the establishment and functioning of the administrative producer groups:

- Projects that support the adaptation of production to market demands and requirements;

²⁸ <http://www.finantare.ro/cresterea-valorii-adaugate-a-produselor-agricole-si-forestiere-masura-123.html>, accessed in 2.08.2013

²⁹ http://tovishat.ro/?page_id=1305, accessed in 2.08.2013

- Ensure the commercialization of products, including preparation for sale, centralisation of sales and distribution at the wholesale stage;
- Increasing the value added of production obtained in common and better economic management of resources and the results achieved.

*Measure 143-Providing advice and consultancy to farmers*³⁰

The objective of this action is to improve the competitiveness of the agricultural sector through improving the sustainable management of their holdings by farmers resulting in increased performance.

Funding through measure 143 aims to assist farmers to utilize the services of counselling and advice to restructure and improve the general performance of their activity:

- consulting and advisory services for farmers;
- consulting and advisory services relating to the management of the holding and the implementation of good agricultural practices and the environment;
- counselling services and advice on compliance with the standards of a modern quality agriculture to commercial farms, including processing of farm products;

*Measure 312-Support for the creation and development of micro-enterprises*³¹

The objective of this measure is the sustainable development of rural economy by encouraging non-agricultural activities in order to increase the number of jobs and additional income.

Job creation is a basic necessity in the territory. There are many people who are active in semi-subsistence agriculture and have very low income.

This measure will support entrepreneurship in this territory in non-agricultural fields that will create jobs at the local level will bring revenues to the people and local government and will increase the living standards.

Funding from Measure 312 aims:

- Investments in non-agricultural activities
- Investments to develop handicraft
- Projects aimed at providing services for the rural population
- Investment in renewable energy production
- Construction, modernization, expansion productive purpose buildings, equipment related to equipment, machinery;
- Purchase of software patents, licenses.

*Measure 313-Encouragement of tourism activities*³²

The objective of this action is to develop tourism activities in rural areas to help increase employment and income alternatives, and increase the attractiveness of rural areas.

Funding from Measure 313 aimed:

- Projects to improve the infrastructure of tourist accommodation;
- Creation of a touristic information centre
- Investment in recreational activities;

³⁰ http://tovishat.ro/?page_id=1307, accessed in 04.06.2013

³¹ http://www.finantare.ro/program-6010-masura-312-sprijin-pentru-crearea-si-dezvoltarea-de-micro_intreprinderi.html, accessed in 3.08.2013

³² <http://www.apdrp.ro/content.aspx?item=1973&lang=RO>, accessed in 07.08.2013

- Investment in the creation of information centres, tourism signs;
- Support for the development and marketing of tourism services relating to rural tourism.

Financial Allocation for the measure 313 projects

Table 2.

Number of projects	Total cost	Total cost estimation on measure	EAFRD contribution	National public contribution	Private contribution
20	25,190 €	523,800 €	292,240 €	80,560 €	151,000 €
7	32,357	212500	166800	45700	0
10	33,000	358000	138000	15000	175000
3	4,500	20500	10200	5300	5000

*Measure 322-Village renewal and development, improving basic services for the economy and rural population and upgrading the rural heritage*³³

The objective of this measure aims at improving living conditions for the population, access to basic services and protection of cultural and natural heritage in rural areas to achieve sustainable development. From the analysis of the territory and public debates resulted in a deficit in respect of the development of basic services in the localities of the territory.

Support for this measure is aimed at investing in rural areas in order to:

- Projects for the rehabilitation of the cultural centres
- Support for After School programs setting;
- Lighting network expansion
- Construction of bus stops
- Construction of office hall
- Rehabilitation of roads
- Rehabilitation of public buildings: schools, kindergartens, cultural centres
- Water supply
- Rehabilitation and strengthening "Simon Bărnuțiu" cultural centre
- Introduction to gas network
- Support for execution of the sewerage network
- Establishment, development of public spaces for rural recreation (parks, playgrounds, sports fields, cycle);
- Renovation of public buildings and facilities of car parks, markets;
- Investment in systems of production and supply of energy from renewable sources;
- Investment in the construction of new kindergartens for children, including their equipment;
- Purchasing buses to provide public transportation to the local community;
- Purchase of machinery and equipment for public services (for snow removal, lawn maintenance);
- Investments for renovation, modernization and equipment related to cultural institutions;


*Measure 421-Implementing cooperation projects*³⁴

³³ <http://www.europeanprojects.ro/PNDR322.html>, accessed in 2.08.2013

The objective of this measure in relation to strategy development is the participation of Local Action Groups in cooperation projects. By this measure were funded transnational cooperation projects (between Romania and the other Member States) and inter-district (in Romania) between LAG Tövishát and other groups that operate on the principle LEADER:

- Transnational Cooperation between LAG LAG Tövishát And Del-Zempléni Nektar in Hungary;
- Transnational cooperation between Tövishát LAG and Rural Desarrollo Grupo Filabres-Alhamilla LAG from Spain;
- Transnational cooperation between Tövishát LAG and Sárrét Összefogás Bihar from Hungary;
- Inter-territorial cooperation between Tövishát LAG and Sätmar Area LAG

Figure 2. The number of completed projects on each measure;



Source: Tovishat LAG

Management structure of the LAG

Leadership and management structures for the LAG association are³⁵:

1. The General Assembly is the governing body composed of all associations.

The General Assembly include:

- Approval of the strategy and objectives of the LAG;
- Approval of the income and expenditure account and balance sheet;
- Election and removal of the selection board members;
- Election and removal of its auditor, as appropriate, members of the Audit Committee.

2. The Board of Directors shall ensure that the execution of the General Assembly decisions. It can be made up of persons outside the Association, up to a maximum of one quarter of its composition.

³⁴ http://tovishat.ro/?page_id=1317, accessed in 16.08.2013

³⁵ http://tovishat.ro/?page_id=1327, accessed in 8.08.2013

3. Auditor or auditing committee as appropriate

In carrying out its powers censor:

- Check how it managed assets of the association;
- Prepare reports and submit them to the General Assembly;
- Attend board meetings without the right to vote;
- Perform any other duties provided in the statute or established by the General Assembly.

4. Project Selection Committee (PSC)

The Committee will be composed of 16 people (representatives of authorities and organizations involved in the partnership). In the decision making, economic and social partners and other civil society representatives, shall represent less than 50% of the local partnership and organizations coming from any cities with responsibility and neighbouring rural areas will not exceed 25%.

5. Administrative Department will have the following structure:

- a) Manager GAL - GAL coordinates activities both in terms of compliance with organizational and work procedures;
- b) Financial Officer - Accountant - dealing with supervision and control of financial and accounting management of the LAG;
- c) Department of Animation - Animation activities to promote LAG actions;
- d) Technical department - with the task of checking and selection of projects to be implemented;
- e) External consultants - a consultant for the proper performance of GAL;
- f) Employee for secretarial work;

For transparency of project selection in the GAL and also to carry out the inspection and monitoring at these selections will take part as a representative the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development at the county level.

Conclusions

The present research has proposed to perform an analysis of rural development policy in Romania, trying to highlight the way in which this policy was put into practice by implementing the National Rural Development Programme 2007-2013, which has as main objective the improvement of the rural environment with the goal of decreasing the existing disparities between rural and urban areas and the reduction of disparities between the Romanian and European rural areas. (Echkenazi, 2008: 44)

The common agricultural policy, presented in the first part, proves to be an extremely complex policy formed of several different sections and often contradictory. This complexity is given by the tumultuous evolution which it had, the problems it has encountered over the years and by the reforms which tried to resolve these issues. PAC was constantly adapted to meet the needs and expectations of European society. Currently, the CAP is facing other challenges such as globalization, economic and financial crisis, and price instability, rapid increase in production costs, food security and climate change. The objectives of the new CAP reform: viable food production, sustainable management of environmental resources and climate change, balanced territorial development prove to be realistic, efficient and beneficial for the development of European agriculture and for solving the problems it face. (Knight, 2010: 12)

Regarding the implementation of the National Programme for rural development 2007-2013, this has posed a challenge to Romania due to the new situations that have experienced actors involved in implementing and carrying out the program. NRDP 2007-

2013 objectives materialized in the four priority axes successfully covers the main problems of the Romanian rural space, but it has to improve the way of implementation and the financial allocation for its axis.

Romania is facing serious problems regarding agriculture sector. It tried to solve them in the period 2007-2013 due to the implementation of the RDP, some with desired success, others less. (Mateoc – Sârb, 2004: 93)

In addition to a poorly developed physical infrastructure, Romania faces many other rural development issues. A big problem is the incoming activities (up-stream) and exit (down-stream) in Romania. Currently, Romania has no functional food chains, and without them, the country may not have food security and will always depend on the outside for the supply of food.

The way to solve these problems is complex but one solution is better rural development and more facilities for food processing in Romania, so that Romanian agriculture can supply the Romanian people. This is also extremely important to ensure a range of jobs for rural areas, to build a sustainable economy, which is based on agriculture, but which is offering other jobs.

Finally, long-term vision for Romanian agriculture should focus on the idea of food security in Romania. A large part of the CAP reform debate was focused on food security, but it is mostly focused on food security in Europe. Romania and all other EU countries should focus also on food security within their borders. Common market for agricultural products in Europe abolished import and export taxes and has made it easier for Romania to import food. This is not a reason why Romania should give up trying to build an infrastructure for its own food. These conditions make Romania a country uncertain in terms of food, local producers are not supported by the infrastructure, and this should be a focus for sustainable rural development. (Mateoc – Sârb, 2004: 95-96)

Another problem of the Romanian rural area is the PAC system in Romania, like agriculture throughout the country, is highly fragmented, with massive contrasts between large and small producers. Great farmers in Romania receive the overwhelming majority of money allocated for country's agriculture. This demonstrates that PAC money in Romania largely supports a system that already exists, and if the situation does not change, will further strengthen large farms in their positions of superiority. However, the problem of small producers in agriculture existing in this country was amplified louder than it was before. A solution to this problem would be to establish limits on the amount received by large farms in direct payments. This is the first step that can be done to equalize the playing field between large and small agricultural enterprises.

A major problem of the Romanian agriculture is the fact that Romania is a country with no agricultural vision. As the country opened to foreign agricultural markets, the authorities in Romania seems to be missing any coherent direction to the future of agriculture in this country. Officials continue to encourage the foreign investments as the key to development of Romanian agriculture. If these investors would develop an infrastructure to help Romania on long-term, foreign investment would be beneficial for Romanian rural area, but authorities having no real vision for the future of Romanian agriculture are not concerned with those aspects that support sustainable rural development. (Ștefănescu, 2005: 104-105). The Romanian authorities rely on funds and agricultural policies of the European Union to replace what should be considered national decision. Brussels policies are not designed to be national policy, and cannot replace specific decisions for Romania. EU will not solve Romania's problems. Romania needs to develop its own vision and find a way of using EU funds to complete their vision and not

vice versa. Romania needs agricultural policies adapted to its specific, taking into account the fact that Romania is part of the European Union. These policies should at the same time to represent the interests of Romania and its citizens and intertwine, also with European policy, in compliance with European standards. It is a difficult task, but it is not far from impossible. A country with an agricultural tradition so rich like Romania should be able to create an agricultural vision and to implement it. (Knight, 2010: 12)

Another problem of the Romanian space, which slows down access to European funds for rural development, is slow and inefficient bureaucracy and inconsistent governance. Public service in Romania is slow and uncertain and policies are changing often, sometimes dramatically, when a new Government or even a new Minister takes power. This leads to confusion and lack of confidence in the Government of farmers. There was hope that new rules and EU money could help to remedy this situation and could provide stability. However, in the last 6 years of EU membership, the Government has continuously failed even in the handling of EU funds.

Romanian agriculture will not prosper if the authorities in charge do not work actively on behalf of the great majority of its components – small farmers from Romania.

The Government of Romania should provide more stability through its policies. Farmers in Romania will not develop unless government policies are as consistent and reliable. Banks do not trust that the Government fulfil its promises and is unlikely to offer credits to small farmers without ensuring that policies will not change dramatically for the duration of a loan. If this situation will not change, Romanian peasants will be in a continuous disadvantage towards foreigners operating in Romania (which can get credit from foreign banks) and with large scale farms that may allow investments without loans from the Bank.

It is also important to focus on rural development, with better absorption. In Romania, 55% of CAP funds now go to the second pillar. Romania has always struggled for most of the money to be directed to Pillar I, money that would be more easily distributed and absorbed. Although it will be difficult, Romania should send even more money into rural development and to undertake a better training and rural overhaul so that it can better absorb these funds. Without an effective rural development Romania cannot really benefit from the European common market place and it is Romanian authorities' job to ensure that this happens. (Knight, Douglas, 2010: 15)

To remove the existing disparities between rural and urban areas, and especially those towards European space, it is important that national and local authorities to ensure the correct implementation of the rural development policies. This will have as effect the improvement of the rural space, of the life quality in the rural areas and diversification of the rural economy, which represents the main objectives in the sustainable development of rural space.

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WORKFORCE COMPETENCE IMPROVEMENT BY MEANS OF HUNGARY – ROMANIA CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION PROGRAMME

*Florentina CHIRODEA**
*Edit SZARKA***

Abstract: *The Cross-Border Cooperation component of the European Territorial Cooperation Objective, realized through operational programs that aim the internal borders of the European Union, encourage the entrepreneurship and supports the developing of collaboration, capacity and joint use of infrastructures in health, culture, tourism and education. The strategic objective to approximate the various participants - individuals, businesses and community actors - in order to better exploit the opportunities offered by joint development of the border area, has enabled considerable improvement in the labor market situation. In this context, the cross-border cooperation programs directly contribute to creating a more integrated labor market by promoting cooperation in education, training and lifelong learning. The study aims to highlight the skills acquired by local workforce beneficiary of projects undertaken inside the Hungarian-Romanian Program of Cross-Border Cooperation, which reduced unemployment and more efficient use of local human resources.*

Keywords: *workforce competence, cross – border cooperation, human resources*

1. Introduction

EU enlargement towards the countries of the former Communist bloc was an unprecedented challenge, largely due to the great number of candidates and the considerable differences existing between the group of States of Central and Eastern Europe (PECOS), and between PECOS and the other Member States. The former centralized economies, had already registered major changes at the level of GDP/capital increases, the percentage of unemployed and lowering the supply of jobs, (Bărbulescu, 2006: 25). The impact of these handicaps is often highlighted by socialdeprivations, the mediocrity of education, a high rate of unemployment and an inadequate infrastructure. For offering new prospects for economic growth and general welfare of all EU Member States, it was necessary to reduce and eliminate disparities, i.e. to ensure a harmonious development of the entire community space, by promoting solidarity between the richest and the poorest, in parallel with the life standards of bringing the countries that joined in the last two waves of enlargement, at the medium European environment (Ciocan, Tăut, Nuna, 2007: 276). Rapid transfer of resources from rich regions to poorer ones, one of the priorities of the European regional policy after 2004, is, thus, an engine for economic integration. Based on solidarity and cohesion regional policy aimed at reducing structural

* Ph.D., lecturer, Department of International Relations and European Studies, University of Oradea,
E-mail: fchirodea@uoradea.ro

** Ph.D., lecturer, Faculty of Medicine, University of Oradea, e-mail: szarka.edit@yahoo.com

gaps in Community regions, promoting balanced and sustained development throughout the EU and reducing bad opportunities for all. Thus, it is creating a framework in which the regions can contribute fully to the achievement of economic growth and higher competitiveness, and an environment where they are encouraged to exchange ideas and practices.

Tested over the course of several years, the principles of regional development have been adjusted several times to offer a broad set of policies that will address not only the challenges, but also the social and environmental ones (General Directorate for Regional Policy, 2009: 4). The Lisbon Agenda redefines the priorities of the cohesion policy, promoting competitiveness and creating new jobs, objectives clearly formulated in the partnership for economic growth and employment adopted at the meeting of March 2005. The structural policy is implemented by means of instruments aimed at the investment in modern infrastructure and business trends, better education and training for people in poor regions, which are designed to open new markets and expand the economic potential of all Member States (General Directorate for Regional Policy, 2009: 4).

Regional and cohesion policy translates into the work of the structural funds, the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), European Social Fund (ESF) and the Cohesion Fund (CF), operating in 3 main directions: promoting economic convergence, in order to help the least-developed regions, represented mainly by the new Member States, to the more prosperous countries, the application of various measures aimed at promoting competitiveness and employment at regional level; promoting cooperation between regions and countries in order to reduce the economic significance of borders (General Directorate for Regional Policy, 2009: 5).

Objective "European territorial Cooperation" aimed at both those over 181.7 million people (37% of the total EU population) living in border areas, as well as the 13 transnational co-operation areas and is intended to strengthen cross-border cooperation, regional and local initiatives carried out jointly to strengthen transnational cooperation through actions designed to encourage integrated territorial development, as well as the exchange of experiences. Cross-border cooperation actions or transnational is based on principles of partnership, subsidiarity and on the existence of a cross-border development strategies, involving two types of partnerships: vertically between levels of local, regional and national existing on either side of the border, horizontal, respectively established between two actors locate on both sides of the border (Țoca; Popoviciu, (2010): 89). Bilateral or trilateral cooperation, local or regional becomes thus a key point in establishing partnerships to reduce disparities between regions and between similar structures. Cross-border cooperation is a European objective, implemented at the local or regional collaboration in the creation of a direct relationship between the regions and communities on both sides of the border. The advantages of such cooperation can be observed easily in Western Europe, where these structures have operated efficiently, causing an increase in economic and trade relations between the Member States, the exchanges of cultural, artistic and scientific contacts between people, cooperation in the fields of the environment, or the development of cross-border cooperation in various fields (Brie, 2010: 28-29).

For the period 2007-2013 the budget of the cohesion policy is approximately EUR 347.4 billion (one-third of the EU budget) and is intended mainly to support regional development and foster the creation of new jobs, was assigned to those three funds depending on the objective (europa.eu). European territorial cooperation incumbent 8.7 billion euros and is aimed at regions of NUTS 3 level, regions that are situated both along

the land borders and certain external land borders and those situated along maritime borders separated by a maximum of 150 km. The actions of cross-border cooperation, transnational and inter regional are financed with the help of the ERDF, on three priority axes: the development of cross-border economic and social activities; the establishment and development of transnational cooperation, including bilateral cooperation between maritime regions; strengthening the effectiveness of regional policy by promoting interregional cooperation. Of the 2.5 per cent allocated to territorial cooperation, 6.44 billion euros are earmarked for cross-border cooperation and networking, 1.83 billion for cooperation and transnational networks and 445 million for inter-regional cooperation and networks. In the 2007-2013 budget, the funds allocated to each country (Table 1) have been determined taking into account, mainly regional and relative prosperity, the number of inhabitants and the national unemployment rate, i.e. the principle of allocation of funds not exceeding approximately 4% of the GDP of the Member State (General Directorate for Regional Policy, 2008: 10-11). After a synthetic analysis, the data presented in the table below show a breakdown of the funds at the rate of 36% for the States of Central and Eastern Europe, the rest being allocated to other Member States of the European Union (Grafic 1).


Allocations of funds for the European territorial Cooperation objective during the period 2007-2013

Table 1.

EU Member State	„The European Territorial Cooperation” Objective (millions of euros)	EU Member State	„The European Territorial Cooperation” Objective (millions of euros)	EU Member State	„The European Territorial Cooperation” Objective (millions of euros)
Austria	257	Germany	851	Poland	731
Belgia	194	Greece	210	Portugal	99
Bulgaria	179	Ireland	151	United Kingdom	722
Cehia	389	Italia	846	Romania	455
Cyprus	28	Leetonia	90	Slovakia	227
Denmark	103	Lithuania	109	Slovenia	104
Estonia	52	Luxemburg	15	Spain	559
Finland	120	Malta	15	Sweden	265
France	872	Holland	247	Hungary	386

Source: General Directorate for Regional Policy, 2008

Graphic 1. Allocations of funds for the European territorial Cooperation objective, between PECOS countries and the other EU Member States in the budget year 2007- 2013



The economic crisis triggered in 2008 has led to major changes in the economies of the EU Member States, characterized by the decrease of the GDP, the number of hires, reducing investment, an increase in the number of unemployed persons and the public debt. The unemployment rate increased from 8.2% in 2008 to 9.6% in 2009, with a doubling of it in the coming years in Ireland and Spain and tripling in the Baltic States. The worsening economic climate and declining consumer confidence have led to a decrease in exports of goods and services and decreased foreign direct investments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In this context, the new regional policy and cohesion, enhance the competitiveness and redirected for States or regions, based on their awareness of the fact that development and progress cannot be achieved just by eliminating disparities but also by exploiting the strengths, stimulating excellence and growth poles. The appropriations are thus intended for both economic growth and the creation of new and better jobs (Dascălu; Bârgăoanu, 2010: 53-56).

In this context, the component of cross-border cooperation inside the objective of „European Territorial cooperation "helps to improve the situation on the labor market in areas in close proximity to the internal Community borders, operational programs developed aimed at approximating the various participants-individuals, business and community actors-for exploitation of opportunities offered by the development of these areas. By promoting cooperation in education, training and lifelong learning are tools through which local labor force earns new knowledge or additional skills competencies and acquired in accordance with the requirements of employers, which will lead to the development of a labor market more integrated, to reduce unemployment in the area and at an efficient use of local human resource. The study aims to provide an analysis of these powers acquired by the beneficiaries of cross-border cooperation in the areas bordering the Romanian-Hungarian border area characterized by numerous socio-economic peculiarities, historical and cultural. More specifically, we propose an evaluation of the results of projects conducted through cross-border cooperation Program Hungary-Romania, major intervention field 1.4-cooperation in the field of the labor market and education, action 2.3.2-cooperation on the labor market.

2. Social-economic characteristics of the border region between Romania and Hungary

The internal EU border, the border between Romania and Hungary has a length of 448 miles and two counties surrounding the development of the Northwest and two belonging to the Western Region of Romania from the Northern Great Plain Region and part of the southern great plain Region of Hungary. The population of more than 4 million people is distributed evenly on one side and the other of the border in eight counties of NUTS 3 level: Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg, Hajdú-Bihar, Békés, Csongrád, Satu Mare, Bihor, Arad and Timiș. The average population density in the region is below the EU average, the population is declining in recent years due to the increase in fatalities, decrease in births and the emigrational phenomenon, increasingly emphasized. The share of the population aged between 15-64 years is close to the EU average (67% in Hungary and 70% in Romania), the most significant being the Roma minority. The population of Hungarian nationality is most numerous in the Romanian counties than the Romanians of Hungarian counties, other nationalities being represented by Serbs, Slovaks and Germans (The North –West Regional Development Agency, 2012: 9-10).

In general, the area is characterized by economic and social situations almost similar, it is rich in natural resources, agriculture and food industry, playing a key role in

the regional economy. On the Romanian side, the economic structure is more diversified and industrialized, foreign direct investment is important in the earlier years of the economic crisis on both sides of the border. Despite the dynamic development, especially in the counties of Timiș and Arad, in the area, large enterprises and multinational companies are operating successfully, SMEs are poorly developed. Another problem is the low level of research and development activity, although the number of universities and research institutions is great. The Hungarian region of the area, 184 towns in Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg, Hajdú-Bihar district, 63 and 49 of Békés are declared legally disadvantaged socio-economically, with unemployment rates far above the national average. GDP per capita in 2009-down from 2008 when the three counties is much lower, than the country average and only in the case of Hajdú-Bihar County is higher than the average per region (Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg: 5,115.30 EUR, 34% of the national average, Hajdú-Bihar: 6,899.9 EUR 73.5% of the national average, Békés: 5,276.88 EUR 56.2% of the national average). Compared to other counties of Hungary, these are among the poorest on the national level (HU-RO Cross – border Co-operation Programme 2007-2013, 2008: 9-15).

In 2004 the number of persons engaged in trans-border region fell in 2009 by 34% of the total population (1.4 million) held a job, I mean 27 being 48% Decrease can be attributed to both factors that caused the decline in the population in general, and the worsening climate in the two States after the start of the economic crisis. And in terms of employment, it was recorded a slight decrease in the whole area, although there was an increase in Satu Mare, Romania and Csongrád, in most other counties a decrease in the number of persons employed in recent years was visible. In Romania there are counties, such as Arad, Timiș, where, as early as 2007, an increase of persons engaged in the agricultural sector, in industrial figures was over the national average,. At the Hungarian border, there are record numbers over the national average in sectors such as agriculture, services, public administration and households. Since 2004, the region's macroeconomic indicators are rising faster in the Romanian counties than in Hungarian, in late 2008 the GDP reaching 53.600 euros (11% of the aggregate value of the Romanian-Hungarian), 75% of the EU27 average. GDP growth was stopped after the outbreak of the crisis, the number of employees dropping on both sides of the border (KPMG, 2012: 27, 32).

The large towns - County residences - play an important role in the development of the area, the majority of public institutions, universities, research institutions and leading economic actors being concentrated here. Also, another important natural resource of the region is the thermal water with therapeutic effect, which is highlighted in the famous spa resorts (Băile 1 Mai, Băile Felix, Debrecen și Hajdúszoboszló) (HU-RO Cross – border Co-operation Programme 2007-2013, 2008: 16-20).

The good quality, attractive, and natural environment (especially counties Hajdú-Bihar, Bihar, Arad and Timis), the developing networks of higher education institutions in the border area, representing a broad base of knowledge and a valuable resource for research and development (especially in the towns of Szeged, Debrecen, Oradea, Arad and Timișoara), the multicultural traditions and ethnic diversity, with different national minorities living in the border area especially in the Romanian area are several strengths of the regions eligible under this program. At the same time, the existence of usable thermal waters for tourism purposes or as alternative source of energy and the better and better relations between the two countries are opportunities that can be exploited through this program. Along with these the programme has major directions regarding the intervention and reducing the threats and weaknesses identified in the ex-ante evaluation

of the programme. Of these, the level of education and training is lower than national standard level in the Hungarian area, the Roma population nor being integrated in the labour market, the large number of rural areas dependent on agriculture, which cannot provide a safe and quality life, the low level of knowledge in the field of information technology and communications, the relatively high level of unemployment, especially in the Hungarian area, the low level of education of jobless people, significant inter-regional differences in the labour market (particularly in Hungary), lack of information about the existing tourist attractions and lack of competitive products constitutes sufficient grounds for financing projects which intend to improve regional indicators (HU-RO Cross – border Co-operation Programme 2007-2013, 2008: 21-25).

3. Competences acquired by the labor force through the Cross-border Cooperation Program Romania-Hungary 2001-2013


Financed since 1996 through the first experimental program of cross-border cooperation of the NIF, the Romanian-Hungarian cross-border relations have benefited during the period 1993-2003 funds amounting to 34 million euros for the implementation of the CBC, the Hungarian side of the border and 28 million for the Romanian part. Opened in December 21, 2007, the program has benefited in the current budget year of a funding of 248 million EUROS to stimulate cross-border cooperation in the eight counties eligible, on both side of the Hungarian-Romanian border. 224.5 million from ERDF funds, of which 13.5 million for the remaining 211 million for investment (KPMG, 2013: 12). For the six years of funding, the program has the following main characteristics: territorial cooperation constitutes an objective in itself; a much improved legal basis; a more pronounced emphasis on competitiveness and environmental issues; joint financing, national and European; increasing the share of funding from the European Commission up to 85% in certain cases (www.huro-cbs.eu). Projects funded by the program are aimed at promoting economic performance in the following sectors: business, cross-border cooperation; research and development; touristic development; education; common threats prevention and health. As regards the labor market, cooperation is intended to help the formation and e-learning activities to decrease structural unemployment in the area (KPMG, 2012: 29-30).

The basic elements of the programme strategy aimed at bringing the different participants, individuals, communities and economic actors, in order to exploit more effectively the opportunities offered by the development of the border area, especially since it became the European internal border following the accession of Romania to the EU. On the basis of general goals and strategies were formulated the following objectives: improving the basic conditions for cooperation by addressing the most important obstacles; supporting cooperation initiatives in the various actors. In order to achieve the first objective are scheduled for the development of interventions and information infrastructure, the protection of nature, creating a shared business infrastructures, labor market, cooperation in the fields of education, research, development and innovation in the realm of health, prevention of common threats, as well as through cooperation between communities. In addition to promoting common development, the programme aims at contributing to the protection and strengthening of balance between horizontal principles from both sides ((HU-RO Cross – border Co-operation Programme 2007-2013, 2008).

To boost cooperation activities it was emphasized, on the one hand, the easy access of the inhabitants, the institutions, enterprises and municipalities to the multitude of opportunities (business, educational, cultural, tourist and recreational), and on the other

hand on the easy contact between the partners by developing adequate transport infrastructure. After creating the basic conditions, the programme strategy focuses on exploiting opportunities for common development of both sides of the Hungarian-Romanian border, supported initiatives for cooperation in various fields. Thus, within the framework of the Priority 2 – “Strengthening social and economic cohesion in the border region”, aims to promote and support initiatives for cooperation in key areas such as business, research and education, the development of the labor market, health and risk management. The general objective of the Priority Axis 2 is to enhance the competitiveness of the economy of the region through the development of the business environment and improvement of the quality of human resources, contributing directly to the strengthening of economic contacts in the frontier zone, to boost sustainable economic development on the basis of comparative advantages, and to strengthen the the social and cultural coherence between people and communities. Horizontal principles promoted in the framework of priority are: ensuring equal access of disadvantaged persons, in particular of the Roma population, the various opportunities offered by the proposed intervention measures aimed at developing the labor market and health care system. For the major field of intervention 2.3 – “Cooperation in the field of the labor market and education were opened two actions: cooperation between education institutions and the labor market”, cooperation projects are divided into two categories: soft (3 calls for proposals) and infrastructure (2 applications). The 15 projects in the last part of the soft category and are won on the calls for proposals of the periods October 1, 2008 - January 30, 2009; October 8, 2009 - January 22, 2010 and December 10, 2010 - March 1, 2011 (Graphic 2).

Graphic 2. *Distribution of Cooperation projects won on the labor market in the light of calls for proposals*




Source: Hungary – Romania, Cross-border Cooperation Programme, http://www.huro-cbc.eu/en/financed_projects

The share of no-reimbursement funding was 95% in the case of the Hungarian partners while for the Romanian ones it was 98%; the personal contribution being, 5 and 2 percentage points respectively, and the missing amounts were to be completed from the national budgetary sources. Throughout the period of implementation, 43% of funds are allocated to priority 2, 96.524.222 euro 17.033.686 euro ERDF and the private contribution of Romania and Hungary. Financing of projects started on December 1, 2009, the last being completed in June 30, 2013. The majority was conducted over a period of 1 year, one with an implementation period of 1 year and 4 months, and three of which were financed for a period of 11.5 months. In total, for the 15 projects were allocated to

2.423.935 euros, representing 2% of the amount earmarked for priority 2, the smallest being 79.521 euro funding, and most of the 200,000 euro (Graphic 3).

Graphic 3. *Financing projects submitted on Action 2.3.2*



Source: Hungary – Romania Cross-border Cooperation Program, http://www.huro-cbc.eu/en/financed_projects

The 15 projects to which we refer there were involved, as project leader or partners, higher education and research institutions, NGOs and local authorities in the eight counties in the area program. The actions have been designed and conducted by local and regional actors of the socio-economic life, such as: state higher education institutions (University of Oradea, University of Debrecen and University of Nyíregyháza), private universities (Universitatea de Vest „Vasile Goldiș” of Arad and the Christian University „Partium” of Oradea), an Institute dedicated to the training of adults and the development of methods of research in this area (“Türr István” Training and Research Institute - TKKI), NGOs (Foundation Ciorre Roma Oradea, Association “Consult Scolari” Satu Mare, Foundation „Hans Linder” Satu Mare, the Association or Promoting Businesses of Romania Oradea, Regional Federation of Small and Middle Enterprises Timisoara, Hajdú-Bihar Megyei Vállalkozásfejlesztési Alapítvány” Debrecen, Fiatalok Kulturális Szövetsége – Ifjúsági Egyesület, Nyíregyháza, Életminőség Alapítvány, Debrecen, Humán Fejlesztők Kollégiuma, Debrecen, Federation of Technical and Scientific Societies – MTESZ, County Organization from Békés, Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg, Területfejleszté and Egyesülete, Csongrád) and local authorities (the City Hall of Culciu, Local Council of Ardud, County Satu Mare; City Hall of Pecica, County Arad; City Hall of Mădăras, County Bihor; County Council of Bihor; Csengersima Község Önkormányzat, Szakoly Község Önkormányzata, County Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg; Homokháti Önkormányzatok Kistérségi, County Csongrád; Méhkerék Község Önkormányzata, County Békés).

The partnership idea promoted by the program is quite a special one as it is only common projects of the Romanian and Hungarian partners that can be financed. From this point of view, the majority of projects (12) were developed by the institutions, bodies or local authorities in the development of the Northwest Region and Northern Great Plain, the interest for calls on major intervention direction 2.3, Action 2.3.2, being low for local actors in the counties of Arad, Timisoara, Békés and Csongrád. Cross-border partnerships thus developed are illustrated in the figure below.

Figure 1. *Cross-border partnerships developed under the projects on Joint Action 2.3.2*



Source: personal achievement on the basis of information provided by the official website of Hungary-Romania Cross-border Co-operation Programme

Fostering the idea of partnership and the implementation of the principle of a partner project leader, from this point of view the statistics are as follows:

1. Most projects were leading institutions, organizations or local actors in Hungary, of Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg County the most projects being coordinated (5), followed by Hajdú-Bihar (3 projects), Csongrád and Békés with 1 project;

2. 5 projects have as leading institutions, organizations or local actors in Bihor County, Romania.

In accordance with the strategic element of Hungary-Romania Cross-border Co-operation Program, the 15 projects on Action 2.3.2 general aimed at developing a common approach to the Hungarian - Romanian for structural unemployment, labor market integration of disadvantaged categories of the population, combating poverty and social exclusion, increasing flexibility and competences, at local or regional employers' requirements. Was developed, thus, a framework for use of methods designed to increase the degree of access to education of persons with low levels of schooling, particularly those of the Roma, have established methods of socio-occupational counseling for the unemployed and graduates looking for a job, have been offered qualification courses recognized at national and European level, or courses for the development of language skills and ICT. Round tables, workshops, conferences and seminars and exchanges of experience are other tools used by partners in projects to increase the powers of the region, especially those engaged in agriculture and tourism, the emphasis being placed on entrepreneurial activities which make the possibility of long-term support and starting your own business. Some of the specific targets of the Hungary-Romania Cross-border Co-operation Programme focuses on creating a solid basis for joint development of the communities on both sides of the border and is aimed at improving the flow of information on the opportunities in the border area and strengthen the social and structural consistency at the level of individuals and communities. It also stressed the strengthening compliance with horizontal principles: sustainable development, equal opportunities, gender equality, gender specific needs of disadvantaged people, persons with disabilities and those belonging to ethnic minorities (especially the Roma), protection and development of the natural environment and the human factor. To achieve these objectives, the 15 projects financed by Action 2.3.2 have proposed to develop, firstly, a framework in which those who are looking for a job and employers interact directly, by facilitating access to information on supply and demand of

labor in the region. Most of these platforms developed in the online environment, the networks are actually formed between the economic, social and educational actors, with the goal of providing advisory services, training and assessment guidance for persons looking for a job or wishing to improve their knowledge and skills or to acquire new competences and skills recognized at national and European level. Experts involved in these projects were equally concerned about the identification of the factors affecting the integration of disadvantaged persons in the regional market, particularly graduates, rural youth, unemployed persons and persons of Roma origin, as well as the analysis of the requirements of employers in the region and identify opportunities for employment. The developed programs create an integrated educational content management, modular structure of it allowing the use of e-learning, distance learning or lifelong learning. On-line courses, didactic materials, guides, case studies, practical exercises and documents made available to the target groups are pursuing training in different fields, from economics, business, tourism management, foreign languages and computer science applied to the potteries, photo-video technique application of varnishes, planting trees, creating a bio, gastronomy etc. Last but not least, the beneficiaries of these projects had provided training programs in the workplace (remote work), got information on the techniques of searching for a job, to the composition of a team, developing personal and social skills, teaching skills and the liberal professions.

The results obtained in the course of the 15 projects analyzed can be grouped into three categories, depending on the type of beneficiary:

I. the main target group of the project partners, formed by the unemployed, persons affected by structural unemployment, young graduates, young people from rural areas, disadvantaged persons and persons belonging to the Romani ethnicity, have benefited from the training courses for:- improvement of the competencies or obtain new ones in: entrepreneurship, agricultural economics and agricultural engineering, computer science, geography, history, Hungarian, Romanian, French language, German language, mathematics, psychology and pedagogy, health and medical sciences, environmental science, economic science, pharmaceutical sciences, philology, law and public administration, social sciences, natural sciences, arts, foreign languages applied in automotive, business, law, insurance, tourism, catering, trade or health;

- Obtaining the necessary skills in customer relations, analysis of risks, business communication, negotiation, management, marketing, finance, accounting;
- Acquiring the necessary skills for employment jobs that do not require a higher qualification or for the cultivation of fruit trees and the setting-up of bio farms;
- Expanding knowledge concerning the management of places of accommodation, organizing fun activities for guests or tour guide.

To the same extent, the assessment of competences, skills, abilities and professional skills on online platforms as well as guidelines for vocational guidance are tools made available to those who are looking for a job.

II. For SMEs or regional recruitment companies, partnerships have provided:

- A framework in which the supply and demand for labor was met by the round tables, workshops, conferences, exhibitions, scholarships, jobs of direct dialogues with leaders of ethnic Rromani, even through online platforms created;

III. The higher education institutions involved in the projects had provided an important source of information on changes in requirements and the requirements of employers in the region, so they can be integrated quickly into university curricula.

IV. The local authorities in the region benefit from the completion of these projects:

a list of occupations to be practiced by the featured persons of Roma origin;

- Occupational counseling offices in Oradea and Debrecen;
- Analysis of the cross-border area on the basis of studies and surveys carried out within the framework of projects;
- A database of available jobs in the area of eligibility of projects;
- A database with the most important SMEs from the cross-border area;
- A web-site and a newspaper for news and job vacancies.

4. Conclusions

The economic and social gaps between the EU Member States or regions have accompanied the process of European integration since its beginning (Dascălu; Bârgăoanu, 2010: 51). In the border regions of the States of Central and Eastern Europe these gaps have acquired different shades: significant economic disparities between east and west, differences in development between different regions; cultural and institutional diversity that has become, particularly more evident in these areas (Leibenath, 2008: 1-4). Therefore, the border regions are a major space category in Europe, where regional and cohesion policy may give rise to partnerships between institutions, organizations and local authorities, in order that the emergence of innovation, economic growth, employment and sustainable development. Regional and cohesion policy will focus on countries and regions with the most important needs, in order to correct existing imbalances.

The main tool used is the structural funds for the period 2007-2013, supporting interventions with regard to territorial cooperation operational programs, aimed at the approximation of various participants, individuals, communities and economic actors, in order to exploit more effectively the opportunities offered by the development of the border area (Czekalla, 2010: 7). In this context, the analysis of projects financed through Hungary-Romania Cross-border Co-operation Program, major intervention field "Cooperation in the Field of Labor Market and Education", Action 2.3.2 - "Cooperation on the labor market", show the existence of a substantial number of partnerships developed between the Counties of Bihor - Hajdú-Bihar (7) and Satu Mare - Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg (5), contributing to it, cross-border cooperation relations existing between the different actors of a locate on both sides of the border.

On the Hungary-Romania Cross-border Co-operation Program, the balance of portfolios of projects got its equilibrium between Romania and Hungary after the fifth call (KPMG, 2013: 9), what we can't affirm for Action 2.3.2, where distribution of accessing funds is in favor of Hungarian partners, who have applied and received funding for 10 projects. Public institutions, organizations or local actors of Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg County were unable to access funds as project leader, followed by those in the Hajdú-Bihar, Békés and Csongrád. On the Romanian side, all five projects were won by entities of Bihor County, pointing out a lack of involvement from those of Satu Mare, Arad and Timișoara. Also, a considerable majority of projects won (73%) were submitted from December 2010 to March 2011, for the other two calls being very low interest. Another feature of the projects submitted in the period consists of relatively small deployment, from 11.5 months to one year and four months, in 2012, for Action 2.3.2., the status of the implementation of the projects being 80% (KPMG, 2013: 14).

The direct beneficiaries of the 15 projects analyzed are primarily long-term unemployed, then the young graduates and rural disadvantaged persons and those belonging to the Roma ethnicity in general categories of the population which they find more difficult a job due to lack of experience, or who have insufficient skills and abilities in comparison with the requirements of the labor market. A special category is those who

followed refresher courses and skills knowledge owned or had an opportunity to be assessed and advised in accordance with the needs of employers. In general, the areas in which they were organized training courses are appropriate in eligible counties economy structure, being made competent in fields such as business, agriculture, tourism, social sciences, communication, marketing, finance, accounting, and engineering. A particular interest has been given to training of skills needed to use the language of European movement or those applied in specific areas (French, German, English), as well as those spoken by the population located on the other side of the border (Romanian and Hungarian). This can be an advantage for employers in the area, which may use a work force with superior communication abilities, with beneficial consequences for existing or future business, which extends to the economies of the region.

Indirect beneficiaries of the projects conducted on Action 2.3.2 are employers in eligible counties, who have been offered the framework through which they could evaluate the job offer from the market and experience an alternative system of human resource management. The recruitment firms involved in these projects have opened up new opportunities for mediation and training, and higher education institutions had provided an important source of information on changes in requirements and the requirements of employers in the region, so that they can be integrated quickly into university curricula. Last but not least, the local authorities in the region have received through studies, analyses or information provided by specialists an x-ray structure of the labor market.

The impact of the results on the achievement of the objectives of regional and cohesion policy is not noticeable. The small number of projects, low funding and the reduced implementation duration are factors that have led to the limitation of the number of direct beneficiaries. However, e-learning platforms, occupational counseling offices, databases, websites, and online newspapers are constituents of the mechanism to ensure sustainable development and sustainable employment in the area near the border between Romania and Hungary.

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II. Foreign Policy and International Relations

Constantin-Vasile ȚOCA, Bogdan POCOLA ⇔ *The Debate on the United Nations Security Council reform. Learning International politics actively*

Melania-Gabriela CIOT ⇔ *Idiosyncrasies in the Foreign Policy Decision-Making (I): Cognitive Idiosyncrasies*

Maria GĂVĂNECI ⇔ *Border Regions in Russia's foreign policy. The case of the Baltic Sea Region and the Black Sea Region*

Ioan HORGA, Ioana NAN ⇔ *CFSP into the Spotlight: the European Union's Foreign Policy toward Russia during the Chechen Wars*

Cosmin CHIRIAC ⇔ *Spatial Data Analysis and Cross-Border Cooperation. The Case of Bihor – Hajdú Bihar Euroregion.*

THE DEBATE ON THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM. LEARNING INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ACTIVELY

*Constantin-Vasile ȚOCA**
*Bogdan POCOLA***

Abstract: *To complement the academic research on the topic of UN Security Council reform we hosted a debate based on the model UN format with students from the International Relations and European Studies groups at our faculty. The main objective was to create an interaction between practical elements of international relations (concepts like negotiation, international politics, and power politics) and theoretical elements, familiar to international relations students, in a way as to facilitate learning. The secondary objective was to create an effective learning model for students, one that would help perfect their communication and negotiation skills. The results mined from the data that we recorded proved to be quite interesting both from an international relations perspective and a pedagogical perspective. This article is the direct result of the study done on our data, providing concrete application of the model used in the debate.*

Keywords: *United Nations, Security Council, reform, debate, active learning, international politics*

1. Simulating the UN Security Council

The UN Security Council reform has been a great source of debate over the years and a great case for study in international relations. It has all the issues that make international politics so complex and interesting to study. This is the main reason why we wrote the first article in this series and we considered creating a debate around the subject.

It has been our goal to not only study the subject but to involve students in the study as an opportunity for gaining new insight into the workings of international politics while also having a go at it themselves. The debate centered around the UN Security Council reform has provided us with the opportunity to further explore methods of active learning, a process that invites students to form argued opinions on subjects that require cooperation and good communication. The framework provided by the workings of the UN Security Council and the context of reforming the institution has been a very good starting point for the debate.

The present article deals with the impact this debate had both from the perspective of providing solutions to reform and also providing a method to bridge learning and participating. Solutions put forth by students were not outside the realm of possibility, in fact, the debate conjured quite a few interesting and practical ideas. By documenting and

* Assistant Professor, PhD, Department of European Studies and International Relations, Faculty of History International Relations, Political Sciences and Science of Communication, University of Oradea, Romania. E-mail: toca@igri.ro

** Master Student in European Studies at the University of Oradea. E-mail: poco.bogdan@gmail.com

analyzing the results of this debate we were able to highlight a couple of key points that can act as a valuable guide to similar debates in the future.

The article is structured into several parts. The theoretical background of the subject is studied through examining the context of reform as an ongoing process within the UN and by linking the debate model that we used to concepts and ideas used in active learning methodology. Finally, the workings of our debate are studied and parallels are drawn between the documented behaviour of states on the subject of reform and what students achieved as representatives of their respective state.

2. Foreign policy and international negotiation.

As part of the discussion on debating international politics, the world view and working methods play a very important role. There are a few key concepts that need to be addressed as to better frame the conversation: principal aspects of foreign policy, global political context and negotiations in present day international politics.

As individual entities or as part of an international organisation, states strive towards common objectives. They work towards these objectives through the use of foreign politics, of which the primary objectives are state security, state independence and prosperity (Horga, 2006: 199). An extended definition of foreign politics needs that takes into account different schools of thought. As such, foreign politics is composed of principles, directions, strategies, international agreements, institutions and actions that characterize the relation between one state and another or one state and a group of states or international institutions. The realist school of thought considers military and political power as key points for foreign policy, neorealists turn towards economy and technical development, while other schools of thought have a broader scope of objectives considered for foreign policy (Horga, 2006: 200).

The international arena has become a complex arrangement of moving parts. Classical theories on the matter have pointed to factors that govern foreign policies: national interest or the interests of particular members of society within the state. Since the 1950s, as a result of World War II and the creation of the United Nations, there have been numerous theories that point to an extended list of factors that influence foreign politics. Such factors can be linked to different research fields: psychology, economy, sociology, comparative politics and administration studies. Factors that derive from these fields bring more complex variables to the table; some value the characteristics of the leaders of foreign policy, some the institutional interactions between states, while others look to economy (Horga, 2006: 203). Students have used such theories to shape their positions and views as state representatives.

As part of the process of achieving foreign policy objectives, states make use of negotiation. There is no doubt that negotiation is the key towards winning any debate on matters of international politics. Traditionally, negotiation is included as a parallel process that takes place during war, but it is seldom granted more than a mention. In international relations when we think of negotiation what comes to mind is diplomacy and treaty negotiation. However, a detailed examination of war, treaty negotiation, diplomatic activity, the basic aspects of international relations, allows us to notice that negotiation between actors is always present. Even during war, at certain points, while violent confrontation is taking place, officials will attempt to find a negotiated solution to the confrontation (Iragorri, 2003: 92).

Negotiation can be defined as a process in which explicit proposals are put forward for the purpose of reaching an agreement, an exchange or the realization of a

common interest, where different interests are present. There are two elements that need to be present in order for a negotiation to happen: common interest, and conflict over that interest. If one of the two is absent, there is nothing to negotiate for, or about. Common interest can be of two types: substantive common interest and complementary interest. The former indicates that the parties will share the same object, or want to benefit from the same arrangement. Complementary interest means that the parties want different things, and the only way to obtain them is through each other; they need each other's collaboration and agreement. (Iragorri, 2003: 93)

The negotiation process leads to a particular term of an agreement where the parties involved have three basic choices:

- a) to accept agreement at the terms we may expect the opponent may settle for - available terms,
- b) to discontinue negotiations without agreement, and with no intention of resuming them, and
- c) to try to improve the «available» terms through further bargaining (Iragorri, 2003: 94).

Complexity increases as we move from bilateral to multilateral negotiation. As noted by Howard Raiffa, there is a big difference between two-party and many party negotiations (Raiffa, 1982: 251). The overarching characteristic of multilateral negotiation is its complexity along all conceivable dimensions, as noted by William Zartman (Zartman, 1994, 3). Multilateral negotiations of today are not only multi-party, but also multi-issue and multi-level. Negotiations deal with multiple issues and build systems of bargaining over a broad range of related dossiers; they often consist of multiple negotiation forums at multiple levels of organization. To some extent, the inclusion of multiple issues can facilitate agreement in multilateral negotiation, by allowing for cross-cutting compromises and the construction of package deals that leave everyone better off. Richard Walton and Robert McKersie note point out that there are some limitations to this as the parties would want to avoid having an overwhelming number, so that the negotiators are not overloaded and do not need to devote too much time sorting through items to the detriment of genuine exploitation of particular items. Conflicts over the format of the agenda and the priority of the items can force states to devote scarce time and resources to pre-negotiation talks and preparations whose sole purpose is to arrive at a negotiable agenda (Walton and McKersie, 1965: 146).

As modern multilateral negotiations grow increasingly complex, this has brought about a shift in the challenges facing international negotiators. The principal problem for most contemporary negotiators is not to outsmart their adversaries, but rather to create a structure out of a large mass of information. The classical diplomat's technique of the management of people through cunning has given way to the management of people through the creation of system and structure. The bottom line of the negotiation literature is that the agenda risks becoming either underdeveloped or overcrowded, in the absence of some form of agenda management (Tallberg, 2006: 123).

In the question of conducting negotiations, the theory of formal leadership suggests that the delegation of agenda management powers to the chairmanship constitutes a prominent strategy for dealing with the risk of agenda failure in multilateral negotiations. Just as national politicians design legislative institutions in order to avoid issue cycling, states delegate agenda management tasks to the chairmanship of multilateral negotiation bodies in order to avoid agenda failure (Tallberg, 2006: 124).

In multilateral bargaining, states have tactical reasons to withhold information about their true preferences. Rationalist bargaining theory suggests that negotiations can break down for two reasons: either because the parties, once they have exchanged information about each others' preferences, discover that negotiations cannot yield a better outcome than existing alternatives; or because parties with joint interests in an agreement conceal information about their actual preferences, to the effect that existing alternatives appear more attractive than a negotiated outcome (Tallberg, 2006: 125).

In the conventional view of multilateral negotiation, the process of interstate negotiations is seen as self-contained: states engage in negotiations with each other in search of an agreement that permits them to reconcile their differences and reach a win-win situation. Yet in many actual cases of cooperation in world politics, multilateral bargaining in one area or body is nested within broader processes of negotiation and may even be dependent upon agreements with external actors. If such is the case, the negotiating states must find a formula for their collective representation taking into consideration third parties (Tallberg, 2006: 127).

International organizations rarely encompass all potential members and negotiating parties. The membership of regional associations is limited, and not even global regimes and institutions incorporate all states. Restricted membership creates a demand for procedures to handle relations with non-members. Furthermore, membership of international regimes and institutions is seldom constant, but tends to grow over time, as additional states sign on. In many cases, membership expansion requires negotiations between existing and prospective members over the terms of accession and the implementation of the regime's rules (Tallberg, 2006: 128). In part, the issue of membership has been a prominent case for negotiation in the debate on UN Security Council Reform and has proven to be a very good opportunity for negotiation in our debate.

3. On the subject of reform

It is compulsory to bring arguments for our decision to pick the UN Security Council reform as a subject for our debate. Starting from present day events and going further towards the early days of its creation, as Hans J. Morgenthau appreciates, there is no proof that United Nations has forestalled any war. Instead, there are proves that show their contribution to curtailing 5 wars. It is about Indonesia and Palestine in 1949, Egypt in 1956 and 1973 and eventually Kashmir in 1965 (Morgenthau, 2007: 497).

Under the UN Charter, the Security Council was given primary responsibility in the area of peace and security. Chapter VII of the Charter provided that, should peaceful settlement procedures (such as mediation and adjudication) under Chapter VI fail, the Council would be empowered to adopt military and economic sanctions on behalf of the UN membership against any nations engaging in actions that constituted a "threat to peace". The powers granted to Security Council in this area were far greater than the powers given any other UN institution, since the Council could theoretically take decisions under Chapter VII that would be binding on all UN members (Pearson, 1988: 331).

In our previous work¹ we have highlighted some issues regarding the working of the Security Council and other UN bodies:

¹ The first article published on the subject was „UN Security Council Reform. A Possible Solution to Uncertainty” in *Analele Universității din Oradea Relații Internaționale și Studii Europene, TOM IV 2012*, Editura Universității din Oradea. The study material provided to students participating in the UN Security Council Reform debate was based on research done in preparation for that article.

Article 2, paragraph 1 of the Charter, states that “the Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members”; while in reality some members are more equal than others, with differences among the power of permanent members and non-permanent ones. Secondly, Article 19 from the Charter states that “A Member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years. The General Assembly may, nevertheless, permit such a Member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member.” Hans Morgenthau exemplifies that there were cases which contravene the article invoked. It is the case of Russia from 1st December 1964 and France and other small countries on 1st of January 1965 (Morgenthau, 2007: 507).

Thirdly, we are facing a representative problem: two of three discussions from UN agenda refer to Africa and there is still no African country among the permanent members. Other concerns can come from lack of representations of different religions and cultures or that of emerging economic and demographic powers.

Looking at only these points that are, in fact, only a brief summary of the whole discussion, many paths were left unexplored. Such is the case that we chose to bring the topic of Security Council reform from our area of interest and study to that of open debate.

The subject’s relevance lies in the history of the reform process. As stated by Article 109 of the UN Charter, changes should occur within the organization and discussions should be encouraged on a regular basis. To date, there has only been one occasion when change occurred with in working of the UN Security Council: in 1963 the number of non-permanent members was increased from 6 to 10 while another part of the 1963 resolution (GA Resolution 1991/1963) dealt with the geographical distribution of the non-permanent members as stated:

„The ten non-permanent members of the Security Council will be elected according to the following pattern:

- a) Five from the African and Asian States;
- b) One from Eastern European States;
- c) Two from Latin American States;
- d) Two from Western European and other States.”

1975 marked the birth of the Special Committee for the United Nations Charter and for strengthening the role of the Organization which came about as a need of the organization to keep track of reform necessities and suggestions. (GA Resolution 3349 XXIX, 17 december 1974)

In 1993, the question of representation and membership (through GA Resolution 47/62) lead to the creation of a Working Group on these matters (Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council); the disagreements among states prevented any real progress. The 1993 debates on reform highlighted the position member states took on the reform of the Security Council. The change of perception was evident as the UN members and UN institutions started talking about the reform as a collective.

In more recent news, the fact that there was no definite answer on reform, the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (HLP) proposed two ways to expand Security Council membership (through a report published in 2005). The common aspects of both proposals was that the total number of Security Council members should

be 24., with subsequent distinctions: model A envisioned 6 new permanent seats with no power of veto and three more two-year non-renewable seats, while model B stood for no new permanent seats, but rather a new category of 8 four-year renewable seats and one new two-year non-permanent and non-renewable seat. The term for the next review of the situation is scheduled for 2020.

Beyond the attempts of reform within the UN institutions, state positions on the matter started to gain increased attention since 1993, the number of permanent members and questions of representation being the most important issues (GA Resolution A/Res/47/62).

Germany pressed to obtain a resolution to increase in the number of permanent members (the proposal was named „Quick Fix”) that did not succeed (Ronzitti, 2010: 8). The G4 proposed an increase to twenty-five members by adding 6 permanent (4 seats from Asia and Africa, 1 each for South America and western Europe) and 4 nonpermanent members (Africa, Asia, eastern Europe, and Latin America). The veto right was asked for new permanent members, but the option to refrain from using it for 15 years was also accepted. (McDonald, Patrick, 2010: 38)

The African proposal (A/60/L41, December 2005), suggests an increase in size to 26 members with 6 permanent and 5 nonpermanent members added. New permanent members seats would be distributed consistent with the G4 scheme and full veto rights for all new permanent members (Kelly, 2011: 336).

The United States favored an increase in permanent members from 5 to 10; Germany and Japan should have a permanent seat; going for geographical distribution by giving 3 seats to nations from Latin America, Africa, and Asia; all in all, very similar to Germany’s proposal. The difference is that the German proposal takes into account nations that are not candidates for membership through a process of periodic review for all new permanent and non-permanent members.² Another reform accepted by the United States takes into account an expansion of the Security Council beyond 20 members is acceptable under the circumstances of a reduction of UN payments (Kelly, 2011: 333).

