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PERCEPTIONS ON TRIANON DURING THE INTERWAR PERIOD

Istvan POLGAR[*]

Abstract. *The Romanian-Hungarian border, drawn at the end of the peace process that followed the First World War, was from the beginning, and continues today, a controversial topic in historical research of the two neighboring countries. The intensity whereby each of the two dialogue partners have sustained more or less argued over time their thesis, that were launched on the internal and external market of the history books, has fluctuated, being influenced by a complexity of political, ideological or economical factors.*

In this study I want to present a brief image of the themes and topics that dominate the Hungarian and Romanian research, namely the causality relationships that are tied in the argumentations of their studies.

The British historian Edward Augustus Freeman (1823-1892) defined history as a mere "historical past" (Stephens, 1895: 19), even if we are tempted to say it is more than that. Yet, we should also be aware of the role played by politics or political trends in writing history. We should not ignore that certain schools and historical trends are connected to politics. Therefore, it would be best to detach history from political parties and ideological influences. Yet reality shows us that things are different and this science is influenced by several elements that are sometimes hidden by historians themselves.

The same history differs from one region to another, from one period to another. Historical research may obey totalitarian power, external pressure and often national revival periods throughout political crises. There are moments when nations break from their obscure past and need psychological stimuli, thus resorting to their glorious past, or when nations are hit by national catastrophes and seek for reasons to survive.

The Hungarian historiographer Stephen Bela Vardy considered that the Hungarian and Polish peoples were amongst the first in Central Europe to reach a certain maturity of self-awareness in the decades at the end of the 18th century and the 19th century materialised in the following years in a complex process of cultural and political revival of their nations passing through different means of writing history, from the Romantic to political-ideological historiography (Vardy, 1982: 361). Out of the pioneers of the Romantic trend also known as "delusion hunters", he reminded Adam Paloczi-Horvath (1760-1820) and Istvan Horvat (1784-1846) whose writings had become the bases of the Hungarian nationalist historiography.

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[*] PhD., Lecturer, Department of International Relations and European Studies, Faculty of History, Geography and International Relations, University of Oradea, Romania. E-mail: isti_polgi@yahoo.com

In his opinion, the new trend was characterised by a settled even scholastic trend and therefore it had endured until the events at the end of 1918, when the Hungarian states was dismembered by the Trianon Treaty, an event perceived as the greatest national catastrophe of the millenary history of the Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin leading to major changes in Hungary's social, economic and political status. "Definitely, no Hungarian historian living these tragic events has been untouched – says Vardy – in fact, the impact of these events has been persuasively imprinted in Hungarians' mind and it could be considered as an intense psychological shock" (Vardy, 1982: 362).

The nature and dimension of the shock caused by Trianon on the contemporary Hungarian historians was well seized by Gyula Szekfu (1883-1955), a dominant figure of the interwar Hungarian historiography and the founding father of the *"Geistesgeschichte"* historiographic school. He expressed his frustration in the agonizing introduction to his first work after Trianon entitled *"Harom nemzedek"* (Three Generations). "This book has to be written, this book is my personal experience amidst the events that have hit us and led us to the catastrophe in October 1918, the fall of Austro-Hungary (...) I felt I would never be able to find my strength and urge to write and draw the line on the causes of the decline leading us to this disaster. I have told myself that I would face the forces taking my nation away from a healthy evolution and I have started to write this work (...) this is how I have opened my soul" (Szekfü, 1920: 1, apud Vardy, 1982: 363).

To Szekfu, writing the work entitled Three Generations was a spiritual death – a spiritual catharsis, as he himself put it – helping him get free of psychological pressure he had inside. Yet not all Hungarian historians were able to write such broad and significant work, although all worth mentioning wrote their own book on Trianon, or at least a pamphlet relating to it.

Other historians, generally amateurs or literate people not involved in research, completely lost their track. They started to wander on the path of stories, legends and self-delusion. One of the most obvious expressions of this trend was the revival of Istvan Horvat's "delusion hunters" historiography, who was seeking for Hungarians' roots amongst the great civilisations of ancient world, from Sumerians, Egyptians, Hittites, Etruscans to Indians and the sources of the new Turanian wave refusing the communion with the Western "non-believers" in the vague pan-Turanian dream. As Vardy put it, "finally, it would have been very difficult for us to clean the Hungarian civilisation of its millennium of culture and Christian faith and place it in a 'pure' culture and religion artificially created. Szekfu was right when he called the phenomenon as a 'new paganism' that all civilised Hungarians have rejected" (Vardy, 1982: 363).

Like other intellectuals, the interwar Hungarian historians suffered from the "Trianon syndrome", which was normal considering that they were subjects to psychological, ideological, social, or political pressure. As Ferenc Glatz classified the relationship between the Hungarian historians and politicians in his book, the pressure originated in several written and unwritten sources, the loss of an important segment of readers considering that they were either outside the borders or were so poor that they could no longer buy historical publications and finally the loss of the whole intellectual and ideological environment that the Hungarian society used to have before 1914 (Glátz, 1980: 15).

To these historians, Trianon also meant the end of a relative socio-economic security and a comfortable lifestyle as they were perceived by the readers. Considering these advantages of the Hungarian historians, Trianon was more than a national catastrophe; it was also a personal unprecedented catastrophe for their material and psychological situation and influenced the relations with history as a subject (Vardy, 1982: 364).

The reaction of historians and history in general took several shapes and ultimately led to reorientation to other subjects and not accidentally turned to revisionism.

Nevertheless, throughout WWI, Hungarian historians were aware of the multiethnic structure of their country yet hoped that at the end of it the country would still be multinational in peace projects. This is clearly shown in the surveys published before 1916, where they tried to prove the historical rights of Hungary over the Carpathian Basin (Glátz, 1980: 235).

Most irredentist arguments were taken from this scientific source explaining the uncanny significance and role of historians in Hungary's revisionist campaign. It made reference to historical, geographical and economic unity of Hungary, as well as to the Hungarians' cultural predominance in the Carpathian Basin, a reality that would have led to estrangement of 3.5 million Hungarians on the successive states territories on the basis of the claimed breech of principle of nationalities (Nemes, 1976: 158).

This last argument was less used as it would have led to partial revisionist claims unlike the historical argument justifying total restoration of historical Hungary. The most popular slogan of the kind was that Hungarians were the first to settle and organise a viable state in the area, an entity turning into a bastion of Western Christianity against Eastern barbarism meant to provide the balance between the great worlds of Germans and Slavs.

One of the first works published at the time were political pamphlets inspired by the immediate needs of the moment. Others had scientific weight turning into landmarks of the Hungarian interwar historiography. Most political pamphlets were written with the aim of preventing the catastrophe of Trianon as they were elaborated by first class Hungarian academicians and university staff.

The call of academicians to "civilised world" was made by Angyal David (1857-1947), an eminent professor of History of Hungary at the University of Budapest (Angyal, 1923, Apud, 1980: 162). Other such calls came from the universities of Bratislava and Debrecen and were signed by important historians such as Holub Jozsef (1885-1962), Antal Hodinka (1865-1946) and Istvan Rugonfalvi-Kiss (1881-1957) (Vardy, 1976: 32). "There have been no debates on how this could be done by such a small nation yet this vision has little by little covered the whole historical profession and has begun to become the starting point in the interwar historical research", pointed out Stephen Bela Vardy (Vardy, 1982: 365).

For instance, an issue from 1918 of the University of Budapest publication entitled "*La Hongrie*" described the ethnic structure of Hungary in 12th – 14th centuries stressing the low number of non-Hungarians. It then detailed the increasing number of nationalities through a ceaseless migration in the following period, particularly at the time of the Turkish occupation and right after it. The same year, 1918, the publication of the University of Bratislava entitled "*Pro Hungaria*" focused on the issue of the Slovaks trying to show that the Hungarian tolerance and liberalism provided the survival of nationalities throughout centuries. The work was trying to convince the Slovaks that they were supposed to be grateful to Hungary, a country protecting them and saving them for over a millennium rather than following Czechoslovakia's project where they could lose their national identity (Vardy, 1976: 32).

Hungarian tolerance was also evoked in the calls sent by the University of Debrecen to all "universities of the civilised world". Just like the works of its sister institutions, their surveys tried to earn sympathy for Hungary's claims as it had defended Western civilisation from the pressure of the East and show that Hungary was the victim of its role as a defender of Christianity. According to the survey, the Hungarian people

was described as a "nation of mediators" and Hungary as a "link" between East and West. Yet from an ethnical point of view, Hungary was always characterised as a "community of nations" rising together through joint history, traditions and interests.

These kinds of pamphlets were produced under the auspices of the four top education institutions of Hungary, except from Cluj, and they all had the basic feature defining the interwar revisionist literature. They were written by historians and were structured around historical arguments, yet they all praised the historical primacy of Hungary's right over the Carpathian Basin and the unique role played by Hungary as a bastion of the Christian West (Vardy, 1982: 366).

Romanian intellectuals had similar interests, yet the results of their scientific research were a little late based on the need for institutional integration of educational and research structures in the recent unification of the provinces under the Romanian crown. They were also motivated by the need to counteract both the claims of primacy of the Hungarian people in Transylvania and those of tolerance of the Hungarian rulers towards subjected nations as they were expressed in the writings of the historians in Budapest.

For example, the philologist Emil Petrovici at the University of Sibiu, inspired by the research of renowned scientists in the West, such as the German professor Ernst Gamillscheg, who disagreed with Rosler's theories, mentioned the linguistic argument to show the primacy, continuity and permanence of the Romanian element in Ardeal. "Transylvania is entitled to be called the cradle of the Romanian people. In the west, just like in Banat, Oltenia and the neighbouring areas south from the Danube, the Romanian people and language were born at the beginning of Middle Ages, first uniformly, then divided into four dialects (...) Sheltered by the mountain crown of the Ardeal, the Dacian-Romanian branch of our people has survived the hard times of invasions and, after the settlement of migrating waves, it slowly yet irresistibly descended from the mountains to the fertile plains that had been abandoned by our ancestors"(Petrovici, 1943: 12, apud Jinga, 1995: 112)

Against the modest presence of the Romanian element in archive documents of the early Hungarian administration chanceries often mentioned by the Hungarian historians, the archaeologist Constantin Daicoviciu, a professor at the University of Cluj, opposed his massive presence in the universe of artefacts brought to light after the systematic research campaigns of former Dacian-Roman urban centres sites on the territory of Transylvania. Vexed by the theses released by the Hungarian intellectuals, Daicoviciu challenged the reader with the following question: "what could really be stranger in historical thinking than denying the life of a centuries-old people under new rule?"(Daicoviciu, 1943: 1)

Based on the discovered material evidence, the professor from Cluj made an analogy between the evolution of the Dacian-Roman people and the evolution of peoples from Raetia, Gallia and Hispania, where the same process of cultural and linguistic homogeneity between natives and Roman occupants took place: "The inexorable law of the Dacian land has happened to them too: the newcomers melted into the undying mass of changed natives and both into a Roman people by the two great forces of Antiquity: Roman world and Christianity"(Petrovici, 1946: 6, apud-Jinga, 1995: 113).

The ethnologist Romulus Vuia joined the two professors from Ardeal and provided ethnographic evidence to support the continuity of the Romanian element in Transylvania. "None of the cohabiting peoples in Ardeal has a more native rural civilisation with all signs of an old civilisation deeply rooted in the past and soil of this land than the Romanian people – stated the well-known researcher. Thus, our folk

civilisation is the most certain testimonial of the ancestry of our people on these lands, an evidence more certain than the written documents of foreign courts' chanceries recording only noisy events on the surface ignoring the deeply rooted and steady life devoid of history of great masses in the countryside that has silently created the firm basis of our people." (Vuia, 1943: 32, apud Jinga, 1995: 113)

One of the fiercest supporters of Rosler's theory was the bishop and professor of History of Church at the University of Budapest, Karacsonyi Janos (1858-1929), who enriched it with new hypotheses during the 1920-1930 decade. He was also one of the first historians approaching the issue of Hungary's fall, or possible fall, from the point of view of the historical rights of the Hungarian nation.

In 1916, he published the book entitled "*A magyar nemzet történeti joga hazánk teruletéhez a Kárpátoktól le az Adriáig*" (The Historical Right of the Hungarian Nation on the Territory of Our Country from the Carpathians to the Adriatic Sea) as a response to the work entitled "*The Nationality and the War*" published by Arnold Toynbee in 1915.(Karácsonyi, 1916: passim). At the beginning of the war, Toynbee supported the abolition of Central Powers and the dismembering of Hungary based on ethnic grounds. In Karacsonyi's opinion, the English historian tried to "enforce the principle of nations' self-determinism only in the case of Great Britain's opponents, but he forgot to enforce it in the case of the Entente allies"(Karácsonyi, 1921: 4), where political and economic interests seemed to overcome ethnic interests.

Karacsonyi's thesis was mainly based on the question whether Hungarians, or only Hungarians, had historical rights over the Great Hungary territory. He then corrected the old Rosler's conception according to which in the 9th century, when the Hungarians occupied the Carpathian Basin, it was "no one's land" and that there was no stable population there except for remainders of migratory people staying more or less in the area and being assimilated by the Hungarian competition. He considered that until the end of the 12th century, despite recurrent invitations of the Hungarian kings to different ethnic groups to settle on Hungarian lands and the colonisations following these urges, the basic population of Hungary was mainly made up of Hungarians even under the circumstances.

Karacsonyi also refuted the presence of Slovaks' ancestors on the Hungarian territory before the 9th century. In his vision, nothing showed the existence of an ephemeral and obscure "Great Moravia" rather the Slovaks would have started to settle in Hungary towards the end of the 11th century and then increased in number during the Hussite wars in the 15th century and even more under the Turkish occupation, when the Hungarians were decimated. Thus, the Slovaks could "spawn at ease in their mountains" and a great part of Northern Hungary was denationalised (Karácsonyi, 1921: 5). However, some Hungarian scholars disagreed with Karacsonyi's viewpoint on the origins of the Slovaks and agreed to the idea that they simply spawned against the Hungarians.

The Hungarian prelate made such appreciations regarding the Romanians and tried to reject the so-called Dacian-Roman origin of the Romanians. Based on Rosler's generally accepted arguments, he stated that the Romanians would have come here much later from the Balkans, in the 12th – 13th centuries, where they first lived in the mountains and that their language developed on the basis of their neighbourhood with the Illyrs, who spoke Albanian.

In Karacsonyi's opinion, unlike Romanians' ancestors, the Croats settled in Croatia before the Hungarians, yet Croatia was limited to certain areas nearby the Adriatic Sea and that the territory between the Sava and the Drava was well inhabited by Hungarians right after the withdrawal of the Turks. He also had something to add

regarding the nature of the Hungarian-Croat Union on which there were rumours that was based on the Hungarian conquest. Indeed, he stated that until the 17th century, the Croat historians did not start to debates and write on the conditions of the union taking place in 1102 (*Pacta Conventa*). For this reason, the author considered that Croats' rights were based on mere and consecutive concessions provided by the Hungarian Crown (Karácsonyi, 1921: 5).

In his work, Karacsonyi made a review of the Hungarians' vision on the history of Hungary as printed in 1920 and later on as an abstract in English (Karácsonyi, 1920: passim). During the following years, the work was republished and has always been a source for the most valuable Hungarian irredentist works, as authors have almost exclusively based their arguments on the historical rights of Hungary and not on the fact that existential issues of the Hungarian nation were the result of the lack of tolerance of the Hungarian rulers concerning national groups whose existence was endangered. Although they gave credit to the contribution of nations in building the Hungarian state, they subsequently denied their right to separation. According to Karacsonyi, irredentists were unable to perceive the future of the people in the Carpathian Basin separated from the Hungarian homeland.

Karacsonyi reached the conclusion that only Hungarians had full historical rights in Hungary and consequently they were entitled and had the freedom to preserve the integrity of the country, a thesis according to which any attack to their homeland integrity was an act of treason. In other words, "all nations of Hungary are compelled to defend their millenary rights." (Karácsonyi, 1921: 6)

According to the Romanian vision, it was precisely the principles reminded by Karacsonyi that served as basis for Hungarian intolerance regarding political and cultural claims of nationalities in the Empire, implicitly the rights often claimed by the leaders of the Romanian national movement.

In his broad work dedicated to the Romanian emancipation fight in Ardeal, Banat and Crisana, Teodor V. Pacatian punctually approached a series of events where the intervention of the Romanian representatives to different authorities belonging to the Hungarian central administration encountered hostility and were often thwarted through coercive measures. Such example was that of Deputy Alexandru Roman from Bihor. During the meeting held on 13 December 1867, he uttered a six point protest criticizing the discriminatory policy of the Hungarian administration against minorities. "Hungary is a polyglot country – Alexandru Roman started his discourse – yet nationalities are considered 'enemies of the country' (...) Loving one's fellow citizens is considered a crime in the case of the Romanians and a virtue in the case of the Hungarians" (Păcățianu, 1913: 6). At the end, he pleaded for sincere understanding between Hungarians and Romanians.

When celebrating the Great National Assembly held in Blaj in 1868, he elaborated a statement advocating for the autonomy of Ardeal according to the model provided by the relations between Hungary and Croatia. He requested to enforce the laws adopted by the Sibiu diet in 1863-1864 and to summon the Transylvania diet according to the procedures suggested by the Romanians at the Cluj diet in 1865. The statement and the few articles published in the "Federatiunea" magazine would bring about the withdrawal of parliamentary immunity followed by a press trial then imprisonment at Vat prison for one year and a 500 florins fine.

As settled with Iranyi Daniel, the leader of the left wing group in the Hungarian Parliament, Alexandru Roman tried to support a joint law project referring to equal rights of nationalities in the Empire. The project was generally according to the one elaborated

by the nationalities troika represented by Anton Mocioni, Stefan Branovatzky and Svetozar Miletici, members of the law elaboration sub-commission. It mentioned the division of Hungary into six regnicolar nations: Hungarians, Romanians, Slovaks, Germans, Serbians and Ruthenians led by a "national university" with a "national leader" appointed by the Emperor. However, their endeavour was prevented by the opposition of the Democrat Party (Păcăţianu, 1913: 6).

Then, Pacatian analyzed in detail each field of socio-economic and political life in the Empire particularly criticizing it. He disavowed the content of electoral law for different treatment referring to electoral rights of citizens of different ethnicity in Ardeal as compared to other citizens in Hungary by limiting Romanians' rights to exert power in the state despite the fact that they were a majority in that part of the country.

As far as election campaigns and their development were concerned, Pacatian largely described electoral corruption of the Hungarian candidates appointed in electoral areas inhabited by Romanians, the abuse of local authorities to such a level "that only head in hand can the citizen venture in electoral fights and elections have acquired the image of a civil war" (Păcăţianu, 1913: 489).

As far as the "memorandist" movement was concerned, from 28 March 1892, when the delegation of "the 300" went to Vienna to forward the "Memorandum" to the Emperor, to the time when the Cluj trial brought to the Romanian leaders began in May 1894, there were several anti-Romanian manifestations led by the Hungarian authorities for two years stirring up violence, others started by citizens of Hungarian ethnicity, particularly the elite using less educated people. There were also aggressive riots of loose mobs, such as the case of Turda, where enraged Hungarians destroyed Ioan Ratiu's house endangering his and his family's lives (Dumitriu, no 6/2004).

The 21st October edition of the Oradea daily newspaper of Hungarian language harshly criticised the attitude of Vasile Lucaciu – as Teodor Nes put it in his monograph – who had the "nerve" to introduce his solicitor into Romanian to the court of Debrecen: "would he hope this ignorance concerning the language of the state would be tolerated? wondered the Hungarian journalist – and yet he did it, as he was fiercely urged by the demon to come to the foreground, so that he can no longer have a proper understanding of the aim or means, or make a connection between the two" – he ironically carried on. The journalist went even further accusing all Romanians of the "sin" of following their leaders whom – he stressed – they consider "great smart hero men" without being aware of the "void they are pushed to: This people has no idea of what they are doing as they allow to be used by exalted big-mouth people" – he concluded. In order to underline the negative role of Vasile Lucaciu, he mentioned that he was suspended as a consequence of his conflict with the Uniate Bishop Pavel, a measure taken under the pressure of the authorities, as it was subsequently shown (Nagyvárad, anul XXIV, nr. 180, 6 August 1893: 1). In his opinion, the sole explanation of the fierce attitude shown by the Romanians was mainly the support coming from Bucharest. "These gentlemen would not dare act so bravely if the Romanian Government had not been behind them and favour the invasion of martyrs emigrating from Hungary", he concluded (Nagyvárad, anul XXII, nr. 292, 21 October 1892: 1).

The following meeting in Sibiu triggered once again a violent reaction of the Hungarian inhabitants from Oradea. On the 22nd of July, several groups of "patriots" assaulted the Romanian institutions in the city, as well as the houses of Romanian intellectuals causing serious material damage. The attacks focused on the building of the Romanian Uniate Bishopric breaking its windows (Neş, 1937: 175-176).

Just like Teodor V. Pacatian, Teodor Nes proceeded to enumerate the events during which the leaders of the Romanian national movement faced the intolerance of the Hungarian administration. Yet he focused on local history or leaders coming from the western counties in Transylvania by using arguments provided by memorialistics and the Hungarian press.

Aside from the claimed historical right over the territories detached from Hungary and the claimed tolerance towards cohabiting nationalities, another aspect often used by the Hungarian historians related to the claimed breech of the plebiscite character of the disintegration process of the territory of former Hungary on national criteria. For instance, Francis Deac printed in New York in 1942 a volume dedicated to the Paris Peace Conference taking over a series of considerations on the topic issued by some western historians and political analyses of the time, such as Sarah Wambaugh, who considered that after the St. Germain Treaty only Slovenians in Carinthia were consulted through plebiscite and that they were against joining the new Southern Slav state choosing to remain within the boundaries of the Austrian state (Wambaugh, 1933: 163, apud Deak, 1942: 225).

Even though the example of Slovenians in Austria was not enough argument supporting the principle of the new European *status quo* proclaimed in Paris, the Hungarian historian used it to support the injustice made to Hungary when territories inhabited by Slovaks, Romanians and Serbians were taken away despite the requests of the Hungarian delegation representatives to organise ballots similar to the one in Carinthia.

On the basis of information published by the American analyst H.W.V. Temperley, he blamed the French Prime Minister Millerand for all faults as he had publicly stated on the 5th of May 1920 that such plebiscite acts would not be necessary on the Hungarian territories inhabited by other nationalities as their results would be much different than realities already considered and settled by peace treaties. "As far as the issue of plebiscite is concerned, the Central Powers consider it necessary only when they undoubtedly consider that these consultancies are characterised by a complete guarantee of electors' honesty and that they will not lead to significant difference as compared to their conclusions after a thorough survey of ethnographic realities and national aspirations" – the French Prime Minister would have said (Temperley, 1921: 422).

Deac's argument was simple: the cause of Hungary's disaster was rooted in the lack of respect shown by the winners regarding the principles they had imposed themselves in Paris, and the effects of the "crime" were materialised by territorial annexes of which succesoral states took advantage. "Although the Monarchy has been destroyed on behalf of the principle of people's self-determination, it has been grossly violated in practice, as no nationality living in the empire has not expressed as such through a plebiscite", concluded the author (Deak, 1942: 226).

He then turned to statistical arguments to insert one of Winston Churchill's remarks referring to the new "paradoxical" political configuration of Central Europe in the evidence. Thus, out of the 52 million inhabitants of the former dualist monarchy, 38 millions got to live in the so-called winning countries. In other words, only the populations of Austria, with 6,289,380 inhabitants, and Hungary, with 7,615,117 inhabitants, were considered to be defeated, an "absurd" situation determining the future British Prime Minister compare it with "two soldiers serving together one cause, with the dangers and sufferings brought about by war; at the end of the war, they each return to their village; yet, in the meantime, a border has been traced between them and one

becomes a miserable defeated happy to have lived the winner's revenge, while the other turns into one of the winners" (Churchill, 1929: 231-232).

It is true that neither in the future Kingdom of the Serbians, Croats and Slovenians nor in the future Republic of Czechoslovakia were organised plebiscite actions, as the leaders of the peoples considered that they were not necessary, as their national will had been clearly expressed by the whole range of antimonarchist political events they had been involved into until the beginning of WWI.

Yet the author was wrong concerning Transylvania. The leaders of the Romanian national movement managed to draw up popular adhesion lists legitimating the presence of the delegation at the Great Assembly in Alba Iulia as they were aware of the traps involved by such carelessness.

Roman Ciorogariu was the first to contradict the allegations of the rulers in Budapest according to whom the plebiscite character of the act of union of the Transylvanian Romanians with their brothers in the Kingdom had been breached before the Romanians leaders managed to provide written evidence, that is, "credentials" list of church, cultural and people's institutions delegates from Transylvanian counties mainly inhabited by Romanians. "In the hall, the 1,200 delegates from churches, cultural and people's institutions, on glittering galleries and outside, on Horea's plain, 100,000 peasants led by their priests and teachers under their national flags waiting for the new freedom gospel" (Ciorogariu, 1994: 71), accounted the Orthodox vicar of Oradea.

The unity of will of all Romanians from Ardeal was underlined by the author in the fragment describing the enthusiasm of the masses at the moment when Iosif Jumanca announced the unconditioned adhesion of the socialists to the act of union. "His statement on behalf of the Romanian socialists read by Goldis that they join the act of union, as they are first Romanians and then socialists is covered by a roar of applauses even louder than before" remembered Ciorogariu (Ciorogariu, 1994: 71).

He resumed the issue in the chapter introducing the terror installed by the Szekler troops in the spring of 1919 against the Romanian people in Bihor, particularly against the Romanian leaders of opinion, such as priests, schoolmasters and lawyers. Due to the visit of Colonel Trousseau to Oradea, where he went to observe the state of facts on the territories beyond the line settled in Beograd, a delegation of the Romanians from Bihor went to the officer to describe the crimes and atrocities committed by the Hungarian troops in the county and argued their complaints with minutes elaborated during the investigations carried out on the spot and with a map showing the places concerned.

Upon the colonel's request, the secretary of the Orthodox Vicariate of Oradea, Dr. A. Magieru, showed on the map the approximate "expansion of the Romanians west from Oradea and begs him to abort the plan to sacrifice Oradea with the territory in the west, which would contradict Wilson's national principle", as Ciorogariu pointed out (Ciorogariu, 1994: 122). Trousseau replied that such a request would vex the Hungarian authorities that were firm in requesting a local plebiscite.

Inspired and fully justified, Magieru explained to the officer that such a plebiscite had already been organised in Alba Iulia on the 1st of December 1918 and that the Romanians from Bihor had expressed their irrevocable wish to join Romania. "A plebiscite under Hungarian authority, even under the supervision of allied army, does not provide any guarantee on the freedom of the plebiscite as it would still be under the terror of the Hungarian administration", he added (Ciorogariu, 1994: 122).

In other words, the Hungarian historians invoking the breech of the right to plebiscite on the territories concerned made subjectively and exclusively reference to the

inability of local Hungarian administrations in those areas to organise ballots controlled and coordinated by their clerks under the threat of the Szekler bayonets and to prevent the free expression of this right. Ciorogariu's memories fully showed the real face of the "democracy" in Budapest after the proclamation of the republic. An example in point would be the 41st army attacks of the Hungarian military in Oradea against the places of Romanians and in certain villages, all with casualties and material damage under the auspices of the truce (Ciorogariu, 1994: 104-115).

The interwar Hungarian historians also used economic arguments. It is true that the fall of monarchy had negative effects on Hungary's economy. Its great internal market and economic balance suddenly disappeared. Many factories were devoid of traditional sales markets or raw material because of the infrastructure that remained on the succesoral territories.

Moreover, Trianon added even more difficulties. For instance, the new borders divided the basins of 24 flood control centres. As Czechoslovakia and Romania refused to cooperate, Hungary was exposed to flooding having no means of defence. In the opinion of the historian Stephen D. Kertesz, the situation could have been solved through some small border adjustments if the Hungarian experts had been consulted during the Conference, and the country would not have been subject to huge expenses and labour force for building dams. Pressure was also caused by the waves of refuges, about 350,000 of them, coming from the other territories and encouraging the revisionist spirit on a social level (Kertesz, 1982: 49).

Against the background of economic collapse in Hungary, one of the theses approached by the Hungarian magnates at the Paris Peace Conference was based on the consequences of the agrarian reform in Transylvania proclaimed on the 1st of December 1928 which would have disfavoured the landowners of Hungarian origin in their opinion.

Yet the reality of the pre-war agrarian economy was completely different from what they presented in Paris. The statistics of the time show that Romanian ethnics had more than half of the territory in the countryside only in the counties of Fagaras, Bistrita-Nasaud, Alba Inferioara, Hunedoara, Sibiu, Solnoc-Dobaca, Turda-Aries, and Caras-Severin, while the Hungarians owned more than half of the agrarian territories of the counties of Ciuc, Odorhei, Trei Scaune, Mures-Turda, and Cluj, while the Saxons of Transylvania owned land in the counties of Tarnava Mare, Sibiu, Timis, Tarnava Mica, Torontal, and Bistrita in Transylvania and Banat.

The 1895 census showed that in Transylvania and Banat there were only 209 Romanians owning small or midsize land exploitations, out of which only 35 were great landowners, while in the counties of Bistrita-Nasaud, Brasov and Odorhei there was none. Besides, Romanians had only small properties. In other words, over 66% of small property belonged to the Romanians, while the Hungarians had lots of over 100 yokes, particularly lands of 1,000 yokes and exclusively lands covering a surface of over 20,000 yokes (Venczel, 1942: 41).

Only great landowners were discontent, as the declared principles of agrarian reform were fully democratic and according to the progressive trend spreading in all succesoral countries of the empire. Expropriation and appropriation aimed both Romanian and Hungarian inhabitants in Transylvania with no discrimination pursuing "the promotion of social levelling and production strengthening".

This principle was subsequently used in the law project voted on 19 August 1919 by the Great National Assembly of Transylvania, Banat and Hungarian Countries, as well as in the political programme released on 24 April 1920 by the Romanian National Party, according

to Victor Jinga (Jinga, 1995: 485). It utterly contradicted the principle expressed by Banffy Erno in September 1913 at a farmer meeting. "We do not want to consider our fellow countrymen of other languages as enemies but in point of land possession, we have to consider them as our enemies and consequently we have to be organised"(Pesti Hirlap, 1913).

A general picture of expropriations and appropriations carried out due to the agrarian reform in Transylvania as compared to the situation under the dualist rule shows that 978,253 yokes were taken from the Hungarian landowners, that is, the main landowners, then 32,320 yokes from Germans, and 55,762 yokes from Romanians. This surface was subsequently divided amongst poor peasants as follows: 66% to Romanians, 33% to Hungarians and 1% to Germans. It was somehow proportional to the presence of these ethnics in Transylvania, as 58% Romanians, 24% Hungarians and 10% Germans lived there at the time (Atlas Statistique, 1938: 75).

The agrarian reform started by the Romanian rulers contradicted a similar action attempted by governments succeeding in post-war Hungary with disastrous effects. The interwar period did not bring the expected reform to the structure of the Hungarian agrarian economy. On 11 January 1919, the Earl Karolyi Mihalyi Government announced their intent to start an agrarian reform by expropriating properties covering a surface of over 285 hectares, which was little for the Hungarian agriculture. Because of that, the average land covered a surface of only 2.9 hectares; in some areas of the country, it only covered 0.8 – 1.1 hectares (Petö, Szakács, 1985: 37-45).

Unlike its neighbours, Hungary did not start another agrarian reform after WWI. Kun Bela's communist Government committed one of the most serious errors by not giving land to the peasants, an error finally leading to the victory of the "White Terror". The Hungarian revolutionaries declared that there would be no redistribution of land as they would turn great land properties into "collective agricultural cooperatives", a solution that did not fit peasants' aspirations.

It is a paradox that the single communist regime in Central and Eastern Europe preserved the old feudal relations considering that agricultural production lowered to over 40% as compared to pre-war production. According to the Hungarian historian Varjassy, "Hungarian aristocracy owes it to Bela Kun, as he made it possible to preserve the feudal system and revive the oligarchic reactions. As a sign of gratefulness, they should erect a statue in one of the most beautiful squares in Budapest." (Varjassy, 1934: 94)

Agrarian reform in Romania and implicitly in Transylvania was enforced in the spirit of western European laws that was also present in the Constitution. It meant a fair and previous compensation paid to expropriated landowners; the financial operations for payment were carried out at the Agrarian Bank in Cluj. Moreover, those unsatisfied with the expansion of expropriated lands or with the assessed price could turn to the Court of Appeals in the counties where they had the property.

Nevertheless, there was a group of Hungarian great landowners, also known as the "choosers" in historical literature because they chose to keep their Hungarian citizenship and live in Hungary. According to the law, they were not supposed to be compensated; they received compensations and then they were discontent and put the Romanian state on trial in international lawsuit. According to Victor Jinga, there were about 200 of them. He saw this initiative as a first attempt to revise the Trianon Treaty. "The fiercest fighters against our agrarian reform were the almost 200 Hungarian great landowners integrally expropriated as they were 'absent', according to law; they also arraigned the provisions of the Romanian Constitution, according to which foreigners cannot acquire and preserve rural properties in Romania, that would be a violation of peace treaties (...) This has been

the first bold attempt to revise the Trianon Treaty; thus, it was first a political, then a legal-economic aim that was pursued"(Jinga, 1995: 491-492).

The action of the Hungarian magnates was qualified in the same manner by another witness of the time, the jurist Onisifor Ghibu. He made the connection with similar attempts against Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, that is, other succesoral countries. "Thus, the choosers' lawsuit was an extraordinarily clever attempt of the revisionists to keep in check public opinion worldwide for as long as possible on the issue of Hungary. According to them, it had been unjustly mutilated. They were convinced that in time they would earn people's sympathy to achieve their dream to rebuild the old Hungary", stated Ghibu (Titulescu, 1986: 183).

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CONSIDERATIONS ON THE SITUATION OF THE JEWS FROM ROMANIA AND HUNGARY DURING THE YEARS 1945-1953

Anca OLTEAN[*]

Abstract. *The Jews from Romania and Hungary hoped that the installation of communism will put an end to the discriminations they had to bear in the past which culminated with the Holocaust. In a few years they realized that communism will not improve their situation and a lot of them chose to emigrate in Israel, especially in Romania. In Hungary, much more Jews chose to integrate in the communist state and not to emigrate.*

Keywords: *Jews, Romania, Hungary, communism, assimilation, emigration*

Introduction

Marx expressed his point of view on Jewish question considering that the emancipation of Jews in modern society meant the separation from Judaism (Wistricht, 1982: 25). In the conception of Marx to be a Jew meant to accept the religion of money and human progress had to be achieved after the end of this religion (Wistricht, 1982: 26). Marx was aware that the process of emancipation of Jewry manifested in the framework of capitalist society which he considered governed by private property and selfish interests. In several occasions, Marx manifested his critical opinion about the Jews. They became an interesting topic only by giving up to the quality of Jews.

The author Robert S. Wistricht explains that the orientation of Jewry towards radical ideas and towards socialism began at the end of XIX century, after 1870, and gives the example of German Jewry of leftist orientation and which get involved in Social Democrat Party. A lot of Jews who joined SPD were not of Marxist orientation and approached the social democrats from humanitarian considerations towards the oppressed social classes and because of their ideal to build a better society. What was interesting (Wistricht, 1982: 75) at Jews of leftist orientation was that they rejected their Jewish affiliation as Marx did it. The involvement of Jews in leftist movements was underlined by other authors[1].

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[*] Researcher, Institute of Euroregional Studies, Faculty of History, Geography and International Relations, University of Oradea, Romania. E-mail: oltean@igri.ro

[1] Stanislaw Krajevski, *Jews, communism and the Jewish Communists*: "Most Jews who left the closed traditional communities tended to support political radicalism. If they did not choose Zionism, they supported the revolutionary left. Sometimes both. Secular Yiddish culture was predominantly leftist. What is even more relevant, Jews were important in communist movements. They were important among revolutionary leaders, both before and after the seizure of power by the communists". Also, Raphael Patai in the work *The Jews of Hungary. History, culture, psychology*, Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 1996, p. 605, asserts that they were more social democrats and communists among the Jews than among the rest of the population. The Jews, considers the same author, were more receptive to ideas and movements who brought the change in social order.

The Jews from Romania and Hungary during the years 1945-1953

Communism allowed a new emancipation of Jewry to the extent to which it was disposed to give up to the religion and traditional values, but also to the quality of member of Jewish community. The communism allowed the affirmation of some Jews but the situation of Jewish community was in danger. Stanislaw Krajewski shows that anti-Semites exaggerated the involvement of Jews in communism and considered it a Jewish creation implemented and imported exclusively by the Jews. Maybe because this anti-Semitism which some of us show in the interpretation of historical facts, is a consequence of disputes from the past or of a precarious culture from communist times when what was not Romanian was put under question mark. The examination of the role played by communist Jews, bring us to the point to see our part of responsibility. Because there were also a lot of Romanians who took advantage of communist governments, so as there were a lot of victims both on our side, but also of the Jews, among the political dissidents or political prisoners which worked on Dunăre - Marea Neagră chanell.

Holocaust affected the whole Jewry totally. They were a lot of people who, after the war, lost their families, especially among the Jews. Communism needed these people who lost their roots, to form them in its own style and to use them. The Jewish street was a place which communism tried to conquer[2]. On the other side, while for majority of Romanian and Hungarian population the presence of Russians was a reason of fear, for the Jews this was a liberation because of the fact that Hitler and Stalin were in opposite camps. A lot of the Jews who became communist in the years 1950, believed in a moral setting right of the societies from these two countries, Romania and Hungary, by adopting communism. In a interview given to the magazine *Observator cultural*, professor Ion Ianoşi asserts the enthousiasm which he had in these years for leftist ideologies: „I had the hope, after 1944, in a setting right of historical and social climate. Even for minorities. I was double minoritarian. I was a Jew, and at home we were speaking Hungarian. After that, I became a Romanian intellectual by my own decision" (Safirman, Volovici, 2007: 163) [transl. A.O].

Reffering to the question to which we try to find an answer, namely the Jewish contribution to the construction of communism, we consider that, professor Ianoşi give a moderate answer and close to reality: „The Jews will be blamed in the same time or alternatively – for creating both the capitalism and socialism. Them would have created the selfish capitalism, and, in the same time, would have dominated radical socialism. Both assertions are true (partial and complex), and, by absolutizations false" (Safirman, Volovici, 2007: 169) [transl.A.O]. On the other side, it must be remembered the Jews who falled victims of communist regime, not few, aspect which is asserted by Leon Volovici: „Paradoxically, during communist period, when the Jews of Romania got away of the fear of Holocaust, when they had their own state, the Jews entered <<with equal rights>> in the new society, at all levels from the superior hierarchy of party and in repressive structures, in Security, in Police etc., in the same time, the Jews gave a big number of political dissidents, both as Zionists and as representatives of class enemy, both as ex-communists and <<members of Nomenklature>> falled into disgrace as <<deviationists>> or <<saboteurs>>. Others are <<imperialist agents>>, accused of liberal sympathies or for sympathies for National Party of Peasants or even, some of them, of collaboration with

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[2] The fact that the Jews who lost family ties were a target for communists was also shown by Stanislaw Krajevski, *op.cit.*

Antonescu" (Safirman, Volovici, 2007: 104). Also, other authors describe the difficult situation in which the Jews were in the communist states from Eastern Europe[3].

It must be remembered that the years which followed after the war were the time when Romanian state tried to make justice to the Jews by the processes directed against the war criminals which took place in the tribunals from Iasi and Bucharest. There were also imperfections of this try to make justice, quite some of the guilty persons succeeded not to be condemned, others were condemned and later rehabilitated and became even members of Romanian Communist Party (Friling, Ioanid, Ionescu: 2005). But, it was succeeded the cleaning of the Romanian state of Nazi reminiscences, and this aspect created for the Jews a proper framework for integration in the society which the communists wanted to create[4]. Anti-Semitism was eliminated in the years which followed the war, but it reappeared in public life because of the fight of Stalin against cosmopolitans and anti-Zionism manifested in the last years of his life. This politics reverberates in all communist block. The topic of Holocaust was ignored by communist historiography because of its ethnocentric logic and because of the lack of allocation of a role for the history of minorities in the national history (Friling, Ioanid, Ionescu; 2005: 345).

There are also opinions according to which Jewish community from Romania was privileged in the years which followed after the Second World War. Thus, Mioara Anton asserts: "On the other hand, Hungarian and Jewish minority evolved from the condition of victims of war to the condition of great beneficiaries" (Anton, 2006: 237). She considered that the Jews and Hungarians joined Romanian Communist Party and that "the unity of working class, independent of nationality, represents the antithesis of nationalism" (Anton,

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[3] Nicholas Bauquet et François Bocholier (dir), *Le communisme et des élites en Europe Centrale*, Presses Universitaires de France, 2006, p. 30 shows the precarious condition of the Jewish elites from Central Europe during communist domination: "En premier lieu, les tragédies de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale ont amorcé des processus de destruction sociale et physique de pans entiers des élites locales: extermination des élites juives, qui prive ces sociétés d'une partie notable de leurs élites économiques et culturelles; politiques systématiques de repression voire de liquidation d'élites susceptibles de constituer l'épine dorsale d'une résistance nationale, comme dans la Pologne soumise à la double domination stalinienne et hitlérienne; expulsions massives des Allemands de Pologne et de Tchécoslovaquie en 1945. Ici plus qu'ailleurs, les violences de la stalinisation ne font que prolonger un long cycle de violence et de repression dont le massacre de Katyn constitue un des épisodes particulièrement saillants".

[4] In ensemble, the Work *Raport Final (Final Report)* elaborated by the International Commission for the study of Holocaust in Romania shows the positive aspects of the end of the processes directed against war criminals: "Above the possible hesitations, above some errors in the course of the processes, of some inclinations towards politization, especially in the group Antonescu, the processes of war criminals were led in a legal framework. This can not be today not taken into consideration, so it suggests the ones who try to rehabilitate persons accused in these processes, on the ground that there were processes directed and made by communists. The processes enrolled in a coherent political context and post war logic and had a legal base similar with the process of Nurnberg. This institutional framework was inspired on one hand by valid international legislation concerning the war and situations of war, but also on the adhesion of the victors to values and principles specific to peace and humanism.

A special element which must be underlined in this context is the fact that the processes analyzed individual faults, a basic feature of any state of law and did not rely on collective guilt. The element of change is the fact that these processes demonstrated that not only the one who push on the trigger is guilty of crime, but also these persons who prepare politically and institutionally the context in which discrimination and mass crime, on ethnical, political and racial criteria become reality". [transl. A.O] (*Raport final*, p. 337)

2006: 238). We consider that this unity was not genuine taking into consideration the way in which communism was imposed, at least in the first years after the war. Among the Jews there were a lot of people who brought the progress of the societies where they lived and surely these people could not be satisfied by the restrained universe of Romanian state. And when they had the occasion, they emigrated to a large extent to Israel, where not only that they built socialism so as some communist leaders would have wanted, but they also contributed to the construction of their own democratic state. Their wish to emigrate was so high that they renounced to their jobs of superior level and even at their houses which were confiscated by the state, only because they wanted to go to Israel.

In Hungary, Raphael Patai (Patai, 1996: 597) considers that the Jews did not trust Hungarians, and they did not believe that Hungarians are no more anti-Semite and the reality was that there were a lot anti-Semite Hungarians after the war. This aspect was due to the repressions suffered by the Jews during Holocaust. The Hungarian Jews were better educated than the Hungarian ethnics (Patai, 1996) and this created the premises to get important jobs. Both in Romania, and in Hungary, there were frictions between Hungarian owners and the non-Jews who wanted to keep the houses which they succeed to get in fascist period. There are proves that also after the war, anti-Semitism continued to exist. In Hungary, anti-Semite manifestations reached the situations of pogroms. In time, after the war, the Jews from Romania and Hungary assimilated getting closer to Romanian culture, respectively Hungarian, getting involved in politics or entering in dialogue with the majority. We can say that both in Romania and in Hungary[5] the Jews had the wish to be the same like the majority of population and hence their wish to assimilate. The assimilation was achieved by change of names, mixed marriages or by passing to Christian religion. Harry Kuller describes very well this variation of the Jews between integration and emigration, this expectations or reticence which the Jews of Romania had towards the communism[6].

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[5] Raphael Patai (Patai, p. 604) considers that Hungarian Jews had the wish to be the same like Hungarian people and a consequence of this aspect is their wish to integrate after the war. We consider that this assertion is true also in the case of Romania, but the assimilation to Romanian culture and society did not stop the process of emmigration of Romanian Jews.

[6] Harry Kuller in the work "Evreii in anii tranziţiei spre comunism (1944-1948)"/ The Jews in the years of transition to communism (1944-1948) in Acad. Nicolae Cajal, Dr. Harry Kuller (coord), *Contribuţia evreilor din România la cultură şi civilizaţie,* Ed. Hasefer, Buc, 2004, p. 155 describes the moral and soul state of Romanian Jewry after the war: „After August 23 1944, a great part of Jewish bourgeoisie had the ilusion, for a while, that „Americans are coming". The Jewish communists, in opposition, embraced the communist-intellectualist ideal. Americans did not come when they were waited for and communism was not built in Romania and elsewhere, according to the expectations. The majority of Romanian Jewry which was formed from a larger category, overwhelmed by the numerous and heavy dayly burdens was oscillating between integration and emigration (...)

The years 1945-1949 were, in consequence, years of expectations and confruntations – between organisms and organisations, between their leaders, followed by larger or smallers groups. A state of democracy, some would say; paradoxically the general social-political current did not lead towards democracy. At horison it appeared a socialism of Soviet type; there were Jews who wanted it, others who tried to avoid it, making compromise until they achieved their aim, until the emigration; last but not least a considerable number decided to remain in the place where they were born „in worse, or in good times". None of the above mentioned categories did not „bring" socialism in Romania. But they did not stop its coming, because it would have been impossible". [transl. A.O.]

For the Hungarian Jews the coming of Red Army was a moment of liberation which put end to deportations. Both in Romania and in Hungary, the local inhabitants feared of Soviet occupation. The different perception of Soviet occupation determined the fact that the Jews did not perceive the communism as a disaster, at least at the beginning (Patai, 1996: 617). Raphael Patai explains that, in contrast with Nazi genocide, the communist view with regard to Jews was more open and non-violent. The communists tried to assimilate the Jews, to make them subordinated citizens of Hungarian state and to make them to renounce to the condition of Jews, to these particular elements which made the Hungarian Jews to be different from Hungarians. If the Jews suffered more in communist period, it was because among the Jews there were more elements of bourgeoisie than among Hungarians (Patai, 1996: 618). The Jewish life almost did not survived in Hungary after the war. The Hungarian Jews were often discriminated, the ones who did not obeyed to communism or economic and cultural elites were deported, it was forbidden to them to emigrate or their community or religious life was destroyed[7]. In the communist view, the Jewish question was a product of capitalism and had no utility in communist society. Communism tried to destroy cultural differences, to assimilate national minorities.

On the other side, the cosmopolitan spirit of the Jews and their wish to maintain the connection with other Jews from Israel and other states of free world were forbidden. The creation of the state of Israel was perceived with a lot of reticence by Hungarian communists, and the situation became more hostile in the same time with the advance of Stalinist anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe. As in Romania, also in Hungary the Zionist leaders were persecuted.

The Hungarian Jews who returned from deportation were around 160000 - 190000 (Fejto, 2000: 282). We attach a table regarding the number of deported persons returned from deportation registered by National Committee for the Care of Deported Persons. The people who returned from deportation chose to assimilate in the new Hungarian state[8]. They suffered more profound traumas than the Jews of Romania. They were attracted by the universalism and proletarian solidarity promoted by communists. It is sometimes difficult to understand why the Hungarian Jews decided to collaborate with Hungarians to the edification of socialist state, why they chose to assimilate when they suffered so much[9]. And that happened because the instauration of communism meant for them the separation of an older past when the Jews were persecuted.

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[7] Raphael Patai shows that the number of Hungarian Jews after Holocaust was 100 000. Gyurgyák János, *A Zsidókérdés Magyarországon*, Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2001, p. 581 shows that after the census from 1946, the number of the Jews on the territory of Hungary was about 165.330 of Jews, but considers that the data were not complete because a lot of Jews did not declared themselves Jews, especially in the Province. The same author provides us the data of the census from 1949 which registered 133, 862 of Hungarian citizens of Jewish religion and 101.259 of them had lived in Budapest.

[8] Romcsics Ignác, *op. cit.* shows that the adherence of Jews to Communist Party was due to their difficult experience when, during Holocaust, the whole Hungarian society mobilized against them. For the Hungarian Jews shows, Romcsics Ignác, the Red Army and USSR were liberating them and felt towards them gratitude. They felt that, in communism, their identity was protected. So, the Jews increased the ranks of Communist Party.

[9] Assimilation had as finality also to get closer of Hungarian culture. There were a considerable number of writers of Jewish origin who became important names in Hungarian culture. Such writers were Kertész Imre, Konrád György, Nádas Péter. In communist period, the majority of Hungarian

Number of returned Jews from Deportation in Hungary   **Table 1**

Time	Number of returned Jews
Before April 30, 1945	9000
May	12 758
June	25 678
July	14 759
August	9909
September	5550
October	2859
November	1131
December	500
Total for 1945	**82 144**
January 1946	166
February	108
March	102
April	84
May	116
June	161
July	201
August	93
September	156
Total for 1946	**1187**
Total combined for 1946 and 1945	**83 331**

Source: Hungarian Jewish Archives. Documents of National Committee for the care of Deported Persons, L 4/6. Apud Tamás Stark, *Hungarian Jews during the Holocaust and after the Second World War, 1939-1949: A statistical review*, East European Monographs, Boulder, distributed by Columbia University Press, New York, 2000, p. 79.

Stephen J. Roth (Roth, 1997: 733-753) shows that in Hungary, after the war, the Jews who survived the Holocaust were compensated. The principal measure, shows Roth, was the decree 200/1945 M.E. from March 17 1945 which stipulated that the deprivations of property from fascist period were discriminatory and declared null the deprivation of rights. The agricultural and horticultural property was not returned if it did enter under provisions of agrarian reform and of nationalization of land. (Decree 600/1945, Law VI from 1945). But also other goods could not have been recuperated such as mobile goods, equipments, the stocks of Jewish factories and shops were destroyed, deposits of money lost their value as a consequence of inflation, and the goods taken over by Nazis were never returned. In November 15 1946 was created a National Jewish Fond of Rehabilitation which inherited the goods of the Jews who died in Holocaust and which were not the subject of above mentioned laws[10].

Jews had the tendency to hide that they were Jews, wanted to be considered the same as Hungarians, wished to be no reason of discrimination or difference.

[10] From the Jewish community from Oradea, we have the information that in Romania was created a Fond of Jewish Property administered by Jewish Community from Romania. For instance, a great part of the houses of the ones who died during Holocaust were administered by Jewish Community, but existed also exceptions.

The new installed communist regime from Hungary needed new personnel with a good education. The Jews were more educated than Hungarians and could take the jobs from state administration. More than that, they were people who were not compromised during fascist regime and they fit to the system (Fejto, 1957: 283). The perspective of joining the new regime, saved the Jews from the shock of loosing their property. The Hungarian Jewry took part more than Hungarians in administration and governance.

The wealthy Jews had to bear the same persecutions as Hungarian bourgeoisie[11]. They were deported to the same extent. This is why when we try to evaluate the role of the Jews in communist system, we do not have to leave aside also the Jews who were oppressed by communists. In order to assimilate, several Jews passed to Christian religion.

Jews from Budapest who changed their religion   **Table 2**

	Number of Jews who changed their religion according to:		
Year	Churches which received them	Statistical Office from Budapest	Jewish Communities
1934	352	732	-
1935	363	890	775
1936	454	1141	1128
1937	377	1058	1088
1938	2211	6127	3956
1939	1495	3558	1626
1940	936	1866	2533
1941	643	1607	1733
1942	926	2052	2173
1943	674	1061	1060
1944	5521	-	3385
1945	388	-	261
1946	326	-	282
1947	247	-	-
1948	167	-	-
1949	61	-	-
1950/1955	32	-	-
1956	42	-	-
1957	101	-	-

Source: Viktor Karády, Traumahatás és menekülés [The effect of trauma and evadation] in *Múlt és Jövö* 1994/2 Apud Tamás Stark, *Hungarian Jews during the Holocaust and after the Second World War, 1939-1949: A statistical review*, East European Monographs, Boulder, distributed by Columbia University Press, New York, 2000, p. 84.

The ones who chose to dissimilate were few. The most pregnant form of dissimilation was Zionism. However, the number of the ones who chosed immigration, was much smaller in Hungary than in Romania[12]. Emigration was possible after 1945 and

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[11] Kovács András, Zsidosag az 1945. A zsidókérdés a mai magyar társadalomban, in *1100 Evés Együttélés)The life together during 1100 years)*, 2001, p. 14 shows that among the population of Hungary which was sent to Gulag, the Jews represented 30%.

[12] The Zionist movement activated in Hungary also during Holocaust when it was achieved the rescue of a number of Jews. Fejto Ferenc, *op. cit*., asserts that during 1945-1947 left Hungary, 28 103 Jews. When ceased its existence (13 III, 1949), the communists considered its members as the fascists of

for a short time. Also for a short time the zionist movement enjoyed liberty of action. In 1949 a radical change of Hungarian state took place towards zioism and zionist organizations were forced to end their activity. The zionist leaders were arrested. Zionism was now condamned as a consequence of a press campaign[13]. These events took place in the context of a change in the attitude of USSR towards the Jews which reverberated in all communist space. So, in 1948, when the state of Israel was formed, Soviet Union was the first state which acknowledged it. But when it became obvious the pro-Occident attitude of Israel, USSR changed its politics. Starting with 1948, antisionist manifestations took place in Poland and Romania. In Hungary, antizionist propaganda was sustained by the press. The Slanski trial from Czechoslovakia and white gown affaires from URSS, marked in the communist block the pick of anti-Semite politics.

The ones who assimilated hoped that communist party could settle the discriminations to which they were subjected in previous times and during the Holocaust. The ones who assimilated realized later the mistake which they did embracing communism. They tried to assimilate to the Hungarians and talked no more about the fact that they were Jews.

The Jews from Romania and Hungary had to bear the same regime as national ethnics. Their community life was affected during communism and a lot of them assimilated. The ones who emigrated, in a larger number in Romania than in Hungary, were looking to have their own state and were not satisfied with the life in a communist state.

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Szalasi and arrested them. Also in Hungary and in Romania took place antizionist trials. Raphael Patai, *op.cit.,* shows that between the years 1945-1947 left Hungary between one third and a quarter from Hungarian Jews who survived in Hungary, 28 000 in Israel and together with the ones emigrated in Western Europe and overseas, the total number of emigrants was 56 000 of Jews. Gyurgyák János, *op.cit*, shows that during the years 1945 and 1947 approximatively 60 000 of Jews chose the path of emigration.

[13] Gyurgyák János, *op.cit*, p. 588. Also in Romania the Zionists were persecuted by the communists starting with the year 1949. All the communist block was influenced by Stalin's antisemite politics during the last years of his life.

Raphael Patai (1996), *The Jews of Hungary. History, culture, psychology*, Wayne State University Press, Detroit.

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LE DESTIN DE L'HISTORIEN ET HOMME POLITIQUE SILVIU DRAGOMIR DANS LA ROUMANIE COMMUNISTE

Sorin ŞIPOŞ[*]

Abstract. *The ending of the Second World War didn't bring the Romanians the peace they wanted so much. For Silviu Dragomir, the Romanian historian deeply involved in the political life of King Carol II's authoritarian regime, it meant the loss of his academic position and some years of detention in the communist prisons. In Romania, under various pretexts, the intellectual and academic elite suffered perhaps the worst attacks in its history from the communists. Silviu Dragomir and the other political prisoners remained imprisoned at Sighet until 5th of July 1955 when some of them were set free while others were transferred yet to other prisons. According to a phone record number 4/39374 of 9.06.1955 sent by Bucharest Penitentiaries and Concentration Camps Division to the Sighet penitentiary, it was requested that the prisoner Silviu Dragomir be immediately freed.*
Silviu Dragomir made a timid return to the scientific activity in 1955 when he was first a freelance and later on a researcher in ordinary at the Institute of History and Archaeology, Cluj-Napoca. These were difficult times for the professor: with almost no financial resources as his state pension had been annulled by the government, evacuated from his house on Mikó street. Fortunately his former students and collaborators had not forgotten him. Especially Constantin Daicoviciu and Andrei Oţetea used their influence to get the researcher position at the Institute for the professor and also helped him on several occasions.

1. Repères biographiques

Silviu Dragomir (1888-1962), originaire de Hunedoara, a réussi, grâce aux ses qualités intellectuelles et à l'appui offert par l'Eglise Orthodoxe, suivre les cours de certaines institutions prestigieuses d'enseignement théologique à Cernăuţi et respectivement à Vienne. A partir de 1911, il est professeur d'histoire des églises dans le cadre de l'Institut Théologique *Andreean* de Sibiu, et à partir de 1919, il est professeur de l'histoire des peuples slaves à l'Université de Dacie Supérieure. Dans cette qualité, il a donné des cours de l'histoire des peuples slaves et de paléographie slave, de l'histoire des roumains des Balkans et des conférences consacrées à l'union des roumains avec l'Eglise de Rome et à la Révolution de 1848, jusqu'en 1947. Il s'est activement impliqué dans le mouvement politique du début du XXe siècle et il a participé à l'organisation de la Grande Assemblée Nationale de Alba-Iulia. Après l'Union de la Transylvanie, sa présence dans la vie politique de la Roumanie a été discrète, à l'exception de l'année 1926, lorsqu'il a été élu député de Hunedoara et du période compris entre la fin de l'année 1937 et l'été de 1940, lorsqu'il a été en tête du Ministère des Minorités. Comme une reconnaissance de ses

[*] Prof. Sorin ŞIPOŞ, PhD. Department of International Relations and European Studies, Faculty of History, Geography and International Relations, University of Oradea, Romania. E-mail: ssipos@uoradea.ro

mérites scientifiques, il a été élu membre correspondant et, plus tard, membre à plein droits de l'Académie Roumanie.

2. Silviu Dragomir et les nouvelles réalités politiques de la Roumanie des années 1947-1955; sa condamnation politique

La fin de la deuxième Guerre Mondiale n'a pas apporté la tranquillité que les roumains souhaitaient autant. Pour Silviu Dragomir, historien roumain impliqué d'une manière active dans la vie politique du période du régime autoritaire du roi Carol II, cette fin a représenté la perte de la Chaire universitaire et quelques années de détention dans les prisons communistes. En Roumanie, sous différents prétextes, l'élite intellectuelle et académique a souffert, peut-être, les plus graves agressions de son histoire de la part des communistes. Ainsi, dans le *Journal Officiel* de 4 octobre 1947, on a publié la décision signé par le ministre Ştefan Voitec le 2 octobre 1947, dans laquelle on mentionnait que 80 des professeurs de l'enseignement supérieur devaient quitter leur travail le premier septembre 1947 pour régler leurs droits à la retraite. A cette occasion, à Cluj, on a obligé à prendre la retraite, parmi autres, le linguiste Gheorghe Giuglea, le sociologue Constantin Sudeţeanu, l'ethnologue Romulus Vuia, le botaniste Alexandru Borza et l'historien Silviu Dragomir qui avait en ce moment-là 59 ans (Someşan et Iosifescu, 1998: 472; Buculei, 2000: p. 91; Zub, 1997: 267).

L'année 1948 a représenté pour notre pays l'année de l'institutionnalisation de l'état-parti de type communiste. C'était l'année dans laquelle une des institutions nationales respectée et avec tradition, c'est-a-dire l'Académie Roumaine, a été, a son tour, la victime du processus de destruction des valeurs de la Roumanie (Popescu-Gogan et Voiculescu-Ilie, 1998: 498).

Suite à la proposition du soi-disant Comité Provisoire de l'Académie R.P.R., le 13 août 1948 apparaissait le Décret Présidentiel no. 1454 qui nommait les membres titulaires actifs, les membres titulaires honorifiques et les membres d'honneur. Conformément au Décret Présidentiel, on nommait 27 membres titulaires actifs, parmi les anciens membres en gardant seulement D. Pompeiu, S. Stoilov, Gh. Spacu, G. Macovei, Tr. Săvulescu, Em. C. Teodorescu, D. Danielopolu, C.I. Parhon, A. Rădulescu, I. Iordan et M. Sadoveanu (Popescu-Gogan et Voiculescu-Ilie, 1998: 502). En conséquence, une grande partie des anciens membres n'existent pas dans la nouvelle structure de l'Académie. Sur la liste des éliminés se trouve aussi l'historien Silviu Dragomir (Scurtu et Buzatu, 1999: 556).

Au moment où les changements politiques de la société roumaine étaient presque finalisés, Silviu Dragomir, Emil Haţieganu et Ion Agârbiceanu, et également certains fonctionnaires de la Banque Agraire de Cluj, se trouvaient à la fin d'un procès pénal. Les trois étaient accusés « par le réquisitoire avec le numéro 2722 du 8 mars 1948 du Parquet du Tribunal de Cluj » que grâce à leur position à l'intérieur de la Banque Agraire de Cluj avaient accordé des fonds propres de la Banque un crédit de 1 300 000 lei pour financer l'Industrie de Briques et de Carreau de Cluj. Le professeur est mis en état d'arrestation le 1er Juillet 1949 à Cluj[1] et, plus tard, il est transféré dans le Pénitencier de Caransebeş pour expier sa peine de 6 mois de prison de correction pour délit contre la Loi des banques, auquel on avait ajoutait également une amende de correction de 2 600 000 lei[2]. L'amende de correction a été changée,

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[1] *Conceptul cererii adresată de Silviu Dragomir Preşedintelui Prezidiului Marii Adunări Naţionale*, dans l'Archive de la famille Enescu, p. 1.

[2] Conformément à la décision prise dans la réunion de la Chambre de Conseil du 29 décembre 1948, « La Cour disposait que la mention *în solidar* soit remplacée par des mots à 2 600 000 amende

ultérieurement, dans une année de prison, de sorte que Silviu Dragomir allait effectuer un an et six mois de prison de correction[3].

Le 5 mai 1950, Silviu Dragomir a été transféré dans la prison de Sighet, en rejoignant les hommes politiques et les intellectuels mis en arrestation et emprisonnés ici. Le transfert a été vite fait et en conditions de sécurité maximale. La mis en arrestation et l'emprisonnement, ainsi que le transfert à Sighet des leaders politiques et des intellectuels qui étaient encore en liberté et de ceux qui se trouvaient déjà en détention, a été une action développée en secret. Si le déménagement à Sighet de l'historien avait été fait seulement par des raisons de sécurité, celui-ci aurait du être libéré le 27 décembre 1950, lorsque sa condamnation prononcée en 1948 pour délit contre la Loi de banques expirait. Mais, le destin de l'intellectuel avait pris un autre cours.

Le Dossier a la base duquel les autorités communistes avaient décidé de prolonger la détention de Silviu Dragomir, a été rédigé par le Ministère de Affaires Etrangères, la VIIIe Direction. Dans l'œuvre *Silviu Dragomir-istoric* (*Silviu Dragomir -l'historien*) nous avons fait quelques considérations concernant le contenu de dossier (Şipoş, 2008: 100-103). Le dossier d'enquête ouvert au nom de Silviu Dragomir a le numero10 162 et contient 44 feuilles. Il faut clarifier, dans cet état des recherches, quelques problèmes majeurs, comme le contenu des matériaux, le but et le moment de la constitution du dossier.

En analysant le dossier, on constate que les documents compris dedans appartient à différents types de catégories, ont des valeurs différents et font partie des périodes différentes. Des 44 pages du dossier, 13 sont des articles des journaux *Capitala*, *România*, *Universul*, *Timpul*, *Porunca Vremii*, *Cuvântul* etc., dans lesquels Silviu Dragomir apparait en qualité de ministre des minorités et de secrétaire du Front de la Renaissance Nationale (F.R.N.) (A.M.J., *F. Serviciul C.* Nr. 10 162: 4-30)[4]. La lecture même que des titres ne laisse aucun doute regardant le contenu des articles et des communiqués de presse. Ce sont des matériaux à caractère électoral, des réalisations du Front de la Renaissance Nationale en rapport avec les représentants de certaines minorités nationales tel que la hongroise, la allemande ou la bulgare ou on peut trouver également le nom de Silviu Dragomir dans sa qualité de ministre des minorités, des communiques du FRN, mais aussi des polémiques politiques et confessionnelles. Les articles représentaient pour les autorités communistes les preuves de l'implication de Silviu Dragomir dans la gouvernance de la Roumanie pendant le

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correctionnelle chacun » (Les Archives Nationales – La Direction du Département de Hunedoara, *Fond Silviu Dragomir*, dossier 4, f. 23)

[3] « Condamné par la Cour d'Appel de Cluj le 6 novembre 1948 pour délit à l Loi de la Banque d'Etat à 6 mois de prison et une amende en argent transformée dans un an de détention, j'ai été détenu à Cluj en juillet 1949, et je dois être libéré le 27 décembre 1950 » (*L'autobiographie de l'auteur* de A.N.-D.J. Hunedoara, *Fond Silviu Dragomir*, dossier 4).

[4] A continuation on présente les plus importants matériaux : *Minoritatea germană*, *România*, 12 janvier 1939, f. 4. Dos. 4857/A.ssi, f. 7; *Încheierea acordului cu minoritatea bulgară*, *Capitala* din 12 février 1939, f. 5; *Minoritatea maghiară şi Frontul Renaşterii Naţionale*, f. 6; *Apel către prietenii publicaţiei Revue de Transylvanie*, f. 9; *În preajma alegerilor judeţene dela Hunedoara*, *Porunca Vremii* din 23 VIII 1937, f. 15; *Politica României faţă de minorităţile etnice. Expunerea d-lui ministru Silviu Dragomir la Cameră*, f. 18; *Între ortodocşi şi uniţi. Un răspuns d-lui prof. Silviu Dragomir*, f. 19; *Impozanta adunare a soc. Cultura*, f. 22; *Acuzaţiile d-lui Silviu Dragomir. N-a fost decât o manevră politicianistă*, f. 23; *Încheierea acordului cu minoritatea bulgară*, f. 25; *Consfătuirea membrilor Frontului Renaşterii Naţionale din ţinutul Olt. Cuvântarea d-lui ministru Silviu Dragomir*, f. 26; *Problema minorităţilor şi noua constituţie. Opera Comisariatului General şi directivele pe care în îndeplinirea gândului regal le urmăreşte d. Silviu Dragomir, ministru pentru minorităţi*, f. 27. *Indicaţiuni asupra înscrierilor în listele electorale şi depunerii candidaturilor*, f. 28-30.

Gouvernement de Octavian Goga et de la période du régime instauré par Carol II. Les matériaux n'incriminent pas à Dragomir, en prouvant plutôt son implication dans le Front de la Renaissance Nationale et dans la politique des Gouvernements du période du régime du roi Carol II.

Cependant, les abus du Ministère des Affaires Intérieurs ont continués. L sous-dite institution a émis en 1953 la décision ayant le numéro 559, par laquelle on majorait la peine de Silviu Dragomir avec 60 mois, étant libéré, dans ce cas, en 1958 (A.M.J., *F. Serviciul C.* Nr. 10 162: 4-30) seulement. Le régime extrêmement sévère, l'alimentation insuffisante, le manque de médicaments et de l'assistance médicale ont conduit à la mort dans la prison de beaucoup des arrêtés, et surtout de ceux qui souffraient de maladies qui nécessitaient un traitement spécialisé. Les détenus étaient battus par des raisons mineures, en laissant dans la majorité des cas des traumatismes physiques (Ploscaru, 1993: 187-188; Giurescu, 1994: 157; Raţiu, 1990: 27). Le régime alimentaire a eu aussi un rôle important dans la politique d'extermination.

Silviu Dragomir avait survécu au régime de la prison. La vie dans la prison allait laisser des traces sévères sur son âme et son physique. Le régime imposé aux détenus de la prison de Sighet cherchait l'épuisement physique et psychique au but final de l'élimination. La nourriture insuffisante, la volée et le traitement inhumain appliqué par la majorité de gardiens, le manque d'une assistance médicale spécialisée, l'interdiction durant la détention de communiquer avec l'extérieur, avaient comme but l'élimination physique.

Il faut préciser que Silviu Dragomir et les autres dignitaires et intellectuels fermés à Sighet le 6-7 mai 1950, sont restés là-bas beaucoup de temps mais sans aucune base légale. C'est le 1er août 1951 seulement, par la Décision du MAI no 334, singée par le ministre adjoint, le général-lieutenant Gheorghe Pintilie que 89 des anciens dignitaires ont été envoyés dans une unité de travail pour un période de 24 mois. Dans le cas particulier de Silviu Dragomir, le période de condamnation a été de 38 mois. La Colonie de travail des anciens dignitaires a été, en fait, le pénitencier Sighet, susnommé codifié le Danube (Secaşiu, 1999: 263). La peine administrative, sans droit d'appel, a été majorée jusqu'au 6 août 1953, avec 60 mois de plus, par la Décision du MAI no 559, signée, au nom du Président de la Commission de la Sécurité de l'Etat, par Alexandru Nicolschi (Secaşiu, 1999: 263).

Silviu Dragomir et les autres dignitaires sont restés à Sighet jusque le 5 juillet 1955, quand une partie a été libérée et les autres transférés dans d'autres prisons[5]. De cette manière, conformément à la note téléphonique ayant le no. 4/39 374 du 9.06.1955, envoyée par la Direction Pénitenciers, Camps et Colonies Bucarest au Pénitencier Principal de Sighet, on sollicitait la libération du détenu Dragomir Silviu (A.M.J., *F. Serviciul C.* Nr. 10 162: 42). Avant d'être libéré, il a signé une déclaration par laquelle il s'engageait que « de ce que je connais du période quand je suis resté dans ce pénitencier et dans d'autres pénitenciers, et surtout concernant les personnes avec lesquelles j'ai cohabité, je ne divulguerai rien et je ne discuterai avec personne rien de ce que je connais » (A.M.J., *F. Serviciul C.* Nr. 10 162: 43).

3. La libération de la détention. Années de difficultés et de sacrifices (1955-1962)

A sa libération de la détention, Silviu Dragomir avait remarqué que de sa maison située 40, rue Mikó sa femme avait été évacuée immédiatement après sa mis en

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[5] Conformément au Billet de Libération no. 193 534 de 1956, Silviu Dragomir a été libéré le 9 juin 1955 (A.N.-D.J. Hunedoara, *Fond Silviu Dragomir*, dossier 4). Sa libération le 9 juin est confirmée également par le billet de voyage spécial, Sighet-Cluj, confort III, série A, no. 0635301, au nom de Silviu Dragomir (*Ibidem).*

arrestation, respectivement le 1er avril 1951 et obligée à déménager a la périphérie de Cluj, dans une pièce avec plancher de terre et fontaine dans la cour, située no. 16, rue Goethe[6]. La maison, en construction, ensemble avec un petit jardin, avaient été achetée par les époux Dragomir des héritiers du professeur Iosif Popovici, en 1928[7].