Italy is in favour of a seat for the European Union, with no expansion of fixed permanent membership at all, only rotating regional permanent seats and supports the idea of semipermanent seats rotating frequently among a group of 30 to 40 states (McDonald, Patrick, 2010: 38). This method is in place of a regional allocation algorithm. As part of the Uniting for Consensus group (UFC) that brings together countries such as Mexico, Paraguay, Pakistan, etc. a draft report of a security council reform was written and submitted in 2005 (GA draft Resolution A/59/L.68, 2005). The paper had some interesting ideas: a model based on 25 member states, permanent seats occupied by France, China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the US while the other 20 member shall be elected by the General Assembly. The election of the nonpermanent members will take into account „in the first instance the contribution of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security and the other purposes of the Organization, and also to equitable geographical distribution”.

Chile, supported by *Egypt* and *Ukraine*, proposes a regional system for new permanent members, with long-term seats from a single country representing the interests of the region as a whole. No veto applies to these countries. Another country from South America, Belize, discussed about permanent regional seats with a 5 year mandate and the

² “New permanent members will become accountable to the general membership. The performance and the action of any new permanent member will be taken into account at the moment of review. Any new permanent member could be replaced.” As found in: *Periodic Review Clause: Working Paper by Germany*, July 3, 1996, U.N. Doc. A/AC.247/1996

possibility for indefinite renewability. These permanent regional seats should be the result of elections supervised by the United Nations (Kelly, 2011: 334).

As part of the Group of Arab States, Syria considers an expansion to no less than 26 members; if the number of permanent seats will be increased is in their belief that the Group of Arab States should be given a permanent rotating seat based on their criteria.

The 2005 General Assembly summit hosted very little conclusive talks about the subject: support for an early reform of the Security Council was promised in order to make it more broadly representative, efficient and transparent and to further enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions (Office of the Presidency of the GA Press Release, 19 December 2005). The most important aspect of the 2005 talks was the fact that a number of states made their point clear on reform and, by doing so, put the talks in a whole new perspective:

- the G4 proposal
- the Uniting for Consensus proposal
- the African Union proposal

Decision 62/557 gave the Open-ended Working Group a mandate to continue negotiations and to gather all opinions of the member states on the subject. The five key points that needed addressing were: categories of membership, the question of the veto, regional representation, size of an enlarged Security Council and working methods of the Council, the relationship between the Council and the General Assembly.

While not connected directly with the workings of the UN Security Council, the EU's regional influence has determined cooperation on certain matters. In a study on the effectiveness of the UN Security Council, David Hannay outlined some aspects related to the institution itself and some related to the EU – UN interaction. The key points were as follows: developing the sense of cooperation between the permanent members, with emphasis on compromise (to negate the possibility of going back to Cold War habits of stalemates); creating an effective peacekeeping force that can act promptly as needed; more attention given to regional and subregional organisations; further continuation of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear proliferation; integration of the topic of environmental challenges on the UN Security Council agenda; achieving a strong Security Council enlargement so as to strengthen, not weaken the institution (D. Hannay, 2009: 10-12). A more prominent role of the EU in such fields needs to develop so as to adhere to the Lisbon Treaty principles.

As part of an active debate on UN reform, we also provided our own views on the subject; these ideas were the result of studying state official positions, group positions and proposals from the academic community. For the implementation of a solid and functional reform of the Security Council, that all countries feel is long overdue, there are three main factors involved.

Firstly there is the question of equal representation of all member states of the UN. In such a case, the creation of 7 regional groups on a global level would give the incentive to resolve conflicts at a regional level. Each region would get 1 permanent seat and 2 rotating nonpermanent seats on a 3 year cycle, with a total of 21 members. Thus, cultural and ethnic specificity is enforced.

Secondly, the way the veto power works must be analyzed and tweaked. The veto has always been an obstacle in granting new permanent member seats. Restrictions on the use of veto will not be applied because the mechanics will change the discussion about voting in the UN. Security and peacekeeping issues that are of a regional scale will be dealt

with on a regional level, involving 2 other adjacent regional groups. If consensus cannot be obtained, the issue becomes a subject for the whole Security Council.

The third aspect that needs a solution is that of the resources aggregated in enforcing security. Today's UN model is based on the concept of an exterior administrative entity. On the front of growing security issues, this has to change to a participative system. The concern here is that without such a model, the regional security plan will not work to its full capacity. The armed forces used today to maintain security come directly from the member states, they are not a part of a UN controlled unit. Such reform proposals will need a rethink of the Charter and are more likely issues for the future.

As pointed out by Elisabetta Martini, the process of reform is quite a tricky one. First, a minimum of 128 members of the General Assembly must cast an affirmative vote to adopt a reform plan; those abstaining or absent are not counted and there is no requirement that all permanent members must vote to approve the plan at this stage. Second, once the plan is approved by the General Assembly, it must be ratified by the national legislatures of two-thirds of member countries, including all of the permanent-member countries. It is, therefore, impossible to vote for a reform that is not agreed to by the permanent members (E. Martini, 2009: 9).

4. Debate methodology

From an organising standpoint, the debate framework revolved around the question of reform of the UN Security Council, aspect discussed in the section above. Given the nature of the subject and its complexity, our choice was for a method that can offer simplicity, for students new to such activities, while also providing ample opportunities for constructive debate; it was equally important for the debate to provide concrete data for analysis.

The educational nature of this debate was one of its strongest points. Taking some ideas discussed in academia about the importance of unstructured dialogue in building confidence and speaking patterns, the debate featured a flexible structure built on only two elements: a timeframe and context. As pointed out by R. Keith Sawyer creative teaching is a form of disciplined improvisation, it always occurs within broad structures and frameworks. Research has noted that the most effective classroom interaction balances structure and script with flexibility and improvisation (Sawyer, 2004: 13). The concept of the creative teaching has much to do with displaying cultural curiosity, continuous self motivated learning, valuing personal creative dimensions and understanding how creative connections can be made between their personal experience and teaching (Grainger, Barnes, Scoffman, 2004: 246). Using such pedagogic methods implies that students become active members of the overall conversation and bring constructive ideas to it. This is directly linked to what contemporary pedagogical approaches emphasize on: the importance of the active participation of students—including inquiry-based learning, constructivism, project-based learning, and collaborative learning (Sawyer, 2004: 13).

Further expanding on the pedagogic methods used in this debate, other aspects pointed out by R. Keith Sawyer also came up. Within a constructivist framework effective teaching must be improvisational, for students to co-construct their own knowledge. Discussion needs to be open-ended, to not be structured in advance and to reliably create interaction among students, where any participant can contribute equally to the flow of the interaction (Sawyer, 2004: 14). Creative teachers tend to place the learners above the curriculum and that the combination of a positive disposition towards creativity and person-centred teaching actively promotes students who learn and think for themselves

(Grainger, Barnes, Scoffman, 2004: 246). The scope of this method is to go beyond what traditional teaching methods can achieve, with predetermined structures and lower levels of interaction, and develop an environment where open discussion and collaborative thinking can help create new ideas.

The benefits of such methods are very appealing. Creative teaching suggests a certain vision: teachers are knowledgeable and expert professionals and are granted creative autonomy to improvise in their classrooms. Creative teaching results in deeper understanding among learners, a form of learning that is more difficult to quantitatively assess; yet, close empirical studies of the discourse processes of collaboration have the potential to document these benefits. It has the potential to result in brighter, more motivated, and more effective teachers, and to result in students with deeper understanding and improved creative and social skills. (Sawyer, 2004: 18)

From a communication standpoint the debate functions to inform, but also to communicate (Şoproni, 2011: 5-8). To inform is to connect people with facts and events, to create connections between people and events. To communicate means to create connections between people. It is an invaluable exercise in expression for students, having the opportunity to manifest their thoughts and opinions on the given subject (Şoproni, 2007: 5). Although the debate was not structured on a strong communication evaluation, meaning that participants were not required to act the part of the country representative in its fullest capacity, it did make an interesting case for metalanguage. Metalanguage, as a concept, functions as a code designed to hide the raw intentions, to mask certain aspects of ordinary language (Şoproni, 2007: 85). It is a very important tool of communication in international relations, used to build relations and to maintain the code of diplomacy (Şoproni, 2004: 143-147). It can be used to read between the lines and to get access to the intentions of other members of the conversation. (Şoproni, 2007: 90; Şoproni, 2002: 73-90).

As discussed above, the debate was framed by only two aspects: time and context. Given that the context (reform of the UN Security Council) has already been addressed, we will continue by explaining the timeframe and structure.

The debate was to be constructed on 6 hour time schedule. The rules and restrictions of the state representatives only dealt with interventions in the overall discussion as to respect the time restraints. All participants were to queue up for 2 minute intervals, with priority given to those with fewer interventions. Participants were to maintain the discussion on topic, with respect to the all representatives; they were advised to maintain a formal address, as state representatives. The debate was as follows:

9:30 – Official opening of the UN Security Council session

Countries' position papers

Reform proposals

Debate on reform proposals

Amendments to reform proposals

Vote on reform

Drafting a resolution

Final vote on the resolution

15:00 – Closing the UN Security Council Session

On a detail analysis of the debate structure, some aspects need to be noted. Firstly, given the timeframe restrictions, one could argue that there isn't enough time for proper construction of a reform proposal. To a certain extent this is true and part of the reason for it is the reasoning behind the debate: discussions were structured on a few basic concepts (most of

them strongly related to actual state positions on aspects of voting, the structure of the UN Security Council and such issues) that can sustain strong state positions; at the same time, the debate was equally important as a structured teaching exercise meant to stimulate student knowledge on international politics and the mechanism of international politics negotiation.

Secondly, the debate holds true to the value created through improvisation. Almost all of the debate was unstructured in its main issues; from 9:30 to 15:00 discussions occurred on topics that the students, acting as representatives of the UN Security Council states, found meaningful. The goal was to simulate actual workings of the UN institution with state positions that were close to the reality of politics, while also having a level of constructive unpredictability.

As far as the actual debate model is concern, some aspects need to be pointed out. The political nature of the debate within the UN Security Council leaves little room for structure. We chose the approach used by Modal UN organisations and organisers as a basis, a model that provided a very degree of flexibility to the students while also providing ample room for individual research; students were encouraged to familiarize themselves with the Model UN debate rules on top of the research into the specific country that they were representing.

Model United Nations³ is an academic simulation of the UN where students play the role of delegates from different countries and attempt to solve real world issues using the policies and perspectives of their assigned country. Once a team has registered for a conference, it receives a country to represent. Each student on that team will represent that country in a different committee with different topics. Given the number of small participants, our debate only featured one student representing one country, instead of a team. As with most conferences, we provided a background guide that introduced the topics; in this case we presented the students with our research and resources on UN Security Council reform.

Students had to prepare two products to prepare before the conference: the position paper (sometimes called a policy statement) and opening speech. In some cases students chose to combine the two products into one; there was the option to include aspects of their position paper during their opening speech. The position paper is a document that is essentially a summary knowledge on the topic and the position the country plans to take. It typically contains three sections: background of topic (provided by the debate guide given to the students), past international actions, and country policy and Possible Solutions. It was not required of the students to present their position papers before the debate.

The opening speech lasted up to a maximum of 5 minutes. Students were encouraged to take the opportunity to explain the country policy and the key sub-issues the student would like the debate to focus on. Opening speeches were used as a way for countries to determine who they want to work with in many of the cases mirroring realistic political choices.

Students were assigned member countries of the UN Security Council: Russia, Morocco, South Africa, Azerbaijan, China, Colombia, France, Germany, Guatemala, India, Pakistan, Portugal, Togo, The United Kingdom, The United States of America.

5. The Security Council reform debate

Using the framework presented above, the debate hosted on the topic of the Un Security Council reform was to showcase two principle reform arguments: creating a representative structure within the status of membership and defining the limitations of new

³ Explaining the concept of Model UN, we used information available on <http://bestdelegate.com/>. Some aspects of the model had to be modified so as to fit the organisational restrictions that we faced. The full structure is explained in detail in the article.

and existing members in the field of vote. As part of the structure of the model UN debate, the chairman of the meeting (the representative of Guatemala, in this case) opened the floor by framing the state positions on reform. State representatives were asked to present their position on reform and had the opportunity to give further explanations during their opening speech. To better understand what the negotiation process appeared at the beginning of the debate, the table below shows members' position on debate (in the two key issues, or just the reform process in principle) with some added observations contained in the position papers.

Initial state position on the subject of UN Security council reform

Table 1

	UN Security Council Members	Position towards Reform	Position on		Observations
			No. of members	Veto	
1	Russia	X			Makes remarks on the fact that UN policies are outdated
2	Morocco	X	X		Argues strongly for the need of an Africa permanent seat
3	South Africa	X	X		Wants more transparency and members for Africa. Looks towards India and Brazil for support.
4	Azerbaijan	X	X		Argues for and UN SC agenda concentrated on social problems.
5	China	X			An increase in the representativity of the UN SC on a global scale.
6	Columbia	X	X		Displeased with the inequality of the current system. Argues for representation and solving social issues. Increase in the preventive role of the UN SC.
7	France	X	X		Is in favor of increased representativity and increase in membership (up to 20).
8	Germany	X	X		Wants a permanent position for Germany in the UN SC.
9	Guatemala	X	X		Supports regional representation, seats for Africa and Latin America and decision by consensus.
10	India	X	X		Supports the candidature of South Africa as permanent member.
11	Pakistan	X	X		Wishes for more interest in peace keeping from the UN.
12	Togo	X	X		Support for a more transparent and multilateral UN SC.
13	USA	X			Appreciates and agrees with the need for reform. Would agree to an increase in members, up to 20.
14	Portugal	X	X		Wants a permanent position for Portugal on the UN SC.
15	UK	X			Argues the case of efficiency as a must for any new reform.

It is important to note that not all states had an initial position on reform, while other states had quite a strong plan from the start. Some other interesting facts that the position papers showed have to do with positioning towards other states, for example South Africa leaned towards India and Brasil for support on a permanent membership for Africa. Other states, especially permanent member states, approached the debate very carefully, with no clear idea on reform, but with clear ideas on the limitations of reform. Some less influential states like Guatemala and Colombia pushed for a clear reform process with significant changes right from the start.

The opening speeches represented another opportunity for the state representatives to explain their plans for reform in greater detail, while also getting a feel for the room and looking towards forming groups to back up their proposals. Not all representatives agreed to hold an opening speech; from the ones that did, the table below highlights the key

points of their speech. It is also interesting to note that the discussions featured 4 out of the 5 permanent members and the most vocal of the nonpermanent states were those that had clear ideas for reform.

Concrete state positions on reform at the start of the debate


Table 2

Country	Position
Russia	Wants a seat in the UN SC for India and Brasil. A maximum of 21 UN SC members.
USA	Wants a maximum of 5 additional members and no change to the veto system.
Colombia	Wants 25 UN SC members, to abandon the present veto system. New veto should be 3/5 for approval from the permanent seats plus 50% agreement among nonpermanent seats.
India	Wants up to 25-27 members, with representation for Latin America, Africa and Eastern Europe.
France	Wants membership for Japan and Germany. Considers Arab states a security risk in the UN SC.
Morocco	Wants better representation for North Africa and increased interest in economical development.
South Africa	Wants increased interest in maintaining security and economic growth.
China	Wants bteer representation for developing countries and African countries. No veto for new members.

The interesting aspect, in this case, is that the representatives of the permanent member states revealed different ideas on the reform restrictions they would agree to. No consensus was shown on who will be preffered as new permanent members, while the subject of the veto system was definetly seen as off limits.

Following these initial proceedings, the first official break was called. As part of the negotiation process, this break was the first opportunity for informal negotiations. What followed after the break saw most of the states group towards the reform proposals that they considered to be in their best interest. Out of all the ideas two groups were formed: the first, around the structure of the Colombian proposal and the other around the permanent states. As the reform process was a priority for both permanent and nonpermanent members, the need for compromise was evident.

Fig. 1. *The „Colombia group” proposal*


Guatemala India Morocco Portugal Pakistan Colombia Germany		6 additional permanent members: 2 from South America, 2 from Africa, 1 from Asia, 1 from Oceania. The 10 nonpermanent members to be elected by the General Asembly.
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The Colombia proposal was centered on a few core ideas: expansion of the UN Security Council membership both towards permanent and nonpermanent members, thus ensuring a better representation of world regions and a more transparent process throughout the workings of the Security Council.

The permanent seats proposal showcases express a more restricted view on reform, as the states that adhered to these proposals favored a more conservative

approach. The key issues addressed were: adding 3 new permanent members (nominated, in this case) with some restrictions on the veto power applied and ensuring better representation through skipping over new European memberships.

Fig. 2. The „permanent seats” proposal

Russia USA China UK France Azerbaijan		3 additional permanent seats: India, South Africa, Brasil. No veto for new seats for a term of 5 years. No addition of European states as permanent members of the UN SC.
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The two approaches can be detailed further. The Colombia group can be described as favoring a more open climate within the Security Council, with less developed countries having access to the decision process. The permanent seats group favored more developed countries as future members of the Security Council, countries that presented stronger economic opportunities towards strong economies: India, Brasil and South Africa all present strong emerging markets with stretgic or consumer potential. As far as the view on veto and procedures, there were no surprises that one view would be progressive and one would be conservative.

Amendments proposed by UN SC members on matters of membership and voting **Table 3**

Amendments	
UN SC new members	Veto and voting procedure
Increase in mandate for nonpermanent members from 2 to 4 years.	Vote within the permanent members to need 4/8 for a pass
Give permanent member status to G4 states	Restrict the use of veto in certain situations
Give permanent member status to India, Brasil and South Africa and nonpermanent status to 3 other countries.	Vote within the permanent members to need 6/8 for a pass
Give permanent member status to 6 new states.	Vote within the permanent members to need 5/8 for a pass

The final stages of the debate saw a number of amendments put to vote. Out of the 8 amendments, 3 of them passed: the increase in mandate for nonpermanent members from 2 to 4 years, proposed by the representative of the USA; the revised proposal of the permanent seats group, with India, Brasil, South Africa as permanent members and 3 other nonpermanent seats to be determined later and a reform of the veto system, with 6 out of 8 of the permanent members needed for a motion to pass, a proposal by the representative of the UK.

The resolution drafted at the end of the debate, read by the representative of China, included the 3 major changes to the UN Security Council presented above. The interesting aspect of this debate has to do with the way the permanent states agreed to change their conservative views on account of the aggressive negotiation tactics used by the Colombia group. The latter, in turn, accepted concessions on the number of membership increase and on the question of new permanent member states, while gaining an advantage towards reforming the veto.

6. Conclusions

The debate provided us with a fair amount of data with application both towards the study of the model UN as a pedagogical tool and the study of reform of the UN

Security Council. As all that data was recorded as audio format the many nuances of the students' tactics were easy to analyze. As the general feedback was positive and the result, though idealistic in the current international context, proved a challenge to negotiate, the debate proved its efficiency.

The model also provided insight on some of its limitations: the schedule only provided 4-5 hours of actual debates, with an increased need for breaks near the end; negotiations proved to center much more consistently in the question of membership, with discussions on the veto right only lasting little over 1 hour. The debate was also restricted to these two topics for organisational reasons and lack of a more extended bibliography on the subject (the students received in their briefing documents the study we conducted last year and the bibliography that we used for it). As such is the case, the debate wasn't as dynamic as it could have been.

Going further with this result we will continue to expand the debate format to include other subjects and a broader range of students, while mining data from these exercises to better understand the strengths, limitations and applications of this model.

Building new topics, with smaller time constraints and a broader selection of participants, we hope to address some of the issues we faced with the current model. As most of the problems will be tackled, we feel that the creative capacity of this debate can spark improvement in tools used to teach international relations.

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IDIOSYNCRASIES IN THE FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING (I): COGNITIVE IDIOSYNCRASIES

*Melania-Gabriela CIOT**

Abstract. *Foreign policy decisions are influenced by many factors. The role of informational processing, of framing, of idiosyncrasies ask for the use of a psychological approach of foreign policy decision-making process. This study will be the first one from a series of studies, which will present the different types of idiosyncrasies which influence the decision-making process, at individual level. It will emphasize the different categories of cognitive idiosyncrasies which may influence and the researches and studies that underlined their presence.*

Keywords: *idiosyncrasies, foreign policy decision-making, cognitive factors*

1. Introduction

Nowadays, the professionals from the field of international relations bring into our attention factors such as personality and belief of leaders, leadership style, emotions, images, cognitive consistency, the use of analogies, intelligence and the way in which these elements could influence the decision-making process and the expected results. These factors put on question mark the power of rational model (Mintz, DeRouen, 2010: 97). This does not mean that the decidents are irrational, but rather that they are limited by their abilities in going to all the phases of the rational model (Mintz, DeRouen, 2010: 97).

The presence of idiosyncrasies (of personal and social factors), which influence the decision-making could lead to more complex, realist approaches of decision-making process, different from the “classic” rational model (Campanale, 1997: 13). Fagen mentioned two styles of foreign policy decision-making: calculated and emotional (Fagen, 1962: 214).

The term idiosyncrasy came from the Greek word *idios*, which means “private”, *sun*, which means “with” and *krasis*, which means “mix”, tough, in a free translation, the term designates the “personal mixture” that every person brings into a relation (Keys, 2003: 2). This mix of personal characteristic is composed and influenced by external and internal (social) factors (Mearns, Thorne, 2000: 15). Idiosyncratic empathy is the element which can be used by the decident, with the aim of emphasizing the importance of the transparency in the relation with other persons and of the intuition of the decident, but also to facilitate the realization of the direct relation between the persons involved in the decision-making process (Keys, 2003: 2).

Goldstein, Pevenhouse mention the levels at which the individual idiosyncrasies could manifest: the first level is the one of wrong perceptions and of selective perceptions (when the information filtering is realizing); the second level is the one of emotional idiosyncrasies (the emotions which are felt as the effects of actions, linked by the

* PhD, Associated Professor, Department of European Studies and Governance, Faculty of European Studies, Babeș-Bolyai University, Romania. E-mail: Gabriela.Ciot@euro.ubbcluj.ro

sympathy or rejection of a person); and the third level, of cognitive idiosyncrasies (cognitive balance and cognitive dissonance) (Goldstein, Pevenhouse, 2006: 145).

Thompson, Neal, Sinaceur (2004: 8) organize the psychological factors (idiosyncrasies) which influence the decision-making process (which may intervene also in negotiations) into four categories: cognitive, social, motivational and emotional idiosyncrasies.

2. Cognitive idiosyncrasies

The cognitive idiosyncrasies are systematic deviations from normative norms which prescribe the rational behavior, as they are portrayed in the game theory and other normative principles (Thompson, Neal, Sinaceur, 2004: 10). They result from heuristic processing, as framing, anchoring and overestimation (Neale, Bazerman, 1991: 10). The above mentioned authors identify two approaches when referring to the researches on cognitive idiosyncrasies from the negotiation process. The fundamental argument is that the decident suffers from wrong perceptions when he/she evaluates a risk, the value of a game or some other situations. This approach identifies the model of expected utility. The second approach derives from the concepts of cognitive schemas or maps (Gilovich, 1981: 797) or from cognitive-mental models developed by the cognitivists (Evans, 1993: 561, Tabossi, Bell, Johson-Laid, 1999: 299). These structures (schemas, maps and models) operate directly on information processing, inclusive on attention, categorization and withdrawal.

Raghubir and Das (2009) affirm that cognitive idiosyncrasies could be identified in five different stages: *perception, recovery memory, information integration, judgement and behavior*. Thompson, Neal și Sinaceur (2004: 10) syntethize the cognitive idiosyncrasies which may appear in a decision-making/negotiation process, but also the authors which identified it:

Cognitive idiosyncrasies in decision-making/negotiation process (after Thompson, Neale, Sinaceur, 2004, p. 10-11).

Table 1

Theory	Cognitive idiosyncrasies	Researches
Prospect theory and cybernetic model	Framing	Bazerman, Magliozzi and Neale (1985): decidents/negotiators which frame positive a situation present a greater risk aversion than the ones who frame negative the situation.
		Bottom and Studt (1993): positive frames can be trusted when they are not shared by all parties.
		De Dreu, Emans and van de Vliert (1992): decidents/negotiators are influenced not by their own frames, but also by the others' frames.
	Anchoring	Northcraft and Neale (1987): decidents tendency of failure when adjusting of a judgement to its initial value.
		Galinsky, Seiden, Kim and Medvec (2002): initial offers affect the decident/negotiator satisfaction on them, more than the obiectual success.
		Korhonen, Oretskin, Teich and Wallenius (1995): a start position with idiosyncrasies has an impact on the results of a decision-making process/negotiations.
		Ritov (1996): the values of initial offer influence the final profit, for the initiator and for the other persons.
		Galinsky and Mussweiller (2001): the effects of initial offer on the results are moderated by the perspective's approach.

Theory	Cognitive idiosyncrasies	Researches
		White et al. (1994): the reservation price is the dominant reference point.
		Whyte and Sebenius (1997): Anchoring effects are the same size for a group as well as for the individuals; this is because the groups tend to adopt the majority rule or the consensus rule.
	Disponibility	Northcraft and Neale (1986): more concrete information affects decision-making during a negotiation.
		Borgida and Nisbett (1977): live information, concrete and emotional has a bigger effect than the abstract, pale and weak information from the emotional point of view.
		Taylor and Thompson (1982): live information does not have a bigger impact than the information which are equal from informational point of view, but more "pale".
	Overestimation	Neale (1984): negotiators for whom the negotiation costs are not so preminent, behave in a less concessionary manner.
		Bazerman and Neale (1982): negotiator's tendency to overestimate the possibility that a neutral referee will choose his/hers offer.
Theory of information processing	Utility	Simons (1993): when the diades conceptualize the utility as the subjective preference, tend to realize more integrative agreements.
	Perceptual frames	Pinkley (1990): negotiators could have one of the three frames: based on relations, emotional-intellectual and compromise-gain.
		Pinkley and Northcraft (1994): cognitive frames influence the content of agreements and the results of the negotiation.
Task's perception	Thompson and DeHarpport (1998): when both parts have the same perceptions of their interaction, the negotiator is softer.	

Cognitive consistency is the most prominent cognitive theory of how perceptions influence decisions. It means that decision makers minimize certain information, which is not compatible with their pre-existing images and beliefs, or pay exaggerated attention only to information that is consistent with these images and beliefs. Within a group or in the "group-thinking" where the information that was in disagreement with the consensus of the group, there may appear the tendency to perceive new information in light of previously held expectations. In other words, new information is processed through the pre-existing images and decision makers perceive what they think is there (Jervis, 1976: 117, apud Mintz, DeRouen, 2010: 98). The information is consistent with previous images, and the expectations are of paramount importance, where the search for other types of information is reduced. In essence, it is about "closing a person's mind towards anything which is not compatible with any pre-existing beliefs throughout a decision" (Jervis, 1976: 117, apud Mintz, DeRouen, 2010: 98).

At the level of knowledge, idiosyncrasies of the two elements may occur: (1) cognitive content and (2) cognitive process (Young, Schafer, 1998: 66). The cognitive

content refers to what an individual thinks, at the level of knowledge; the cognitive process refers to the use of such content at a conscious and unconscious level.

Another example given by Mintz, DeRouen (2010: 98) is the evoked set, a term taken from Jervis (1976: 203). This refers to the immediate concerns which are in the mind of the decision maker. Decision makers can be influenced by competing events. In other words, the focus of attention of the decision maker can influence how the new information is received, knowing that what is most important in the mind of decision-makers, will help predict and understand the decision. Jervis mentioned that it was difficult to refocus the attention of the decision maker from this information (Jervis, 1976: 99).

Suefeld, Cross, și Stewart, (2009: 9) identify two cognitive variables which cause the appearance of idiosyncrasies: conceptual complexity (Hermann, 2006: 178) and integrative complexity (Suedfeld, Tetlock, Streufert, 1992: 394), both descendants of the cognitive style theories, proliferated in the 1960s (especially the theory of conceptual cognitive complexity).

Another cognitive idiosyncrasy refers to the variables of the verbal style, developed by Weintraub (Weintraub, 1981: 35, Weintraub, 2006: 138). These variables attempt to differentiate people based on the idiosyncratic use of verbal structures. The advantage of such analysis is that these verbal structures imagery, such as imagery, complexity are not handled consciously, like the semantic content. According to this author, people can be identified as belonging fully or partially to a certain style. Thus, several dimensions of personality can be deduced (Weintraub, 2006: 143):

- A large number of qualifiers (like *perhaps might be*), occurring in the text may indicate indecision or lack of desire to have a point of view;
- Using the retractors (for example, *anyway, however*) are signs of impulsivity. Frequent users of retractors are people who draw conclusions quickly or give conclusions too quickly and then they will have to amend or withdraw them;
- Using the pronoun *I*, rather than *we* indicates the need of a person to be seen as independent, vs a spokesman for a group or a cause. Using the pronoun *me* means passivity, that is things are done behind the respective person, without the possibility of control (for example, when there is pressure, manipulation or victimization);
- Using impersonal forms (*someone did this*, where the subject is not specified), where it is more feasible to make a recognizable reference, is known as *impersonal reference*. If a source uses too much such impersonal forms, it appears to be emotionally detached. The opposite trend, a high number of personal indications may reflect self-oriented concerns;
- *Oppositional* behavior or stubbornness is indicated by the use of negatives (*not, never, nothing*);
- Using explanations (*because, therefore, since*) suggests rationalizing, points of view which are justified, explained or excused. People using largely extent these words are hyper-rational, and those who use them less are didactic and do not feel the need to explain to others;
- Those who usually assign emotions or self assessments (often saying *I like something*) or use other expressions related to emotions, transmit warmth. The lack of these words can mean coldness or detachment;
- Adverbs which emphasize or add more authority to a statement are *adverbial intensifiers* (*very, really*). The use of these enhancers adds an ounce of drama to the statements. People who use few adverbs can be boring;

- *Direct references* appear when the person speaking refers directly to the person spoken to. References can be counted directly, as the person speaks. Using these words indicates a friendly or engaging behavior, and those who make few references are seen as being shy or detached.

Also, observing how people spontaneously explain events, may verify whether they tend to see the causes of positive or negative events as being primarily internal or external (caused by their actions or by external forces), stable or unstable (consistent/chronic or temporary, short), and global or specific (resulting from a wide variety or intrinsic aspects of an individual or of a nation, or, alternatively, resulted in a specific area, limited aspects of a person or of a nation). Those who see positive events as caused by internal, global, stable factors and the negative events as caused by external, unstable and specific factors, have an explanatory *optimistic* style. Those who reverse speech patterns than those listed above are classified as *pessimistic*. Evidence demonstrated by Satterfield and Seligman (1994) shows that those who are pessimistic tend to be passive, indecisive and weak in solving problems and, therefore, this variable is to be considered for the decision makers (Satterfield, Seligman, 1994: 78). The optimistic explanatory style is associated with better physical and mental health and with occupational success (Kahneman, Rehnshon, 2006: 35).

D'Amato (1967) mentions the influence of four constructs that influence the decision making process (D'Amato, 1967: 294):

- *Systemic-Personalist* - how the decision maker receives the environmental mechanism;
- *"Eagle-Swan"* - the desire to use the power and strength;
- *Incremental-Avulsive* - the degree of change of present and past decisions;
- *Flexible-Rigid* – the degree of flexibility of previous constructs.

Images represent another cognitive idiosyncrasy (Goldstein, Pevenhouse, 2006: 147). They are mental representations used for framing and organizing the world and can be considered a kind of stereotypes that the mind uses to categorize events and people. Therefore, images are formed from cognitive processes (Herrmann, Voss, Schooler, Ciarrochi, 1997: 407, apud Mintz, DeRouen 2010: 101). Images are useful for simplifying the complicated world, but they place the decider in a situation of risk by supra-generalizing, being formed by the interweaving of three elements: strategic balance, perceived opportunity or threat and perceived culture (Herrmann, Voss, Schooler, Ciarrochi, 1997: 407, apud Mintz, DeRouen 2010: 101).

Images are important for other aspects of foreign policy decision making. For example, the operational code and cognitive maps use images to explain decisions. Cashman (1993) states that images are used in order to create the system of beliefs (Cashman, 1993: 145).

Goldstein, Pevenhouse (2006) identify mirror images as cognitive idiosyncrasies that relate to the two sides of a conflict which keeps opposing images of opponents (eg, "they are defensive, we are aggressive"). The same researchers talk about the psychological projection of their own feelings on another actor (Goldstein, Pevenhouse, 2006: 145).

Schemes are individual knowledge about a person, role, group, event or other objects (Kuklinski, Luskin, Bolland, 1991: 1343, apud Mintz, DeRouen, 2010: 102). These are important concepts in the analysis of foreign policy, because the impact of previous information is profound and it influences decisions at all levels of analysis. Schemes save time and energy and therefore people use them.

The rational model is based on orders, rather than looking for coherence. Sometimes, information processing is influenced by the memory of previous experiences. Analogies (or historical analogies) (Goldstein, Pevenhouse, 2010: 146) represent a strong cognitive command. When leaders experience events demanding decisions, they tend to reflect the past showing similar circumstances, alternatives and possible outcomes. Past events are referred to as analogies. They help us to provide a sense to the environment and the new situations (Houghton, 1996: 524). If the alternative has been selected and implemented, the decision maker can learn from this experience. The analogy and its counterpart, learning can provide useful commands. However, they can lead to disastrous results if the wrong lessons are learned or if the current situation is not a reflection of the reference event. Understanding how nations learn can help to provide a sense of following the *purpose* by a state, the *ways* to accomplish it and to make decisions (Goldsmith, 2005: 1). Learning from the past appears when the decision makers look at the past in order for it to be helpful in solving the present problems (Khong, 1992: 6). Many studies of foreign policy decision-making process attribute the behavior of states to the distribution of resources, alliances or regime type (Mintz, DeRouen, 2010: 104). However, the focus on learning can help choose the option even when these factors don't vary with the position taken by a government (Goldsmith, 2005: 2). Leaders can learn from each other and from their past events.

Axelrod (1976) brings conceptual maps to the attention of the foreign policy decision-making process, with a different meaning from the traditional, psychological one (Axelrod, 1976, apud Mintz, DeRouen, 2010: 119). A cognitive map (conceptual) is a graphical deployment of the system of beliefs, using figures or numbers (Maoz, 1990: 116). In other words, cognitive maps are diagrams of individual decisions and causal assertions. The arrows represent causal directions that connect points within the cognitive maps. Maoz (1991) provides the example of Kissinger's conceptual map, with its two nodes: "the Soviet concept of the balance of powers" and "foreign policy leadership" (Maoz, 1990: 117).

Causal arrows go from the first to the second node. The value of this conceptual map is in influencing Kissinger's belief system on the Soviet Union and the overview it offers on the structure of the decision. Conceptual maps support decision theory by exposing the nexus between what the decision maker states as a choice choice and the results it expects from these choices.

Conceptual maps are applicable in the following situations: (1) decisions are vital to national security, such as those involving situations of war, (2) decisions are made at the highest level by leaders unconstrained by bureaucracy, (3) long-term policy planning, with a high degree of uncertainty, (4) decisions are made in ambiguous or uncertain situations, resulting from inadequate information, (5) decision makers are constrained by stress (Holsti, 2006: 30).

Conceptual maps enable determining the satisfactory strategy or other strategic decisions by the decision makers. The greatest benefit provided by this technique is a "glance" into the structure of beliefs of the participants involved in making a decision.


A valuable research for identifying emotional change was made by Findlay and Thagard (2011), who used a new method of graphic representation, the cognitive-affective map to analyze emotional changes occurring during the negotiations in 1978, at Camp David, which led to an agreement between Egypt and Israel. The two authors have used this technique to model the mental states of the two negotiators Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin, based on details provided by the memoirs of Jimmy Carter. This

account has enabled the measurement of the emotional states of the Israeli and Egiptian leaders, generating maps that showed how Sadat and Begin's attitudes have changed during deliberations, eventually leading to a settlement of the major conflict. This method for facilitating the recognition and reconciliation of emotional differences between the disputants can contribute to peaceful agreements. Selecting the concepts which drew the cognitive-affective maps have followed this method:

1. Identifying the main concepts, beliefs, goals and emotions of the person who will be analyzed.
2. Identifying these elements as emotionally positive or negative and representing them through ovals or hexagons. The ovals are positive emotional elements and the hexagons negative ones. The rectangles are neutral elements or those having positive and negative aspects.
3. Identifying the relationships between elements that are complementary, mutually supportive (thicker lines) or conflicting, incompatible (dashed lines).
4. Introducing the resulting cognitive-affective map to others, to see if they understand the presentation of the situation.

The figure below (1) renders these conventions by graphic representation:

Fig. 1. Coventions for the cognitive-affective map (after Findlay, Thagard, 2011, p. 5)



Goldstein, Pevenhouse (2006) mentions another cognitive idiosyncrasy: *wishful thinking* that is the overestimation of the probability of getting the expected results (Goldstein, Pevenhouse, 2006: 145).

3. Conclusions

Cognitive idiosyncrasies filters are some of the theoretical filters for the study of the behavior of the decision maker. The cognitive approach is the individual approach to an inherent social situation.

The use of psychological methods for the analysis of the foreign policy decision-making is one of the newest approaches. These methods do not intend to replace the 'traditional' (rational) ones, but they want to bring an addition, especially at the individual level.

Alternative models of decision-making analysis warn about the elements of subjectivity, the idiosyncrasies that influence the choice of the solutions to the problems. Knowing the types of idiosyncrasies (cognitive, social perception, motivation and emotional) and their identification, favors the anticipation of the solution to be chosen, but also outlines the strategies that will have to be addressed.

We believe that now, when the decision-making processes become more complex and involve more actors, the dynamic field of international relations needs to diversify as much as possible the methods they use, and must have an openness to the knowledge

belonging to other fields (eg, psychology), which can only make the specific strategies of knowledge more efficient.

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BORDER REGIONS IN RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY. THE CASE OF THE BALTIC SEA REGION AND THE BLACK SEA REGION

*Maria GĂVĂNECI**

Abstract: *Regional policy became a real test for EU- Russia relationship. The common neighborhood can play an essential role in defining the structure of their relationship and establishing a set of rules for their interaction. Facing new realities, Russia was forced to rethink its approach to borders and regionalism, and to integrate this region building process in the design of its foreign policy. The aim of this article is to analyze Russia's involvement in region building process at the border with EU and the way the considered regions reflect its foreign policy conception. The analyze will start from defining the role regionalism plays in the construction of Russia's foreign policy and its approach to this concept, followed by an examination of its interest in the two regions selected and the role they play in Russia's internal debate over security. I will analyze, then, the construction of Russia's foreign policy and its reflection in the relationship with other players, especially EU, in order to summarize this study in several points that could help EU's policy in the common neighborhood with Russia. Are these regions a reflection of EU-Russia policy? Is Russia an active player or does it only react to the evolutions imposed by other actors? The way Russia takes part in the construction of these two regions differs and I will try to examine the factors that lead to this different approach, paying attention to the role of regional identity, as well as the EU stance in the region. It is interesting to analyze in this context if the Russian approach in these two different regions follows a strict conception of foreign policy or it's an adaptation to the regional actors and evolutions. For this, it is necessary to examine also the internal debate over the foreign policy design and the way these two regions are envisaged in this design.*

Keywords: *border regions, Russia's foreign policy, Baltic Sea Region, Black Sea Region*

Introduction

The frontiers between Russia and the EU have known an increase in their importance since the collapse of the USSR and the enlargement process started by the EU. The common neighborhood became one of the favorite issues of debate about the meaning of the new frontiers, the way the EU enlargement affects the understanding of frontiers and how this reshaping is understood in the context of Russia-EU Near Abroad. Most of the times, the analysis of the two actors' approaches revealed differences, misconceptions and miscommunication in their relationship. Important as they are for each other, the two actors face a blockage in their cooperation, suffering from the mutual incapacity of understanding the Other's identity and to adapt the strategy according to this understanding. Soon after the collapse of the USSR the focus was on their internal

* PhD student in International Relations at Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca.

development, thus ignoring the potential for cooperation. The situation has changed when their interdependence increased. In the first years of the 21st century they started to be interested in building a relationship and develop a border policy. Nevertheless, except the Yeltsin moment and Russia's openness towards the West, the cooperation between them did not find a solid common ground. After Putin's returning to power, the gap increased, pushed also by the lack of trust in the new Russian orientation. The crisis in relations, as agreed by many scholars, has continued from 2006 and seems to become even more acute as Russia is envisaging a more consistent role as a normative actor in the region. Nevertheless, cooperation between the two actors is as important as ever. Tsygankov enumerates dominant military and diplomatic resources, historical experience and cultural capital, and enormous energy reserves (Tsygankov, 2012: 9) as elements that make Russia still matter in its Near Abroad, so that, despite the internal problems both of the actors are facing, they cannot afford to minimize their relationship.

The partnership between Russia and the EU is still essential for a peaceful design of relationships in the region. The dependence is mutual: Russia needs EU as a foreign trade partner and as source of high tech investment; the EU relies on Russia's energy resources, as well as on the Russian market for European goods and services. This relevance is emphasized also by Barroso in his last visit to Moscow from March 2013, noticing that he came to Russia with what he thinks “is the largest delegation ever of Commission members in terms of executive-to-executive meetings”¹. Nevertheless, the stress is put on trade relations, and in this regard, the partnership seems to be stuck in cold numbers. In the same meeting from March 2013, Putin stresses that EU remains Russia's largest trading partner, with a 2012 turnover of more than \$410 billion, and Russia figures in the third place among EU partners, after the USA and China². Further than this “economization”, their cooperation faces blockages over human rights issues, and more important over a Russian confrontation of the normative “monopoly” that the EU is pursuing. EU's lack of willingness in allowing Russia to promote its own version of the common neighborhood has been analyzed by some scholars. Marin (2006) considers that one of the main reasons for the growing reciprocal alienation is that the EU did not allow Russia “to have a say in the definition of supposedly common frames of cooperation (Marin, 2006: 46), and Haukkala (2001) concludes that Russia had “either to comply with Brussels' rules, or be “othered” from the Wider Europe” (Haukkala, 2001: 9). This normative confrontation is also an echo of the role identity plays in defining the general Russian foreign policy. By rejecting the EU's model Russia is claiming its own position on the international scene and it is proclaiming its European identity. As Laure Delcour concludes “while being still in the making, the current shape and contours of Russia model highlights a clear inspiration from Western Europe” (Delcour, 2009: 516). We can suggest that, contrary to what many scholars affirm regarding Putin's policy, we cannot talk about an opposition between the models proposed by the two actors, but more of a confrontation of two schema rooted in the same interests of imposing their view on the international system. Russia is claiming the right to adopt a model that the EU would like to patent as its own. Playing this card, Putin recognizes the relative potential of EU's model, but he also emphasizes its lack of relevance for the regional realities. What he proposes is, thus, a model which better tackle the regional characteristics. Of course, one can

¹ Jose Manuel Barroso, Meeting with European Commission President, (Moscow, 21 March 2013), accessed June 12, 2013, <http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/news/5151/print>

² Vladimir Putin, Meeting with European Commission President, (Moscow, 21 March 2013), accessed June 12, 2013, <http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/news/5151/print>

suspect Russia adoption of an European style discourse of serious lack of content, but its inspiration can nevertheless be easily found in the West.

This normative confrontation corresponds to a more assertive position in Russian foreign policy. Starting from Tsygankov's division of Russian position towards the West in 3 different categories: cooperation, defensiveness and assertiveness (Tsygankov, 2012: 123), this paper will argue that at present Russia adopts an assertive foreign policy, without excluding cooperation with the West. Assertiveness will be defined as a refusal to accept the EU normative monopoly and the set of rules defined by it, but not as an entirely rejection of EU as a partner.

Further the paper will analyze how this foreign policy orientation affects the region building process in the common neighborhood and how it influences the frontier's understanding between Russia and the EU. The case studies I will analyze offer a broader understanding of the understanding Russia is placing on regionalism and the way it incorporates this understanding in its foreign policy design. Comparing the strategies in the Black Sea region and Baltic Sea region we will be able to understand the complexity of Russian foreign policy, as well as the complex interactions between Russia and the EU. This comparative analyze will help us to shape more accurately the theoretical motivations behind Russia's strategy in the region and to understand how it deviates and adapts its interests according to regional contexts.

Theoretical background and methodology

In the face of the challenges brought by globalization one of the solutions that states found took the shape of cooperation and integration schema. This is the New regionalism and the end of Cold War brought a great impulse for it all over the world. As defined by Jean Grugel this regionalism is an “attempt by the states and/ or domestic actors to impact on and influence the course of globalization within their regional sphere” (Grugel& Hout; 1999: 11). Regions, regionalism and regionalization became notions widely analyzed not only by international relations experts, but also economists, sociologists, etc. The need of a proper definition of the terms opened a debate across the IR theories, focused on the two main thinking schools: rationalists and constructivists. Interested in material elements and state-interest, the rationalists approach views regionalism as a consequence of rational calculations and bargains by rational agents. In contrast, the social Constructivists' approach goes behind the material interactions, for emphasizing the regional identity and culture as driving forces, and views regionalism as an ongoing process. States do not act indifferent to the national and material objectives, but they construct the national interest according to their understanding and the socio-political situation in the broader international system. As Wendt said: “identities are the basis of interests”. Actors do not have a “portfolio” of interests that they carry around independent of social context; instead they define their interests in the process of defining situations.”(Wendt, 1992: 397)

Taking into consideration these 2 approaches, we have a pragmatic vision, state-centric, security- driven on one hand, and on the other hand we have a vision focused on the constructed and evolving process based on discursive factors and socio-cultural constructions. Although the Russian approach to regionalism was generally seen as a rational policy, it would be wrong to affirm that Russia always act as a *realpolitik* type of actor. As Makarychev concluded in his study, EU and Russia adapt their stance on regionalism according to the existing necessity in a region and only the comparative studies one can “comprehend the structural circumstances in which Moscow and Brussels deviate from the corresponding logics of realism and normativity (Makarychev, 2012: 14).

Starting from this conclusion, we will argue that rational theory fails to offer a comprehensible explanation for regional building policy of Russia. The geopolitical calculations still play an important role in Russia's vision, but taking into consideration the changes at the discursive level that will be analyzed in the article, we can talk about an inefficiency of the realistic approach in explaining all the dimensions of Russia's regional policy. To see regionalism in dichotomy terms and suggesting that EU exports values in the regions, while Russia promotes interests is just an oversimplification of the analysis, and impedes us to see that both actors are exporting material interest, as well as a proper vision on regional order.

Some experts point to the fact that from a theoretical point of view, regions are eclectic notions, Katzenstein formulating even a theoretical framework alternative to the realistic and constructivist vision: analytic eclecticism. Although it is not yet widely accepted as a comprehensible explanation model for regionalism, it points out the analytical difficulties faced when dealing with regions, because the “actors are in a continuous interaction and region-building process and one regionalization process might be totally different from the other on behalf of the driven factors, goal, aims and functionality” (Rusu, 2011: 49).

Thus, regionalization is a complex phenomenon, depending on a variety of factors and requiring a larger approach.

From methodological point of view, the paper will analyze official foreign policy documents, official declaration of the Russian government towards the Black Sea region and the Baltic Sea region, presidential speeches, as well as official agreements and empirical reality that helps us to understand the implementation of Russian foreign policy. As methods I propose: structured comparison and process-tracing approach, the latter allowing emphasizing the causal connection of independent and dependent variables, while the former approach will allow analyzing in each case the role of the systemic factors and local ones, by permitting to deal only with the relevant factors for the research objective.

Regionalism as seen from main Russian foreign policy documents

The analyse we envisage will focus on several recent Russian foreign policy documents: Foreign Policy Concepts (1998, 2000, 2008, 2013), the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020, the Military Doctrine until 2020, important speeches of Putin, Medvedev, Lavrov, as well as main events of foreign policy that can help us understand the main directions of Russia's policy.

Analyzing these documents we can talk about a more assertive tone for Russian foreign policy, as well as a more structured conception on regionalism. After the pro-Western orientation of Russian foreign policy during Yeltsin's presidency at the beginning of 1990s and the inadequate West's response, Westerners could not find anymore a preponderant place in Russian discourse. When Primakov came to power in 1996 a radical Eurasian policy was followed trying to eradicate the consequences of Yeltn's policy. Somewhere in between these directions, Putin is often characterized as “pragmatic nationalist” (Flenley, 2006: 445) trying to impose a Russian voice in the international system, without denying Western type of modernization. If many analysts talk about an anti-Western policy after Putin's returning to power in 2012, what can be seen in the recent foreign policy documents is more an image of a great power, that is ready to assert its own role on the international scene, to follow an independent path in its international policy, and to develop a model that could work as an alternative to the European one, being more sensitive to regional realities. In these terms, Russia has not known a drastic

turn in its foreign policy orientation, but it has obtained a more confident voice which can be recognized also in the regional building strategy, and which can be defined as an effort to exploit the West in Russia's advantage. The 2000 Foreign Policy Concept explicitly warned the threat of a “unipolar structure of the world under the economic and military domination of the United States³, and the reenforcement of regional policy was a translation of this priority of diversifying the international arena and of becoming an influent center of world system. In 2013 the Foreign Policy Concept stated a movement in the international system, 'the essence of which is the creation of a polycentric system of international relations'⁴. In correlation with this evolution, the paper also emphasizes the decreasing appealing power of the West and the dispersal of the global power. Thus, if the previous years were marked by the efforts to counterbalance the West, the focus is now on exploiting the West in its advantage. Russia's lack of confidence in the European project is translated in a normative role that envisages playing in the region, translating and adopting the EU discourse in the post-Soviet space. By doing this, Russia adopts a similar regional building logic with the EU, one that is focused on the role it plays in the process, not in a real integrationist process. Yanukovych's declaration after the visit he made in Russia this year can support this view. He stresses the key, decisive role Russia plays in the Custom Union, and he agrees that at this stage they only hold talks with Russia, although “we are sometimes joined at various meetings by our colleagues from Kazakhstan and Belarus”⁵. We cannot talk, thus, of a joint project coordinated by the countries involved, but rather of a project of Russia's ambitions in the region. If we put together the diminishing role and power of the EU expressed by the 2013 Foreign Policy Concept with the increasing numbers of eurosceptics from all over Europe we can better understand the moment that Russia seizes to promote a more active position as a normative power in the international system. In the same direction goes also the emphasis that Moscow places for the first time on the soft dimension of its power. Realizing that proposing an attractive strategic vision in its Near Abroad is vital for Russia's ability to become a reference pole in the international relations, Putin introduced the term in his pre-election article “Russia and the Changing World” from March 2012, where soft power was understood as “matrix of tools and methods to reach foreign policy goals without the use of arms but by exerting information and other levers of influence”⁶. Two months after his re-election, Putin hold a meeting with his foreign policy staff where he stated that soft power is “all about promoting one's interests and policies through persuasion and creating a positive perception of one's country, based not just on its material achievements but also its spiritual and intellectual heritage”⁷. Dolinsky compares the notion that Putin promotes with the one of the American author of the term, Joseph Nye, and points out a difference that is far from being stylistic: “the American political scientist points out attractiveness as the key element of the notion, while the Russian politician is

³ Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (June 28, 2000), accessed May 12, 2013, <http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml>

⁴ Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (February 12, 2013), accessed May 12, 2013, http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168189ED44257B2E0039B16D

⁵ Viktor Yanukovych, Meeting with President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych (Moscow, March 04, 2013), accessed June 03, 2013, <http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/news/5080/print>

⁶ V. Putin, “Russia and the changing world”, *RT*, (February 27, 2012), accessed March 12, 2013, <http://rt.com/politics/official-word/putin-russia-changing-world-263/>

⁷ Vladimir Putin, Speech at a meeting with Russian ambassadors and permanent representatives in international organizations, (July 9, 2012), accessed May 09, 2013, <http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/4145>

focused on the levers of influence”⁸. It appears that Putin understands -soft power merely as a contra-propaganda instrument which could be used in constructing a viable alternative society model that could compete with the influence EU and USA have in the neighborhood regions. Russia's soft power projection is clearly in competition with the projects launched in the region by other powers.

The stress on soft power and moral values that appears as a novelty in Russian discourse talks about an instrumentalisation of these elements for a more intense regional policy. Soft power raised Russia's interest since the Orange Revolution in Ukraine⁹, and it comes as a solution for the “ideological emptiness” that accompanies Russian external projects. The instrumentalisation of soft power in making from Russia an attractive pole is revealed by Sergei Ivanov statement from 2004: “if there is a Western democracy there should be an eastern democracy as well”¹⁰. The process has started with an internal construction of “sovereign democracy”. Although it is difficult to fill in this notion from the Russian documents, it is intended to be a competitor to the soft-power and democratization used by EU to construct its neighborhood area. Regionalism is still viewed in Russia as a bloc and alliances policy formed in geopolitical purposes. Following this logic, “major world powers are believed to pursue policies of hegemony by means of building regional alliances, which presumes that smaller countries are hardly able to contrive regional integration and stability on their own” (Liska, 1973: 236). This is also the scope of Russian soft power, seen more like an instrument to be used in its influence zone.

Those tendencies of building the attractiveness of a Russian model correspond also to the European style Putin adopts in his recent discourses, which can be traced also in the Foreign Policy Concept. Nevertheless, what Russia is envisaging, at internal and external level, is not an European model, but more a combat of the European monopoly on the normative role in the region. Based on the conception that the world has become more polycentric, Russia's strategy is to seize the moment and to become a reference point. Though, the huge domestic problems of Russia's society can not allow an anti-West attitude. Russia collaborates both with West and non-West organization, and its main economic focus remain a stronger integration with the EU's economy and the WTO. This attitude is visible also in the regional approach, where the main demand formulated by Russia is a more open attitude from the EU, one that would allow its participation as an equal member in the regional initiatives. Instead, what Moscow perceives from EU strategies is an expansion into Russia's presumed sphere of influence (Andrey Makarychev& Sergunin, 2012: 11), without offering the option of being a co-author of the regional architecture. The perceptual gap between Russia and the EU existing in the common neighborhood is one element that influences most of the initiatives Russia has in the Common Neighborhood, and its regional policy translates often the general relations with the European Union.

In terms of Russia's foreign policy priorities, the Foreign Policy Concept form 2013 is doubled by the geographical spread of Putin's visits and meetings after his re-election from 2012, and also by the practical policy conducted in these regions. The most important area is the Community of Independent States, where Putin had also his first visit

⁸ A. Dolinsky, “What is Public Diplomacy, and Why Russia Needs it?”, *Russian International Affairs Council* (2012), accessed June 12, 2013, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=913

⁹ Nicu Popescu, “Russia's soft power ambitions”, *CEPS Policy briefs*, No. 115 (October 2006)

¹⁰ “Ministr Oborony Soobshil Inostrannym Jurnalistam chto Sushchestvuet Osobaya Vostochnaya Demokratia”, *Newsru.com*, (July 12, 2004), accessed May 07, 2013, <http://www.newsru.com/arch/russia/12jul2004/democracy.html>

in his third term visiting Minsk, in May 2012. Another important priority appears to be the raising importance of relations with Asia, confirmed also by his visit in China in June 2012. Also, related to the EU, Dmitry Trenin speaks about an “economization” and a narrowing down of the relations (Trenin, 2013) although the West is recognized as one of the most important partners. The preponderance of economy in their relations is depicted in many recent official declarations, focused on the economical interdependences existing between the two actors.

Baltic Sea Region

The Baltic Sea Region does not appear as a priority in Russian foreign policy, but Moscow has been a participant in the Baltic Sea Cooperation since its beginning. The aim of this analysis is to emphasize the role it plays in the region building process, its interests in the region, and how does this region reflect its foreign policy and the general relations with the European Union. For doing this, we will first analyze the level of integration of the region and the elements that shape the region building process, than we will focus on the place the region has in the Russian foreign policy. Our object of study will be the Council of Baltic Sea States, as it represents the main institution in the region from Russia's perspective.