Silviu Dragomir est revenu timidement dans l'activité scientifique en 1955, lorsqu'il a été employé collaborateur externe au début, et plus tard chercheur scientifique permanent à l'Institut d'Histoire et d'Archéologie de Cluj[8]. Parallèlement, il a relié la liaison avec certains des collaborateurs du période de l'entre deux mondiales, en essayant de publier de divers matériaux, certains préparés avant sa mis en arrestation, et d'autres immédiatement après sa libération de la prison. L'historien de Cluj, comme nombreux de intellectuels qui avaient survécus aux prisons communistes, a constaté que les souffrances n'avaient pas cessé. Sans aucun aide financier (l'état roumain avait coupé sa pension), retiré de son immeuble situé dans la rue Mikó, Silviu Dragomir n'avait pas été oublié par certains de ses anciens étudiants et collaborateurs plus jeunes du période de l'entre deux guerres mondiales. Constantin Daicoviciu et Andrei Oțetea avaient intervenu pour qu'il soit employé dans l'Institut d'Histoire et d'Archéologie de Cluj (A.N.-D.J. Deva, *F. Silviu Dragomir*, d. 92), et également il a été aidé à résoudre certains de ses problèmes[9]. Finalement, le professeur avait reçu, à l'aide de Constantin Daicoviciu, un logement civilisé, composé d'une pièce, salle de bain et cuisine, dans l'espace de l'Institut d'Histoire (Buculei, 2000: 92). A son tour, l'historien Andrei Oțetea, qui en ce moment-là se trouvait dans les grâces du pouvoir, a aidé Silviu Dragomir.

L'historien a repris des thèmes comme : *les roumains du nord de la Péninsule Balkanique dans le Moyen Age, la Révolution de 1848 de la Transylvanie et l'union des roumains avec l'Eglise de Rome,* investigués également dans le période de l'entre deux

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[6] Les soussignés Silviu et Flora Dragomir on demande la permission de vous annoncer que suite aux dispositions de l'office de logements, on a évacué l'immeuble situé dans la rue Miko, no. 38 et on a déménagé dans la rue Goethe, no.16 (Document de l'Archive de la famille Enescu, p. 1)

[7] « Au dessus de l'immeuble qui forme l'objet de la vente, l'antécesseur des vendeurs a initié la construction d'une maison qu'ils ont construit presque jusqu'à la moitie et qui est non achevée pour le moment. Le travail est en entreprise à la firme Ratz et Attl, architectes en Cluj. L'immeuble se vend ensemble avec ce bâtiment inachevé, mais sans obligation des vendeurs de continuer le travail et sans dépenser rien d'autre pour le bâtiment. En échange, les payements faits par le défunt dr. Iosif Popoviciu aux entrepreneurs Ratz et Attl restent faits et passent à faveur des acheteurs. L'immeuble décrit, donc, ensemble avec tout ce que lui appartient, se vend au prix de 500 000 lei. » (*Contrat de vente-achat*, dans l'Archive de la famille Enescu, p. 1-2)

[8] Conformément à l'adresse de la Sous-section de Sciences Historique de l'Académie Roumanie de 30 janvier 1956, signée par Petre Constantinescu-Iași, Silviu Dragomir était annoncé du fait que « en prenant en compte dans la réunion du 24 janvier 1946 votre demande d'emploi, [La Sous-section de Sciences Historiques, n.n.] on a donné l'avis favorable et on a déposé la demande au Préside de l'Académie RPR. En conséquence, merci de vous présenter à l'Institut d'Histoire de l'Académie RPR de Cluj, pour recevoir le travail pour lequel vous avez été recommandé » (A.N.-D.J. Hunedoara, *Fond Silviu Dragomir*, dossier 92).

[9] Dans une lettre envoyée à Constantin Daicoviciu, probablement au cours de l'année 1956, Silviu Dragomir lui remercie " pour l'intérêt prouvé pour sa cause. En même temps, il lui demande d'intervenir pour regagner le logement perdu après le processus de nationalisation ». (*Ibidem*, dossier 3, p. 243). Andrei Oțetea a aidé Dragomir, tel qu'on voit bien de la correspondance privée entre les deux, à rentrer dans le circuit scientifique. Dans ce sens, l'académicien a mis à la contribution toute son autorité scientifique et politique, convaincu qu'il aide une grande personnalité qui ait desservi avec dévouement les intérêts de son pays, mais un grand ami aussi.

guerres mondiales, sujets qui ont été interdits par la classe politique. Cependant, après des efforts incroyables, dans une lutte continue avec la censure du temps, en utilisant les arguments agréés par les communistes, Silviu Dragomir a réussi en 1959 publier son premier œuvre consacré aux roumains du Sud du Danube, après l'instauration du régime communiste en Roumanie[10]. Un destin approximativement similaire ont eu également les documents concernant la Révolution de 1848 de la Transylvanie, ensemble avec la monographie consacrée a Avram Iancu (Dragomir, 1965). L'œuvre, finalisée dans une première phase en 1947 et finalisée en 1958, était novatrice par la manière d'approche des rapports roumains-hongrois et par les conclusions auxquelles l'auteur arrive concernant le développement de la révolution. Présenté à l'Edition Scientifique, en vue de sa publication, le manuscrit a été rejeté à cause des conclusions qui n'étaient pas en concordance avec les visions du régime politique (A.N.-D.J. Hunedoara, *F. Silviu Dragomir*, d. 90: 1-8; d. 93: 69-70)[11]. Voici deux directions de recherches sensibles pour le régime, qui ont été reprises par l'auteur dans le contexte des nouvelles réalités politiques de la Roumanie.

Généralement, après qu'il est sorti de la prison, Silviu Dragomir a eu une vie très active. Il a repris ses activités scientifiques, il a été contacté par les historiens plus jeunes et il a repris le contact avec ses anciens collaborateurs du période de l'entre deux guerres mondiales. Dans les années 1955-1962, l'historien a beaucoup travaillé, il a parcouru la bibliographie historique récemment apparue et il a essayé de publier le plus possible. Ceci n'a pas été toujours possible, car il y avait encore des réticences concernant sa personne, apparues de la part du régime politique ou même de la part des collègues provenant du même domaine[12]. Pour la monographie consacrée à Avram Iancu, et pour le volume VI *d'Etudes et documents concernant la révolution des roumains de la Transylvanie entre les années 1848-1849. La Révolution. Les Héros. Le roi et les roumains*, Silviu Dragomir n'a pas reçu l'accord de les publier. Le régime communiste de la Roumanie entre les années 1955-1971, tel que Alexandru Zub, Şerban Papacostea et Stelian Tănase ont souligné, ne s'est jamais ouvert réellement, sinon a promu, plutôt, une libéralisation modeste et contrôlée (Papacostea, 1996: 251).

Est-ce que Silviu Dragomir croyait-il que l'attitude du régime communiste a changé ? Quelles ont été les raisons qui l'ont déterminé travailler pour un régime qui ait essayé de détruire sa famille ? On peut seulement avoir l'intuition des réponses. Probablement, il ne croyait pas que le système allait modifier son attitude. Mais, il avait des collègues qui faisaient part du même domaine, qui se trouvaient dans des positions

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[10] Silviu Dragomir, *Vlahii din nordul Peninsulei Balcanice în evul mediu*, Bucureşti, 1959, 224 p. Le travail avec le titre initial *Românii balcanici în evul mediu*, a été proposé à la publication par l'auteur depuis février 1956. Dans l'automne de l'année suivant, le manuscrit finalisé a supporté une correction de la part des spécialistes de la Commission pour l'Etude de la Langue et du Peuple Roumain, et l'année suivant de la part de l'Edition de l'Académie de la République Populaire Roumaine – la Rédaction Histoire. Vis-à-vis de certaines observations faites par les référents du manuscrit, Slviu Dragomir a manifesté don désaccord. Conformément aux A.N.-D.J. Deva, *Fond Silviu Dragomir*, dossier 17, p. 11-14, 62-67, 16-20, 44-52, 33-34.

[11] Voir, dans ce sens, Sorin Şipoş, *Silviu Dragomir versus Editura Ştiinţifică*, în *Munţii Apuseni*, anul III, nr. 1-2, Oradea, 1997, p. 70-81.

[12] « Distingué Professeur, je vous retourne le manuscrit de votre travail, avec le regret de n'avoir pas pu vous servir. J'ai essayé de le présenter à Lugoj et à Severin » (La lettre du professeur N. Trâpcea, adressée au professeur Siviu Dragomir, du 14 VII 1958, dans A.N.-D.J. Deva, *Fond Silviu Dragomir*, dossier 96).

importantes dans le système communiste, qu'il appréciait et dans lesquelles il avait confiance. Certains l'ont aidé dans les périodes difficiles de la vie. Ils avaient besoin de ses connaissances et de son expérience scientifique pour les futures luttes qui se proliféraient entre les groupes du Parti Communiste. En autres mots, Silviu Dragomir confiait quelques intellectuels du parti, surtout certains de ses collègues du domaine, mais en aucun cas il ne confiait le système.

4. Poursuit par la Sécurité

Immédiatement après sa libération du pénitencier, Silviu Dragomir est entré de nouveau sous l'attention de la Sécurité, en obtenant plusieurs notes informatives concernant l'historien. Les officiers ont été déroutés un certain temps, car ils ne savaient pas où habitait-il. Ceci est arrivé, le plus probable, aussi à cause du fait que, après sa libération de la détention, Silviu Dragomir n'a pas été enregistré dans les évidences, à cause de son âge avancée[13]. Plusieurs informations concernant Silviu Dragomir ont été obtenues pendant l'action d'identification des membres de Cluj de l'ancienne Association Roumaine-Américaine, association dans laquelle, entre 1946-1947, l'historien a détenu la fonction de président par la Transylvanie (Pleşa, 2005: 217-229) [14].

Les résultats n'ont pas été les souhaités, de sorte que la Sécurité ait renoncé au recrutement de Silviu Dragomir, d'autant plus qu'il est entré à l'attention des organismes de répression comme suspect d'espionnage à faveur des anglais (Pleşa, 2005: 217-229).

L'occasion a été la visite d'une délégation des parlementaires anglais à Cluj, le mois de septembre de l'année 1957. Parmi les membres de la délégation était également le lord Oswald St., soupçonné par la Sécurité d'être le collaborateur du service d'espionnage anglais[15]. En conséquence, les membres de la délégation ont été poursuivis pendant le période quand ils ont été en Roumanie.

Après une poursuite informative de presque quatre ans, l'officier de sécurité propose à ses supérieurs les suivants: « Car les matériaux qu'on détient sont de moindre importance, on propose la fermeture du dossier de vérification de Silviu Dragomir, et que son dossier soit attaché au dossier-problème no. 20, pour continuer la poursuite de son activité » (CNSAS, d. Silviu Dragomir, I 513: 8). Si concernant le problème de défiance d'espionnage le dossier ouvert au nom de Silviu Dragomir a été fermé, quand même, l'historien est toujours poursuivi par la Sécurité. L'activité politique développée par Silviu Dragomir entre les deux guerres mondiales l'a fait indésirable pour le nouveau régime politique. Même si l'historien a fait des efforts pour prouver sa bonne foi, le régime politique maintenait sa défiance dans les anciens

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[13] « Le soussigné Dragomir Silviu, ancien ministre, a été emprisonné plusieurs années et dans l'été de l'année 1955 a été mis en liberté. En présent il est sans occupation ; d'ailleurs, il est assez âgé : 77 ans. Il est trop vieux pour être pris en évidence » (*Note* du 13 septembre 1955, dans le Conseil *National pour l'Etude des Archives de la Sécurité*, a continuation CNSAS), dossier *Silviu Dragomir*, I 513, p. 8. *Ibidem*, p. 10. L'officier qui avait rédigé la note a calculé mal l'âge de l'historien; en réalité Silviu Dragomir avait 67 ans.

[14] Voir, dans ce sens, Liviu Pleşa, *Istoricul Silviu Dragomir în plasa Securităţii*, în *Dosarele Istoriei*, nr. 11, 2005, p. 43.

[15] « Des matériaux qu'on possède – des déclarations – il résulte les suivants : Au cours du mois de septembre a été déplacé à Cluj la délégation parlementaire anglaise où se trouvait également le lord Oswald St., soupçonné d'être agent du service d'espionnage anglais. Lui, ultérieurement, a été identifie comme liaison du fuyard Raţiu Ioan, de l'Angleterre, qui développe des activités d'espionnage contre notre pays » *La décision d'ouvrir le dossier de vérification sur Silviu Dragomir, 30 janvier 1958 dans CNSAS, dossier Silviu Dragomir*, I 513, p. 8.

leaders politiques de l'entre deux guerres mondiales. La Sécurité a poursuivi l'historien jusque le 23 février 1962, quand il a décédé[16].

Les informations fournies par des agents sont généralement bien articulées, pour toutes les époques, concernant ses études universitaires, son activité dans le cadre de l'université, en mettant en évidence les principaux moments de l'histoire contemporaine, l'union de 1918, le Dictée de Vienne, le refuge à Sibiu, le retour. Egalement, les informateurs mettent en évidence l'activité scientifique remarquable déroulée par Silviu Dragomir dans la période de l'entre deux guerres mondiales. Les agents Axinteanu et Voicu sont les seuls qui font une note discordante, en critiquant l'œuvre de l'historien et ses options nationales. En grandes lignes, l'activité politique est correctement présentée, mais négligeable en comparaison avec la scientifique. La grande majorité des informateurs savaient, même en détail, de la détention soufferte par Silviu Dragomir.

Après la sortie de la détention, l'historien essaye de continuer son activité scientifique, de publier. En ce sens, il est d'accord à se familiariser avec la philosophie marxiste, avec le matérialisme dialectique et historique, d'accepter l'appui de ses collègues plus jeunes, formés dans la nouvelle réalité politique. La détention de Sighet l'a déterminé d'être plus réservé, extrêmement prudent avec ceux de son entourage. Il savait qu'il était encore à l'attention de la Sécurité, et beaucoup de ceux qui simulaient l'amitié étaient des informateurs de la sécurité. En conséquence, après sa libération de la prison, Silviu Dragomir mène une vie retenue, il ne discute avec presque personne de l'expérience de Sighet et des autres problèmes politiques qui pourraient causer de nouveaux problèmes. Cependant, la Sécurité a réussi obtenir à l'aide des informateurs, placés dans l'entourage de Dragomir, toutes les informations dont on avait besoin.

Le 23 février il meurt (Buculei, 2000: 92-93). Conformément aux histoires racontées par Florica Enescu et Sabin Belu, la mort de Silviu Dragomir est survenue à cause d'un cancer au colon. Les médecins ont essayé d'extirper la tumeur, mais l'organisme du professeur, faible à cause des années de prison passées à Sighet, a cédé et les traitements appliqués non plus eu les effets prévus.

Conclusions

Après l'instauration du régime communiste en Roumanie, le destin du distingué intellectuel a connu des changements significatifs. Car il n'avait pas accepté la collaboration avec le nouvel pouvoir, il est éliminé de l'enseignement supérieur et de l'Académie Roumaine. Il a été condamné et emprisonné par les communistes entre les années 1949 et 1955 dans les pénitenciers de Caransebeş et Sighet. Après sa libération de la détention, il est revenu timidement dans l'activité scientifique, en étant employé par l'Institut d'Histoire et Archéologie de Cluj. En conclusion, on peut remarquer que dans le période où en Roumanie on a encouragé la recherche scientifique, Silviu Dragomir a connu des grands succès dans sa carrière, qu'il a obtenus suite à des efforts intellectuels remarquables. Plus tard, lorsque le système de valeurs du pays a été modifié, l'historien a perdu sa position, le peu de fortune qu'il avait et également sa liberté.

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[16] « Vendredi, 23 février 1962 est mort dans un hôpital de Bucarest le prof Silviu Dragomir de Cluj, ancien ministre, ancien membre de l'Académie Roumaine et un des plus importants historiens du passée de la Transylvanie. […]. Comme historien, Silviu Dragomir est connu comme un des meilleurs connaisseurs de l'histoire de la Transylvanie, spécialement des siècles 18-19 de la Révolution de 1848-1849, sur laquelle il a réalisé une monographie monumentale (manuscrit). Sa mort laisse des regrets unanimes dans les cercles de l'intellectualité roumaine. Ses funérailles auront lieu lundi, 26 II '962 » (*Raport de Szarka Ernest, 26 II 1962*, dans *Ibidem*, p. 3).

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A HISTORY OF GLOBAL HISTORY

Chloé MAUREL[*]

Abstract. *The trend of global history, which developed for thirty years in the US, brings valuable methodological and epistemological innovations. This trend is very fecund and dynamic. It gave rise to a large number of publications and to the creation of numerous research institutions in the US. The "global" approach is also more and more used in Europe. But it is important to notice that many of the innovations of global history are in fact not really new, but borrow their principles and methods to previous trends, like compared history or transnational history. And we have to be vigilant concerning the possible ideological motivations present in the works of global history.*

For about thirty years, the historical trend "world history" or "global history", which appeared initially in the United States, had an intense development and aroused a keen interest in the anglo-saxon world. How did this trend emerge? By means of which structures did it develop in the United States? How can world history be defined? What are its specificities, its innovations? What is the difference between world history and global history? How did this trend evolve until nowadays? What is the ideology behind it? In order to answer these questions, I will first retrace the birth and evolution of world/global history in the United States and emphasize its innovative aspects. Then I will moderate this innovative character, and evoke its political implications.

In 1963, William McNeill, a Canadian historian, publishes a pionner book entitled *The Rise of the West. A History of the Human Community* (McNeill, 1963). The title is an allusion to the title of the book by Oswald Spengler, a German philosopher and historian, *The Decline of the West*, published in 1918. Spengler had developed the idea of partitioned, isolated civilizations. McNeill on the contrary emphazises the reciprocal influences of the different civilizations and underlines fusions of cultures. The "Rise of the West" that McNeill analyzes results in a growing influence of European civilization on the whole world. This book is a bestseller.

Another pioneer in world history is Andre Gunder Frank. He is an historian, an economist, a sociologist, an anthropologist, a geographer, a specialist in international relations and political science. With his interdisciplinary profile, he really embodies the universal character of world history. He was one of main representatives of the dependency theory in the 1970s. According to this theory, resources flow from a "periphery" of poor and underdeveloped states to a "core" of wealthy states, enriching the "core" at the expense of the "periphery" (Spengler, 1918).

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[*] Lecturer at the University of Paris1 and at the University of Versailles-Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines. Associate Researcher at the IRICE (Sorbonne), the IHMC (École Normale Supérieure/CNRS) Paris, France. E-mail: chmaurel@yahoo.fr

So world history started to develop in the 1980s in the United States. Patrick Manning contributed to its development. He wrote in 1969 a doctoral dissertation on the economic history of South Dahomey. He contributed to the setting up at the University of Wisconsin, in the 1980s, of a pioneer program of world history. He wrote then a "global history" of slave trade (Manning, *Slavery, Colonialism and Economic Growth in Dahomey, 1640-1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); *Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa, 1880-1985* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); *Slavery and African Life: Occidental, Oriental and African Slave Trades* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); *History from South Africa: Alternative Visions and Practices* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991); *Slave Trades, 1500-1800: Globalization of Forced Labor* (Aldershot: Variorum, 1996).)

So, in the 1980s and 1990s, world history strongly developed in the US, and then in the whole anglo-saxon world. In 1982 the *World History Association* was created, and many specific journals were created, like the *Journal of World History*, published since 1990 by the University of Hawaï. Internet played a leading role: it allowed historians to communicate more easily thanks to websites and discussion lists like *H-World* and online journals like *World History connected*, launched in 1994.

Many American universities put into place world history curricula, first for undergraduated students, and created research centres in world history. In 1994, under the impulsion of Patrick Manning, a "World History Center" and a doctoral program in world history were created at the Northeastern University. Then many other American universities put in place research centres in world history. The State University of New York Stony Brook created in 2003 a "Center for Global History".

From the 1990s, the publication of world history books proliferated in the US. For example *A World History* by William McNeill (1998), *Navigating World History: Historians Create a Global Past* (2003) by Patrick Manning, and *Holt World History: The Human Journey* (2005) by Akira Iriye (McNeill, 1998; *The Human Web: A Bird's-Eye View of World History*, 2003; Iriye, 1997; *Holt World History: The Human Journey*, 2005). In *Navigating World History*, Patrick Manning includes more than 1000 titles, of which more than a half are dated of after 1990. It illustrates that this trend is recent and grew exponential. This extraordinary interest in world history continued in the 2000s, with the creation of the *Globality Studies Journal*, published since 2006 by the *Center for Global History* (New York), and the organization of a symposium entitled « *Global history, globally* » at the University of Harvard in February 2008. The *American Historical Association*, for its 123rd annual meeting in January 2009, chose the theme "*Doing Transnational History*", according importance to world history.

World history is close to the trend of "universal story". It gave rise to big synthesis including many centuries, like the *Encyclopedia of World History* published in Boston in 2001 (Stearns et alii, 2001; Pomeranz and Topik, 1999; Mithen, 2004). In theses enterprises, the educational aim is important: because it presents a general overview of the history of humanity, world history appears particularly appropriated for students. So, Patrick Manning adresses explicitly his book *Navigating World History* to highschool teachers and students (Manning, 2003). It is the same for *The New World History: A Teacher's Companion* by Ross E. Dunn. This book presents a historiography of world history teaching and give practical suggestions on how to teach world history (Dunn (ed.), 2000).

If the expression world history dominated in the beginning, progressively this designation competed with "global history". In 1989 Bruce Mazlish launched the "New

Global History Initiative" (NGH). He wrote *Conceptualizing Global History* in 1993 (Mazlish, Buultjens, 1993). He conceives global history as the analyze of the birth and evolution of "globalization".

According to Bruce Mazlish, global history is the best way to study the interdependant world and the globalized society which has been existing for a few decades. According to him, global history should be a new period in history, after modern history and contemporary history. It would be centered around the story of economic, technologic and cultural globalization. It would study the emergence of a world mass consumer society, space exploration, nuclear threat, technological risks, environmental problems. According to Mazlish, these phenomenons, which transcend states, can be better studied from a global than from a local or national point of view.

The "Center for Global History" of the State University of New York, directed by Wolf Schäfer, claims to belong to the "New Global History Initiative": it wants to promote historical research on the "globalization". It wants to underscore themes like environmental questions, to the detriment of other themes like the role of the state.

In the last years, the expression of "global history" prevailed over that of "world history". The expression "global" appeared more meaningful, because it underlines the interdependency and the integration at the scale of the planet. So, more than world history, global history is conceived in the frame of "globalization". A lot of books were published on this theme in the last decades (Scholte, Aart, 2000). In the *Encyclopedia of Globalization* published in 2007, there is an article entitled "Global History" (Schäfer, 2007: 516-21). In connection with the theme of globalization, global history bases on the concept of "global governance" (Sinclair, Hewson, eds. 1999; Weiss, Gordenke (dir.), 1996). This concept presupposes the idea that the role of states is decreasing (Strange, 1996), and that the role of other actors is increasing, such as NGOs, foundations, multinational corporations, etc.

So global history intends to transcend the national partitioning of historical research, in order to apprenhend phenomenons which exceed national borders. For example nuclear or terrorist threats, environmental problems, capital exchange.

The "New Global History Initiative" develops an extremely broad conception of global history: it intends to study the whole history of the human being, including natural history. So, "new global history" is close to the "Big History". Big History, which appeared in the US from the 1980s, intends to explain the evolution of the human being from the Big Bang until today, using many disciplines like climatology, archaeology, demography, or biology. It is what Fred Spier tried to do with *The Structure of Big History: From the Big Bang until Today* (1996) (Spier, 1996), or more recently David Christian, with *Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big History* (2004) (Christian, 2004). Peter Douglas Ward and Donald Brownlee wrote a history of the planet Earth, *Rare Earth* (2000) Douglas Ward, Brownlee, 2000).

Global history also intends to analyze phenomenons at different levels, to combine scales. John H. Bodley reflected on the role of scales in *The Power of Scale: A Global History Approach* (2003) (Bodley, 2003). By the up and down between different levels of scale (time scales or space scales), global history aims at seeing parallelisms, connections, that traditional history cannot see. Global history would be able to reveal general interpretations that otherwise would remain invisible.

So, global history wants to unite and combine the contributions of the "*microstoria*" as of "*Big History*". Local history and global history can combine and form a dialectic between local and global (Mazlish, Buultjens, eds. 1993; Schäfer, in

Globalization, Philanthropy, and Civil Society: Toward a New Political Culture in the Twenty-First Century, edited by Hewa and Stapleton 2005: 33-48).

Besides, in comparison with world history (which can be seen as a juxtaposition of national histories), global history distances oneself from world history by a keen interest to the links and comparisons. Far from limiting itself to linear stories, global history is interested in combinations of events and approaches. It aims at revealing new meaningful relations, transcending the national framework.

This want to "decentralize" history meets the reflexions initiated in the previous years by researchers on other continents, like the French historian Michel Espagne and the German historian Michael Werner on the French-German "cultural transfers".

Global history also combined with "cultural studies", "postcolonial studies" and "subaltern studies". Cultural studies appeared in England in the 1980s and developed in the US in the 1990s, with the sociologist Stuart Hall. It gave rise in the US to studies on communities, like "Black studies" or "Chicanos studies", and studies on the theme of border: "border studies". The cultural studies analyze domination relations in the field of culture and particularly relations between power and cultural identity (Hall, 2007).

Postcolonial studies initially developed in the field of literary critic, under the impulsion of Edward Saïd. He wrote *Orientalism* in 1978 and *Culture and imperialism* in 2000. Postcolonial studies allowed to analyze documents written by authors steming from colonized territories. Postcolonial studies analyze the links between cultural identities and phenomenons of domination. Works of this trend showed how the colonial system put into place in the colonized territories and among colonized people a system of values based on the idea of superiority of European culture and values. After the independences, those people tried to reaffirm their origins and to invent specific cultural and national identities.

The "subaltern studies" developed from the 1980 at the instigation of the Indian historian Ranajit Guha and of the literary critic Gayatri Spivak (Spivak, in Nelson and Grossberg, eds., 1988:.271-313; Spivak et Guha (dir.), 1988). It aimed at inverse the elitist character of the historiography of India. It intends to reassert the value of the "subaltern" classes of India, neglected by traditional historiography. The trend of subaltern studies draws its name from the eponymous publication of a series of volumes in the UK from 1982[1]. The subalternist historians made an economic and social critic of colonization, a critic of the orientalist colonial writings, and of eurocentrism in social sciences. From the beginning of the 1990s, postcolonial studies increased in the US and increasingly concerned the historical field. They proposed a new lecture of history of colonization. They based themselves on the analisys of texts and speeches of the colonial and postcolonial period. They explored the relations between the former colonizator and the former colonized people, and showed the vestiges of colonialism which remains in the politic and economic situation of the former colonies and of the culture of their inhabitants.

Subaltern studies are represented mainly by historian researchers like Homi K. Bhabha (Bhabha, 2007), Dipesh Chakrabarty Chakrabarty, 2000; Chakrabarty, 2002), Arjun Appadurai (Appadurai, 1996). The three of them became professors at the university in the US. Subaltern studies are a strong symbol of reappropriation by intellectual of South countries of the colonial past of their people. Arjun Appadurai analyzed the phenomenon of the indigenization of cricket in India. The cricket is a sport that British colonizators introduced in India. It carries the traditional and elitist values of colonial England. But, used

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[1] *Subaltern studies. Writing on South Asian History and Society*, 10 volumes, Oxford University, from 1982 to now.

by the Indian elites, it became an authentic Indian sport. Now it is very popular in India and associated with Indian nationalism. The example of cricket illustrates the processus of appropriation of exogen values and indigenization of a cultural practice. Global history has many common points with postcolonial studies and subaltern studies, notably its efforts to decentrate the perspecive and to break with occidental ethnocentrism.

The global approach gave rise to many studies on different transnational objects, like diseases (William McNeill, *Plagues and Peoples*, 1976, Alfred Crosby, *America's Forgotten Pandemic: The Influenza of 1918*, 1989), trade (Kenneth Pomeranz et Steven Topik, *The World That Trade Created*: *Society, Culture, and the World Economy, 1400 to the Present*), energy (Vaclav Smil, *Energy in World History. Global Perspectives and Uncertainties*, MIT Press, 2003), dance (William McNeill, *Keeping together in time. Dance and Drill in the human history*, 1995), fire (Johan Goudsblom, *Fire and Civilization*. 1992), food (Raymond Grew, *Food in Global History*, 1999), migrations (Wang Gungwu, *Global History and Migrations*, 1996), religion wars, arts, etc (McNeill, 1998, première édition 1976; Crosby, 2003; Pomeranz, Topik, 1999; Smil, 2003; McNeill, 1995; Goudsblom, 1992; Raymond, Grew, 1999; Gungwu (ed.), 1996). The approach is really original, because these objects had never been taken as the real centre of a research. Now, by a perspective shift, they are apprehended in their moving character, it is the historian who moves and follows the objects. For example, in his works on migrations, Wang Gungwu analyzes the trips of migrants, and the links between migrants. These works underscore the world interconnections, the interactions between cultures.

World historians and global historians often choose subjects which are important preoccupations in the 1990s and 2000s. For example, the theme of the origins of globalization has an important place in the global history works. They tried to determine the localization of the centre of impulsion of world economy: is it in Eastern Asia or in Western Europe? How did the main world areas become more and more interdependent on the economical point of view?

Among the favorite subjects the theme of environment appears frequently: with *Something New under the Sun: An Environmental History of the Twentieth-Century World*, John R. McNeill (son of William McNeill) wants to write a real "environmental history of the XXth century" (McNeill, 2000). This book obtained the prize of the *World History Association* in 2000. It analyzes the antagonist issues of the need of energy consumption and the want of environment preservation.

The interdisciplinary character of global history is illustrated by the intellectual profile of many of its representatives, like Andre Gunder Frank. In order to apprehend the huge field that they delimitated, the promoters of global history want to use disciplines as diverse as economy, sociology, anthropology, linguistic, archaeology, biology, botanic, geology, climatology, environment, demography, genetic. Many works in global history were realized in close link with geography, like *The Myth of Continents*: *A Critique of Metageography*, by Martin W. Lewis and Karen Wigen (Lewis, Wigen, 1997), or with biology, like *The Panda's Thumb: More Reflections in Natural History* by Stephen J. Gould (Gould, 1980), or *The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492* by Alfred Crosby. In this late book, the author tries to explain by biological reasons why the Europeans were able to succeed easily to the precolombian civilizations in America. Alfred Crosby uses biological facts to explain historical events like the conquest of Mexico by Cortez and the fall of the Inca Empire (Crosby, 2003).

The role of biological and ecological factors in human history was also showed by Jared Diamond. *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies* (Diamond, 1997) is a vast panorama. It was published in the US in 1997 and became a best-seller. It was

awarded the Pulitzer Prize in 1998. In this book, the author, professor of physiology at the University of California, tries to explain how environmental factors allowed some societies to get more advanced than others and to dominate them. Jared Diamond uses many sciences: biology, zoology, paleoanthropology, economy, history, sociology, philosophy, archaeology, linguistic, psychology, political science, etc. According to him, the world present situation (characterized by strong discrepancies in development between regions) would result from processes that go back to the Neolithic period. During these 13 000 years, some civilizations would have, for biological reasons, acquired a more elaborated level of technological development. They would have imposed themselves in front of other civilizations less advanced, everywhere in the world. The first ones developed first in Eurasia, and more precisely first in the Fertile Crescent, because of biogeographic factors. These factors would have allowed the apparition of farmers-producers in place of hunters-pickers. It would have provoked an increase in food production, so a demographic increase. This would have allowed those men to devote more time to craft industry, culture, arts. These ways of life would have then easily spread toward West because of the absence of ecological barrier, whereas in Middle East, environmental obstacles (notably ground salinization due to agriculture) would have provoked the collapse of Sumerian societies. And, in Western Europe, these civilizations would have improved, stimulated by the competition due to the setting up of many rival states. With this thinking, Diamond tries to refute the ethnocentric myths of the superiority of Europeans: the striking differences in the long term history of populations of the different continents are not due to innate differences, but to differences due to environment, he asserts (Diamond, 1997). With this refutation of traditional ethnocentrism, Jared Diamond's approach resemble Peter Gran's. Gran, in his book *Beyond Eurocentrism* (1996), brought to light and denounced ethnocentrism of the European civilization (Diamond, 1997).

A few years later, in a new book, *Collapse. How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed* (2005), Jared Diamond claims the use of the "comparative method", so of comparative history, to understand the collapse of societies because of environmental problems (Diamond, 2005). He says that some civilizations, like that of Easter Island, of the Mayas or the Greenland Vikings, were the cause of their own ruin owing to their impact on their environment. They would have accomplished an "ecological suicide", destroying their resources. By his analysis of the causes of the collapse of some civilizations, he takes some of the themes developed by the American historian Joseph Tainter in *The Collapse of Complex Societies* (1988) (Tainter, 1988). Diamond also studies the case of societies which succeeded to survive in spite of enormous environmental difficulties, like the inhabitants of Papua thanks to their agriculture, or Japanese of the Edo era thanks to their forest management. He tries to draw conclusions and even predictions about today's societies, which are in front of severe environmental problems and climate change (Diamond, 1997).

Nevertheless, it is important to have a critical vision of methods and conclusions of global history. First, one can underline that many global history books are not rigorous enough. One can put into question the validity of the interpretation of great historical, political and social phenomenons, which rest only upon biological and environmental explanations.

Moreover, many of the methodological innovations of global history appear as not really new. Global history is to be apprehended in the heritage of past trends, notably of "universal history". "Universal history" exists since the Antiquity (Herodotus). It was developed in the XVIIth century by the Frenchman Bossuet (Bossuet, 1681), and in the XXth

century by Oswald Spengler (Spengler), Arnold Toynbee (Toynbee, 1976), and René Grousset (Grousset, 1956). The "global historians" don't reject the filiation with previous historians. On the contrary, they claim the heritage of Arnold Toynbee : Bruce Mazlish received in 1986 the Toynbee Prize. This prize aims at awarding contributions in social sciences which give a large overview of human society and of social and human problems. From 1987, the Toynbee Prize Foundation began to support directly the enterprise of global history, and more precisely the "New Global History" project. In 2008, the Toynbee Prize was given to William McNeill.

The comparative approach and interdisciplinarity cannot be considered as specificities of global history because they had been already introduced by previous historians and previous historiographical trends, like Marc Bloch and the "*école des Annales*" in France as early as the 1920s-1930s. The only element which can appear relatively new is the want to use sciences like biology. Nevertheless, works on climate have been realized also by historians outside the global history trend, like in France Emmanuel Leroy Ladurie, who wrote a *Human and Compared History of Climate* (2004) (Ladurie, 2004). Moreover, the idea to transcend national barriers, and to study connections and parallelisms to the "global" scale, was already developed by many European historians, with the trends of cultural compared history, history of "cultural transfers", history of cultural circulations, transnational history, connected history, crossed history.

So, if global history appears stimulating by its want to abolish national, historiographical, disciplinary barriers, one must relativize the innovative character of this trend. Besides, by its presuppositions and its centers of interest (notably the globalization, seen as a necessary process, if not the result of the whole world history), this trend appears eminently "US", "west-oriented" in its conceptions, contrary to the anti-ethnocentrical approach that it claims.

In the anglo-saxon world, global history seems to be moved by a positive vision of globalization (except Andre Gunder Frank). Thus, many global historians promote, like Bruce Mazlish, the notion of "global governance" (Hewa, Stapleton, 2005; 1995: 1047-1060). Many articles and books were recently published on this theme, and a review: *The Review of Global Governance*. The notion of "global governance" implies the idea that States would not be anymore able to fill their duties of regulation, notably in the economic and social field, and to master the flows of globalization. This notion implies that other actors (international financial institutions, or even transnational corporations) should dictate to them these tasks (Laroche (ed.), 2003). The notion of "global governance" emphasizes the emergence of new forms of regulation, the apparition of many new protagonists in world affairs: NGOs, experts, associations, local and regional networks, private corporations. The States would not have anymore the monopol of public action. The idea of global governance distinguishs itself clearly from the classical idea of government, because it denounces the traditional political model which entrusts only to political authorities the responsibility of public affairs (Beck, 2003). It advocates that the States should relinquish their attributions notably in the social field and in the field of human rights. So it advocates a massive liberalization. This conception is in keeping of neoliberalism. It is the want to make prevail the model of private management on this of public government, the corporate logic on this of human, social, cultural rights (Moreau Defarges, 2003).

So, one can reproach some global historians to want to present an interpretation of world history conforting the idea of economic, social and cultural "globalization". In demonstrating the ineluctability of globalization, global history aims to oppose the critics

of alterglobalists concerning this process. In explicating by biological and not socio-economical causes the reasons of inequalities between peoples and societies (as Jared Diamond does), this trend aims at clearing the big powers (and first of all US) of their responsibility in the growing North/South gap. In underscoring, as Bruce Mazlish does in *The New Global History* (2006) and in *Leviathans. Multinational Corporations and the New Global History* (2005) (Dupont Chandler, Mazlish, 2005), the diminishing role of States, and in promoting the growing influence of other actors like transnational corporations, this trend praises the neoliberal globalization. And, in moderating the seriousness of climate change, and in relativizing the role of man in this phenomenon, this trend can justify the position of US, who refused to ratify the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. So we can ask if global history is not a new tool of US "soft power". In order to verify it, it would be interesting to determine from where the financing of the numerous institutions of global history comes.

So, the trend of global history, which developed for thirty years in the US, brings valuable methodological and epistemological innovations. This trend is very fecund and dynamic. It gave rise to a large number of publications and to the creation of numerous research institutions in the US. The "global" approach is also more and more used in Europe. But it is important to notice that many of the innovations of global history are in fact not really new, but borrow their principles and methods to previous trends, like compared history or transnational history. And, lastly, we have to be vigilant concerning the possible ideological motivations present in the works of global history.

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THE IMAGE OF LONDON AS CULTURAL MOSAIC IN NOVELS WRITTEN BY SALMAN RUSHDIE, HANIF KUREISHI, MONICA ALI AND ZADIE SMITH

Simona Veronica ABRUDAN CACIORA[*]

Abstract. *The purpose of this paper is to emphasize that nowadays, perhaps more than ever before, Europe can be perceived as a rich mosaic of cultures. Given the large diversity of people living in contemporary Europe, the success of the EU depends, among others, on its efforts to become as inclusive as possible, encouraging cooperation across states while preserving and respecting individual rights and freedoms, collective identities and cultures.*

During the last decades, many large cities and metropolises of the "Old Continent" have turned into rich cultural mosaics, where people belonging to different nations, regions and cultures encounter and interact; the European urban space may be considered a mirror, reflecting processes that are currently at work in the entire European Union.

This paper makes reference to the way several novelists, writing in English during the last decades, perceive London and the problems it confronts, arguing in favor of tolerance that, in their opinion, might be the best, if not the only solution to peaceful co-habitation in present-day Europe.

Introduction

One of the main ideals, which stimulated the formation of the European Union, was that of turning Europe into a competitive power in the economic, technological and scientific context of the world. Nowadays, mobility within and across countries and regions is encouraged, among others, by political processes, the phenomenon of globalization, the economic development in most Western countries and the attempts of some people to find better jobs abroad. As centers of intense economic activity and social life, cities attract people from both within and outside national territories.

The demographic expansion, as a result of the above-mentioned changes and developments, increases the number of foreigners in European cities, where the multicultural and the multiethnic aspect of the Union becomes very visible. As indicated by Moritz Czáky, the contact with the ethnic and the cultural heterogeneity, characteristic of the European Union, facilitates, on the one hand, the acceptance of diversity, through the easy circulation and reception of cultural products, but also favors the outbreak of potential or latent conflicts, as well as the intensification of identity crises (Czaky, 2003: 25). In other words, cities have now became ambivalent places of both connection and confrontation, where the impermeability to novelty and otherness still hinders the European Union's efforts to promote a more integrative model, in an attempt to harmonize uniqueness with diversity.

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[*] PhD., Lecturer, University of Oradea, Romania. E-mail: veronicaabrudan@yahoo.com

The city as mosaic and the cultural borders of Europe

Given the multitude of religions, languages, cultures and ethnicities that can be identified in contemporary European cities, the urban space has often been compared with a mosaic. The association of the city with the image of a mosaic would suggest the existence of a harmonious pattern, but in reality the encounter of different people in the dense urban atmosphere often results in conflict and divergence; the contact with otherness generally determines a process of identity redefinition, which is rarely an easy process.

Despite the fact that probably no European state, and implicitly no European city, has ever been culturally homogeneous, internal diversity rather than unity characterizing them, the presence of European and non-European citizens in places such as London, Paris, Madrid, Milan, Vienna etc., is not easily accepted by the host population and continues to give rise to many problems, even to violence, drawing attention upon the fact that the new European Union is still a fragile construction (Guibernau, 2007: 89), and the changes it has brought are not welcome and accepted by all its citizens. It appears that, even though state borders tend to lose importance, new dividing lines might emerge, creating segregation within societies, isolating people in ethnic ghettoes, or reflecting mentalities that might hold back the integration process. Such mental frontiers[31] are sometimes rooted in sets of values, beliefs, customs, traditions, conventions and habits that are shared by groups of people and identified with their *own* culture. The more diverse the cultures are, the stronger the conflict, caused by the encounter of the representatives of those cultures, might become.

During the last decades, Europe has witnessed an intensification of opposing reactions to the "threat" of cultural homogenization, the most visible of which being the attempts of either cultural elites or of extreme right-wing movements to defend cultural territories and specificity. The street-riots in France, the Basque or the Irish conflict, the pleas for the preservation of national and cultural purity, and - to some extent - the campaigns for the protection languages/dialects and the resistance of some countries to full European integration, might be regarded as forms of isolation within "cultural borders", which challenge and impede the process of European expansion and consolidation.

As distressing as they may be, these conflicts and manifestations of weak tolerance should probably be regarded natural parts of the process of setting the bases of a new, larger and more inclusive, political structure. To give but one example in this respect, one can recall the formation and consolidation of national states in Europe, which was, by no means, an easier process. It was based on defining one's national identity in terms of its difference from the others, though still holding to values such as Christianity, freedom, humanism and material progress (Guibernau, 2007: 94) associated with Europe as a cultural reality. Europe itself, whose geographical limits have always been questioned and suffered countless changes throughout time, defined itself in terms of elements that differentiated it from other parts of the world, especially the Eastern people. However, as Smaranda Enache has emphasized, the cultural history of Europe also demonstrates the impressive capacity of national cultures to include and borrow from local or regional elements, resulting in a synthesis of common values (Enache, 2002: 302). It is therefore suggested that, in the process of national identity formation, local/minority elements have not been eliminated, but included as elements of a common culture, whether national or

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[31] See Malcolm Anderson, *European Frontiers at the End of the Twentieth Century. An Introduction,* p.3, in *The Frontiers of Europe,* Edited by Malcolm Anderson and Eberhard Bort, Cassell, 1998.

European. The ideologies promoting the purity and uniqueness of nations have sometimes resulted in regrettable conflicts (In time, many wars, fought on the territory of Europe, were caused by attempts to defend national territories or cultural specificity. However, having this in mind, as well as the lesson of so many confrontations – the wars between Christian Europe and the Islamic world, the wars for independence, the two World Wars and even the Cold War – most people agree that conflicts – armed or not – are not a solution to the problems of humanity). Therefore the European Union declares its intention to rely on and promote principles such as tolerance, respect for human rights in general and those of the minorities in particular, insisting on the possibility to integrate extremely diverse people within a unitary structure. The attempt to create balance and harmony between uniqueness and diversity is illustrated, among others, by the activity of many national and European institutions that try to stimulate intercultural communication, or by the new legislative forms adopted by the European states, which grant the rights of minorities and the protection of foreigners. Therefore it is suggested that culture should not be used as a starting point for the creation of new borders, but stimulate the acceptance of otherness and welcome the spiritual enrichment resulting form the contact among different cultures.

"Trans-cultural" cities

In the contemporary city, boundaries are more often symbolic than physical and clearly drawn. Sometimes they are made of brick and stone, other times they refer demarcations of difference in terms of lifestyle, social class, culture, ethnicity, or race. Centre and periphery refer both to spatial delineation and to the psychological or subjective experiences that result from the recognition that people hold different degrees of power and importance in the life of the city.

The daily contact with the plurality and the heterogeneity of populations living in the dense atmosphere of the urban space favors the appearance of conflicts among different nationalities, social classes, cultural groups or human types, encouraging tendencies towards self-affirmation, or even segregation, xenophobia and anti-Semitism.

The presence of migrants and/or autochthonous minorities, which is a characteristic of most European states, changes the composition of populations and determines the beginning of a process of adaptation, for both newcomers and the host population. No part involved in such an interaction remains unchanged. On the one hand, migrants and minority groups are faced with the necessity to learn a new language, understand and even adopt, or adapt to, new cultural forms and legal systems, which enable them to communicate and establish relationships with the members of the host population or the authorities of the state. The isolation within minority communities can have negative consequences, encouraging, as indicated above, the formation of cultural and even physical enclaves within societies and cities/countries/regions. Thus, a certain degree of adaptation is necessary on the part of migrants, though it should not mean the rebuttal of their own traditions and cultures, since the decision to leave their state, with some exceptions of course, has been theirs. On the other hand, host societies should not only tolerate, but also support diversity, perceiving it as a positive factor, granting equal rights and opportunities to all their members. As Ioan Horga has emphasised, the existence of people coming from different ethnic/social/cultural backgrounds than the European inhabitants determines not only problems associated with the need to re-forge identities, but may contribute to supporting social security systems (in places where the

members of the host population have left the country) or to the regeneration of culture and local economies (Horga, 2006: 8).

Faced with difficult situations, caused by the encounter of different people within a certain territory, most EU governments and state authorities suggested a series of models of co-habitation, emphasizing the importance of adopting values such as freedom of speech and tolerance, as well as the possibility to learn in the minorities' native language, access to services and electoral participation, organisation of festivals and cultural events, and the possibility to wear traditional clothes. An impressive number of politicians, sociologists, writers, journalists and analysts plead for a new understanding of concepts such as centre and centrality, periphery and marginality. They also challenge models such as assimilation, integration or even multiculturalism, which have been advanced by the authorities of many countries where different cultural and ethnic groups interact. The definitions they present are less rigid, since they take into account the social, the ethnic and the cultural plurality characterizing cotemporary metropolises.

Before discussing the solutions offered by contemporary writers to the phenomenon of cultural diversity characterizing contemporary cities, the most important solutions brought forward so far will be briefly presented hereafter.

Initially, faced with the presence of diverse people in their cities, some theoreticians started to discuss the concept of *assimilation*[32], which suggests a complete absorption of a minority group within a dominant culture and therefore its possible disappearance over time, due to cultural suppression and obligation to conform to new rules, habits and practices. It is a gradual and one-way process, in which the host society is changed very little and the minority becomes almost indistinguishable from the majority. It involves integration within communities and neighbourhoods by owning or hiring a house or a flat, taking part to the activities of that community, acquiring intercultural competences and linguistic abilities, etc. Given the idea of suppression of one's origins, through the gradual adoption of the second language and of different cultural and social norms, the idea of assimilation was widely criticised and soon replaced by other forms and models of cohabitation.

As an alternative to assimilation, *integration* was subsequently suggested: it implies the full participation on the part of migrants/minorities, but also the acceptance and the openness of the host society. It is based on the active cooperation of both parts, in order to achieve social harmony. It appears to be a more liberal concept, on condition that it wouldn't re-inscribe the authority of the centre (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Racial_integration). Thus, host societies are encouraged to be more open to diversity, while migrants/minorities are suggested that aspects such as bilingual competence or the understanding of a country's legal and cultural systems represent advantages rather than conditions imposed with the view of ensuring the conformation of minorities to the majority's rules. The concept of integration is closely connected to the idea of *multiculturalism*, which is essentially based on the respect for human and cultural diversity, and the exclusion of a certain culture's hegemony. As compared to the integration model, multiculturalism involves not only the acceptance of diversity, but also the promotion of multiplicity and heterogeneity as positive factors of progress and development in a society. It is perceived as a better, more tolerant

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[32] Among the first theoreticians of assimilation, one can mention William I Thomas and Florian Zaniecki, who studied mainly the process of Polish emigration into Europe and the USA and published "The Polish Peasant in Europe and America, but also Robert E Park, Ernest Burgess and William I Thomas

alternative, which allows the free expression and formal manifestation of one's traditions and culture. Starting with the 1970s, many European countries adopted multiculturalism as an official policy, which involves: "recognition of multiple-citizenship; government support for newspapers, television and language in minority languages; support for minority festivals, holidays and celebrations; acceptance of traditional and religious dress in schools, the military and society in general; support for music and arts from minority cultures; programs to encourage minority representation in politics, science, engineering, technology, mathematics and the workforce in general" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Multiculturalism).

However, all these concepts have been revealed as hiding some negative connotations by some critics. For instance, the well-known writer Salman Rushdie identified instances of racism even at the level language, as some of the concepts mentioned above suggest that migrants, especially the Indian or Asian ones, are still discriminated against in Britain[33]. The critic argues in favour of a more pluralistic, post-colonial sense of British culture and national identity. In his essays, critical studies and novels, Rushdie celebrates "hybridity, impurity, intermingling, the transformation that comes of new and unexpected combinations of human beings, cultures, ideas, politics, movies, songs. It rejoices in mongrelization and fears the absolutism of the Pure. Melange, hotchpotch, a bit of this and a bit of that, is how newness enters the world. It is the great possibility that mass migration gives the world…" (Salman Rushdie, *Imaginary Homelands*, apud Bart Gilbert Moore, 2001: 195).

'*Hybridity'* thus appears as more progressive concept, as it excludes the idea of "purity" and therefore opposition between different cultures, races, social classes, etc, potentially diminishing, or even eliminating divergences and extremist attitudes; it also challenges all former assumptions about centre and periphery.

Homi Bhabha is another critic who has insisted on the importance of migrants' points of view. He argues that English literature, as well as Britain's image in the world, has changed enormously due to writers such as Salman Rushdie, Hanif Kureishi, Monica Ali or Zadie Smith. Using the city as the background for their novels, they challenge most former perspectives and assumptions. According to Bhabha:

"The historical and cultural experience of the Western metropolis cannot now be fictionalised without the marginal, oblique gaze of its postcolonial, migrant populations cutting across the imaginative metropolitan geography of territory and community, tradition and culture.

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[33] "A language reveals the attitudes of the people who use and shape it. And a whole declension of patronizing terminology can be found in the language in which inter-racial relations have been described inside Britain. At first, we are told, the goal was '*integration*'. Now this word rapidly came to mean '*assimilation':* a black man could only become integrated when he started behaving like a white one. After '*integration'* came the concept of '*racial harmony'*. Now once again, this sounded virtuous and desirable, but what it meant in practice was that blacks should be persuaded to live peaceably with whites, "in spite of all the injustices done to them every day. The call for '*racial harmony'* was simply an invitation to shut up and smile while nothing was done about our grievances. And now there's a new catchword: '*multiculturalism'*. In our schools, this means little more than teaching the kids a few bongo rhythms, how to tie a sari and so forth. In the police-training programme, it means telling cadets that black people are so 'culturally different' that they can't help making trouble. Multiculturalism is the last token gesture towards Britain's blacks, and it ought to be exposed, like 'integration' and 'racial harmony', for the sham it is." (Salman Rushdie, *The New Empire Within Britain*, reprinted in *Imaginary Homelands: Essays and criticism 1981-1991,* Granata Books in association with Penguin Books USA Inc.1922: 137).

Afro-Carribeans in St Pauls, Bristol, Muslims in Bradford, Punjabis in Southall, Gujaratis in Wembley, Cypriots and Turks in Stoke Newington, Tamilians in Tottenham, are now part of the air of reality that the novel breathes. These minorities, who are re-drawing the margins of the metropolis, also provide a frame for narratives of the loosely defined, postmodern condition." (Bhabha, *Novel Metropolis*, 1990: 16)

Homi Bhabha's criticism shows that the encounter between different people always affects all the parts involved in interaction. When discussing the relationship between the colonizers and the colonized, he exposes the concept of *mimicry* (which refers to the means whereby the colonized, either willingly or unwillingly, try to reproduce the colonizer's way of life or discourse) as inappropriate for the contemporary world. Like Rushdie or Kureishi, he adopts the term *hybridity* in order to describe the fusion of cultural forms that results from the cultural interaction of people coming from different ethnic, religious, or cultural backgrounds. He stresses the survival of the distinctive aspects of the culture of all parts interacting in a certain environment, and shows how these have become an integral part of new formations which arise from the clash of cultures.

The Image of contemporary London in the novels of Salman Rushdie, Hanif Kureishi, Monica Ali and Zadie Smith

Since 1945, the experience of migrants in London has been central to the preoccupations of writers, politicians and cultural analysts. As shown in the introductory part of this paper, the presence of immigrants started to be perceived more acutely with the arrival of people from the Caribbean, Africa, or South Asia in what used to be the imperial centre of the British Empire. Unlike the Irish, the Pole or the Jewish immigrants, whose presence was not conspicuous among the white, Anglo-Saxon and protestant population of London, West Indians or Asians could not be ignored because of the colour of their skin. Isolated from the British population through a series of personal or economic barriers (the inability to speak adequate English, the availability of jobs that confined migrants to the low levels of economic scale, the isolation within the members of their own community, preference for night shifts, sometimes even the hostility of the host community), these immigrants tended to group, as David Street suggests, into certain areas of the city (Street, 1978: 182). The deficient communication between the British and the foreigners living in London or other large cities of the Western world often resulted in tension, misunderstanding and prejudicial attitudes on both sides. Consequently, post-war and contemporary London has often been associated with a history of racism and prejudice.

As I shall try to highlight in the following sections of this paper, an important change in outlook, defined by a more democratic perception of otherness, is characteristic of a new generation of British writers, most of them being the offspring of racially/ethnically mixed families. Rather than insisting on the isolation of minorities within the city, they place a great emphasis upon the way the city has been re-created, both materially and imaginatively, by the migrants' fresh energies and imagination (John McLeod, 2005: 39). In other words, they illustrate the way in which a former 'imperial centre' has turned into a 'trans-cultural metropolis', characterized by ethnic diversity, linguistic heterogeneity, and cultural variety.

Dichotomies such as East/West, centre/periphery, black/white are challenged by post-war British writers, who strive to value the possibilities of a multicultural London and set them against the problems of racism and nationalism that trouble the city's social relations. In *Postcolonial London: Rewriting the Metropolis* (2005), John Mc Leod draws attention upon the power of literature, music, dance, or theatre, to challenge the imperialist

or racist attitudes and preconceived ideas. From the critic Homi Bhabha, McLeod adopted the phrase 'vernacular cosmopolitanism' in order to refer to the new forms of expression created out of the encounters of different kinds of Londoners, especially migrants and young artists:

"If officious discourses of British nationalism had changed the post-war years to suggest a particular intimacy between racial identity and national belonging, making the terms 'British' and 'white' almost homologous in ways which had not happened before, then the kinds of cosmopolitan, multicultural energies enabled by great metropolises like London suggest challenging new modes of social and cultural affiliation which exposed national discourses as ill-equipped to cope with contemporary conditions and contested prevailing attitudes to race and culture" (McLeod, 2005: 39).

The role of the 'other' in challenging fixed assumptions and creating new forms of interaction is emphasized in novels written by contemporary British writers. London may be regarded as a symbol of 'hybridity', where new forms of consciousness reflect a new world order. In spite of all the negative attitudes towards contemporary cities, which are sometimes the scene of terrorism, murder, extremism, religious and racial intolerance, the novels written during the post-war period by writers such as Salman Ruhdie, Hanif Kureishi, Monica Ali or Zadie Smith try to project an image of London as a better place, where the transforming power, resulting from the interaction between different ethnic groups, may be regarded as a positive aspect, causing the disappearance, rather than the emergence of cultural barriers.

a. Salman Rushdie's *The Satanic Verses*

Without fear of exaggeration, Salman Rushdie's *The Satanic Verses* may be considered the most controversial book published in Britain in the last decades. The violent reaction of people from India, Pakistan, South Africa, Iran, Britain, etc., at the publication of the novel in September 1988, culminating with the sentencing to death of its author for blasphemy, indicate how the freedom of speech can still be threatened by different forms of extremism. Ironically, what the writer wanted to emphasize in his book was the necessity for more tolerant attitudes in the contemporary multicultural and heterogeneous world. Rushdie disagrees with both the attempt of dominant groups to impose a certain identity upon "foreigners", and the tendency of marginalized people to perceive themselves as discriminated against or justified to respond with violence to discrimination. The impossibility of completely giving up one's ethnic identity in order to adopt another, or the danger of associating the image of *the other* with exclusively negative features, is also emphasized. Rushdie seems to be trying to express the view that all human beings, irrespective of their race, ethnicity, or religious belief, are both good and evil, both victims and criminals, both creators and destroyers. The characters that resist transformation cannot survive till the end of the book. Extremism of any kind leads to destruction and insanity. The 'mimicry' of others is rejected in favour of the redefinition of one's identity in the context of the diverse contemporary world.

In order to express his ideas more clearly, the writer has created a book with an intricate structure, where several narrative plots, themes and characters are knit together in a game of cross-reference, allusions, reflections and echoes. The odd sections of the book (one to seven) are set chiefly in contemporary London, while the even chapters, which include of dreams and fantastic stories, describe imaginary or mythical places. The last part (IX) is set in Bombay, the native city of the two main heroes. The mixture of fantasy and magic with the political satire and elements of every day life is characteristic of

Rushdie's fiction, but also to writers such as Gabirel García Márquez or Carlos Fuentes. The failure of the characters to be either demons or angels, to love without hating, to be honest without lying contributes to the clarification of the author's message: there are no absolutes in this world, and traditional assumptions of all kinds should be carefully questioned rather than easily accepted. Rushdie's derision at the claims of infallibility on the part of religious or political leaders has attracted, as indicated above, extreme reactions. However, his tone and the manner helped him create a book that does not establish rules, but raises questions with the view of creating a better world.

The portrayal of London as a mixed, non-homogeneous place contributes to the challenging of the English/European/white sense of identity, and the imperialistic claims at centrality. Rushdie's London seems to be dominated by immigrant-figures (Indians, Bengalis, Pakistanis, Poles, Jews), who clearly outnumber the Anglo-Saxon characters (Gibrieel Farishta, born Ismail Najmuddin, Sladin Chamcha, born Salahuddin Chamchawala, Muhammad Sufyan, Hind Sufyan, Mishal Sufian and Anahita Sufian, S. S. Sisodia are Indians; Alleluia Cone is the daughter of a Jewish expatriate; Uhuru Simba, originally named Sylvester Roberts, is a leader of a black militant group; Imam is the leader of fanatical Muslim extremists; the Anglo Saxon characters are minor and generally associated with negative traits of character: corruption, bigotry, egoism or stupidity. They are rarely identified, and often presented as a group). This insistence on non Anglo-Saxon characters should not be regarded as a mere reversal of terms, with the 'marginalized' categories placed at the centre, where they didn't have access for a long time. What the author insists on is the necessity to give up all forms of exclusion by suggesting models of identity that are more appropriate for the multicultural context of the contemporary city. In his opinion, the purity of one group is more and more difficult to be preserved, and people should be simply regarded as human beings, and not defined in terms of colour, nationality, their religious, political, or sexual preference.

Most characters of the book seem to illustrate a typical way of perceiving the multicultural world. For instance, Gibrieel Farishta is the symbol of the migrant who cannot adapt easily to the conditions of the Western world. Imam, the character that portrays the Ayatollah Khomeini, represents the extreme form of nationalism, being intolerant and rigid. Saladin's mother illustrates the person who defines her identity in terms of opposition to the others (in this case, the English). The Sufyan family exemplifies the reversal of roles in the traditional Muslim family after the contact with the Western world. Otto Cone is the prototype of the migrant who strives to become English. Pamela Lovelace, Saladin's wife, is the English woman fascinated by Indians. Mimi Mamoulain is the 'outsider' who manages to succeed in the competitive environment of Margaret Thatcher's England. Zeeny Vakil is the Indian lover of Saladin, who tries to 'reclaim' him and mocks his mimicry of the English. Saladin Chamcha seems to be the only character that undergoes a positive transformation in the novel: initially he betrays his Indian roots by simply changing one identity for another. This causes him much trouble, of which he is relieved only when he is capable of accepting transformation and manages to forge a new self, more appropriate for the diverse world in which he lives.

Since the characters of the book are so diverse, their perception of London is also varied, often contradictory. Those who cling to their Indian roots, for instance, idealise their homeland and describe London as the most deprived of all places. They try to isolate themselves from those around them or, as in the case of the insane Gibreel, they attempt to 'tropicalize' the city, that is to turn it into an image of their familiar, native environment.

Gibrieel embodies the native who, according to Fanon (actually quoted in Rushide's book), is "an oppressed person whose permanent dream is to become the persecutor". Convinced that the moral confusion of the English is "meteorologically induced", he decides to "tropicalize" the city, thus making it more like his native place:

"Gibreel enumerated the benefits of the proposed metamorphosis of London into a tropical city: increased moral definition, institution of a national siesta, development of vivid and expansive patterns of behaviour among the populace, higher-quality popular music, new birds in the trees (macaws, peacocks, cockatoos), new trees under the birds (coco-palms, tamarind, banyans with hanging beards). Improved street life, outrageously coloured flowers (magenta, vermilion, neon green) spider monkeys in the oaks. (…) Religious fervour, political ferment, renewal of interest in the intelligentsia. (…) Emergence of new social values: friends to commence dropping in on one another without making appointments, closure of old folks' homes, emphasis on the extended family. Spicier food; the use of water as well as paper in English toilets; the joy of running fully dressed through the first days of the monsoon.

Disadvantages: cholera, typhoid, legionnaires' disease, cockroaches, dust, noise, a culture of excess" (Rushdie, 1997: 363).

The comical description of Gibrieel's attempt to reverse symbols illustrates a tendency to turn from oppressed into oppressor by simply changing roles, as illustrated by the quotation from Fanon. Rushdie suggests that such an attitude cannot be accepted as a solution to the migrants' problems. He further ridicules the actions of the mad Gibreel, who experiences himself as capable of blowing the flames that will purge "Proper London", "Mahagonny", "Alphaville", "Airstrip One" of all its sins.

The opposite stance, that of rejecting one's origin and trying to adopt or copy another group's identity, is seen as equally destructive. The fact that Saladin Chamcha, the character who strives to become a 'proper Englishman', turns into a demon is not accidental. The term 'demonization' has often been used in literary criticism in order to refer to the process of imposing, through description, a certain identity upon the 'foreigners' by the members of a dominant group.

Saladin leaves his native Bombay, which he associates only with dusty streets, vulgarity, inadequate, uncivilised forms of behaviour, and excesses of all kinds. In his determination to become English, he is ready to do anything, even to adopt uncomfortable masks:

"… but never mind, he would be English, even if his classmates giggled at his voice and excluded him from their secrets, because these exclusions only increased his determination, and that was when he began to act, to find masks, clown masks, until he fooled them into thinking he was *okay*, he was *people-like-us*. He fooled them the way a sensitive human being can persuade gorillas to accept him into their family, or fondle and caress and stuff bananas in his mouth" (Rushdie, 1997: 44).

However, the need to forge a new identity rather than simply copy a ready-made one is indicated by the association of England with "a peculiar tasting smoked fish full of spikes ad bones" with which each stranger has to manage alone, since the others are unwilling to explain how it can be eaten.

In spite of the fact that Saladin becomes a successful 'voice impersonator', a radio man whose face remains hidden from the view of the English, his integration into the new world cannot be achieved until the transformation is complete and a new identity is created. His Indian lover Zeeny Vakil mocks at his false sense of self, and accuses him of having betrayed his roots:

"You know what you are, I'll tell you. A deserter is what, more English than, your Angrez accent wrapped around you like a flag, and don't think it's so perfect, it slips, baba, like a false moustache" (Rushdie, 1997: 53).

The metamorphosis of Saladin into a demon illustrates not only the ludicrous aspect of those who try to copy other people without attempting to adopt a new identity, but also the bigotry of the English who "demonize" foreigners by imposing upon them a certain identity. As long as Saladin is 'invisible' (he is successful because of his voice, not because of his face), the English are polite and human. When he is arrested as an illegal immigrant and turns into a goat-like (that is, visibly strange) creature, he is humiliated and treated badly by the police. "How could it be, after all", he wonders "where in all that moderate and commonsensical land was there room for such a police van in whose interior such events as these might plausibly transpire?" (Rushdie, 1997: 163). Unable to accept the racism of English society, he chooses to believe that he had indeed died in the explosion of the aeroplane and his bad treatment by the police is just part of a nightmare. Closed into a bizarre hospital where strange experiments are carried out, he eventually understands the processes whereby a dominant society dictates a certain way of reading the identity of immigrants. All the other creatures are turned from human beings into different animals by a process of description. As the goat-like Saladin is told by the manticore: "They describe us (…). That's all. They have the power of description, and we succumb to the pictures they construct" (Rushdie, 1997: 174). Accepting the other patients' offer to reject such treatment, Saladin manages to escape from the hospital and starts his journey towards a saner acceptance of the self. He loses his devilish appearance after a visit to the bizarre Hot Wax nightclub and, in spite of his misfortunes (the loss of his job, as well as of his English wife), he manages to continue the search for his real identity. He accepts his Indian heritage (and makes peace with his father) but refuses to reject the experience of migrant. In this way he turns into a hybrid person, able, unlike Gibreel or Imam, to love London, a city whose "conglomerate nature" mirrors his own. Saladin appreciates the city for its openness in spite of immigration laws and the "ingratitude of the refugees' children" (Rushdie, 1997: 413). Those who can accept any city as their home and are tolerant in relation to others appear to be better fit for the situation of the contemporary world.

Rushdie's cosmopolitan London can be described as a place that, through resistance to stereotyping, can become the space new identities are forged. In the modern city, the belief in individual freedom, tolerance, self-expression and love are seen as better alternatives to former ways of perceiving one's individuality in terms of difference from others, exclusion and hate. However, in order to allow change to flourish, old forms of discriminatory thinking must be eliminated. As Saladin Chamcha puts it both at the beginning and at the end of the book, "If the old refuses to die, the new could not be reborn".

b. Hanif Kureishi's *The Buddha of Suburbia*
Hanif Kureishi is another British writer who openly rejects the clear-cut definitions of cultural or ethnic identity, which is not surprising, as he is the son of a Pakistani father and an English mother. He always argues in favour of a transcendence of the forces that confine one within the borders of categories such as ethnic/cultural/sexual belonging. The central themes in his novels challenge dominant discourses about race, ethnicity, 'normal' sexuality or national belonging. His characters, though initially suspended between two cultures, eventually accept their condition of 'hybrids' and manage to adapt to the challenges of an ever-changing world. The author even suggests

that 'hybridity' might be regarded as constant feature of all humanity and not the exclusive "property" of a minority.

London is a favoured symbol of 'hybridity' in Hanif Kureishi's writing. In the novel entitled *The Buddha of Suburbia*, the experience of the main character, which seems to reflect that of Kureishi himself, is set against the background of the city. The author makes use of concepts such as *centre* and *periphery* in order to trace the trajectory followed by his main hero, Karim Amir, whose "migration" from the South London suburbs to the centre of the affluent metropolis is paralleled by his evolution from an insecure adolescent, who wants to succeed in the world, to the position of a successful actor.

As the son of an expatriate Indian aristocrat, who became a civil servant in London, and an English mother, Karim feels that, though part of two cultures and races, he doesn't fully belong to any of them. The adolescent describes himself as "a funny kind of Englishman, a new breed as it were, having emerged from two old histories" (Kureishi, 1990: 3), in other words – a hybrid. In the process of defining his identity, the adolescent constantly oscillates between Asian and English communities, as he symbolically moves form the suburbs towards the centre of London, eventually re-inventing himself while circumscribing London and devising a "city of the mind" (Brînzeu, 1997: 194), where his aspirations can find fulfilment.

The dreary suburbs are associated with periphery and marginality while London represents the luxurious centre, where life is lived intensely and everyone, irrespective of their race, is given a chance. The suburbs are blamed for the state of confusion in which the seventeen year old boy finds himself; the feeling of being "here and there, of belonging or not" is associated with his being brought up in suburbia. Karim yearns for a more interesting, intense way of living and is ready to take any kind of chance.

Karim is not the only character in the book that tries to reach the 'centre' of his life while fighting to escape the suffocating suburbia. Marginality, social and financial failure are uncomfortably experienced by most members of the Amir family, who find themselves at the confusing stage between lower and upper middle class. The English family of Karim's mother, Uncle Ted and Auntie Jane, are also fighting to climb the social ladder. Jamilla, the daughter of AnwarKarim's father Asian friend, runs away from her suburban home in order to escape an arranged marriage and the atmosphere of a traditionalist Muslim family. Karim's father, Haroon, leaves his wife and home to get rid of the bourgeois atmosphere of the suburbs. However, unlike other immigrants who want to become, by all means, a part of the mainstream society, Haroon is very proud of having preserved his Indian identity. His understanding, that his roots are located in an 'imagined India', distinguishes him sharply from his Muslim friend Anwar who, as the novel progresses, embraces a rigid and exclusionary conception of his identity. Anwar feels antipathy for the presence of Hindus in Britain, for Haroon's eating habits or his relationship with an English woman, which is not his wife. However, he turns out to be just a hypocrite, who hides behind the image of a strict Islamic identity.

Kamir's perspective upon life is different from that of the representatives of the older generation of immigrants. He is a 'new breed', a new type of person, whose identity is not 'pure' but 'hybrid'. The definition of his self parallels his attempt to escape from his class and ethnic origins. Although he first defines himself in terms of difference from the others and exposes the racism of the London society, he will finally accept his role in society.

While he is still living in suburbia, the location of Karim's dreams is London, the place where he wants to start a new life. Within the walls of his room, he fantasizes about London, in this way mocking at and rejecting the suburban milieu of uniformity and

routine. He cannot understand how people around him may prefer the security and safety of the suburban environment instead of the lively, whizzing atmosphere of the city. His dream is to cross the boundaries of his neighbourhood as quickly as possible and get away to London where life is 'bottomless in its temptations'. Sometimes he rides his bicycle through the streets of London, "nearly getting crushed (...) by lorries, head bent over the handlebars, swiftly running through the ten Campagnola gears, nipping through traffic, sometimes mounting the pavement, up one-way streets, breaking suddenly, accelerating by standing up on the pedals, exhilarated by thought and motion." (Kureishi, 1990: 63)

The rhythm of the city fascinates him; the journey he undertakes through its labyrinthine streets turns out to be a symbolic one, a quest for identity. He associates the city with the emergence of a new self and a brighter, more colourful life.