The cooperation history in the region is old and the discourse on region-building process has reinforced references to different historical precursors of cooperation, the Hanseatic League being one of the most common references as a possible model of cooperation. The idea of a Baltic League became possible and appealing after the First World War and corresponded to the period of independence of the Baltic States. Nevertheless, the Soviet occupation that followed brought about an end to the concept of Baltic cooperation. Nevertheless, the “pluralistic security model” (Duna, 2009) the countries from the North promoted during the Cold War had a great impact on the region and generated a less confrontational approach of their relationships. The changes that occurred in the world politics during 1989-1990 determined also a re-affirmation of the regional cooperation agenda. The fear of isolation from Europe was one of the main determinants for the Baltic States, but more than this it is interesting to see how the region was build up by states that followed their own interests and that realized that the best way to achieve these interests is to pursue a regional cooperation agenda. The CBSS was founded in 1992 at a conference of foreign ministers upon a Danish-German initiative. The founding members consisted of all Nordic States, the three Baltic States, Russia, Germany, Poland and the European Commission. It was envisaged as a “flexible answer to a new political situation” (Waever, 1992: 96) and this status was in concordance with the the fact that each state had its own interest. Russia could, thus, find a place in this structure without being forced to adapt its institutions and internal rules. The cooperation is centered around low-politics areas, keeping the institutionalization of the region with a rather simplistic and decentralized form. The region-building process was first motivated by the isolation fear, a threat that the countries from the region felt soon after the end of the Cold War. The process of regionalisation was perceived in these countries more like a return to Europe and not like an aim itself. The common ecological system and the problems encountered in this was another common denominator that gave an impetus to cooperative policies, and helped avoiding discussions on high policy elements. The elements helped at building a certain regional identity and membership feeling.

Russia's involvement in the region reflects its general attitude towards the EU and its Baltic Sea Region policies can be also understood as reactions to the institutional

framework the EU created in the region (Elo & Kaakkuriniemi, 2012: 17). As in the Black Sea Region, Moscow has refused to take part in the institutions developed by the EU. Lavrov is very drastic in his statements regarding the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region from 2009, arguing that Russia cannot be either its subject or object. He accuses the EU of being too focused on imposing its internal rules and standards in the region, concluding that “as a non-EU country we simply cannot unconditionally abide to it” (Lavrov, 2012). In their analyze, Kimmo & Tapani argue that the institutional framework that the EU has developed for the Baltic Sea Cooperation will face the same vulnerabilities as the general ENP, because “the core idea of all these frameworks also present in the Baltic Sea Region is to promote and support the EU's interests and policy priorities” (Elo & Kaakkuriniemi, 2012: 19). The asymmetric relation that is created is not an impulse for a closer co-operation between Russia and the EU. What is still important to reveal is the lack of a Russian alternative model suggested for the Baltic Sea Region. If we analyze the general style of Russian foreign policy we will clearly see the focus on challenging the European normative power. The fact that Russia has not developed a competing model in the region suggests that the cooperation in low-politics and the general state of affairs in the Baltic Sea Region are satisfactory for Moscow and the rejection of EU's institutions is more a declarative attitude. This is to be explained also by Russia's limited interest in the Baltic Sea Region, similar with that of other big players, like Germany and Poland. (Elo & Kaakkuriniemi, 2012: 19). Nevertheless, in recent years, Russia's interest towards the Baltic Sea Region gained more vitality and it strived to increase the independence of the CBSS vis-a-vis the European Union, especially after the launch of the European Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. This trend is visible also in the program that Russia developed for its 2012-2013 presidency of the CBSS, which strives for coherence and continuity with previous and future CBSS presidency (Etzold & Ganzle, 2012: 55). There is in this attitude a signal that the Baltic Sea Region is in Russia's foreign policy more like an answer to general relations with the EU, than a priority in its own right. We can conclude that, after the initial phase of the Baltic policies concerned with the choice of the Baltics to „return to the West” (Kononenko, 2006: 83), envisaged as a membership in the EU and NATO, at present, Russia develops a counterbalance policy to the EU initiatives in the region. Correlating this reality with the centralisation of power during Putin's presidency we can observe how the cross-border cooperation process has been politicised and a deeper regional policy has been thus neglected. Russian northwestern districts, Kaliningrad and Leningrad regions, had gained incontestable benefits from the Baltic Sea Cooperation, but they are not in the position to conduct an independent regional policy, and thus the current potential in the region is not fully valorised. Being less independent in their external relations these regions have limited resources for influencing Russian foreign policy in the direction of a deeper regional cooperation. The signals coming from the regions level are nevertheless important and they can create a dichotomy in the policy Russia is conducting. The frontier that Russia shares with the EU in this region generated a more intensified discussion on the common policies and that was especially the case with Kaliningrad region. Moscow has shown a great interest in this area and has manifested its openness towards cooperation with the EU. Despite the progress that has been made in the region, the mutual misconceptions and lack of trust undermine the potential of cooperation. Russia's vision seems very well explicated by the status it envisages for Kaliningrad region, where it claims that the problem should be solved by granting the Oblast a special status. Being unable to understand the real nature of European integration, Russia wants to impose its own rules for the game, taking

advantage, in the same time, of the benefits that the European regional policies are bringing. It was also seen a contradictory signal from the EU the problems that Schengen space seemed to bring at the border with Russia, by creating a „paper curtain”. (Haukkala, 2001: 13). As Dolghi concludes, the Eastern EU border represents now both „a limit, designed to secure EU, and an area of cooperation, exchange, dialogue and opportunities with the neighbours” (Dolghi, 2010: 186). The fear of the frontiers becoming a rupture in the transboundary interregional cooperation can be balanced by the Russia-Finland frontier example, where the cooperation is running smoothly. In the beginning of 2000 the cooperation in the region had been intensified by the establishment of Euroregion Karelia which is based on the Euregion model already used on the German-Dutch border 25 years ago (Cronberg, 2001). These forms of cooperation are important for the opening they bring to EU-Russia partnership, but they have to overcome a series of problems and obstacles that undermine their potential. As Cronberg concludes regarding Karelia region, the cooperation has suffered from a lack of mutual trust between the partners, translated in the EU tendency to take decisions and implement the projects, while sending a message of distrust and exclusion to the Russian side (Cronberg, 2001: 8). Despite these deficiency, the cooperation was favored by the initiatives coming from the regions, not directly from the EU. This situation can not be replicated in the Black Sea Region where the bottom-up initiatives are undermined by the internal problems of the countries involved in the region.

Despite the signals coming from the region in favor of a more integrated policy, from the central level the region does not appear as being a priority. There are barely several statements regarding the state of the regional cooperation and the number has increased recently mostly due to the Russian presidency of the CBSS in 2012. From all the official foreign policy documents it is evident the priority of the south in Russia's foreign policy, but the West continues to have its geopolitical relevance, especially for the Western regions of Russia. Making a comparative analyze of the role the Baltic Sea Region is playing in the foreign policy of other member states we can conclude that it had a marginalized role in the development of Russian foreign policy. Moreover, the Baltic states appeared in the official Russian discourse related to the historical problems and to the Russian minorities existing in Latvia and Estonia, and only rarely the references were made to the Baltic region itself. Nevertheless, the 2012 presidency of the CBSS seems to have had positively influenced Russia's attitude towards the Baltic Sea Region. More than in the Black Sea Region, Russia is trying to use its soft power and to build its relationship with the participant countries. A list of the projects it developed during its presidency makes it clear that Russia is trying to adopt a more 'European' style in its discourse and actions in the Baltic Sea Region. In 2013, Moscow has organized An international Baltic week, a Baltic Sea Forum, as well as a Baltic Sea NGO Forum in April 2013¹¹. But the use of the soft power resonates with the entire Russian Baltic policy. It is very weakly elaborated, it lacks a clear long-term strategy and it mirrors Russia's general strategy toward the West and its involvement in the Near Abroad. Considering the history of the region, Russian attempts to use 'soft power' mechanisms in the Baltic states have been rather unfruitful, despite the emphasis Moscow is placing on soft dimension in its recent foreign policy documents.

We can conclude that Russia's policy in the region reflects the general principles of Kremlin's foreign policy. Although it does not strictly combat the EU values, it clearly refuses a policy imposed by the West in the region, and the efforts to strengthen the CBSS

¹¹ For more information see CBSS official site, available at <http://www.cbss.org/>

are an echo of the desire to formulate a more independent policy, to assert its role on the international scene and at the regional level. Although the Baltic Sea Region is not a priority in Russian foreign policy, Moscow has the capacity to stagnate or to block the evolution in the region if it manifests its opposition towards the European initiatives in the region. This is why, it is important for the two actors to find a common ground, based on equal positions, the only situation that could advance Russia's cooperation in the European Union projects in the region. From this point of view, the EUSBR has the deficit of promoting a macro-regional approach, but excluding in the same time one major regional power and neglecting thus Russia's interests. (Etzold & Ganzle, 2012: 60)

Regarding the cross-border cooperation and the frontiers situations, the recent centralizing strategy adopted by Putin downplays the cooperation potential and the general confrontation between the EU and Russia keep their frontier in a non-integrated stage.

Black Sea Region

The Black Sea region strategy has developed in Russia's foreign policy in different stages that translates the general orientation of the country. More than the Baltic Sea Region, the south is a more predominant and constant element of the foreign policy design and it points out more accurately the elements behind the conduct of external strategy.

Being a region still in the making, trying to re-establish itself as a geopolitical entity, the Black Sea Region has several obstacles to overcome. It is, first of all, the place of several so called 'frozen conflicts', which undermine the potential of cooperation. The 2008 conflict over Abkhazia and South Ossetia was only the most recent materialization of the numerous tensions existing in the region. Among these, the tensions in Chechnya, Transdniestria, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Crimea are the most important in shaping the regional interactions. In all these conflicts, Russia is an active player, acting either as a mediator or as a participant. (Rusu, 2011: 54)

After the collapse of the USSR the region was confronted with a lack of security order and it became the battle place of three different regional-building projects: Russia, the EU and Turkey. During the Cold War the majority of the countries from the region were tied to the Soviet Union. Based on this history, at present, Russia is claiming more rights over the countries from the area and it manifests a clear opposition towards the external powers' influence in the region, especially the US and the EU. This attitude reflects Russia's vision over the regionalism and its claim for finding regional solutions to regional problems. This claim is, nevertheless, at least doubtful in the Black Sea Region considering the numerous countries that are part of the regional institutions, but are not geographically littoral states. Russia itself is perceived as an external actor by the European Union (Kobrinakaya, 2008: 2) which makes the regional situation even more complex. The strategy EU adopted initially in the Black Sea Region and translated in the European Neighborhood Policy did not bring the envisaged effects due to the lack of membership incentive. In 2007 the EU enlarged its perspective on the region and tried a more holistic approach, by launching the Black Sea Synergy policy. As in the case of the Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, Russia has refused to partake in it, accusing EU of a unilateral policy which overlaps the existing initiatives from the region. To these regional problems we can also add the lack of a common identity for the region, the endemic corruption in many of the participant states, the competing legacies, as well as opposing geopolitical agendas of the main actors. Some analysts even question whether the Black Sea area is a region at all, and the lack of the EU interest in the area emphasizes the same conclusion.

Despite the lack of unifying conditions and a unifying project in the region, the Black Sea Region manifests a series of elements that signalize a more integrated region, such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) Organization, GUAM and other regional organizations. Nevertheless, the organizations do not necessarily speak of a regional identity, as long as BSEC origins are not in a genuine commitment to regional integration, but rather the “product of a peculiar concatenation of geopolitical interests. (Danile Hamilton&Gerhard Mangott (eds.), 2008: 21). BSEC was initiated in 1992 by Turkey's initiative and found support in many countries involved in the region, but its initiative responded also to a geopolitical interest. In the early 1990s, Turkey sought a new regional role, and wanted to promote itself as a potential provider of stability in the region. The involvement of the other countries was based essentially on their national interests and the geopolitical confrontation than on the desire to build up a regional identity. These elements are strong enough to explain the lack of a clear strategy and direction for the BSEC, which persists even today.

In this situation, the Russian strategy towards the Black Sea Region reflects strictly its political ambitions and the geopolitical and geo-economical game it entered with the other big powers in the region. The importance is placed for Russia on its long-term zone of influence and interest, not on the cooperation based on a neighborhood concept. As Sinem Kocamaz concludes, for Russia it is more important who sustains the stability in the region rather than its existence. (Kokamaz, 2009: 53) Thus, as long as the EU presence in the region is seen more as in economical terms, Russia's opposition towards its influence is more reduced. The main aim of Moscow's policy is to counterbalance the influence of the US and NATO and to reduce their interference in the regional security.

Together with this geopolitical orientation, other elements of Russian foreign policy are manifested in this area. The growing assertiveness of Moscow's policy was translated in the five-days conflict with Georgia in 2008, which activated the 'frozen' conflicts in the region. At the borders' level, the conflict brought into question the demarcation line established after the fall of the Soviet Union, not only among post-Soviet states, but also inside those states. (Prystayko, 2008: 62) The conflict intensified also the critics of those who see Russia as a power with imperialist demands that threatens the regional states and diminished its credibility in the region and as a possible partner for the EU. (Țicu, 2008) But Russia's supremacy in the region is essential for the success of its vision over the world order. Moscow's stress on the multipolarity of the international scene is strictly dependent on its leading role in the Black Sea Region. This is why an intensification of conflicting logics in region-building process can be expected around the Black Sea rim.

As the recent foreign documents points out one of the new priority of Russian external projection is the increase and capitalization of its soft power, in the fight for a normative place in its near abroad. But in the Black Sea Region, as well as in the Baltic area, Russia has to admit its lack of attractiveness. The context in the Black Sea area can make its efforts more efficient than in the Baltic region formed mainly by countries with a strong European orientation of their foreign policy, but the conflict in Georgia confirmed for many regional countries the worst expectations from Russian foreign policy. The authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes of many of the regional countries, as well as the economic tights to Russia or to other post-Soviet republics can facilitate Russia's projection as a leader in the region. Russia's offer at the normative level is nevertheless very limited. As Makarychev emphasizes in his analyze, the choice of Russian foreign policy is between normative issues, including democracy, and a civilizational-based

element, in both cases encountering stronger adversaries in the region (Makarychev, 2013: 43). A comparison with the EU's normative power would place Russia in an inferior position, especially after the principle break of collective actions for solving regional conflicts during the war with Georgia. At the same time, in civilizational terms Turkey has a more appealing offer for the countries from the region. (Makarychev, 2013) In these conditions, Russia is in a difficult position when trying to impose its leadership in the region and the differing policies and values of the main actors mean that the neighborhood will remain a source of conflict for the future as well. Neither the external factors, nor the internal ones are favorable for the deepening of cooperation in the Black Sea area, so that the region has not become a closely integrated space. Instead, the region remains a "loose cluster, where external actors position themselves as those who can establish order, but are largely unconcerned about the true interests of local states". (Ryabstev, 2006)

We can thus summarize Russian strategy in the Black Sea Region as translating its foreign policy assertive tone, the geopolitical and geo-economical motivation of its regional policy and efforts to promote itself as an alternative model to those of the competitor powers in the regions, but facing its important domestic problems and limitations.

Concluding remarks

The relationship between Russia and the EU is extremely complex and an analysis of the regionalization process in the common neighborhood is relevant for the divers forms took by their interactions. Analyzing the recent documents on Russian foreign policy, as well as concrete measures took by Putin in his third term we can conclude about an intensified normative competition between the two actors. Russia gained a more confident voice and it is trying to challenge an impaired EU normative power. It places thus a more important role on the external projection of the country, tries to intensify the soft dimension of its power and to impose its status as great power.

The region building process reflects also a great complexity of the EU-Russia interactions and of the elements that shape their involvement in this process. Comparing the two regions we choose for our analysis we can conclude that regional policies for both of the actors responds to regional context and it is not useful to place their strategy in dichotom terms. Both of the actors seem more preoccupied of their own interests in these regions, and less focused on a real integration process. Of course, the understanding of the actors on the regionalization differs. If EU is more preoccupied of a base of common values for its regional policy, for Russia regionalization is still a game of great power, trying to impose their geopolitical interests. The references at the common values are almost inexistent in Russia's documents, and the focus is on a realpolitik thinking, based on balance of power and geopolitics. The situation is nevertheless more complex, with Russian regions becoming more opened towards crossborder cooperation, and appearing ready to change the geopolitical thinking with a more geoeconomic one. As Haukkala states in his study, Russia started to use "two sets of cards" in its politics towards the EU, that respond to the rapid changes brought by regionalization. One set of cards is used in at the level of the overall political relationship, characterized more by realism thinking and geopolitics, and the other is used as a response to the signals coming from Russia's regions opened towards more "post-modern" forms of transboundary cooperation. (Haukkala, 2001: 13)

This evolution is more visible in the Baltic Sea Region, where Russia has shown a surprising amount of initiative and creativity in approaching the EU in order to solve problems. One of the explanations resides in the bottom-up initiatives that characterize the regions, instead of actions coming directly from the EU. In the Black Sea Region where

the conditions that could favor a more authentic regional cooperation are almost inexistent, the EU-Russia cooperation remains stuck in a geopolitical game.

The instruments that the EU has developed until now in the Common Neighborhood seem also rather inefficient for cooperating with Russia, which claim its right of being treated as an equal member in the region building process. Moscow has classified EU initiatives as being focused on imposing a European model, and denying its status in the common neighborhood. One of the unfavorable evolutions we can extract from 2013 Foreign Policy Concept is Russia's focus on developing the Custom Union, and not on finding a common ground with the EU across their common borders. Correlating this evolution with the internal problems of the EU and its change of focus on the South, due to the Arab Spring, Russia-EU relations seem to enter a passive phase, which will maintain the problems existing in their common neighborhood.

Even if the North is considered to be a laboratory of regional policies, not even the dense network of regional arrangements from the Baltic Sea region did conduct towards a normalization of EU-Russia relations, those being rather blocked by general reasons that form their miscommunication and misconception. The case of frontiers between Russia and Finland is a good example of cooperation, but from the center the signals concerning the EU-Russia cooperation are very different and stuck most often in a geopolitical logic. We've analyzed a more integrated region- the Baltic Sea Region, and a region 'still in the making'- the Black Sea Region. If in the first one Russia and EU can find some common elements to build their cooperation on, like the environment problems or the Kaliningrad status, the Black Sea Region is defined more by dividing elements and the lack of bottom-up initiatives transform the region in a debate over normative hegemony, when transforming the Common Neighborhood in a safer place depends on bilateral coordinated initiatives between Russia and the EU.

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CFSP INTO THE SPOTLIGHT: THE EUROPEAN UNION'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD RUSSIA DURING THE CHECHEN WARS

*Ioan HORGA**
*Ioana NAN***

Abstract: *The European Union is a unique organization for the study of politics on both domestic and international level. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union has been in various cases characterized as inefficient and lacking unity and consensus in addressing crisis situations. This paper makes an analysis of the CFSP during the two Chechen wars. It will first offer an insight into the Russo-Chechen conflict, then a short perspective on EU-Russian Federation relationship after the fall of the Soviet Union and finally analyze the CFSP through the Liberal Intergovernmentalism theory.*

Keywords: *The Common Foreign and Security Policy, the European Union, the Russian Federation, Chechnya, Liberal Intergovernmentalism*

Introduction

This paper will argue that the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union has not been as effective in addressing crisis situations as one would think, because of several factors which will be explained further. The focus will be on the impact and effectiveness of the CFSP in the relationship between the European Union and the Russian Federation during the war in Chechnya. The research questions are: why did the EU failed to formulate a coherent response to this crisis? Was the decision-making system of the CFSP effective in addressing this issue? The research on this subject is important for regional security as Russia and the EU need to work together to combat new threats to security such as terrorism, crime, illegal migration and trafficking people as well as drugs. The EU and Russia have an extensive dialogue on political issues around the world, including the resolution of conflicts such as those in the Middle East, Afghanistan, the Western Balkans and Sudan and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the relevant technologies, as in the cases of Iran and North Korea.

Chechnya is the case study which comes to support the thesis that the European Union has not reached total political integration because of the intergovernmental nature of its institutions. The general opinion among scholars and politicians about the foreign policy of the EU during the period covered in this paper was that the CFSP “had not enabled the EU to assume an international role which corresponded either to its ambitions in foreign affairs or to its importance as the largest economic bloc in the world” (Muller-

* PhD., Professor, Department of International Relations and European Studies, Faculty of History International Relations, Political Sciences and Science of Communication, University of Oradea, Romania. E-mail: ihorga@uoradea.ro

** PhD Candidate, University Babeș-Bolyai of Cluj-Napoca, Mihail Kogălniceanu, nr. 1, RO-400084, Cluj-Napoca, Romania.

Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002: 259). Even if the EU has aspirations to become an important actor in international crisis management and to be a united, strong ally of NATO and has created the institutions and instruments necessary for a coherent foreign policy, it has used them selectively (Gross, 2009: 1). European disarray over Libya has shown how difficult it is for EU governments to find common cause, even on urgent and high-profile foreign-policy challenges.

The analysis of the CFSP is as challenging in applying International Relations theories as creating new ones to explain how this unique entity which is the European Union can function as a veritable actor in issues of international security (Gross, 2009: 7). The analysis of the CFSP will begin from Eva Gross's statement: "the European Union is neither a state nor a traditional alliance and [...] presents a heterodox unit of analysis" (Gross, 2009: 7). In other words, one cannot analyse this foreign policy as would usually do for a sovereign state because the scale is different and also because the instruments, structure and purposes are formulated in such a way as to encompass the will of all Member States. Europe offers a unique setting for the study of issues in politics on domestic and international level. The EU is the most integrated and highly institutionalized organisation in the world and it presents the opportunity to study the functions of international institutions, the links between domestic and international political processes and also the role of international law.

I will base my analysis on information about the Chechen wars, about the relationship between the EU and Russian Federation and by applying the theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism. I will try to prove that the CFSP had an important part in defining the EU-Russian Federation relationship.

The Chechen conflict background

Chechnya is a republic, part of the Russian Federation, situated in the North Caucasus, flanked by the republics of Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Dagestan and Stavropol. It covers around 6,000 square miles with a population of around 1 million people, most of them Muslims.

In the summer of 1994 rebel Chechen groups erupted into violence and the position of President Dudaev was under threat. In Moscow, the support for intervention was growing, initially only under the form of material assistance of anti-Dudaev forces. Other thoughts in Kremlin were that inaction would determine other republics to secede. An important aspect of the decision to intervene or not was the fact that Moscow had an economic interest in the area because an important oil pipeline from Azerbaijan to Russia was crossing the Chechen capital city, Grozny (Youngs, 2000: 9).

President Yeltsin authorised the intervention on 9th December with the purpose of disarmament of the rebel groups. The first official attack on Grozny was a total failure because of the wrong belief of the Russian soldiers – with evident advantage in manpower and armament – that Chechens would surrender at the sight of their army. But Chechens fought cleverly by mounting a series of ambushes against the isolated Russian troops. Reports in Moscow showed that "by December 1995 the number of casualties from the conflict was estimated to be between 26,000 and 50,000, including around 20,000 civilians" (Youngs, 2000: 10). The Chechens came to the point of withdrawal in February 1995 due to lack of ammunition, manpower and medical supplies. But this situation did not last for long because a group of rebels, without the support of the authorities in Grozny, seized a hospital in the Russian town of Buddenovsk. The rebels were under the command of Shamil Basaev, the person with whom the Russians negotiated directly. The

Chechens gained a cease-fire and direct peace talks after this event. The following two months were rather quiet, but the non-fighting break was over when a series of Russian officials were attacked in Chechnya. When the fighting resumed, Kremlin announced that elections were to be held in December 1995. The elections were boycotted by the Chechens because the main candidate, Doku Zavgayev, was supported by the Russian government. In August 1996 at Khasavyurt, general Lebed – former counter candidate of Boris Yeltsin – negotiated directly with the Chechen chief of staff, Aslan Maskhadov, an agreement which brought about “a five-year postponement of a decision about the final status of the territory” (Youngs, 2000: 12). “In the meantime, Chechnya would remain part of the Russian Federation, at least in Russian eyes, but with an autonomous government formed after fresh elections” (Youngs, 2000: 12). In 1997 Aslan Maskhadov became president but the republic was far from being on the progress path. Federal financial support was withdrawn, organized crime increased and the authority of Aslan Maskhadov was shaken.

In August and September 1999 the situation became violent again after two major events. First, there was an invasion in Dagestan by “around two thousand militia fighters under the combined command of Basaev, Khatab and Dagestani Islamist leader Hajji Bhauddin” (Youngs, 2000: 15). The aim was to determine “a local insurrection and establish an independent Islam republic” (Youngs, 2000: 15). This second war was described by Putin as a “counter-terrorist operation” and later, after 11 September 2001, as “war on terror”. The attacks on World Trade Centre draw attention to Chechnya as “one of the regions most affected by the increased focus on terrorism” (Cornell, 2003: 168). In an article from 2000 by the Foreign Affairs Minister of Russian Federation Igor Ivanov read in the Council of Europe, it is mentioned that the heavy military operation was necessary because of the “nature of threat in Chechnya” (Ivanov, 2000: 1). Two questions arise from this statement: why was this new war different? Was Russia efficient in handling the relationship with this territory?

A switch in this crisis came in 2003 when a referendum was organized to approve a new Constitution which would give Chechnya more autonomy but still remaining part of the Russian Federation. The new Constitution was approved and in November 2005 parliamentary elections took place. Over half of the seats were won by the pro-Moscow party –United Russia–, result which was contested by the separatist rebels. Since then, Chechnya began its reconstruction; more and more investments came to Grozny for rebuilding. But still, even though at surface the situation seems more calm and peaceful, there have been many violence outbursts from 2005 onwards, mainly from the Chechen separatists even though Russia retreat its military force in April 2009.

The Russo-Chechen conflict during the two wars was seen by the international community as an internal affair of Russia, even though major human rights abuses were done by both sides. The international response was many times confusing because the US, the EU and other important international actors had major interests in keeping Russia as an economical and political partner.

The conflict in Chechnya appeared in the spotlight of the media only after the failed attack on Grozny of the Russian forces in November 1994. At first the military actions were denied by the officials but there were a lot of contradictions which resemble the mistakes made by the British in the Falklands in 1982 (Koltsova, 2000: 44). A relevant article on the EU’s position regarding Russia and Chechnya is the one of Andrew Osborn from 2003 in *The Guardian*. He stresses very well the difficulty the EU encounters in approaching the Chechen conflict because of the strategic partnership with Russia. But

still, the EU has to tackle this point on its foreign agenda if it wants to become “a credible force on the international stage”, says Osborn. Also he points out what are the stakes involved in the EU –Russia partnership and why the EU has to be careful how it will deal with the Chechen crisis. The EU's interests in the partnership with Russia are the preferential access to Russia's reserves of oil and gas, the ratification of the Kyoto climate change pact, a sweeping cleanup of Russia's nuclear waste and cooperation from Moscow to fight trans-border organised crime and human trafficking (Osborn, 2003).

European Union – Russian Federation relationship

In December 1991 the world witnessed the fall of the Soviet Union and the formation of fifteen states. This moment also marked the end of the Cold War between the United States and the USSR, a historical moment which brought about important changes in international relations. At that time, in Europe, the Treaty of Maastricht was being signed by the heads of the governments of the states in the European Community. The treaty established the European Union and it created the European citizenship which entitled the people from the member states to run and vote for the European Parliament.

The relationship between the EU and Russia was at first incoherent and lacked mutual understanding. Russia saw in the EU just an ‘economic association’ (Flenley, 2008: 198) and preferred to have bilateral agreements with member states. In the 1990s the EU was mainly concerned with internal issues and did not put Russia as a priority on its agenda (Flenley, 2008: 198-199). A big step towards an organized co-operation between the EU and Russia was the signing of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) in 1994. The aims of this agreement were to provide a suitable framework for political dialogue, to assist the Russian Federation with its transition towards market economy, to encourage trade and investment, to support Russian efforts in building a democracy and to create the conditions for a free trade area.

The year 1994 was difficult for the Russian officials, as the first war in Chechnya began. Many previous studies of the conflict searched for explanations, but “it is generally argued that Yeltsin and a ‘war party’ within his administration preferred coercion against Chechnya to accommodation in order to defend Russia's strategic and economic interests in the Caucasus and Caspian” (Hughes, 2007: 56). Chechnya had numerous oil fields, relatively small by Russian standards, but it also had the largest oil refinery and well developed petrochemical industry (Hughes, 2007: 63). The decision to intervene militarily in Chechnya was made “at a high point in Yeltsin's personalization of presidential power, but a low point in his popularity” (Hughes, 2007: 77). The EU did not interfere in the war as it considered it to be an internal affair of the Russian Federation. When the war got to the point of negotiations, talks were held in the presence of the head of the OSCE Assistance Group in Chechnya, Tim Guldemann (Hughes, 2007: 89). It was the first time when the EU as an organisation had, through OSCE, the role of mediation and it was the ‘most important international influence’ in Chechnya conflict.

“Putin's ability to deflect criticisms of his Chechnya policy has been helped by the growing tension in EU foreign policy between attempts to secure a ‘common strategy’ towards Russia, and the material interests of those member states who are the biggest trading partners with Russia, notably Germany, whose national interests are best served by bilateralism” (Hughes, 2007: 134). What Hughes said is one of the most important aspects of EU-Russia relations: the prevalence of national interests in the Union. The EU struggles to unite and hold together all national interests and make them a Common Foreign Policy and also to build its role as an important actor on the international scene.

Since 2000 Russia's international position became more powerful due to a series of internal and external factors such as: "positive changes in its economy, destabilisation of international relations, and the growing importance of the security factor and increased dependency of the world economy on energy" (Karaganov, 2005: 30).

Liberal Intergovernmentalism and CFSP

In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the CFSP it is necessary to address first the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism and its predecessor, neofunctionalism.

Neofunctionalism presents the first comprehensive theory of regional integration and was developed by Ernst Haas, Leon Lindberg and others in the late 1950s and 1960s. But to determine exactly what neofunctionalism stands for is no straightforward undertaking, mostly because the original versions of the theory were revised and modified by a large number of writers such as Joseph Nye, Philippe Schmitter, and Stuart Scheingold. Integration was seen, in the views of Haas and Lindberg, as a process which involved the creation and role expansion of regional institutions. The central point of neofunctionalism is the relationship between economic and political integration. The premise of the theory is that integration in economic sectors will put pressure to political integration due to 'spillovers' and 'unintended consequences'. The key role is played by supranational organizations which provide dynamic for further integration.

Neofunctionalism sees integration as a process which involves the creation and the role expansion of regional institutions. The concept of 'spillover' lies at the base of this theory and it refers to a dynamic of economic and political measures triggered by European integration and which leads to further integration. This concept can be of two types: 'functional spillover' and 'political spillover' (Moravcsik, 1993: 475). Functional spillover reflects the "interlinked nature of modern economies, in which government in one sector engenders economic distortions elsewhere" (Moravcsik, 1993: 475). The political spillover refers to the existence of supranational organizations which begin a process of institution building. For neofunctionalists, the most important non-state actor in Europe was the European Commission (Moravcsik, 1993: 475).

Integration in economic sectors increases the volume of trade and transactions across borders. Trade creates problems which can be solved only by supranational bureaucracy. When supranational institutions are created, interest groups tend to organize and put pressure on the bureaucracy, which itself acts as a pressure for further integration. Gradually, the expectations and interests of citizens become focused on creating a new political union (Moravcsik, 1993: 90).

Neofunctionalism has been by far the most influential theory of European integration. It played a crucial role in reminding that the state cannot be viewed as a unitary actor in international politics. Also it portrayed integration as being a two-way process in which "national groups seek to shape 'federal' or 'supranational' decisions but in turn come under pressure to conduct themselves in accordance with doctrines originating from the new central institutions" (Haas, 2009: 102).

Liberal-Intergovernmentalism was developed by Andrew Moravcsik in the first years of the 1990s. LI is parsimonious – multi casual but simple. It deliberately seeks to simplify the EU politics by stressing the essential and excluding secondary activities (Moravcsik, Schimmelfenning, 2009: 67-68). It appeared as an opposition to neofunctionalism and it rests on the assumption that states are actors which "achieve their goals by intergovernmental negotiations rather than through a centralized authority making and enforcing political decisions" (Moravcsik, Schimmelfenning, 2009: 68-9).

Another important assumption is that states which calculate the utility of alternative courses of action and choose the one that maximizes their utility are rational actors. An example to explain these two assumptions is how the decisions to cooperate internationally are made: firstly states define their preferences, and then they negotiate and finally create the institutions to secure the outcomes. Each stage is defined by a different theory (Moravcsik, Schimmelfenning, 2009: 68-9).

The Liberal-Intergovernmentalism model considers that the decision-making process in the European Community is based on “foreign economic policy preference formation, inter-state bargaining, and institutional delegation” (Moravcsik, 1995: 612). Microeconomic interests, geopolitical and ideological motivations constrain national preferences and inter-state bargaining and indicate alternatives to the agreement by including offers in order to connect the issues and threats of exclusion and exit (Moravcsik, 1995: 612). The assumption of rational state behaviour, the liberal theory of national preference formation and an intergovernmental analysis of interstate negotiations are the three main elements of liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik, 1993: 480). The model of rational state behaviour originates from the basic reasoning that states act in a certain way in order to achieve a set of goals and objectives. Each state formulates its foreign policy depending on the national interests which are established through “domestic political conflict as societal groups compete for political influence” (Moravcsik, 1993: 481). The theory of national preference formation states that what influences the foreign policy is the identity of important societal groups combined with the nature of their interests and what influence they have on domestic policy (Moravcsik, 1993: 483). In other words, the relation between the state and the society is important in formulating national preferences. Interstate bargaining is a mechanism through which conflicting interests are reconciled (Moravcsik, 1993: 497). The outcomes of interstate bargaining depend on various factors among which are the nature of the alternative policies and coalitions, the level of symmetry of information, the institutional setting, the potential for strategic misrepresentation of interests, the importance of reputation, the cost-effectiveness of threats and side payments (Moravcsik, 1993: 497).

Neo-functionalism emphasizes the domestic technocratic consensus, the opportunities to upgrade common interest, the active role of supranational officials in shaping negotiation outcomes, whereas liberal intergovernmentalism analyzes domestic coalition struggles, the passive institutions and the autonomy of national leaders (Elistrup-Sangiovanni, 2005: 300).

The CFSP was created as a second pillar of the European Union in the Treaty of Maastricht signed on 7 February 1992 and entered into force on 1 November 1993. “The second pillar establishes common foreign and security policy (CFSP), enshrined in Title V of the Treaty on European Union. This replaces the provisions of the Single European Act and allows Member States to take joint action in the field of foreign policy. This pillar involves an intergovernmental decision-making process which largely relies on unanimity. The Commission and Parliament play a modest role and the Court of Justice has no say in this area” (European Union, *Treaty of Amsterdam: a comprehensive guide*, 2010). The Treaty of Maastricht was a significant document for member states especially from a political point of view because of the uncertainties raised from the German reunification after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The other two pillars are the European Community (EC) and the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). The predecessor of the CFSP was the European Political Cooperation (EPC) which was established at the EC's Hague Summit of 1969. It

was constructed as a reunion of foreign ministers and diplomats who held regular meetings in order to formulate ways of coordination of national foreign policies (Gordon, 1998: 84).

An analysis of the objectives and of the main bodies of decision is imperative in order to explain the effectiveness of the CFSP. The Treaty of Maastricht stipulates the following objectives of the CFSP: to safeguard the values and the interests of the Union, to strengthen the security of the Union, to maintain peace and international security on the principles in the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter, to promote international cooperation and to promote and consolidate democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human rights (European Union, *Treaty of Maastricht*, 2010, Art.J1). This last objective will be the starting point in discovering the effectiveness of the CFSP in Chechnya.

The responsibilities and the roles of the main EU institutions are stipulated in the Treaty of Maastricht and amended in 1997 by the Treaty of Amsterdam. The European Council has the power to define the principles of the CFSP, to decide on common strategies – which involves settling the objectives, the duration and the means available to a certain strategy (European Union, *Treaty of Amsterdam*, 2010, Art. J3). The Council of Ministers has the responsibilities to recommend common strategies to the European Council and to implement them by adopting joint actions and common positions (European Union, *Treaty of Amsterdam*, 2010, Art. J3). Most of these common strategies are part of the European Neighbourhood Policy which also includes Russia.

The role of the Presidency was among the functions which were amended in the Amsterdam Treaty and it is responsible for the implementation of the decisions taken in the Council and to represent the Union in matters of the CFSP. The Presidency is assisted by the Secretary- General of the Council which has the function of High Representative for the CFSP (European Union, *Treaty of Amsterdam*, 2010, Art.J8). Also, the Presidency has the possibility to consult the European Parliament on main issues and basic choices and it has to ensure that the views of the Parliament are taken into consideration (European Union, *Treaty of Amsterdam*, 2010, Art. J11).

In the first half of 1999 a British-French initiative at St. Malo became a reality: the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The role of the ESDP was to strengthen the EU's "external ability to act through the development of civilian military capabilities for international conflict prevention and crisis management" (Gross, 2002: 6). The CFSP together with the ESDP face two major 'dilemmas': the national constraint and the relationship with NATO. The issue of national constraint comes from the intergovernmental character of the CFSP and it cannot be silenced because the Member States are first concerned about their own interests. "Political Europe and military Europe even more, is still a sum of sovereign nations that wish to remain so" says Gnesotto (Gnesotto, 2004: 19). After the creation of the ESDP, the US accepted this new step toward political integration but it formulated specific conditions which concern the status of the EU-NATO relationship. The Petersberg tasks were formulated in such a way to respect these conditions. The tasks include "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking" (Gross, 2002: 6). What has helped to overcome rivalry at EU-NATO level after the creation of the ESDP was that former Secretary General of NATO, Javier Solana, became the High Representative of the CFSP and the Secretary General of the Council. Solana "has acted as an invaluable bridgehead between the two organisations, allying NATO's concerns about the EU's new role and ensuring that the Union will have enough military expertise to prevent its first operation ending in disaster" (Cornish, Edwards, 2001: 591). NATO's worry was that either

the ESDP will require a significant part of EU resources made available for defence or the ESDP will be too efficient in addressing the security and defence issues that it will weaken NATO's effectiveness and US influence in the EU.

The Helsinki Summit in 1999 established the Political and Security Committee (PSC) which entered into force only in 2001 in Nice at a Heads of State or Government meeting (Council Decision 2001/78/CFSP). This Committee may have the most important role in the CFSP because it monitors the international situation, informs the Council in order to help it define certain policies and coordinates, supervises and monitors the work of the different working groups in the CFSP area (Europa, 2011). It is also responsible for conducting the political dialogue with other international forums and organizations such as NATO. "The PSC is permanently chaired by the European External Action Service. It comprises one ambassador per Member State, a permanent representative of the European Commission, a representative of the EUMC, a representative from the Secretariat of the Council of the EU and a legal service" (Europa, 2011).

When it comes to the responsibilities of the Member States in the CFSP, the Treaty of Amsterdam states that they "shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity" (European Union, *Treaty of Amsterdam*, 2010, Art. J.1).

The decision-making system in the CFSP has been changed in the Treaty of Amsterdam but the general rule from the Treaty of Maastricht still remains: CFSP's decisions always require a unanimous vote in their favour (European Union, *Treaty of Amsterdam*, 2010, Art.J13) which means that any Member State can use its veto right to block a certain proposal. However, a clause of 'constructive abstention' is permitted but it does not block the adoption of the decision. The abstention of a Member State implies that it is not obliged to apply the decision but it has to accept "that the decision commits the Union as a whole and must agree to abstain from any action that might conflict with the Union's action under that decision" (Europa, 2011). An important amendment to the initial Treaty of Maastricht is made in regard to the Council's act by qualified majority which can be applied in two situations: "when adopting joint actions, common positions or taking any other decision on the basis of a common strategy; when adopting any decision implementing a joint action or a common position" (European Union, *Treaty of Amsterdam*, Art. J13.2, 2010). Qualified majority voting therefore enables Member States to block majority voting for reasons of national policy. When this happens, the Council may decide, by a qualified majority, to pass on the issue to the European Council to decide by unanimous vote (European Union, *Treaty of Amsterdam*, Art. J13.2, 2010).

When analysing EU diplomacy and the CFSP in particular, one has to bear in mind that the EU has two goals: one to influence the international arena and to "settle mutual relations" (Keukeleire, 2003: 33) between Member States. The expectations regarding the CFSP were high even before the implementation of the Treaty of Maastricht because the general public opinion did not take into consideration the daily policies in which the CFSP was successful, but looked only at the major crisis situations at the top of the international agenda (Keukeleire, 2003: 44).

While the EU was in a process of integration in the last two decades, Russia was preoccupied with keeping its federation intact and to reforming the state. During this period, both powers have been under radical changes in "the very nature of the nation-state in a post-Westphalian world, and the state's survivability and adaptability in a globalised world of transnational flows" (Medvedev, Haukkala, p.14). The European Union had to improve its political system and adapt it to the new challenges brought about

by its enlargement and it had to find ways to strengthen its position in the world. The Russian Federation on the other hand had to overcome numerous changes such as the proclamation of independence of states from the former USSR, the economic and social reforms meant to democratise the state and the fight against the vicious circle of oligarchs, corruption and state power.

The relationship between the EU and Russia had different attributes over time: the first three years after 1990 were described as “the romantic period” (Medvedev, Haukkala, p.15) when Russia aspired to join the EU. But the EU had a wake-up call as the first war in Chechnya began and, after that, when the political crisis hit Russia in August 1998.

The European Union has always been a promoter of democracy, human rights and the rule of law and it stated this in most of the Treaties which describe the role, the functions and the general rules of the EU. If one takes a closer look at the joint statements or integral text of the bilateral EU-Russia summits, they will observe that the issue of human rights is barely mentioned in a few points. Even at the summits which took place during the Russo-Chechen wars, the EU did not have a firm opposition to the atrocities committed. The European Union had at its disposal several reports from important NGOs which were monitoring the situation in Chechnya. Even if Russia permanently tried to control the mass-media in order to keep its ‘victim’ image intact, the EU still cannot deny that it had sufficient proofs for actions to be taken to stop the human rights abuses in Chechnya.

So the questions are: why did the EU failed to formulate a coherent response to this crisis? Was the decision-making system of the CFSP effective in addressing this issue?

Having in mind that the CFSP was born at a difficult moment for the EU, when the disintegration of Yugoslavia was in course, it can be argued that during the first Russo-Chechen war the CFSP lacked the necessary instruments which would have helped it to cope with the “new upheavals and catastrophes on the international scene” (Muller-Brandeck-Bouquet, 2002: 258).

What the EU did in the advent of the atrocities was to postpone the signing of the Agreement on Trade which was part of the general PCA but it stated that this action must not be considered as a sanction on Russia and formulated four conditions: to allow the presence of the OSCE in Chechnya, to permit humanitarian assistance, to agree on a ceasefire and to open negotiations to reach a political solution (Forsberg, Herd, 2005: 460). The result of this action had no effect whatsoever because Russia did not show any effort in trying to respect the conditions and, on top of this, after a few months the postponement was lifted and the PCA was signed. In this situation the EU was expected to show a higher degree of unity and the Member States to support the normative agenda (Forsberg, Herd, 2005: 473). But inconsistency was the predominant attribute for the decision-making system which can be blamed for allowing too much national foreign-policy involvement into the process. “National egoism, distinctly divergent foreign policy interests of the individual members and an inefficient decision-making system in the CFSP, along with the far-reaching retention of sovereignty by individual states, all led to a lack of coherence in collective action and was thus a great handicap to the conduct of European foreign affairs” (Muller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002: 259-260).

The second Russo-Chechen war started in the summer of 1999. The situation became more complicated than in the first war. What was ‘new’ in this war? A few important words appeared onto the board: ‘terrorism’, ‘anti-terror war’, ‘global war on terror’. These words reflect the strategy of the Russian Federation to present this second campaign as being legitimate and part of the world fight against terrorists. Also, the control of the media deepened and foreign observers were kept away from Chechnya.

Even so, as previously stated, the media managed to present the facts in the international press. So once again the EU was faced with strong evidence that human rights violations take place in Chechnya. This time the EU expressed its concerns over human rights abuses and it issued, through the Council, a Declaration on Chechnya: "The European Council condemns the intense bombardments of Chechen cities, the threat levelled at the residents of Grozny and the ultimatum set by the Russian military commanders as well as the treatment of the internally displaced persons as totally unacceptable" (Annex II *Declaration on Chechnya*, 1999). It is important to observe that the EU has formulated recommendations to Russia not to carry the ultimatum against the people of Grozny, to end the bombings, to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid and the assistance of international relief agencies, to start a political dialogue with the Chechen authorities (Annex II *Declaration on Chechnya*, point 4, 1999). It also urged the Chechen authorities to respect the humanitarian law, to condemn terrorism and to agree to participate in a political dialogue. Following the recommendations, the European Council states the possible consequences among which the most important seems to be the suspension of some provisions from the PCA (on trade especially). As a financial measure, part of the funds in TACIS were transferred to humanitarian assistance and the budget for the year 2000 was going to be limited to priority areas such as human rights, the rule of law. The final point in this Declaration is a reassertion of the major partnership between the EU and Russia and an encouragement for Russia "to live up to its obligations" (Annex II, *Declaration on Chechnya*, point 8, 1999).

During the second war, which still has no peace agreement, the EU Member States continued to maintain strong economic and political relations with Russia. The economic factor played a major role both inside the EU and especially in the CFSP and also in Russia. On one hand, there was an intense debate between the Member States on what sanctions to impose to Russia because the interests were high and important for different national foreign-policies. The issue of energy interdependence comes into the spotlight. There are critiques which argue that, on one hand, Russia will use at some point the 'energy weapon' (Stegen, 2011: 6506) to achieve political objectives. Others say that Russia cannot use energy as a tool in foreign policy because it would risk its relations with major Member States, therefore risking its' long-term economic security over a short-term political success (Stegen, 2011: 6506). But the facts about the Ukrainian gas crisis in 2009 are well known, when eighteen European countries reported major drops in or complete cut-offs of their gas supplies transported through Ukraine. Also, the Russo-Georgian conflict represents a series of setbacks for Europe's planned Nabucco pipeline, which is the best way of weaning itself off Gazprom. Karen Stegen asks a very pertinent question in her article (2011) "Although the Kremlin has some measure of control over Gazprom, the question remains: can Russia's resources actually be converted into real political power and yield foreign policy gains?" The response depends also on the client, the EU, and how it will use its common foreign and security policy to respond to Russia's measures. The intergovernmental nature of the CFSP will probably slow down the pace of the decision-making process since Member States have different bilateral agreements signed with Russia. In a situation like this, the Presidency/ High Representative are unable to offer the necessary leadership for "an efficacious diplomacy, which causes problems in acute crisis and in conflicts that require a quick and firm response" (Keukeleire, 2003: 41). The problem is that the Presidency has structural dysfunctions which affect the credibility of the CFSP. "Its ambivalent 'European' statute, the lack of continuity, the limited availability, the absence of sufficient instruments and the absence of a sufficiently elaborated administrative and diplomatic structure" (Keukeleire, 2003: 41) represent the obstacles which have to be overcome.

Conclusion

To sum up, the EU considered that its relation with Russia was too important and sensitive to take proper measures in Chechnya. As Forsberg and Herd (2005) say, “it seems clear that it was unrealistic to suppose that the EU could determine Russian internal policy making toward its regions” (Forsberg, Herd, 2005: 473). Chechnya was an internal affair of Russia which had the “potential to unravel the Federation, punishing centre-periphery relations” (Forsberg, Herd, 2005: 473). Some may consider that the EU did not have the right “sticks and carrots” (Forsberg, Herd, 2005) to use in its relation with Russia in order to export the values and principles of the EU. Probably these values and principles have been denied by Russia because it had no prospects of integration but we should also ask if Russia ever wanted to become a part of the European Union. In candidate countries these values have been easily adopted and the EU had the wrong belief that its strategic partner will do the same. Even though the EU became an “economic colossus”, it “must remain a political pigmy because of its deficiency in handling foreign affairs” (Muller-Brandeck-Bouquet, 2002: 260). But even so, the expectations from European foreign policy will always be high “so as long the European Union survives and flourishes” (Hill, 2004: 143).

I have demonstrated throughout this paper that the CFSP was inefficient in addressing the crisis in Chechnya and its intergovernmental nature was decisive in regard to the EU-Russia relation. Based on the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism developed by Andrew Moravcsik the instruments and mechanisms in the CFSP were evaluated and the conclusion is that the decision-making process should be modified but before that Member States should be ready to give up more of their sovereignty in political matters.

The weaknesses of the CFSP and its’ intergovernmental nature could be overcome by allowing neo-liberal institutionalism into the game. This theory could offer the proper framework for the European Union to function as a powerful international actor in security issues. Neo-liberal institutionalism focuses on four key elements: “non-state actors”, “forms of power besides military force and threats”, “the role of interdependence in addition to anarchy in the international system” and “the importance of cooperation as well as conflict in international politics” says Helen Milner (Milner, 2009, p.3). Neo-liberal institutionalists share part of their views with neo-realists but they go beyond neo-realists in some aspects such as: states are rational actors, but they admit that NGOs and international institutions are very important as well (Milner, 2009, p.5). One could therefore assume that if the EU would want to get involved in different international conflicts, it would be more efficient if it would be assisted by other international institutions and organizations. This is because the EU is not, as stated before, a fully integrated political organization and it has encountered serious issues over time.

Neo-liberal institutionalism sees international institutions as “sets of governing arrangements that involve implicit or explicit principles, norm, rules and decision making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge” (Milner, 2009, p.6). One can assume that the CFSP of the European Union would be part of a global arrangement of involvement in peacekeeping, peace-making or humanitarian aid situation. It is possible that in this way the CFSP will be able to achieve its’ goals and to be the promoter of EU principles.

EU Member States have been reluctant in providing a clear and straight-forward answer to the Russo-Chechen conflict because most of them had bilateral agreements signed with Russia and also because the national interest was put on the first place before the interest of the European Union. Russia on the other hand used every ‘tool’ it had to keep Chechnya out of the global agenda. Having in mind that Russia is an important strategic partner of the

European Union, the Common Foreign and Security Policy was expected to provide an efficient solution to the Chechen conflict in order to prove that the European Union has a strong voice in defending its values and in building its status as a world political power. But as it has been demonstrated in this paper, the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP was an impediment for the European Union to find and apply the best solution in Chechnya. The theory of intergovernmentalism was very useful in demonstrating that the foreign policy mechanism of the European Union has acted as a barrier between the EU and Russia and it has delayed the progress of this relationship. The impact of intergovernmentalism on this partnership was that it allowed Member States to determine the way of conduct and the policies related to the Chechen conflict. Even though there is a Common Strategy on Russia signed by all Member States, it seems that Member States have enough individual power in the decision-making process to determine what policies will be adopted by the EU. One can argue that intergovernmentalism will, for a long time, intervene between the EU and Russia because the EU has still a long way to political integration in which Member States will act as one on the international scene. As Gnesotto says “if the construction of European political power must choose between these two extremes – the Community level or the intergovernmental model- then the impasse is obvious, and the status quo will tend to favour the nation-states” (2004: 22). It can be said that there is a real need for coherence in the formulation of policies at European level because usually in dealing with one issue there are more than ten players involved, from the Member States, the Presidency, the Commission, the Council, to the representations and the military (Gnesotto, 2004: 28). Besides the large number of institutions involved in the decision-making process, each of them has different aims and interests that “jeopardise the Union’s collective effectiveness, therefore it is not so much additional resources as a single authority that the Union needs: to define a policy, set common aims and ensure that all are working together to implement them” (Gnesotto, 2004: 28).

The current situation of the European Union does not seem to lead to a deeper political integration because the Union is facing serious internal issues. These issues also reveal that in order to function at maximum potential, the European Union has to make major changes in its decision-making system. “The European Union can no longer avoid questioning its own nature in order to understand its relationship with Russia” (Gomart, 2008: 9). Also, Gomart states that the European Union cannot afford to delay much longer an internal debate “on the nature of the political relations to be forged with Russia” (Gomart, 2008: 9), a debate which will finally force Member States to agree on a common analysis of Russia (2008: 9). This debate should decide whether Russia is or not a partner of the European Union in matters of security, geopolitics and economics. On the other hand, Russia should also reflect on its position towards the European Union, in the sense that it should value and reassess the trade relationship with the EU. These two regional powers with global aspirations seem to be tied up together in a relationship in which none wants either to progress or to end. The various agreements keep this relationship standing but if there is no clear and firm re-assessment of the relationship both sides will have to lose.

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SPATIAL DATA ANALYSIS AND CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION. THE CASE OF BIHOR – HAJDÚ BIHAR EUROREGION

*Cosmin CHIRIAC**

Abstract: *For areas such as the Bihor County from Romania and the Hajdú-Bihar County from Hungary, entities that together give the name and space for the Bihor - Hajdú-Bihar Euroregion, to find a common ground for development it is essential to have the data that can uncover such possibilities. Evidently, this raises a series of issues that need to be tackled before such an analysis is possible.*

This article focuses on these issues, analyzing them, while trying to find solutions that will allow a thorough understanding of development possibilities for the abovementioned studyarea.

Keywords: *geographical databases, cross-border cooperation, administrative hierarchy, data exchange and analysis*

Introduction

The Bihor – Hajdú-Bihar Euroregion was established towards the end of the year 2002. Its main objective, at the time, was to help, through the enhancement of cross-border cooperation, the process of integration of Hungary (2004) and Romania (2007) within the European Union. Even though both states are now members of this structure, the Euroregion remains an active one, finding ground for its existence in one of European Unions' key priorities, that of strengthening cross-border cooperation through different key objectives that cover social and economical developments amongst other ("Pagina oficiala a Consiliului Județean Bihor" 2002; "Cross-Border Cooperation Within the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)" 2012).

Central and Eastern European member states, more than other European countries, can benefit from this key priority since only recently they found the possibility to express themselves outside their national borders. Before 1990, most of these countries had their borders closed, with effects on the level of development of their border areas. By opening their frontiers, more options are available for resources, business partnership or target market. Another aim of this key priority is to tackle the issues that rise from such a diverse cultural environment, as is the European one, helping not to eliminate any differences, but to help neighbouring communities accept them and live with them, moving around the concepts of cultural homogeneity and cultural differences (Brie, 2010: 79).

An important facet of cross-border cooperation is represented by the level of development of the two neighbouring areas (counties in this case). During the period of Soviet influence, Hungary was considered as one of the most developed and, to some extent, liberal

* Teaching Assistant, Department of International Relations and European Studies, Faculty of History International Relations, Political Sciences and Science of Communication, University of Oradea, Romania. E-mail: cchiriacuniv@yahoo.com

countries in behind the Iron Curtain. Being nicknamed “the happiest barrack in the camp” after a very prosperous period of economic evolution between 1966 and 1975, Hungary had a guided, moderate economic decrease until 1988, but at the cost of a growing external debt and a serious decrease afterwards (Kornay 1996, 952–954). Romania had a similar economic growth before 1980 but with a serious downfall afterwards and a stricter regime. Romania had its worst economic evolution at the end of the 1980’s and after the fall of the Communist Regime it suffered more, many industrial enterprises becoming inactive due to their inefficiency, but with an increase in many other aspects of the economy due to the freedom of expression that came after the revolution of 1989. From this perspective, cross-border cooperation between two economically imbalanced regions (even if the differences between the two counties were not important), can be beneficial for both areas in question and can help level any inequalities or even boost their social and economical evolution. Even if it is not clear whether cross-border cooperation had any direct impact on the evolution of these two counties it seems they balanced out any differences during the first decade of the 21st century (Cismaş and Sabău 2012, 97), however, that doesn’t necessarily imply a positive evolution on both sides.

To improve the development level of these two administrative entities as a whole, of great importance is to have the information that can uncover common or separate issues that they have and that can underline cooperation possibilities based on the resources, the infrastructure and the current social and economical status of each of them. Arguably, the best way to organize such information is in the shape of geographical databases, a structure that combines graphical and statistical data and allows pertinent analysis as support to decision-making processes.

However, the realisation of a geographical database in this scenario raises a few issues concerning territorial-administrative and institutional structures, scale of analysis, data protection laws, data acquisition process, database hosting location, information analysis structures and others, taking into consideration the fact that the study area contains administrative entities that reside in two separate countries.

The study area – general characterisation

The characteristics of the two areas are the ones that outline the possibilities for a positive development of the Euroregion. Both homogeneity and heterogeneity can be put to value. This part of the study focuses on presenting, without too much detail, the characteristics of the counties in question.

The administrative structure is important because it influences the analysis possibilities of the study area, through the similarities or differences in their administrative hierarchies.