In the second part of the book, the metropolis is the scene on which Karim plays the part life has assigned to him, experiencing happiness and deceit, success and failure. The final paragraph of the novel suggests that, despite all difficulties, Karim seems to have escaped the marginality:

"As I sat in the centre of this old city that I loved, which itself sat at the bottom of a tiny island. I was surrounded by people I loved, and I felt happy and miserable at the same time. I thought of what a mess everything has been, but that wouldn't always be that way" (Kureishi, 1990: 248).

c. Zadie Smith's *White Teeth*

Zadie Smith's first and award winning novel[34] *White Teeth* (2000) focuses on the lives of three interlinked, ethnically mixed families living in North West London, and on their responses to the diversity of the multicultural city. It shows how racism and prejudice can still create problems in the contemporary world, although the experience of second generations of immigrants is very different from that of the first "participants" to the ocean-crossing experiment. Hybridity is accepted as a more appropriate definition for one's identity, and offered as an alternative to the rejection of modernity in the name of tradition or the repudiation of one's roots in an attempt to become fully assimilated into the host society. However, the problem of the divided ethnic consciousness represents the source of most of the conflicting situations in the book. As a response to the de-centred contemporary world, some characters find refuge in secular or sacred models of faith: for instance, Archie Jones relies on fate and the tossing of a coin whenever major decisions need to be made; Hortense Bowden becomes a fanatic follower of Jehovah's Witnesses; and Marcus Chalfen believes in the potential of genetic engineering to solve the problems of the world. The younger generations try to assert their personalities by becoming members of London's diverse youth cultures, or the city's multiple organizations, such as KEVIN (*Keepers of the Eternal and Victorious Islamic Nation*), or FATE (conducting campaigns against animal testers, torturers and exploiters). While describing their experiences, the author has the opportunity to reflect on the many cultural and social details of contemporary London, creating the vivid portrait of a dynamic and colourful city.

The conflicts experienced by the generations of unassimilated immigrants are generally reflected in the histories of the Joneses, the Bowdens and the Iqbals.

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[34] Published in 2000, Zadie Smith's *White Teeth* has won the *Guardian* First Book Award, the Whitbread First Novel Award, the Commonwealth Writers Prize, two Ethnic and Multicultural Media Awards, and was shortlisted for the *Mail on Sunday* John Llewellyn Rhys Prize, the Orange Prize for Fiction, and the Author's Club First Novel Award.

Archibald Jones, a working class Englishmen, marries Clara Bowden, the daughter of Black immigrants from Jamaica. Clara's blood is not entirely pure: her grandmother, a Jamaican beauty, was seduced by an Englishman, gave birth to Hortense, and became a convinced supporter of the Jehovah Witnesses' creeds. In the book, Hortense Bowden is the embodiment of religious fanaticism. She is also discontent with her daughter's marriage with a white man, with the "un-blackness" of her granddaughter, and their lapse from religion.

Irie Ambrosia, like her grandmother Hortense, is born of an English father and a Jamaican mother. Initially, she hopes to solve the crisis of her split self by trying to merge with the Chalfens (a third generation of Jewish immigrants, who have been fully assimilated in the British society). She rejects the religious fanaticism of her grandmother, but decides to return to Jamaica, to understand more about her ancestors. A symbolic scene, which also explains the title, occurs when Irie discovers that her mother's beautifully white, straight and perfect teeth are actually false. At the moment she realizes how little she knows about her true heritage.

Unlike the Joneses' hybridity, the purity of the Iqbals is the constant preoccupation of the Bengali Muslim Samad Iqbal, an "intellectual" waiter, as he likes to call himself. His twin sons Millat and Magid are the result of his arranged marriage with Alsana, the Muslim woman he brought to England. For him, the capital city of England is the centre of decadent living, where traditional beliefs and ways of life have been replaced by unacceptable forms of behaviour and thinking. His own sons prove to be more interested in fashionable clothes, noisy TV shows or sport rather than the teachings of Mohammed. They misbehave in the mosque, chase blonde white girls, and smoke tobacco or marijuana. Many other Muslim young people are in the same situation. As Samad puts it:

"Well, take Alsana's sisters – all their children are nothing but trouble. They won't go to mosque, they don't pray, they speak strangely, they eat all kinds of rubbish, they have intercourse with God knows who. No respect for tradition" (Smith, 2001: 165)

Samad can provide an entire list of young Blacks or Asians who gave up tradition and were corrupted trough the contact with the Western world: Mujab (fourteen, criminal record of joyriding), Khandakar (sixteen, white girlfriend, wore mascara in the evenings), Dipesh (fifteen, marijuana), Kurshed (eighteen, marijuana and very baggy trousers), Khaleda (seventeen, sex before marriage with a Chinese boy), Bimal (nineteen, doing a diploma in Drama) (Smith, 2001: 189). He is deeply worried about the descendants of the "great ocean-crossing experiment".

 Samad feels that, on coming to England, he has unconsciously signed a pact with the devil, which made him unable to return to his home in Bangladesh, in spite of the unpleasant weather and the awful English food. Once he came into contact with the Western hell, he became different, "unsuitable to return" (Smith, 2001: 349), and also unable to integrate completely. Eventually, not even a God-fearing person like Samad can remain immune to the corruption surrounding him. He perceives the assimilation into the Western society as a way of accepting the corruption that chacterises the Western world. Holding to his traditional culture and history, he hopes to preserve a sense of identity in the randomness and chaos of London. As a response to his crisis, he adopts Islam as his system of values. In an attempt to save at least one of his sons from the dangers of a de-centred world, he kidnaps Magid and sends him to Bangladesh to learn traditional Mulslim values. Through an ironical twist, Magid eventually becomes an atheist, while Millat, the son who grows up in London, enrols in a fundamentalist Islamic movement.

Smith presents with irony the characters that hold on to their history or religion too strictly. Hortense Bowden's fanaticism is constantly ridiculed, while Samad's piety is questioned by most of his actions, including his involvement with his sons' music teacher and his excessive drinking. However, reliance on religious faith, when nothing else can support one's sense of identity, is presented as an alternative response to the reality of a multicultural city.

As a result of repeated waves of immigration, contemporary London is described in the novel as a mosaic of cultures, religions, and colours. Besides the Joneses, the Bowdens and the Iqbals, there is Mickey, the owner of O'Connells Pool House and his cross-culturally named sons Abdul-Mickey and Abdul Colin; Mr Van, the Chinese chiropodist; Mr Segal, a Jewish carpenter; the Calfens, liberal and very English, though their ancestors are Jews.

The school where the Iqbal boys, Irie Jones and Joshua Chalfen learn may be regarded as a miniature image of the British society at large. Here, black British teenagers meet, befriend and fall in love with their English colleagues, without perceiving race or ethnicity as insurmountable barriers. Most of the white girls in the school are fascinated with the dark-skinned, violet-eyed Millat, without taking into consideration his personal history and his non-English roots. However, Irie, half-Jamaican and overweight, sometimes feels excluded. The presence of Black, Asian or Indian people is perceived as a natural fact. The school celebrates the diversity of religious festivals: Christmas, Ramadan, Chinese New Year, Diwali, Yom Kippur, Hanukkah, etc. Thus, the exclusiveness of a single tradition is given up in the favour of diversity and multiplicity. The idea of purity is always challenged. As Alsana puts it, "it's still easier to find the correct Hoover bag than to find one pure person, one pure faith, on the globe. Do you think anybody is English? Really English? It's a fairy tale." (Smith, 2001: 204)

The attempt to eliminate randomness and diversity from life, as illustrated by Marcus Chalfen's experiments in genetic engineering, is associated with fanaticism rather than with progress and the objectivity of science. Instead, he argues in favour of hybridity while comparing the cross-pollination of plants and the random mixing of genes and cultures. In both situations, diversity leads to healthy development and strength.

The coexistence of diverse people in London throughout history is reflected in the architecture of the city, and in places such as O'Connell Pool House, where Samad Iqbal and Archie Jones meet every evening to talk and drink. The name of the place is quite inadequate, since it has neither pool tables nor an Irish owner. At the end of the twentieth century it has been turned into a hybrid place, "half café, half gambling den" (Smith, 2001: 10-11), where an Iraqi owner cooks pork-free fey-ups. However, Abdul Mickey, the Arab who runs the pub, has chosen to preserve the memory of the place, so on the carpeted walls, one can see "George Stubbs's racehorse paintings, the framed fragments of some foreign, Eastern script (…) an Irish flag and a map of the Arab Emirates" (Smith, 2001: 159). Above the bar, a picture of Mangal Pande, Samad's ancestor and great hero from the so-called Indian Mutiny of 1857, also hangs. On entering O'Connell, one can experience the feeling that "nothing changes here, things are only retold, remembered" (Smith, 2001: 211).

Finding a neutral place, where history has not been inscribed on walls or images, is almost impossible in London. When Clara tries to reconcile the twins that have been separated for a long time, she looks for a space where "no Indian burial grounds, no Roman viaducts, no interred alien spacecraft, no foundations of a long-lost church" (Smith, 2001: 392) can be traced. Only a room in a South London University, which was

built on wasteland, can be considered appropriate. As in the case of people, and their unexpected mixtures of races, layer after layer of history can be detected under the surface in the city.

In order to emphasize the diversity of contemporary, postcolonial London, the author chose to reproduce of the varying sounds of the urban speech and to mingle different registers. The resulting polyphony of voices represents one of the book's strengths and most appreciated aspects.

d. Monica Ali – *Brick Lane*

Monica Ali was born in 1967 in Dhaka, Bangladesh, but her Anglo-Bengali family eventually settled in Britain in 1970. She grew up in Bolton, near Manchester, and studied Philosophy, Politics and Economics at the University of Oxford. Like Zadie Smith, she published a first novel that was shortlisted for the most prestigious literary prizes in Britain (The Man Booker Prize for Fiction, Guardian First Book Award, British Book Awards, The National Book Critics Circle Award, Orange Prize, Commonwealth Writer's Prize, etc.). For all this appreciation by literary critics, the book created controversy within the Bangladeshi population living in London, and was indicted for the negative presentation of the immigrant communities living in the Brick Lane region.

The novel focuses on an East London district where Nazneen, the main character of the book, arrives after being married to a man twice her age. Coming from the plain regions of Bangladesh to the heart of a multicultural London, the eighteen years old young woman will embark upon a process of discovery of both her self and of the world around her. She will gradually change from a person who wouldn't waste her energy fighting against fate (as the traditionalist cultural background she grew up in taught her to do) into a strong-willed and liberated woman. This transformation is set against the background of the 1980s and the 1990s London, a city that is portrayed not only as a centre for racial tension, but also as a place of freedom.

"What cannot be changed must be endured" Nazneen's mother would tell her daughter. Consequently, the young woman starts her existence in London as a wife who tries to observe the rules of the traditional culture she is part of. In spite of her lack of real affection for her husband (a kind but inefficient man, who keeps on blaming the racism of the Western society for the failure of most of his plans), she dedicates herself to domestic activities such as cleaning their over-furnished flat, cooking traditional meals (samosa, bhaji, curry and dal), and cutting her husband's corns with "dreadful regularity". When she needs to collect her thoughts, she reads passages from the *Coran*, and tries to convince herself that her father has arranged a good marriage for her. However, she cannot stop feeling trapped into a world made up of brick and concrete, dominated by "the muffled sounds of private lives sealed away above, below and around her". She tries to establish a sort of communication with the persons she sees from behind the curtained windows of her flat, and feels the urge to get out and meet other people, in spite of the fact that the only English phrases she is able to pronounce are: *sorry* and *thank you.* The only thing that makes her dream of a different world is represented by the skating shows she watches on TV.

On the rare occasions she gets out of the house, she walks one step behind her husband, and is forced to listen to Chanu's constant talking about the superiority of their culture to the Western one. Although in the Tower Hamlets district women continue to wear saris and men are dressed in panjabi-pyjamas, the contact with the white population brings about change. Nazneen watches with interest the English women's clothes, and admires her friend Razia for her courage to give up wearing the sari, and for attending

some language learning courses. She also supports, though silently, the ideas put forward by Mrs Azad, who does not blame English society but those who, despite the fact that they chose to live in London, refuse to adapt to the Western way of life.

While Nazneed is ready to accept change and become forward-looking, her husband Chanu chooses to dream of a space and a time he no longer belongs to. He represents the type of immigrant dominated by the thought of returning home. Convinced that the fate of the migrant is a tragic one, he argues in favour of preserving his identity and refuses integration into the host society. At the same time, he also distances himself from most of the other Bangladeshi living in London, who try, from his point of view "to just re-create the villages here (in London)". His failure in everything he tries to do is indicative of his insecurity and mistaken understanding of his existence.

Gradually, Nazneen proves to be more intelligent and practical than her husband. She not only turns into the breadwinner of the family (the sewing job she takes helps supporting the members of her family and pays for her husband's debts), but also manages to settle the conflicts caused by the clash between Chanu's traditionalism and their daughter's non-conformist attitudes.

Nazneen's first escapade alone in London helps her understand that, even if she might get lost, she will always manage to find her way back. The simple fact of talking to a stranger makes her more confident. Although she feels like straying through the paths of a labyrinth of concrete and asphalt, which hinders any form of communication with nature, Nanzeen is able to appreciate the importance of preserving contact with others. At the moment when Karim enters her life (he is the person who brings Nazneen work for her new sewing job), she feels like a crippled person who recovered a lost sense, after years of deprivation. Karim has the attitude of a powerful man, who hopes to motivate the local Muslims in their fight against white militants. In London, the war between the Bengali Tigers and the Lion Hearts is carried not only in the form of leaflets in which they accuse each other of interference into the normal course of life, but also in the form of street fights. In spite of the fact that Nanzeen comes to witness the riots that change London into a scene for racial conflict, she refuses to return with Chanu to Dhaka. She understands their two daughters' impossibility to adapt to a place dominated by tradition, after having lived several years in the Western world. She has the courage and the ability to continue to support them as a single parent in London, but eventually gets the prize of freedom. When, at the end of the novel, Shashana, Bibi and Razia take her to a skating rink and help her turn her old dream into reality, she understands that in England, and implicitly in London, "anything is possible".

Conclusions

Europe is not entity made up of countries and people sharing the same cultural values. Actually, it has never been culturally homogeneous. This feature has become even more obvious after the creation of the European Union. The possibilities to find jobs and accommodation in other countries have attracted people of different nationalities and origins - European and non-European - especially to the large and affluent cities of the EU. As a consequence, cities have become very diverse and colorful, though not unaffected by conflicts caused by this very diversity.

The leaders of states and the mayors of cities try to emphasize the major role played by cities in the context of the European Union and strive to ensure social cohesion, improve the life quality of citizens and stimulate the respect for national/regional/local identities. Despite their efforts, some of the models of cohabitation suggested so far –

assimilation, integration, multiculturalism – have not proved to be ideal solutions. As a response to the conflicting situations still characterizing many European cities today, the writers presented in this paper put forth the concept of "hybridity" that, in their opinion, reflects the essence of the contemporary world, where claims at national/ethnic/cultural purity can always be challenged. As Europe has become an extraordinary mosaic of cultures, they emphasize the importance of perceiving cultural diversity, or even cultural ambiguity as a positive factor and stimulator of cultural creativity. The presence of different cultural and ethnic groups in most European states should rather be regarded as a bridge, rather than dividing lime among nations and their citizens.

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II. EUROPEAN STUDIES

Mariana BUDA (Oradea) ⇔ *The introduction of European Studies in the Universities from Romania*

Monica OPROIU (Bucharest) ⇔ *The European Union's Comparative Advantage at a Crossroads*

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THE INTRODUCTION OF EUROPEAN STUDIES IN THE UNIVERSITIES FROM ROMANIA

Mariana BUDA[*]

Abstract. *In Romania, European Studies have been introduced relatively late compared with other European countries. Immediately after the fall of the Communism, Romanian universities made efforts to introduce the European dimension in their curricula. The first specializations of European Studies date from the middle of the 90th. Today, the Romanian Higher Education in the field of European Studies respects the European standard and provides courses at European level.*

European Studies, taught today in most European universities at bachelor, master or doctorate levels, became a natural component of the curricula of higher education study. They introduce the European dimension in higher education and over time, contributed to the ongoing process of European integration of countries from the European space to the great family of European Community and later the European Union.

Currently, there are differences or different ways of approaching the teaching - learning for European Studies in various countries of the European Union, according to the time of accession to it (J. González, R. Wagenaar, 2005:19). Founding countries of the European Union or those that joined the European Union many years ago see differently the European integration process and the European issues. We believe that this diversity is beneficial and it would be a mistake to impose uniformity in this field of study. However one can see many similarities in the objectives of European research programs and competencies that graduates need to acquire to complete their studies.

In Romania, European Studies have been introduced relatively late compared with other European countries, where they existed since the creation of the European Union, according to International Report[1] published in 1989 which include the place and role of European Studies in European Union countries to date. Andrei Marga, former education minister in Romania between December 1997 - December 2000, specifies in the volume *Years of Reform and what followed* that "In 2000 was covered the introduction of

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[*] Teaching Assistant, Department of European Studies and International Relations, Faculty of History, Geography and International Relations, University of Oradea, Romania. E-mail: buda@igri.ro

[1] In 1989, the Association of the European Community Studies (ECSA) has conducted an extensive report titled „Place de l'intégration européenne dans les programmes universitaires. Rapports nationaux" presented in Brussels on June 29 to 30, 1989 in ECSA-Europe Conference on the status of subjects with a European orientation, which includes state of European studies at each of the member countries of the European Community until 1990, or as its name says, place of European integration in the university curricula.

European studies in the curricula of schools, colleges and universities in the Romanian accession process to the European Union" (A. Marga, C. Baba, 2005:61).

In this study we wanted to verify from where European studies have emerged in Romania, as they were born and how they present themselves in Romania until 2000, when this phenomenon started to grow in our country by creating new disciplines in the spirit of the European Union and by creating new specializations in higher education.

This work does not pretend to be exhaustive. It would, however, reflect a state of affairs and an existing reality, an inventory of existing resources and it is a tool able to reflect a new approach and dynamic needs in the higher education.

Aspects of Romanian university education in the 90s

After 1989, education reform was one of the stated priorities of all governments that have succeeded. The years that followed were years of transition from all points of view, and in education it was felt quite strongly. The first three years of transition were characterized by the lack of a coherent policy on education. Immediate corrective measures have predominated, taken under the influence of various pressure groups, or the desire to eliminate as quickly as possible the most visible aspects of communist education. In government programs, the objectives regarding the education were irrelevant or were absent altogether (D.C. Radulescu, 2006: 108).

Romanian school in the early 90s was in a unique situation: it was forced to produce changes that the government was unable to challenge or even to manage. Until then the Ministry controlled administratively almost all aspects of university life. But in l968 Education Act (amended in 1977) had become largely ineffective. Phenomena as: curriculum development, international openness, emergence of new institutional structures (universities, colleges, private universities), pressure for university autonomy escaped from the ministry's capacity to contain them. Universities were moving faster than the ministry was reacting. And therefore his work was soon to meet the challenges coming to him, not to produce him a change. The reagent character was associated with the selective: although in that period appeared tens, even hundreds of private higher education institutions, the ministry didn't want to stick them into account, they do not exist. As a result, to the university life has been added the chaos, the legislative and institutional confusion (A. Miroiu *et al*, 1998: 117).

Romanian higher education in l993 showed in many ways unrecognizable. Only then the ministry has managed to initiate a difficult process of relocation into new frameworks of the already established. Has been developed a White Paper reform, has enacted Law no. 88/l993 on accreditation of higher education diplomas and has elaborated the draft of the education law (A. Miroiu *et al*, 1998: 117).

However, at national level they have made the following improvements: improve curriculum by refreshing the list of disciplines, enhancing international conference sessions organized in faculties, revival of the academic scientific production, progress equipping with modern equipment of faculties and departments, expanding group of specialists who participated in the meetings and international scientific activities. It also states that have strengthened the university faculties and departments and points out the universities do not yet have a 100% autonomous, leading them in part by laws developed long time ago. One aspect that seems important to note is that since 1993, Andrei Marga, Rector of Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca, expressing his intention of setting European Studies Faculty in the very near future at the University of Babes-Bolyai Cluj-Napoca (A. Marga, 2009: 18), this being the second of its kind in Eastern Europe. This

statement confirms the extraordinary opening of the University desires, but also the need to rally to a European system, free, democratic and a trend that existed at that time in Europe for a few years.

It is interesting to note that this trend towards Europeanization is found only in Transylvania at the time, space always characterized by multiculturalism and multiethnic.

Romanian education alignment to European standards

In this context of change in the academic year 1994-1995 is established at the University of Babes-Bolyai in Cluj, in addition to other specialties or independent colleges, the *School of Comparative European Studies*, as a school with rank of faculty (A. Marga, 2009: 30), thus promoting European Studies at undergraduate level. Just four years after the fall of communism in Romania is set the first School that speaks about the opening to Europe and to the values promoted by it. In addition, starting this academic year, many functional Cultural Centers are established besides the University, of which the most important for our research are the *European Center*, *Library of European Studies* and *International Mobility of Students Office* (A. Marga, 2009: 31), mentioning the importance of mobility in Europe and beyond, both as students and teachers. This year marks the choice of University of Cluj as a permanent member of the *Higher Committee of the Council of Europe* and its integration into the *European University Association* (A. Marga, 2009: 31).

In the academic year 1994-1995, at the initiative of the Academy of Economic Studies (ASE) in Bucharest, the Faculty of International Business and Economics (REI), a consortium of 13 partners and five Romanian EU partners is designed to elaborate and develop a TEMPUS project for teaching economics. The project was approved by the European Training Foundation and was applied in the 1995-1996 academic year (I. Popa, 1998: 122-123). It is, therefore, the beginning of European Studies in Bucharest, where they are taught at Master level.

1995-1996 academic year brings many changes in the lives of other universities: Pro Europe journals and several volumes of European Studies appear, at Babes-Bolyai University, the *School of Comparative European Studies* became the *Faculty of European Studies*, graduates obtaining license, this being "the most comprehensive international studies program in the country" (A. Marga, 2009: 65).

At the University of Timisoara are the foundations of a Comparative European Studies School, designed as a postgraduate program for three years. It aims is to achieve the purpose for which it was created, that is to form specialists who have skills in complex issues of building a united Europe. The studies curriculum is centered on several essential subjects related to politic, economic and legal components of European construction, but also with complementary disciplines including social sciences or modern languages. The author also mentions that the Schools is in the third year of existence, and already enjoys a reputation (C. Popeți, 1998: 132). We can, therefore appreciate that this school has started it's activity in the academic year 1994-1995, providing Master courses in European Studies.

At the Alexandru Ioan Cuza University from Iaşi, starting with the academic year 1997-1998, was created a postgraduate program, with an interdisciplinary character, completed with a Master's degree in European Studies (L. Vrănescu, 1998: 248).

A few years later, under the guidance of Adrian Miroiu[2], in spring 1998 is

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[2] It is currently professor of Political Science at the Faculty of Political Science, National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Bucharest.

published in volume titled The Romanian education today- Study of diagnostics at Publishing Polirom in Iasi. Here it is mentioned that "education modernization programs launched since 1990 have produced superficial effects curriculum" (A. Miroiu *et al*, 1998: 77), and to align with European standards, the Romanian education must still make progress. The progress that Romania should take into account to have a competitive education, but also the sense that is going this modernization, were linked to European demands that our country had to meet.   The legal basis of relations between Romania and the European Union is the European Association Agreement[3]. This document has been signed with Romania on 1 February 1993, was promulgated by the President of Romania on 5 April 1993 and published in the "Official Gazette" of 12 April 1993. Europe Agreement came into force on 1 February 1995. European Agreement establishing Romania association with the European Union to establish permanent political dialogue forms. On 22 June 1995, Romania has made, together with the formal application for EU membership, and the National Strategy for Romania's accession to the EU, which aims to provide some solutions on how to lift the European standards of various sectors. On 25 July 1996, was submitted to Brussels Romania's answer to the European Commission questionnaire on preparation of opinion on the application for EU membership.

On 16 July 1997, the European Commission released the package of documents known as Agenda 2000 and opinions on all the 10 associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Agenda 2000 provides a clear vision of the European Union means at entry into the twenty-first century. Based on this Agenda Romania has the duty to obtain an education guide to European standards, performance and competitive. Given the multitude of changes, but also establishing the first private universities in Romania, as well as increasing the number of public universities, of new faculties or study programs and specializations, was adopted the Law no. 88/1993, concerning accreditation of higher education diplomas, republished. Under this Act, was established the National Council for Academic Evaluation and Accreditation (CNEAA), who carried out the activities supported by evaluation, institutional and program accreditation (ARACIS, 2006: 3).

Later, in 1998 it founded at the University of Bucharest, the Department of International Relations and European Studies, which operates as an autonomous department of the Faculty of Letters, from the academic year 1998-1999. This   structure was designed from the perspective of higher education reform as an effort to modernize in line with developments in contemporary Romania, oriented towards European integration. In such a context and in the academic environment, European Cultural Studies department proposes this specialization, with duration of four years, held the day classes ended with a graduation exam and a paper.

Also during this period is created the university autonomy as a tool to optimize performance, by eliminating stagnation and irrelevance (A. Marga, 2009: 54). Arise also the university senates, composed of faculty members. Throughout this period of transition for the Romanian education and European level produced many changes occur. One of the most important changes in the level of education in Europe proposed is the Bologna Declaration in 1999. It was signed by the ministers responsible for higher education in 29 states, including Romania. The main objective of the Bologna Process is to create a European Higher Education Area, based on international cooperation and academic exchanges, a European space so attractive to students and European teachers and for

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[3] It is a treaty between the EU and non-EU country that creates the legal framework for cooperation
   between them.

students and teachers worldwide. By creating the European Higher Education Area is intended to facilitate mobility of students, graduates and staff in higher education, preparing students for their future careers and for life as active citizens of democratic societies, and providing support for their personal development and providing wide access to quality higher education. The three priorities of the Bologna Process are: introduction of a higher education system with three cycles (bachelor, master and doctorate), quality assurance and recognition of education qualifications and study periods (L. Pislaru, 2009).

In 2000, it established at the University Alexandru Ioan Cuza in Iasi the Center for European Studies. The mission of the Center for European Studies (CES) is to help to the cultural, economic and social development in North-East of Romania, as support for EU integration. The Center was established through the Phare program and operates since 2000 as an inter-departmental faculty of the University, providing academic programs for education, research and consulting designed to promote European values, to encourage dialogue on issues concerning European integration and contribute to Romania's EU accession preparation. After the year 2000 is established at several universities in Romania Centers, Departments or Chairs of European Studies and International Relations which begin to implement their projects in the framework of Jean Monnet Action.

European Studies in Romania

In the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the reflections on European Studies begin to be visible since 1997, even if the area is still very new. In 1997, at Cluj-Napoca is organized the conference *European Studies Today*, which reiterated the multidisciplinary nature of the domain, thus allowing the description, conceptualization, explanation and understanding of European realities, which is impossible under a single discipline (A. Marga, 1998: 13). The volume of this conference summarizes very well the concerns at that time for opening to European education, but also the state of the European studies in Romania in 1997.

In the opening volume, Andrei Marga, provides some clarification of the concept of European Studies. He says that the European studies are multidisciplinary studies, since their goal is to describe, to conceptualize, to explain and understand a reality that cannot be understood and synthesized by a single discipline. Moreover, the increasing complexity of life in recent years does not allow traditional mono-disciplinary approaches (A. Marga, 1998:13). In addition, he points out that all Europeans must share the same values, to defend and implement them through participation at their multiplication.

Dan Grigorescu shows the development of European studies through the European program TEMPUS for Romania. He says that TEMPUS program has had a big impact on institutions and its effects have resulted in new management practices at the departmental and faculty level, creating new departments and developing and introducing new activities in accordance with the new values (D. Grigorescu, 1998: 23).

Also in this context it is presented the challenge of Agenda 2000 and Romania's integration into European Union structures, article that highlights the importance of a faculty of European Studies in Romania (A. Boca, 1998: 50), but also their status as a specialist degree in European Studies at European level.The author emphasizes the importance of European studies for the preparation of specialists for Romania at the European institutions but also to offer a multidisciplinary opening to graduates of this specialization (G. Sabău, 1998: 73). Ioan Popa, in his study *Developing curricula for European Studies: a TEMPUS Experience*, proposes to analyze two important issues, from his point of view regarding the development of European Studies curriculum. First,

to what point the European studies may be considered as an area of special research and learning. In other words, on strictly economic field, the question arises whether there is any reason to talk about the European economy in particular, instead of economics or about international economic Euromarketing? Secondly, the question is whether indeed the introduction of European Studies curricula meet the requirements of system updates and upgrades to higher education, i.e the new disciplines "Euro" are indeed an improvement that touches the essence or are only some new books covering subjects hiding already outdated (I.Popa, 1998: 123). Thus, in the academic year 1994-1995 represents the beginning of European Studies in Bucharest, at Master level.

At the same conference, Cornelius Popeți proposes an interesting vision on European studies in his study entitled *The Institutionalization of European Studies - Achievements, Difficulties, and Perspectives*. From the outset stated that he believes that the promotion of European studies, i.e. placing them in institutions, must be addressed both from the perspective of Romania's integration in Europe, but also in terms of educational reform in our country. Thus, he proposes the following three main directions: first to be seen whether Romania has a strategy of integration into European structures. Then, he suggests checking the stage in which the educational reform in our country is, and the third, the author asks what the European studies are (C. Popeți, 1998: 131). His study responds, in turn, at all these issues raised. Moreover, he presents the moment of introduction of European studies in Timisoara. Thus at Timisoara University are the foundations of Comparative European Studies. This school has started its activity in the academic year 1994-1995, providing Master courses in European Studies.

An interesting perspective on European studies also offers Victor Neumann in his study entitled *Perspectives on European Studies in Romania: the training of trainers*. He said that the questions concerning the purpose of European studies is well justified since the theoretical debates fail to show their point of interest. It is difficult to determine the status of European Studies as a discipline, Victor Neumann said, as long as international institutions that promote such studies cannot be converged in having a common point of view on European studies (V. Neumann, 1998: 243). The author also mentions that it is an illusion to believe that the study of inter-governmental relations in their various variations, or that learning to solve certain problems related to political and social ways of organization, are sufficient to contemporary European studies. His skepticism, like other researchers, it is clear from the fact that the European studies cannot evolve without sufficient philosophical references and without a solid theoretical basis (V. Neumann, 1998: 243).

Livia Vrănescu in his article *Tempus Project Support for European Integration Studies,* explains the introduction of European-oriented studies at the Alexandru Ioan Cuza University from Iaşi. The author mentions that the University Senate decided in 1995 to create the Department of European Studies, this having an interdisciplinary character. The purpose of this department has been coordinating training programs for future teachers, but also developing a new curriculum. Finally, starting with the academic year 1997-1998, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University from Iaşi offers a postgraduate program in European Studies (L. Vrănescu, 1998: 248). The articles published in this volume, in the international conference *European Studies today* offers a clear vision of European studies at that time in Romania. We can conclude that between 1994-1997 were founded first programs of study in Romania in the European studies, most at Master's level. The fact that in 1997 in Romania was held such an event is a concrete proof of their existence and reveals a concern in this respect. Meetings with specialists in the European studies,

from other countries, as evidenced by the volume, are an important experience that can share the results and needs, but also may create new directions and developments.

Another important fact in the marking and delivery of European studies as a specialization in Romania is the publication in 2003 by Claudiu Crăciun of his study *Nesting Europe. The State of European Studies and Reasearch in Romania*. The aim of this paper is to initiate the formation of a true picture of European Studies and to provide information and insights that can help both the Romanian institutions in question and that school communities, to focus efforts and policies to a more rapid institutionalization of the discipline and research areas (C. Crăciun, 2003: 30).

Claudiu Crăciun says that the first departments that were founded in Romania were those of Political Science, which included various courses of International Relations and European Studies. He says the number is difficult to determine because many of them are in the permitting process or other in temporary operation. According to data presented, however, at that time, there were 10 departments of Political Science in Romania, of which only two independent. Another area that has tried to include European studies under their tutelage was Public Administration (C. Crăciun, 2003: 30).

In terms of competition and cooperation, the author asserts that one of the most striking features of European Studies departmental dynamics of European Studies is the competition for obtaining academic respect. The problem is that even this competition has its landmarks outside the country. The status of a department or program of study is given in principle by the existence of various funds, contacts with foreign organizations and institutions being very important, as the presence of renowned scientists. This is the trend that is observed in all the universities from Romania, since they are clearly oriented towards the outside and less inside. For this reason, many disciplines are lacking in content of the evidence of a national research agenda and an appropriate organizational support.

To understand how the European Studies are taught in Romania, Claudiu Crăciun proposes to take into account the following relevant issues. First, in the social sciences in Romania, students and faculty had to go through a period of transition from an ideological approach, dark and very authoritarian, to one more modern and oriented communication. For example, in Romania, before 1989, there are few traces of a rudimentary teaching of political science and intentional relations in the Academy „Ştefan Gheorghiu" from Bucharest, where Communist Party officials were trained. This institution would be a great base for teaching about Europe today. Second, the reform process can take a long time. However, this was somewhat amortized by the infusion of young professionals trained abroad. On the other hand, leaving aside ideological handicap, there were groups of specialists in different disciplinary areas (eg economics, law, history and even philosophy) who had to catch up, recover, to be able to contribute to the agenda of European Studies. The first department to cover aspects of European integration was the Law, which is easily explained. Scholars in Law had a previous experience, well prepared and of course access to information about Europe, namely the legal documents of 50 years of European construction. Other disciplines have necessarily followed, mainly by shifting some researchers to a new terrain rather than through the conscious reform of the old curriculum (C. Crăciun, 2003: 30). The evolution of European Studies in Romania is confirmed by the European Commission through the Directorate General for Education and Culture, Jean Monnet Project, which between 1990 and 2002 financed various academic initiatives: five modules Jean Monnet, nine permanent courses and four Jean Monnet Chairs in 9 Romanian universities. Taken together, they comprise 18 successful

initiatives within existing disciplines: four in History, four in EU law, 6 in the European Economy, two in Political Science and three multidisciplinary (C. Crăciun, 2003: 30).

In another order of ideas the stage of development was overcome by passing to the next step, especially in the departments receiving substantial international cooperation. It means, that very quickly it was realized that European studies and European construction is not just treaties and economic integration. The influence of political parties, issues related to culture and identity, transatlantic relations during Cold War were themes raised to make more explicit the processes of European construction. Looking, however, today at European studies courses, this initial phase of implementation of European studies is again exceeded, most political science departments move to the stage of specialization. Specialization means that the study of Europe begins to be strong related with various theoretical and illustrative issues. This is an advantage for the students who receive more information than five years ago on this subject, but the overall picture of European studies is still far from being heterogeneous and organized (C. Crăciun, 2003: 30).

In 2003, the publication year of Claudiu Crăciun's study, the Romanian institution that best promotes European studies was Romanian European Institute, as he says. This institution currently supports the only magazine that refers to European affairs: „The Romanian Journal of European Affairs", magazine that exists today. This is a trilingual publication, edited three times a year. European Commission through the Phare program has funded this initiative to which contributions come mainly from Western Europe, the Romanian ones being quite rare (C. Crăciun, 2003: 30).

At the end of the study, Claudiu Crăciun says that the most important in judging the importance, success and development of European studies in Romania are the students. In Romania there is still a difference of perception between the "dynamic" Europe, represented by the activities of the European Union and European state, which taught in the schools, and also the one related to the accompanying bureaucracy. The author concludes that if scientists will be able to demonstrate how Europe favorably influences the life of Europeans, there is a chance for a successful Europe (C. Crăciun, 2003: 35-36). This is the image that gives Claudius Crăciun on European studies in 2003. Subsequent developments and the developments that have taken place in this discipline are evident.

Aspects of Romanian university education today

Currently, in the documents of the Romanian Agency for Quality Assurance in Higher Education, the International Relations and European Studies field figures as part of Political Science department (ARACIS, 2009:18). A study program in this field must cover the following disciplines: *Introduction to International Relations, Introduction to European Studies, History of International Relations, World Economy, International Law, Research Methods in Social and Political Sciences, Introduction to Political Science, Political Ideologies in the contemporary era, European institutions, International Relations Theories, International institutions and organizations, Foreign policy and diplomacy*. We find also the following optional subjects, recommended: *Sociology of International Relations, Security Studies, Area Studies, International conflict analysis, Geostrategy and geopolitics, Negotiation and conflict in international relations, Globalism and globalization, European integration, EU law, The Governance in the EU, Community policies* (ARACIS, 2009: 22).