The two counties that make-up the Euroregion are Bihor on the Romanian side and Hajdú-Bihar on the Hungarian side. At European level, in the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS), devised by Eurostat, both areas are considered level 3 units or NUTS3, a requirement when it comes to creating Euroregions with inland frontiers (“REGULATION (EC) No 1638/2006 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL” 2006).

On the next level of this hierarchy (LAU1), there are differences between the two countries. Romania does not have a correspondent to the LAU1 statistical level while Hungary has, since 1994, created statistical units called Statisztikai kistérségek (statistical sub-regions), that include more localities, united by their own will (Teller 2004). Territorial units corresponding to the LAU1 level do exist in Romania and take the shape of Metropolitan Areas or of Intercommunity Development Association but they do not

cover the entire territory of Romania as they are the product of the will of the administrative units that form this associations (LEGE Nr. 350 Din 6 Iulie 2001 Privind Amenajarea Teritoriului Şi Urbanismul Actualizată 2001: Art 7). There is another form of association developed mainly theoretically, that are called Territorial Planning Units (TPU) but none of this forms of association can yet be considered LAU1 level units, due to causes presented above.

The next of this hierarchy (LAU2) is present in both countries. However, differences are present in this case too. For Romania, the correspondent of this level takes the shape of a city/town or commune, including most of the times more than one settlement, their population being usually above a couple of thousands of inhabitants, going to just below 200,000 inhabitants in the case of Bihor county. In Hungary, on the other hand, this level corresponds to localities, their population ranging from more than 200,000 inhabitants to just above 100 inhabitants in the case of Hajdú-Bihar county.

Fig. 1. Correspondence table, with comparative data, of the administrative systems of Romania and Hungary to the Eurostat Nomenclature

NUTS3	575398 inh. 7544 km ²	Bihor (county)	Hajdu-Bihor (county)	541298 inh. 6211 km ²
LAU1	theoretical correspondent: 11 TPU units	Absent	Statisztikai kistérségek (subregion)	11 units, 28614 to 211579 inhabitants, composed of 2 to 29 settlements
LAU2	101 units, 1021 to 196367 inhabitants, 1 or more settlements each	Oraş/Comună (city/town/ commune)	Település (settlement)	82 units, 119 to 207270 inhabitants, 1 settlement each

Data sources: Eurostat, <http://www.recensamantromania.ro>

These differences can be counterproductive when it comes to comparing the two counties to each other at a more detailed level, especially for social and economical indicators.

From the point of view of the relief, there are important differences between the two areas, pointed out by their altitude range. Bihor county has an altitude range of about 1700m while Hajdú-Bihar of only 100m. The relief has its implications in the land use patterns of the two counties, being more generous as far as diversity is concerned to the Romanian side.

As far as the network of settlements is concerned, there are similarities between the two counties. Each of them has an important urban centre (Oradea and Debrecen), similar in size, at least as far as demography is concerned, and a similarly sized network of LAU2 level administrative units compared to the extent of their area, with a small advantage to the Romanian side (around 82% is the proportion of the extent and number of LAU2 units

between the two counties). However, it has to be noted that there is a difference in the interpretation of the LAU2 level between the two counties.

Oradea and Debrecen, the two county seats of the Euroregion have developed through their history as “complementary communities”, diverged from their common path (favoured by their proximity) during the communist period (Țoca, 2009: 253,254).

Concerning the economy, the Bihor County covers a great variety of economic activities. The industry includes quarrying and mining, processing industry developments. The agricultural lands cover 66,2% of the total extent of the county. The trade sector is active too, the exports focusing mainly on the products of light industry. In 2003, the occupancy of the number of beds available at county level was at 40,8%, with 83,4% of them being located in spa resorts, showing a certain inefficiency of this type of tourism in the area (Chiriac et al. 2010).

For the Hajdú-Bihar County, agriculture is the most important sector due to its relief and soil, being the second countrywide, even if its proportion within the counties economy is decreasing. Its industry and construction industry, in the last decade was constantly on 7th or 8th place at country level as far as GDP value is concerned. The service sector is below average nation-wide as far as GDP is concerned however, its performance in this sector is above the other counties in the region (Bujdosó et al. 2012).

Both counties have suffered the consequences of the international economic crisis, however their vicinity doesn't imply, so far, a similar economic evolution, a fact that highlights the need of improved cooperation efforts by both sides (Șoproni, 2009: 55).

Illustrating the possibilities (the spatial database)


An efficient and expressive way of presenting the realities of a territory is through GIS visualisation. Considering the scale of analysis, it can be asserted that for a territory such as the one being analysed in this paper, the representations do not have to be extremely detailed.

Social-economical activities depend on many factors, some of them being part of the natural component of the territory and some part of the anthropic component. All these elements need to be included in a spatial database that can be used as a data source for GIS visualisations.

The natural component has the capacity of being a resource as well as a risk element for any society and its activities. As a resource, it favours certain activities and developments and as a result, land use patterns emerge. These patterns do not always fulfil the possibilities of the territory and this emphasises two facets of land use analysis: what is, on one side and what should be, on the other. To be more specific, land use patterns show as simply as possible the way the territory is used. Showing what can be done with it is far more difficult and requires many separate analyses focused on possible activities including studies of suitability, preference and conflict (Carr and Zwick 2007). However, besides the simple visual representation of these patterns, some indices can help in showing the possibilities of development. Choosing the appropriate indices depends on the land use categories and, as far as the economy is concerned, associating them to the economic sectors of activity (primary, secondary, tertiary) and their subdivisions is important. This helps in finding missing links within the economic structure of the Euroregion by outlining dependencies between different sectors of activity.

The risk element of the natural component needs to be correlated to the land use patterns as well. This emphasises the areas that require the most attention in this respect.

Fig. 2. Spatial database general schema, including thematic layers and corresponding information.



The hard and soft infrastructures have both economic and social importance. Some of the most common ones are transport, energy, water management, communication, solid waste management, health care, education, social welfare infrastructures amongst others. As far as these infrastructures are concerned, the most important aspect is to correlate them to the social and economic magnitude of an area and to offer possibilities of improvement.

Information regarding the population of the Euroregion is also essential to the study, since it is the driving force of any economical activity, so demographical data has to be part of the spatial database.

Having these considerations as a starting point, a primary structure of the spatial database can be outlined, keeping also in mind the administrative structure of the Bihor and Hajdú-Bihar counties correlating the information to the lowest Eurostat statistical level, LAU2 or even lower if necessary. As far as the design principles for defining a spatial database are concerned, Fig. 2 presents the thematic layers of the database, each of them containing one or more layers or tables of statistical data (Arctur and Zeiler 2004).

Since this general structure refers to almost every element of a territory, a complete presentation of the structure is not possible at this stage and does not meet the purpose of this study. However, certain elements can be presented with minimum detail. As Fig. 2 shows, all thematic layers are linked to each other based on certain attributes that define those connections.

The administrative thematic layer requires more than the NUTS equivalents of the Romanian and Hungarian units, especially on the Romanian side where the settlements forming the LAU2 units are not present in the hierarchy devised by Eurostat.

The information presented in the economic activities thematic layer has to be structured mainly based on the economic category and activity type, creating a dependency representation based on the economic structure of the two territorial units, both at NUTS3 level and at LAU2 level can help highlight cooperation possibilities.

The representation of land use patterns normally requires usually increased level of detail, its smallest possible division being the land parcel. However, a more general implementation is possible by merging together parcels based on activity types and is actually recommended at this scale of analysis.

Considering the fact that many land uses do not necessarily follow administrative frontiers, this spatial data structure needs to reflect land use pattern limits as well as administrative limits, with the aim of uncovering cooperation possibilities but also facilitating statistical analysis.

The demographical component is relevant in all aspects of analysis, like sizing hard and soft infrastructure, predicting future evolution of economic activities through demographical evolution, guiding training activities as the employment structure requires and so on.

Hard and soft infrastructure is particularly important in all aspects of the social and economical life. Strategies towards a common development of the road network, for example, should be put together even if some road types can not be managed from this administrative level. The location of economic activities, demographical magnitude of the settlements, their functional structure and other aspects of a territory impose on the evolution of hard and soft infrastructure.

Conclusions

For compatibility reasons it is important in such cases as is the case of the Bihor – Hajdú-Bihar Euroregion, to use European Union regulations or classifications, where available. However, particularities that are necessary for analysis purposes should be integrated in the data model. The administrative structures represent the perfect example.

The institutional structure for data acquisition and analysis of the spatial data is an aspect that needs special attention. Data acquisition can and naturally would be realised in a separate way. However, since the finality of this process is to analyse in a joint manner the collected data, some elements that facilitate that process have to be integrated in the acquisition process and in the spatial database structures of each county. Therefore, as far as the institutional structure is concerned, a common establishment is not necessary. Through well-defined protocols, the collaboration between GIS specialists from both county governing institutions should be enough.

The purpose of such an endeavour is to find the right steps towards the future evolution of the Euroregion, whether it means convergent or divergent actions. The finality is to have the necessary information for defining future objectives of the Euroregion through decision-making support.

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III. Identity and Diversity

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DES ENCLAVES IDENTITAIRES AU CŒUR DE LA NATION FRANÇAISE: LES ENJEUX D'UNE POLITIQUE D'INTÉGRATION ASSIMILATIONNISTE

*Alina STOICA**
*Cosmin Adrian POP***

Résumé: *La façon de se rapporter aux minorités et les tensions qui en découlent justement à cause de cette attitude simplement invalidante, voir dénégatoire vers les autres identités culturelles, met la France dans un conflit perpétuel avec les immigrants. Le projet social français construit, bien évidemment, par rapport aux valeurs républicaines, a entraîné la mise en vigueur des normes tout à fait restrictives et qui ne reposent pas sur l'idée d'inter culturalité, mais sur celle de l'effacement des autres cultures aperçues comme inférieures par rapport à celle française. Le dégagement de la sphère publique de tous les particularismes identitaires s'avère une politique simplement non-viable justement à cause de l'accumulation des immigrants qui ont transformé la France dans un pays multiracial et multiculturel.*

Mots-clés: *politique d'immigration, intégration, valeurs républicaines, citoyenneté, racisme, post-colonialisme*

Les éléments normatifs de la politique française d'immigration¹

Les années '80 ont constitué l'occasion pour la première transformation essentielle concernant la politique sociale de la France parce qu'elles représentent l'époque à laquelle la réceptivité progressive de l'état vers la question des immigrants placera la mission de l'intégration des identités non nationales dans la zone des priorités gouvernementales. Ultérieurement, dans les années '90, la nouvelle législation sera implémentée. Le cadre normatif établi, fondé sur l'aversion incontestable face au multiculturalisme² aperçu en

* PhD., Lecturer, Department of International Relations and European Studies, Faculty of History International Relations, Political Sciences and Science of Communication, University of Oradea, Romania. E-mail: stoicaalina79@yahoo.com

** PhD Candidate, University Babeș-Bolyai of Cluj-Napoca, Mihail Kogălniceanu, nr. 1, RO-400084, Cluj-Napoca, Romania. E-mail: pop_cosmin_adrian@yahoo.com

¹ Parce qu'on ne possède pas les ressources nécessaires pour procéder à une analyse à l'intérieur concernant l'option sur les politiques d'intégration déroulées dans l'espace français, ce qu'on va tenter de développer dans les pages suivantes doit être perçu, plutôt, comme une simple évaluation de la situation de la France des dernières décennies concernant le degré d'absorption des identités allogènes par la société française. Vues de l'extérieur, les choses semblent d'être tout à fait claires: la France, à travers la politique implémentée, corrobore plus une direction dénégatoire vers l'altérité qu'une reconnaissance et acceptation de sa culturalité. Notre démarche vise d'identifier les arguments en vertu desquelles se construit l'attitude des instances politiques françaises.

² L'attitude trahit aussi un désaccord avec la terminologie anglo-saxonne concernant l'immigration et l'intégration, particulièrement les notions de multiculturalisme et ethnicité: "particularly anything to do with 'multiculturalism' or 'ethnicity'. This is despite the fact that at local levels, communes pursue policies - such as through the Fonds d'Action Sociale - with look very much like state promoted multiculturalism". Voir FAVELL Adrian, p. XIV

termes de communautarisme, se revendique des principes d'idéologie républicaine. En citant la dévotion absolue vers l'institution de la citoyenneté et l'individualisme libéral, la France a négocié son modèle d'intégration tout en cherchant le respect, de façon générale, des droits et des libertés fondamentales de l'homme.

Ces mots englobent, en fait, toute l'orientation politique de la France vis-à-vis du problème des minorités dont l'existence sur le territoire français est tout à fait déniée, tout en excédant n'importe quelle prévision de la Constitution. Et pourtant, la réalité d'accumulation minoritaire déterminera, dans la France des années '80-'90, un changement de paradigme concernant l'interprétation des relations interculturelles gérées par les instances sociopolitiques.

Pour mieux comprendre les directions générales au regard du projet social entraîné par la France dans les années '80, il est nécessaire de reproduire, de manière en part diachronique, en part analytique, tant les principes fondamentaux qui définissent la philosophie politique française ainsi que le parcours événementiel déterminant pour la relation état / citoyen.

La forme spécifique d'intégration qui s'opère à l'intérieur du modèle français hypostasie le principe traditionnel universaliste de la société française. La distribution des droits et des ressources par rapport uniquement à la culture dominante fait preuve du caractère unilatéral des décisions des instances politiques, la gestion de l'hétérogénéité culturelle étant corrélée, sur le plan idéologique, à la réprobation du communautarisme "des britanniques, des allemands et des américains" (Favell, 2001: XIV). En ce sens, Dominique de Villepin, ex-premier ministre de la France, affirme que la France n'est pas un pays comme les autres, la France n'accepte pas que ses citoyens habitent séparés, tout en ayant des chances différentes et des avenir inégaux (Murray, 2006: 37).

En s'adressant exclusivement en termes de citoyenneté et intégration, le discours officiel français consacré aux problèmes suscités par le phénomène d'immigration se construit sous l'autorité directe de l'idéologie et de la pratique républicaine, idée régulatrice pour les prétentions de la France d'avoir son modèle culturel reproduit dans la zone d'éducation internationale.

L'approche néo-réactionnaire, aisément identifiable dans l'attitude officielle par rapport à la situation des immigrants, évoque la valeur morale de certains principes se revendiquant de la culture historique de la France, tel de l'indivisibilité de la République, mais qui renvoient au racisme, voir à la xénophobie – des phénomènes tout à fait habituels dans une société qui refuse d'accepter l'idée que la France moderne est, contrairement au discours officiel, vraiment multiraciale et multiculturelle (Murray, 2006: 35).³

Ensuite, on va faire recours aux définitions et éléments d'analyse qu'Adrian Favell opère dans la conceptualisation de l'intégration sociale en France, tout en cherchant

³ "there is the anachronistic and, in practice, xeno-racist French ideal of l'indivisibilité de la République. Anachronistic because this principle was born out of the French Revolution and pertained to federalist tendencies of that time which threatened to split the country. Xeno-racist because the French see precisely the same threat as emanating now from ethnic minority communities. An apparent unwillingness to acknowledge that modern France is multiracial and multicultural engenders a justified feeling of rejection and exclusion among the country's ethnic minorities." Voir aussi le point de vue de Brie, Mircea (2011): *Ethnicity, Religion and Intercultural Dialogue in the European Border Space*. Published in: Eurolimes, Vol. Suppli, No. Mircea Brie, Ioan Horga, Sorin Şipoş, Ethnicity, Confession and Intercultural Dialogue at the European Union's East Border, Editura Universităţii din Oradea/Editura Universităţii din Debrecen, supliment Eurolimes, Oradea/Debrecen (2011): pp. 11-18; Brie, Mircea; Horga, Ioan and Şipoş, Sorin (2011): *Ethnicity, Confession and Intercultural Dialogue at the European Union's East Border*. Published in: Eurolimes, Vol. Suppli, (2011): pp. 1-502.

d'identifier correctement et efficacement les pré-conditions socio-historiques en tant que catalyseurs pour un métabolisme politico-culturel spécifique.

Le discours philosophique sur l'intégration, produit dans l'espace français, se construit autour de certains concepts généraux, mais avec des fortes empreintes nationales, comme *la citoyenneté, la nationalité, le pluralisme, l'autonomie, l'égalité, l'ordre public et la tolérance*. La question qui se pose, au fur et à mesure que la politisation du phénomène social s'achève, comporte des réminiscences hobbesiennes: comment un système national pourrait garder l'unité et la stabilité politique le long de ses lignes de scission déterminées par le pluralisme des valeurs et des intérêts individuels? C'est ça la manière dans laquelle Adrain Favell introduit le problème de l'intégration (Favell, 2001: 2)⁴. La dynamique du phénomène est observée à travers les concepts introduits par l'Ecole de Chicago dans l'étude consacrée à l'ethnicité. L'idée de l'intégration, appliquée dans le contexte du rapport entre une culture minoritaire et une majoritaire, reste dénaturée sous l'influence du caractère assimilationniste conféré au processus. Ainsi, un système de *colour-blind institutions* sera implémenté, vraiment permissif concernant l'achèvement de l'unité, mais à travers l'assimilation et pas la reconnaissance (Favell, 2001: 2).

L'instrumentalisation des principes libéraux, voir républicains au cœur de la politique de gestion de l'hétérogénéité renvoie à l'idée d'une continuité historique à l'égard de la citoyenneté française. Les instances de décision politique ne peuvent pas transcender les conditions historico-culturelles. La tendance s'avère aller plus vers une assimilation inconditionnée du modèle culturel français que vers un état d'égalité entre les différents systèmes sémiques. Le projet social procède à confronter des parties avec autorité hiérarchiquement établie, tout en se manifestant, visiblement, la dimension subjective de la nation, incapable de se soustraire à la tradition politique et sociale de l'impérialisme colonialiste et à l'ascension de la France comme état d'immigration.

Dans le processus d'élaboration des politiques publiques, les instances de décision ont tenu compte, chaque fois, de certaines réalités pratiques qui ont concordé avec le statut de l'immigrant à certaines époques. Donc, il devient nécessaire de faire quelques constats concernant la chronologie du phénomène d'immigration sur le territoire français. L'encadrement de celui ci dans un modèle d'exécution universellement valable est tout à fait possible, mais seulement avec la présentation simultanée des spécificités déterminantes pour une évolution particulière, soumises au subjectivisme national.

La première vague d'immigration s'enregistre dans la période qui suit immédiatement la Seconde Guerre mondiale, dans un contexte de nécessité déterminé par le besoin de force de travail et l'abaissement de la natalité.⁵ Les premières vagues massives d'immigration concentrent notamment les habitants des colonies françaises, le

⁴ "This question is of Hobbesian vintage. How can a political system achieve stability and legitimacy by rebuilding communal bonds of civility and tolerance – a moral social order – across the conflicts and divisions caused by the plurality of values and individual interests?"

⁵ En France, la nouvelle vague immigrationnelle commence vers 1950, ayant comme résultat l'accroissement progressif du nombre des immigrants, de 2 millions en 1946 à 3.4 millions en 1968 (Valerie Amiraux, Patrick Simon, "There are no Minorities Here: Cultures of Scholarship and Public Debate on Immigrants and Integration in France" in *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 2006, vol. 47, p. 196 : "The renewal of immigration flows from the beginning of the 1950s results in a continuous progression in the number of immigrants into French territory. From 2 million in 1946, the number of immigrants reached 3.4 million in 1968. The "North-Africans", "French Muslims" or, sometimes "Algerians", according to the various official categories and social labels, are the subject of the attention of the state and completely embody the profile of the immigrant in these years (Sayad, 1977)."). Maintes institutions ont été créées pour la gestion de l'établissement des immigrants, comme *SONACOTRAL* (Société Nationale de Construction pour les Travailleurs), en 1956, et *Fonds d'Action Sociale*, en 1958.

nombre des immigrants commençant s'accroître lors dès fin de la guerre d'indépendance d'Algérie (1962), soit dans un contexte généralisé d'absorption de la force de travail, soit simplement à la suite d'une tendance postcoloniale. Après 1970, au moment de l'arrêt de réception des immigrants en tant que main d'œuvre, à l'initiative de Valérie Giscard d'Estaing, on assiste au déroulement d'un mouvement de regroupement familial dans le territoire français ce qu'augmentera considérablement le nombre des immigrants en France, de provenance notamment nord-africaine.

En revenant à l'idée précédente, le fait d'être un mouvement fortement volontariste – expression d'une initiative personnelle de chaque individu en vue d'obtention de quelques gains matériels – fait preuve pour la nature purement économique des premières vagues d'immigration. L'assimilation devient opérationnelle par le biais de la qualification collective des immigrants comme faire partie de la classe des travailleurs. Les difficultés potentielles d'intégration ont été automatiquement placés dans le contexte de la lutte des classes, tout en cherchant d'éviter la connotation politique de l'existence minoritaire.

La qualité de travailleur est attribuée sur la base d'un contrat à durée déterminée en sous-entendant qu'à la fin les immigrants rentreront d'eux même dans leur pays d'origine. En fait, nulle part n'est envisagé explicitement l'idée de l'établissement définitif des immigrants sur le territoire français, mais la dégradation des conditions de vie dans les états de provenance, surtout en Algérie, a fortement contribué à la révocation d'idée du retour, bien que ce désir continue d'être cultivé jusqu'au-delà de l'année 1980 (et, parmi eux, même aujourd'hui).

Le phénomène acquiert une dimension politique au moment où le rapport entre les différentes instances sociales change, à la suite d'une situation de crise qui conjugue plusieurs facteurs, notamment économiques, et qui génère des répercussions graves sur le marché de travail, surtout une compétition acerbe pour les emplois disponibles. Dans ce contexte, on parle, de la même façon, de l'institutionnalisation du chômage⁶, en tant que réalité formative pour le mental collectif, en disposant ainsi de nouveaux ressorts dans le processus de résurgence des particularismes identitaires. A partir de ce moment-là, l'existence minoritaire, en présentant un caractère visiblement asymptomatique, métastase, sur le plan social, des nouvelles controverses qui peuvent être solutionnées par l'intervention directe du gouvernement. Mais les instances politiques viennent d'être engagées d'une manière totalement distincte par rapport au premier contact, tout en excédant les objectifs économiques de l'état récepteur et en contractant les limites de l'identité nationale dans le processus de gestion des arguments ethniques relatif aux implications du pluralisme culturel pour l'ordre sociale.

De l'immigrant au citoyen: le modèle français d'intégration

La France des années 1980 engage progressivement un discours politique dont les variables utilitaires se construisent sur le principe de l'unité et de la cohésion de la société française autour des grands thèmes tels que les valeurs républicaines, la citoyenneté ou la nature traditionnellement universaliste et cosmopolite de la nation française (Favell, 2001: 40).⁷

⁶ Pour plus d'informations voir Didier Demazière, "Experiența șomajului în Franța: procese de excludere și construcția identității" in Adrian Neculau, Gilles Ferréol (coord.), *Minoritari, marginali, excluși*, Iași, Editura Polirom, 1996

⁷ "around grand themes of republican values, citizenship and the traditional universal and cosmopolitan nature of French nationhood". Voir aussi Brie, Mircea; Polgar, Istvan and Chirodea, Florentina (2012): *Cultural Identity, Diversity and European Integration. Introductory Study*. Published in: *Annals University of Oradea. International Relations and European Studies*, Vol. Supple, No. *European Union. Identity, Diversity and Integration* (2012): pp. 7-20; Brie, Mircea; Polgar, Istvan and Chirodea, Florentina (2012): *European*

La direction politique concernant l'immigration et l'intégration constitue l'apport exclusif de l'intellectualité parisienne qui a monopolisé les débats publics de la huitième décennie, la répétition de mêmes principes dans la construction d'une position officielle relative au problème incité par les immigrants en étant la conséquence directe de la récurrence de mêmes figures dans les discussions publiques, tels qu'Alain Touraine ou Dominique Schnapper. Conformément à Adrian Favell, la pensée officielle concernant ce sujet s'élabore à l'occasion de deux événements majeurs "en permanence invoqués dans les débats, sondés par les médias et utilisés comme instrument linguistique et conceptuel fondamental par les politiciens et les politologues dans leur tentatives de révision et justification des projets politiques: les *Rapports de la Commission de la Nationalité* (1987-1988) et le *Haut Conseil à l'Intégration* (1990-1993)" (Favell, 2001: 42).⁸

L'une des conséquences majeures de ces deux investigations au caractère largement participatif et interdisciplinaire a été, conformément aux affirmations de l'auteur, le consensus extraordinaire qui découle de cette initiative et détermine l'émergence de la République du centre ce qui signifie la transcendance de la fission historique entre la droite et la gauche politiques concernant l'héritage de la Révolution française (Favell, 2001: 43).⁹

En tant que produit du particularisme historique et culturel français, le modèle républicain de la citoyenneté universelle est circonscrit aux demandes de sauvegarde de l'identité nationale, en constituant "une variable-clé pour expliquer la méthode et les politiques françaises des années 1980"(Favell, 2001: 43).¹⁰

Le débat officiel concernant la base normative de l'intégration, en tant que mesure à l'intérieur de la politique de gestion de l'hétérogénéité culturelle, s'est imposé à la suite d'un changement dans le paradigme de l'évaluation du rapport immigrant / état. Par le dépassement de la valeur purement économique attribuée au phénomène d'immigration et le développement de la dimension politique de celui-ci, la France est soumise aux transformations majeures, en affrontant, dans le même temps, l'ascension du régionalisme et le déclin réel de la nation en tant que source de solidarité sociale, à travers la fragilisation du pouvoir de l'état et de sa capacité de financer les programmes d'assistance sociale Favell, 2001: 43).¹¹

Sur plan social, la France "assiste à la résurgence des particularismes, des identités collectives (les français n'agrèent pas le terme minorités) qui prétendent être publiquement

Union. Identity, Diversity and Integration. Published in: Annals University of Oradea. International Relations and European Studies No. Supplement 2012 (2012): pp. 1-342.

⁸ "continually referred to in the debates, scrutinised by the media, and used as the basic linguistic and conceptual blueprints for politicians and policy-makers in their attempts to revise and justify policy developments: the *rapports* of the *Commission de la Nationalité* (1987–8) and the *Haut Conseil à l'Intégration* (1990–3)"

⁹ "The documents can be read as the focal point of an extraordinary consensus in French public affairs, on the vocabulary, themes and theoretical frame they provided for more detailed political discussion and debate. In essence, it was a consensus which coincided with the emergence of *la République du centre* (the centrist republic), much discussed at the time: the recent surpassing of the historical divisions of left and right about the legacy of the French Revolution".

¹⁰ "The apparent rootedness of the public philosophy is testified by the fact that a number of recent American commentators, most notably Rogers Brubaker, have indeed 'corroborated' the official French self-perceptions by making what they call the 'historical cultural idiom' of republican citizenship the key variable in explaining French policy and politics in the 1980s." Pour mieux comprendre les arguments des officialités françaises, celui historique et notamment celui culturel, voir les explications qu'Adrian Favell donne dans les pages 45-45 du livre cité.

¹¹ "That is, the growing power of regionalism, the decline of the nation as a source of social solidarity, and the decline in real terms of both the state's powers of governance and its ability to fund social welfare programmes."

reconnues, tandis que, simultanément, se réédite l'individualisme démocratique" (Wierviorka, 2000: 158)¹² – situation plus que propice pour l'émergence de l'Islam, massivement infusé au sein de la société française. Le besoin de la reconnaissance publique, dans sa forme rééditée, détermine le réveil de la vivacité des identités infranationales (Schnaper, 2004: 158), dont les manifestations mobilisent plusieurs agents moraux soumis progressivement au phénomène de l'exclusion, à l'injustice sociale, aspects qui produisent l'expérience de quelques formes intenses d'inégalité.¹³ Dans ce sens, est nécessaire de se rappeler la mobilisation extraordinaire des immigrants dans une marche pacifiste pour l'égalité - la 'marche des beurs' - l'octobre / le novembre 1983, auquel on ajoute les initiatives Convergence 84 et Divergence 85 (Robine, 2006: 136-139). En accédant aux nouvelles significations de la reproduction sociale, dégagée de tout sens portant sur sa nature de prolétaire, "la figure de l'immigrant émerge dans le contexte des relations de voisinage, à l'école ou au cœur des manifestations collectives qui ont eu lieu après 1968" (Amiriaux, 2006: 198), en provoquant une discontinuité dans l'évolution prospère de la France, caractéristique pour les trente glorieuses (expression qu'on utilise pour nommer les années qui suivent la Seconde Guerre Mondiale).

Tous ces aspects, analysés au sens cumulatif, se constituent dans un mouvement subversif par rapport aux instances d'application des valeurs républicaines, en agressant directement l'institution abstractive de l'universalisme français, et en générant une crise potentielle de la République (en reproduisant l'expression articulée par une partie de l'intellectualité française), en tant que manifestation active "d'une nouvelle ère caractérisée par des processus fondamentaux de fragmentation, déstructuration et recomposition identitaire. (Wierviorka, 2000: 228)".

L'idée même d'une France soumise à l'agression ethno historique, mais pas au sens classique du conflit ethno politique, mais dans un contexte terminologique qui revendique des valeurs typiques au libéralisme et l'universalisme français compromises sous l'action de l'altérité (l'état même en s'apercevant à l'intérieur d'une stase républicaine), a vraiment orienté vers une introversion au niveau étatique. De ce fait, l'état a refusé d'accorder un statut légal aux minorités en tant qu'identité collective et s'assume une véritable mission civique par rapport à l'altérité. C'est en ce sens que l'ascension, depuis la moitié des années '80, du Front National (extrême droit) a eu un rôle significatif, en ayant Monsieur Le Pen comme président du parti qui a légitimé les appréhensions nationales relatives à l'extension des droits sociaux et au pluralisme politique, mais introduites au cœur d'une critique centrée sur les immigrants: "ils étaient la cause principale de l'altération de la nature de citoyenneté

¹² "France has witnessed the emergence of particularisms, collective identities (the French dislike speaking of 'minorities') who demand recognition in the public sphere, while, at the same time, individualism is on the rise."

¹³ On assiste aussi à toute une série des mouvements revendicatifs avant 1973, opérés par des groupes qui se auto percevaient d'être minoritaires, mais dont les actions étaient sans un caractère politique réel et légitimant: "ainsi, dans la France, le mouvement breton re-émerge après une longue période de discréditation à cause d'orientation pronazi pendant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale; le mouvement occitan se construit autour de certaines revendications, culturelles et économiques, lancées par l'association des viticulteurs dans la région; ultérieurement, la France s'affrontera au mouvement corse qui se montrera beaucoup plus violent" (Michel Wieviorka, "The Making of Differences" in *International Sociology*, 2004, 19; 281, p. 283: "In France, for example, the Breton movement re-emerged after having been discredited on account of its pro-Nazi leanings during the Second World War (Le Coadic, 1998) ; the Occitan movement combined cultural aspirations with the economic demands of the wine growers (Touraine et al., 1981); a little later, the Corsican movement emerged and was rapidly attracted to violence."). Au même temps, le cas de la population juive supra dimensionnera le problème relatif à la gestion de la diversité culturelle quand ils s'assument une identité ethnique, dans un contexte national de dénégation de l'existence minoritaire, et réussissent d'obtenir une visibilité extraordinaire au sein de la société française.

française, tout en dénonçant l'influence corruptrice des nord-africains et de la culture islamique sur la culture nationale authentique française" (Favell, 2001: 53).¹⁴

Le Pen propose la mobilisation civique de la population, à l'intérieur de la communauté culturelle de la France, en supra licitant le caractère négatif du droit à la différence introduit par Jack Lang, le ministre de la culture pendant les 1980¹⁵, en soutenant fortement que par la dénomination unique des immigrés, quoiqu'ils seraient des citoyens ou des nouveaux immigrants, voir des résidents clandestins, on procède trop facilement à l'attribution des mêmes droits sociaux à tous (Favel, 2001: 53-54).¹⁶ Ce fait ne réside qu'en l'atrophie de l'institution civique, expression de la quelle découle le besoin de la réitération du dévouement face à la singularité de l'histoire et de la culture françaises, en transposant l'intégration des immigrés au sein des phénomènes qui se développent uniquement par l'assimilation au fond de l'identité française, voir une francisation complète: "être français, cela se mérite". A ce titre, Dominique Schnapper affirme: "les relations avec l'autrui, étrangers et migrants, s'inscrivent aussi dans une tradition spécifique, sur laquelle pèsent les souvenirs de naissance de la nation et de la légitimité politique des empires coloniales, des guerres et du projet politique originaire. [...] En France, la logique spécifique de la citoyenneté s'oppose à celle-ci des minorités." (Schnapper, 2004: 193)

Ayant comme vocation un "abstrait universel" (Dominique Schnapper), la logique normative française appliquée dans la gestion des éléments du post-colonialisme conjugue les principes de la démocratie avec l'idéal de l'homogénéité objective et l'adhésion aux valeurs républicaines de citoyenneté, sécularisme et égalité.

Susceptible de donner un sens à l'existence, la nation est celle qu'élabore, à travers les instances sociopolitiques, le droit des nationalités, en mettant en interdépendance les notions d'intégration, identité nationale et nation, et en transférant le patrimoine de la communauté historique et de la signification identitaire au celui qui adhère consciencieusement aux valeurs de la société française: la nationalité française n'est pas un donné, mais un acte d'adhérence au civisme ou, en utilisant les mots de Renan: un plébiscite déroulé chaque jour (Dominique Schnapper). Ainsi, on réclame la demande morale pour l'intégration politique et sociale, au-delà de l'objectif immédiat de stabilisation des démarcations et d'une simple compression sociale. Le même Adrian Favell affirme: "par l'affirmation de l'adhésion volontaire à la nation, les nouveaux membres engagent une relation distincte avec leur nation adoptée, qui est centrée sur leur droits individuelles et leur responsabilités". (Favell, 2001: 68)

L'intégration en tant que processus actif, se construit sur la logique de l'autonomie du sujet dans la pratique des droits individuels avec quels il vient d'être investi au moment

¹⁴ "It gave voice to legitimate nationalist fears about the general extension of social rights and political pluralism, but framed in terms of a centre-piece criticism of les immigrés: that they were the root cause of the debased nature of French citizenship and, in particular, the corrupting influence of North African and Islamic culture on the authentic French national culture".

¹⁵ A travers lequel la dimension naturellement universaliste de la politique culturelle française acquerrait un vitalisme à part, par le biais d'un militantisme consacré à l'affirmation de toutes formes de culture, soit supérieure soit inférieure, et l'émergence d'un espace de pluralisme culturel capable d'arrêter l'instauration d'un impérialisme culturel d'inspiration américaine (Cécile Laborde, "The Culture(s) of the Republic: Nationalism and Multiculturalism in French Republican Thought" in *Political Theory*, 2001, 29 ; 716, p. 723: "Jack Lang's cultural policy in the 1980s took a "vitalist" turn, championing both the untrammled expression of all forms of culture, both "high" and "low", and the emergence of a culturally pluralist world able to stem the tide of American "cultural imperialism")

¹⁶ "By emphasizing their diverse cultural and religious background, and blurring the lines between new immigrants with full citizenship and those still foreign or illegal residents, the crudely identified immigrés were all thereby said to enjoy overly easy and unproblematic access to social rights and welfare".

de l'adoption, par l'autorité souveraine, des principes libéraux. Ce fait entraîne des conséquences multiples, parmi lesquelles on retrouve la subordination automatique de la culture particulière à l'égalité en droit, principe légitimant pour le refus net concernant l'approbation officielle des minorités en tant que groupes (Adrian Favell).

L'application de certaines restrictions normatives dans la définition du rapport entre l'individu, la culture et l'état touche aussi le problème d'un savoir commun et la rationalisation de la pensée à travers la sécularisation active, nécessaire dans les représentations du raisonnement d'état. La religion en tant que ressource est dénoncée parce qu'elle excède le cadre institutionnel des valeurs civiques, l'espace public en étant dégagé des particularismes religieux à la suite de la neutralité imposée par la législation de 1905; l'individu peut se prévaloir du droit de la pratique religieuse seulement à l'intérieur de la sphère privée, conformément aux principes de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme.

Quoiqu'au fond, l'institution du sécularisme attaque incontestablement et de manière invariable la religion en tant qu'idée régulatrice pour l'espace public, le principe *per se* euphémise de fait la pratique islamophobe, en devenant, à ce titre, une forme de "fondamentalisme *per se* qui discrimine la religion musulmane. [...] Les droits et la dignité des femmes sont typiquement citées comme exemples de l'incompatibilité de l'Islam avec les valeurs républicaines" (Murray, 2006: 40).¹⁷ A ce titre-là, on invoque en permanence l'affaire du foulard¹⁸, fait qui s'ensuit d'un vrai apartheid institutionnel (Ayhan Kaya) en tenant compte que les autres religions bénéficient d'un traitement distinct.¹⁹ Par contre, il y existe une tendance actuelle, parmi les musulmans, de radicaliser leur discours officiel, en portant plus des connotations islamiques que républicaines; on a lancé davantage des revendications au caractère équivoque généré par l'alternance entre la dimension civique et celle civile dans la construction de celles-ci (Kaya, 2006: 4), tout en supra licitant l'effet que le processus d'enclaver socialement apporte. Au même temps, plus des jeunes musulmans renoncent au style de vie imposé par une vision islamique fondamentaliste, en refusant de s'assumer l'identité musulmane au-delà de sa dimension symbolique, c'est-à-dire le refus de la lecture classique du rituel religieux et la dénégation du caractère obligatoire d'un comportement canonique, fait qui les rapproche du projet politique de la nation française: "ceux-ci sont des nouveaux musulmans qui se rapportent à l'Islam dans une manière remarquablement moderne - qui laïcisent l'Islam à peu près de la même sorte que leur pairs chrétiens ont laïcisé le Christianisme. Pour eux, l'Islam constitue un cadre de référence culturel et étique, mais assez détaché de la pratique rituelle."²⁰ On reviendra ultérieurement sur cette question.

¹⁷ "la laïcité (secularism) in France seems to have become a form of fundamentalism itself which discriminates against the country's Muslims. [...] The rights and dignity of women are typically cited as examples of the incompatibility of Islam with *les valeurs républicaines*."

¹⁸ Pour plus d'informations concernant *L'affaire du foulard* voir Adrian Favell, *op. cit.*, p. 153 et les suivantes

¹⁹ Pour plus d'informations sur ce sujet, voir Graham Murray, *op. cit.*, p. 41; Joëlle Allouche-Benayoun, "Comment être juif croyant et moderne dans la France d'aujourd'hui?" in *Sociétés*, n° 92, 2006; Jocelyne Cesari, "Islam in France: the Shaping of a Religious Minority" in Yvonne Haddad-Yazbek, *Muslims in the West, from Sojourners to Citizens*, 2002, Oxford University Press, p. 36-51

²⁰ "These are "new Muslims" who relate to Islam in remarkably modern terms - who are secularizing Islam, much the same way their Christian peers have secularized Christianity. For them, Islam constitutes a cultural or ethical frame of reference, fairly detached from ritualistic practice."(Jocelyne Cesari, *op. cit.*) A la suite de cet idée: "For Muslim immigrants, settlement in France has essentially meant exilic isolation from natural modes of transmission that has resulted in a cultural gap between parents and children. [...] Limited in means as members of the French working class, these parents have lost crucial battles against dominant French educational, cultural, and social institutions in their struggle to inculcate the cultural values of their home countries. [...] many young Muslims are now relating to Islam as "consumers." They are choosing

C'est cela le visage sous lequel le contrat social se réactive, à travers des arguments empiriques, dans un nouveau cadre normatif qui régleme la relation culture / nation par le biais d'une théorie d'intégration dont la force morale exclut la définition des particularismes en termes politiques et de laquelle se soustrait seulement celui qui n'est pas, au cœur, français. La théorie a été appliquée par la promulgation de nouvel Code de la nationalité française et l'entrée en vigueur des lois Pasqua, l'été de 1993, qui "obligeait les enfants nés en France de parents étrangers à faire une démarche positive entre 16 et 21 ans - en d'autres termes, à manifester leur volonté - s'ils souhaitaient acquérir la nationalité française, obligation abrogée en 1998 par la loi dite "Guigou" qui rétablit, pour ces jeunes, l'automaticité de l'acquisition de la nationalité française à la majorité" (Ribert, 2009: 570).

La critique du modèle républicain: l'ethnicité en tant que principe régulateur pour la réorganisation du projet d'intégration sociale

Pour la conceptualisation et l'évaluation pratique de la philosophie de l'intégration, les instances de décision notamment, et celles d'application de la politique d'immigration ont procédé à l'exclusion, tant dans les communiqués officiels que surtout dans la législation, de la notion d'ethnicité en tant que principe opérable pour la diagnose de la société française; c'est-à-dire, en faisant recours invariablement au cadre idéologique républicain, on impose une matrice d'interprétation des faits sociaux qu'évade volontairement la dynamique sociale de l'ethnicité en tant que processus continu (Amiriaux, 2006: 194). Ce fait conduit incontestablement à l'institutionnalisation d'une forme progressive de racisme, par la réinterprétation des relations qui s'établissent entre la majorité et la minorité; dans ce contexte-là, la majorité est susceptible de créer un groupe unitaire, par contre, la minorité est aperçue d'être excédentaire par rapport au contenu moral attribué à la société par les français.

En construisant autour d'une controverse des catégories – expression qu'émane de la terminologie opérée dans le discours social, Amiriaux et Simon considèrent que le choix de la communauté scientifique de ne pas utiliser les catégories ethniques et raciales dans les statistiques empêche l'accumulation des données sur la pratique discriminatoire et contribue effectivement à l'euphémisation des impacts sociaux du racisme.²¹ Le discours officiel est donc dégagé de toute expression raciste, en tant que pratique sociale, ce que permet de conserver les mécanismes de reproduction des inégalités. Et cela dans un contexte où la société s'affronte à une politique concernant l'accès aux ressources et la redistribution des droits culturellement déterminée.

Les actions violentes d'octobre/ novembre 2005, déclenchées par les habitants des zones périphériques de Paris et d'ailleurs – l'expression d'un défoulement réel et simultanément agressif des jeunes minoritaires (les enfants de l'immigration) victimes du système social français – ont mis en lumière la condition réelle des communautés ethniques en France. Notre intention ici n'est pas de présenter chronologiquement les

which rules and tenets of their religion to embrace and which to dismiss. [...] On a philosophical level, they search within Islam - especially with better education and greater upward mobility - for ethical and moral values to guide the course of their lives. Drawing a distinction between those who merely believe and those whose belief leads to practice, they have broadened the term, "believer." For them, it includes those who, like themselves, acknowledge the legitimacy of Islamic rules and values without observing. This redefinition of believer allows them to remain a bona fide part of their parents' community."

²¹ "while choosing not to use ethnic and racial categories in statistics, the French scientific community prevents the accumulation of discrimination data and contributes to euphemizing the social impacts of racism. While wishing to avoid the hardening of ethnic and racial divisions, statistical invisibility contradicts the experience of the dominated and functions as a normative imposition."

événements de 2005, ce fait étant excédentaire à nos objectifs, mais de faire preuve, par le biais des instruments fournis par le seul événement, des inadverances du modèle français d'intégration sociale qui fonctionne impeccablement au niveau théorique, mais lorsqu'il est appliqué on peut aisément observer une recrudescence d'un modèle exclusif de gestion des différences. Et ce fait ne touche pas seulement les opportunités de travail et l'ascension professionnelle, mais aussi le système de logement et l'attitude des autorités policières vers les ethniques minoritaires; au même temps, le manque de la représentativité syndicale et, surtout, institutionnelle, maintient un tel déficit au niveau de l'intégration des minorités (Murray, 2006: 27-32).

Dans une logique similaire, Ayhan Kaya affirme que "ce ne sont pas tant la différence culturelle et l'islamisme qui ont fait descendre les jeunes musulmans dans la rue qu'une réaction en chaîne à deux siècles de colonialisme et de racisme, renforcés par des phénomènes récents de pauvreté et d'exclusion" (Kaya, 2006: 2). La liaison faite entre les immigrants musulmans et les groupes extrémistes, d'une manière univoque et indépendamment du contexte social, explique en part l'attitude sceptique des autorités relative à la capacité d'intégration de ces catégories dans un système pacifiste de cohabitation; dans le même temps, on assiste à une permutation dans la pensée de l'acteur social français dont l'imaginaire construit de façon différente le statut de l'immigrant nord-africain: de l'arabe, respectivement le maghrébin, on passe, à la suite des attentats de 9/11, au musulman qui fait dès l'objet d'un racisme justifiable, opérable au fur et à mesure que l'islamophobie devienne légitime, tout en véhiculant, de façon obsessionnelle, l'existence des cellules terroriste dans les banlieues de Paris. En ce sens, Antoine Boulangé dénonce l'amalgame « islam=intégrisme=terrorisme » (Boulange, 2004) qu'émerge en tant que principe pour la définition de la communauté islamique vers laquelle on manifeste une attitude tout à fait hostile, soutenue par l'instrumentalisation de toutes ressources disponibles, voir les acteurs sociaux français – particulièrement l'enrôlement des formateurs d'opinion – dans une vraie propagande contre les musulmans. Conformément à Jocelyne Cesari, la fausse conception vers l'Islam acquiert en France un caractère particulier, lié à l'appréhension de plus en plus manifeste concernant l'accroissement de la visibilité musulmane sur le territoire français (Cesari, 2001: 36).²²

Quoiqu'on constate une tendance authentique de laïcisation parmi les jeunes immigrants à travers l'invalidation de l'islam en tant qu'idée régulatrice pour le processus de maturation, ce n'est pas l'aspect qu'intéresse²³; les autorités françaises persistent dans le même objectif, c'est-à-dire, l'inculcation d'une image erronée concernant la désobéissance des communautés islamiques à travers le rattachement du concept musulman à un noyau des significations négatives, tout en cherchant de mettre en lumière le caractère menaçant de leur présence dans le territoire. Cette attitude est bien expliquée par Jérémy Robine dans l'article *Des ghettos dans la nation. Conflit géopolitique à propos des enfants français de l'immigration postcoloniale*, où il dénonce l'initiative de Nicolas Sarkozy concernant la création d'un ministère de l'Immigration et de l'Identité nationale, fait qui

²² "The widespread misconception of Islam has its own particular version in France, where fears of a growing Muslim visibility have, since the 1980's, unleashed French passions – especially in the form of racist murders in suburban housing projects."

²³ On parle d'une tendance identifiable pas seulement parmi les jeunes musulmans, mais aussi au sein des autres communautés minoritaires. Au même temps, la source d'identification ne reste plus la nation française, mais cela passe à la société française. Pour mieux comprendre les rapports entre les immigrants et leur pays de résidence – c'est-à-dire, la France – d'une part, et leur pays d'origine, d'autre part, analysés comparativement et d'une perspective multi niveau, et pour une présentation détaillée de la sphère motivationnelle du chaque segment, voir Evelyne Ribert, *op. cit.*

contrevient de manière flagrante à l'éthique vers les communautés minoritaires : "Le cœur des reproches exprimés contre la création de ce ministère réside dans le fait que son intitulé associe « immigration » et « identité nationale », affirmant ainsi tout d'abord que la nation [de la] France serait confrontée à une menace, touchant particulièrement son « identité nationale », et que ce problème d'identité nationale que connaîtrait la France serait lié à l'immigration. La création de ce ministère aurait ainsi pour effet d'appuyer cette idée partagée par une partie importante des Français." (Robine, 2006: 176)

D'autre part, l'emplacement des banlieues et la manière dans laquelle ont été bâties touche sévèrement les gens qui les habitent, tant leur esprit que leur façon de se rapporter à la vie, en général. Pour beaucoup d'entre eux, le seul espoir est de quitter ces milieux dont la dynamique est une de ghettoïsation tant physique que morale. En plus, pour arriver dans les banlieues, c'est souvent nécessaire de changer plusieurs moyens de transport ce qui réduit nettement les possibilités de garder un emploi, presque toujours offert par des entreprises ou bureaux qui siègent au cœur de la ville.

Le soutien pour telles formes d'urbanisation, partiellement arrêtées dès 1973²⁴, a conduit vers une ghettoïsation des jeunes immigrants, aperçue de la même façon jusqu'au aujourd'hui, fortement renforcée par la tendance vers une atomisation sociale, voir ségrégation, et par l'état général de pauvreté – les aspects d'un dysfonctionnement aisément identifiable dès les premiers jours d'habitation là-bas. Cette accumulation des traits tout à fait négatifs portant sur le même espace annonce le caractère territorial du problème exprimé dans l'incapacité de quitter les quartiers-ghettos (Robine, 2006: 188); nous met face à une conséquence directe de la perpétuation des attitudes discriminatoires, particulièrement vers les noirs et les arabes, les seuls probablement qui restent dans ces espaces de compromis social. (Robine, 2006: 189-191)

Les émeutes s'avèrent d'être pratiquement l'effet de l'oppression raciale et de la discrimination, des phénomènes qui contreviennent à l'égalité en droit et celle des chances proclamées par le caractère universaliste de la société française. Dans le discours des multiculturalistes français, cette espèce d'universalisme dit *culture-blind* est à la fois mystificateur et faux parce qu'il, premièrement, repose sur un cadre idéologique fortement permissif pour la discrimination en tant qu'élément structurel de la société, et deuxièmement, il reflète l'entendement étroit en ce qui concerne, d'une part, la relation entre la culture, l'identité et la politique démocratique, et, d'autre part, les paramètres de l'identité individuelle; c'est nécessaire d'entendre que la culture et la religion font partie de nous-mêmes, étant des données qu'on ne peut pas simplement abandonner dès qu'on accède à la sphère publique. (Laborde, 2001: 721)²⁵

Aperçue comme être une réédition de l'impérialisme colonialiste, la politique d'intégration construit un espace public qui s'avère aisément pénétrable par les acteurs de la culture dominante, mais qu'impose des restrictions parfois insurmontables pour les immigrants.

Conclusions

Fracture sociale, fracture urbaine, la République, la France pour tous, l'ordre

²⁴ Seulement pour les projets de grande ampleur, c'est-à-dire des unités plus réduites continuent d'être bâties jusqu'au 1980.

²⁵ "Culture-blind universalism is blamed for being, respectively, mystifying or mistaken. According to the first, more radical charge, culture-blind universalism works as an ideological mystification that perpetuates existing structures of domination. [...] According to the second line of attack, culture-blind universalism relies on a mistaken understanding of the relationship between culture, individual identity, and democratic politics. Cultural and religious loyalties are not objects of choice that can be rationally reflected on; rather, they define individual identity and cannot therefore be "left behind" when entering the public sphere."

républicain, l'intégration, la solidarité (Murray, 2006: 44) sont des termes qui renvoient carrément à la rhétorique de l'extrême droite, par le biais desquels on sollicite la diffusion inconditionné d'un modèle officiel de *melting-pot* qu'exige la dissolution effective de l'identité individuelle. Par l'homogénéisation forcée des cultures, voir la désintégration de tous particularismes identitaires au nom des valeurs universelles, on se rapproche à une espèce d'assimilation semblable au racisme; en exigeant le renoncement à toutes formes de culture individuelle, voir identité parce qu'elles sauraient inférieures à celle de français, on s'engage dans un discours tout à fait raciste qui proclame la discréditation, voir dénégation de l'altérité et l'intégrité de l'autrui.²⁶

Dans un contexte très spécifique, largement déterminé par la diversification structurelle de la société française, les valeurs du projet national français s'avèrent plus contraignantes que libératoires, particulièrement pour les nord-africains issus d'une histoire coloniale également opprimante; leur exclusion de manière tout à fait doctrinaire s'ensuit progressivement d'une introversion générale qui touche aussi le niveau organisationnel. A partir du moment où cela s'achève, on aperçoit la réalité d'une façon totalement dénaturée, renforcée par l'idée d'une hyper marginalisation dont l'interprétation se fait par recours aux principes presque nihilistes. Dans telles conditions, la religion fournit l'espace d'une supra identification, l'espace de refuge qui doit être fortement revendiqué; en ce sens, les tendances fondamentalistes ne constituent pas une externalisation de certains principes, voir donnés immanents, mais au contraire elles expriment une réaction tout à fait normale face la marginalisation, voir l'invalidation des cultures minoritaires, en l'occurrence les musulmans.²⁷

Au même temps, la *radicalisation progressive de l'identité musulmane*, en citant Ayhan Kaya, s'avère beaucoup plus complexe qu'on peut s'imaginer; si on change la perspective d'interprétation et on se met au cœur de la politique institutionnelle, on peut légèrement observer la différence entre les instruments que chaque identité utilise pour faire passer leur demandes: "On peut faire le parallèle avec les analyses d'Alasdair MacIntyre (1971), pour lequel il y a deux modes de politique: les « politiques des établis » (*politics of the insiders*) et les « politiques d'étrangers » (*politics of the outsiders*). Les établis portent leur pratique politique via des institutions politiques légitimes (Parlement, partis politiques, médias) alors que les étrangers (*outsiders*) s'appuient sur la culture, l'ethnie, la religion et les traditions pour atteindre leurs buts (Bloul, 1999). Le développement de pratiques ethnoculturelles et religieuses par les immigrés et les groupes minoritaires peut donc être perçu comme un désir de rattachement à la sphère politico-publique." (Kaya, 2006: 3)

L'ethnicité devient parfois une variable dans la distribution des services au niveau institutionnel ce qu'amène le racisme parmi les principes systémiques et entraîne une évolution vers la ségrégation. Cette réalité est fortement déniée par les autorités françaises

²⁶ Michel Wieviorka, "The Making of Differences", p. 292 ("those who wish to accelerate or stress a process of decline of cultural differences in the name of universal values may, in extreme cases, advocate a form of assimilation which becomes a sort of racism: to tell a group that its identity must disappear and dissolve is tantamount to discrediting, denying and despising it, seeing therein a danger and this sort of discourse can degenerate into racism, a negation of the alterity and integrity of the members of the group targeted.")

²⁷ Michel Wieviorka, dans l'article "The Making of Differences", p. 290, relate le cas suivant: "in the course of fieldwork, I have often met young Muslims in France who say two things (Wieviorka, 1999). In the first instance, they explain that their choice of Islam is personal and deliberate. Second, they consider that Islam enables them to keep going when confronted with a racist society and one in which their living conditions are particularly difficult. In this case, Islam does not keep them apart from society; on the contrary, it is Islam which enables them to be satisfied with limited access to resources, on in any case to bear this while waiting for something better in the future. "

qui ont pris l'habitude de changer les paramètres d'approche, c'est-à-dire de remplacer les éléments de discrimination par des valeurs républicaines. La construction du projet politique et sociétal autour des valeurs strictement libérales a, pour la France, des répercussions qui portent sur l'idée d'une mission civilisatrice, voir post colonialisme, qui la détermine de prendre des décisions qui continuent d'atomiser et de requalifier (du point de vue identitaire) les groupes qu'elle souhaite d'intégrer. Pour reprendre les mots de Wierviorka, ce qu'il reste pour la France c'est d'apprendre les moyens de faire la transition de l'analyse du racisme à la compréhension du système, voir pratique discriminatoire, en acceptant de fait que la France est devenue une société multiraciale.

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SURVIVORS OF HOLOCAUST AT THE JEWISH COMMUNITY FROM ORADEA

Anca OLTEAN*

Abstract: *The element of novelty brought by this paper is to valorify a number of 8 questionnaires with Jews that either were deported or their family members were deported, from Oradea. Together with an introduction in the topic of the history of Jews from Romania and Hungary from the years 1945-1953 and an analysis of the existent bibliography in this field of research, these are the contributions brought by this paper. The questionnaires, the original part of this paper, reveal the uncertainty, scarcity of material resources, the illnesses and the political pressure that the Jewish community from Oradea had to bear after their return from Holocaust.*

Keywords: *Jews, history, Holocaust, postwar, community, communism*

1) General considerations concerning the History of the Jews from Romania and Hungary during the years 1945-1953

We find the theme “History of the Jews in Romania and Hungary (1945 – 1953) in the Romanian and Hungarian historiographies” a topical issue, a topic whose reinterpretation is required. The communist history held the role or even the existence of minorities and their peculiarities unnoticed. The Jewish community continued to exist during communism, as well, and the Jews were trying to keep their traditions and aspirations (an example being their massive emigration to Israel, as illustrated the Rabbi of Romania, Moses Rosen in his book *Primejdii, încercări, miracole*).

This does not mean that the communist Romanian state did not attempt to assimilate minorities, to lead a policy of levelling the differences and particularisms. However, the state failed to destroy the Jewish community, although the emigration has reduced this community to merely a few thousand today.

Transylvania is a unique space in which all ethnic communities make their presence felt. The Jewish Community of Oradea had been well represented in the interwar period, by comparison to what happened in other cities. The ghettoization experience to which many Jews from Oradea had been submitted under the Hungarian rule of Horthy caused many to emigrate; nevertheless, the remaining small Jewish community still conducts a series of activities in Oradea.

This community has played an important role in the modernization and development of the city on the Criș River. Researching the history of this community in a difficult period that were the years 1945 - 1953, period during which many tend to say that it was basically extinct, I was able to find printed works that confirm the existence of the community, including a considerable amount of archived documents. I think I was able to reveal the problems faced by the community during those years, its attempts to integrate

* Researcher, Institute of Euroregional Studies, Faculty of History, International Relations, Political Sciences and Science of Communication, University of Oradea, Romania. E-mail: oltean@igri.ro

within the Romanian nation, or to conceal itself by choosing the path of emigration. That confirms that the rich ethnic diversity of the Transylvanian space could disappear suddenly by a stroke of the pen (see the Teheran and Yalta Agreements).

The theme that I chose to research was approached in the spirit of the nowadays European historiography. I found more than 100 works (volumes of documents, memoirs and special papers) relating to the Jews during the years 1945-1953 in Romania and Hungary. Further research is needed on the Jewish history from 1945 - 1953, including on the base of the material found in the archives. There is sufficient archival material, especially in the local archives, that have remained unexplored on the situation of the Jews in Romania and Hungary in the first years after the war. It would be desirable for these sources to be integrated into scientific circulation.

The theme of our paper lead us to try to make an in-depth comparative research on the history of the Jews in Romania and Hungary, to look into these Romanian-Hungarian Jews in the period after 1945 in the broader context of the communist space, separated from the West by the Iron Curtain. The public space had very little to offer to the minority, and the minority's possibilities to manifest their own culture were not to the liking of the authorities. The minority member was accepted to join the communist society precisely by dropping their own specificity, their ethnic features, by integrating into the cultural and the public space of the new Romanian communist society.

Of course, there is always a private sphere, less exposed to the public, a sphere where the traditions, religion and culture were perpetuated. Such a framework was the family and the relations with the community members whose particularities were not in plain view, but somewhat hidden. Important is the fact that such inter-community relations existed. Within the family, the community specific culture was carried on in many cases based on traditions.

Despite criticism against the communist regime concerning the forced integration of the ethnic communities in Romania, the majority culture tended to accept Jews by giving them a chance to integrate into a new society, after several centuries of them having been regarded with suspicion or having congregated into a *separatum corpus* in the Hungarian and Romanian spaces. Insufficient knowledge about the Jewish community, the envy arisen about the Jewish congregation because of their strong entrepreneurial spirit led to the emergence of many prejudices and stereotypes concerning the image of the Jew in the mental of our community, as it is shown by Andrei Oișteanu in his work *Imaginea evreului în cultura română (The image of the Jew in the Romanian culture)*. After the war, the Jews' need to integrate, to be regarded as a constituent part of the Romanian people, and not to be regarded as intruders, especially after the genocide of the Holocaust that rendered them heavily injured physically and morally, was visible both in Romania, and Hungary. The Jews tried to integrate into the newly created communist society, with many of them, in the beginning, truly believing in communism. In 1945, they perceived communism as the only force who could oppose fascism, racism and xenophobia. Soon, however, they realized that the new system was not a democratic system and their vast majority chose emigration. After the war, there were remaining in Romania around 420 000 Jews, as it is shown by Liviu Rotman. Of these, nearly all emigrated during the communist period.

Our research aimed at the critical assessment of the scientific publications that have studied the history of Jews in Romania and Hungary during the years 1945 to 1953. This is how we made an inventory of the historiography of the problem that demonstrates that in these years the Jews can be regarded as a distinct ethnic group and it demonstrates

that we can speak of a history of the Jews. In the first years after the war, things tended to return to normal and the Jews tried to rebuild their lives. Not all Jews were communists, there were Jewish organizations that did not integrate into the communist landscape and were therefore abolished. There were Jews who were victims of the communist regime, being detained in prison or in hard labour at the construction of the Danube - Black Sea canal. The number of communist Jewish was not as great as it was said later on, especially as a share of the total population. As I noted above, it is not difficult to see why some have chosen communism – it had saved them from death, and many were those who perceived it that way. We should not ignore the fact that at the time it was a large-scale trend in the Jewish world, the Zionism, who advocated for Jewish immigration to Israel. A great wave of Jews immigrated in those years, legally or illegally to Palestine (from 1948 Israel).

This paper tries to explain the relation between the Jews and the communism and condition of the Jew under communism. We hope that the following pages will prove that the Jews are a particular ethnic group, sharing valuable ancient traditions, and that they were not the ones who brought communism, but they accommodated to or cooperated with it at the most, while keeping hope that they would be thus contributing to the establishment of an ideal egalitarian society, or will facilitate their immigration to the “land of Israel”.

2). Sources and documentation used in the research of *History of the Jews from Romania and Hungary 1945 – 1953 in the Romanian and Hungarian Historiographies*

The **Documentary Sources of Our Research** section aims at presenting the sources we used, mainly published bibliography (collections of documents, published memoirs, general works and special works). In addition to these, of great value proved to be the data provided by several questionnaires completed and implemented by the author to the Jewish Community of Oradea, where eight Jewish Holocaust survivors were interviewed regarding their situation at the end of the world war.

We used several published collections of documents. Important are the ones coordinated by Ioan Scurtu. The first one, *România – Viața politică în documente 1945* (Scurtu, 1994), capture from the documents published in the epoch the overall situation of the country in 1945 when the country was seeking to punish the war criminals and the collaborators with the Nazi regime. The second volume of Ioan Scurtu, *România – Viața politică în documente – 1947* (Scurtu, 1994), outlines the general situation of Romania in 1947, when after removing the monarchy the communization process is completed. Another work that we have studied is that of Mihai Pelin (editor), *Cartea Albă a Securității* (Pelin, 1997), which includes documents that tell the story of the legal and illegal immigration to Israel, the Zionist organizations activism and the overall situation of the Jews of this period. Nicolae Baciú, in his work *Agonia României 1944-1948. Dosarele secrete acuză* (Baciú, 1997), illustrates the situation of Romania in the international context in 1939 – 1953, showing how Romania was betrayed by its allies, how the opponents of the communists - the Liberals and the Peasants' Party members - were falsely accused of fascism. Dumitru Hîncu, in his work *Un licăr în beznă. Acțiuni necunoscute ale diplomației române* (Hîncu, 1997), brings to the scientific debate original documents showing how Romanian diplomats serving in the West had been trying to protect the Romanian Jews during the Holocaust, highlighting the good intentions of these diplomats, and also their inability to save a considerable number of Romanian Jews from death. A very important work is the collection of documents published by Daniela

Bleoancă, Nicolae Alexandru Nicolescu, Cristina Păiușan, Dumitru Preda, *România – Israel. 50 de ani de relații diplomatice* (Bleoancă & Nicolescu & Păiușan & Preda, 2000). This volume puts us in direct relation with the evolution of diplomatic relations between Romania and Israel during the period in which we are interested (1945-1953). Through the documents, we can analyse the liaison of the Romanian Legation to Israel with the authorities in Bucharest, the Israeli diplomatic relations with the authorities in Bucharest and with the Romanian diplomats in Israel. The Hungarian collection of documents revealed several important documented evidences as to the fate of the Hungarian Jews during the Holocaust and after the war. For the period of the Holocaust we analysed the first and second Jewish Law passed in Hungary. For the postwar period we analysed documents which attempted to determine the number of deaths during forced labour in Hungarian settlements, the number of deportees buried at the periphery of their village in the County of Şopron, etc. Finally, we note the collection of documents of Mihnea Dobrințu, Dorin Dobrințu, Armand Goșu, *Istoria comunismului din România. Documente. Perioada Gheorghiu Dej (1945-1965)* (Dobrințu & Dobrințu & Goșu, 2009).

An important category of works, presenting experiences directly from the “source”, based on facts spent in a particular historical conjuncture, local or international, are the memoirs. Of course, they may have a dose of subjectivity due to exceptional moments lived by the author, be it happy or troubling ones. Completed with details provided by other sources of information: original archival documents, special papers written by specialist historians, oral history data, etc. – the memoirs contribute to deepening the historical truth, giving its understanding a private note. Such memoirs were those written by Moses Rosen, Chief Rabbi of Romania during the communist period, *Primejdii, încercări, miracole. Povestea vieții șef – rabinului Dr. Moses Rosen* (Rosen, 1991); another work was that of Mrs Teresa Mozes, *Decalog însângerat* (Mozeș, 1995), in fact her memoirs of the Holocaust when he was deported; the work of Carol Buium Beniamini, *Un sionist în vremea lui Antonescu și după aceea* (Buium Beniamini, 1999), where he is describing his activity as a Zionist, member of the Hașomer Hazair movement. Șlomo Șitnovitzer’s work, *Documentul autentic sau amintiri din închisorile comuniste din România* (Șitnovitzer, 2003), describes the year spent by the author as a Zionist prisoner of the prisons Jilava Malmaison, Pitești, Caransebes, Rahova. In his book *Speranțe în întineric. Memorii* (Saxone, 2004), Valentin Saxone describes the oppressions that he had to live under during communism, being deprived of his right to exercise his profession and the period of detention he suffered in communist prisons.

The list of general work list is not exhaustive, though they exist in abundance both in Romania and in Hungary. They provide a regional and national perspective on the Jewish history in Romania and Hungary in the period 1945-1953 and outline a general framework of these countries where communism was imposed.

Our attention was drawn to the special works written in Romanian, Hungarian or international languages like English or French. Romanian, Hungarian and Jewish authors we have outlined a considerable list of works. Here are but a few of them: Paul Lendvai, Kovács András, Victor Karádi, George Hodos, Tamás Stark, Arieh Kochavi, Bernard Wasserstein, Harry Kuller, Raphael Patai, Ladislau Gyemant, Stephen Roth, Antonio Faur, Ranki Vera, Theodor Wexler, Fejtó Ferencz, Kende Peter, Liviu Rotman, Andrei Oișteanu, Matei Cazacu, Lya Benjamin, Radu Florian, Victor Neumann, Carol Iancu, Radu Ioanid, Ablonczy Balázs, Árpád von Klimó, Kádár Gábor și Vágy Zoltan, Daniel Lowy, Molnár Judit, Jean Ancel, Maria Ghitta, Kocsis Karoly, Randolph Braham, Corneliu Crăciun, Haraszi György, Michael Shafir, Gido Attila, etc.

Among the most important works on the history of Jews in Romania and Hungary in the period 1945-1953, drafted by expert historians, sociologists, political scientists, law specialists, we will focus on those that we consider important for our research.

Thus, in *The Jews in Soviet Satellites*, the authors Peter Meyer, Bernard Weinryb, Eugene Duschinski, Nikolas Sylvain (Meyer & Weinryb & Duschinski & Sylvain, 1953) addresses the issue of property restitution for the Jews in Hungary and Romania. This was only partially returned after many difficulties. In his book *Anti-semitism without Jews. Communist Eastern Europe*, Paul Lendvai (Lendvai, 1971) makes a description of the Jews in the communist space, showing that also the Jews were victims of the communism, part of the interwar elites being deported. The author notes that in Romania the Jews supported the installation of communism, the most representative Jewish who was part of the communist elite was Ana Pauker. Viktor Karady, *Antisémitisme et stratégies d'intégration. Juifs et non- Juifs dans la Hongrie contemporaine* (Karady, 1993: 239-264), paints the picture of the Hungarian society after the war, trying to outline the prospects of integration available to the Jews in the new society. Communism meant for the Jews the beginning of a new era, while for the Hungarians it was the setting of a totalitarian regime. Raphael Patai, author of the book *The Jews of Hungary. History, culture, psychology* (Patai, 1996: 596-659), shows that while the Jews saw salvation in the arrival of the Red Army, the Hungarians saw defeat. According to the author, anti-Semitism was perpetuated in Hungary during the communist period. Theodore Wexler in the study "Procesele sioniștilor" published in the volume *Anii 1954-1960. Fluxurile și refluxurile stalinismului* (Wexler, 2000), describes the situation in Romania in 1952-1953 when the Romanian communists decide to solve the Zionists problem once and for all. By 1959, around 250 of Zionists would be arrested and interrogated. Another work is that of Fejtő Ferenc, *Magyarság, zsidóság* (Fejtő, 2000) where he shows that in the postwar Hungary the Jewish condition was not disadvantageous, while the bourgeois condition was. The Jews returned from deportation were most interested in de-fascisation and democratization. The Jews, believes author, were more educated than the Hungarian proletarians, who were preparing to occupy leadership positions, fact that helped them.

Harry Kuller, in *Evreii în România anilor 1944- 1949* (Kuller, 2002), points out that not all Jews were attracted to communism. Some opted for the new regime in order to be in some sort of shelter. The Communist Party was particularly interested to obtain the adhesion of the "Jewish street". A study by Viktor Karady, *The Jews of Europe in the Modern Era. A Socio-historical outline* (Karady, 2004: 1-452), describes a broader sociological perspective the situation of the Jews in the space of the communist state. The author believes that the Jewish property was too little returned. Liviu Rotman in his *Evreii din România în perioada comunistă: 1944- 1965* (Rotman, 2004) draws a picture of the situation of Jews in Romania during the communist era, capturing two events of major importance for the Jews in the communist space: the Slansky trial in Czechoslovakia and the "white gown affair" in the USSR. Ladislau Gyemant in *Evreii din Transilvania* (Gyemant, 2004) tells the story of the Jews in Romanian territory since ancient times to the contemporary era. The Jews try after WWII to rebuild their institutions and at the same time, they created a vast network of Zionist institutions. In June 1945, the Jews founded the Jewish Democratic Committee to substitute other Jewish organizations. Harry Kuller shows in his article *Evreii în anii tranziției spre comunism (1944-1948)* (Kuller, 2004) that in Romania, after the war, the Jews oscillated between integration and emmigration. A study by Dr. Victor Neumann, *Evreii în anii regimului comunist* (Neumann, 2004: 174-180), describes the condition of the Jews under communism by analysing the entire Jewish

community. The author shows that Jews continued to aspire to immigrate to Israel during the communist period, and rejected communist egalitarianism. Radu Ioanid in his *Răscumpărarea evreilor: Istoria acordurilor secrete dintre România și Israel* (Ioanid, 2005) describes the emigration movement of Jews to the Holy Land. The author captures the important role played by Moses Rosen in the emigration and the continuity of the Jewish community in Romania.

Kádár Gábor și Vági Zoltán in their research *The Economic Annihilation of the Hungarian Jews, 1944-1945* (Kádár & Vági, 2006: 77-87) stresses that not only Hungarian fascists supported the anti-Jewish laws in Hungary but many Hungarians who wanted to seize Jewish property were advocating for such laws. On the other hand, the deportation of Hungarian Jews lasted 8-9 months, so it was impossible for Hungarian state to incorporate their wealth. The authors' conclusion is that the local authorities indulged in looting the Jewish population. In the article by Liviu Rotman, *Spațiul paralel – un pericol pentru puterea comunistă* (Rotman, 2006), it is shown that in Romania anti-Semitism was a phenomenon often encountered. At the same time the author explains that the communist regime in Romania tried to assimilate the Jews, but they never understood them. Professor Ladislau Gyemant (Gyemant, 2011: 50) makes a study of the Jewish Community in Alba Iulia in the years 1940 to 1950. The Jewish community here tried to regroup after the war by restoring community structures, but they gradually found themselves surrendered to communism. These are but some issues raised by the special published works on the history of the Jews in Romania and Hungary in the period 1945-1953.

The volumes concerning the history of minorities in Romania and in Europe edited under the auspices of the Institute for Euroregional Studies from Oradea bring an important contribution concerning the situation of minorities in Europe in past and present. Mircea Brie, Ioan Horga, Sorin Șipoș edited in 2011 the volume *Ethnicity, confession and intercultural dialogue at the European Union Eastern Border* (Brie&Horga&Șipoș, 2011), and Mircea Brie, Sorin Șipoș, Ioan Horga edited in 2011 the volume *Ethno- Confessional Realities in the Romanian Area. Historical Perspectives (XVIII- XX Centuries)*. (Brie & Șipoș &Horga, 2011). Mircea Brie in the article *Ethnicity, Religion and Intercultural Dialogue in the European Border Space*, talks about an ideologic crisis of European countries, the continent being at the crossroads: „ The old forms of social- political and economic life are redefined. Even relations between people and communities resettle on new organization and relational forms”.(Brie, 2011:12) The problem of integrating minorities is a problem of all Europe, with a focus on Central and Eastern Europe where there are the most pronounced clivages, considers Mircea Brie. Ioan Horga in the article *Ethnicity, religion and intercultural education in the curricula of European Studies* considers that “the fight for religious and ethnic diversity and intercultural dialogue is both justified and morally necessary”. (Horga, 2011: 19) The author consider that the subject of multicultural/ intercultural is approached in EU Studies curricula in the Chapters *Europeanization and cultural diversity* that integrates “local, national, and regional culture to the European identity” and in the chapter *European dialogue with other geo-cultural spaces* at several universities from Europe. Anca Oltean in the article *Aspects from the life of Romanian and Hungarian Jews during the years 1945-1953* points out that the Jews from these regions had to face a lot of discriminations, oscillating between integration in the societies from Romania and Hungary and emigration, emphasizing that they were rather victims of communists then beneficiary loosing a great part of their former properties after deportation and during the communist rule, being deprived by their rights as being forced to loose their propriety

before they emigrated to Israel. (Oltean, 2011: 171). An important aspect is brought forward by Antonio Faur who in the paper *Considerații referitoare la „filierele“ de trecere clandestină a evreilor din Ungaria în România (mai-august 1944)* (Faur, 2011), writes about the illegal crossing the border of Jews from Hungary to Romania especially from the border from Bihor county, underlying the fact that there were a few Romanians who helped the Jews from death. Even if there were cases when Romanian authorities required money from the Jews, their life was, in consequence, saved. In his book *Un deceniu din existența evreilor bihoreni (1942-1952)* (Faur, 2012), Antonio Faur takes an interview to Varodi Judith, survivor of Holocaust. Mrs. Varodi mentions in her interview that the Jews were a hardworking people who were sharing friendly relations with other communities. She was deported to Auschwitz- Birkenau where they were put to hard labor. After deportation, she settled in Timisoara where she graduated a textile school and then she worked in this domain. These are only a few sources who are mentioning the condition of Jews in postwar years.

3). Data of oral history gathered from questionnaires applied to the Jewish Community of Oradea

We were able to question some Holocaust survivors on the issue of postwar life; they were either deported or escaped arrest being hidden by humanitarians; they were natives of NW Transylvania.

The questionnaire that I constructed took into account several classic works written by scholars which were based on investigations conducted by questionnaires. Gidó Attila and Sólyom Zsuzsa, in the study *The surviving Jewish Inhabitants of Cluj, Carei and Oradea. The survey of World Jewish Congress in 1946*¹, draws a picture through questionnaires analysis of the Jewish society during the war and in the months following liberation. The authors describe the situation in Romania in the interwar period by indicating that many Romanian Jews were deprived of citizenship both in 1924 and during the rule of Octavian Goga in 1938, making a comparison with Hungary, where the second anti-Jewish law brought restrictions in that the foreign Jews could not obtain citizenship in any way. Based on questionnaires, the authors add to this picture a description of the situation in Cluj, Carei and Oradea during the Hungarian administration. Thus, in the first months of occupation Transylvania was organized by a military administration, and then replaced with a civil one. First steps were taken against Jews by banning Jewish publications, sports clubs and non-religious associations. Since 1940 insults, evictions, arrests and expulsions of Jews became frequent.

The authors assigned a separate chapter the existing anti-Jewish legislation in Northern Transylvania under Hungarian occupation. Such anti- Jewish first law (Law XV-1938) reduced the number of Jewish scholars or freelancers to 20% of the total number of the Jewish citizens.

A second anti- Jewish law dated May 5, 1939, during the government of Count Teleki Pál, considered Jews those who were members of the religious Jewish community, and if one parent or two grandparents were Jewish. The 20% ratio of Jewish intellectuals or freelancers was limited to 6%. The Act introduced several anti-Jewish measures, among them being the *numerus clausus* law that limited the number of Jewish students to 6%. The limit of 6% Jews has been brought in the professional areas of the lawyers, engineers

¹ Gido Attila, Solyom Zsuzsa, *The surviving Jewish inhabitants of Cluj, Carei and Oradea. The survey of World Jewish Congress in 1946*, Cluj-Napoca, ISPMN Working Papers, nr. 35/2010, <http://www.ispmn.gov.ro/uploads/35%20pt%20web%20final.pdf>, accessed in February 2011.

and doctors, for the Chamber of Mass-Media and the Actors Guild. The law limited the right of the Jews to acquire agricultural and forestry properties and made possible the expropriation of Jewish property. Many lost their jobs and even more Jewish shops were closed. In practice, the number of Jewish closed stores and expropriated goods was much larger than the number admitted by the law.

The third anti – Jewish Law (Law no. XV/1941) and its provisions were applied also to the Northern Transylvania. The law forbade marriage between Jews and non-Jews and imposed penalties for Jews who had sexual relations with non-Hebrew women.

Another anti – Jewish Law was Law XV/1942 setting out that the Jews had lost their right to buy property.

Based on questionnaires prepared by the World Jewish Congress in 1946, the authors provide information about the forced labour. Established by several decrees, the forced labour came into force on 1 July 1939 and it remained valid until April 1941. The Jews who did forced labour were exempt of military service. Those who did forced labour could not bear arms. But the Jews had to do hard physical labour, had to endure cruel and inhuman treatment, including inadequate food rations.

The questionnaires provide information about the deportation that began after March 19, 1944. In late March 1944, the Germans arrived in Northern Transylvania, and on April 5, the Jews were forced to wear a yellow star as a mark of their origin. Jewish property was blocked. First, the authorities seized the children and the elderly people together with the young people who were not recruited for forced labour. There were ghettos in the cities of Cluj, Gherla, Dej, Şimleul Silvaniei, Satu Mare, Baia Mare, Bistriţa – Năsăud, Oradea, Târgu Mureş, Reghin, Sfântu Gheorghe. Most deportees were sent to the concentration camps in Bergen-Belsen, Buchenwald, Dachau, Grossrosen, Günskirchen, Mathausen, Neungamme or Ravensbrück.

In 1946, 7, 200 Jews were still living in Northern Transylvania, of which 200 Jews in Bihor, 1,500 in Cluj, 800 in Maramureş, 700 in Satu Mare, 650 in Someş County, 500 in Sălaj and Năsăud.

The authors listed the themes and issues tackled by the related questionnaires.

Thus the respondents were asked about their legal and financial status and atrocities suffered. They were asked to write about the consequences of the provisions and amendments relating to marriage. The questionnaires consisted of questions about what happened under the Hungarian administration. The respondents were able to clarify on any injury suffered, to report material losses suffered from private enterprises expropriation, restrictions on business, confiscated objects, living conditions, income. In addition to these data, the questionnaires asked questions about deportation, requiring the date, place and concentration camps.

Robert Eaglestone in his book *The Holocaust and the Postmodern* (Eaglestone, 2004) notes a statement by Maurice Blanchot (Eaglestone, 2004: 15) who writes that the Holocaust survivors are not read as usual books. Elie Wiesel (Eaglestone, 2004: 15) considers that a new type of literature was invented with the Holocaust, that of oral testimony that reports personal experiences. The Holocaust experience involves subjective stories from the survivors.

On a much smaller scale, we interviewed some members of the Jewish Community of Oradea who were survivors of the Holocaust, or they had close relatives who died in Holocaust. The questionnaire requested data on:

1. Name and surname:
2. Date of birth:

3. Place of birth:
4. Place of residence:
5. Occupation:
6. Nationality:
7. Were you deported during Holocaust?
8. How were the Jews received upon their return from deportation? How were you personally received?
9. When you returned were you able to take your properties back (mobile and immobile)? If yes, to what extent?
10. Were you part of the life of the Jewish Community in 1945-1953 and to what extent?
11. Did you receive any aid designated specifically to the Jews in 1945-1953?
12. Were you a member of a Jewish organization after the war? Can you name the organization?
13. You are not thinking of immigrating to Israel or in other countries of the free world?
14. Were you a member of the Communist Party? What was the reason for you joining the Party? Did you truly believe in the ideals of the egalitarianism?
15. Did you have any relatives in other countries? To what extent were you able to maintain the connection?
16. Were you able to speak freely about emigration in 1945-1953?
17. Did you have any connections to the Zionist movement? Did you know about the existence of Zionist organizations?
18. What were the reasons for which some Jews emigrated to Israel (political persecutions, etc.)?
19. How do you motivate that you did not emigrate?

Thus, **Hommonai Maria**, born 30 XI 1947 in Oradea, is Jewish and currently retired. She filled in the questionnaires on behalf of her dead parents Schwartz Iosif și Schwartz Ileana (born Krausz) who were deported – the father to forced labour in Russia and the mother in the camps of Auschwitz - Birkenau. When asked how they were received upon their return the daughter Hommonai Maria said: “I know nothing about the reaction of official bodies, I know only about neighbours or relatives who had returned sooner or by different circumstances escaped deportation. They were received with friendship and feelings of remorse.” Their property suffered greatly during the time they were deported, “Father found his house, where I currently domicile with my family, but it was ravaged terribly and acted as a stable for the Soviet troops that ruled the city, my father’s house was shelter for horses. Mother, upon her return from Sweden, where she had arrived after her release by the Danish Red Cross, found his personal belongings with a family friend, who told her that they had been able to take possession of her property after she had been taken to the Ghetto in Oradea.” Between 1945-1953, Schwartz Iosif and Schwartz Ileana did not attend to the Jewish community life, did not received any aid for Jews, were not members of Zionist organizations after the war, did not emigrate because they were at a second marriage and were physically and emotionally exhausted after deportation. They were not member of the Party and did not have relatives abroad. Schwartz Iosif and Schwartz Ileana had no links with the Zionist movement. Hommonai Maria, their daughter, believes that Jews who immigrated to Israel wanted that history be not repeated. Her parents did not emigrate because “they lack the power and the strength

required to start a new path in life, they were concerned with restoring normal life as they had previously known ante their deportation.”

Braun Vioara was born on 30.09.1926 in Marghita. She is now retired. A Holocaust survivor, she was deported with her parents and two brothers who died in Auschwitz. When asked how they were received upon their return from the Holocaust, Braun Vioara said, “Differently. Some with curiosity, with hidden enmity, with distrust, with sympathy, etc.. I came home in September 1945 when a Jewish community of survivors was formed of those who had already arrived at home and from whom she received aid.” She failed to recover their property, stated that she found the house empty, attended the Jewish community life from 1945 - 1953 with live performances with the youth. She was a member of the Democratic Grouping of Jews in Marghita, had no thoughts to migrate. She believed in the ideals of communism and in the desire that the things she went through will not be repeated. She had an older brother who emigrated to the U.S., he returned later to see her and she visited him. She had no links to the Zionist movement. Among the reasons the Jews had to emigrate to Israel she lists distrust, uncertainty and “the hope that they will be treated as equal citizens in their own country”. She did not emigrate because she birthed two children and she was ill.

B. Zs. was born in Oradea, 20.04.1944. She is retired and of Hungarian origins. She speaks on the behalf of her Jewish acquaintances who were deported. On where she was involved she notes: “I was a refugee in Arad (Romania). My friends were happy about the return of those who escaped deportation. Our former maid of offered housing, she dressed, disinfected, and fed those who needed help.” She only heard of the loss of properties, of the Jewish buildings. She did not attend the Jewish community life during 1945-1953, did not receive aid and she was not a member of any Jewish organization after the war. She had a brother who emigrated, but it was too late for her. She was not a member of the Party, had relatives in Israel with whom she kept in touch. In her opinion, it was not possible to talk openly about emigration, and she had no ties to the Zionist movement. In her opinion, the reasons why some Hebrew emigrated to Israel were: “They believe in their own country, where they could be Jewish without persecution.” Her motivation for not migrating lays in the fact that she was loyal to the state that offered a peaceful life for herself and her child.

Steier Elisabeta was born at 24.10. 1917 Boiu (Bihor), then she lived in Oradea. She is retired and of Jewish origins. She mentions that after 23 August 1944 they were liberated. She partially managed to recover her properties. In the period 1945-1953 she performed volunteer work for the Jewish community, benefitted from aids (clothing), was not a member of the Jewish organizations after the war, did not think to emigrate to Israel or to other countries of the free world. He was a member of the Party and, like other supporters, she believed in the ideals of egalitarianism. She had relatives abroad with whom she kept in touch by mail and visits. Her husband had ties with the Zionist movement. The reason that some Hebrew emigrated to Israel was political persecution. She did not emigrate because of medical reasons.

Bone Gabriela was born on 28 March 1928, in Târgu Mures and lived in Oradea. She was deported during the Holocaust, she is now retired and of Jewish descent. When asked how they were received upon their return from the Holocaust, she reports: “From deportation – I was at the Bergen Belsen Camp - I arrived home in Targu Mures, Goga Street 18 - we were received by the Jewish Community with much warmth, we were admitted in a hospital, I got clothes, a room equipped with everything necessary”. Their properties had been nationalized and through trials they have been largely recovered. During

1945-1953, she was a member of the Jewish Community in Târgu Mures and Reghin, she received aids. He was a member of a Jewish organization after the war, (Ha)somer Hațair. She had no thoughts to migrate because she got married. She was a member of the Party and thought it would be better during communism. She had no relatives abroad and remembers that she could talk openly about emigration in the years 1945-1953. She had no links with the Zionist movement. She regarded emigration to Israel as an ideal emerged after the Holocaust for the Jews to have a country to defend and a place with no room for another Auschwitz. She did not emigrate because she got married.

Kincses Ecaterina was born on 11.05.1940 in Cluj-Napoca and then lived in Oradea. She is retired and a Jew The grandmother's name was Diamantstein Yolanda and she was deported. Ecaterina and her mother escaped deportation because his mother was married to a German ethnic. However, during the Holocaust they stayed in the hide. Her mother's brother was also deported, Diamantstein Ivan. He and grandmother were deported to Auschwitz. Except her Uncle Ivan, no one of the family ever returned from deportation. She had only movable property. After liberation she was able to recover some of them. She does not remember her parents to be involved with the Jewish Community immediately after the war. They received aids, but very little. In the years 1945 - 1953 they received aid in the form of clothing and cans. She was not a member of any Jewish organizations after the war. There did not think to emigrate to Israel, her mother was annoyed that other Jews were considering emigrating. Mrs. Kincses believed in communist ideals. She motivates that mother, father and stepfather believed in communist ideals. "My mother wept at Stalin's death and did not know how it will be after his death." In the period 1945-1953 they had no relatives abroad. In 1978 an aunt emigrated and they managed to keep in touch by phone and packages. The packages arrived in a terrible state, loosened, ripped open, discarded. Parents, mother and stepfather did not want to emigrate. Her family had no connection with the Zionist movement. She believes that some Jews chose to emigrate because of political persecution, believes Mrs. Kincses. She says that she did not emigrate because "I cannot imagine life elsewhere. In Israel there are problems with the Arabs."

Varadi Judith was born on 09.01.1926 in Cluj-Napoca, then she lived in Oradea. She is retired and of Jewish descent. Deported during the Holocaust, she makes a note of the places she was in: "Between 1944, May 3, in the ghetto in Dej, Auschwitz camps C, B, Buchenwald Commando "Taucha", the Death March up to 5-6 May 1945 upon my return nursing hospitals - repatriation in March 1946." When asked how they were received upon their return Judith says, "Left alone in life, I personally never got back to the town from which I was deported, but to Timișoara where I used to have an uncle from my mother's side – he died in the Holocaust, along with my brother. In a short time I was hired and started getting a qualification". The house where she had lived before the Holocaust was demolished. She attended the Jewish Community life after returning to Oradea in 1948 and was a paying member of the Community together with her husband. Not a recipient of any aid, she was not a member of any Jewish organizations after the war, did not think to emigrate to Israel or elsewhere. She was a member of the Party and believed in the ideals of egalitarianism. They had relatives abroad with whom she corresponded and kept in touch. During the communist period migrate was very difficult, she believes, "emigration waiver campaigns were strong then in time no one could migrate, then after many years of waiting for an answer to their application the vast majority were denied, and then a new possibility appeared after 1970". She had no links with the Zionist movement. In her opinion, the Jews emigrated because they were not promoted at work and they heard the calling from Israel.

She did not emigrate because the Holocaust left her sick and because when she returned she found no physical and mental resources to start a new life in another country.

Somogyi Livia filled in the questionnaire on behalf of deceased father, Somogyi László, born in 1892 in Beiuș, a pharmacist who later lived in Oradea. When asked how the Jews were received upon their return from Somogyi Livia says that she returned with the hope that he would find her family and she would take back the buildings they used to own. Unfortunately, no property was returned Somogyi László participated in religious festivals and led the synagogue community choir. He received no aid specifically designed for Jews and he was not a member of any Jewish organizations after the war, did not think to immigrate to Israel, arguing that he was too old to start everything from zero. They had relatives abroad, exchanging letters. He was a member of the Party, believing in the communist ideals. According to Somogyi Livia they could not talk openly about emigration because you risked losing your job. They had no ties with the Zionist movement. Some Jews emigrated to Israel to “be Jews in their country and to have an easier life.”

Analysing the published bibliography for the purpose of elaborating this study it turns out that we have a massive amount of literature dedicated to the Jewish phenomenon after World War II, published in Romania and in Hungary. Written by Romanian and Hungarian historians, some even of Jewish descent, the published bibliography reveals a string of particularities of the evolution of the Jewish community during the communist period in Central Europe.

Sources of oral history allows us to bring out new interpretations and understanding of a community fighting to overcome the tragedies of the Holocaust, adapting to new political and economic realities of the region, but also fighting to preserve their identity.

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DIFFERENTIATED INTEGRATION - FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE. DETERMINERS IN THE INTEGRATION PROCESS OF THE WESTERN BALKANS: ETHNICITY

DANIELA BLAGA*
MIRCEA BRIE**

Abstract: *Most studies of differentiated integration are limited to the European Union, to the relations between the existing Member-States, and to the various institutional arrangements. The relationship between the European Union and the Western Balkans offers the support for testing the concept of differentiated integration on the dynamics recorded between the EU and a group of foreign states. Different Balkan states signed different contractual agreements with the European Union, with the expressed wish to consolidate their European perspective. The EU has a large range of initiatives, already implemented or in the process of implementation, for the Western Balkans. One such key initiative is the regional approach, which pushes the Western Balkan states toward forms of regional cooperation that need to be achieved if progress is sought in their contractual relations with the EU. This approach of the EU is salutary in theory, but in practice, the region of the Western Balkans is not uniform, it does not have any constants in the regional characteristics, in terms of identity, culture, and political and economic development. The Western Balkans space is synonymous with the geopolitics of violence, where drawing and redrawing borders and frontiers hide scars rooted in ethnicity, confession, religion and/or nationality, which are often translated into nationalism and desire for independence.*

Our work will attempt to tap into likely determiners in the integration process of the Western Balkans and to see if it is possible to establish an integrationist model open to dialogue. One of the starting premises is that ethnicity has been a determiner in the integration process (or the disintegration process, for that matter!), both in the case of Yugoslavia, and in the case of post-Yugoslavia evolution, including the process of European integration. Ethnic barriers have been passed by some countries with great difficulty, and the prospect of European integration does not entail a solution to all disagreements. Moreover, some states/nations are at an early stage of identity construction process, often involving claims or amendments to/from other countries.

Keywords: *EU, Western Balkans, (differentiated) integration, ethnicity, cooperation, region, enlargement*

Although the political and scientific relevance of this topic is perceived as increasingly larger, the overall research on this topic is characterized by little and disparate data, with a poor theoretical framework that is relatively unfocused on the explanatory

* Master Student in European Studies at the University of Oradea. E-mail: msdanielablaga@gmail.com

** Ph.D., Associate Professor, Department of International Relations and European Studies, Faculty of History International Relations, Political Sciences and Science of Communication, University of Oradea, Romania. E-mail: briedri@hotmail.com

analysis. Think tanks started running international projects, often within European Centres of Excellence (Jean Monnet, Altiero Spinelli) in order to try to establish theoretical frameworks and models for the analysis of recurring situations and trends of differentiation depending on the country and the specific policies pursued by that country.

In trying to develop a theory for this phenomenon, the approach is inductive. It means that the existing models have not followed theoretical models, but tried to provide quick solutions to problems raised by certain states.

Most studies of differentiated integration are limited to the European Union, to the relations between the Member States and to various institutional arrangements. The relation between the EU and the Balkans provides scholars with a new insight on the differentiated integration applied on various binds that are forged between the EU and non-EU states (in the case of the Balkans we can address the states as a group). Different states at different moments have entered contractual agreements with the Union in order to consolidate their European perspective. (Leuffen; Rittberger; Schimmelfennig, 2013: 2-6).

The states of the Western Balkans are on different trajectories in what concerns their EU accession. The Union has a large range of initiatives running for the Western Balkans. One key initiative is the regional approach through which the EU pushes the states of the Western Balkans towards forms of regional cooperation that must be attained as a condition to move forward with the contractual agreements with the EU. Thus the region of the Western Balkans is not one to share regional characteristics, either in terms of identity, culture, or political and economic development. (Leuffen; Rittberger; Schimmelfennig, 2013: 26-28) Albania is different from Croatia, which is different from the Former Yugoslav Republic Macedonia. What connects the dots between these states are geographical proximity, a common and agitated history, a political and economic development in a post-communist society, and most importantly, the EU policy to bring and maintain together. From the territory point of view, the EU defines the Western Balkans partially from location and proximity reasons, but mostly from a shared recent violent past. Various policies could be designed based on the economy of these countries, but the regionalism promoted by the EU is based on pushing the hostile states towards cross-border cooperation while their accession to the EU is postponed until local problems are somehow mitigated.

Europe is a multi-identity space. Identity cleavages are present everywhere: Catholic Europe-Orthodox Europe; Western Europe-Eastern Europe; Christian Europe-Muslim Europe; Europe – the EU; Europe – the Non-EU (Brie, Polgar, Chirodea, 2012: 9-11; Brie, 2011) In this European area, the Balkans is not lost among the other states, but remains rather offstandish. Europe did not know and does not know how to manage the Balkans; it has been easier for Europe to regard the Balkans as the Other. The multiple identities are found in the approach of the European policies. Rethinking a theoretical model focused on the Balkans is therefore necessary. There is great need of refining policies and of improving the knowledge about the space. Improving knowledge means an improvement of the entire situation, and this means better integration

1. What is differentiated integration?

“Integration and globalization are two objective processes of the present world development and as such the fate of each nation is closely related to the fate of others, which provides a mutual opportunity to advance and to adapt to the requirements of economic and social progress. The beginning of the new century and the new millennium is, from this point of view, very promising and brings forth in Europe, one of the greatest opportunities, that of unification ... The basis of this European identity, added and not conflictually opposed to

national identities, are our common values: democracy, rights and freedoms, equality, social justice, rule of law, peaceful resolution of conflicts, faith in progress, humanism, pluralism, protection of minorities, unity in diversity". (Ion Iliescu, *Integrare și globalizare. Viziunea românească*, Presa Națională Publishing House, Bucharest, 2003, p. 5, 7)

Economic and social progress is closely related to the coexistence in time and space of the actual world of nations. In a post-war era in which we talk of globalization and mondialization, integration has become part of usual terminology. Economic integration is a complex process; it is based on the development of relations of cooperation and collaboration of an organized and systematic nature, between several countries seeking to achieve larger economic areas of action or "larger assemblies" that allow the full and more efficient use of production capabilities, as well as the more active promotion of the common interests of the partners in the global market. In this way, between the participating countries will take shape not only relations of cooperation, but also systematic and stable economic interdependence. (Crețoiu, 2007: 270)

In a general form, **economic integration** can be defined as the process of interaction and development of economic interdependence between states through various forms and methods which, on the one hand, ensure the continuity and the deepening of mutual exchanges and, on the other hand, increase the degree of interpenetration of national economies in a body diverse in presentation, but unified and homogeneous in its functionality. (Crețoiu, 2007: 582-583)

In terms of the nature and contents of relations between countries, economic integration leads to the following categories:

- *preferential* relations between the member states within a group or an organization, but also *protectionist* treatment towards third party countries;
- relations of cooperation between member states and competition or competitive relations between some integrationist organizations;
- specific relations of cooperation or tension between regional and global organizations.

So, we have reached a first level of differentiation: preferential treatment in terms of economic integration.

As we have mentioned above, the theoretical framework of differentiated integration is scarce and lately researchers and politicians have felt the need for a norm to explain or to regulate certain phenomena within the EU. The inductive approach of members of academia and think tankers have come up with explanations and possible definitions for an European reality. Thus, **preferential integration**, or **flexible integration**, or **differentiated integration** refers to the territorially fragmented validity of the EU norms, be it economic policies or social policies. *The integration is differentiated if: the individual EU norms are not applied to some member states; the individual EU norms are applied to some non-member states; or both.* The specialists in European Studies, together with politicians or members of international organizations believe that the territorial and functional enlargement of the EU resulted in an increase of the need for differentiated integration.¹

The result? Various solutions were designed for various member states, with different priorities and different capacities, to move on the path of progress towards a deeper integration, at various speeds.²

¹ <http://www.eup.ethz.ch/research/diffintegration>, viewed at 29.08.2013

² *Differentiated Integration in An Enlarged Union*, published in March 27, 2002, revised in January 29, 2010 available at: <http://www.euractiv.com/future-eu/differentiated-integration-enlarged-union/article-117073>, viewed at 29.06.2013

A first agreement: any group of member states entering a deeper cooperation should remain open to accept other member states that are willing and capable to join the initial core. Joschka Fischer and Jacques Delors were firm in denying any intention to erect walls within the enlarged EU. A second agreement: all leaders agree that any initiative on the part of member states should not affect the *acquis communautaire*. Joschka Fischer insisted on this issue asking to create coordinating mechanisms between these countries, in order to stimulate a better integration. Romano Prodi made clear that the uniformity of the legal framework and the coherence of the *acquis communautaire* must be preserved.³

In 2002, Michel Barnier and António Vitorino asked the fundamental question, as a corollary of a long going debate: “What is that we want to do together?”. The answer will dictate whether a common political project can provide the basis for further integration, or if different projects can coexist. Michel Barnier went further, arguing that the question should not be addressed only in terms of economic policy or security policy, but there is need to expand the debate to the future of the internal market, regional policy and competition.⁴

1.1. Differentiated integration: *Pros*

Differentiated integration, in one form or another, has long been practiced. Like any concept put in practice, it can present both advantages and disadvantages. Differentiated integration does not prevent progress, but rather unifies the integration results in relation to the whole (i.e. the entirety of the member states). Differentiated integration is a consequence of the diversity and plurality of the member states and provides not only a legal framework for countries that want to submit their application, but also ways of expressing individual will, by separating from the whole (see the case of the *opt-out*). In general, differentiated integration is addressed to the states that are not integrated (see the cases of Macedonia, and Serbia), or states that are excluded (see the case of the UK before it was accepted to join).

If differentiated integration provides different ways and different speeds for membership and/or living in the Union then it also offers a reversed potential for separation from the Union, at one level or more (see the discussion regarding Greece and Spain, the euro zone, etc.).

1.2. Differentiated integration: *Cons*

A first reaction to the differentiated integration policies enforced in states that have not yet received permanent membership status is that the progress within the EU (especially regarding EU enlargement) is hindered by a number of uneven policies. If we regard this issue through the lens of local realities seen by comparison with European realities, it can be argued that differentiated integration policies were issued and applied precisely in response to these local realities (see the case of Romania and Bulgaria - corruption, or Serbia - human rights).

Another argument against differentiated integration is the uneven enforcement of European rules only in some of the states, and addressed only to some European citizens (see the Schengen area, or the cooperation in security and intelligence exchange between states).

³ Ibidem

⁴ *Contribution de Michel Barnier et António Vitorino à la Convention européenne sur „La méthode communautaire” (3 septembre 2002)*, available online at: <http://www.cvce.eu/collections/unit-content/-/unit/d5906df5-4f83-4603-85f7-0cab24b9fe1/356d1e8d-3396-4cf0-9031-e6939faf75f1/Resources#6605c830-7a2d-451e-a4de-3f27d49d19e8>, last viewed on 25.09.2013

The most serious objection relates to obtaining benefits from differentiated integration without assuming the costs of participation in such integration (see the differentiated monetary policy or the safety and defence case, especially in the context of EU-NATO relations).

2. Differentiated integration in the space of former Yugoslavia. Determiners in the integration process: ethnicity

Most studies of differentiated integration are limited to the European Union, to the relations between the existing Member-States, and to the various institutional arrangements. The relationship between the European Union and the Western Balkans offers the support for testing the concept of differentiated integration on the dynamics recorded between the EU and a group of foreign states. Different Balkan states signed different contractual agreements with the European Union, with the expressed wish to consolidate their “European perspective”. (Dyson, Sepos, 2010: 5-8). The EU has a large range of initiatives, already implemented or in the process of implementation, for the Western Balkans. One such key initiative is the regional approach, which pushes the Western Balkan states toward forms of regional cooperation that need to be achieved if progress is sought in their contractual relations with the EU. This approach of the EU is salutary in theory, but in practice, the region of the Western Balkans is not uniform, it does not have any constants in the regional characteristics, in terms of identity, culture, and political and economic development.

The Western Balkans space is synonymous with the geopolitics of violence, where drawing and redrawing borders and frontiers hide scars rooted in ethnicity, confession, religion and/or nationality, which are often translated into nationalism and desire for independence. Such a region cannot be treated as a whole. The dissolution of Yugoslavia brought Europe to face a new problem: the new state borders are not the same with the frontiers between the nations. Although the Christian denominations (particularly the Orthodox confession, but also Catholicism in Slovenia and Croatia) are the majority here, the Muslim communities in the Western Balkans are not an artificial creation; they are the result of a long history (the migration of Muslim population from Asia and the conversion of local population to Islam). (Gossiaux, 2002: 37-39). These differences in religion and ethnicity have led to political disagreements, the relations between states being managed unequally by them (see the cases of Croatia-Serbia, Serbia-Kosovo-Albania or Macedonia-Greece), not to mention that Europe’s reactions to the Balkan movements are divided (see the recognition of the independence of Kosovo).

We do not know whether the differentiated integration is relevant to the EU-Balkans relations, but we have to tap into some of the relevant aspects for our research. Firstly, the differentiated integration resulted from the political interests and preferences of the EU member states. These Balkans states, if given the option and if they chose to immediately become full members of the EU, would not adopt willingly the policies of differentiated integration. If a part of the definition for the differentiated integration reads “*the process through which European states... opt to act at different speeds*” (Dyson, Sepos, 2010: 4), in the case of the Balkans it would have to be turned into “*the process through which European states ... opt for other non-EU states to act at different speeds for European integration*”. Europe’s implication in the Balkans has been ever since 1991 of such a nature that it can be argued that the EU has been imposing a differentiated integration in the Balkan region. (Economides, 2008: 1, 2).

Secondly, if we apply the enlargement lens again, the differentiated integration has a very strong political hue to it. In other words, the EU's decisions referring to the Balkans show a direct manifestation of political strategies to manage the so-called Balkan problem – ethnic rivalries, irredentism, separatism, war, corruption, democratization, institutional consolidation.

In view of the complex features of the Balkans, it is questionable why Europe has been intent on treating the Balkans as a whole region. There is historical reason that adds to the psychological reason to prove that the nations and ethnicities living within the geographical space of the Balkans do not share the same traits. We only have to look at the Yugoslav wars, or the disintegration of Yugoslavia that only made more visible that the unification that gave the former Republic of Yugoslavia was a political one and it was not shared by the inhabitants of the newly created state.

The EU policy towards the Balkans falls under two essential queries referring to space/territory. *What is the territory that we call “the Balkans”?* (what and where are the Balkans)? and *Where does the EU want to set its territorial limits?* (Economides, 2008: 4)

The answers are important because of at least two reasons: the EU formulates the policies for the Balkan states as a region, and at the same time, the EU differentiates between the Balkan states in terms of candidature or their accession to the EU. Secondly, the Balkan states have imprinted differently on the member states, and the politicians have different reactions towards them, hence the debates related to the EU enlargement and its territorial limits. If the EU's stated intention to create a regional interconnected series of Balkan states regions (connected both at interstate level and transnational level) in order to transcend ethnical and national cleavages for the purpose of bringing them closer to European integration, then such intention is undermined by the European hostility towards the enlargement, precisely because such enlargement to contain the Balkans is partially based on matters of identity and religion.

In terms of identity and territory, the Balkans have proven to be an easy target for the European critique. From the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand to Yugoslavia's violent collapse, the modern history of the Balkans is easily condemnable. The expression “Balkans, the powder keg of Europe” is copied, enhanced and almost always used to describe the politics developed in the region. The long term western perception of the Western Balkans is beyond that of a region with problems, but by judging after European marks, the perception is that of a foreign region, an alien region located at the very heart of Europe. The Other, geographically in Europe, but in attitudes and actions with no roots in Europe. Some dispute this image, arguing that whatever image created in the mind of the Western Europe is that of some “imaginary Balkans”. An inextricably geographical region of Europe, but culturally constructed as Alterity, the Balkans have often served as a repository of negative characteristics on which a positive image of the “European” was built. (Todorova, 1997)

What is real is the fact the Balkans and its inhabitants still raise negative reactions, and the event of 1990 onwards have “helped” to consolidate their negative image. All these had a tremendous influence on the modern understanding of the Balkans and consequently, on the impact on the EU's policies towards the region. When the Federative Republic of Yugoslavia was amid a bloody conflict, of ethnical purging and genocide, Europa was transforming as well: in the east – the fall of communism; in the west – the European project (Treaty of Maastricht and the creation of the European Union). In other words, a true redesign of the continent. This has been more than a spatial and territorial redesign; it was one of cultural and ideological change where the Europeanness was gaining ground with its new norms and democratic ideals. It was a time for the nation-state to change face. The European

project turned the table around, the nation-state was starting to lose ground. Nationalism raised once more with the fall of communism and with it so was the question of ethnical identity in some states. Not much importance was given to nationalism and ethnic identity as the new wave of democratic reconstruction of a universal European space was the new high.

Against this euphoric backdrop, whatever European conflict that was simmering in the Balkan region neighbouring both Eastern and Western Europe was impossible to grasp. It was easier for Europe to turn a blind eye and to return to Todorova's explanation of the "imaginary Balkans". Robert D. Kaplan comes up with another explanation, a stereotype, finding plausible ground for the Yugoslav wars being rooted in the much older hypotheses referring to a "non-European" part of the continent. (Kaplan, 2005: 79-181)

The "Balkans" became a pejorative term for a continental region amid war. (Dyson, Sepos, 2010: 120-128). Following the conflict in Yugoslavia, the rest of the region was perceived as having the same problems, with the same enmities that fuelled the Yugoslav wars. Again, Europe looked at the Balkans as a region, as a whole. The main reason for confusion was the lack a clear distinction between the geostrategic threats and the consequences of Yugoslavia's break-up, and the socio-cultural problems that are at the core of the conflicts in the area (Glenny, 1993: 92-105). The general view was that the Yugoslav wars and thus the Balkans politics were ones of nationalistic fight, by placing one ethnic group against the other (Economides, 1992: 142-156). And that was seen as an anachronism in a new Europe, on its way to advanced integration.

Susan Woodward, analysing the causes of the Yugoslav wars (Woodward, 1995: 22-31), maintains that the problems of Yugoslavia were not the problems of Europe. Romania and Bulgaria, for instance, were not caught by the same ethnical problems as Yugoslavia. Secondly, she argues that the dissolution of Yugoslavia was not the result of a simple equation incorporating nationalism and ethnical rivalries, but the result of a much more subtle and complex interaction between economic, political and constitutional problems that needed to be evaluated in a larger context, both nationally and internationally.

Incapable to reach some consensus as to what to do with the Balkans and moreover, without any coercion mechanisms, the EU set out an isolation policy. Isolation against war, against refugees and economic migrants. This was the policy applied to the entire region until the second half of the 90s when after the end of the war in Bosnia (December 1995), some states perceived as being Balkan - Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria - entered in contractual agreements with the EU and later on even started their negotiations for accession. Western Europe realized in the whole process that the Union maintained separate relations with separate states and groups of states from the region. Thus a new term appeared, the South-Eastern Europe (SEE) that replaced the term "Balkans" and Romania and Bulgaria received the green light for a different path to join the EU. Romania and Bulgaria applied for EU membership in December 1995, the Luxembourg European Council issued a favourable response in December 1997, and the negotiations for full membership began in early 2000.

Romania and Bulgaria's accession to the European Union is an example for decision-making and policies of differentiated integration. The big gap of time between the issuance of a favourable opinion and the beginning of negotiations was because while politically and strategically the EU wanted to encourage Romania and Bulgaria, in reality, these countries could not fulfil the criteria for membership in the short term.

Slovenia followed a different path once it emerged free from the Yugoslav Federation: Slovenian approaches to the EU were viewed much more favourably, due to Slovenia's ability to meet the accession criteria and the *acquis*, but also because of the

strong support within the EU (France, UK, Germany, despite strong objections from Italy), and the general belief that Slovenia is a central European state and not a Balkan one.

With three countries on different paths, echoes were not late to appear. There are several implications of the differentiated integration within the regional context: on the one hand, the Balkans are treated differently from other European regions undergoing enlargement, and on the other hand, notwithstanding the great inclination that the EU has for regionalism, the Union does differentiate between certain parts of the Balkans in terms of integration.

Then in turn there is the feedback from the Balkans: their eye is critical, they look upon the enlargement with what is called euroscepticism. The regional approach from the EU does not sit well with the different dates of accession and with the various requests in order to receive official candidate status. Let us see how far from the mark we are with this statement. In 2004, Slovenia joins the EU. Croatia just became a member this summer (July 1, 2013). Serbia received full candidate status on March 1, 2012. The accession negotiations with Montenegro started on 29 June 2012.

With Albania the situation is rather delicate: in October 2012 the European Commission evaluated the progress of Albania to comply with several key priorities, being conditional to achieve official candidate status and start accession negotiations. Out of twelve, four key priorities were found to be met, while two were well in progress and the remaining six were in moderate progress. The report concluded that if Albania manages to hold a fair and democratic parliamentary election in March 2013, and implements the remaining changes also to comply with the eight key priorities still not fully met, then the Council of the European Union would be recommended to grant Albania official candidate status.⁵


Macedonia has been a candidate for accession to the EU since 2005 since it submitted its membership application in 2004, thirteen years after its independence from former Yugoslavia. As of 2012, it is one of five remaining candidate countries, together with Iceland, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey, after the latest round of enlargement that brought membership to Bulgaria and Romania. Among current obstacles to full membership is the on-going dispute with Greece over the country's name, which is also the reason why it is officially addressed by the European Union with the provisional appellation "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", rather than its constitutional name, "Republic of Macedonia". Another problem are the strained relations between Macedonia and Bulgaria due to the ethnic groups and their allegiance to either country (the Macedonian Question). Overall, the Western Balkan region is not heterogeneous in terms of their views of Europe: *Gallup Balkan Monitor*⁶ describes a complex image that incorporates a wide range of perceptions pertaining to the European Union. The opinions recorded in poles vary from the euphoria of the EU (in Kosovo and Albania) to a beginning of an alienation feeling (in Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina).

The GBM results from Macedonia and Bosnia reflect also opposing opinions of ethnic groups living in these two countries. When asked if they trusted the EU institutions, only 7% of the Croats answered that they had high trust, while only 35% admitted that they "kind of" trusted the EU, reported *Gallup Balkan Monitor*, in 2010⁷.