Firstly it can be noted that today European studies is a field of study, a specialization of the universities from Romania. This did not exist before 1989 in Romania, although other universities in Europe had already implemented the European

Studies programs[4]. Currently, in Romania we have a Faculty of European Studies, the first of its kind in Romania, namely the Faculty of European Studies in Cluj-Napoca and 17 universities, which through 19 faculties have in their programs of study European Studies specialization, which in Romania is associated with a specialization in International Relations, in short RISE[5]. These universities and colleges are: Andrei Şaguna University of Constanta, Faculty of Communication Sciences and Political Science, specializing in RISE, Ovidius University of Constanta, Faculty of History and Political Science, specializing in RISE, SNSPA, Bucharest, Faculty of Political Science, specializing in RISE, University of Bucharest, Faculty of Philosophy, specializing in European Studies and International Relations, University of Bucharest, Faculty of Letters, specializing in European Studies, West University of Timisoara, Faculty of Political Science, Philosophy and Communication Sciences, specializing in RISE, Spiru Haret University of Bucharest, Faculty of International Relations, History and Philosophy, specialization RISE, Danubius University of Galati, Faculty of International Relations and European Studies, specialization RISE, Mihail Kogălniceanu University of Iasi, Faculty of International Relations and European Studies, specialization RISE, University Alexandru Ioan Cuza of Iasi, Faculty of Philosophy and Social-Political Sciences, specializing in RISE, Lucian Blaga University from Sibiu, Faculty of Political Science, International Relations and European Studies, specialization RISE, Constantin Brâncuşi University of Targu-Jiu, Faculty of Public Administration and Comparative Political Studies, Specialization RISE, Petru Maior University of Targu-Mures, Faculty of Sciences and Letters, Specialty RISE, Western University Vasile Goldiş of Arad, Faculty of Humanities, Political and Administrative, specialization in RISE, University of Oradea, Faculty of History, Geography and International Relations, specialization in RISE, Babeş-Bolyai University from Cluj-Napoca, Faculty of European Studies, specialization in RISE, Babeş-Bolyai University from Cluj-Napoca, Faculty of History and Philosophy, specialization in RISE, Ştefan cel Mare University of Suceava, Faculty of History and Geography, specializing in RISE, University of Craiova, Faculty of Social Sciences, specialization in RISE.

If, before, the subjects were focused on Europe as a continent, without reference to the European Union, European Community, European Economy, etc, the subjects of today also refers to the idea of Europe as a continent especially in within some specializations, but also refers to the idea of European unity, European Union, the European institutions, European integration. This is somehow natural, given the political changes experienced by Romania in recent years: joining the European Union and the need for specialists to represent Romania in the European institutions, trained personnel who understand processes and high-level integration mechanism as, at local level, opening of young people and population, in general, to Europe. In addition, the Romanian Agency for Quality Assurance in Higher Education provides a compatibility with European standards. Thus, despite the existing diversity in the area of political science, there are some minimum standards or programs that need to share the university whose mission incorporates European Studies (Romanian Agency for Quality Assurance in Higher Education, 2009: 25).

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[4]Rapport „*Place de l'intégration européenne dans les programmes universitaires. Rapports nationaux*" presented in Brussels on 29 to 30 June 1989, confirmed the existence of European Studies programs in EU member states at that time

[5] International Relations and European Studies

In another order of ideas, the changes are very natural, given the fact that education is a dynamic process that must be folded on the needs of contemporary society and the population. In these circumstances higher education, and the entire education system needs to integrate into society, individuals and turn them to the extent possible, in useful citizens, worthy, with equal rights, able to integrate into a society that suffers the unbridled impact of technology and science.

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OMBUDSMAN OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Viktoriya SERZHANOVA[*]

Abstract. *The present work aims at presenting the European institution of Ombudsman whose main goal ist o study the complaints regarding the defective administration of the European institutions and bodies. Starting with the origins and the legal basis of this institution and continuing with the Ombudsman competences and roles, the study intends to bring about an important contribution to a better knowlege of all European citizen's rights*.

Keywords: *Ombudsman, Council of Europe, European Communities, EU*

1. The Origin and the Legal Basis of the EU Ombudsman

The idea of creating an institution of the Ombudsman for the European states appeared for the first time within the Council of Europe. It was tried to establish in 1971 during the European Parliamentary Conference for Human Rights, which took place in Wien. It was there that a possibility of appointing a body entitled to receive from citizens complaints for administrative authorities' activities was being considered. The intention of the authors of the idea was to equip the institution into the right to analyze the entering claims and next turn to appropriate administrative authorities in particular countries to be provided access to documents and information concerning the case being the subject of the claim. The principles, on which the functioning of the institution was supposed to be based on, was similar to the ones existing in the Scandinavian countries.

A debate on a possibility to create such an institution was renewed on the Community level at the end of 1970-s. The first step in this direction was taken by applying such a motion to the European Commission (then the Commission of the Communities) in 1979. In May, after presenting a special report on appointing the Community Ombudsman (later called Walker Smith's Report, named so after its author and reporter), the European Parliament adopted a resolution on this matter. However it did not bring any measurable effect.

The idea to appoint the institution did not revive until 1980-s. In 1984 a so-called Adonnino Commission was appointed for the purpose of preparing the basis for institutional reform of the European Communities. It aimed at creating a unitary international entity and contributed to the revival of the idea. One of the subjects of the Commission's activities was a concept of strengthening the system of human rights protection. The activities ended by handling a report addressed to the European Commission, presented to it on 28-29 June 1985. However the document discouraged the European Parliament to appoint the Ombudsman institution. It was mainly caused by a concern that the systems of human rights protection existing in particular Member States

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[*] Prof. Viktoriya Serzhanova, PhD., Faculty of Law and Administration, University of Rzeszow, Poland. E-mail: prodzagr@univ.rzeszw.pl

would lack common features. In the next years to come the Commission received consecutive motions in the matter of appointing the institution.

A concrete proposal was made in 1990 by Spain, which opted for introducing a European citizenship and a supranational institution being a mechanism to guarantee coming from it rights. Denmark definitely supported it by means of memorandum on political union. Legislative solutions for appointing the Ombudsman became the subject of the talks during the International Conference on Political Union, which took place on 20 February 1991. Taking into account some elements of the Spanish proposal, as well as Danish and Luxembourgish ones, which suggested a bit different solutions concerning the organ's position, competences and appointment procedure, there was adopted the final version of art. 138e (later art. 195) of the Treaty establishing the European Community on the matter of appointing the Ombudsman of the European Union. The institution was established on the basis of the provisions of the Treaty of Maastricht from 1992 (Mokra, 2007: 40).

The first Ombudsman was appointed on 12 July 1995. It was Jacob Söderman – the previous Parliamentary Ombudsman of Finland.

At present the legal basis of appointing the Ombudsman is included in art. 24 and 228 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (the Treaty of Lisbon)[1] – ex art. 21 and 195 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. However the most important for the institution's organisation and functioning legal act is the Decision of the European Parliament on the regulations and general conditions governing the performance of the Ombudsman's duties from 9 march 1994 with later amendments, sometimes also called Ombudsman's Statute. Moreover there are implementing provisions adopted by the Ombudsman – Decision of the European Ombudsman adopting implementing provisions from 8 July 2002 with later amendments.

2. Appointment and Recall Procedure, Position of the Ombudsman

A candidate for the Ombudsman's position must meet the following requirements:
• be the citizen of the European Union and possess all the civil and political rights;
• give full guarantees of independency;
• possess qualifications to hold the highest judge functions or
• possess qualifications and experience in holding the Ombudsman function in the Member State which he is a citizen of.

The Ombudsman is appointed by the European Parliament after every election for its five years term of office (Michalowska, 2007: 248; Fridrich, 2007: 162). There is a possibility to appoint the Ombudsman for consecutive terms of office without any limits concerning their number. The candidate must receive a support of at least 32 European deputies representing at least two Member States. The voting for each candidate is taken by a secret ballot. A simple majority of at least half of the parliamentarians' votes decides on the election. If consensus cannot be reached during the first two rounds of voting, the two candidates who receive the most number of votes in the second voting move to the next stage. If both candidates receive the same number of votes, the one senior by age wins.

Before the position assumption the Ombudsman takes an oath before the Court of Justice of the European Union.

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[1] Official Journal of the European Union C 115 of 9.5.2008.

The Ombudsman's term of office expires after the period of time he was appointed for. The Ombudsman can resign from his position or can also be recalled from it when he stops meeting the requirements necessary to execute the function or when he commits a serious offence. In the last case the Ombudsman is recalled by the Court of Justice on the motion of the European Parliament.

The fundamental attribute of the Ombudsman's activities is his independence. Moreover he cannot take up any other professional activity, both for salary or for free.

3. Competences of the European Ombudsman

European Ombudsman is appointed in order to protect human rights and freedoms within the European Union. He is considered to be the guard of these rights and the means of control over the abiding by the Community law.

From the subject point of view competences of the Ombudsman contain:
- all the citizens of the European Union,
- all the natural and legal persons residing or possessing their statutory offices registered in one of the Member States (Mokra, 2007:40).

If talking about competences of the Ombudsman from the subject point of view an essential matter seems to remain a concept of the European Union citizenship, defined by art. 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (ex art. 17 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community). Every person holding the nationality of an EU Member State legally becomes an EU citizen (Michałowska, 2007: 228; Fridrichova, 2008:50). It remains additional to and does not replace national citizenship.

However the Ombudsman's competences from the object point of view include so-called maladministration having taken place in the activity of an EU institution with the exception of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The concept of maladministration has not been defined homogeneously. There can be classified such activities of the EU institutions or authorities, which remain in nonconformity with the provisions of the Treaties and other acts of the European Union, as well as a violation of the European law rules determined by the Court of Justice of the European Union. Practically it is about procedural incorrectness, misuse of power, discrimination, prolixity of proceedings, denial of giving information, inactivity (Michałowska, 2007: 228; Mokra, 2008: 215).

A group of institutions and authorities (subjects) which remain under the Ombudsman's estimation can be divided into several categories. Firstly they are the basic EU authorities, such as the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission. Secondly they are the institutions appointed on the basis of the Treaty law, such as the Committee of the Regions, the European Central Bank, etc. The third group includes other authorities of a decentralized and assistant character, like for example the European Environment Agency, the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions and many other institutions acting within the EU structures (Fridrichova, 2008:49; Fridrich, 2008:215).

The activities of the Member State's authorities, even when facts of a case or legal conditions are connected with implementing the EU law, remain beyond the Ombudsman's jurisdiction (Mokra, 2006:40).

A complaint to the Ombudsman must meet certain formal requirements. It has to contain information about a mal administration incident, personal data of a complainant, it must also be handled not later than in a term of two years from the moment, in which a complainant learnt about the situation being the subject of the complaint.

Undertaking his activities the Ombudsman may lead control if he decides it reasoned, except the cases, when the facts, being the reproach, were or still are the subject of judicial proceedings. If the Ombudsman recognizes the complaint admissible he starts a preliminary proceedings. After that he turns to the institution, which activity or inactivity has become the subject of the complaint, to draw up a so-called introductory opinion. The institution is obliged to send a response within a three months' term. Later the Ombudsman sends the introductory opinion to the complainant, who is entitled to raise objections within a month term. On this stage of proceedings the Ombudsman may finish it on a reasonable basis. Such a situation can take place if the action, taken up by the institution, is enough from the point of view of the complainant's interest. If the result of the hitherto proceedings is not satisfactory the Ombudsman takes up further actions. He may present a recommendation draft containing a suggestion as to how the case should be solved. Then the institution is obliged to draw up a detailed opinion on the matter within a three months' term. The last stage of the proceedings includes handling a detailed report on it to the European Parliament (Michałowska, 2006:249).

The European Ombudsman's activity contributes to raising the quality of the EU institutions' work through eliminating irregularities and incorrectness, which may influence negatively the European integration process. Equipping citizens with an instrument of easily admissible complaint to the Ombudsman gives them a indirect possibility to make a "pressure" on the Union authorities in the present situation, when the EU administration starts to play more and more considerable part and the hitherto mechanisms remain not effective enough.

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THE EUROPEAN UNION'S COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE AT A CROSSROADS

Monica OPROIU[*]

Abstract. *The EU is getting more and more involved in crisis management and conflict prevention around the world, building a distinct identity by means of the Common Security and Defense Policy. Even though the defence part of the CSDP is currently underdeveloped, the security component – through the civilian and military crisis management – has established the EU as a major player in this field and forged its reputation as an honest broker. The Lisbon Treaty provides a clear legal framework for the EU to pursue a comprehensive approach drawing upon all the available instruments so as to prevent conflict and manage crises, while the new NATO Strategic Concept could make the Alliance a direct competitor in civilian crisis management. This paper looks at the specific pattern of civilian crisis management as performed by the EU and assesses its post-Lisbon perspectives.*

1. The Beginning

Civilian crisis management is an essential and specific instrument within the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union and it has no equivalent in the lexicon of any other international or regional organization (Nowak, 2006: 16). Even before civilian crisis management (CCM) as such was included as a distinct element of the CSDP in 1999, the concept of "non-military crisis management" was already in use within the EU and it defined any involvement of a civilian nature by the EU in a crisis situation. The entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty (1999) according to which the EU took over the Petersberg tasks from the Western European Union allowed the EU to begin the process of accumulating the necessary capabilities for implementing future decisions regarding conflict prevention and crisis management. In the meantime, as the war in Kosovo had come to an end, it became obvious the difficulty of endowing the UNMIK with a sufficient police force pertaining to the civilian component of this mission, thus signaling to the EU member states that it was necessary to consider developing non-military instruments for crisis response. The European Council of Cologne (in June 1999) asked for an assessment of such instruments that the EU and the member states had at their disposal. This inventory showed that both the EU and the member states had gained a rich experience or benefitted from significant resources in terms of humanitarian assistance, police, administrative and judicial rehabilitation, search and rescue operations, monitoring elections or human rights enforcement (Nowak, 2006:

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[*] PhD candidate in Political Science, National School of Political Studies and Public Administration, beneficiary of the „Doctoral Scholarships for a Sustainable Society" project, co-financed by the European Union through the European Social Fund, Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources and Development 2007-2013, Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: oproiu_monica@yahoo.com

18). At the end of 1999, the Helsinki European Council adopted the Action Plan for EU non-military crisis management which set the objectives in this domain: consolidating the synergy and the response at national, collective and NGO level in order to avoid duplication of resources and to improve performance, while maintaining for each contributor the flexibility to decide whether to engage in a certain crisis situation; facilitating and developing contributions by the EU to the crisis management activities of other organizations like the UN or the OSCE; ensuring inter-pillar coherence for EU initiatives (Nowak, 2006: 19).

According to the Action Plan, a study regarding the member states' experience and practice in this domain was initiated, which identified four major areas of interest. Acknowledged by the Feira European Council (in June 2000), those four areas were: police, strengthening of the rule of law, strengthening of the civilian administration and civil protection (Presidency Conclusions Feira European Council, 2000). The commitments taken initially were fulfilled and then renewed at the Conference on Capabilities which took place in December 2004. At the Conference it was decided that:

- in the field of police, the EU envisaged gaining the capacity to deploy any kind of police operation fulfilling various tasks from counseling, assistance and training to substituting for local police force in the host country; the member states committed to providing 5761 police officers of which 1400 to be deployable in 30 days maximum;

- in the field of strengthening of the rule of law, the aim was building the credibility of rule of law by ensuring an effective judicial and penitentiary system capable of supporting an efficient police force; the member states' commitment envisaged the availability of 631 persons for specific operations (judges, prosecutors, penitentiary officers, etc);

- the civilian administration component benefitted from the organization of a pool of experts – a total of 565 persons – to be deployed rapidly in specific missions within the effort of crisis management;

- finally, the civil protection component envisaged the availability of 2 to 3 assessment and coordination teams to be rapidly mobilized and deployed, intervention teams of 2000 persons each and of specialized supplementary equipment to be transferred in 2 to 7 days according to the crisis particularities; the member states' commitments envisaged a number of 579 experts of civil protection and 4445 persons as intervention personnel (ESDP - the civilian aspects of crisis management, 2009).

2. Institutional Developments

During the years 2000 the institutions involved in planning and operationalizing civilian crisis management were created, among which the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) is the most important, as the permanent structure responsible for an autonomous operational conduct of civilian CSDP operations. Moreover, the concept of „monitoring mission" was added to the four priority areas of Feira by a Political and Security Committee decision of May 27th 2003. According to this decision, the monitoring mission is an instrument that can be used during all phases of crisis management and consists of „a mission whose main activity is to observe, monitor and report to the organization that sent it about the general and security situation in the host country or regarding a particular agreement" (Concept for EU Monitoring Missions, 2003). Its mandate can be extended to activities such as low level conflict resolution and de-escalation assistance, contributions to confidence building, monitoring the return of refugees, of the borders, of the rule of law, observance of human rights, disarmament and

demobilization. This kind of mission fulfills the important task of prevention/deterrence by presence and ensures the EU is visible on the ground, thus probing its commitment for a particular crisis or region. At the same conference in 2004 the member states pledged the availability of 505 people for EU monitoring missions (ESDP - the civilian aspects of crisis management, 2009: 2).

A fifth dimension of the civilian component of crisis management was the activity of the EU Special Representatives (EUSR), which was often unequal in terms of efficiency or invisible on the ground. Rhetorically, their activity is meant to promote the policies and interests of the EU in conflict-striken regions and to contribute to the peace enforcement, stability and strengthening of the rule of law (EU Council Secretariat factsheet: EU Special Representatives, 2009). In 2010, the EU benefitted from the activity of 11 such EUSRs in countries and regions like Afghanistan, the Great Lakes Region in Africa, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central Asia, Kosovo, FYROM, the Republic of Moldova, Sudan, South Caucasus, Middle East and to the African Union.

In 2004 the first Action Plan for civilian aspects of crisis management was adopted after the launching of the European Security Strategy. This Action Plan asked for more ambitious objectives and proportional efforts in order to attain them, drawing attention to the need of using „the entire set of potential responses" at the European Community and member states level and within the CFSP/ESDP as well, so as to ensure peace, stability and development in conflict-torn regions or countries (Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP, 2004). Moreover, it was highlighted that the future ESDP missions had to become more comprehensive, more flexible and more adaptable because the EU had to develop a capacity to deploy experts in integrated formats - the structure, dimensions and functions of which were to vary according to the crisis particularities. In addition to this, it was considered that the expertise of the EU civilian missions had to be extended in order to comprise fields such as human rights, political affairs, security sector reform, mediation, border control, disarmament, demobilization, reintegration of former combatants and media policies.

An essential starting point for achieving the stated goals was the unitary training of experts coming from different member states, since the recruitment procedures varied greatly at national level; another issue was the lack of a direct link between training and deployment on the ground, an issue that still persists today. That is why the Concept and EU Training Programme for the ESDP was adopted in 2004, which aimed at improving the inter-operability of civilian personnel coming from various member states and at sharing a common culture of the ESDP based on the lessons learnt from the previous missions(Cameron, 2007: 182).

Together with the Action Plan adopted in June 2004, the European Council decided to elaborate periodical Civilian Headline Goals (CHG), the first of which had to be attained in 2008. What was new about this programme was an integrated approach which highlighted the need of improving inter-pillar coherence and of the ESDP operational capabilities; in addition to the four priority areas identified by the Feira European Council, the CHG included monitoring missions, the activity of the EUSRs and the contribution to processes of security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) respectively (Civilian Headline Goal2008 2004).

The implementation of Headline Goal 2008 began in 2005, the priorities being the rapid response capacity, the coordination with military capabilities and the coherence between the initiatives of the Council and the Commission; in addition to this, the Civilian Response Teams (CRT) were conceptualized, their tasks being assessment and fact-finding

missions in a crisis situation, rapid operational presence on the ground following a Council Joint Action, the purpose of which was to prepare the launching of a civilian crisis management mission, the strengthening of EU mechanisms on the ground as an emergency response, under the coordination of a Special Representative (Multifunctional Civilian Crisis Management Resources in Integrated Format-Civilian Response Teams 2005).

A new conference aiming at improving the civilian capabilities took place in November 2007 which also adopted the Headline Goal 2010. The new objectives had a particularly qualitative dimension regarding the training and expertise of the personnel for ESDP missions and the planning and deployment of those missions (procedures, logistics, equipment, inter-operability, lessons learnt); moreover, they also had a component regarding the availability and engagement of national resources (periodical evaluations of the available potential, increasing the number of personnel seconded from national level) and the synergy with the military element of the ESDP, with the European Community initiatives and with the activity of regional and international organizations (Civilian Headline Goal2010 2007). These goals had to be fulfilled by the end of 2010, when a new assessment was envisaged.

3. The Operations So Far

The first civilian crisis management operation was launched in 2003 and since then a diversification of the types of missions and an extension of the geographical area within which the EU undertakes crisis management operations has been taking place. The EU launched 24 missions until today, 12 of which are ongoing; among the total of 24 missions, 16 were civilian ones – in the Western Balkans (EUPM in Bosnia Herzegovina; EULEX Kosovo; EUPOL PROXIMA and EUPAT in FYROM), the Middle East (EUBAM Rafah and EUPOL COPPS in the Palestinian territories, EUJUST LEX in Iraq), in the South Caucasus (EUJUST THEMIS şi EUMM in Georgia), in Africa (EU SSR in Guineea Bissau, EUPOL RD Congo and EUSEC RD Congo, a supporting mission for AMIS II in Darfur/Sudan) and in Asia (EUPOL Afghanistan and the Monitoring Mission in Aceh, Indonesia) (Civilian CSDP missions: lessons and best practices 2011). Of these 16, 8 are ongoing.

The 8 years which have passed since the launching of the first EU civilian operation marked an evolution that can be measured through the increasing number and diversity of the missions, the development of the capacity to support several missions at the same time, the significant numbers of the engaged personnel and especially through the success on the ground.

While the first civilian crisis management operation was a police mission (EUPM Bosnia Herzegovina), today the range of missions is greatly diverse and includes also security sector reform, police reform, the judicial and penitentiary system reform – all wrapped in an integrated approach on the functioning of the rule of law after a crisis or the escalation of a conflict took place. At the same time, the methodologies used for these missions have evolved as well, from the classical monitoring, mentoring and counselling to the complex monitoring of cease-fire agreements (EUMM Georgia) and taking over the executive functions in a state whose leadership cannot perform them (EULEX Kosovo performs functions of police, customs and judicial systems). Last but not least, the extent of the CCM component of the ESDP has triggered a proportional institutional effort culminating in the creation in 2007 of a central command structure in Brussels, led by the Civilian Operations Commander, assisted by the Civilian Planning and Conduct

Capability comprising a number of 60 police officers, judges, diplomats and political advisers (Klompenhouwer, 2009: 31).

The major advantages that CCM holds in comparison with other instruments developed by the UE pertain to flexibility, reduced costs, long term effects, effectiveness even without political consensus at a certain point. The ESDP missions are initiated following consensus reached by the member states, who establish their mandate and endow them with resources, set the evolution track which they adapt to the conditions on the ground and the political context. Having at its disposal the human and financial resources of 27 member states who are generally willing to participate in such ESDP missions represents a convincing argument for the success on the ground, the more so because an EU-level approach has many more advantages then that of any individual member state when it comes to the relationship with the host country. It is true at the same time that the common resources for CCM are limited, but nevertheless this civilian security capability remains unique in the world (Klompenhouwer, 2009: 32). Flexibility is entailed by the fact that the launching of a civilian operation is generally welcome and less affected by juridical controversies (which could prevent a military mission) or ideological ones (pertaining to the debate about a future European army) and its mandate can always be modified so as to adapt to the political evolutions that might alter the initial context which made the mission necessary in the first place. Moreover, the civilian missions are less costly than the military ones and represent only a very small fraction of the budget for the EU's external action, but nevertheless they bring remarkable long term benefits (stabilization, eliminating the hotbed of conflict, the refugees flows and human suffering in general in the respective regions and PR gains for the EU, too – visibility on the ground, strengthening of its legitimacy and prestige as honest broker). Last but not least, this kind of missions can maintain their effectiveness even in the absence of or in the context of a diluating political consensus, as was demonstrated in the case of EUMM Georgia (the mandate of which was extended, even if soon after its launching there was no more consensus for imposing sanctions on Russia because of the August 2008 war).

4. Perspectives After The Lisbon Treaty

The Lisbon Treaty – which entered into force in 2009 – encompasses significant changes as far as the security and defence component of the EU policy is concerned. First of all, the European Security and Defence Policy was renamed the Common Security and Defence Policy, thus signaling a stronger commitment from the member states for the EU's endeavours in this field. As part of the effort to ensure the coherence of the EU's external action, the crisis management structures within the General Secretariat of the Council were to be transferred to the newly created European External Action Service as a distinct unit placed under the direct authority of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. During the process of designing this new EU body, the members of the European Parliament, who had an important role for approving the EEAS project, insisted that these structures be directly subordinated to the HR and thus ensure a transparent chain of political accountability. Moreover, the Treaty highlighted the fact that the EU can use military and civilian instruments in the framework of the CSDP to the purpose of maintaining peace, preventing conflicts and strengthening international security (Article 28A TUE Lisbon Treaty, 2007). What was new in this approach was the extension of the Petersberg-type missions, now comprising joint actions for disarmament, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-

making and post-conflict stabilization (Article 28B TUE Lisbon Treaty, 2007). All these tasks could be used so as to contribute to the fight against terrorism as well, including by providing support to a third country for combating terrorism in its own territory. Furthermore, a new mutual defence clause was introduced, which provided that „if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power" (Article 28A Lisbon Treaty, 2007).

Last but not least, the Treaty provides for the permanent structured cooperation to take place between the member states in the field of security and defence as well, committing the willing ones to "proceed more intensively to develop defence capacities through the development of national contributions and participation in multinational forces, in the main European equipment programmes, in the activity of the European Defence Agency, and to have the capacity to supply by either at national level or as a component of multinational force groups, targeted combat units for the missions planned, structured at a tactical level as a battle group, with support elements including transport and logistics, capable of carrying out the tasks referred to in Article 28 B of the Treaty on European Union" (Article 28E Lisbon Treaty, 2007) .

What did not change was that voting in the Council in matters regarding CSDP – including the launching of missions, both civilian and military – is subject to unanimity among member states.

If the operational novelties will become visible in the medium and long term, the institutional changes are the ones taking the forefront at the moment. First of all, the creation of the EEAS triggered a massive restructuring of the EU's foreign policy apparatus which did not left untouched the crisis management structures within the Council. Now, the HR is the highest authority governing these structures – from the Political and Security Committee which assess the need for launching missions to the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD - encompassing both civilian and military elements) which plans and deploys those respective missions – and the EEAS project was amended consistently by the MEPs so as to ensure clear accountability and that the military leadership of EU missions would not be placed under the authority of a civil servant like the Secretary General of the EEAS, as was designed in the initial draft of the project (EUobserver, 2010). Second of all, the HR envisages eliminating the EU Special Representatives for various countries or regions, since the Heads of Missions within the future embassies of the EU would be in the forefront. The appointment of the EU Special Representative in Afghanistan as the Head of the EU Commission's delegation in Kabul set a trend that will become the general rule in the future. Consequently, if maintained, the office of EU Special Representative will cover a broader geographical area and not just a single state as was the case with the EUSRs for the Republic of Moldova or the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). For instance, there will be a single EUSR covering the Balkan region.

But another interesting parallel development is the inclusion in the new Strategic Concept of NATO – which was adopted at the Lisbon summit in October – of the commitment to develop a civilian crisis management component within NATO, too, as part of the lessons learnt in the war in Afghanistan. The 29 Allies thus decided to "form an appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability to interface more effectively with civilian partners; this capability may also be used to plan, employ and coordinate civilian activities until conditions allow for the transfer of those responsibilities and tasks to other actors; enhance integrated civilian-military planning throughout the crisis

spectrum; identify and train civilian specialists from member states, made available for rapid deployment by Allies for selected missions, able to work alongside our military personnel and civilian specialists from partner countries and institutions" (Article 25 NATO Strategic Concept, 2010). In this context, the question arising is whether the two organizations will enter a competition in the field of civilian crisis management and if what represented a comparative advantage for the UE in crisis management so far could diminish or, on the contrary, a certain "division of labour" would become more and more obvious between the two – with the EU focusing on civilian crisis management and NATO maintaining its military instruments while being unable to truly develop a civilian component as well.

Conclusion

Although it is generally perceived as a reactive measure, civilian crisis management by the EU – in the framework of CSDP – plays an essential role in stabilizing the (sometimes explosive) situation on the ground in crises and armed phases of conflicts and, in combination with other EU instruments for conflict prevention and crisis management, upholds a comprehensive and unique approach to these phenomena, thus strongly individualizing the EU among the regional and international security actors. It is obvious that any kind of CCM operation is undertaken for security reasons by the EU, the more so because it is deployed in the near neighbourhood of the EU or in areas that are traditionally connected with the EU Member States (like Africa or the Middle East). Moreover, the manner in which the EU designs and deploys these operations provides "the indispensable link between security and development" (Klompenhouwer 2009: 32), thus offering a chance to stabilization on the long term according to the fundamental values promoted by the EU and by using its own institutional and financial resources.

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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION - INNOVATION LEADERS WITH DIFFERENT OUTCOMES

Olivér KOVÁCS[*], *Ágnes OROSZ*[**]

Abstract. *Our study attempts to contribute to the better understanding of the economic realization problem of the European higher education innovations by using the science and technology policy approach. The paper points out some imperfections by giving a landscape about the situation in the European Union. While one strand of economic literature suggests that the increased expenditures on R&D and on innovation lead to better economic performances we empirically pinpoint that the thriving expenditures per se are not necessarily enough to stimulate growth.*

Now we live in a knowledge-based society where innovation plays a major role in economic development that is why science and technology Policy (henceafter STP) is a noteworthy field in the world and in the EU as well. Its importance is based on the recognition that an economy's growth potential can be influenced by the tools of STP in facilitating the innovation opportunities. Salomon (1977) defined science policy as the accelerator of scientific and technological development and also as the institutional factor of the economic utilization of the innovative outcomes. STP affects technological development and finally economic growth (Solow, 1957; Barro – Sala-i-Martin, 1999). STP has to be streamlined while being adapted to the economic and political circumstances of the given country. The key factor of economic growth is innovation as Schumpeter (1936) claimed. Although the relationship between policy and science is ambivalent, so there is a strong need for the dynamic co-operation between the actors. Just the whole society is able to influence this ambivalent relationship heading toward the right direction. Policy should coordinate science without violating scientific freedom but science needs policy as well because social needs are transmitted by political institutions (UNESCO, 2006).

Science policy is a part of the comprehensive social policy moreover to the science policy organically related technology policy is a political competence (Mosoniné – Tolnai 2008). The matching point between them is R&D and innovation. We consider innovation beyond the Schumpeterian framework as innovative opportunities supported by higher education rather than just innovations of the enterprises. STP has to foster the

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[*] Ph.D candidate, ICEG European Center, Faculty of Economics, University of Debrecen, Hungary. E-mail: olko.ktk@gmail.com
[**] Ph.D candidate, Faculty of Economics, University of Debrecen, Hungary. E-mail: agnes.orosz@econ.unideb.hu

expansion of new scientific knowledge while adjusting the scientific development to the actual challenges and demand (Friesenbichler – Leo, 2007).

Within science policy the role of the universities are crucial. The triple helix model shows the relationship among university, government and industry. The central element of this system is the positive synergy among the three different actors in knowledge spillovers. The model emphasizes that the university stands at the centre of the innovation progress with its academic-based research and development activities, the industry's role is to provide customer-demand-based commercial activities as well as research and development, and the government stands as a policy maker (Irawati, 2006).

The integration of these different actors lies at the heart of the triple helix system, the quality of their relationship is stressed according to the triple helix model. In this system the science policy does not simply mean "knowledge production" (Gibbons et al., 1994). Now in the knowledge-based society we expect from the universities (1) to generate new knowledge; (2) to apply the new scientific developments and methods and to implement knowledge and technology transfer; (3) to introduce the new scientific developments into the education process (Schlett, 2004).

Our paper begins with the overview of the science policy concerning higher education in the European Union in order to give a comprehensive picture about the current situation. After we emphasize that the Union has to make up its backlog, we outline the Finnish and the German experiences which are the cases of being innovation leader with different outcomes.

Science policy in the European Union

We can consider the 1970s as a beginning of a new era therefore science policy has been playing a more and more important field within the European Union's policies. The science policy is inspired by the idea of building a knowledge-based society but the unfavourable demographic conditions cause serious challenges to the education system and to science policy as well. It is becoming more and more obvious that the economic development and the social cohesion in a knowledge-based society can be reached through education. That is why lifelong learning is an essential policy in the EU which was stressed in 2000 on the Santa Maria da Feira European Council Meeting (European Council 2000). There are several programmes which promote lifelong learning like the Leonardo da Vinci sectoral programme. "The aim of the Leonardo da Vinci programme is to contribute through lifelong learning to the development of the Community as an advanced knowledge society, with sustainable economic development, more and better jobs and greater social cohesion. It aims to foster interaction, cooperation and mobility between education and training systems within the Community, so that they become a world quality reference" (EUPA, 2010). Another programme for improving education is the ARION. The aim of the ERASMUS programme is to encourage and support academic mobility of students and teachers within the European Union. These programmes stimulate transnational partnerships and network co-operations among the institutions of higher education, companies and national laboratories.

Research and development lies at the heart of the strategy of the European Union. It was set at the Lisbon Strategy to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy by 2010. This strategy has had to be renewed which is called Europe 2020. The aim regarding to the innovation capacity has remained: 3% of the EU's GDP should be invested in R&D (European Commission, 2010).

The innovation gap of the European Union

The growth rate data of the European Union have been disappointing for the last 30 years but policymakers have only recently started to realise that Europe's growth performance is in close connection with the research performance in which the role of the universities are crucial. The problems of the universities are the unsatisfactory autonomy, the inappropriate governance and the counterincentives (Aghion et al., 2007).

During the last two decades higher education innovation reforms have been introduced across Europe. We can conclude that the innovation gap has gently decreased between the European Union and its two main competitors (C*hart 1*), the US and Japan but the international comparisons related to the STP permanently emphasize that there is much room for improvement in Europe in order to eliminate the differences and the inappropriate achievements which are undoubtedly reflected in the economic growth rates as well.

Chart 1. Evolution of innovation gap among EU25, US and Japan
Source: EIS (2006): European Innovation Scoreboard. Comparative Analysis of Innovation Performance, pp. 5.
Note: the vertical axis shows the difference among summery innovation indices (SII).

Despite the decrease of the performance gap between the EU and its two main competitors there is still a significant difference in the economic utilization of the innovation outcomes, in which the EU still lags behind (Conti – Gaulé, 2009). According to the PISA[41] ranking the performance of the secondary education system is around the average in the US. In this case it is very likely that the competitiveness advantage of the US is reached by the higher education performance. It can be illustrated by the Jiao Tong ranking of the universities, in which among the first 20 universities we can count 17 from the US (e.g. Harvard, MIT, Yale, Stanford, Columbia, Berkeley, Chicago University, Princeton, Cornell), two British (Cambridge and Oxford) and one Japanese (The University of Tokyo) (Török, 2006).

Innovation can contribute to the economic growth, but not just its number counts regarding to the successful economic utilization. For example the macroeconomic performance of the United States has permanently improved since the 1980s while the innovation activity has remained stable. The effectiveness is the key factor which can be demonstrated by the university licence fees. In Europe the licence revenues are remarkably lower compared to the US (Thursby et al., 2007). We can conclude that the

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[41] PISA assesses how far students near the end of compulsory education have acquired some of the knowledge and skills that are essential for full participation in society. In all cycles, the domains of reading, mathematical and scientific literacy are covered not merely in terms of mastery of the school curriculum, but in terms of important knowledge and skills needed in adult life PISA (2010).

reason for the EU's performance gap is the lower level of co-operation between the business sector and the universities, the lower level of industrial innovation and R&D activity, the distorting incentive system (Aghion et al., 2007), the lower level of R&D spending and the lack of autonomy at the universities.