⁵ European Commission, "Key findings of the 2012 Progress Report on Albania", retrieved 11 October 2012

⁶ *Gallup Balkan Monitor*, GBM in short

⁷ *Gallup Balkan Monitor, Insights and Perceptions: Voices of the Balkans*, "The Gallup Balkan Monitor: the Western Balkans' most wide-ranging survey ever", 2010, available at <http://www.balkan-monitor.eu>, viewed on 25.09.2013

Graph. 1: Poles results showing the support of Balkan countries for EU accession

Source: Gallup Balkan Monitor⁸

These situations render difficult the creation of a comprehensive policy.⁹ Because the Balkans have presented a series of challenges (geostrategic, political and economic, and socio-cultural), the EU has struggled to formulate and to implement a range of policies to accommodate all. But when we deal with different territories (and types of territories) it has proven to be quite difficult to integrate all these countries as a region.

But how far do the Europeans want to draw the borders of Europe? Where and when they want to stop expansion? (Brie, Polgar, Chirodea, 2012: 12-15). The Western Balkan countries have been but a spectator to the accession of countries in South East Europe. The insistence of the Union in terms of regional cooperation mostly related to the region ethnical issues would be indications that their accession prospects are dark. Why were they just treated differently and why not were they not offered an early entry into the EU as a way to accelerate the reform and to introduce EU membership as a mechanism for conflict resolution? Is it possible that the insistence on regional cooperation combined with the current European crisis and the general recession is a means to accelerate the transition to the EU or is it just a way to build a form of regional integration which will act as a substitute for enlargement (with preferential sectoral agreements with the EU)? (Polgar, 2011: 46-48)

These questions have myriad ramifications. The European future of the Western Balkans is subject to a larger European debate referring to merits seen through a European lens. Serbia's European future was not hampered by the inability to satisfy the technical aspects of the *acquis*, but because of Serbia's refusal to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), concerning the arrest of indicted war criminals, a return to the violent collapse of Yugoslavia that has come to characterize the Balkans. (Dyson, Sepos, 2010: 57-81).

There is a current of opinion which suggests that there were too many EU policies towards the Balkans since the mid-1990s (Rupnik, 2011: 17-30; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2011: 154-160), and that the region was too much tried by too many initiatives. Generally

⁸ *Idem*

⁹ Gallup Balkan Monitor, *Insights and Perceptions: Voices of the Balkans*, "Perceptions of the EU in the Western Balkans", 2009, disponibil la http://www.balkan-monitor.eu/files/Gallup_Balkan_Monitor-Focus_On_EU_Perceptions.pdf, viewed on 8.06.2013

speaking, these initiatives aim at the reconstruction, the state building and the institutional consolidation, and finally at the EU accession. The Commission used a variety of tools to implement these initiatives in order to promote the status of EU membership to all states in South East Europe (SEE). These types of initiatives were carried out simultaneously, and while some states like Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia along the newest entrant Croatia have achieved membership through a traditional route, the other Western Balkan states face the prospect of a variety of policies and agreements before signing the final agreement to start the process of accession. All Western Balkan countries aim to become members of the European Union, an objective endorsed by the European Council in Feira in June 2000 and confirmed by the European Council in Thessaloniki in June 2003. In 2005 the European Council clearly reaffirmed the existing commitments¹⁰:

1. Croatia is an acceding country¹¹.
2. Montenegro, Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia who received candidate status remain part of the PSA.
3. Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo * (under UNSCR 1244/99) - potential candidates.

In January 2006 the European Commission adopted a Communication on “The Western Balkans on the road to the EU: consolidating stability and raising prosperity”¹². The Communication assesses the progress at the summit in Thessaloniki and establishes concrete measures for strengthening the EU policy for the Western Balkans and its instruments.¹³

A territorial new group - a European space - was created as a result and it is the recipient of substantial EU policies. In turn, this has created a specific timeline or a differentiation over time in terms of integration, in the case when some countries are moving steadily and faster than others towards (potential) EU accession. (Marks; Scharpf; Schmitter; Streeck, 1996: 136)

Klaus Goetz speaks of the temporal differentiated integration (Goetz, 2010: 67-81), which is different from the variable geometry and *à la carte* approach through the fact that it does not question the common objectives. Thus some states can move faster than others, while the goals remain the same. Here, the common goal is joining the EU: all countries of South-East Europe have declared so. The Thessaloniki Agenda, 2003, certified the Union’s intention to accept the accession of all Western Balkan states¹⁴.

Conclusions

While some countries have made progress with the process of EU accession following a route set through European Agreements, the commencement of negotiations and finally the accession, the Western Balkan countries are required to negotiate and sign a series of “pre –contracts” before anyone could contemplate applying for full membership. Some see this as “obstructionist tactics”, others see it as “a more permanent obstacle” to EU accession. However, what it does is to increase the spatial concept of

¹⁰ Report from the Commission, The Stabilisation and Association process for South East Europe, Second Annual Report – Annex 1, Brussels, 26.3.2003, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/enlargement_process/accesion_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/sap/85349_en.pdf, viewed on 12.09.2013

¹¹ After the report was issued Croatia joined the EU on 1 July 2013

¹² Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/key_documents/index_en.htm, viewed on 12.06.2013

¹³ Official website of the European Commission, Extindere, Procesul de Stabilizare si Asociere, disponibil la: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/enlargement_process/accesion_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/sap/sap_composite_paper_annex1_en.pdf, viewed on 29.06.2013

¹⁴ Thessaloniki Agenda, available at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004R0533:RO:HTML>, viewed at 29.06.2013

differentiated integration and create “a parallel process of temporal differentiated integration”. (Economides, 2008: 28-31). Since the 1990s the region seems to become more narrow and compact as ever. The Balkans have remained a region synonymous with war, many have not been able to see past the ethnic crises in Kosovo and Serbia, and the involvement of other countries and organizations to restore peace have since been on-going. By the end of the Kosovo crisis, the overall Balkan region, also known as South-East Europe, acquires a new political identity in the eyes of Europe: “Western Balkans”.

The famous formula “Western Balkans are the states of former Yugoslavia, minus Slovenia, plus Albania” has become a *leitmotif* among EU officials dealing with South-East Europe (SEE). In reality, the Western Balkans have become just “Balkans” in the eyes of the EU in terms of differentiated integration. The Balkan states are regarded as “problem states”, often regarded as a religious enclave in Europe, and the EU made it clear that they have a long way to go before having a real chance to apply for EU membership status.

How can one advance if there are countries that are able and do wish to go ahead when there are countries that have no wish to do so or are unable to move forward? The flexibility is the functioning principle that would allow the EU to come up with methods of differentiated integration¹⁵, as opposed to the institutional rigidity that would entail the exclusive enforcement of the EU system in all cases and for all countries. (Closa Montero, 2010)

History will tell if such a complex knot of ethnicities and populations with different beliefs and under different conditions will be able to be funnelled through the integration motors of the European Union.

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¹⁵ i.e. Positive or negative integration

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MINORITIES ISSUE - FROM IGNORANCE TO CONCERN AT THE EASTERN BORDER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE ROMA POPULATION

*Claudia Anamaria IOV**
*Claudiu MARIAN***

Abstract. *The minorities issue was always a corner stone for the Central and South-Eastern European countries during their negotiations with the European Union. The Roma issue represents a particular chapter, not only for its large number, but also because of its complexity, the involved actors and the political and social stakes that accompanied it. The present paper intends to illustrate the interdependence relation of two components: identity and security, focusing on the potential interethnic conflict, international legislation, the way in which different aspects of the legislative approach regarding human rights and protection of national and ethnic minorities influenced the relation between state (majority) and minority (Roma population) in several Central and South-Eastern European countries.*

Keywords: *ethnic minority, security, social integration, (inter)national legislation, acquis communautaire.*

By continuing the enlargement process in 2004 (10 new states) and 2007 with Romania and Bulgaria, the European Union integrated twelve new European states, economies, cultures, many of them with a communist experience and minorities problems. Then, but also now, issues like cultural identity, nationalism, autonomy, the relation between majority and minorities, the relation between international actors, the state and the minorities represented and still represent a problem of security for the European Union, in general and for the member countries, in particular.

With this study, we intend to illustrate and analyze the interdependence relation of two components: *identity* and *security*, focusing on the potential interethnic conflict, international legislation, the way in which different aspects of the legislative approach regarding human rights and protection of national and ethnic minorities influenced the relation between state (majority) and minority (Roma population, considered here as a non-popular minority) in several Central and South-Eastern European countries.

The research questions are related to the impact of the accession criteria on policies for Roma population. How did the accession process influenced the legislation on minorities, in general, and the relation between state (majority) and the minority (we consider here the Roma population), in particular? Was there any important change in the process of social integration made by these countries due to the fact that they joined the EU?

* Phd Candidate in International Relations and European Studies, „Babes-Bolyai” University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, claudia.iov@ubbcluj.ro.

** PhD in International Relations and European Studies, „Babes-Bolyai” University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania. E-mail: claudiu80075@yahoo.com

The first part of the research is focusing on defining the concepts we will work with, and then we will focus on the international legislation on minority. Simultaneously, our attention will be drawn on the examples given by several Central and South-Eastern European countries on the ground of minority's legislation. In this context, the Copenhagen criteria of national minority protection as a condition for candidate states from Central Eastern Europe, can represent an opportunity for redrawing the political approach towards the Roma issue in this region, implementing new policies before and mostly after their joined the European Union. One can imagine that the constraints (conditionality) imposed by EU to the candidate countries from Central and South-Eastern Europe, in our case in the field of minorities issue are the *sticks* and the financial stimuli (pre-accession funds, European Social Fund) the *carrots*¹.

“Minority”, “Identity”-concepts, definitions, dilemmas

The reference literature has an impressive number of definitions for “minority”, “ethnic / national minorities”, “ethnic group” “ethnic identity” or “cultural minority”. There is no common universal definition accepted for these concepts in international documents or international legislation.

In 1950, the UN Commission on Human Rights rejected the proposal for a single definition to minority saying that “...it would be difficult, if not impossible for the Commission to reach general agreement on a definition that would be universally applicable (United Nation Document E/CN 4/689, Para.245).”

The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Mr. Max van der Stoel, in his speech at the opening of the OSCE Seminar in Warsaw in 1994, referring to the issue of minority, said that he thinks that he can recognize minorities if he sees them:

“First of all, a minority is a group with linguistic, ethnic or cultural characteristics, which distinguish it from the majority. Secondly, a minority is a group which usually not only seeks to maintain its identity, but also tries to give stronger expression to that identity”(Declaration of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Mr. Max van der Stoel).

The sociologist Max Weber gave a definition for “ethnic groups” that was afterwards accepted by other sociologists, too:

“[T]hose human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration; this belief must be important for group formation; furthermore it does not matter whether an objective blood relationship exists” (Phillips, 16-17).

Problematic would be here to establish the borders of an ethnic group: who is *in* and who is *outside* the group? If a person doesn't assume the belonging to an ethnic group, from different reasons, like discrimination (if we talk about the Roma population) would it be *in* or *outside* the ethnic group? Who can draw the border?

The French Professor André-Louis Sanguin considers that the ethnic minorities' issue (he uses the term “ethnic minority” from the beginning) is the result of the “spatial non-superposition between Nation and State” (Sanguin, 1993: 7-9). According to him, an ethnic minority is:

¹Sticks and carrots theory: Is a policy of offering a combination of rewards and punishment to induce behaviour.

“A societal entity that lives in one of the following spatial contexts: the border of a state; isolated in the inland of a state; they have a nomadic course on the territory of a state (some communities of Roma people)” (Sanguin, 1993: 7-9).

From these definitions one can draw a preliminary conclusion that the minorities will be to live separately, without melting or mixing with the majority being afraid of losing their own identity. This desire gave birth to a so-called social syndrome “us” opposed to “them” and also to a social fear of losing the identity if mixing with the majority population (the instinct of self-preservation). Meanwhile, the state (the majority) wants a homogenous community that can provide stability for economic development. Any threats against the security, survival and identity of a minority can be a source of tension. Christian Thuderoz said that conflicts are “inherent in social life” (Thuderoz 2002: 31) and in general, are generated by the lack of resources, by the social division of work, by the existence of an exchange relation, in which everyone will try, for axiological and teleological reasons, to optimize their retribution in comparison with the contribution; by the opposition of interests between those who lead and those who are led (in this case, between the dominant group and minority) and by the necessity of integration of a spread will (Ivan, 2006).

The conflicts between majority and minority groups have, in general, similar causes. Every issue regarding minorities, anywhere and anytime, has the same elements: a numerically inferior group in a state, distinguished from the majority by certain cultural, linguistic and national characteristics, the preservation of identity elements (Ivan, 2006), their desire of living apart and having the sentiment of belonging to a group. Any threat to one or more of these elements can represent a source of tension or even conflict.

Sources of tensions between majority and minorities are several; the most frequent are the help of the mother-country (the case of the Hungarians from Transylvania, Slovakia or Voivodina), self-determination (the case of the Corsicans and the Basques) or the claims of independence (the case of the Albanese from Kosovo). There are certain socio-ethnic groups that claim the respect of the fundamental human rights or special rights such as the Roma minorities. These minorities are a threat to the security of the continent only if their socio-economic integration cause a major lack of balance in the states where they live, having effects on the social and national security (Ivan, 2006). (the Mailat case from Italy, 2008, Northern Ireland 2009 and France 2010 and August 2012²).

When it comes to minority issue or minority conflicts in international area, there are different actors involved in the mediation process or solving the conflict, such as the international actors, like the Council of Europe, the OSCE, NATO, the European Union, (Ivan, Iov, 2012: 125) UN, then we have the minorities NGO's and the states (2 categories: the state of origin or mother-state and the receiving state). Every involved actor has its own view on the situation, but their involvement and actions are according to international minority legislation.

International Legislation and Instruments in the Field of Minorities

The historical root for international minority protection goes back to the 17th century, when the European sovereigns attempted to protect the religious minorities, as religious conflicts became better in many parts of Europe (examples : Treaty of Westphalia 1648, Treaty of Vienna 1606 or Treaty of Paris 1763). But only in the 19th century, with the rise of nationalism, the protection of minorities became subject of

² The Socialist Party (SP) government of French president François Hollande dismantled two makeshift camps housing 200 people near Lille and flew 240 Roma gypsies from Lyon to Romania in the biggest repatriation of its kind since Francois Hollande succeeded Nicolas Sarkozy as president in May.

different multilateral treaties and a real concern for Europe (the starting point was the Final Act from the Congress of Vienna 1815).

After the Second World War, the number of normative acts referring to minorities increased, also the number of conflicts and tensioned situations in different parts of the world and international actors to tackle them. We can name here some of the well known documents, like: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights elaborated by the UN in 1948, the Helsinki Final Act (1975), the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (1992), the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1992), the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995, Strasbourg), the European Convention on Nationality (November 1977), the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (December 2000) or the Recommendation 1735 (2006).

Article 2 from the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* states that:

“Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set for this declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion or other opinion, national and social origin, property, birth or any other status” (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1984)

One of the international actors involved in tackling minority issues is the Council of Europe. The Council aims at combating discrimination, but does not have direct instruments to force the member states to adopt the European norms on protection of minorities. The *Protocol No.12 to the Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms*, adopted in Rome, 2000, states at **Art.1** that:

“[T]he enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, color, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status” (Protocol No.12 to the Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 2000).

37 states signed this protocol, but in 19 cases the signature wasn't followed by ratification³.

Another actor is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) that illustrates the idea of a *Pan-European Security* (Ghebali, 1996); covering with its member states a great part of Europe.

In 1990, the states participating at the OSCE Copenhagen Conference elaborated a document that condemns “racial and ethnic hatred, anti-Semitism, xenophobia and discrimination” including here also the particular problem of Roma (para.40) (Council of Europe, 2008). This commitment was renewed several times in different occasions such as the Geneva Report on National Minorities or the Moscow Conference, both in 1991. The 1999 Istanbul Summit declaration states that:

“[w]e will reinforce our efforts to ensure that Roma and Sinti are able to play a full and equal part in our societies and to eradicate discrimination against them” (Council of Europe, 2008).

In 1992, at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (in Helsinki) was created an instrument to prevent conflicts, totally orientated towards minorities: the *High Commissioner on National Minorities*. The High Commissioner role is to provide

³More information about signatory countries at: <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=177&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG> accessed 17.08.2012

early warnings and take appropriate early actions to prevent ethnic tensions to develop into ethnic conflicts⁴. His office is located in Hague.

One of the most important European actors in minorities issue is the European Union. With some little exceptions, the preoccupation for minorities protection was almost absent from the European Community's agenda until the *Maastricht Treaty (1993)*. Article 151 from the treaty (Former Article 128) stated that one of the Community roles is to contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the member states, while respecting their national and regional diversity (para.1). Furthermore, the *Amsterdam Treaty (1999)* inserted a new article (Article 13) which stated that, in certain conditions, the Council can take appropriate actions to combat discrimination based on religion, racial or ethnic origin.

Why this concern for minority issue just now? Because after the falling of the communist regime in different parts of Europe (Central Eastern Europe and in the Western Balkans) a lot of tension situations and ethnic conflicts have arisen. At this moment the minority issue became not only a problem of stability but also a problem of security in Europe. For the first time the relation "*ethnic identity (minorities)-security*" was on top of the European agenda. In many cases, but especially in the Western Balkans, the EU assumed a leading role in creating instruments and institutions for solving ethnic conflicts in order to establish security and create a background for economic development in the region (it can be mentioned here the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe⁵, 1999). "the security is, in the end, the state of normality that facilitates the society's development, progress and evolution" (Cămarășan, 2012: 139).

The Copenhagen Council (1993) stated the three conditions any European country has to fulfill in order to become a member state of the European Union⁶, among them the respect for human rights and minority protection plays an important role.

In 2000, EU adopted two Directives for promoting minority protection, namely: Directive 2000/43 that provides for equal treatment on grounds of racial and ethnic origin (Council of Europe, 2008: 27) and the second one Directive 2000/78 that prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion or beliefs, disability, age or sexual orientation, as regards employment or occupation and membership of the organization (Council of Europe, 2008: 27).

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, adopted in 2000, prohibits directly discrimination and sustains diversity, in two articles, namely Art. 21 and Art. 22:

Art. 21. "Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, color, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited."

Art.22. "The Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity." (The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union)

The Lisbon Treaty „ the most recent document that refers to the right of persons belonging to minorities"(Ivan, Iov, 2012: 127), introduced the *Charter of Fundamental*

⁴ See the High Commissioner Mandate on-line: <http://www.osce.org/hcnm/43201.html> accessed 19.08.2012

⁵ For more information about the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe see <http://www.stabilitypact.org/html>

⁶ The European Council in Copenhagen (1993) established a set of accession criteria (known as the Copenhagen Criteria), such as: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; and the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic & monetary union.

Rights into European primary law, providing new solidarity mechanisms and ensuring better protection of European citizens and minorities. When the Lisbon Treaty entered in force, in December 2009, the charter was given binding legal effect equal to the Treaties. Article 1 from the same Treaty refers to the respect of human rights and for the first time to persons belonging to minorities and not minorities in general:

“The Union is established on the values of respecting human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of the law, and on the respect of human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities” (Lisbon Treaty, 2009, Article 1 a).

Using these documents and many others as starting point, a lot of specific documents, institutions, initiatives and instruments targeting the Roma population were formulated to foster the process of social integration for this non-popular minority in 4 cross-cutting fields, namely: healthcare, housing, access to education and employment. Among this, the most important are: *The Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005-2015*, *Europe 2020 Strategy*, *The European network on Social Inclusion and Roma under the Structural Funds (EU Roma)*, *2005 Plan of Priority Measures for European Integration*, *Joint Inclusion Memorandum (JIM) 2005-2010*, *the Millennium Development Goals (2000)*.

The Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005-2015 (a Pan-European initiative) is a commitment of 12 countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Spain) Roma civil society and international partners (the World Bank, the Council of Europe, European Roma International Office, World Health organization (2011) or European Roma and Traveller Forum and so on⁷) to improve the socio-economic status and the social inclusion of Roma. During the Decade, the aim of the actors involved is to significantly reduce socio-economic disparities that divide the Roma citizens from the majority. The intervention areas are: education, health, employment and housing, fighting poverty, discrimination and gender inequality (Ionescu, Cace, 2006: 73).

The Europe 2020 Strategy for a new growth path – smart, sustainable and inclusive growth – leaves no room for the persistent economic and social marginalization of what constitutes Europe's largest minority (Iov, 2011: 490).

The European Network on Social Inclusion and Roma under the Structural Funds (EURoma) is a European network established as a result of the working seminar 'Transnational Cooperation on Roma Community and Social Exclusion' held in Madrid in June 2007. Its aim is to promote the use of Structural Funds in order to foster the social integration of the Roma minority. The network is based on three institutional pillars: the Management Committee, Working Groups (on Education, Employment and Social inclusion) and the Technical Secretariat⁸ (managed by Fundacion Secretariado Gitano, Spain).

Some Central and Eastern Europe states, influenced by the process of integration in NATO and the EU, introduced the European norms on protection of national minorities in their Constitutions. Relevant examples in this respect are Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and so on. In these countries, the attitude towards minorities had different and positive forms of manifestation, affirmative policies, hard to imagine in the communist regimes. They made concessions regarding the cultural and religious autonomy, and in Romania and Slovakia, the Hungarian minority governed together with the majority.

⁷ For further information see also Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005-2015 site: <http://www.romadecade.org/>

⁸ More information about European Network on Social Inclusion and Roma under the Structural Funds, see also <http://www.euromanet.eu/about/index.html>

“The current context of crisis, which is not only a financial and economic crisis, but also a political, social, mental, and even ideological crisis, shows the need to strengthen the dialogue”(Brie, 2011: 12) between minorities and majority.

The situation in Central Eastern Europe–The Roma minority from ignorance to concern

The Roma situation is different from country to country being directly related to the number of Roma ethnics, the relation between the majority and them, the economic development of the country, the social politics, the institutions and instruments created to stimulate their social integration. Like other minorities, they are not a monolith; they have success and failure stories, rich and poor families, well integrated persons and others that are not suited for social life.

After Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007, many European voices said the number of ethnic incidents, children exploitation, prostitution and illegal trafficking in the EU countries grew due to the fact that an important number of Roma ethnics coming from these two countries were freely to move and establish all over the EU member states. The civil society and mass-media contribute to the denigration of the Roma community image, both internally and externally and so the issue seems to become a key one again.

According to the 2001 census, in Romania are living 409.723 Roma ethnics, but according to other sources (Minority Right Group) their number is between 1,8-2,3 millions, in Bulgaria as well, their official number is around 370.908 (4,7%), but according to other sources their number is much higher, over 650.000. In certain context, the Romanian authorities (the same situation in Bulgaria too) and Roma NGO's at national or local level have a certain interest in presenting a higher number of Roma than in the official documents. The availability of funds depends on the number of Roma ethnics and their social-economic situation. The danger is that some actors (local or national) may take advantage of this uncertain situation about the real number of Roma inhabitants. Also there is the problem of assuming the identity, the belonging to a certain ethnic group (both in Romania and Bulgaria the Roma ethnics are a non-popular group). That's why at the 2011 Romanian census many Roma ethnics declared themselves as being Romanians or Hungarians.

Until 2001 little has been done by the Romanian institutions for the “Roma issue” and all the actions were taken after strong lobby from the Roma NGO's or at the recommendation of international organizations (UE, Council of Europe, OSCE and so on). After Romania engaged on becoming a member of the NATO and the EU, the situation changed and the preoccupation for Roma social inclusion became visible.

On 25th April 2001, the “*Strategy of the Government of Romania for Improving the Condition of Roma 2001-2010*” was adopted by Governmental Ordinance. The Strategy proposed a comprehensive approach to addressing problems and challenges faced by the Roma minority in 11 main areas of action (social security, education, health, children's protection, culture public administration, justice, economics, public order, communication and civic participation) (Kertesz et al, 2003) until 2010. On 14th December 2011, it was adopted the “*Strategy of the Government of Romania for the Inclusion of the Romanian citizens belonging to Roma minority 2012-2020*”⁹. The Strategy continues the measures taken by the “Strategy of the Government of Romania for

⁹ See the whole document online: http://www.anr.gov.ro/docs/Strategie_EN.pdf

Improving the Condition of Roma 2001-2010” and aims at fully benefit of the good practices obtained and the experienced gained.

In 2004, by another Governmental Ordinance (no.78/ 7 October 2004), the National Agency for Roma¹⁰ is funded. The Agency is a governmental structure that represents the Roma at national level. The Agency played an important role in implementing educational and social project for Roma, mostly funded by the European Social Fund, The Human Resources Development Operational Program (HRD OP). The projects¹¹ were mostly targeting issues like education, employment, qualification, social inclusion, equal access to social and health services.

According to information released by the Managing Authority of HRD OP, in Romania are being implemented 102 projects, funded by the European Social Fund for vulnerable groups (including also Roma ethics), a total of 250 million Euros. Even so, little has changed in the Roma communities as the results of investments in human resources are very difficult to quantify on short term.

In order to enhance the minority participation in the national political life, in the Parliament of Romania, seats are reserved for minorities if their parties do not reach the *electoral threshold of 5%* (Slovenia has the same policy too). The Roma minority is represented in the Romanian Parliament by deputy Nicolae Paun.

Hungary is far more advanced in this respect having developed a *minority self-government system* that guarantees the minorities wide ranging participation in local and national affairs that affect them. In Hungary, the Romas are the largest minority (190.046 (1,9%) according to Open Society Institute in Budapest their real number is between 500.000 and 600.000). In the last few years, the Soros Foundation, Open Society Institute and other organisations of this type initiated programmes regarding the social integration of the Roma minority, their access to education, culture, medical and social quality services.

Romania was the first country to held the rotate presidency of the Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005-2015, from 1st July 2005 to 30th June 2006. During the first year, the state members of the Decade adopted the most important documents and developed instruments for action like the *Terms of Reference, National Plans for Action*, intervention groups in different areas, mechanism and instruments for evaluation process. Not much has been done during the first year for improving the situation of Roma neither for their social integration but the back ground action plan was drawn.

Much more expectations were put on Bulgaria, the country that followed at presidency, between 1st July 2006 to 30th June 2007. Neither of them aquierd a notable succes on proposing or implementing a sustainable policy for Roma social integration. Many voices said that it was due to the short period of presidency (rotated presidency-every country one year) others said it was due to the inconsistence of policies (every country has its own vision, background, its own priorities, its own Roma problems).

Hungary followed Bulgaria at the presidency of the Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005-2015, between 1st July 2007 to 30th June 2008. The Hungarian presidency¹² focused on enhancing the intergovernmental cooperation through work-shops and international campaigns also tackling new topics like corporate social responsibility (CSR) and anti-

¹⁰ See more about the National Agency for Roma online: <http://www.anr.gov.ro>.

¹¹ Examples of projects: “*Together for a better society*”, “*Together on the labor market*”, “*School-a chance for everyone*”, “*Equality throw difference. The Roma women access on the labor market*”, see more information online: <http://www.anr.gov.ro/html/Proiecte.html>

¹² See also the Program of the Hungarian Presidency, online: <http://www.romadecade.org/files/downloads/Decade%20Documents/Program%20of%20the%20Hungarian%20Decade%20Presidency.pdf>

segregation policy in the field of education and housing. Neither the Hungarian presidency managed to change the European perception on Roma ethnics, especially after the Mailat case from Italy (2007).

Another Central Eastern country with an important Roma minority (the second largest minority after Slovak) is the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic faced, like all countries in Central Europe, many difficulties related to the integration of this community and ensuring effective dialogue between majority and the Roma minority. The Roma issue in the Czech Republic is not a new subject on the agenda of the government in Prague. Since the existence of Czechoslovakia, Roma were seen as society pariahs; both the Slovak state and the Czech one have, in turn, tried to get rid of this inconvenience.

According to a survey conducted by the Institute of public opinion (STEM) on a target group of 2056 Czechs in September and October (România Liberă, 2010), Czechs consider the Roma a community unable to adapt to the society mainstream; furthermore, they seem to destroy and pollute the environment, are violent and represent a real source of crime. As STEM put it, these results suggest that the Czechs perceive the Roma as “foreigners rather than fellow citizens” (România Liberă, 2010).

Serious barriers also arise when it comes to legal employment for Roma. In addition to the limits imposed by the relatively low level of education and training, there is a strong prejudice in terms of employment and workplace treatment for Roma. The majority of them live in insalubrious dwellings, often in separate areas at the outskirts of the urban centers, with a minimum level of infrastructure and in an environment that often affects their health. Furthermore, they consider that the medical staff is frequently insensitive to their different attitudes and cultural traditions. Without an integrated program to tackle all these problems and barriers of communication between the majority and the minority the potential conflictual situation will continue to exist and if real measures aren't taken it can get even worse.

The Czech Republic held the presidency of the Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005-2015, between 1st July 2010 to 30th June 2011 in a moment of great tension for Roma population in the EU after the Mailat case in Italy and Silvio Berlusconi's election campaign policy of deporting tens of thousands of Roma back to Romania and former Yugoslavia and also Sarkozy's expulsion policy in 2009 (around 10,000 Romanian and Bulgarian Roma) and 2010 (around 8,500 Romanian and Bulgarian Roma). Both actions were justified by the national governments as necessary for security reasons. Former French president Sarkozy's staff identified the illegal Roma camps from Paris, Grenoble or Lyon as sources of illegal trafficking, prostitution, exploitation of children (forcing them to beg), drugs and crime. Even though the EU (through the voice of Viviane Reding- Commissioner for Justice, Fundamental Rights, and Citizenship) international organizations and Roma civil society took position and demanded France to stop the expulsions, Sarkozy went on with his actions as “a strategy to improve his ratings and to bolster his position for the next election” (Severance, 2010) (elections he lost in 2012 in favour of Francois Hollande).

The Czech mission wasn't simple; it had to tackle all this problems and also the problems with the Roma ethnics from its own territory. One of their priority area was in this case to present the Roma minority positively in the media and thus to promote the improved co-existence of the Roma in the majority society¹³. Their actions didn't have the expected success as the expulsions are continuing under President Hollande as well.

¹³ See also the Program of the Czech Presidency, online: http://www.romadecade.org/czech_decade_presidency_20102011



The evolution of the public policies in the field of national minorities had evolved in parallel with the EU enlargement process towards Central and South Eastern Europe. The apparition of policies concerning national minorities in Central and South Eastern Europe has been influenced by the international legislation in this field and by their desire to join NATO and the EU. By adopting the international legislation and by formulating their own policies on minority issues, the countries from Central and South Eastern Europe proved that they have the power and the will to overpass the communist period and to become real democracies.

Being such a complex issue, the minority problem requires comprehensive approach, integrated measures, international expertise transfer and cooperation between local, national and international actors. The problem needs to be tackled *bottom-up* with a special role designate for the minority civil society. The challenge is to put another base on the relation between majority and minority, especial when it comes to non-popular minorities like the Roma ethnics. The challenge is to overpass the barrier between “us” and “them” and to tackle the social integration process “at the grass root”.

The social integration process of Roma minority is advanced in all Central and South Eastern Europe countries and especially in the ones with an important number of Roma ethnics (Romania, Bulgaria or Hungary) but there are still many things left to be done as the process is very complex covering different areas, from housing to culture and employment.

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THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO MODEL IN THE EXPERIENCE OF ROMANIAN COMMUNIST PRISONS

*Antoanela Paula MUREȘAN**

Abstract. *This paper is an analysis of two totalitarian regimes, Romanian and Russian, from the perspective of those who were imprisoned due to their convictions against the communist system. We tried to identify and understand the similarities and the differences between these two regimes, taking into account some patterns (reasons for confessing, arrests, food, physical and psychological pressures, or relationships with guards) that in our opinion offered the image of the real life in Romanian and Russian prisons.*

Keywords: *Legionnaire Movement, Iron Guard, physical pressure, psychological pressure, totalitarian regimes*

In this paper, we shall attempt to analyse the writings of several adepts of the Legionnaire Movement who were imprisoned because of their belonging to this structure, whilst chiefly elaborating on a series of leitmotifs encountered in most of these texts, telling their part of the truth: reasons for confessing, arrests, food, physical and psychological pressures, or relationships with guards. Our study basically focuses on human condition within a totalitarian regime. It is our aim to also achieve a comparison with the Soviet model of the prison system described by Alexandr Solzhenitsyn in his book, *The Gulag Archipelago*. We shall, thus, focus on five legionnaires, namely Dumitru Bordeianu, Dumitru Banea, Ioan Muntean, Grigore Caraza and Liviu Brânzaș.

From their biographies, we learn that they all had a certain attachment to culture, that they were educated and that they joined the Movement for strong ideological convictions.

Why have these people written about their experience? What has prompted them to make such confessions? Why would they share their innermost thoughts? Perhaps, beyond the psychological relief and emotional refuge, their writings are histories of life, which they lived at a very personal level, creating unforgettable experiences that left a deep imprint on their very existence, encompassed by the history of the Romanian people. And, since history is the sum of all personal histories, our approach attempts to uncover the truth encountered in this set of life stories.

1. Reasons for the Confessions of Dumitru Bordeianu¹: *Confessions from the Swamp of Despair*

From bibliographical sources, we learn that Dumitru Bordeianu served “16 years in prison”. In 1989, confessor Bordeianu went to Australia. In the tranquillity and loneliness provided by this foreign place, between February and December 1990, martyr

*PhD in History, Babeș-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca, Faculty of European Studies,
E-mail: paula.muresan@euro.ubbcluj.ro

¹ See <http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/pitesti/bordeianu/explicatie.htm>: last access: 14.02.2013.

Dumitru Bordeianu dictated to his wife, with great accuracy and lucidity, his memories from communist prisons. His manuscript was published in Paris (1992) and Bucharest (1996, 2001), under the title “Confessions from the swamp of despair”.²

“I write these things fearing the Lord, in whom I trust unlimitedly, as only He knows that what I shall confess is true. (Bordeianu, 1995: 3)... “These confessions do not aim to be literary writings. They are pieces torn from my soul and the conscience of some young warriors, faithful before God and faithful towards themselves; young men who did their best in the service of the idea of justice, freedom and faith.” (Bordeianu, 1995: 6)

First of all, we encounter in Bordeianu’s reason for writing the influence of legionnaire ideas with regard to man’s relationship with God. Starting from himself, Bordeianu extends his ideas by attributing them to any legionnaire youth. It is in fact the homage he brings to this legionnaire youth, one that embraced such ideas as honour, honesty and faith, as the latter were being promoted by the leaders of the Movement. His text denotes altruism, his suffering turns into that of all his peers, while his homage needs to be heard by future generations. He cannot remain indifferent to what he or his comrades went through. It is, in fact, an oath of the soul, as their credo was a genuine one, purely motivational. His cries for mutiny are all the greater as the youths’ virtues become standpoints in the mentality of the new regime.

Dumitru Banea³: *Defendant, witness, attorney in the trial of my life*

Similarly to Bordeianu, he served 16 years in prison⁴. His biography provides us with little information, although his brother, Ion Benea, is much better known as a legionnaire leader. Five years prior to his death, Dumitru Banea published his only book, entitled *Defendant, witness, attorney in the trial of my life*. In 1994, he included several fragments from his book in the collection *The New Man, Miami Beach*.⁵

“Why? Why is it that I am writing these lines? Is it because I want my name to appear on the cover of a book? No! Will I earn money? No! Then it is the truth, the simple truth from the love I bear for the youth of the country, as I am addressing to it.”(Banea, 1995: 5)

We may notice in Banea’s endeavour the same reason for writing: the love for the youth of Romania. The author denies from the very beginning any financial incentives or those pertaining to notoriety, which could have prompted him to write this book. An existential and moral aspect is invoked instead: the desire to reveal the truth about his times. It is his honourable duty to render this known from the viewpoint of the man who knows best what happened then, which is why his own past is subjected to analysis.

Ioan Muntean spent 15 years of his life in the prisons of Pitești, Gherla and Aiud. Released in 1963, he wrote his memories after 30 years. Muntean died in 2000, at the age of 77. For Ioan Muntean,⁶ writing is germane to psychological states. From the very start, we are puzzled by the sentence he chooses to start his memories with. He first speaks about his human condition and demands not to be judged by anything else than his deeds. Nevertheless, his detention mates are the only ones that can emit judgements about him. Therefore, we notice that he is chiefly interested in the legacy of his book, given the fact that numerous outsiders may appear and comment on a history they have not experienced

² <http://www.crestinortodox.ro/parinti/dumitru-bordeianu-126450.html>: last access: 14.02.2013.

³ See http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/ioanitoiu/dictionar_ab/ab/dictionarab_10.html: last access: 16.02.2013.

⁴ http://www.zelea-codreanu.com/Personalitati/1_Statul_Major_Legionar/Ion_Banea.htm: last access: 16.02.2013.

⁵ <http://www.miscarea.net/banea2.htm>: last access: 16.02.2013.

⁶ Biography <http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/pitesti/imuntean/explicatie.htm>: last access: 16.02.2013.

firsthand. In the author's view, this is the gravest thing that may occur, as history could thus be altered, depending on the will of amateurs. With pathos and condescendence, the author invites his readers to do him a favour, namely to treat him as human. Could it be that his craving for human recognition was taken away from him in prison? "I ask the reader of my notes to treat me as human, from the very beginning. To let go of his prejudices regarding any political affiliation. If anyone is to judge me politically, let them turn to those years only after going through the history of the time "sine ira et studio"... I have strived to write everything, without selecting from my memories. This is all I have left. I did not take notes, after my release, from an exaggerated sense of prudence, especially after going through Pitești. The only readers for whom I set no condition are all those who lived with me in Pitești, but not those who simply passed through there. The others I ask, one more time, to reread the first sentences". (Muntean, 1997: 5)

Grigore Caraza is the only one of the five writers who is still alive. Released from prison in 1977, after 21 years of political detention and 2 years of house arrest⁷, after spending time in the prisons of Piatra Neamț, Galata-Iași, Văcărești, Jilava and Aiud, he published his book, *Bloody Aiud*, in 2004.

One major difference compared to previously mentioned writers of memoirs is the fact that Grigore Caraza⁸ wrote in answer to the advice given by two people close to him: his wife and a friend. The moral values he believed in throughout his life, which refer to the Legion, of course, have made him accept incarceration instead of attempting to buy his freedom. For him, being part of the Legion is a credo of honour, while the rigour of being a legionnaire is an example for others to follow, regardless of the potential consequences. We are referring here to special moral qualities, as only a person with an immaculate and righteous soul, with altruistic ideals, can go through communist prisons, harsh as they were, without considering betrayal. It takes a lot of interior force to face the dreadful detention regime, in other words, a strong character, a role model for the youth, a landmark that will forever stand before others.

"Thinking back to what I went through, the idea of publishing this book came up a long time ago, during my first detention period in Aiud, when people of great value whom I met urged me to write. Sadly, life has always stood against me, so writing this volume was delayed, until the memory of my good and unmistakable friend Marcel Cazacu convinced me, and to his insistence was added that of my wife, as well as of other people who were very close to me. *Bloody Aiud* is a consequence of the fact that, throughout my life, there was never any time when I considered buying my freedom, selling my conscience, selling God or selling my nation." (Caraza, 2005: 5)

Of his 58 years of life, priest Liviu Brânzaș⁹ suffered in communist prisons for 13 years. In 2001, his book entitled *The Ray in the Catacomb* was published, as a history of life and endurance to psychological and physical torments in communist prisons. He is the only one of the five legionnaires who, during the communist period, worked as a priest. "He is released in 1964, along with all political detainees, but from Zarca Aiudului. In 1968 he is admitted in first place to the Theological Institute with the rank of university in Sibiu, and after his first year of study, he is appointed priest, having already married and being the father of a little girl. He is a parish priest for 22 years in the parishes of Iacobeni, Tureni and Suceagu. During this whole time, he refuses to obey the ban on religious

⁷ <http://ziarulceahlaul.ro/grigore-caraza-la-84-de-ani/>: last access: 16.02.2013.

⁸ Biography <http://ziarulceahlaul.ro/grigore-caraza-la-84-de-ani/>: last access: 16.02.2013.

⁹ Biography <http://www.fericiticeiprigoniti.net/liviu-branzas/809-scurta-biografie-a-parintelui-liviu-branzas/>: last access: 22.03. 2013.

education for children, as he regarded the Christian part of education as a fundamental and defining element for the Romanian people.¹⁰”

Priest Liviu Brânzaș¹¹ endows his writings with an existential motivation. The public he seeks is timeless (the tribunal of history), while the background for his book is given by his fellows in sufferance, living or dead. The reasons behind his writing thus become psychological, meant to heal him and inform others.

“Our true final word is this confession I utter before the Tribunal of History, in the name of my comrades who are alive, and in the memory of those who have passed into Eternity.” (Brânzaș, 2001: 1)

One first conclusion pertaining to the reasons for these confessions is their diversity, which becomes noticeable from the first pages of the memoirs. Some claimed that publishing these texts was their honourable duty, as they took part in the Movement and lived the experience of those days, whilst others believed they had to make them public in the name of love for the nation’s youth. They aimed to show everyone that they had betrayed neither themselves, nor God, however harsh their detention was. Justice, honour, faith and truth lay at the core of these writings. The motivation comprises only moral elements, while financial ones are explicitly denied. Beyond these reasons, the authors openly declare their will not to be judged either politically, or sentimentally, as they are merely depicting *the truth stemming from personal experiences*.

In Solzhenitsyn’s case, the reasons are existential. His book is dedicated to those who lost their lives in prison. It is in fact the homage brought to his fellow inmates, given the will to depict life behind bars and present the truth as it genuinely was. In his attempt to exhibit this as objectively as possible, the author requests clemency and forgiveness, if, for various reasons, certain aspects have been omitted.

“I DEDICATE this book to those who did not have enough life to tell these stories themselves. And may they forgive me for not seeing, not remembering, not understanding everything.” (Solzhenitsyn, 1997: 3)

2. Arrest

Being a member of the Legion automatically led to arrest. The criterion was plain and simple: “anyone who was a legionnaire, whether active or passive, had to be arrested, so as to be locked up, until the torments began.” (Bordeianu, 1995: 16)

After the arrest, we have first-hand information from Bordeianu about the behaviour of the authorities – the first psychological or physical torments started.

“While I was there, I could not forget three facts:

1. During all that time they only gave us one meal a day, at noon, a single slice of bread and course soup.

2. They asked us to write a short autobiography, without forcing us to state why we had been arrested.

3. At the end of the 10 days, we were removed from our cells, late at night, on rainy weather, about 20 convicts under heavy security, and taken to a cemetery, where there were freshly dug graves, similar to collective ones.” (Bordeianu, 1995: 10-11)

For Muntean, the reason for the arrest is false and he openly declares it: “And from the file it resulted that I was an anti-Semite and against patriotic labour. This is how they interpreted it.” (Muntean, 1997: 17) Anti-Semitism is invoked by the authorities to

¹⁰ <http://www.memoriarezistentei.ro/branzas-liviu-elev/>: last access: 16.02.2013.

¹¹ Biography http://www.procesulcomunismului.com/marturii/fonduri/ioanitoiu/dictionar_ab/ab/dictionarab_20.html: last access: 16.02.2013.

justify his arrest, to which they added the disobedience towards a system that promoted what was peculiarly referred to as patriotic labour.

Father Brânzaș portrays the motivation of his arrest in an evidently ironic manner, by using the standard language of the authorities. In reality, his belonging to the Movement is what triggered his arrest; even though he does not explicitly reveal it, preferring to use the phrase *enemies of the people*, as a generic term, behind it lies the word legionnaire.

“Their aim: to put as many “enemies of the people” behind bars, so as to be able to “build socialism” quietly, and to justify – as a right consequence, how else? – their privileges as guardians or the proletarian order.” (Brânzaș, 2001: 8)

Caraza believes that arrests are unjustifiable. Patriotism, instead of being appreciated and commended, becomes a flaw. The nation and the people, pillars of legionnaire ideology, have lost their calling. Moreover, they become reasons for incarceration. The dream of recreating Greater Romania has been shattered. The author mentions another reason for imprisonment: it is forbidden to affirm national spirit through songs. In fact, it thus becomes illegal to manifest any form of free spirit, especially one that strongly believes in a set of democratic values.

“I was given a 47-year political sentence, my only fault being that of taking an oath of love for my Christian and ancestral country. Upon my first arrest, in 1949, my main thought was that I would have to serve time for one of my ideals, Basarabia and Northers Bucovina, since they are ours, for singing “Awaken, Romanian!” and “Dance of Unification”, for thinking and feeling like a Romanian.” (Caraza, 2005: 5)

Therefore, we see that the reasons for the arrests are various. From these memories we understand that the prisoner has to provide the authorities with merely a statement, as the biography of the person was already well-known upon arrest. New elements behind the reasons for the arrest are, however, revealed: it was directly linked to being a member of the Legionnaire Movement, the oath of love for the country and its people, and the fact that a so-called anti-Semite or anticommunist behaviour was exhibited. From tangible elements one moves towards transcendental ones: the fact that these people had *strong Romanian feelings*.

If, for legionnaire memoirs writers, arrest was explicitly due to the fact that they had partaken in the Movement, Solzhenitsyn’s arrest is based on incredible reasons, as we were to consider them from the standpoint of a democratic society. A mere letter exchange with a co-worker, intercepted by the police, leads to his arrest.

“For me, however, it was enough: I immediately understood that I was under arrest for writing to my school mate and I understood where to expect danger from”. (Solzhenitsyn, 1997: 11)

The author insists on the chaotic system of choosing those who had to be arrested. This is where the misunderstanding and confusion arises, since:

“This happened because of failing to understand the mechanisms of the epidemics of the arrests. Most often, the Authorities had no serious reasons for making their choice: who to arrest and who to leave alone, they only attained a predetermined number. This number could be achieved in accordance with some rules, but it could also have a merely random nature.” (Solzhenitsyn, 1997: 8)

We, therefore, learn that there were no distinctive rules or directives that had to be obeyed in order for the arrest to be made, as it was only important to reach a certain number of detainees.

One of the main differences between the two detention systems is that in the case of Romania, the reason for the arrest is explicitly linked to political affiliation, while in the Soviet Union, this has little relevance.

Solzhenitsyn sheds light on another four prominent aspects, from our point of view: the arrests occur chiefly at night, their purpose being that of inducing fear (security agents greatly outnumber) and not knowing exactly how many people are taken into custody. At the time of the arrest, the authorities concoct many things – the idea was to find additional evidence to get a conviction, but also to create panic amongst family members. They met with little or no resistance, as people were innocent, while the place of the arrest was unpredictable – it could occur either at home, or at work or even on the street.

“Is it really necessary to state that it is a turning point of your entire life? A thunderbolt that falls on you? A soul-shattering thing that not everyone can come to terms with and they often fall into insanity? The world has as many centres as living beings. Each of us is the centre of the world, and the universe splits in two when you are whispered to your face: “You are under arrest!” (Solzhenitsyn, 1997: 4)

The arrest can be followed by a psychological shock. It could make the difference between a state of lucidity and madness. It is the time of utmost emotional tension, as the human being experiences a form of tension it is not acquainted with.

3. Food

Hunger is a recurrent element in prison memoirs. We have to underline the fact that, albeit there were sometimes three meals a day (breakfast, lunch and dinner), the nutritional value for a regular meal was below any accepted limits, as food consisted of merely 600-900 calories a day. Starvation was part of the torture methods that were specific to the *Securitate* and the prison regime. The starved inmate's will steadily decreased, as did his endurance to psychological torments. A hypo-caloric regime brought people to a state of obedience and prompted them to give in to pressures more easily, such as requests to testify, while ensuring a more effective control of the prisoners.

“How is it possible that, for 16 years, 24 hours a day, the meals would only consist of 600-900 calories?” (Bordeianu, 1995: 20)

In some cases, the meals were served only once a day. Hence, bread became an existential landmark. The prisoner would go so far as to count the grains of cereals; sometimes, a meal would not exceed 25-30 grains. The food served in prisons often consisted of cereal grains, barley, pumpkin, kohlrabi, potatoes, turnip etc.

Meat was excluded from the diet. Details referring to these meals provide crucial information pertaining to the physical ordeal prisoners were subjected to. Thus, the amount of food itself becomes an instrument of torture. The ability to adapt becomes essential to survival. The extermination regime through starvation becomes the pride of the authorities.

“Lunch was made up of boiled cereals or cabbage, potatoes and, in the best-case scenario, beans, but the vegetables themselves, if they were not missing completely, could be counted. Even the cereal grains, small as they are, did not exceed 25-30 pieces.

In the evening, it was something like this again, but much weaker than at lunch. The only more consistent thing was tray-baked bread, 250 grams of it, which, if squeezed in the palm of your hand, could be shrunk to the size of a goose egg. Hence, one day's worth of food did not surpass 600 calories, i.e. a quarter of the normal amount a human being has to receive, even in a state of relaxation. We were dying every day, we were dying every hour, every moment we were dying!” (Caraza, 2005: 59)

Hunger, along with water and sleep deprivation, is one of the worst conditions the human body can endure; it generates states of confusion, schizoid or paranoid feelings, severe depression, as the body and mind become powerless against any form of aggression. In the re-education process within the prison system, generally speaking, starvation was one the most effective means of torture, food becoming the reward, as in the case of animals in their training process. Food deprivation as a punitive method, strictly applied, yielded remarkable results.

A political regime that starves its own citizens is one that automatically inspires and triggers fear. But what does a detention system trigger when it boasts just 450 grams of poorly baked bread to a person, for years in a row? This is the essential information with regard to food provided by Solzhenitsyn. Because of the starvation practiced by the authorities, serving meals becomes a key moment in the life of the detainee. Hence, some questions arise on the part of the prisoner, as well as an entire philosophy of eating: what to do in order to endure famine as little as possible? Have the bread all at once? Leave it for later? Wait for the tea as well? Only by simply enumerating this series of questions can we imagine the extent of the psychological torture prisoners were subjected to. In other prisons, meals were served twice a day, at rather close time intervals: at 13:00 and 16:00, a well conceived strategy through which the authorities could achieve the total subordination of prisoners.

To conclude, we may state that in both detention systems, the Romanian and the Russian, starvation was one of the most productive torture methods.

“These 450 grams of improperly baked bread, whose core is soaked in water and soft as a swamp, half made from bread, is our food and the main event of the day. It is the beginning of life! The beginning of the day, this is the true beginning of the day! Each detainee has a lot of problems: did he use yesterday’s portion correctly? Would it be better if he cut it with a piece of string? Or break it avidly? Or slowly pick it? Should he wait for the tea or feast on it right now? Keep some for dinner or only for lunch and how much of it?... Again, there is movement down the corridor: they are pouring the tea. Another lad in a grey robe passes with the buckets. We put out our teapot between the bars and he pours from a blunt bucket into the teapot and on the side. And the entire hallway shines of cleanliness like in a first-class hotel. Soon, biologist Timofeev-Ressovsk from Berlin will be here.” (Solzhenitsyn, 1997: 87)

4. Psychological and Physical Pressures: Torture - Beatings

Life in communist prisons was hard to imagine. The extremely harsh conditions in which inmates led their lives stand as testimonies to this undeniable fact. Earth-shattering details provided by prisoners with regard to psychological and physical pressures reveal a detention system that demeans human beings. The system develops and feasts on the degradation and humiliation of its political adversaries. Conceiving such practices is beyond human understanding. The level of torture practically reveals a prison system that can be referred to as ill and paranoid, but able to attain its goals through the practices it aims to use: terror, mockery, humiliation, oscillation between life and death, all of which are meant to prove it is capable of being the sole and almighty decision maker in the lives of those who are incarcerated. Nothing prevents it from taking down its adversary, but it seems to take particular pleasure in proving the fact that it is in total control of human beings, and, as such, it pushes its victims beyond the limits of human endurance. Those who adapt keep being tortured, while those who do not, die. The concentration camp is

proof of physical and psychological strength and personal character, in other words a decisive landmark.

One of the main traits of prison regimes was the pressure detainees were subjected to. Dumitru Bordeianu presents us with a key piece of information at page 33 of his book. According to him, the pressures inmates faced were meant to alter their existence through their voluntary or reluctant participation in various actions carried out by the prison leadership. Their goal was to manufacture inquisitorial evidence that was going to be forwarded to tribunals in order to get a “righteous and impartial” conviction of detainees. We are basically referring to dossiers fabricated by the authorities, lies taken for truth, meant to ruin lives. This is a well-known instrumented practice, as, in fact, there is a complete lack of evidence leading to the conviction of the culprits.

“They would remove us from our prison compounds and take photos of us, as if we had been in our nest meetings. They tried the ultimate monstrous lie: a legionnaire activity... they took photos of a nest meeting, exactly as it was described in the Nest Leader’s little book.” (Bordeianu, 1995: 33)

Beyond the psychological pressure, they would turn to the physical one. As far as torture is concerned, beating was the most widespread form. Systematic or not, the beatings detainees were subjected to were beyond human imagination. Torture instruments included the riding whip, the lash and the bat. There was basically no body part that would not endure hits and mistreatment. Another element we uncover is that beatings were administered either by guards, or by a cellmate who was forced to undertake this assignment. Such tortures continued until the victim was nearly dead.

“On our prison block, overlooking the courtyard, one could hear the cries of pain of those who were being tortured and the muffled sound of hits. These beatings that could be heard from a distance were frightening and demoralising. Investigators used to hit tirelessly, while the screams and moans would never cease.” (Brânzaș, 2001: 44)

The reason for the beatings was the fact that prisoners affirmed their belonging to the Movement, as well as that they did not have an adequate behaviour towards the guards. The coarse bed became the place for torture, where the entire body was battered.

“Other reasons followed, on the inside, such as the fact that we were leading a legionnaire life within our cells, that we insulted the guards, that we criticised the administration, bandits as we were. Only then did I realise why they had asked so many questions when we entered that place. And for everything, they lay us on the coarse bed as they had done the first time, though they would change the places where they hit us, time after time, until there would remain no spot undamaged by belts: the soles, the palms, the spine, and, just as I thought they were done, I noticed they still had the calves. At the end, after they had terrified us with their beatings, they had us beat one another.” (Muntean, 1997: 65)

Caraza’s testimony is indicative of the level of beatings prisoners suffered. It paints a bleak picture of the human mind’s despair when facing death. His control, or that of his mates, over their own bodies, was completely taken away from them. The severity of the hits renders them immobile, making them collapse on the ground. Beatings occur at any time of day. They do not have any regularity, as they largely depend on the guards’ mood. Violence turns to chaos, which instils even more fear. The fact that torture can show its face at any time, regardless of the moment of the day, even in the late hours of the night, leaves prisoners without any hope. The fear of violence is permanent, the psychological pressure becomes unbearable, whilst the cruelty of the act itself is unimaginable.

“One by one, in a straight line, we would try to pass under the storm of hits. Bats swung cracking the skull, shoulders, back or feet of prisoners who were rendered

immobile, falling to their knees or lying in the gravel covering the yard. When, at last, we entered the cell block, it appeared to be a sort of heaven, compared to what I had been through. The same was true of what happened to us when we would head from the cell block to the factory, around midnight, when we used to go towards the dining hall, to have our porridge - namely one scoop containing 300 grams of flour, not really boiled in water. From the tip of my head, then down my spine and all the way to my heels, I felt as if a cattle rod had gone through me, to cut me in half. I distinctively heard my skull crack and something wobbling inside my head, after which I collapsed and blood invaded my face and shoulders, gushing out of my mouth, ears and nose. Ardeleanu lifted his bat again and struck me, there as I was, lying on the ground.

Stop that! Stop or you'll kill him! Can't you hear? Stop it!" (Caraza, 2005: 74-75)

From the analysis of what we have presented above, we conclude that beatings and psychological forms of torture were the main *tools* used by the authorities, while *working* with detainees. The totalitarian regime led human beings onto the thin line between life and death, by repeatedly resorting to such abominable acts. The unimaginable physical suffering was furthered by a mental one. Hence, physical and verbal violence proved to be dominant traits of communist justice.

The Russian prison system did not hold supremacy over torture methods worldwide. In fact, accepted forms of torture were not regulated, so any innovation was permitted. And there were so many innovations that the prisoners experienced the product of ill minds, aiming to exterminate their own citizens. The tortures detainees faced were pointless, albeit incredibly violent. We have uncovered a form of sadism that, bizarrely, entertained the authorities and led them to become curious as to the limits a human being can cross whilst enduring pain. The methods were not only psychological (leaving no scars but destroying the will of the prisoner), but also physical. Solzhenitsyn identifies no fewer than 31 of them, such as: using the cover of darkness, persuasion through a sincere tone of voice, initial humiliation, any procedure that would bring the prisoner to a state of despair, intimidation, deceit, playing with the attachment towards loved ones, noise torture, tickling, extinguishing a cigarette on the defendant's skin, torture by light, dragging to interrogation, boxes, staying on a stool with no backrest for six days, putting the prisoner in a grave, having him kneel without resting on his soles, obliging him to stand, long-term thirst, sleep deprivation, continuous inquiry, the box of ticks, dungeons, locking the prisoners in a narrow place where he was forced to stand, starvation, beatings that left no trace, the nail-pulling machine, the straitjacket, breaking of the spine, the swallow.

"However bad the cell is, solitary confinement is always worse, while the cell appears to be heaven, in comparison. In solitary, man is drained of his strength through starvation and, usually, cold (at Suhanovka there are also hot cells). For instance, the cells at Lefortovo do not get heated at all, the radiators heat up only the corridor and, on this "heated" corridor, guards walk wearing thick boots and winter coats, whereas the detainee is naked, left with nothing more than his underwear, sometimes just trousers, and he has to stand still (the place is narrow) in his cell for about three to four or five days and nights (hot soup is only given every three days", (Solzhenitsyn, 1997: 50).

Inhumane, hard to imagine, used for the steady destruction of the human being, torture methods undoubtedly yielded the effects they were expected to: to ruin human nature, since, regardless of the prison system that has made use of them, man's universe remains the same.

5. Relationships with Guards

The prison guard plays an important role in the memoirs of detainees. He becomes a constant occurrence, with whom they relate every single day. The guard is inherent in the idea of any detention system. He is, practically, the means through which a connection is made between the prisoners and the system itself. A constant presence within the prison environment, an instrument of torture, and the guard becomes a significant pawn in the equation made up of authorities and prisoners. The relationship between the latter and the guards provides us with essential data regarding life within the prison system. Caraza is the author that dwells on details with regard to the origin of the guards: Romanians, Hungarians and Hungarian Gypsies. Therefore, their ethnicity was of little significance for the newly-installed political regime. Whether by accident or not, the servant of a family in a state of freedom becomes its executioner in prison, casting all his anger accumulated in time and brutally hitting his former masters. The image of violence inflicted by guards is expressed by Caraza somewhat metaphorically, with the help of a set of terrifying images. Appearing to be drawn out of a horror film, the description of the beatings is combined with an acoustic image that renders the entire scene much more frightening. The screams and shrieks produced by the guards as they launch the assault terrify the prisoners to an even greater degree. The number of guards is also impressive: 275. When the collective beating is initiated, it meant that detainees were going to be forced through a row of about 250 guards. Equipped with a large variety of close-combat weapons, from bats and crowbars to wooden bed legs, they savagely hit detainees until they brought them on the verge of death.

“The guards revealed their true nature, showing exactly who they were. Ardeleanu was screaming like a hungry hyena as he was lifting the bat over his head, so as to swing it violently at our bones; the beast in him broke loose, in all its savageness and ferocity. Then followed Barabaș - a Romanian of Hungarian descent, Liță - a Hungarian Gypsy and Dumitru Năstase from Vaslui, the commune of Codăiești. From this commune, in the prison of Aiud, there was Mr Corcoțoiu, together with two sons of his, one of whom was a jurist and former warden of Piatra Neamț prison, while the other was an economist. Dumitru Năstase had been a servant of this family at their manor, so when he came face-to-face with his former masters, he beat them insatiably, for no reason whatsoever. I have thought a lot about this story and said to myself: God save you from the rule of the little ones, the wrath of the stupid and the vengeance of the fool!... As far as I know, the prison had 275 guards, but in that line I think there were at least 220-230. Dressed in blue, each swinging bats, crowbars, pieces of metal, wooden bed legs or bush branches, they formed a sinister row, of nothing but death.” (Caraza, 2005: 74)

The picture described by Ioan Muntean, when referring to guards, is a much gentler one. The fact that they had not yet embraced atheism could be noticed in their behaviour. Detainees still had the possibility to sing religious chants without getting beaten. Moreover, while apparently breaking one of the prison laws, the guards used to buy them newspapers. They were also the ones who brought prisoners their meals, accompanied them to the toilets and, much to their surprise gave up eavesdropping around corners.

“The guards on duty had not yet turned to atheism and left us alone. Each night, we would sing together “God is with us”, the psalm of all those who are in distress... Since we had money on us, we were allowed to be bought newspapers by the guards. But this right came with a twist, as the favour lasted only as long as the trial orchestrated against the bourgeoisie lasted that autumn... The guards came with the food, took us to the bathroom, the head-wardens - Ciobanu and Mândruță - announced the wake-up call and

lockdown, knocking on the bars, every morning or night. But there were no more searches, no more spying behind closed doors; they trusted that Țurcanu would not embarrass them. "(Muntean, 1997: 31-35)

Brânzaș describes one of the beatings and refers to an escape, which was hard to imagine during the communist period. The guards beat detainees and carry out brutal searches. One exception is a Hungarian guard, who does not embrace his comrades' game. Perhaps his previous job, that of violin player, makes him have a more humane attitude towards detainees.

"The concentration camp is crawling with guards and officers. Most of them are deployed at the gate, while the others watch the barracks. The ones at the gate check the prisoners that go outside. This "welcome" consists of fists, kicks, profanities, menacing screams and a thorough and brutal search. After everyone is out, the headcount begins. It is unclear how many detainees have escaped. For this reason, the headcount starts all over again. Once, twice... ten times. They keep counting until midnight. Each inmate lies in his bed, so they look for empty beds. In the end, there are 14 empty beds, so 14 escapees. I believe in the entire history of high security communist prison there has never been such an achievement!... All guards partake in these brutal searches. Actually, not all of them! There is one guard, Hegheduș, who does not take part in the ambush. He conducts the search formally and non-violently. This Hungarian, a former professional violin player, displays surprising humaneness." (Brânzaș, 2001: 119)

Banea's account of the guards' attitude is unexpected. The humaneness they seem to exhibit is emphasised by the use of the term *Brothers*, which means they were sometimes capable of feeling empathy towards prisoners.

"Brothers, don't tell on me, as I'll get 20 years in prison; I've come to bring you a bit of water. "(Banea, 1995: 125)

The guards also ensured protection in the case of prisoner transfers. The security measures were extreme, so as to prevent any attempts at escaping. Furthermore, the guards bore arms.

"When we reached Pitești it was a beautiful day. At the time, the prison did not have any vans for transporting the prisoners. The warden was waiting for us at the train station with about 30 armed guards. As they had no chains, they made us line up in rows of six, based on our height, and tied our hands with ropes. In this way, running became impossible, as we were watched by armed guards. "(Bordeianu, 1995: 78)

The analysis of the relationship between detainees and guards leads to several important conclusions. The guard became the main connection between the prisoner and the system. For the authorities, the ethnic origin of the guards was irrelevant, so long as they performed their duty. We also learn that their numbers were relatively high (250 guards per prison). One possible explanation for this would be the need to strengthen the oppressive system, so as to maintain control. Within the prison, the guards carried close-combat weapons and, often, firearms. Moreover, they ensure prisoner transfers to various locations. Albeit turned into instruments of torment of unusual cruelty, they are sometimes described by memoirs writers as humane (they allowed prisoners to sing religious chants, bought them newspapers and did not spy on them).

In the Russian detention environment, the guard, a faithful representative of the system, was endowed with numerous roles: the punitive one: "the guard would barge in, screaming Open your eyes, or I will drag you from the bed by your feet and tie you up against the wall!" (Solzhenitsyn, 1997: 44); that of decision maker: "the heating tap on the corridor, at the guard's hand "(Solzhenitsyn, 1997: 76); security provider: "the guard started

unlocking the door “(Solzhenitsyn, 1997: 78); supervisor: “Communications between cells were tracked, to such a great extent that, following each exit from a bathroom, the guards would check it with a portable light bulb and light every toilet hole” (Solzhenitsyn, 1997: 205); spy: “he watched - all too often - through the peephole, as he had to make sure these gifts from the administration were not used with bad intentions: that they were not making holes in the wall with the teapot” (Solzhenitsyn, 2007: 80); and, worst of all, murderer: “the guards show up in the area and open fire on those who were walking legally. Three rounds. Six dead and three severely wounded”. (Solzhenitsyn, 1997: 198)

All in all, several conclusions are necessary, in order to come to the assistance of those who are preoccupied with uncovering the truth about prison systems under dictatorial regimes. Our comparative research, beyond shedding light on differences and similarities, has helped us to pinpoint new elements. The latter have chiefly emerged thanks to memoirs, more precisely reasons for writing, accounts of arrests, food, physical and psychological pressures, relationship with wardens etc. The motivation behind the endeavour to narrate such life stories, apart being endowed with a psychological aspect, meant to being healing, attempts to genuinely explain causes and consequences of a disturbing phenomenon. We therefore notice that the reasons for the arrests are chiefly linked to the involvement in the Movement, in the case of legionnaires, whilst for Solzhenitsyn, they are broader and more chaotic. It is, however, the number of people who were arrested that matters the most, not necessarily the justification for the arrest. Detention systems were meant to exterminate prisoners, chiefly through brainwashing. To achieve this, the system resorted to both physical and psychological torture methods. Our analysis shows that Russian techniques were not only harsher, but also more diversified. The very essence of the Gulag Archipelago favoured such an approach, as the bearers of authority, whether we are referring to guards, investigators, prosecutors or judges, enforced the laws of a totalitarian state and, often, went beyond them, in their zeal. Irrespective of the system, hundreds of thousands of people have been affected by the repressive means adopted by the two principal totalitarian regimes.

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IV. Events

DISSEMINATION OF THE RESULTS OF THE PROJECT “INITIATIVE AND CONSTRAINT IN THE MAPPING OF EVOLVING EUROPEAN BORDERS”

Locations: Oradea – Debrecen- Uzhgorod- Chernivtsi - Chisinau – Oradea
Dates: June 3-13th, 2013

The University of Oradea, as a main partner in the Jean Monnet Multilateral Research Group entitled “Initiative and Constraint in the Mapping of Evolving European Borders” organized in June 2013 the dissemination of the results of the project in an itinerant seminar session entitled “*Communicating the EU Policies beyond the borders. Proposals for Constructive Neighbour Relations and the New EU External Communication Strategy*”. The participants were project members from all of the partner institutions that participated in the project. The dissemination was organized in order to deliver a different perspective on borders, for the participants, by crossing 4 different borders (Romania-Hungary, Hungary-Ukraine, Ukraine-Moldova, Moldova-Romania), as well as for the beneficiaries of the project, such as local authorities and universities from the cities in which the seminars were held. The dissemination seminars were held in Oradea (Romania), Debrecen (Hungary), Uzhhorod (Ukraine), Chernivtsi (Ukraine) and Chisinau (Moldova).

The dissemination of the results of the project opened with the kick-on workshop in Oradea on June 3rd 2013, where the project manager, prof. Ioan Horga presented the evolution of the project and some of its results: the number of collected sources so far, the issues of Eurolimes that were released, the project consortium and the researchers involved, as well as the activities of each work packages. The CVCE technical expert presented the preliminary results of the digital database regarding borders in the frame of the new CVCE website. The seminar continued the next day with the dissemination workshop, entitled *The Prioritization of EU Enlargements: A Strategic Choice to Encourage Constructive Neighbour Relations*, chaired by prof. Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro, from the University of Coimbra, Portugal and prof. Ariane Landuyt from the University of Siena, Italy. The main topics that were discussed were the enlargement process of the European Union, the EU regional policy, gender equality policies and geopolitical priorities.

The structure of the next seminars would follow the structure of the seminar in Oradea: first, the results of the project are presented, afterwards several papers are presented. The next seminar was held in Debrecen, Hungary, on June, 5th, 2013 and it was entitled *Enhancing EU External Relations: The Challenge of Identity Borders in Communication of EU Policies*. The main focus of the seminar was the discussion of the EU’s relations, related either to identity, energy or even economy, in relation to its neighborhood and how can the EU improve its communication within its external relations. For instance, Dr. Polgar’s point of view in this sense was the need to build a



common memory beyond borders in order to help create a better communication outside the EU's frontier, while Dr. Penzes' paper focused on the need to build better economic relations between the Eastern Member States and the neighborhood.

The first stop from Ukraine in the dissemination activity at the Eastern border of the European Union was at the University of Uzhgorod, in the city of Uzhgorod, Zakarpattia Oblast, where the project team was met by local officials, such as Mr. Ledida Oleksandr, the Head of the Transkarpatian Regional Administration, and the rector of the University of Uzhgorod, Prof. dr. Vashuk Fedir. Before the panel, the *Initiative and Constraint in the Mapping of Evolving European Borders* project was presented by prof. Ariane Landuyt, who emphasized the main activities and achievements of the project team, as well as the following activities of the project, the number of the sources that were collected, while prof. Ioan Horga presented the digital side of the project: the website and the sources that have been collected. The general themes of the papers revolved around EU's relations with the neighboring countries, especially at the Eastern Border. Using the border concept, the authors revolved around the need for the EU to focus on cross-border activity and cross-border identities in order to foster better neighborhood relations. These ideas were, of course, applied to Ukraine, as it has been caught in a struggle between East and West. The seminar ended with the tour of the city and departure to the next location.

The third seminar in the dissemination activity was held in the UNESCO heritage site of the Yuriy Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University. The title of the dissemination activity was: *New Approaches in the Communication of EU Border Governance*, on June 8th, 2013. Like in the previous meetings, the seminar was attended by local and regional officials, Stepan Melynychuk, the rector of the University, Mykhailo Hainicheru, the head of the Chernivtsi Oblast Rada and Ion Popescu, deputy in the Ukrainian Parliament. They were introduced to the activity, objectives and results of the project in a presentation made by prof. Ariane Landuyt and prof. Ioan Horga.

In the panel chaired by prof. Carlos Pacheco Amaral and prof. Anatolyi Kruglashov, several concepts were discussed, such as multilevel governance, the special situation of the EU's outermost regions or cross-border cooperation. The participants and audience welcomed the debate related to the cross-border cooperation between Romania and Ukraine, two countries bound by historical connections and tied thanks to the different minorities living on both sides of the borders. In this context, the discussion on the importance of cross-border cooperation and euroregions focused on the need to transform the border between Ukraine and Romania into a more developed connection axis. The seminar ended with a short visit around the university campus.

The final workshop organized in the dissemination activity was held on June, 10th, 2013 in Chişinău in the capital city of the Republic of Moldova, another member of the Eastern Partnership of the European Neighborhood Policy. The title of the workshop was *The Security Dimension of New EU External Communication*. The seminar started in the presence of local academic officials, the Rectors of the State University of Moldova, prof. Gheorghe Ciocanu and prof. Igor Şarov, the Dean of the Faculty of History and International Relations from the same university. The theme of the seminar regarded the security of borders and how can it be improved without making borders impossible to pass. Alternatively, a rich debate was born after Svetlana Suveica's paper on the debates regarding the Romanian citizenship for Moldavians relating to issues of identity and citizenship. The researcher tried to answer the question whether the Moldovian citizens seek Romanian citizenship for the EU citizenship or rather for identity reasons. The other papers focused on cross border security issues and how these challenges are overcome, using smart borders, or law principles.

The dissemination activity concluded in Chişinău with the presentation of the conclusions of the project and the dissemination by prof. Georgios Contogeorgis on the complexity of borders and the many facets that were discovered during the debates within the itinerant conference entitled *Strategy for Constructive Neighborhood Relations and New EU External Communication*.

Developed across four countries, crossing five borders within and without the European Union, the dissemination activity is one of the most important outputs of the Multilateral Research Group project. Within this activity, both main objectives of the project were accomplished. First and foremost, the direct contact with the border experience helped the professors and involved young researchers to clearly see the impact of the border both inside the European Union and outside its borders. The academic network learnt about the issues of border regions, from security issues to identity and economic issues. The evolution of European borders, both inside the EU and outside could be clearly seen as participants exited the EU space from Romania and Hungary to Ukraine and Moldova. Secondly, the academic team that participated in the seminars and shared their research results across four countries entered in contact with local officials and decision-makers, helping in the creation of a connection with the local academic research and the decision making institutions. The academic network that was founded through this project was indeed strengthened. The papers delivered during the course of this itinerant conference are gathered in the final collective volume of the conference entitled *Strategy for a Constructive Neighborhood Relation and New EU External Communication*. Each paper contains a set of policy recommendations, based on the results of the research, as well as the observations made during the itinerant conference in Romania, Hungary, Ukraine and Moldova.

Mirela MĂRCUȚ
E-mail: mir3lam@gmail.com

THE CELEBRATION OF 10 YEARS OF EDUCATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND EUROPEAN STUDIES

The department of International Relations and European Studies within the Faculty of History, International Relations, Political Sciences and Communication Sciences, at the University of Oradea, has celebrated this summer 10 years from the establishment of the International Relations and European Studies.

The event that marked this anniversary took place on Monday, June 3, in the Aula Magna of the University. With this occasion, the exhibition of the scientific research results of the Department of International Relations and European Studies was organized, in which some of the authored books, the volumes of the international conferences and the journals edited by the members of the Department were presented.

The event enjoyed the attendance of local and regional authorities, teachers from the partner universities in the country and abroad, past generations of graduates and also of students from two High Schools in Oradea – the Mihai Eminescu and the Aurel Lazar High Schools.



Greeting and congratulatory messages were presented by the Rector of the University of Oradea, Professor Constantin Bungau; the President of the Bihor County Council, Cornel Popa; the Bihor County Prefect, Claudiu Pop; the Deputy Mayor of Oradea, Ovidiu Muresan; the former Chief Negotiator Romania – EU (2000-2004), former Minister of European Integration (2008-2009), prof. dr. Vasile Puscas, from the Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca; the President of the Oradea University Senate, Professor Sorin Curila; the co-Manager of the Institute for Euroregional Studies Debrecen-Oradea, Professor Istvan Suli Zakar, from the University of Debrecen; Professor Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro, from the University of Coimbra; the vice-President of the Romanian Association of International Relations and European Studies, RAIRES – ECSA Romania, the President of the Commission for Political, Social and Communication

Sciences in ARACIS, Professor Adrian Ivan, from the Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca; from the NATO Centre of Excellence in Oradea, Colonel Marin Dinca; from NSPAS Bucharest, Senior Lecturer George Anglitoiu; from the West University in Timisoara, Professor Grigore Silasi; an exceptional graduate of the first generation of the IRES specialization, Mihai Jurca.



All the guests saluted the results and reputation that the IRES Department team acquired in the country and abroad in the ten years of existence, through research and teaching, both circumscribed to the desire to form valuable students, with skills and competences that meet the demands and challenges of the current socio-economic environment.

The emergence of this specialization at the University of Oradea started from several premises, including: the tradition, the internationalization of the University of Oradea, the need to prepare through a Masters Degree specialists in regional development, cross-border cooperation and security at the EU external borders and last, but not least, the implementation of a study program with multidisciplinary attributes that meets the required model imposed by the implementation of the Bologna educational concept. The creation of the Department of International Relations and European Integration in 2000, at the initiative of the Rector Teodor Maghiar, entrusted to manage to Professor Ioan Horga was, on the one hand, an active lever for developing a consistent inter-university relations with similar institutions in Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, in particular through the Erasmus program. On the other hand, it was intended to be the framework for the initiation of several teaching and research projects, targeting International Relations and European Studies. The inauguration of the International Center for Euroregional Research (ICER) in 2000, the launch of the Euroregional Studies and Cross-border Relations MA (2001) and the beginning, in partnership with the University of Reims Champagne Ardenne and the International Institute of Administrative Sciences in Brussels, of the research project on the impact of the media on the process of European construction, the creation of the "Jean Monnet" Department for Euroregional Studies (2002), as well as, early in 2003, the signing of the agreement through which the University of Oradea became a member of the Siena network of the European Master "Building of Europe", alongside universities in Athens, the Azores, Bologna, Coimbra, Krakow, Granada, Hanover, Salamanca, Siena and Strasbourg, have created the academic and logistical premises for the operation, starting with the 2003-2004 academic year, of the International Relations and European Studies program.

The scientific bases, backed by a team of committed teachers conscious of the mission they received, consisting of renowned professors from the Departments of History and Geography, were strong arguments on which the National Council for Academic Evaluation based its decision to award, on a proposal from Professor Vasile Vese from the "Babes-Bolyai" University in Cluj-Napoca, the authorization for the provisional functioning of the undergraduate program in International Relations and European Studies (IRES). Meanwhile, a young generation has contributed to the multidisciplinary training of the future graduates of the IRES specialization. European recognition for the teaching and research potential materialized in 2005, the European Commission approving the submitted project for the creation of the Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debreceen (IERS) as the "Jean Monnet" European Centre of Excellence. IERS soon became a veritable research pole, results being embodied in 17 collective volumes and numerous articles published in the *Eurolimes* magazine, which has established itself as a scientific reference product in international academia.

After a five years long construction and research period, the IRES team had to pass, in 2007-2008, an extremely important test, that of the evaluation of the first three series of graduates, followed by the accreditation of the specialization. The evaluation of the students was made by a committee of teachers from the National School of Political and Administrative Sciences in Bucharest (NSPAS), consisting of Professor Adrian Miroiu, prof. Cezar Barzea and prof. Iordan Gheorghe Barbulescu. All the three promotions evaluated in 2007 and 2008 have passed the exigent exam with a promovability percentage of over 90%, which was an additional argument for the IRES study program accreditation by ARACIS in summer 2009. In the same year, the Regional Development and Institutional Communication in the EU and the European Security Masters programs were both accredited, completing the profound training palette in IRES.

Confident in the academic and research potential, the young team from Oradea managed to diversify the range of programs of study, receiving accreditation for carrying out studies of IRES in English (2010) – the first in the country; of Undergraduate Security Studies (2012), as well as Masters degrees in the field (European Studies - 2011, International Relations – 2011, the Evaluation of European Public Politics and Programs - 2013). The evolution towards more and more specialized types of training is completed since 2010 by obtaining, by prof. Ioan Horga, the right to lead PhD thesis in the IRES domain, in the PhD School of the "Babes-Bolyai" University in Cluj-Napoca.

Today, the Department of International Relations and European Studies offers, both at undergraduate and Masters levels, fields of study (majors) in Romanian or English, with a strong interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary character. They are dealing with current issues, with a consistent supply of practical activities (at undergraduate level: field applications, internships) and experience exchanges (Erasmus scholarships) in over 60 universities in the European Union. The training that the department offers opens a wide horizon in terms of employment opportunities.

Florentina CHIRODEA
E-mail: fchirodea@uoradea.ro

V. Honoured Personality

LAUDATIO

In the Honor of Professor Doctor Vasile Pușcaș, Babeș-Bolyai University, Celebrating a Prestigious Academic and Diplomatic Career

There are only few universities around the world who can be proud to have among their academics an outstanding personality, a visionary diplomat, a creative builder of a dynamic school in the field of international relations and European studies and a real patriot, who took the opportunity to change his country destiny for the benefits of its citizens. The *Alma Mater Napocensis* is proud to have among its prestigious academics a world tale professor and diplomat, Prof. Dr. Vasile Pușcaș, the Transylvanian who arrived to Washington to negotiate for his country the *Most Favored Nation Status*, who arrived from Cluj to Brussels to negotiate with the EU Romania's accession and whomown wis his "to *make history*, not just *speak* about it". Indeed, the Negotiator Vasile Pușcaș managed to enroll Romania on right contemporary trajectory, among other important global actors.



An elite European intellectual and a real believer in the role of the European Union project, Professor Vasile Pușcaș is the most known brand of Babeș-Bolyai University, especially in the field of international relations and European studies. He represents an inspirational model of professional and personal career to his students and colleagues.

His ability to give represents one of his main characteristics, which easily can be seen in his former students careers or in the transparency of the dissemination of the technical details of the negotiation process of Romania's accession to the EU. For the city of Cluj-Napoca, the Professor and Negotiator Vasile Pușcaș, is a sign of pride and a reference point of knowledge, credibility and trust.

The distinguished Professor was born on July 8th, 1952 in Surduc (Sălaj county). He graduated the Faculty of History and Philosophy, "Babes Bolyai University", Cluj-Napoca with a degree on History and Social Sciences. He obtained a Ph. D in History, with a thesis entitled "Organizarea și activitatea științifică a Universității din Cluj în perioada 1919-1940" (*The organization and the scientifically activity of University of Cluj, between 1919-1940*), being recognized in the field of contemporary history as one of the most modern approach of the history of the University of Cluj, largely appreciated nowadays among the students and scholars. The second edition of his Ph. D publication, "Universitatea – Societate-Modernizare" has the preface written by Professor Keith Hitchins (2003), who made the following remarks: "Here, then, is the first history of the University of Cluj to describe systematically its organization and functioning during the first twenty years of existence. Vasile Pușcaș has given us a case study of how a great university comes into being. His history of this complex process will become essential reading not only for Romanians, but also for all those elsewhere who are concerned about the role of the university in society. But he has done more; he has gone beyond the hard

evidence of the sources to capture the spirit of the University of Cluj, that vital force that lay behind its impressive growth and accomplishment in the interwar period. It is the spirit that endured throughout the difficult decades that followed the Second World War, and it is the spirit that guides university today”.

His main research fields are *International and European Negotiations, International Relations, Central and Eastern Europe in the XXth Century International Relations* and *International Business Relations and Conflict Management*.

He followed all the steps of academic career, becoming a full professor in the field of International Relations in 1995. From 2000, he is Ph D coordinator in International Relations and visiting professor of International University Institute of European Studies in Gorizia / Trieste (Italy).

His innovative academic vision is present in the BA, MA and Ph. D programs which he initiated, mainly in collaboration with prestigious universities and educational entities from abroad: **BA program - Faculty of Political Sciences**, Babes-Bolyai University, in collaboration with USAID Central European Academic Program, with BA issued in Political Sciences, Public Administration, Journalism and Communication (1995); **MA - International Peace Operations**, under Academic Consortium International University Institute for European Studies Triste-Gorizia (2000); **MA - Cooperation project Making and European Policies**, under Academic Consortium International University Institute for European Studies Triste-Gorizia (2000); **MA - Communication and Methods for European Policy Making**, under Academic Consortium International University Institute for European Studies Triste-Gorizia (2005); **MA - Cultural Diplomacy and the Global Economy**, in collaboration with Institute for Cultural Diplomacy Berlin (2012); **MA - International Relations and Cultural Diplomacy**, in collaboration with Institute for Cultural Diplomacy Berlin (2012); **PhD program - Transborder Policies for Daily Life** under program Academic Consortium International University Institute for European Studies Triste-Gorizia (2000); **PhD program - Cultural Diplomacy** (2012); a **Research institute - Institute for International Studies**, Babes-Bolyai University, Faculty of History and Philosophy (1999) and the **Center for International and European Negotiations and Mediation** at Babeş-Bolyai University (2012).

From 2011, his excellency in teaching European studies disciplines was recognised by the European Commission, thus he was awarded the title of Professor Jean Monnet *Ad Personam*, within a European project - *European Politics and Negotiation in the European Union* - which he is coordinating. The European Commission recognised his expertise, appointing him as the trainer for the accession negotiation teams of the Western Balkans countries. He is actively involved in the Regional Environmental Network for Accession (RENA), a project which is aiming to enhance regional cooperation in the Western Balkans and Turkey in the field of environment in the prospect of accession to the European Union and to assist these countries in the preparation for accession. Within this project, he wrote a handbook on European Accession Negotiations, printed in the year 2013 which will constitute the basis for the training of the Balkan countries for the European accession negotiations.

His research preoccupations are present in more than 10 research projects that he managed or was involved in, as a member team. Among the most important projects, it could be mentioned: *Accession Negotiations to Communities/European Union (1962-2007). Methods, Procedures, Perspectives (2007)* as director, *Cross-border Co-operation in Balkan-Danube Area - Romania - Bulgaria, Hungary, Moldova, Serbia and Montenegro (2002-2005)* as a member of research team, *Region and regionalization in*

European Unionea and the countries of Central Europe and NATO (2002-2004) as a member of research team. He is actively involved and a real promoter of the projects financed from the European Social Funds, as director or expert: „*Socio-humanistic sciences in the context of globalized evolution – developing and implementation of the studies and research postdoctoral program*” (2010-2012) - director, „*The Center for the Promovation of the Entrepreneurship in the field of Sustainable Development*” (2010-2013) as expert and „*Managerial competences in developing poles and future entrepreneurship in competitiveness poles*” (2012-2014) as expert.

The international scientific prestige is evidenced by the professional organizations that he is leading or is a member of: Academy of Political Sciences from New York, Association of International Law and International Relations; Governors Council Gorizia/Trieste; Commission of the History of International Relations; Commission of Military History; Steering Committee, European Institute from Romania, Bucharest; Scientific Committee of *ISIG*- Gorizia-Trieste (president); European Institute, Florence; Advisory Committee of the Institute of Cultural Diplomacy from Berlin; Society of Romanian Historians; Romanian Society of European Law and European Academy of Sustainable Development.

Also, it is worth mentioning the editorial team of prestigious journals, where he is a dedicated member or the collections from contemporary history and international relations which he coordinates: “Romanian Journal of Society and Politics”; Coordinator of collection *UNIVERSITAS*, serie *Contemporary History and International Relations* (Eikon Printing House); “Eastern Journal of European Studies”, Centre for European Studies, Al. Ioan Cuza University, (Iași); Editorial Board, *IUIES Journal* (Gorizia); Editorial Board, *ISIG Journal* (Gorizia); Editor, International Politics and Diplomacy Collection, “Sincron” Printing House, Cluj-Napoca; “Central European Issues” (Bucharest); „Central European Political Review” (Budapest); Coordinator of collection “Politics”, Dacia Printing House (Cluj-Napoca); “Foreign Policy - Romania”; “History Folders” (Bucharest); „Review of Political Studies and International Relations” (Bucharest); “Eurolimes” – Journal of the Institute for Euroregional Studies (Oradea) and *Studia Universitas Babes-Bolyai. Studia Europaea* (Cluj-Napoca).

The dedicated Professor is well-known in the academic community as one of the most prolific publishers from the field of international relations and the author of the first handbook of international relations (1998). He received in 2007 the Romanian Academy Prize “Mihail Kogălniceanu”, for the book *România spre Uniunea Europeană. Negocierile de aderare (2000-2004) (Romania to the European Union. Accession Negotiations)*. This book represents the quintessence of the process of the Romania’s Accession to the EU, it was translated into English language for the international public, and it was preceded by more than 2000 pages describing the technical process of accession contained in the six volumes of the book *Negotiating with the European Union* (2003-2005): „Documente inițiale de poziție la capitolele de negociere” (*Initial position paper of negotiating chapters*) (2003), as the first volume; „Initial Position Papers” (2003) as the second volume; „Preparing the External Environment of Negotiations” (2003), the third volume; „Pregătirea mediului intern de negociere” (*Preparing the internal environment for negotiation*) (2003), the fourth volume; „Pregătirea mediului de negociere, 2003 – 2004” (*Preparing the environment for negotiation 2003-2004*) (2005), the fifth volume and the last volume „Comunicarea publică și negocierea pentru aderare, 2003 – 2004” (*Public communication and negotiations for accession 2003-2004*) (2005). From all of the countries from the fifth wave of enlargement, Romania was the only

country which described in detail this process, and for that we have to thank to Professor and Negotiator Vasile Pușcaș.

He published until now, 28 volumes as single author; he coordinated and was the co-author of more than 50 books and more than 150 articles and essays in prestigious international and national journals and reviews.

The powerful character of Professor was obvious from the beginning of his academic and publishing activity, when his first book, *Dr. Petru Groza – pentru o „lume nouă”* (*Dr. Petru Groza – for a “new world”*), published in 1985 at printing house Dacia, was forbidden and full edition was burnt. Instead of abandon his scientific interest and academic activity, Professor Vasile Pușcaș decided to go further on, and the same pattern of behavior conducted him in the difficult public positions that he occupied, when he had to take decisions as for the *Most Favored Nation Status* or the decisions regarding the Romania's accession to the EU.

Being recognised as the **Negotiator** in the public life, the eminent Professor is a brave and responsible diplomat who served his country on each position he was assigned. The most important public positions that he honored were: Director of the Romanian Cultural Center from New York, which was created after his negotiations (1991-1992); Charge d'Affaires / Interim Ambassador, Washington, D.C. (1993-1994); Minister Councillor, DCM, Romanian Embassy, Washington, D.C. (1992-1994); Minister Delegate, Chief Negotiator with European Union (2000-2004); Member of Romanian Parliament (2004-2008); Member of European Parliament (2007) and Minister of European Affairs, Romanian Government (2008-2009). The diplomatic activity represents his emblem in the public life at international and, especially, European level. A lot of European officials and specialists from international relations field of studies said that we, Romanians, owe our accession to the EU to Romanian Negotiator, Professor Vasile Pușcaș and to his negotiation team, composed merely from his former students. His dedication, intense work and efforts, the official connection that he developed and the recognition from the most important European actors.

His experience is constantly in the service of the others, being frequently invited as a keynote speaker in international and national conferences, organized by academic, diplomatic or NGOs entities.

His activity was several times awarded by different communities and organizations, from which we mentioned the following: *Excellency Diploma* from Romanian Academy for researches in the field of contemporary history (2010); *Doctor Honoris Causa* of University of Oradea (2010); *Excellency Trophy “10 for Romania”*, at the category *Diplomacy*, for the *negotiation of the Accession Treaty of Romania to the European Union and for the academic, scientific and diplomatic activity, held throughout his entire career*, offered by the Reality TV station, *Transilvanian Cross*, offered by the Metropolitan of Cluj, Alba, Crișana and Maramureș (2010) and the *Romanian Star Medal*, the rank of knight (2002). He was awarded several times with the prize of *Representativity* or *Excellency* from the University Babeș-Bolyai.

He is an active supporter of the entrepreneurship, being the first Romanian deputy who initiated a law for entrepreneurship. He is involved in the activity of the *Romanian Entrepreneur Club* (*Clubul Întreprinzătorului Român*), participating in its projects (for example, he is expert in the project *„Managerial competences in developing poles and future entrepreneurship in competitiveness poles”*, of which beneficiary is *Romanian Entrepreneur Club*). His expertise is valued by the Transilvania Bank, a national bank which decided in 2009 to ask for consultancy regarding the investment with European funds. As a sign of appreciation and performance of his work, the Advisory Board of the

bank,ask him to join it as a member (from 2012) andthen, as the senior advisor of the President of the Transilvania Bank.

The words are not enough to express the gratitude of the community and academic corpus for what Professor Vasile Pușcașhas given in his prestigious career. He accomplished a lot, and then gave a lot to the others: students and colleagues from university or from other institutions where he worked. Respect and admiration for the Professor and Negotiator Vasile Pușcaș, who changed Romania's history: to many other accomplishments!

Assoc. Prof. PhD. Melania-Gabriela CIOT

IN MEMORIAM

PROFESSOR BARBU ȘTEFĂNESCU

The beginning of this year came with a great loss for the Department of International Relations and European Studies and University of Oradea: the death of one of our most loved and prestigious teachers. Mentor of many generations of undergraduate, master and PhD candidates, Professor Barbu Ștefănescu suddenly disappeared from Oradea academic landscape, leaving behind a complex work, recognized both at national and international level, research projects and future plans which are to be continued by his colleagues in the Departments of History and International Relations and European Studies with whom he had worked for almost twenty years. Hardworking and extremely dedicated Barbu Ștefănescu brought his contribution to the strengthening of the academic management in his positions as Scientific Secretary of the Faculty of Letters and Human Social Sciences (1996-1998), Vice Dean of the same faculty (1998-1999), Dean of the Faculty of Human Social Sciences (1999-2000), Dean of the Faculty of History and Geography (2000-2007), Dean of the Faculty of History and International Relations (2007-2008), Vice Rector for International Relations and Communication (2008-2012), Director (having vice rector duties) of the Council of University Doctoral Studies (2012-2013). In all these positions he came to the fore with the tenacity he supported his ideas with, the balance he proved in conflict management and the skills he had in human resources management.



The death of our distinguished Professor in February 2013 made us write these lines in his memory, and the event is even more sad, as this year he would have reached the age of 60 years, and the staff of our Department was about to celebrate him by bringing an homage to his entire activity. Taking into account everything mentioned above, the following lines will not be a mere series of data from his CV and a list of his publications, but rather an endeavor to underline the quality the researcher and Professor Barbu Ștefănescu brought to the Department of International Relations and European Studies.

Thus, our approach will start by presenting certain biographical data. Barbu Ștefănescu was born at Ohaba de Sub Piatră, Hunedoara County on 5 July 1953. In 1968 – 1972 he attended the High School in Hațeg, in 1972 he entered the Pedagogical Institute in Oradea where he studied at the History Geography specialization graduating as top of the form. He continued his studies at „Babeș-Bolyai” University, Cluj-Napoca at the Faculty of History and Philosophy, which he graduated in 1979. It is here too, that he brought to perfection his professional training when he sustained his doctoral thesis “The Agricultural Technique and Work Rhythm in Crisana Peasant Household (18th Century – the beginning of the 19th Century) in 1995 in the field of history. After having graduated the Institute he was employed by Țării Crișurilor Museum as a restaurator in the History Department (1975-1979), and then as a curator in the Ethnography Department (1979-

1994).from 1980 to 1994 he was Head of Department and in 1990 – 1994 he was director of the Museum. In 1994 he became lecturer at the Faculty of Letters and Human Social Sciences, the Department of History and Geography. Two years later he was appointed Senior Lecturer in the same department, and in 1998 he was appointed full professor, thus starting with 2000 he could supervise doctor's degrees in the field of history. Starting with 2006 he was a member of the National Council for Doctor's Degrees Certification and Doctor's Degrees Supervisor's Quality, History Commission and with 2011 he was a member of the National Council of Attesting University Tiles, Diplomas and Certifications, Human Sciences and Arts Field, History and Cultural Studies Commission.

Regarding his activity as a researcher, it started once he graduated the Pedagogical Institute when he was employed as a curator. The recognition of his activity came with his being awarded the „Gheorghe Bariț” Prize by the Romanian Academy for his work “The Agricultural Technique and Work Rhythm in Crisana Peasant Household (18th Century – the beginning of the 19th Century). The previous year he had been awarded „M. G. Samarineanu” Prize by Familia Magazine for “the laborious historiographical restoration of the rural west country, thus synchronizing it to the major cultural trends of historical research” and in 2004 he was awarded the “Cultural Merit” in the rank of Knight in “National Cultural Patrimony” category. His researches were mostly directed upon the “discreet peasant world” as the professor himself had characterized, in one of his books, the rural society in western Romania, in the era of transition from medieval to modern.

His interest in the rural collectivities' image had expressed itself immediately after Barbu Ștefănescu graduated the university studies and worked as a curator; it is now that he published his first works in the field of ethnography. Using modern methods and innovative ways in sorting the records and illustrations, he intended to offer an integrative image of the “quiet peasant world”, which “besides these material traces and a few oral ones too little mentioned by researchers, leaves few documents about itself”. Thus, embracing Jacques Le Goff's ideas, our ethnographer succeeded in bringing forth, at the end of the 20th century, elements belonging to the rural world civilization which marked humanity up to the beginning of the modern epoch. By studying the furniture beyond its utility, the historian discovered a certain spirituality of this world, a certain mentality in organizing the space in the household which surpasses the material level thus revealing a belief about good and beautiful or about life and death. Furthermore, the feasts that broke the everyday monotony, the masculine and feminine space, the dialogue between generations, the magic-religious dialogue, are also elements that describe the human civilization which Barbu Ștefănescu placed in an inherent relationship with the pieces of furniture he registered.

Such a modern approach implies using new techniques in investigating historical resources and interdisciplinary methodological tools. The interdisciplinary research on all its four levels of cooperation and interrelation determine nothing but a “fertile dialogue between sciences” or some of their branches; and the researcher is invited to take into account contributions brought about by the sociologist, the ethnographer, the economist, the political scientist, the semiotician while studying the same topic. It is exactly what professor Barbu Ștefănescu understood very well when he approached the problem of the rural world with the aim to give “the study of the rural world a primary position in the historiography as promoted by the School of Annals.” Further research through the study of original sources and the analysis of edit documents using new methodological instruments make possible the understanding of the peasant society in the 18th and 19th century by recreating a more complete picture of the society “as it was”. His long experience in the field of history and ethnography convinced him even more of the necessity and efficiency of an interdisciplinary

cooperation when “studying the behavior in time of a concrete person and a real humanity”, in other words getting out of the patterns created by the “scientific and narrow perspective of contemporary historiography”.

Following his convictions, Professor Barbu Ștefănescu recommended his students and PhD candidates to use “the interdisciplinary methodology tributary to more directions” in order to research any topic. First and foremost the Professor laid stress on the historiography promoted by the School of Annals; as the inconsistency of the traditional documentary resources could be compensated by a frontier approach of science and the researched topic. Secondly, he insisted upon using the specific instruments of ethnography, geography, ecology, linguistics, philosophy, sociology, anthropology, or demography in order to compensate the lack of written documents or the often deformed information coming to us from the ancient times of human civilization. During this interdisciplinary intercession history had always been kept as a pillar science, the Professor being convinced that, in its turn, the historical analysis represented a great interest for the other sciences especially because when relating with other sciences, “many branches of history tend to become self-sufficient”.

The complex rural world, studied from the economic, social, political, judicial and artistic perspective represented the starting point towards other sciences consistent with the field of international relations and European studies. As an adapt of Pierre Chaunu’s principles, Barbu Ștefănescu referred to the methods of economic history in order to interpret from a quantitative and serial point of view agricultural productions, grain yield, cattle drive, prices, information that gives substance to such terms as natural economy, subsistence economy, market economy. Studying the peasant society in its preoccupation to secure the daily food, Barbu Ștefănescu made use of the social history for which the development of the peasant society is the same with “long duration rhythms”. At the same time, political history was involved in order to underline the role of politics in the modernization of a society in which reluctance to renewal was great, or the instruments of history of law were also used in order to analyze the discrepancies between the official judicial norms and the custom ones according to which rural communities function. At the same time history of art and the study of the images brought about important clarifications in understanding the rural life.

Regarding history, Professor Ștefănescu mentioned that the most important benefits were coming from its interaction with ethnology and anthropology. The former “gives history a new documentation different from the usual one”; the documentary importance of the folk culture being demonstrated by the study using critical methods upon oral testimonies. From this point of view, Professor Ștefănescu found convergent elements between “the new history” and ethnology by means of the history of mentalities, sensibilities and the history of the imaginary, a field concerned only with the “deep structures and long duration” which “derives its strength mostly from the world of folk culture”. The history of everyday life completed the information obtained using the methods of the history of mentalities in the field of alimentation, clothing, or habitat. Thus, Barbu Ștefănescu urged us to do a history that “accepts suggestions from ethnology”, being convinced that history was to be studied by means of events, repeated and expected facts, common ones which were strongly connected with everyday life, a conversion that inevitably directed the research towards the history of mentalities and social imaginary. From this point of view, both the methodology and the instruments suggested by our professor for the research of the collectivities can successfully be applied in the field of international relations and European studies.

Thus under his supervision, students and PhD candidates in this field of study, could elaborate interesting works in which they applied the new means of investigation in order to answer the new historiographical necessities of our time. In this way they could restore issues that had not been dealt with before by other researchers, could bring about important contributions in studying the relations between countries, their cultures, traditions, the impact of cultural models upon different cultures and could demonstrate the value of the image of the Other and its impact upon the collective mentality. All these researches helped the students understand the importance of studying different sciences so that they may be better prepared to become actors in international relations.

Another central theme in Barbu Ștefănescu's research was anthropology, the science that "aims at a global study of the human being covering the whole spatial and temporal area of humankind". Embracing Fernand Braudel's opinions, Professor Ștefănescu emphasized the idea that history was "the human being and...the rest". Whether it was the cultural anthropology promoted in USA, or the social anthropology promoted in Great Britain, anthropology was used as "a stage in the synthesis, superior to ethnology, and mainly based on the methodologies of ethnography and ethnology". By using each methodology he urged us "to start from techniques to get to the social and political life, or vice versa, to start from the social life to get to techniques". This is but another way to research the problems in the field of International Relations and European Studies which was opened by our distinguished professor. Furthermore, Barbu Ștefănescu underlined that "the great ambition of anthropology was to know all the aspects and general rules of action of the mankind ensemble thus revealing the general characteristics of human life and its universal features." By paraphrasing Wunenburger, he wrote that "society cannot be reduced to a mere aggregate of individuals, it is more than the result of a phylogenetic evolution as it is defined by its existence above people, by a collective consciousness which imposes itself by means of the sense of obligation".

We, therefore, can observe the hallmark left by the researcher Barbu Ștefănescu upon the teacher Barbu Ștefănescu who shared his students, his PhD candidates and younger colleagues innovative ideas and approaches in fields seemingly far from his scientific preoccupations. His courses (Collective Mentalities, Introduction to Anthropology, Cultural Anthropology, Security Anthropology, Interdisciplinary Research Methods), the lectures he delivered, and the works he published lie at the basis of the education of future students. At the same time, the interdisciplinary research based principle he constantly supported, could be regarded as another lesson he taught both his colleagues in University of Oradea and other universities as well.

*Staff of the Department of International Relations and European Studies
University of Oradea*

VI. Book reviews


LEADERSHIP AND NEGOTIATION IN FOREIGN POLICY

Mircea BRIE*

Melania-Gabriela Ciot, *Modelul negociatorului (idiosincrazii în procesul decizional al politicii externe) / Model of negotiator (idiosyncrasies in foreign policy decision making)*, EIKON, Cluj-Napoca, 2012, ISBN: 978-973-757-694-1, 413 p.

The work is remarkable for at least 4 components: methodology, contents, documentation sources, and stylistic / language component. The author's merit is with the idea and the subject of great interest and currency, and with her knowledge to use theory in order to explain the particular and vice versa, the use the particular for explaining the theory.

Mrs. Melania-Gabriela Ciot structures her work in 7 chapters: introduction, developments in the international system after the Cold War, foreign policy decision making – recent approach, alternative models of decision making, idiosyncrasies in foreign policy decision making, idiosyncratic analysis process in the process of negotiating accession for Romania to the EU (case study) and conclusions.



After a generous *Introduction* that places the subject matter within a theme (in the wider context of studies on decision making), there is a presentation of the methodology, assumptions and premises of research; the author proposes a logical demarche that implies an approach from the general to the particular, and in an explanatory manner, from a case study to the solving of paradigms formulated as hypotheses. The author is interested in the psychology of decision making applicable in foreign policy. Her study focuses on the factors that have generated actions and events in foreign policy, not just the action of states and their leaders. The author's intention is to „get inside the leaders' minds”, the decision-makers. The psycho-pedagogical training of Mrs. Gabriela Ciot proved extremely useful in terms of the conceptual and methodological approach.

The author proves an advocate of dialogue, communication and cooperation through negotiation to develop a space of security and understanding.

Methodologically, in the study of decision making a particular emphasis is placed on the elements of subjectivity, of idiosyncrasies. The methodology is qualitative: the case study aims to investigate the extent and the manner in which idiosyncrasies, as elements of subjectivity, especially of the psychological type, manage to put their mark on decision making (the research itself refers to the analysis of interviews, media representations, public and political speeches of Romania's chief negotiator with the EU, Prof. Vasile Pușcaș) (Ciot, 2012: 16).

The theoretical part of the paper begins with a thematic and conceptual contextualization. Chapter *Developments in the international system after the Cold War* is

* Ph.D., Associate Professor, Department of International Relations and European Studies, Faculty of History International Relations, Political Sciences and Science of Communication, University of Oradea, Romania. E-mail: briedri@hotmail.com

a modern complex analysis of recent changes in the international system, made through the transition from bipolar to the unipolar and later multipolar systems. The author makes a radiograph of the post-crisis situation, a description of the evolution of the international economic framework at the end of the first decade of the XXI century. Also the author makes a portrait of international policy framework in the post-Cold War. In this context, as the author shows, the Europeans want to define their own political agenda, while the U.S. has a structural power in the world that followed the collapse of the two antagonistic blocs. The American power, the author believes, will continue to play a catalyst role on the world stage if it is based on smart power and not on political-military power (Ciot, 2012: 35). By analysing the two international forums, levers of global governance, the G20 (forum of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors) and the G7/8 (its parents), the author attempts to discern how to ensure global economic stability including through the stable international banking market. The author identifies in this chapter all the contemporary international system actors who are „nation-states, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), transnational corporations (TNC), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and stakeholders – networks” (Ciot, 2012: 41) and their contribution to global economic stability. The author argues for restructuring the post-Cold War international system. A first factor that can bring changes in the international system is „limiting the role of some international institutions”, the author citing NATO whose role has increased after the Cold War. Another factor that can cause changes in the international system is its continuous balancing, the national capacities of the state being subject to constant change. The international system is unipolar and the polarity is uncertain – this is the third factor-driver of change (Pușcaș, 2012; Brie, Polgar, and Chirodea, 2012). If Europe returns to the system of international relations is a matter of speculation, believes the author, after two world wars ended any European supremacy (Ciot, 2012: 54). In the subsection *Concepts and theories of contemporary international system restructuring*, the author starts from the concept of Professor Nye (defined in the context of 1990) which defined the current order as a world of interdependencies where the greatest power should rule, otherwise the system stability would be in danger (apud Ciot, 2012: 57). The same Professor Nye talked about three categories of power: soft power (co-optive power), hard power (the traditional power, the military forces) and „smart power” that he considers the ability to combine hard power with soft power. Other theories consider global civil society as a future world political order. Stefano Bartolini’s theory (apud Ciot, 2012: 61) considers that the political structuring under the territorial boundaries change. The author talks about the power of diversity that reduces the gap between communities and values joint projects. Mathias Albert brought to the reader’s attention by the author, talks about the modern theory of systems. Here, the existing global society is closely linked to communication by any means that the society has. A recent theory mentioned by the author is that of Benjamin Miller’s regional war and peace by which he assumes the existence of conflict and cooperation among the great powers. Doran’s power cycle theory, cited by the author, takes into account the development of France during three centuries, examining the factors that determine a power to become hegemonic. States changes their role in the system simultaneously with changes in the system, shows the author. Regarding the current state of the international system restructuring, the author believes that this has been waiting for more than two decades to be restructured. The present era is a world where „global interdependence do not manifest themselves in the economic area only, but also in the areas of political, social, cultural and communication realms” (Ciot, 2012: 68). These interdependencies are products of historical evolution and not accessories of the crisis, are the shared opinions of professors Pușcaș and Modelski, as cited by the author. The events

of „9/11” 2001 and the global economic crisis signalled the need for change in the international system. It requires the concept of the *New World Order* that supposes both cooperation and conflicts so that decent stages of human dignity are achieved.

In Chapter 3, *Foreign policy decision-making process - recent approaches*, the author presents mechanisms and traditional models of decision making. The use of methods pertaining to cognitive psychology in the areas of economics, political science and management has raised new problems and new approaches were found. The author defines the scope of her interrogations and research: „Why is it important to study decision-making in foreign policy? Because thus we can cover cognitive processes that lead to a decision and “we can enter the minds” of leaders who take decisions. Also , we can identify individual and general patterns of decisions and we can generate views on leadership styles and personalities of leaders who cannot be revealed through a systematic approach to foreign policy analysis . This approach to foreign policy analysis has the potential to bring a bigger, better contribution to the study of international relations” (Ciot, 2012: 85). Then, the author identifies various considerations on the decision-making process approached from a psychological perspective. Mintz refers to factors that influence decision making. (apud Ciot, 2012: 86) Leaders’ uncertainties are due to factors related to the motivations, beliefs, intentions or opposition calculations, shows the author (Ciot, 2012: 87). After Elizabeth Brigham and Christopher Hill there are two components of decision-making, i.e. development and implementation (apud Ciot, 2012: 88). Regarding the existing types of decisions in foreign policy, they are: singular, interactive, sequential, sequential-interactive, and group decisions. Singular decisions are rare in international relations because it involves a single decision maker, the interactive decisions involves two players; then the author mentions sequential decisions, which are in fact a series of decisions that link between them, see for instance the sequential description of the U.S. to attack Iraq. The sequential - interactive decisions are common in international relations, the example provided here being the arms race. The author mentions that there are three levels at which decisions about foreign policy follow sequence: individual, group, coalition (Ciot, 2012: 95). There are three levels of analysis of foreign policy: the systemic level (e.g. power distribution), the nation-state level (e.g. government), the individual level (individual entities). Foreign policy decisions are taken by environmental factors such as: time constraints, informational constraints, ambiguity, familiarity, responsibility, risk, stress, dynamic frames vs. static frames, interactive teaching (Ciot, 2012: 101). For the analysis of foreign policy decision making, the author identifies three models: the rational actor model, the organizational behaviour model, and the government policy model. The rational actor model, as shown by Goldstein involves the following steps: setting clear goals in the given situation, placing purposes in order according to importance, establishing alternatives to achieve goals, investigation of the consequences of each alternative and choosing the best alternative. The second model shown by the author is the model of organizational behaviour that the author defines as a “classic model [that] emphasizes the benefits of division of labour, of hierarchy and of centralization associated with expertise, rationality and obedience” (Ciot, 2012: 146). The third model is the model of government policies which assumes that it is based on a “negotiation process” in which individuals compete for power. This model is based on several actors (players).

In Chapter 4, *Alternative models for decision making*, we are proposed new models, “more flexible and more dynamic”, with a focus is on the psychological approach. The first alternative mentioned by the author is the cybernetic model. The author states that the “cybernetic model of decision making states that the uncertainty is minimized by the use of feedback information loops.” In this case the rational model is not used in the absence of the

necessary skills. The decisions to be taken in this case are simple, requiring no additional processing means. A second alternative model of decision making is the prospective theory, a psychological theory used to study decision making. The key to predict international phenomena “is to understand the nature of risk-taking behaviour in international politics” (Ciot, 2012: 183). Risk appears in uncertain situations. This theory takes into consideration the individual predispositions of a leader to risk, and the leader’s decision-making and reasoning. A third alternative model of decision making is the polyheuristic theory. According to Mintz, this is a combination of cognitive and rational schools of interpretation of the decision-making mechanism (apud Ciot, 2012: 194): “the polyheuristic theory agrees with the cybernetic model, in the sense that the options seemed that had seemed based on the principle of non-compensation, used in the first stage, are subject to cost-benefit analysis of normative rationality” (Ciot, 2012: 197). A fourth alternative model of decision-making model is the multiple-flux model. It is a proactive model used in the analysis of researcher Ramona Saikaly in the areas of domestic policy and foreign policy. The changes in are caused by changes in ideas. The political flux includes ideas expressed by communities, researchers, members of the academic staff, groups of analysts. Here at this level, we deal with producing ideas that will shape the future policies. A fifth alternative model of decision making is the psychological approach.

Chapter 5, *Idiosyncrasies in foreign policy decision-making*, is also a theoretical approach to the idiosyncrasies understood as “deviations from established theoretical models known as rational”; this does not mean that the decision maker is irrational, but he, under the influence of subjective factors, escapes from traditional patterns. The negotiation takes on a separate psychological dimension separately.

The rational model of decision making is no longer sufficient, having to deal with idiosyncrasies that the author defines as personal and social factors and which exists at the moment a potential decision is taken. A personal mixture or blend that the leader brings forth when making a decision, the idiosyncrasies represent the leader’s subjectivity in relation to an objective reality (an event). There are cognitive idiosyncrasies, idiosyncrasies of social perception, motivational idiosyncrasies, and emotional idiosyncrasies (affective). The cognitive idiosyncrasies are deviations from the rational model, for example, when the negotiator suffers a wrong perception when assessing a risk or a given situation. The second approach derives from cognitive structures (schemas, maps, models). The author groups cognitive idiosyncrasies in five different categories: perception, memory of recovery, integration of information, reasoning and behaviour. The idiosyncrasies of social perception perceive social objects, events and people. They consider the perception of the leader on social entities and social situations. The emotional (affective) idiosyncrasies consider the wrong perceptions and inconsistencies between feelings and actions, and feelings and judgments.