The United States in its innovation strategy emphasize the importance of the co-operation between the higher education institutions and the private sector in order to assist the economic utilization of the innovations. The role of the universities has increased along the innovation progress. In order to drive innovation some companies have utilized research partnerships with universities either by directly funding research or by co-locating research centres on the available university campuses. For example, Intel has established university research centres at Carnegie Mellon University, the University of California Berkeley. It may be advantageous to form partnerships in the geographic area in the neighbourhood of the company's headquarters, but there are increased opportunities and incentives to form research partnerships with high-quality universities around the globe (Council of Economic Advisers, 2008).

**Chart 2.** GERD and its international distribution (% of GDP)
Source: OECD (2008): Main Science and Technology Indicators 2008-1, Key figures pp. 3.
Note: GERD represents the gross expenditure on research and development in proportion of GDP.

In the Japanese science and technology policy the economic utilization of the new developments plays a major role in which the priorities are life sciences, information and

communication technologies (Stenberg – Nagano, 2009). The structure of the national research institutions has been modernized in order to foster competition among them, the autonomy of the universities has been improved and the educational structure has been reshaped to fit the demand for industrial workforce (Oba, 2005).

The international comparisons related to science policy permanently emphasize that in Europe there is much room for improving the innovation performance. The American and Japanese experiences prove that the governments should increase the investments and should improve the autonomy in the higher education field (Aghion et al., 2007). The innovation leaders within the European Union are Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Germany (EIS, 2009; Hall – Mairesse, 2006). These countries have been able to extend and to take advantage of their innovation capacity (Stern et al., 2000). The innovation followers are the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria.

The innovation capacity can be measured by the Gross domestic Expenditure on Research and Development (GERD) which is a statistical series, constructed by adding together the intramural expenditures on R&D as reported by the performing sectors. As it is discernible on *Chart 2* the European Union still lags behind the OECD average in terms of R&D expenditures. For example the Lisbon Strategy's 3% target was eclipsed only by Sweden, Finland and Japan in 2004 (Götzfried, 2005). The government still plays an active role in the innovation processes but the desired governmental function is only coordinating and organizing rather than financing, although the Lisbon Strategy constrains the robust increase of the R&D expenditures (Rodrigues, 2003; Gács 2005; Palánkai, 2006).

Chart 3. Share of the innovator firms in some European countries 2002-2004
Source: CNR (2010a): Scienza e Tecnologia in cifre Aggiornamenti 2008, Fig. 11.4.

In Japan the direct financing system has additional quantitative limiting factors as for example the amount of R&D revenues, the number of publications or the number of patents (OECD, 2005). Thus, the utilization of resources is more favourable in Japan than in the EU.

Chart 3 shows the share of innovator firms in some European countries. As can be seen, *Chart 3* covers the years 2002 to 2004 and shows that the number of the innovator firms was the highest in Germany and Ireland. The innovation performance in the

Scandinavian countries was above EU27 average as well. The figures seem to indicate that R&D expenditures tend to increase simultaneously by economic development (NSB, 2004).

The science policy point of view also deserves attention, how and where tilts the innovation's balance from the enterprises in terms of co-operations with public research organizations in the same period of time *(Chart 4.)*. As shown in *Chart 4* the Scandinavian countries are leaders referring to the co-operations between public research institutes and business sector. Although, Germany is also an innovation leader, its position is far behind them. Apart from this, the expenditure on R&D by business sector is a relatively good indicator of the development level of the given country.

Chart 4. Distribution of innovative firms in collaborating with public research institutes 2002-2004
Source: CNR (2010b): Scienza e Tecnologia in cifre Aggiornamenti 2008, Fig. 11.6.

The higher value represents more competitive economy (Török, 2006). The sheer fact of numerical leeway does not indicate the inability of the German's business sector to successfully reach the economic realization of the innovation results. The transformational quality of the expenditures is crucial (Mustó, 2005), i.e. the nature and efficiency of collaborations are more important than their quantity. Consequently, the quality of institutions are essential, which are likely to be in a good condition if the propensity to invest reflects in a certain extent the competitiveness. *Chart 5* gives us an opportunity to contemplate how the expenditures on R&D and higher education can trigger the international competitiveness of countries.

As a result of uniquely designed national strategies, Scandinavian countries operate predominantly under a relatively high investment rate in percentage of GDP. The European Union does not centralize to all intents and purposes the science policy by creating a supranational institution, thus science policies remain active at the national levels. The key line of bearing is the better exploitation of innovation capacities among higher education, business sector and research institutes.[42]

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[42] These priorities were among the main topics of Bologna Policy Forum especially on the further reforms of higher education (Rauhvargers et al., 2009).

Chart 5. Distribution of investments in knowledge production in 2004 (% of GDP)
Source: OECD (2007): Science Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2007, pp. 23.
Note: (a) illustrates data collected in 2003

Country briefs
    Nowadays the STP is rising to its deserved eminence in the European Union. In the following we concentrate on the STP of Finland and Germany of which surpassing performances can be regarded as the most cited examples in the literature. Specifically, we tend our focus on the economic utilization of the higher education innovations.

Finland
    The pro-active accentuation of innovation policy can be traditionally ranked to the Finnish basic values (Pajarinen – Ylä-Anttila, 1999). Finland's innovation policy has been concentrating on the enhancement of the firms' innovation ability since the 1960s, when the Finnish National Fund for Research and Development (SITRA) was established. The perceptible shift in the STP's focus to the innovation and R&D had a benevolent effect on the potential economic growth (Niininen, 2000).
    Finland as a Scandinavian welfare state faced with the worst economic crisis regarding to its depth and length in the early 1990s seen in any industrialized economies since the World War II. The economic crisis can be treated as a matrix with many exogenous and endogenous factors (Gorodnichenko et al., 2009). The major substantive factors were the lack of appropriate regulation for the financial and banking sector, the economic bubble, and the unambiguously visible shrinkage of exports due to the collapse of the bilateral trade with the Soviet Union (Sutela, 1991).
    Finland also had to overcome the crisis on the side of public finance. To this end, Finnish government implemented a very large fiscal consolidation and structural reforms in order to bring closer the feasibility of sustainable public finance. The Finnish STP also had a substantial role in the recovery process. The government made the innovation,

research and development and higher education dimensions immune to the fiscal rigor in the spirit of *self-sufficient innovation* activity; they increased the flow of expenditures rather than cutting back the financial resources. This made happen the markedly contribution of the software- and information technology sector to the revival process of the Finnish economy, additionally to the lasting economic growth and sustainability of welfare state.

The institutions of Finnish STP went through an evolutionary development parallel with the economic history. The Science and Technology Policy Council is responsible for the image design and the function of Finnish science policy by providing recommendations and comprehensive control mechanism. It analyses the Finnish economy from different aspects, prepares the necessary plans, and submits them to the all-time government. First and foremost it concentrates mostly on the followings: research and development policy, scientific education and research. Its role also covers the financial issues of R&D in the light of the economic and public finance conditions. The Finnish science policy emphasizes the importance of the streamlined trans-border scientific and technological collaborations. The major stakeholders are also involved in the Council, such as the Academy of Finland[43] or the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation (TEKES). The first institution is in charge of providing the needs of basic research; the second is accountable for the duly channelling of fiscal transfers to the sanctuary of applied research (research institutes, labs) (Hjerppe – Kiander, 2004). These transfers have to be used for networking among firms and institutions. The most renowned universities and labour unions are also members in the Council beyond the public institutions (e.g. Ministry of Education).

The fostering of a new institutional configuration became a crucial backbone of the Finnish science policy since the accession to the European Union. Therefore the policy has officially committed itself to bolster any co-operation with the different levels and objectives among the Finnish industry, the public research institutes and universities. The main task of SITRA is to acclimatize the innovation approach in the domestic economic policy, and to fund rentable SMEs operating in the high-technology sector which firms are able to utilize economically the major results of university researches. The Board of Directors are responsible for the science policy of Academy. This organization allocates the resources among the research groups. The funds are assigned to the tenders by professional competences. The Finnish science policy aims the basic research at the academic level, which is completely in accordance with the 7th Framework Programme of the European Union. Thus, we can claim that the Finnish practice has already recognized the central importance of the axes of basic research and technology development for many years. The percolation of research achievements to the economic sphere is solved through this recognition.

The Finnish state also plays a crucial role in the field of research and development. The Technical Research Centre of Finland (VTT) was established in 1942. This independent professional organization aims to enhance the competitiveness of firms by capacity building for more developed R&D and technological activity in order to make the successful conquer of new markets available. Technically, the VTT is an institutionalized linchpin between the basic- and applied research. VTT covers the following key areas: constructing and transport, biotechnology, industrial systems, process

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[43] The executives of Council are excluded from getting any subsidies for their own groups. This penal term can filter the corruption and unethical behaviour out from practice. As a corollary of this, the level of trust can be permanently high.

technology, information technology and electronics (Vossensteyn, 2008). The R&D expenditures by the Finnish government were oscillated around 3% of GDP over the period 2000-2009 *(Table 1.)*. The structure of R&D expenditures showed a very strong orientation towards the company sector. Moreover, the publicly established R&D activities have shown a visible increasing since the early 1980s (Oksanen, 2000), the public expenditures are allocated to the SMEs through righteous tendering process (European Commission, 2006). The changes affected the propensity to mobility and emigration. More and more high-skilled Finnish people decide to re-migrate.

Scientific and technological development in Finland 2000-2009   **Table 1**

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
R&D expenditures by government sector	0.35	0.34	0.35	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.29	0.3	0.34
R&D expenditures by business entr. sector	2.37	2.36	2.35	2.43	2.42	2.46	2.48	2.51	2.77	2.87
R&D expenditures by higher education sector	0.6	0.6	0.64	0.66	0.68	0.66	0.65	0.65	0.64	0.7
Employment in high- and medium-high techology manufecturing sectors	7.23	7.44	7.38	6.85	6.79	6.76	6.81	7.3	6.95	n.a
European hich-techology patents	121.59	119.883	115.138	106.803	127.993	115.804	104.694	39.665	n.a	n.a
Venture capital investments - early stages	135.428	140.405	98.713	84.498	40.246	68.816	45.261	70.774	61.642	n.a
Internet access	n.a	n.a	44	47	51	54	65	69	72	78

Source: Eurostat   (2010a):   Science   and   technology database.   Available   at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database
Note: R&D expenditures are in % of GDP, employment data are in % of total employment, patents are in million of inhabitants, venture capital is in millions of euro, the internet access is in % of households.

According to the view of the institutional apparatus of Finland science and technology policy the most driving forces are found in two prominent areas. The first is the efforts for the heightened willingness to mobility; the second one is the thriving interdependency among different places of the World (TEKES, 2006). The relevance of the human resources and the production of useful knowledge are inevitable on the road to an era of information society (UNESCO, 2005). There is a visibly growing demand for such changes of science and education policy which promote the better collaboration opportunities and integration among the actors. This general principle was fully adopted in the innovation strategy action program of the Finnish higher education system. The state

has been investing into the higher- and further education in surpassingly high volume. The beneficial effect of this behaviour is the durable impulse for the Finnish economic growth. The distribution of R&D expenditures towards higher education by fields of science is eloquent and illustrates the major driving force of Finnish information and telecommunication industries. The science policy calls its attention not just to the natural sciences, but to the technology sciences as well. The distribution was in 2007: Social sciences and Humanities 29%; Natural sciences 25%; Medical sciences 23%; Technology sciences 20% and Agricultural and forestry sciences 3% (Eurostat 2010a).

The higher education system, including its 20 universities and 29 polytechnics, made the fulfilment of human resource development easier due to its high flexibility and notable internal mobility (e.g. growth in the number of PhD degree). Nevertheless, Finland has reached success in the deepening process of industrial linkages. As for the number of foreign researchers, experts and students, the science policy has still room for improvement in the near future. As a result of the magnetic attractiveness of the Finnish technology-intensive industries, the depth of the industrial linkages are surpassingly good due to the high interest of foreign firms. There were lots of investments in Finland building the "innovation stove" during the 1990s. The capital invested into the information- and communication sector searched and looked after the still possessed and potentially obtainable linkages with higher education and research institutes (Hjerppe – Kiander, 2004).

The focal point of the national science- and technology policy is the bridge building over the chasm amid the clustering, network creating and the information-technological programs of higher education. As a reaction to the global challenges, Finland has striving to make its science policy in line with the Finnish long term strategy within the confines of the national innovation system (Cogan – McDevitt, 2003). It mostly happens through the creation of international (e.g. Nordic Council; Council of the Baltic Sea States), which are managed by the Academy of Finland, the Center for International Mobility and the TEKES also has a close ties with foreign associations (e.g. Swedish partner institutes). Furthermore, the STP has ranked to its goals the attraction of foreign eminent experts by the initiation of the so-called "Distinguished Professors" project which is in conjunction with the aspirations of mobility program.

The National Innovation System of Finland has provided the improved autonomy of the universities, the enhanced efficiency of the R&D and innovation strategy. The major corollary was the increased potential of economic growth, ultimately the extended latitude of financial resources for research and development.

Germany

The improvement of the innovation capacity and the international competitiveness has been cardinal policy aims for decades in Germany. The Nobel Prize winner Emil Fischer as a science policymaker urged the awareness in science policy and in innovation in order to support the economic utilization of the new developments. In the process of innovation in which the outcomes of basic research are converted into marketable products, the higher education institutions play a central role. That is why the German science policy has always focused on the improvement of universities' performance and on the innovation culture.

The effectiveness of the German universities is a boundary condition of the innovation success and contributes to the innovation leader role (Aghion et al., 2009). *Table 2* illustrates clearly that the number of R&D oriented start-up companies was increased significantly at every actor during the 1990s.

Number of R&D oriented start-ups established in Germany   **Table 2**

Spin out from	1990	1997
University Professor	140	240
University Student	205	395
University Total	345	635
National Laboratory	73	152
Company	247	458
Total	665	1245

Source: Noboru (2004) pp. 6.

If we examine the R&D expenditures' sectoral distribution we can conclude that in Germany and in the Scandinavian countries as well information technology and bio-technology are the dominant industries. One of the German science policy's major problems is that the higher educational structure is not harmonized with the industrial demand. The distribution of R&D expenditures towards higher education by fields of science illustrates it clearly. The distribution was in 2007 the following: Natural sciences 29%; Medical sciences 27%; Social sciences and Humanities 22%; Technology sciences 20% and Agricultural and forestry sciences 2% (Eurostat 2010a).

The leitmotifs of the German science policy are the following: (1) Forming competitive research projects in order to foster co-operation between the different actors. (2) Setting up scientific and research clusters providing innovation-friendly climate for the economy co-financed by the federal state, the higher education institutions and the business field. (3) Adjusting education to the occupational structure and supporting the mobility between the higher education institutions. (4) Creating safer and more prosperous working conditions to young scientists, researchers and academics. (5) Subsidizing the university research centres and the other laboratories. (6) Modernizing the infrastructure of higher education institutions.

In order to foster competition among the universities, the Federal Government and the states have launched the "Excellence Initiative". The main goal is to strengthen Germany as a knowledge hub, improve its international edge, and give its leading universities and academics a far higher profile (Tatsachen über Deutschland, 2010). Institutions of higher education are facing great challenges in Germany that is why the Higher Education Pact 2020 tends to improve the flexibility of the universities and the autonomy of research centres.

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Scientific and technological development in Germany 2000-2009   **Table 3**

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
R&D expenditures by government sector	0.33	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.34	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.36	n.a.
R&D expenditures by business entr. sector	1.73	1.72	1.72	1.76	1.74	1.72	1.77	1.77	1.84	n.a.
R&D expenditures by higher education sector	0.4	0.4	0.42	0.43	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.43	n.a.
Employment in high- and medium-high techology manufacturing sectors	11.19	11.22	11.37	11.05	11.24	10.50	10.72	10.72	10.89	n.a.
European hich-techology patents	49.734	49.037	46.37	39.673	42.965	38.659	37.612	25.491	n.a.	n.a.
Venture capital investments - early stages	1652.572	1154.34	560.82	292.42	353.53	304.87	264.25	426.528	464.853	n.a.
Internet access (% of households)	n.a.	n.a.	46	54	60	62	67	71	75	79

Source: Eurostat   (2010a):   Science   and   technology database.   Available   at:
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database
Note: R&D expenditures are in % of GDP, employment data is in % of total employment, patents
are in million of inhabitants, venture capital is in millions of euro.

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In order to foster competition among the universities, the Federal Government and the states have launched the "Excellence Initiative". The main goal is to strengthen Germany as a knowledge hub, improve its international edge, and give its leading universities and academics a far higher profile (Tatsachen über Deutschland, 2010). Institutions of higher education are facing great challenges in Germany that is why the Higher Education Pact 2020 tends to improve the flexibility of the universities and the autonomy of research centres. Many studies regarding to German science policy do not analyse the regional differences because it is assumed that German unification has led to a total transformation process of the East German science system. It can be proved by the more and more East-West collaborations after the fall of the Wall, partly caused by

Western scientists getting positions in the East (Havemann et al., 2006). Contrary to this point of view our study emphasizes the importance of the regional disparities.

Today Germany is still divided into two parts, the higher education system has been never completely unified. The distribution of staff and students represents this properly, only one-third of the highest-ranking professorships in East Germany are now held by East Germans, and an East German professor in a West German university is an uncommon phenomenon. The proportion of East German students in West Germany is only 2% but 14% of students who grew up in East Germany study in West Germany.

We can observe both advantages and problems at the same time examining the East German higher education institutions. First of all, the equipment at East German universities is more modern comparing to many West German universities, having been almost completely updated in the last few years and the staff-to-student ratio is very favourable. The most important problem is the post-effect of the changes in the university system, resulting in refraining from any further reform. It is problematic that the East German academic environment is very conservative which hinders the evolution of entrepreneurial universities (Pasternack, 2000). The unification has not completed yet, the differences at the higher education affect the innovation capacity and the economic performance as well which finally influences the convergence between the regions.

Disparities of the economic performance exist not only between countries but also between regions of the same country. However this trend can be also observed in R&D expenditures as a proportion of GDP. The largest difference between two regions in 2005 was observed in Germany, and was 5.2 percentage points; conversely, the smallest gap was in Ireland at 0.21 percentage points (Petrovka, 2009). These outstanding differences at the innovation performance may have significant effect on the convergence process, and this as such explains the still remaining regional disparities in the economic performance. The Western part of Germany has undergone continuous technological development since the World War II thanks to the foreign direct investments while the Eastern part lagged behind in the field of innovation during the planned economy period (Münter – Sturm 2003).

The long-term objective of the European Union and Germany is the maintenance of economic development in every region. This is to be achieved by strengthening competitiveness, improving employment and education and boosting research and development activities in order to reduce inequalities between regions with different economic development levels (Making your business…, 2008). The support of education and R&D activities is beneficial to the economic development, moreover it is an useful tool to reduce the regional inequalities. Griffith et al. (2006) show that firms in East Germany are more likely to undertake R&D than those in West Germany. This result is also observed at the aggregate level, for instance the share of continuous R&D performers in East Germany was 28 % as against 24% in West Germany in 2000. An explanation for this surprising result can be the existence of special support programmes for firms located in East Germany to help the catching up process on the productivity of West German firms. The productivity gap in East Germany is still high, the productivity per worker was only 77% compared to the West in 2007 (Ragnitz, 2007). If we accept the conclusion of the newest wave of the economic growth theories, claiming that the main driving force is the innovation, it would be surpassingly observable that the growth rates of the once GDR's regions have not been able to overshadow the Western performance (Wirtschaftsdaten neue Bundesländer, 2009).

The German performance is quite puzzling because it is an innovation leader, the R&D activity of the companies is prominent, but the innovative co-operation between the SMEs and public research centres is low. Examining the insolvency rates we can observe that Germany has the highest rate after France in Western Europe, on the back of this its rate is still higher in East Germany than in the Western part (Euler Hermes 2009). We can summarize that the Eastern innovative companies are not able to improve their competitiveness. Additionally the entrepreneur activity is lower in East Germany (Sternberg et al., 2006), but the propensity to research and development is higher according to Griffith et al. (2006). We can conclude that East Germany has serious problems with the free-rider behaviour of the Western companies of which Eastern settlements are dominated by the governmental subsidies (Zimmermann, 2007).

The above mentioned problem might worsen further if the necessary fiscal consolidation curbs significantly the governmental investment incentives (this took place during the fiscal adjustment period in 1996-1997). Consequently, the likelihood of the occurrence of declining investment activism including the R&D performance is growing especially in the lack of sufficient public incentives. The situation of economic policy is controversial (Günther, 2004). On the one hand, Germany has to operate with strict fiscal discipline in order to meet the Maastricht criteria and to successfully cope with the current global financial crisis. On the other hand, the dampening incentives might aggravate the smoothening process of inequalities and could stymie the positive outlooks of German economic growth.

Comparative summary of Finland and Germany

The simple reason behind why we chose Finland and Germany was the fact that despite they are innovation leader; significant differences can be explored in their economic growth performances relative to each other. The solution of this puzzling question might be educational in the light of new economic growth models, which extremely emphasize the role of innovation amid the major factors of growth. The presented two cases *per se* could serve important message for the European science and technology policy as well.


Chart 6. Real GDP growth in Finland and Germany
Source: Eurostat (2010b): Economy and finance. Available at:
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database

The science and technology policy compellingly promoted the growth of R&D expenditures. As it depicts (*Chart 6 and 7*), Finland has committed itself to a steeper

increase compared to Germany, and as if this might have contributed to better performance of the Finnish economic growth over the increasing period. The real GDP growth rate was permanently higher than in Germany.[44] Subsequently, we can claim with reasonable certainty that the increased expenditures on R&D and innovation were not able to directly stimulate the economic growth as it was registrable in the case of Finland. This anomaly is originated in the unequivocally controversial circumstances between the Eastern and Western regions. Germany's situation also calls our attention to the non-irrelevant importance of the financial structure of R&D. The competitiveness backlog of the European Union in the field of R&D and innovation mostly stems from the inappropriate distribution of financing, especially the low level of entrepreneurial activity (European Commission, 2005).

Chart 7. R&D expenditures in Finland and Germany (% of GDP)
Source: OECD Factbook 2009. Available at: http://titania.sourceoecd.org/vl=2030535/cl= 20/nw=1/rpsv/factbook2009/07/01/01/index.htm

The strengths and weaknesses of the presented science- and technology policies would be instructive for the better fulfilment of R&D and innovation strategies developed by the European Union. The main strengths are the following. Both countries have the national innovation strategy which intends to be the R&D internationalized. Simultaneously, the broadening of the university- and research institute's autonomy also plays an essential role in the concept of the national science- and technology policies. Both economies operate with high level of expenditures and absorb numerous scientists and researchers. Weaknesses mainly refer to the case of Germany take for instance the distinctive patterns in dynamics of R&D between the eastern and western regions, the non-satisfying level of university's autonomy or the lower level of R&D induced by enterprises.

The concrete examples of the investigated countries shed light on the vital role of the innovation and R&D in the economic growth. They also call the attention of

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[44] The inflex point was caused by the global financial crisis from 2008.

policymakers to the future challenges. On the one hand, if the all-time government aspires to be the major achievements successfully capitalized, it might be conducive to provide higher expenditures. On the other hand, the growing expenditures cannot be considered in isolation. As the two cases shown, the lifting of co-operations on the international level and the bolstering of internal innovation capacities require the awareness in regional differences. It is more likely to contribute to the design of a better innovation milieu, and has a better chance to intensify the knowledge transfers. Providing good institutions, the increasing of different aspects of autonomy and the solution of patent/ownership issues could be the indispensable milestones of success.[45] The extended autonomy and higher level of financial resources may entail with the possibility of distorted function. The science and technology policy have to maintain permanent control and assess mechanism with high diligence in order to avoid the sub-optimality.

Conclusion

Our study attempted to illustrate how the science and technology policy could contribute to the successful economic realization of innovations in higher education. The economic literature underpins that the STP has to focus on the development of human resources and infrastructural backgrounds of universities and research institutes. It should facilitate the dynamic flows of knowledge transfers between the university and business sector. Additionally, it also should foster the transparent solutions of patent issues and the long-lasting collaborations of partners by well functioning incentives.

Our paper pointed out some problem by giving a picture of the European Union's situation. Nowadays, there is much room for improvement concerning the regulation (especially on the utilization of intellectual products) which could be able to promote innovation in most universities. Universities require better financial structure. To this end, the science and technology policy should make decisive stimulation by bolstering spin-offs' activity and creating venture capital funds. The ultimate goal might be the creating of Humboldt model in order to stop the shrinkages of high-skilled people graduated in fields of natural or technology sciences. As a result of the increasing notability of interdisciplinary, the mobility of scientist and researchers has to be motivated according to their geographical or research area conditions. Besides the meaningful co-operation between the university and business sector, the real economic utilization of results mostly depends on the depth of embraced firms. Meanwhile it also requires the acclimatization of managerial knowledge in domestic training.

Finland showed that the increased expenditures on innovation and R&D may have substantial effect on economic growth. The supplementary claim came from the educational case of Germany. Namely, the thriving expenditures *per se* are not enough to stimulate growth without well functioning institutional backgrounds. STP has to maintain the permanently running control and monitoring mechanism in order to minimize the possibility of the distorted functioning.

The major leitmotifs of the STP can be juxtaposed as follows: (1) increasing in spending on innovation and R&D in Union and national level as well; (2) fostering the tripartite collaboration amid public research institutes, universities and business sector; (3)

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[45] It goes without skating over new findings on academic patenting which says that the re-evaluation of database led to a revised view of European universities. According to these studies France, Italy and Sweden appears to have better contribution performance to the domestic patenting than it was thought before (See Lissoni et al. 2008).

improving and widening the mobility of researchers through direct and indirect channels of R&D subsidies; (4) giving greater autonomy for universities; (5) better utilization of patents channel provided by knowledge- and technology transfer offices; (6) action plans for more qualified careers.

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IS THIS THE RIGHT TIME FOR A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND CANADA?

Sanda FĂRCAŞ[*]

Abstract. *The present paper is investigating the prospects of the European Union and Canada to form a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) from a network formation game perspective. By looking at the preconditions that define such kind of economic partnership, we intend to determine to what extent we can predict whether or not this project is going to be stable or not and consequently, achievable.*

Keywords: *European Union, Canada, businesses, agreement, Custom Unions*

Introduction

Since the beginning of 1990, we are witnessing a surge in the number of the preferential trade agreements concluded: "As of 31 July 2010, some 474 Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs), counting goods and services separately, have been notified to the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)/ WTO (World Trade Organization). Of these RTAs, Free Trade Agreements and partial scope agreements account for 90%, while custom unions account for 10%" (World Trade Organization, Homepage). The continuous popularity of the free trade agreements as an economic model has its roots in the flexible nature of such kinds of mechanisms. In contrast with the Custom Unions, the Free Trade Agreements allow participating countries to exercise their right of free choice: "Under an FTA, each member country (or a subset of member countries) can sign another FTA with outside countries without consent of other member countries" (T. Furusawa& H. Konishi 2007: 312). This fact would provide enough reasons to understand why the ongoing negotiations between the European Union and Canada would rather take the form of Free Trade Agreements.

Another amendment that has to be made to this overall context regards the current economic conditions. Because of the recession, this trend to create a growing network of economic partnerships might be subject to further filtering, depending on the recovery solution adopted by every single country as well as on its degree of protectionism. Whatever the case, we are going to notice several adjustments and realignments. Some of the countries would have to reassess the development potential of their present economic partnerships and leave behind the ones that prove to be languishing. This is also the case of Canada which realizing that its main NAFTA partner, the U.S. is the epicenter of a global recession will have to look for other ways to compensate for the decline in American demand for their exports. In this case, a major option is to revive a 60-year-old

[*] Phd., Asociate Professor, Vancouver University British Columbia, Canada. E-mail: sandafarcas@hotmail.com

dream about creating not only a military alliance with Europe, as did it happen with NATO, but also a transatlantic economic and political union.

Another premise on which we have grounded this study is related to the increased complexity of the free trade agreements whose benefits could no longer be restrained to the traditional gains derived from trade liberalization. On the contrary, according to R. Fernandez and J. Portes, nowadays, free trade agreements move beyond and above the generally expected results by providing credibility, signaling, bargaining power, insurance and coordination. This theoretical framework helps us examine the motivational component of the European – Canadian Trade Agreement from multiple perspectives.

Analytical model

The underlying reason for choosing the network formation game theory as a main analytical framework for the current study lies in its ability to capture a few essential issues arising in social and economic networks. First of all, the free trade agreement between Canada and the European Union has not yet been fully materialized being still a debated topic for both sides. In these circumstances, the network formation game approach developed by Jackson and Wolinsky in 1996 enables us to investigate the stability of this newly constituted network in which the players are still in the stage when they have the discretion to form or sever links. In particular, we will examine two sorts of conditions. On one side, we are going to analyze the incentives to sign the free trade agreement between the European Union and Canada. Based on this, we will assume that a motivation articulated on several levels and even in quantified terms is likely to generate a stronger configuration both politically and economically. A distinct emphasis throughout this study is placed on evaluating the sources of tension between these two parts as well as their potential to create deviations from the major goal. On the other side, this paper is investigating the symmetries and asymmetries in the preexistent conditions leading both parts to sign up the agreement. The assumption we are having in mind this time has its origins at Furusawa and Konishi (2007: 314). According to them, when countries are symmetric in the market size and the industry size, the network in which they operate is stable.

A few words should be also mentioned about the information sources we are relying on. Even if the negotiations on a free trade agreement between the European Union and Canada are coming closer to a final stage, the issue is still too narrowly reflected in the literature. For this reason, the main information I had access to stems from a few prominent Canadian newspapers that reported on this topic in the past years. Before moving on, we have to be aware of the scant coverage of this subject that has not been fully incorporated into the political debate: "The talks have so far received little attention, even though the government says it is working toward an arrangement with the EU's 27 members that will be broader than the North American free-trade agreement among Canada, the United States and Mexico" (The Globe and Mail/ May 1, 2010).

Historical Context

Going back in time in 1949, when NATO was under negotiation, Canada wanted to create a complex alliance able to go well beyond the military dimension by covering the economic and political aspects, too (The Economist/ May 7, 2009). The final result for Canada at that time was to get drawn into the American orbit for about 60 years.

In the 1970s, Canada's Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau aimed to negotiate a contractual link with Europe to lessen the Canadian dependency on the American market. Almost 40 years later, Stephen Harper is visiting Europe to push for a "comprehensive

economic and trade agreement" (The Toronto Star/ May 7, 2010), although his stated goal is not to use Europe as a counterweight to the U.S. Canada has been asking the European Union for a free trade agreement for the past ten years (The Globe and Mail/ December 17, 1999). Initially, Canada suggested that the EU should deal with the North American free trade agreement countries as a block. The European Union refused to do so, rather favoring bilateral talks with the United States in 1998 and Mexico in 1999. As to its relationships to Canada, the European Union considered: "The time for a simple trade agreement is not yet. . . . This is not yet the moment." (The Globe and Mail/ December 17, 1999) Instead, the European Commission through its president, Romano Prodi was supportive of developing the existing trade transactions in a less formal context. A main explanation for this attitude was a very little convergence of their economic and political agendas. The only one common interest at that time was related to the agriculture field, namely the farm subsidies. Canada intervened in the 1990s, by asking the European Union to put an end to all its farm subsidies which lowered significantly the commodity prices and harmed the Canadian farmers. On the other hand, the European Union was willing to continue supporting its farmers by paying them high subsidies in order to maintain the rural way of life. In the end, in the absence of any other issues to be traded off, the European Union disregarded Canada's claim.

However, in May 2009 Canada embarked on negotiations for a free trade agreement with the European Union putting ahead an estimated two-year framework to get them concluded: 'Amidst dark mutterings about the rise of protectionism in global trade the good news is that the European Union and Canada are today launching "comprehensive trade and investment negotiations," leading to a free-trade agreement.' (The International Herald Tribune / May 6, 2009). This time, the topics that bring them to the negotiation table were much broader in scope and coverage: removing all remaining tariff barriers, the opening up of procurement at all levels of government; the free movement of skilled workers; the harmonization or elimination of a range of regulations that are especially noxious forms of protectionism, particularly in agriculture and environmental enhancement (further details on these issues will be discussed later in this paper) (The Toronto Star/ July 5, 2010).

Motivational component
This free trade agreement is unique for both participating political actors as it could be the first post-recession economic accord pursued by partners with comparable economic performance. For the European Union, this comprehensive bilateral trade agreement settled not with a developing country but with a developed nation could serve as a newly reassessed and more realistic basis for any future partnership aiming to reinvigorate the transatlantic market.

For Canada, pursuing such a partnership would mean getting access to the world's largest single market with a population of 500 millions as well as an effective alternative path in an environment still dominated by economic uncertainty. Canada's commitment to take on these economic responsibilities is additionally illustrated by the fact that for the first time in history all ten Canadian provinces and three Canadian territories participate in an international trade negotiation process that would open their domestic market to the 27 member states of the European Union (The Toronto Star/ July 5, 2010).

For both sides, this free trade agreement is seen as an opportunity to redefine their relationships in a new framework that surpasses the old terms imposed by the GATT/ World Trade Organization convention. This bilateral agreement also comes to fill up the

gap generated after the suspension of the Doha talks as well as the lack of immediate prospects for adopting new forms of further liberalization. For both partners, the mere existence of this trade agreement will perform at least two beneficial functions. On the one had, the completion of this free trade agreement plays a signaling role, indicating that both economies are still competitive and appealing to investors in spite of the overall financial instability. On the other hand, the same agreement works as a credibility mechanism coming to reinforce the strengthened position of the countries that are entering the economic accord. For instance, "a successful accord with Europe would give Canada access to all three of the world's major markets: the United States, Europe and Japan. And not only them, of course, but the emerging markets of China, the Asian Tigers, and the Americas" (The Globe and Mail/ December 29, 1994). Another possible impact of this agreement would be the fact that Canada is going to gain more prominence and bargaining power in case that NAFTA accord will be renegotiated as more and more democratic voices are calling for (The Globe and Mail/ March 6, 2008).

As to the gains expected from this agreement, we are noticing that all information sources are converging towards underlying a mutual benefit for all parts that are directly involved, regardless of the time scale: 'The Harper government has made the expansion of free-trade agreements a priority, and estimates an EU deal would boost the Canadian economy by $12-billion a year' (The Globe and Mail/ May 1, 2010). Or according to The Toronto Star (July 27, 2010), 'the two sides estimate that a deal would generate within seven years additional annual income of about 11 billion euros ($14.2 billion) for the EU and 8 billion euros ($10.7 billion) for Canada (The Toronto Star/ July 27, 2010)'.