These four categories of idiosyncrasies in the sixth chapter, *Idiosyncratic analysis of Romania’s EU accession negotiation process (case study)*, transposed on Romania’s EU accession negotiation process, namely on the personal characteristics of the decision maker. It consists of a schematically rendered procedure for accession of a State to the European Union (Puşcaş, 2007). During accession to the European Union, Minister Vasile Puşcaş was involved in the negotiations as the Chief Negotiator of Romania to the European Union. The author specifies that: “The substance of the accession negotiations is the *acquis*, divided into chapters, 31 for the fifth wave of enlargement, 35 for the acceding negotiations with different degrees of difficulty and the candidate countries relate to them according to their internal preparation stage” (Ciot, 2012: 294). Accession negotiations are based on the win-win formula. In the process of Europeanization are internalized values,

laws of the European Union by the candidate state. The author cites Hermann's theoretical model which includes three sections: the nature of the situation, personal characteristics and filters, model that she adjusted by introducing the 4 types of idiosyncrasies: cognitive, of social perception, motivation and emotional (Ciot, 2012: 309) This model was used by the author in public and political discourse analysis, media representations and interviews with Romania's chief negotiator, Professor Pușcaș in 2000-2004.

The *Conclusions* show that out of this research a model of the negotiator might come off, a model for foreign policy decision-making successfully illustrated by Minister Vasile Pușcaș. The author discusses two major axes of analysis: one of the idiosyncrasies and one of the situational factors. The idiosyncrasies manifested at individual level, shows the author, have retained a national character. Also in the conclusions, the author summarizes the four categories through examples of existing speech idiosyncrasies in the case of Romania's chief negotiator. Thus the cognitive idiosyncrasies were "placing, anchoring, availability, usefulness, perceptual/cognitive frameworks, task perception, cognitive consistency, idiosyncrasies related to cognitive contents, idiosyncrasies related to cognitive process, the evoked set, conceptual complexity, integrative complexity, idiosyncrasies of verbal style (...) the presentation of events (explicative optimistic style)", constructs that influence the decision making style, images, historical analogies, etc. (Ciot, 2012: 371-372). There were also identified idiosyncrasies of social perception, such as transparency, perspective approach, prioritizing own interests, knowing the other party (Ciot, 2012: 373). In the motivational idiosyncrasies area, the author identifies the following: self-realization (self-exceedance and use of resource), coherence and balance, cooperation and responsibility (Ciot, 2012: 373). Regarding emotional idiosyncrasies, the author identifies positive and negative emotions which have influenced Romania's chief negotiator with the EU.

We can conclude that the work *Model of negotiator (idiosyncrasies in foreign policy decision making)* is a well-written book that summarizes the most important works in political science and psychology of decision making, whose working methods must be known in order to achieve a complete understanding of the present study.

The reader is invited to discover this analysis that gives substance and consistency to this work

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CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES IN WORLD POLITICS

Anca OLTEAN*

Review of: Daniel Biró (coord.), *Relațiile internaționale contemporane. Teme centrale în politica mondială*, Iași: Polirom, 2013, 335 p., ISBN 978- 973-46-2227-6.

The volume coordinated by Daniel Biró entitled *Relațiile Internaționale Contemporane. Teme centrale în politica mondială (International Contemporary Relations. Central themes in World Politics)* contains articles signed by the authors such as: Daniel Biró, Simona R. Soare, Radu – Sebastian Ungureanu, Olivia Toderan, Bogdan Ștefanachi, Mihai Zodian, Șerban Filip Cioculescu, Octavian Milevschi and Stanislav Secieru, Paula Gângă, Valentin Quintus Nicolescu, Victor Negrescu, Diana Andersson Biró, Mihaela Răileanu, Diana Elena Neaga. The topics approached cover a wide variety of subjects: From the theory of international relations to central themes of world politics; transition of power, Identities and political communities, Diplomacy, International Economic System, the Transfer of arms, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; terrorism as an ancient phenomenon but in the same time new and surprising, “frozen conflicts” in post- Soviet space; Energy in international relations, Failed states and state construction. The radiography of some concepts and practice contested; Global governance; the Third World; The international development: between politics of development and international public relations; Religion in international relations; On ethics of climate change, The problem of gender in International Relations.



Daniel Biro, in the article *Introduction. From the theory of international relations to central themes of world politics*, asserts that the topics approached in this volume can offer an important perspective of the evolution of the domain. The approach of the time is in function of time and space; if time can offer some central topics, the space makes the author to interpret facts according to his geographical position¹. The volume, asserts the author, tries to offer an image of the dynamics of political process of the international system (Biró, 2013: 14). It is a “pluralist” text, one that continues the process of continuity in international relations. In the last years, shows the author, on Romanian book market, appeared a few good translations from Anglo- Saxon literature. Then he makes a brief portrait of writings of the present volume, offering interesting details about the papers.

The next work is *Transition of power* written by Simona R. Soare. The author starts with the statement that the discipline of international relations developed at the beginning of 20th century offers predictions and adequate explanations. The author raises the question of transition of power defining the theory of transition of power developed by

* Researcher, Institute of Euroregional Studies, Faculty of History, International Relations, Political Sciences and Science of Communication, University of Oradea, Romania. E-mail: oltean@igri.ro

¹ For seeing the elements of continuity in the field of international relations from XVII, XVIII and XIX century, a good start is the book of Mircea Brie and Ioan Horga, *Relațiile internaționale de la echilibrul la sfârșitul concertului european (secolul XVII- începutul secolului XX)*, Editura Universității din Oradea, 2009.

A F.K. Organski. Thus the theory of transition of power defined by Organski has at its base an important premise: that international anarchical system is constructed on an international order that is not anarchical, but hierarchical, organized in a similar way and after rules similar with internal political order of international actors. (Soare, 2013: 21) The author defines transition of power as being different from the model of balance of power and having at its base competition. The change of system appears as a consequence of a general dissatisfaction with the view of global order. The author mentions revisionist powers that are not satisfied with the general order. (Soare, 2013: 22) When a rival that is an important power in the system is searching to have a new place in the system, the peace is undermined. (Soare, 2013: 22). Then the author gives the example of the theory of the hegemonic transition of Robert Gilpin. This theory offers an answer concerning the causes of apparition of system change. (Soare, 2013: 23) Gilpin offers an explanation to system change and that is the rise and decrease of power of international actors. In the global system, there is always a competition for power and this power is easy to conquer and difficult to be maintained, is the opinion of the author. At the basis of change of international system are unique events, says the author. (Soare, 2013: 24) International order favors the states that contributed to the system development, but it will be contested by the powers that are in a process of continuous development and look for a place in the system. These powers tend to contest the static order of international system that doesn't adjust to system translation of powers. In the same the classical big powers that put the basis of the system tend to fight to preserve their power (hegemony). The most important power in the system, the hegemonic state, tends to fight to preserve the system that protects its interests. Simona Soare defines the factors that conduce to change in the system according to Robert Gilpin. These are: stability and equilibrium at the beginning of systemic order; if the benefits of the changing the system are higher than the costs, a state will try to change the existent order; that a state can change the international system by territorial, economic and politic expansion; a state of lack of balance can follow because the status quo is harder to maintain; if it can not be maintained system can be changed. (Soare, 2013: 26) This theory can generate hegemonic war, an armed competition between states that determine which states will govern the international system. The author offers another example, the theory of hegemonic cycles of George Modelski (Soare, 2013: 29). Modelski presents the perspective of evolution of international system, and introduces the concept of cycle in this process. Cyclical evolution is on the base of systemic change thinks Modelski. If hegemonic power loose from its power, the system tends towards multipolarity. Modelski defines the relative duration of systemic translation of power: "The theory of long cycles indicates the fact that international system tends to change at intervals of approximatively a century (hegemonic change) and about two times in each millennium – moment where it exists significant premises of system change". (Soare, 2013: 31). Then the author refers to the theory of long cycles of Joshua Goldstein. Goldstein delimitates five long cycles delimited by a series of changes in modern international system. The long cycles are for Goldstein delimited between productivity and war.

Immanuel Wallerstein and his approach of world system are also analyzed by Simona Soare. Wallerstein's approach is a leftist orientation approach. Wallerstein talks about a succession of world systems. He divides the world economy in three categories: a) the center of world economy that is formed from the most powerful states including the hegemonic state, b) semi- periphery that comprises both great powers in decline and in ascension and c). the periphery that comprises the less developed states in world economy

that depends on the centre. The author remarks the systemic transition of power at the beginning of 21st century, that is a transition from single-polarity to multi-polarity².

In the article of Radu – Sebastian Ungureanu entitled *Identities and political communities*, it is defined the international relations field as a study of the way in which interact sovereign political entities. The author considers that Neorealism can not offer answers to important political problems. For Neorealists, asserts the author a small political power can be regarded as insignificant, and this is not always the case. Referring to the identities of the actors, the author asserts the change of identity can explain the change of Romania's identity. The new identity of Romania pursues the purpose of democracy, then of a credible member from developed identities. Then the author focus on defining the political community: „Identities of nature would define political communities could have extreme diverse origins –ethnic, linguistic, ideological, religious, racial, related to gender” (Ungureanu, 2013: 44) The author approaches the problem of national political community. In the opinion of the author, the nation is a community in which member individuals acknowledge each other as equals. Their members share sovereignty and unity. There is a nationalism of elites and one of the masses, thinks the author. Another chapter is dedicated by the author to the assertion of national principle that appeared in Europe at the end of the Middle Age. The concept of nation was formulated and spread in Europe after the French Revolution. In the chapter *The End of Cold War: international security and the problem of identities* the author asserts that at the end of cold war, national tensions appeared in the public sphere. The author offers as a case of the wars from former Yugoslavia. Then he dedicates a chapter to a new trend in modern society: globalization and definition of political communities. The flow of economic change, ideas, migrations, technological unification is not a new process, shows the author. A reaction of anti-globalization is the expression of contemporary nationalism (Ungureanu, 2013: 52). Towards globalization, shows the author in the part of conclusions, it appeared violent manifestations of particular groups which want to preserve their particularities.

In the article of Olivia Todorean, *Diplomacy*, the author considers that although diplomacy plays a central role in international relations, it did not capture the attention of specialists. (Todorean, 2013: 61). Then the author presents the main currents existent during time in diplomatic world. She talks of idealism or idealist liberalism, of classical realism for whom „diplomacy is one of the instruments of manifestation, preservation, eventually even of increase of state power to the extent it is based on other attributes of power (especially military force)” (Todorean, 2013: 63). The author also talks of Neorealism promoted in Waltz's book, *Theory of international politics*. For neo-realism diplomacy is not relevant not even as institution of international system and also not even as an instrument of external politics of states. (Todorean, 2013: 63) Also the author draws the picture of neoliberal institutionalism or neoliberalism, a systemic theory having a few implications for the diplomacy. Neoliberalism puts in its centre the importance of international institutions. Another school of taught is constructivism. Constructivism

² See the article of Dorin I. Dolghi, *Geopolitics and security in the European Neighbourhood*, in *EuroTimes*, volume 10 (*The Geopolitics of European Frontiers*), Oradea University Press, 2010, p. 181-190 in which the EU is a factor of stability, but also Russia has a strong influence at the Eastern border of EU. EU tries to become a global actor, but there should improve the security governance at its Eastern borders. See also the article of Ioan Horga and Dana Pantea, *Europe from Exclusive borders to inclusive frontiers. Introduction* in *EuroTimes*, volume 4, *Europe from Exclusive Borders to Inclusive Frontiers*, Oradea University Press, 2007, p. 5-10 taking about the current (then) of European crisis, underline the importance of European borders who can evolve, not generating the actual crises, because markets are interdependant anyway.

identifies the complex processes from international relations field and the consequences of these interactions that are under continuous construction. Another school of thought is postmodernism. The author concludes about postmodernism „in consequence, it sees in diplomacy an extremely important process by which political communities give an answer to the need of mediating complex processes of alienation (of territories, of political power, of economic resources, of personal security, of interstate existent order” (Todorean, 2013: 64) After making a portrait of diplomacy process in the past, the author focused on contemporary diplomacy. In the opinion of the author, democracy is a process of continuous change. According to Hamilton and Langhorne one of the factors that influences the process of diplomacy is the progress in technology and science. The information became the new tool of diplomatic process. The functions of diplomacy are representation, exchange of information, negotiation, protection of citizens' interests, the protection of commercial interests, elaboration of recommendation for a good external policy. In the part of conclusions, the author offers details about the perspectives of diplomacy. After a period of decline of diplomacy, the post 1989 diplomacy had to face the great expectations concerning the creation of a new open diplomacy. In a society in which the interferences between political and economic are very dense, diplomacy has an important role in establishing the welfare of society. (Todorean, 2013: 81)

In the article of Bogdan Ștefanachi, *International economic system* shows that this system is more integrated than ever (Ștefanachi, 2013: 86). The economic crises demonstrated the complex interdependency of global economy³. The author allocates a space to the constitution of global economy and the two world wars. In the opinion of the author, the interdependency of economies could not stop the rise of First World War. In spite of official predictions it followed the crisis from 1929-1933. A total and global war, the Second World War consacrated United State of America as a super power together with Soviet Union. The economy that followed after the Second World War was characterized by liberalism and multilateralism. While industrialized states look for economic expansion, the countries found in the process of development seeked for protectionism to protect their economies. After 1989, we can talk of the „end of history“ and liberal values won in Eastern Europe. In economic world prevails globalization and economic liberalism. Then the author brings into discussion the benefits of liberalization at macroeconomic level by diminuation of tariffs, transport and communication costs as a consequence of technologic development. (Ștefanachi, 2013: 92) Also at microeconomic level, these benefits are important shows the author. In order to face competition, companies must search for innovation and to apply new technologies, the rise of imports eliminate the distorsion of monopolist power, when commerce is liberalized, productivity is increased, productivity increases when business environment has to face international demand and best practices of international competitors, shows the author. (Ștefanachi, 2013: 92). But, there is a trend that appear during globalization process that is fragmentation or regionalization (Ștefanachi, 2013: 93). The author defines globalization as the way in which culture, economy and politics is transformed because of the existence

³ See the article of Luminița Șoproni and Ioan Horga, *The Economic frontiers of Europe- Introduction*, in *EuroTimes, volume 8 (Europe and Economic Frontiers)*, Oradea University Press, 2009, p. 5-6 when during the economic crises the authors are confident in future progress and success of global governance: „Nowadays regions have become bridges between local and global models of economic progress, offering new opportunities for development strategies.

The globalization phenomenon turns frontiers more permeable and confirms the „vision” of Thomas Friedman, who argues that „the world is flat” (Friedman, *The world is flat*, 2007). At least in the economic world, uniformity represents one of the aims of development” (Șoproni&Horga, 2009: 5)

of interdependencies (Ștefanachi, 2013: 94). The author allocates a space to the institutions of the system from Bretton Woods. The system of Bretton – Woods was established in 1944 when it took place the monetary and financial conference of United Nations. With this occasion it was created International Monetary Fund. Later on, several institutions were created FMI (International Monetary Fund), BM (Mondial Bank) and GATT (OMC) (Mondial Organization of Commerce).

The article of Simona R. Soare entitled *The transfer of Arms* the author makes the specification that this kind of survey usually belongs to Security Studies Field. The author starts with some theoretical approaches of arms transfer. Thus a first approach of liberal nature regards the arm transfer as a fundamental limited enterprise from a legal point of view and of capacity of production. (Soare, 2013: 104). The second approach is a realist one sustains that this represents a coagulator factor of social and industrial development (Soare, 2013: 104). The author emphasizes the structural causes of arms transfer that are: the change of system, revolutions in military affairs, changes in models of economic production. Then he allocates a space to the typology of arms transfer and to arms transfer in international contemporary system.

Mihai Zodian in the article *Proliferation of arms of mass destruction* considers that this phenomenon represented one of the most important threats in security field since the beginning of XXI century.

Șerban Filip Cioculescu in the article *Terrorism, an old phenomenon, but a new and surprising one* asserts that terrorism is the present day threat and not the war. After the events of September 11, 2001 terrorism became subject of research. Then the author tries to see the phenomenon of terrorism in perspective trying to find out its origins, definition, prototypes and implications. Probably terrorism appeared in Antiquity with the massacres of emperors against civil unarmed population. (Cioculescu, 2013: 137) The phenomenon was present in the French Revolution, in Russian Empire mentioning its proliferation in XIX century, then the present day terrorism of Islamic extremism. Then the author talks about the character of new terrorism. The author identifies in the existent literature different kinds of terrorism. The first would be ethnical and nationalist terrorism, the second type of terrorism is ideological terrorism (there exists left wing groups that militates for the change of regime, passing to communism, break of the alliance of Western states with United States of America, shows the author). Then the author raises the question if Al- Qaeda is the prototype of successful terrorism also in the future? (Cioculescu, 2013: 149). The opinion of the author is that in the future it will exist beside terrorism for religious grounds also a terrorism with social and economic basis as a consequence of the discrepancies between rich and poor.

Octavian Milevschi and Stanislav Secieru in the article „*Frozen conflicts*“ in *post-sovietic space* defines “frozen conflicts”: “A frozen conflict is considered that conflict in which armed confrontation had stopped, but a real political solution was not accepted yet, nurturing a Security environment where violence can start anytime” (Milevschi; Secieru; 2013: 161). He analyzes the concept of frozen conflict at individual level, intra- state level, inter-states level, global level. He offers a few study cases of “frozen conflicts”: Nagorno- Karabakh, Southern Osetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria, offering in the end of his survey a synthetic analysis of “frozen conflicts”.

In the article *Energy in international relations: perspectives and solutions* of Șerban Filip Cioculescu, the author acknowledges that all the states in the world protect their energy resources. Oil and gas are very important for modern economy, starting with the century XIX and XX. There are two kinds of energetic resources: non-regenerable (oil, gas, coal) and regenerable (alternative energy). The author dedicates a space to European

Union and Energetic security, than to NATO and energy, to Russia as a European energetic superpower and to Romania and its energy. In what concerns the situation of Romania, starting with 20th century it has reach resources of oil. But during the two world wars, Romania lost these resources in favor of Germany and USSR. Romania imports from abroad over 32% of its energetic potential. (Filip Cioculescu, 2013: 201). The author mentions the document „Energetic strategy of Romania for the years 2007- 2020” that mentions that in 2010 the need of energy of Romania from external countries will increase at 33% from the total necessary amount. (Filip Cioculescu, 2013: 201)

In the article of Daniel Biro, *Failed states and statal construction. Radiography of some contested concepts and practises*, the author considers that international intervention is very encountered in the process of state – building. (Biro, 2013: 205) When international state assistance is not manifested, the potential state has all chances to fail. The process of state –building as opposed to state failure takes place around the process of nation building, shows the author. (Biro, 2013: 205) After the Second World War it takes place a process of consolidation of institutions of nation – states in Europe, and at global level. Among other aspects, the author refers to the relation between terrorism and failed states that is very encountered. The politics of the years 1990 was a politics of containment and humanitarian intervention, and the author considers it inefficient. What it followed after 11 september 2001, was the fact that the concept of securitization was applied to the whole international system. (Biro, 2013: 223)

In the article of Paula Gângă, *Global governance* the author considers that for global problems are important global solutions. (Gângă, 2013: 232) On international agenda, the problem of global governance is more and more important. The present paper starts by describing the evolution of the phenomenon of globalization. In the opinion of the author, globalization is not a new phenomenon, but it existed from Antiquity. Globalization had no important consequences in the past, but in present times it can lead to global economic crises such as the financial crisis from 2008. (Gângă, 2013: 233) The author allocates a space to global governance and international relations. According to global governance the state is as important as non-governmental organisations, transnational corporations or civil society actors. (Gângă, 2013: 237). Non-governmental associations signals state – abuse. International Organizations also play an important role. In the end of his study, the author makes the critic of global governance.

In the article of Valentin Quintus Nicolescu entitled *Third World*, the author starts with the celebration of independence of 193 state acknowledged by ONU in 2011, Southern Sudan. After two civil wars Southern Sudan separated from Sudan becoming a new state with strong resources of oil. The author points out that in this new state it exists five ethnical groups: Dinka, Nuer, Bari, Azande and Shilluk. Then the author tries to find a definition for the third world. After 1991, there exists first world, the capitalist state stable in terms of political institutions. The Second World is formed from state that benefits from a medium infrastructure with institutions find on the way of consolidation (Nicolescu, 2013: 249) The Third World is formed, in the opinion of the author, from states with very limited resources with an economy of subsistence with a very destroyed infrastructure. Harry Truman in 1949 elaborated the Four points plan separating underdeveloped Third World from the prosperous area of the world. Then the author talks about a few characteristics of the Third World that is characterized by economic, politic, social and cultural particularities. The third world is characterized by economic, social and cultural, political peripherality (Nicolescu, 2013: 254). Then, the author offers a few theories concerning the third world: the theories of modernization, respectively the theories of dependency.

Victor Negrescu in the article *The international development: between politics of development and international public relations* asks himself if poverty at global level can be eradicated. The author assumes this could be a difficult task as 85% from world population lives in modest conditions and generates only 1/5 from global production. (Negrescu, 2013: 265) European Union would like to offer assistance to states found in the process of development, shows the author. A chapter of this study refers to the *role of the countries found in the process of development on international scene*. During the cold war, shows the author, Great Britain and France tried to continue domination in their former colonies. Presently geopolitical interests dominate the relationship between the countries that are developed in their relation with the countries that are in the process of development. (Negrescu, 2013: 268). The author allocates a space to cooperation for development in the theories of international relations. A chapter refers to the realism of development and national interests. The realist approach, shows the author, states that internationally there is a state of anarchy and the states that are international actors act according to their selfish interests. Starting with the concept of soft power the developed states extend their influence diffusing by peaceful mechanisms their own model of development. Then the author approaches the humanitarian liberalism. By offering certain liberal institutional approaches, the author considers that cooperation for development implies both states and individuals (Negrescu, 2013: 274). Having at its base the democratic model, cooperation for development spread democratic model in other states and contributes thus to global stability. In the part of conclusions the author raises the question if Romania is ready to assume a role in international development. And the conclusions of the author are that Romania did important steps in this sense by joining NATO and European Union and implementing the *acquis communautaire*.

Diana Anderson Biró in the article *Religion in international relations*⁴ dedicates a chapter to *Secular mentality and postsecularism in international relations* that separates religion from politics. Religion, still remains an important factor in modern societies. Mihaela Răileanu in the article *About the ethics of climatic change* shows that until the industrialization process began, the nature dominated the life of individuals. Human civilisation goes hand in hand with climate evolution shows the author. Starting with the year 1970, the mankind, shows the author, started to be aware that the climate is changing (Biró, 2013: 298). The evolution of the climate can not be predicted, but it can be a problem for future times, shows the author. Diana Elena Neaga in the article *Problem of gender in international relations* says that although international relations are involving more men's approaches, feminist interpretations are relevant. The author considers that, in Romania, women continue to play a marginal role in society, being very low represented in top structures and very present in casual activities.

The papers grouped in the volume coordinated by Daniel Biró, *Contemporary international relations. Central themes in world politics* bring into the spotlight the latest problems from the field of international relations being an interesting lecture for the readers interested in this field, offering interesting interpretations and helping them to formulate future conclusions in the field of international relations.

⁴ See the article of Ioan Brie, Mircea Brie, *The interreligious Dialogue in the context of the New Europe: The European Ecumenical Movement*, in *EuroTimes*, volume 5 (*Religious frontiers of Europe*), Oradea University Press, 2008, p. 95- 107 in which the authors emphasize the necessity of interreligious dialogue and of ecumenism of religions in the perspective of building a „New“ Europe.

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MEDIA AND EUROPEAN DIVERSITY

*Mirela MĂRCUȚ*¹

Review of: Ioan Horga, Luminița Șoproni, *Media and European Diversity*, Bruylant Publishing House, 2010

Keywords: *mass-media, intercultural dialogue, European Union, identity*

Comprised now out 28 states, the European Union has indeed chosen a representative motto, “Unity in diversity”. If the unity part is still a bit problematic for the European Union, no one can deny the massive diversity of cultures, nations, religions, ethnicities and social landscapes of the European Union, which has indeed shaped EU’s priorities in the past 50 years.

Managing and creating a balance between such a diversity of cultures can be challenging, but one way to do that is by building bridges of communication between different communities of the European Union. Enhancing intercultural dialogue is done by offering minorities the chance to freely express themselves and the chance to work together to build a better society.

In a borderless Europe, communication between different ethnic, religious communities is encouraged or it should be encouraged by the mass-media, which assumes the role of a shaper of public opinion. The research regarding the role of mass media in society in general is vast and almost exhaustive, but the role of media in conveying diversity, namely European diversity, is still under thorough research, because mass-media acting as liaison between the social and the political and also as a shaper of public opinion can truly convey the importance of intercultural dialogue in building a stronger and more united Europe.

In this context, it is important to take into consideration the publication entitled suggestively *Mass-Media and European Diversity*, edited by Luminița Șoproni and Ioan Horga and published under the auspices of Institute of Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debrecen, a Jean Monnet Center of Excellence. The volume published in 2010 is comprised out of papers presented at the International Conference „Media and European Diversity”, held at the University of Oradea in October 2008.

The main theme based on the conclusions of the research presented in this volume is that the role of mass-media in the European society should be based on the process of building connections between different communities. Moreover, in the challenge of building and maintaining European identity, mass-media plays a crucial role, due to its power to influence its audience. The volume is divided into four distinct sections, namely: *Mass media and local/regional/European identity. European citizenship, Diversity versus convergence in European economic integration, European visibility in the world. Mass media and the image of Europe and Managing the European Diversity. Regional*



¹PhD Student, „Babeș-Bolyai” University, Cluj Napoca. E-mail: mir3lam@gmail.com

disparities. The volume focuses largely on issues such as identity, intercultural dialogue, European integration and European identity

Identity is a key concept in the connection between media and diversity. But what kind of identity? Local, regional, national or European identity? The impact of media in identity is analyzed in the first section of the book. As a starting point for the analysis of the conclusions of the authors, we must provide a background related to this relation. For instance, Ioan Horga concludes in one of his studies that the media still focuses on national aspects, on national identity, rather than on transnational /European aspects (Horga, 2007: 44). As stated above, media influences the way in which we see the surrounding reality, which is, from a social point of view, built inherently in Europe on the relation between majorities and minorities. The media creates representations of identities, which sometimes are one-sided, considering the fact that mostly it is concerned on presenting majority opinions. This argument is supported by the article written by Natasa Simeunovic, entitled *Media Representation of Roma: Exclusion or Inclusion?* in which she analyzes the media representation of the Roma in Serbian press and concludes that their image is more often negatively presented. Media attitudes towards minorities, especially the Roma minority, as largest minority group in the European Union, are largely one-sided. Based on the theoretical analysis, the author assesses that the voice of the Roma population is not heard. Alina Stoica also handles the delicate situation of media representations of the Romanian immigrants, mostly of Roma origin, in Italy. In a similar analysis to the one of Natasa Simeunovic, Alina Stoica shares the belief that media bias is extremely dangerous, as it clearly influences the general public opinion and the civil society, concepts which are analyzed in connection to the civic spirit in a psychological approach applied to Romania, by Dragoş Dărăbăneanu in the article entitled *Determining Factors Of The Civic Spirit And Of The Social Participation In The European Context*. He concludes that the liberal democracies, based on transparency, legitimacy and control are dependent on the notion of public opinion, which is usually the majority opinion. Mass-media can help with the expression of social minorities and are the tools for social control of the public opinion. However, as specified above in the case of showcasing identities, they can distort reality, such as is the case of Romania during the transition to democracy, or the above mentioned case of media bias regarding the Roma minority. Mass-media was just a tool in the dissemination of demagogy. Instead of helping develop a civil society, mass-media was a tool for manipulation.

Despite its negative connotations analyzed in the aforementioned articles, the relation between mass media and diversity is considered to be instrumental in the development of intercultural dialogue and mutual understanding of one's differences. Intercultural dialogue is defined by the Council of Europe as "an open and respectful exchange of views between individuals and groups belonging to different cultures that leads to a deeper understanding of the other's global perception." (Council of Europe, 2008). The key term we need to take into consideration is "communication", which can be defined as well as an exchange of views and opinions. Mass-media, as a channel of communication for the population, public opinion or civil society, can be the distributor of the views and perceptions of different cultures. In her article entitled *Memory and Identity in Intercultural Dialogue*, Dana Pantea explains the mechanism of identity and its connotation and underlines the fact that communication is the key to surpass the hostile attitude towards the other. Culture, as a result of the interaction between people and environment, is an exhaustible source of identity, according to Dana Pantea. Despite the fact that the role of media is not mentioned, it is mentioned that the emphasis on communication between different communities is most significant at the borders, which

have been diluted due to the influence of globalization. Borders have thus become an important source of intercultural dialogue, as they help connect different identities, operating as “bridges” in Europe’s cultural archipelago, seen as a shared European cultural area, but with different disruptions (Brie, 2010: 90).

Due to the transformation of mass-media in today’s 24/7 news cycle and globalized world, new media have developed, since the development of the Internet and new forms of communication. In the need for ratings and audiences, the media can become an obstacle to establishing an authentic European cultural citizenship, which is actually based on the maintenance of the European diversity. This point of view is detailed in the article entitled *Mass Media and European Cultural Citizenship*. Starting from the basis of the establishment of a European identity, such as the Greco-Roman tradition, Renaissance or the Enlightenment, the author studies the viability of an EU public sphere, which might serve as a basis for a true European citizenship by emphasizing the fact that the European citizenship, as we understand it today, namely based on the freedoms and rights given to every citizen living in the European Union does not justify the use of the term “cultural citizenship”. According to the author, cultural citizenship implies cultural pluralism, which can be cultivated with the help of a healthy intercultural dialogue built on a common foundation. Considering the media’s influence in the establishment of a European cultural citizenship, the author concludes that the transformation of the media due to globalization inhibits the development of a public sphere and the cultural citizenship.

Moreover, this transformation has converged to the level of language, a genuine marker of identity, a trend which is analyzed in the article entitled *The Presence of English-Loan Words In The Written Media: The Case Of Two International Women’s Magazines*, and written by Simona Veronica Abrudan Caciora. The excessive use of English as a marker of globalization can be a sign of the dilution of a language, and this statement is proved by Mrs. Caciora’s analysis with a special focus on glossy magazines, as she states that English, the new universal language, is infiltrating itself in the media language. This might be a sign of promoting diversity, but the author argues that some *anglicisms* which are used seem to be rather redundant.

The challenge of maintaining linguistic identity in today’s globalized world is analyzed in Mariana Buda’s research regarding multilingualism in the European Union. As a concept aimed at protecting cultural diversity, multilingualism can be difficult to defend if we consider the many accounts according to which English has become an universal language. The EU’s attempts at preserving its linguistic identity and diversity are analyzed in Mrs. Buda’s article entitled *L’application Du Multilinguisme Dans L’union Européenne – Un Problème Sans Issue ?* But the reality of the matter is more complicated than it seems. Several solutions are taken into consideration in the article, the most interesting of which could be the creation of a new language or the establishment of three official languages, namely English, French and German.

Today’s media is still sensitive to the shaping of identities that lost their exclusively cultural roots, according to the author of the article entitled *Media, Identity and Legitimacy: The First EU-Brazil Summit in the Portuguese Press*. The study case reflecting on the way in which identity, be it national or European, and legitimacy is conveyed in the media takes into consideration the first EU-Brazil summit that took place under the Portuguese presidency of the EU in July 2007 in Lisbon. The cultural and historical links between Portugal and Brazil are mainly exploited in the Portuguese press, thus proving that national rather than European identity and actors are given more importance in the media.

Media can also help build an identity, especially when we take into consideration the similarities between identity and branding, which can be conveyed as a instrument to help build an identity for a target group. This need to build a regional brand is emphasized in the study case by Maka Khvedelidze, entitled *Creating Regional Identity – the Strategy of Promoting a Region*. The regional brand of Georgia is conveyed in this article, considering its socio-economic landscape and advantages regarding regional development. The SWOT analysis presented in the research provides a clear starting picture for the development of a regional brand or identity to Georgia. Contrary to the trend of globalization, regions have become more and more important, but they indeed require an identifier, and that's why a clear brand could become useful in the battle for investors. This point is also presented in other studies (Şoproni, 2008, Şoproni, Popoviciu, 2006, Şoproni, 2006), that consider a case study from Romania, namely the Northern Transylvania region.

The second section of the book is devoted to analyzing socio-economic aspects related to the European integration process, namely *Diversity and Convergence in the European Economic Integration*. This collection of articles focuses rather on socio-economic aspects of the European diversity model. The educational aspects in Oradea are analyzed in different researches, such as *Social Dimensions of the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) - Consideration on the International Mobilities of the Students enrolled at the University of Oradea*, or *Communication in the Educational Triangle in Post-Accession Romania*, or *Education without Borders in Europe. Case Study – University of Oradea, Romania*. Also, within the article *Place, means, perspectives of the Romanian vocational educational system so as to provide competitive manpower at a European level* the authors combine the necessity of an effective educational system in Romania with the need to provide competitive workforce on the European labour market.

The role of communication in the learning process is taken into consideration, not only between the teacher and the student, but also between the parents and the school. The educational system in Romania is undergoing many changes, many of them being introduced by the European Union. Some of them are analyzed in the case studies of the borderless education implemented by the University of Oradea, namely the international mobilities and how students benefitted from the Erasmus programme. One of the most successful initiatives of the European Union, the Erasmus system wherein students can study or work in a different university has also proved to be successful in Oradea, also because it helps in the fostering of a sense of Europeanness, as well as in the building of a true intercultural dialogue. These are initiatives of fostering cooperation, mutual understanding between different communities and they also help people experience other forms of education which can translate to a better educational environment at home (Horga, Brie, 2007:)

No economic system could survive without education. However, the EU's economic system has suffered in the past years, due to the globalization of finance and the contagion effect. Consequently, the labour market also suffers. The causes of the current economic crisis are explored in the article *The American Depression Impact on Economical Relations between the European Union and the United States of America*, with special focus on the contagion effect of the American economic crisis in the European Union. This article discusses the contagion effect between the US and the European Union and provides several possible solutions to surpass the economic crisis, such as mergers between economic-financial structures, reducing the interest rate, a measure which has been already undertaken in the European Union, or to set up public or public-private funds to support financial institutions in distress.

In times of financial turmoil, social assistance programs are put under pressure due to austerity measures put in place by states. In recent times there has been a clear clash between the social and the economic aspects of business. More often than not, profit has been in the forefront of business, while private companies have ignored their social responsibility. Corporate social responsibility is a tool through which companies can use their influence to improve the society. This policy is studied in George Tsourvakas' article entitled *Corporate Social Responsibility and Media Companies*, where he argues that media companies, responsible especially for correctly informing the public, should introduce social responsible practices in their policies. Indeed, companies are socially responsible, especially in times of crisis. In order for CSR policies to benefit both the companies and the society, it is necessary for them to act in a sustainable manner, a measure which is encouraged by the EU (Büchner, 2012: 52).

The mass-media bears a big responsibility, as the distributor of information to the masses. CSR and media companies should be closely linked due to their commitment for the good of the society. Media companies are responsible for upholding freedom of expression, a concept which is analyzed by Adrian Popoviciu in connection to the European jurisprudence. The author catalogues several important cases related to infringements to freedom of expression in European law.

The third and fourth sections of *Media and European Diversity* relate the concept of European diversity to two divergent tendencies, the global tendency, as well as the regional tendency. Globalization, as a phenomenon that has caused profound changes in the way we view the world, both politically and economically, has met the powerful match of regionalization. The third section focuses more on communication aspects with global outreach, which have impact on Europe, such as the need for the EU to develop a stronger communication strategy in order to reduce the communication gap between it and its citizens. This aspect is analyzed thoroughly in Dorin Dolghi's study entitled *Legitimacy and the Communication Strategy of the European Union*. The so-called democratic deficit can threaten the Union's legitimacy in front of its citizens if communication is not enhanced and the citizen is not engaged. This point is detailed in another study entitled *Legitimacy, Institutions and the Communication Strategy in the European Union*, where the author analyses the EU's communication strategy and postulates that better EU-citizen relation could be achieved if the citizens' level of understanding would be better communicated. The media plays an important role in engaging the citizens, both at a European level, as well as at a national level. Such responsibility can be surely sidetracked and pressured if democracy, debate and dialogue are not transparent in a state. This aspect is studied in the article entitled *The Press Strangulation Phenomenon in Moldova and Its Political Implications*, where the authors paint a rather different deficit, in comparison to the EU's deficit, namely the deficit of democracy, as she explains that the independent press is put under pressure both economically and physically by the political establishment in Chişinău.

While Dolghi's study focuses on the European aspects related to communication, other studies analyze the influence of the media at a national level, namely the following ones: *The Source Of Information About The European Union Among Hungarian Pupils: School And Media* by Kalory Teperics and Gyula Szabo, *Polish Student Radio in an Era of Changes* by Urszula Doliwa, or *The Most Important Characteristics Of Slogans And Symbols Used In Hungarian Tourism Communication Activity* by Gabor Kozma. Media's role in education is paramount according to the first two studies, which analyze two very different age groups, but reach a very similar conclusion, namely that media, as a primary source of information, is essential in education and builds a sense of community. This argument is illustrated by the fact that, according to Karoly Teperics and Gyula Szabo,

everyday life is more influential in a child's education than teaching material. Likewise, the case study of Polish student radio emphasizes media's important role in superior education, where it can help strengthen the foundation, because it places the subjects (the students) in the double role of communicators and recipients of information.

Tourism nowadays works hand in hand with the concept of brand identity, namely the need to create a clear picture for a tourist location so that customers can clearly separate it from the crowd. Slogans, symbols and other instruments work perfectly in this instance. But they are not enough. A clear communication and promotion strategy is needed. Gabor Kozma's article on slogans and symbols in Hungarian tourism can be analyzed in tandem with Luminița Șoproni et al. In their article, they emphasize the need for Romania to develop a coherent and clear international brand and relate to the past and failed brand strategies to conclude that Romania's national brand must be "sold" firstly on the inside and it must be more dynamic.

The regional disparities reflected in the fourth section offer the regional perspective to the concept of diversity. The fourth and final section builds on the foundation of intercultural dialogue and diversity to provide an alternative perspective, namely the disparities, which were present in history and are still resilient. The historical perspective is depicted in the study on the Alba Iulia Treaty of 1595 and its political and religious implications by Sorin Șipoș and Laura Ardelean, as well as the historical perspective regarding the Jews' image in Romanian collective memory or the Hungarian historical perspective on Trianon (see also Polgar, 2011). Other studies elaborate on culture as an agent of reducing disparities, of bringing people together, as Martin Hoffman's study on cultural mediators, or the perspective on the European Ecumenical Movement by Mircea Brie (see also Brie, 2009a; Brie, 2009b; Brie and Brie, 2008) or Ștefănescu's view on historiography as a form of memory. Other means of reducing disparities are Lifelong Learning Policies, cross-border cooperation or the perspective of EU enlargement, as some of the main tools that the European Union uses to build regional identity and strengthen regional identity. The reality of the border in today's Europe brings a lot of challenges as well as opportunities for border communities. On the one hand, they can be considered peripheral, but they benefit from cross-border cooperation, which is indeed a means of reducing disparities, as well as fostering a common sense of European, rather than national identity. This opportunity can be analyzed more clearly in studies, such as *Sociological Research. Thinking the Future Together, Debrecen-Oradea Cross-Border Agglomeration*, (Țoca, 2009), or *Perspectives for a Development Strategy of Debrecen-Oradea Cross Border Agglomeration*, (Țoca, Horga, 2008).

The majority of the articles in the present volume deal with the challenges of European diversity and intercultural dialogue in today's European culture of cultures. What role do the media play in this scenario? In the hunt for audience and profit, mass media may have forgotten its role as an educator of the masses, but its role is still instrumental in shaping the prospects of intercultural dialogue.

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FRAGMENTS OF HISTORICAL INTERPRETATIONS


Anca OLTEAN*

Review of: Sorin Șipoș, Gabriel Moisa, Mircea Brie, Florin Sfrengu, Ion Gumenâi (coord.), *The Historian's Atelier. Sources, methods, interpretations*, Cluj-Napoca, Editura Academia Română. Centrul de Studii Transilvane, 2012, 278 p., ISBN 978-973-7784-84-1

Keywords: *history, historian, methods, interpretations, sources*

The volume *The Historian's Atelier. Sources, methods, interpretations* pleads for the cause of real historian who is called to write a genuine history for the next generations. Authors such as Ioan-Aurel Pop, Florin Sfrengu, Ion Eremia, Igor Șarov, Barbu Ștefănescu, Roxana Ivașca, Antonio Faur, Gabriel Moisa, Mircea Brie, Ioan Horga, Igor Bercu, Sergiu Matveev, Elena Arcuș, Radu Românașu, Egry Gábor, Jean – Marc Moriceau, Bodo Edith, Ioan-Aurel Pop, Sorin Șipoș, Ion Gumenâi, Laura Ardelean and Mihaela Cioca, Florentina Chirodea and Gheorghe Palade offer to the readers a series of particular histories from Antiquity, Middle Age, Modern Times and Contemporary period, demonstrating their capacity to be historians, to reveal the past as it was and not the phantasies and literary creations revealed by non – specialists around the notion of history.

The topics are of a large variety focusing on archeological discoveries from 8th-11th centuries in North-Western Romania, the terminology of Tara Moldovei and moldovans in Russian historical sources, Bessarabia in Russian historiography (1812-1823), the system of values of the rural world, the history and identity construct in Romanian literary Romanticism, historiographical sources with regard to the actions to save Jews from Hungary and Northern Transylvania in 1944, Politics and History in Romanian postcommunist historiography, the cultural frontiers of Europe, religious situation in *re'âyâ-lele* led by Ottomans on the territory of Moldova, the legislation of patrimony in the Russian Empire in the XIXth century and its impact on Basarabia province, then a research of Romanian Cultural Religious Meetings from Bihor County in interwar period time, a study around the concept of *everyday ethnicity* and *national indifference* in interwar Transylvania. Jean – Marc Moriceau describes the story of the wolf and its impact on humans in France during XV-XX century, Bodo Edith refers to documents with economic character enacted by Roman Catholic Bishopric from Oradea, Ioan Aurel Pop talks about publication of latin medieval documents after late copies from XIXth century, Sorin Sipoș wrote about the Morlachs of Dalmatia in a Memoranda of Colonel Antoine Zulatti (1806), Ion Gumenâi describes the national, confessional and social composition of the city of Ismail, Laura Ardelean and Mihaela Cioca talks about



* Researcher, Institute of Euroregional Studies, Faculty of History, International Relations, Political Sciences and Science of Communication, University of Oradea, Romania. E-mail: oltean@igri.ro

documents concerning the provenance of the Society of Archeology and History from Oradea and Bihor County's Collection reflected in Documents, another paper deals with study documents of the Academy of Law from Oradea and, last but not least, a study based on documents concerning the repressive regime from Bessarabia (1940-1941).

Ioan Aurel Pop asserts that the present volume pleads for professionalism of the historian in a world of amateurs, a very superficial world (Pop, 2012: 7). Ioan Aurel Pop pleads for an accurate history of the past, being aware that every generation has his own history and writes the history according to their values, being unavoidably influenced by the present. The author pleads for the access of historian to primary sources, first hand sources which are so important when writing about the past realities. The author considers that universal knowledge can not be possessed any more by individual personalities, so it is important to delimitate the knowledge in fields of study. A historian must know how to work with methods specific for his domain, although sometimes we need interdisciplinarity (Pop, 2012: 10).

Florin Sfrengu in the article entitled *Historical interpretations of archaeological discoveries between 8 and 11th centuries in North-Western Romania* asserts that most archeological investigation concerning the realities of North-Western Romania during 8 - 11th centuries were developed after 1970. In these archeological investigations conducted in North-West Romania several institutions were involved such as "museums of Arad, Carei, Cluj-Napoca, Oradea, Satu Mare and Zalău". (Sfrengu, 2012: 15). In 1949, at Vârșand took place excavations and were discovered 58 inhumation tombs from 11th century. In 1954, there were continued investigations in Biharea by M.Rusu, considering that the cemetery did not belong to Hungarians. S.Dumitrașcu continued the investigations of M.Rusu in Biharea. He based his research on local archeological discoveries, but also on archeological discoveries in the Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. He shows that „the Slavs penetrating the South and West during the sixth and seventh centuries bring with them a pottery different from that of the Roman and non-Roman population in the areas where they settled”. (Sfrengu, 2012: 19). During the last four decades several specialists approached the problem of archeological discoveries between 8th-11th centuries in North-Western Romania such as M. Zdroba, D.Băcuet- Crișan, M. Blăjan and E. Dörner, V. Boroneanț, P. Hurezean, P.Hügel, N. Chidioșan, M. Comșa, C.Cosma, I. Crișan, P.Iambor, Șt. Matei, N. Iercoșan, Al.V. Matei, J. Nemeti, E.D.Pădureanu, I.Stanciu. (Sfrengu, 2012: 22)

Ion Eremia in the article *Țara Moldovei și Moldovenii reflectate în terminologia surselor documentare rusești – Observații preliminare (The Moldovan country and the Moldovans reflected in the terminology of Russian documentary sources – Preliminary observations)* analyzes the Russian terminology "used to describe Tara Moldovei, its inhabitants and the spoken language" (Eremia, 2012: 29). Soviet historiography pursued the existence of a Moldavian people, separated from the Romanian one. Although in the documents of the time, it is reflected the unity of Romanian people, the Sovietic politic factor influenced the translations considering a fact the existence of a Moldavian people with a Moldavian country, having an independent origin.

Igor Șarov in the article *Basarabia în istoriografia rusă (1812-1823): De la Kunițki la Svinin/ Bessarabia in Russian historiography (1812-1823): From Kunițki to Svinin* shows that after the Russian's conquest of Bassarabia in 1812, many foreigners, travelling in Bessarabia published "memoirs, notes or historical works". In consequence, there are a variety of writings about Bassarabia of those times. And not all of them were written by professional historians. Sometimes the writings showed an official character, considers the author, as most of the works published in Russia at the end of XVIIIth

century and at the beginning of XIXth century were pursuing the expansionist character of Tsarist regime.

Barbu Ștefănescu in his work *Teme posibile în atelierul istoricului: Elementele sistemului de valori al lumii rurale/ Possible themes from historian's Laboratory: The Elements of the Rural world's system of values* approach the peasant society “in Transylvania from the beginnings of modernity through the value system it relates to” (Ștefănescu, 2012: 73). Barbu Ștefănescu analyzed the writings from the history books, secondary issues, important for observing the popular sensibility, a world characterized by the author as having very few written sources to describe it (Ștefănescu, 2012: 74). Other sources he utilizes are analysis of Church paintings and ethnological and anthropological observations. The Church appears as the principal promoter of moral values assumed by the society at all levels. The group cohesion is assured by priest and judicial authorities. There is also a group cohesion given by common values and the ones who don't act or behave in consequence are severely judged. The work continues showing different circumstances where peasant world's morality manifested.

Roxana Ivașca in her article, *Întemeierea necesară. Istoria și constructul identitar în Romanticismul literar românesc/ The necessary beginning. The history and the identity construct in Romanian literary Romanticism* has a topic of research the stage of Romanticism in Romanian literature, an essential literary current of the Romanian society. The author allocates space to pre-Romanticism and Romanian Romanticism. The Pasoptist generation was a generation of historians who wrote literary texts in the same time. Pretty often, considers the author, Romanian writers from XIX th century felt inferior to the ones from Western world creating an ideal picture of the past or adopting themes from western literature. The Romanticism looked also for an educative contribution, to a critical re-evaluation of values and institutions. But the realities of the time were different than the literature and there were a class of peasants, illiterates, whom were not sufficiently educated by school or Church who were not sensitive to literary creations. It was necessary a reform of the Romanian countries that will follow up later by the Union of Principalities and the instauration, in a few years, of monarchy.

Antonio Faur in his work *Study on different interpretations in works focusing on the actions to save the Jews from Hungary and Northern Transylvania in 1944* identifies a few important historiographic works, published in the years 1986 and 1989, referring to the actions of saving Jews from Hungary and Northern Transylvania. A few of the authors recalled by Antonio Faur are Elie Wiesel, Adrian Riza, Raoul Șorban, Oliver Lustig, Moshe Carmilly – Weinberger, Itzak Artzi. Showing that some Jews were saved from deportation by this *networks of humanity*, Antonio Faur ends his study with the memorable words of Talmud: “Whoever saves one man, saves the whole world”.

Gabriel Moisa in his study *Politique et histoire dans l'historiographie Roumaine Postcomunisme. Quelques considerations* shows his opinion that in these times there was a continuous dialogue between society and historiography. The author thinks that also democratic regimes “are not entirely disinterested in the writing of history, yet they have a more nuanced approach and the means by which they influence historiography are finer and more subtle” (Moisa, 2012: 99). Totalitarian regimes had a special wish to control the past. In post-communist period, the historiography reflected the image of society. Also democratic regimes are interested in the writing of history, not only the totalitarian regimes.

Mircea Brie and Ioan Horga in the study *Le frontiere culturali Europee: Tra l'identità dello Spazio Europeo e le Politiche Comunitarie* talks about the notions of people, culture, history, territory. They identify a local area influenced by European culture: “The paper is a survey on the European cultural space in two aspects: 1. Europe

with internal cultural border areas 2. Europe as external cultural – identity border area” (Brie and Horga, 2012: 107). The European culture reached the level of regions by multiculturalism. Cultural diversity, pluralism and multiculturalism are elements specific to the European area. The European integration process is complex; it does not impose and is not conditioned by the idea of cultural unity, or the existence of a common culture including all Europeans (Horga and Brie, 2010a: 158). Specificity and diversity are precisely the means of intercultural dialogue between European peoples. Each European society has to find their own integrating solutions depending on traditions and institutions (Brie and Horga, 2010a: 128). The researches from this domain of the two authors are more complex, being made reference to epistemology, specificity and tipology of the European states (Brie and Horga, 2009; Horga and Brie, 2010b; Brie, 2010b; Brie and Horga, 2010b), to cultural dimension of European space (Stoica and Brie, 2010; Brie, 2010a), cultural cooperation and university cooperation at the Eastern frontier of EU (Horga and Brie, 2009; Horga and Brie, 2008).

Igor Bercu in the study *Confluente religioase în “Re’âyâ-lele” Otomane de pe teritoriul Țării Moldovei* mentions the fact that these administrative units were created by the Ottoman Empire at the end of XVth century. The number of these units increased in the following centuries in the Principality of Moldavia. The population of these units was very diverse. After the Ottoman conquest the proportions of Muslims increased in comparison with the Christian population. The Ottoman gate imposed through these units its administrative, political, economical and fiscal system while reflecting the Ottoman religion both in internal and external policy. The ones who did not belong to the Muslim religion did not have the same privileges as the Muslims. There were cases when the Christians converted to Islam for having the same privileges as the Muslims. A Christian could not pay the taxes <djizya> if he passed to Muslim religion. In turn there were granted the protection of Allah, they had to pay a tax for the help of the poor, they were forced to participate to the Saint War. Although many Christian churches were turned into Mosque, the author remarks the spirit of tolerance of the Ottoman Gate towards other religious minorities.

In the study of Sergiu Matveev and Elena Arcuș entitled *Legislația patrimoniului în Imperiul Rusiei în secolul al XIX-lea și impactul asupra guberniei Basarabia/ the Legislation of patrimony in the Russian Empire in the XIXth century and its impact on the Basarabia Province* shows that the administration of the time accorded much attention to the treasures. In 1823 at Odessa there was created a Museum of Antiquity. In Odessa too, in 1839 it was created the Society of History and Antiquity. In 1846 at Sankt-Petersburg was created the Archeological Society, all these organizations having as purpose the valorization of treasures. Bessarabian people were recommended to sell old objects at a smaller price to amateur collectionaries. The negative consequence of the Russian rule was that Bessarabian treasures arrived in the Museums of Russian Empire, as the authors emphasize.

Radu Romînașu in the article *For a systematic research of the History of the Romanian Cultural- Religious Meetings in the interwar period. The Case of Bihor County* talks about Romanian cultural and religious meetings from Bihor County in interwar period which helped at the development of society. The author defines Bihor county region as a „Western region of the unified Romania integrated to the common flow of the national culture, fact that both men and institutions worked together in an ardent startup towards progress and European sincronization” (Romînașu, 2012: 150).

In the article of Egrý Gabor, *Between past and present: the notion of everyday ethnicity and national indifference in Historical Research. A case study from Interwar Transylvania*, the author considers that identity is a main concept in social sciences that

was put under criticism. Ethnicity appear as a feature of groups. The topics approached are identity, ethnicity and national awareness as they were important topics that influenced social and historical sciences in the last years. The author looked for the concept of daily ethnicity and national indifference in the interwar Romania's past.

In a very interesting article *Le Loup et L'Historien: La Réalité des Attaques sur L'Homme. Un bilan a L'Échelle de la France (XVe – XXe siècle)*, the author Jean – Marc Moriceau analyzed cases when humans were victims of wolfs focusing on the negative role of the wolf in the collective mentality. The author finds 573 cases of attacks of wolfs during the years 1571- 1890. Then he furnishes a map with series of attacks coming from wolfs during the years 1578-1887. After a period when the wolf disappeared from France, it reappeared in 1992, coming from Italy.

Bodo Edith in the paper *Actele Economice ale Episcopiei Romano-Catolice de Oradea. Sursă pentru istoria economică și socială a județului Bihor/ Economical Acts of Roman-Catholic Bishopric of Oradea. Source for the Economic and Social History of Bihor County* shows that the archive of Roman – Catholique Bishopric from Oradea is the most important written source for knowing the history of Bihor County, containing many documents from the end of XVII century, but also from XVIII and XIX century. The author offers a space to economic acts enacted by the Bishopric, considered as a very important source for the history of the region. An important source of information is given by urbarial conscripts which offer information concerning land culture and agricultural production, number of animals detained by the peasants, vineyards, work obligations, taxes. Also there are informations about small enterprises constituted on the territory of Bihor County such as glass manufacture from Beliu, the iron factory from Vascau, the Beer factory from Seleuș. The registers for tax collections are important sources of information of the Roman – Catholic Bishopric from Oradea.

The Academician Ioan-Aurel Pop in the work *Despre publicarea documentelor latine medievale după copii târzii (din secolul al XIX-lea)/ About the publication of Latin medieval documents after late copies (from XIXth century)* defines the historian as a man capable to reconstitute the past of an epoch or of a century. A lot of medieval documents got lost but they could have been preserved in late copies from XVIII and XIX century. The publication of the volume of Ioan-Aurel Pop (coord.), *Diplome maramureșene din secolele XVI-XVIII, provenite din colecția lui Ioan Mihalyi de Apșa* brings an important contribution for the history of Romanians. The texts are mainly in latin, not an accurate language. Probably the mistakes belonged to the authors of copies. The simultaneous use of Latin, Hungarian and Romanian in the same text makes the form more difficult to understand, asserts Ioan – Aurel Pop.

Sorin Șipoș in the work *A Forgotten Minority: The Morlachs of Dalmatia in a Memorandum of colonel Antoine Zulatti (1806)* talks about a Manuscript Memory of colonel Zulatti on reforms and reglementations of Morlaques in Dalmatia written in 1806. The memorandum was describing the situation of Morlaque society that was missing ethnic identity, but also linguistic identity: „We think here of frequent thefts, conflicts with political authority, violation and destruction of property and crops, the difficulty of being integrated into a system because of transhumance. Also, we mention the vindicative spirit, the pride and rebellion, the courage and generosity towards the weakest and the faith of God, often speculated for the benefit of the powerful”. (Sipos, 2012: 212)

An interesting paper is the one written by Ion Gumenâi, *Un izvor inedit privitor la componenta națională, confesională și socială a orașului Ismail la 1816 (a New Issue concerning national, confessional and social componence of the city of Ismail in 1816*. Another interesting study is the one of Laura Ardelean and Mihaela Cioca, *Some Aspects*

Regarding the Provenance of the Society of Archeology and History from Oradea and Bihor County's Collection reflected in documents, emphasizing the importance of the Society of Archeology in Oradea and, last but not least, the study of Florentina Chirodea, *The Study Documents – Sources for a history of the interwar Higher Education in Transylvania. Case Study: The Oradea Academy of Law*, focusing on documents enacted by the Oradea Academy of Law in interwar period time and furnishing illustrative tables. The study of Gheorghe Palade, *New documents about the Repressive Soviet Regime in Bessarabia (1940-1941)* when the author analyzes the victims of this regime and their conditions of life under communist rule. The volume reveals actual trends in modern historiography, pleading with honesty for the job of genuine historian, successfully assumed by the authors.


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
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


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
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
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


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


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
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


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


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
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


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


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
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
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


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
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


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


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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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


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


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
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
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