Symmetries

The idea of framing the relationships between the European Union and Canada through the Natural Partners Paradigm is part of the public discourse about this topic: 'Before anyone heard of the Canada-U.S. Trade Agreement (born in 1988), or NAFTA (1993), there was Europe, the motherland. Culturally and economically, Canada was very much attuned to Britain, France, Germany and Italy.' (The Globe and Mail/ April 25, 2008). On this ground articulated around two dimensions, cultural and economic, the whole free trade agreement project seems to fit naturally and take precedence over any other economic and political configurations in place. This perspective is confirmed by an economic examination of the nature of this relationship. Up to now, most Canada – EU goods trade is already tariff-free, as notices The Economist (May 7, 2009). In these circumstances, we could assume that there are some common trade practices and traditions that have been shaped and cultivated in the economic arena where both parts are acting: 'Transatlantic trade is already substantial, not surprising since the European Union is now the world's largest market. But much more opportunity abides. Investment has grown significantly. Canadian-owned businesses in Europe now sell four times more product than is exported from Canada.' (The Toronto Star/July 5, 2010) A certain phenomenon of convergence is already operating when it comes to the tariff rates applied to imports. In most trading sectors, except the processed food area, the tariffs on goods have been already lowered to less than 3%. Meanwhile, both Canada and the European Union continue to keep high tariffs in a few sensitive but less traded fields. Fish and seafood products remained strongly protected by the European Union while Canada sustains its domestic producers of footwear, textiles and apparel (Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest/ May 20, 2009). Expanding a bit further the comparative framework, we could distinguish a similar export trend defined by a large diversification of the products

which are part of the trade. In 2008, the majority of the EU exports to Canada, meaning about two-fifth were represented by machinery and vehicles followed by chemicals and other manufactured articles, each of them accounting for about a fifth of exports. The European imports from Canada covered mainly aircraft, refined oil, diamonds, coal, nickel and iron ore (Europolitics/ May 6, 2009). Looking at the trade map that has been traced across the Atlantic Ocean in the past years, we could easily notice that Canada has already formed solid partnerships with five key members of the European Union: Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy and the Netherlands. Based on the information available in 2008, we could point to Germany as being the largest exporter to Canada (EUR 6.2 billion or 24% of the total), followed by the United Kingdom (EUR 4.6 billion or 18%), France (EUR 2.8 billion or 11%) and Italy (EUR 2.6 billion or 10%) (Europolitics/ May 6, 2009). The balance is staying pretty much the same when we are considering the import needs of the European countries from Canada. The first position is assigned to the United Kingdom (EUR 7.4 billion or 31%) followed by Germany (EUR 2.8 billion or 12%), the Netherlands (EUR 2.6 billion or 11%) and France (EUR 2.3 billion or 10%) (Europolitics/ May 6, 2009). To better assess the mutual benefit of the relationship between the European Union and Canada we are going to modify a bit the time scale. If we investigate the time span of 2000 - 2008, we could see that there was very little discrepancy between the EU exports of goods to Canada and the associated import values. More precisely, the EU exports of goods to Canada grew from EUR 21.1 billion to EUR 26.1 billion whereas the EU imports from Canada went from EUR 19 billion to EUR 23.8 billion (Europolitics/ May 6, 2009).

Getting back to the current trade agreement project, a major point of similarity could be found in the articulation of an agenda well before the commencement of the negotiations:

'Last summer's EU-Canada summit thrust investment and trade to the forefront, and more negotiations were scheduled for late April in Brussels. The main topics would be to reduce or eliminate investment barriers (import tariffs on both sides are already low). Other issues to be addressed include labor mobility, such as the mutual recognition of professional qualifications; common investment and procurement rules; an open-skies policy for airline routes; and some sort of agreement on carbon emissions and carbon trading' (The Globe and Mail/ April 25, 2008). This state of preceding consensus on what constitutes the economic priorities for both sides leads to another type of similarity, namely the commitment to move ahead with negotiations at a steady piece: 'Canada and the European Union have completed three rounds of negotiations. The fourth begins this month in Brussels. The three earlier rounds have cleared away much of the underbrush, including reaching agreements on specific issues. Difficult ones remain, but as we near the halfway point, there is every reason to believe that in the next 12 months or so the negotiations will come to a successful conclusion' (The Toronto Star/ July 5, 2010).

Another premise that works as a catalyst for concluding any kind of agreement between the European Union and Canada is related to the shared character of the human rights principles on both sides of the Atlantic: 'we don't have to worry about the Europeans compromising human rights or exploiting labor or plundering the environment' (The Toronto Star/ May 7, 2010).

Asymmetries
Even if many of the core discrepancies between the European Union and Canada have been narrowed down, there are a number of contentious issues that have been alleviated neither by commercial practices nor by negotiations. Europeans are contesting the protectionist logic of the Canadian provincial procurement policies which require the

majority projects to be domestically sourced (The Toronto Star/ May 7, 2010). This problem is deepening even further by the fact that every single Canadian province has its own procurement model. In this way, the European Union has to approach all ten Canadian provinces independently.

Another line of dispute is represented by the loose environmental standards existent on the Canadian side. While the development of the Alberta oil sands is not part of Harper's agenda, the European Union passed a resolution expressing 'its concern about the impact of the extraction of oil sand on the global environment' (The Toronto Star/ May 7, 2010). To provide a bit of background information, we have to mention that every dollar invested in the Alberta oil sands generates about $9 worth of economic activity and one-third of the benefits are flowing outside the province and Canada (Alberta's Oil Sands Economic and Investment Information, Homepage).

A third sector that creates tensions between both parts is the sealed products. The European opposition is strong enough since on the same day when the free trade negotiations opened, the European Parliament voted with a large majority – by 550 to 49 – to ban the import and sale of seal products for commercial purposes (The Scotsman/ May 6, 2009). The European animal-rights activists are raising concerns about the inhumane cull of seals, aiming to put an end to the international market for pelts and facts. On the other side, the Canadian government stands for rights of the Inuit people for whom hunting sales is not only the main survival strategy but also a traditional way of life. Looking into the impact of the commercial seal hunt in Canada, we could notice that an average of 5,000 – 6,000 individuals obtain up to 35% of their annual income from sealing. In essence, they are residence of the coastal communities situated in Atlantic Canada and the North Territories (The Canadian Sealers Association, Homepage).

For Canadians, for quite a lot of time, the agricultural subsidies provided to the European farms constituted a major stumbling block in view of pursuing any trade agreement with the European Union. This perception has been slightly changed lately as Canadians are tempted to consider that given the EU expansion, the Union will not be able anymore to provide high subsidies to all its members (The Globe and Mail/ June 17, 1999).

Another main level on which the discrepancies between the European Union and Canada should be subject to mutual adjustments is that of the service sector which covers in particular banking, telecommunications, architecture and consulting. There are at least two underlying preconditions on which both sides have to intervene: the number of services that can be provided by foreign firms and the registration/ nationality requirements that give preference domestic companies. The stimulus to proceed with these measures is not at all negligible. By diminishing such kinds of barriers, both trading partners could obtain a significant GDP growth - more than €5 billion for the EU and roughly €3.6 billion for Canada (Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest/ May 20, 2009).

Conclusions

We started the current paper from the following hypothesis: if the number of symmetries between the European Union and Canada at different levels (preconditions, political agenda, expectations) outweights the pairs of manifesting aymmetries then there is a high probability that they will create a solid trade partnership. Throughout this study, we have noticed that even if both sides proceeded from separate treamlines, they have evolved from soft forms of symmetry to harder ones after four rounds of negotiations occurred so far. This fact is becoming even more meaningful if we are considering the complex spectrum of this project that has been gradually shifted from hard trade

agreements like tariffs to soft restrictions like environmental standards or other product areas where the trade policy is generally far more composite. The limited literature available as well as the low public profile of this topic in the media impede us from formulating definite conclusions. However, after investigating the chief divergences between the European Union and Canada we observe that the trade negotiation process is not imune to the possibility of imbalance as there are still difficulties of achieving coordination on a few issues that constitutes the core agenda (agricultural subsidies, sealed products, environmental standards for the Alberta oil sands, the Canadian procurement policy). Another factor that complicates a bit any attempt to assess the likelihood to form a steady partnership is the unique essence of this project which has not been preceded by anything similar. For more than 20 years, the perfect partnership model for Canada seemed to be the United States due to the next reasons: open border, proximity, common language and corresponding regulations. In spite of it, way before the agreement will be signed, we could clearly see its beneficial impact expressed in terms of: increased bargaining power with respect to third parties or current members, signaling that governmental policy is rather liberal than protectionist and providing insurance that they are able to manage effectively the economic uncertainty.

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III. EUROPEAN SECURITY WITHIN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

LA SÉCURITÉ GLOBALE VERSUS
LA SÉCURITÉ NATIONALE

Diana GAL[*]

Abstract. *Global Security versus National Security. The emergence of the concept of security possible when the concept has become a normative sense. In this case, it appears an increasing degree of complexity resulting from the appearance of a series of factors (political, economic, military, informational, etc.), whose interaction has generated structure the concept on several levels: international security, regional security, national security and, increasingly circulated today, global security. This article tries to present the most important concepts of security: national security and global security.*

La sécurité durable est un terme générique au même titre que l'honneur, la justice ou la paix. Quant à la notion sémantique de la sécurité, elle est définie par „le fait d'être loin de tout danger" ou „sentiment de confiance ressenti en l'absence de tout danger".

Si l'on approfondie cette notion, la sécurité „désigne les locaux et les circonstances qui déterminent à la fois le statu quo de confiance générant le sentiment de paix, de protection et de défense contre une menace ainsi que le processus menant à la prévention de tout danger".

L'émergence de la notion de sécurité est possible dès lors que le concept prend un sens normatif. Dans ce cas, il apparaît un degré croissant de complexité résultant de l'apparition d'une série de facteurs (politiques, économiques, militaires, d'information, etc.). „ la Sécurité"n'est pas seulement un concept, mais aussi, un générateur d'idées. Il en résulte les concepts suivants: le risque (d'un événement qui peut causer une perte), la menace (procédé conduisant un risque à devenir réalité), prévention (méthode pour éviter qu'une menace ait le risque d'être mis à éxécution), sécurité (niveau d'assurance pour qu'un système de sécurité se comporte comme prévu).

Cette corrélation permet d'affirmer que la sécurité est actuellement traitée comme un système, parce que le concept implique plusieurs dimensions en termes de promotion des intérêts: dimension politique, militaire, économique, informationnel, etc. De ce fait, le système de sécurité peut être défini en intégrant des notions telles que „un ensemble de principes, de règles et de connaissances sur ce domaine, adoptés par un groupe d'états, reconnu internationalement comme les institutions et les instruments à surveiller et à faire respecter".

1. La securite globale

La sécurité mondiale exige, à l'heure actuelle, la révolution militaro-technologique (qui a conduit à l'accélération de la dynamique globale des armes), la mondialisation des transferts

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[*] Master Student at the University of Reims Champagne-Ardenne, France. E-mail: dyana_rmd@yahoo.com

d'armes, les modes actuels de production mondiale de technologie militaire et technique et la nouvelle concentration de la puissance militaire.

Face à des risques majeurs et les menaces actuelles, les états prennent en compte cette problématique et y font face à l'echelle mondiale en renforçant leur puissance militaire nationale traditionnelle et celle de ses alliés. Cependant, la montée du terrorisme mondial et des armes de terreur de masse, qui a prit une dimension supplémentaire depuis les attentats du 11 Septembre aux Etats Unis, a conduit à comprendre que cette lutte pourrait être effectuée plus efficacement en augmentant les efforts pour promouvoir la sécurité par la coopération.

Tout en renforçant la sécurité collective (l'alliance) et le développement de la sécurité commune initiée par les petits États pour régler les problèmes de sécurité, y compris économiques, sociaux, environnementaux, la communauté internationale a augmenté les mesures de sécurité coopérative. Il s'agit du contrôle des arsenaux nucléaires et de sécurité:

- assurer la reconversion des industries militaires et de défense qui mettrait en danger la sécurité internationale

- dispositions communes relatives à la taille et la structure des arsenaux militaires et la prolifération des technologies dangereuses. Cette définition est cohérente par rapport à la notion d'intervention légitime convenu par processus multilatéral visant à réglementer l'utilisation de la force comme dernier recours pour assurer la sécurité.

- promotion mutuelle de de systèmes de défense transparents qui sont nécessaires pour les arrangements de sécurité coopérative.

La sécurité mondiale est gravement affecté par la montée en puissance et la prise de contrôle du crime organisé sur les territoires tant sur le marché interne qu'externe. La violence, la corruption, le chantage, les menaces, la contrebande tendent à affaiblir le pouvoir de l'Etat. D'où la neccessité de définir une approche préventive, systématique, pour assurer une sécurité globale et coordonnée, renforçant ainsi mécanismes existants d'actions simultannées entre les Etats permettant l'harmonisation des politiques de lutte contre la criminalité organisée et le terrorisme international, résultat d'une mondialisation non maitrisée.

2. La securite nationale

En 2001, Les Etats Unis mettent en place une politique sécuritaire suite aux changements qui ont affecté la vision sur les analystes de la sécurité en général, et la sécurité nationale en particulier.

Composante de la sécurité mondiale, la sécurité nationale prend, après la guerre froide, une nouvelle dimension puisque les menaces, selon Barry Buzan, „sont de plus en plus diffuses et non plus purement militaire" (Buzan, 2005). La prolifération des menaces terroristes, environnementales, culturelles, risques majeurs pour la sécurité nationale nécessitent la mise en place de moyens - militaires et non militaires, nationales et internationales afin de tisser un entrelacement de points securitaires aux échelles nationale, régionale voire mondiale, qui soient en mesure d'assurer la sécurité et la stabilité des mécanismes de coopération et de coordination, permettant la régionalisation et la mondialisation des relations militaires et de sécurité.

Par ailleurs, dans les conditions actuelles, la sécurité nationale ne peut pas être "totalement détachée des conditions systémique globale". Il existe une interdépendance stratégique mondiale, car il y a des facteurs systémiques influant sur l'action décisive des pouvoirs de l'état militaire de chaque Etat, ses militaires et sa sécurité potentielle. La sécurité nationale est étroitement liée au monde, dans le contexte du nouvel ordre

mondial, tel que confirmé par le fait que les actions unilatérales d'un Etat donnent des résultats sur la sécurité peu probants.

Les états membres des Nations Unies ont pratiquement leur propre sécurité, Pilier de la Charte, la sécurité collective, qui stipule l'action de l'organisation contre les actes d'agression, pour rétablir la paix et le processus reconstruction qu'il prend en charge ces derniers temps, l'ONU est de plus en plus impliquée dans la sécurité des États. Les faiblesses et les incohérences que présentent les Nations Unies dans le domaine de la sécurité mondiale ne pouvaient pas entièrement rassurer les autorités de sécurités collectives et, par conséquent, la législation nationale (Buzan, 2005).

Dans le domaine de la sécurité a eu lieu récemment des partenariats stratégiques, qui sont induits par le nouvel contexte de sécurité. Les partenariats stratégiques, la sécurité internationale, la sécurité nationale et la mise en place d'une collaboration et d'une coopération effective, permettent d'éviter des affrontements majeurs entre les acteurs régionaux, mondiaux et les Etats membres (Muresan, 2005). On retrouve „dans une nouvelle formule pour l'harmonisation des intérêts de la prévention des conflits majeurs entre les principaux acteurs, tous représentés, regroupés d'un noyau de puissance majeures que sont les États-Unis, l'UE, la Russie, la Chine, le Japon, l'Inde et le monde arabe". Ce groupement crée et maintient un tel environnement de sécurité qui permet d'éviter la détention d'armes de destruction massive et de prévenir des conflits de haute intensité et des guerres (Muresan, 2005).

La guerre contre le terrorisme a démontré que la sécurité nationale est une composante de la sécurité mondiale, dans la mesure où ses intérêts peuvent aller au-delà de la zone d'intérêt stratégique, car le terrorisme n'a pas de frontières. Dans une large mesure, comme dans le monde professionnel, les conflits ethniques et les mouvements séparatistes associés au nationalisme extrême et l'extrémisme religieux, peuvent affecter la sécurité nationale et générer un conflit ayant potentiellement une grande influence sur la sécurité des régions entières, voire sur le monde. Dans le cas des «Etats défaillants» sans un gouvernement fonctionnel, la sécurité nationale est à peine affectée par des acteurs non étatiques, exerçant le pouvoir en son nom propre, pour un interêt personnel, ce qui affecte le climat mondial (Buzan, 2005).

L'analyse de la sécurité nationale actuelle – „Global Security" conduit les gouvernements et les organisations internationales à reconnaître que la prévention des conflits et des crises, ainsi que la mise en place d'une organisation du contrôle de maintient de la paix n'est pas possible sans la participation conjointe de tous les acteurs de la sécurité, de la plus grande à la plus petite (Flanagan & Schean, 2008).

La mesure dans laquelle chaque acteur contribue à la stabilité de sécurité mondiale est très différente. Le manque de performance dans le processus de mondialisation économique limite la contribution gouvernementale possible pour certains états régionaux dans le maintient de la sécurité mondiale, au risque de compromettre leur propre sécurité. Il convient ici de développer l'idée développée dans, Stratégie européenne de sécurité, Javier Solana, qui soutient que la meilleure protection pour notre sécurité est un monde composé de pays bien gouvernés de manière démocratique. Les menaces activent un nouveau visage dynamique. Les problèmes sont rarement résolus par un seul pays sans un soutien régional, comme Solana le développe dans sa stratégie (Flanagan & Schean, 2008). Un monde plus sûr est un monde juste, où chaque entité est basée sur un système de sécurité mondiale, dont le fonctionnement est appuyé par les etats dans un système institutionnel viable.

En conséquence de la mondialisation, de nombreux développements et processus transnationaux ont un impact significatif sur la sécurité nationale. Les gouvernements doivent prendre des mesures pour protéger leur territoire contre les nouvelles menaces. La coalition antiterroriste internationale en faisant appel à la collaboration avec d'autres parties pour désamorcer les conflits internationaux, pour empêcher la prolifération des armes de destruction massive, l'amélioration de la croissance économique dans les marchés en développement en favorisant les conditions du libre-échange et le développement des programmes d'actions de coopération avec les centres mondiaux de l'énergie pour permettre la transformation et la modernisation indispensables aux exigences de sécurité des institutions nationales de ce siècle („*Developing a security and defence culture in the ESDP", 2003*).

Le mode d'action des Etats-Unis soutient fermement cette affirmation: Ils ont structuré une stratégie de sécurité nationale spécialisée de lutte contre le terrorisme et la prolifération des armes de destruction massive, appuyée par des attaques préventives, sur une base sélective et limitée contre les Etats voyous en fonction des armes de destruction massive utilisées par les terroristes.

La Stratégie de la mondialisation et les partenariats en matière d'enjeux de sécurité nationale est une équation parfaitement intégrée et prise en charge par de nombreux États et organisations internationales qui favorisent la coopération dans le domaine de la diplomatie préventive, le contrôle des armements et de leurs exportations, l'assistance pour la réduction des risques et la dissuasion de la prolifération des armes de destruction massive. Cela concerne aussi la promotion d'initiatives importantes pour désamorcer les tensions diplomatiques et les conflits régionaux, qui est un cadre propice à la prolifération du terrorisme et des armes de destruction massive et d'autres menaces à la sécurité.

Les états partenaires de l'Asie Centrale ont effectué des missions avec l'OTAN, selon le nouveau concept de sécurité pour faire face, par projection de la stabilité aux frontières de l'organisation en Afghanistan. La police et les forces spéciales sont formées et équipées pour effectuer des missions de déminage et d'appui permettant le transit et l'installation de troupes et de matériel logistique sur leur territoire. Les mêmes partenaires asiatiques de l'Alliance influencent directement de manière importante les facteurs locaux pour garantir une diversité ethnique en Afghanistan, selon les objectifs de la coalition internationale („*Developing a security and defence culture in the ESDP", 2003*).

Au niveau économique, la sécurité nationale des Etats est affectée par le comportement particulier du processus de la mondialisation des transactions internationales dans l'état serré, dépassé les transactions totalisant près de tous les investissements étrangers directs, plus de 35% des investissements directs mondiaux (PIB) et plus de 75% du commerce mondial.

Dérivé de la mondialisation, l'instabilité régionale peut sérieusement affecter la sécurité nationale. Par conséquent, les États doivent soutenir les efforts du processus de stabilisation et de démocratisation dans les zones adjacentes, et élaborer une politique cohérente visant à atténuer les conflits et éviter qu'ils ne dégénèrent, tout en réalisant une coopération efficace, bilatérale et multilatérale de sécurité coopérative dans l'exemplarité des relations de partenariat régional.

Pour les grandes puissances qui sont concernées par le renforcement de la stabilité stratégique des petits États, elles souhaitent, afin de préserver la sécurité nationale, susciter un intérêt vital dans la construction d'un climat de paix mondiale et de confiance. Dans un effort visant à élaborer la coopération et éviter la prolifération des armes massive, le dispositif consiste à durcir la réglementation en vigueur dans le domaine de la lutte

contre les menaces terroristes internationales et l'étendre aux autres états frontaliers qui ont une forte implication, et de façon permanente.

Grâce à une politique de sécurité nationale active, dynamique et la participation réussie de l'Etat, il est possible d'élaborer une stratégie complexe en matière de sécurité internationale. Ces dernières années, les politiques de défense du territoire national des États membres, par l'intermédiaire d'une diplomatie préventive associée à des politiques offensives pour promouvoir leurs propres intérêts, qui s'appuient sur une stabilité globale dans les différentes régions du monde. En Europe, par exemple, l'UE a mis en place une politique européenne de sécurité et de défense, par l'intermédiaire des objectifs du Pacte de stabilité pour l'Europe du Sud, afin de maintenir la stabilité dans les Balkans et dans la région du Caucaze, de la mer Noire et de la Mer Caspienne. La lutte contre le terrorisme en partenariat avec les Etats membres de l'OTAN participent aux efforts de défense collective dans la construction de l'Union européenne en lui donnant une dimension militaire. Les engagements de partenariat et de coopération avec d'autres États, permettent d'instaurer une confiance et la coopération aux niveaux régional et continental (Cremona, Hillion, 2006).

Les implications pour la sécurité nationale de l'économie mondiale peuvent toutefois couvrir d'autres domaines. La prise en compte de la valeur et du potentiel de développement culturel, scientifique et humain est une composante essentielle pour assurer une sécurité nationale, ce qui induit un impact significatif sur la sécurité mondiale.

Il est frappant, par exemple, de voir à quel point les États, malgrès le processus rapide de mondialisation culturelle, tiennent à conserver leur identité culturelle, l'unité culturelle à travers les programmes locaux et régionaux pour faire valoir leurs identités culturelles propres. Fondamentalement, il faut une lutte acharnée pour la préservation des valeurs nationales et des cultures, en dépit des tendances sécessionnistes et de pertes culturelles dans certains domaines. Avec toutes les influences culturelles l'équilibre penche vers la suppression des différences culturelles entre les nations. Les projets culturels majeurs sont des menaces pour la sécurité interne de la nation (Buzan, 2005). La principale communauté politique et culturelle, ne parvient pas à s'opposer au cosmopolitisme culturel, qui devient plus évident que les éphémérides de la mondialisation.

Entre les deux grandes tendances que sont l'intégration et l'affirmation de l'identité nationale, les Etats se battent pour préserver leur propre sécurité culturelle, percevoir correctement l'impact que l'influence culturelle peut avoir dans le monde, l'évolution culturelle de l'humanité elle-même. En fait, l'argument irréfutable que nous donne les stratégies de sécurité culturelle, dans le cadre de stratégies de sécurité nationale qui ont, en plus des implications internes visant à bloquer le processus d'évolution de leur propre culture, perçue comme une agression à combattre, développe un aspect sécuritaire ayant des implications importantes dans la culture humaine.

Les privations de droits, post-guerre froide, le concept de sécurité nationale prépondérante sur sécurité collective n'a pas supprimé les notions anciennes considérant la diversification comme une augmentation des risques ainsi que la peur des menaces transfrontalières, bien au contraire. Pour faire face à l'insécurité, la corruption, la fraude fiscale,la contrebande, le crime organisé et le terrorisme, tous ont besoin d'une vigoureuse offensive du gouvernement en partenariat avec la société civile, les ONG et les institutions publiques, dans le sens indiqué par la Stratégie de sécurité nationale. Ce type d'opérations de grandes envergures tendent à renforcer l'État, en tant que pilier de la sécurité, la sécurité sous-régionales, régionales, et donc mondiale (Johnston, 2003).

Alors que les membres des grandes puissances de la «communauté de sécurité», sur le modèle de la sécurité nationale américaine, sont restructurées selon la pratique

traditionnelle de la sécurité coopérative pour les petites et moyennes entreprises, sans une force militaire significative, formant ainsi une partie de la sécurité internationale. Mais dans le cas des grands pays représentés par la superpuissance américaine, la sécurité coopérative est d'abord et avant tout un moyen de renforcer la sécurité nationale.

En fait, l'interdépendance de la sécurité mondiale chantier en construction. La sécurité est un des point de l'interdépendance, l'autre étant les relations internationales. Il s'agit d'oeuvrer de manière multilatérale en matière de sécurité nationale pour donner une cohérence durable en matière de sécurité. Initialement, les états limitaient l'ordre mondial aux obligations et aux engagements pris dans les domaines militaires et de la sécurité. Aujourd'hui, il est clair que les choix nationaux dans ce domaine sont présentés comme une décision commune, à l'OTAN ou lors de consultations bilatérales ou multilatérales, dans d'autres organisations internationales. Par conséquent, nous percevons la relation entre la sécurité mondiale et la sécurité nationale comme une interaction dynamique dans un mouvement continu de transformations.

Existe il des situations où la sécurité nationale pourrait affecter la sécurité mondiale?

Répondre à une telle question va, à mon avis, de pair avec le fait que la sécurité est d'ordre mondiale et intégré, qui comprend la sécurité nationale et régionale. Dans ces conditions, la sécurité nationale et mondiale sont complémentaires, même si le concept de sécurité mondiale dépend des notions que l'on intègre à la sécurité nationale (Johnston, 2003). De ce fait, elle peut exercer à la fois une certaine pression sur la sécurité nationale mais aussi se subsituter pour certaines compétences et devoirs imposés au niveau nationaux. Comme le degré d'efficassité du système au niveau mondial est bien plus exigeant, l'importance des fonctions de sécurité nationales se subordonne à celles de la sécurité mondiale.

Les spécialistes considèrent deux problèmes pour le domaine des rapports entre la sécurité mondiale et la sécurité nationale: le premier part d'un manque de confiance dans la sécurité mondiale, ce qui crée une discontinuité avec les orientations nationales, et par répercussion entre le niveau régional et mondial. Le second part d'une exagération du rôle de la sécurité mondiale, ce qui conduit à une diminution du rôle de la sécurité nationale, il se forme une faille dans le dispositif de sécurité, qui affecte l'échelle mondiale mais aussi nationale.

Conclusions

Il est extrêmement bénéfique en termes de sécurité d'étudier la mondialisation et l'intégration nationale, car cela offre la possibilité de structurer une stratégie de réponse, qui, à partir des causes de la crise généralisée, permet de réduire les états d 'incertitudes. Comme il ya une dimension globale et régionale liées à la sécurité nationale, et que l'ouverture rapide sur l'extérieur des frontières nécessite d'accroître la collaboration et la coopération internationale dans le domaine, des efforts multiples s'imposent à la communauté internationale pour répondre aux besoins de paix, de sécurité et de stabilité dans l'ensemble des régions du monde.

Il convient d'accorder une plus grande importance à la sécurité coopérative, qui a soutenu la mise en place de partenariats, offrant une vision optimiste de la sécurité mondiale par conséquence une amélioration à l'échelle nationale en favorisant la mise en place de politiques actives responsables, qui demeurent l'unique solution pour faire face aux nouvelles menaces. L'espace mondial est le bon cadre pour développer les activités qui sont nécessaires pour aider à renforcer la sécurité nationale.

À mon avis, ces activités devraient être axées sur: l'augmentation des ressources de production dans le cadre du renforcement de la sécurité collective et de la sécurité nationale, la maniabilité accrue des systèmes de sécurité collective, le développement sur une base régionale, de la défense de coopération, avec la participation des pays et des acteurs non gouvernementaux, sur l'accroissement de la coopération économique. Il faut atténuer les effets négatifs de la mondialisation, en développant des mécanismes de contrôle de la coopération internationale et en mettant l'accent sur les causes de l'insécurité: la finance et les domaines banquaire, économique et judiciaire. Au delà du terrorisme, le développement de la gestion et le contrôle des menaces asymétriques dans le but de réduire les vulnérabilités économiques, sociales, politiques, militaires, environnementales. Ces préoccupations croissantes pour la sécurité mondiale pour constituer un cadre général pour le développement de la sécurité nationale, parce qu'elle est viable quand elle intègre l'ensemble de ces systèmes.

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EU-MOLDOVA RELATIONS SINCE 1991: RETROSPECTIVE AND PERSPECTIVE

Viorica ȚÎCU[*]

Abstract. *In an attempt to explain this reality some reflections on the evolution of the EU-Moldova relations since independence will be helpful and the present paper will try to analyse this topic explicitly. From newspapers to academic researches (not to say think-tank or other expert analysis and critics), the contributions focused the nature of the EU-Moldova relations grew up in intensity (especially in Moldova) accordingly to the country's aspiration to EU integration. The present research benefited from these contributions, but in the same time used many EU and Moldovan documents related to the topic in order to develop the research further.*

Keywords: *EU, Moldova, International Relations, the Soviet Union*

Introduction

Since 1991 the EU-Moldova relations evolved in a very complicated international environment determined by the end of the Cold War. The Soviet Union was suffered a great internal transformation which resulted in its disintegration and fifteen Soviet republics emerged as sovereign and independent States. In the same time the fall of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the German reunification announced a profound transformation of the political and even territorial architecture of Europe. The European Community faced a great challenge in accommodated to these realities, but the EC adapted itself very soon to the new international architecture. The EC expressed its view on the developments brought by the dissolution of USSR in two documents: "Declaration on Developments in the Soviet Union", adopted by the Maastricht European Council as of 9-10 December 1991; "EPC Declaration on the 'Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union'", adopted on 16 December 1991[1]. Following these documents, in 1992 the European Commission proposed to replace the Agreement between the EC and USSR on Trade and Commercial and Economic Cooperation, signed in December 1989, with agreements to be concluded bilaterally with CIS members.

Along with the establishment of the new relations with the former soviet republics, the EC committed itself to support their political and economic transformation. The EC TACIS programme became thus the main instrument which aimed at enhancing the transition process in all former soviet republics, except Baltic States. When TACIS was initiated in 1991, the technical assistance through this program was a stand-alone activity. Later it became part of a more complex policy approach of the EU towards

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[*] Magister, doctoral student, Lecturer, Department of International Relations and Politology, Faculty of History and International Relations, ULIM, Republic of Moldova
[1] MFAEI and IPP, ed., "European Strategy of the Republic of Moldova", 2007 updated version (English), Institute for Public Policy, In: http://www.ipp.md/biblioteca1.php?l=ro&id=142.

countries in Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia, due to a gradual development and formalization of their bilateral relations through new legal frameworks – Partnership and Co-operation Agreements (PCA).

In the same time, the Republic of Moldova was not as coherent as EU in defining its priorities of external behaviour. From the very beginning of its independency the Republic of Moldova has had to endure the difficult concequences of the USSR break up. The country faced a bloody Transnistrian conflict which lasted some months in 1992 as a real war between Moldovan authorities and the Pridnestrovian ones with the fully support of the 14th Russian army stationed there. As result Moldova's incoherence in foreign policy after 1991 has been much complicated by the secessionist conflict in Transnistria and by assertive Russian power influence in the region. Therefore, certain equilibrium in foreign policy and neutrality as a security policy option were chosen as safeguards of Moldovan fragile statehood. Having these in play, Moldova was reluctant to follow the examples provided by Baltic States in approaching their relations with the EU. At the same time, incoherence in foreign policy of subsequent Moldovan Governments made the EU to be reticent towards Moldova, too.

In an attempt to explain this reality some reflections on the evolution of the EU-Moldova relations since independence will be helpful and the present paper will try to analyse this topic explicitly. From newspapers[2] to academic researches[3] (not to say think-tank[4] or other expert analysis and critics), the contributions focused the nature of the EU-Moldova relations grew up in intensity (especially in Moldova) accordingly to the country's aspiration to EU integration. The present research benefited from these contributions, but in the same time used many EU and Moldovan documents related to the topic in order to develop the research further.

The paper is divided in three chapters which chronologically reflect three distinct periods attested in the EU-Moldova relations since 1991. The first period (from 1991 till 2001) is related to the evolution of the relationships between the European Union and the Republic of Moldova up to 2001 Parliamentary elections, when the Party of Communists took office in Moldova. The second period will be devoted to the EU-Moldova relationships during the years of Communist governance (2001-2009), especially after the articulation of the Neighbourhood Policy of the European Union, when after increasing interest of the EU in its neighbourhood, as a result of its enlargement to the East and South in 2004, along with other external and domestic factors linked with the resolution process of the Transnistrian conflict, made both parties more willing to advance their bilateral relations. The last period is related to the actual stage of EU-Moldova relationships and to analysis of the prospects for Moldova's European future after the launching of the Eastern partnership and 2009 Parliamentary elections in Moldova.

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[2] One of the leading Moldovan newspapers - "Timpul", has created a supplement dedicated to the EU aspirations of the RM.

[3] The last publications of Perre Verluise, *După douăzeci de ani de la căderea zidului*, Chişinău: Cartier, 2009 or Sylvain Kahn, *Geopolitica Uniunii Europen*e, Chişinău: Cartier, 2008, touched the problem from various perspectives.

[4] The leading think-tank analysis came from Institute of Public Policy, IDIS "Viitorul", ADEPT, APE (all from Moldova), Centre for European Policy Studies (Brussels), etc.

Chapter I
The Establishment and Evolution of the EU-Moldova Relations until 2001

The EU-Moldova relations started late to middle of 1995, reluctantly and evasively if comparing to the rest of Central-East European states or even Baltics. Concerning the relations with the European Community, only in January 1994 the first Ambassador of the Republic of Moldova was accredited in Belgium as the Head of Mission of the Republic of Moldova to the European Community. As long as the Baltic and some other Central and East - European states had signed the European Agreements with the EC with more probable finality, Moldova as well as other countries from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was proposed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) - a kind of bilateral treaty based mostly on the economic and trade relations only. After two rounds of negotiations, the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement between the EU and Moldova was signed in November 1994 (Evolutia..., 2009:49).

While the EU-Moldova PCA was passing through a cumbersome ratification procedure by the EU Member States and understanding that the Agreement aimed at co-operation, not at integration into the EU, the second Moldovan President Petru Lucinschi expressed by successive official letters the European aspirations of Moldova. The first two letters were sent in December 1996 and, respectively, in October 1997 to the President of the European Commission Jacques Santer. They expressed for the first time the Moldova's will to become an associate member of the EU by 2000 and start negotiations on an Association Agreement (AA). In December 1997, Petru Lucinschi sent letters with a similar content to all EU heads of states and governments. In addition, in the same month Prime Minister Ion Ciubuc met in Brussels Jean-Luc Dehaene, Prime Minister of Belgium; Hans van den Broek, European Commissioner; and Francois Lamoureux, Deputy Director General of the European Commission DG1A, asking for support so that Moldova be granted with the statute of an association member of the EU. All interlocutors welcomed Moldova's political will in this regard, but underlined that before passing to another stage of relations Moldova should fulfil its obligations under PCA (Evolutia..., 2009: 49-52).

The EU-Moldova PCA entered into force on 1 July 1998, providing thus a new contractual relationship between the Parties concerned and setting out a co-operation framework in a broad spectrum of policy areas: to provide an appropriate framework for the political dialogue between the Parties allowing the development of political relations; to promote trade and investment and harmonious economic relations between the Parties and so to foster their sustainable economic development; to provide a basis for legislative, economic, social, financial, and cultural co-operation; to support efforts of Moldova to consolidate its democracy and to develop its economy and to complete the transition into a market economy.

In 1999, despite the reticent attitude of the EU towards the European aspirations of Moldova, Sturza Government appointed by the ruling parliamentary coalition Alliance for Democracy and Reforms declared European integration as its main foreign policy priority. However, due to the frictions inside political parties, Sturza Government has been resigned, fact which undermined substantially the diplomatic efforts of Moldova on its way to European integration. According to the authors of the European Strategy of the Republic of Moldova, the omission of the Republic of Moldova from the conclusions on EU enlargement to the East, approved by Helsinki European Council in December 1999,

was the most serious consequence of that fact[5]. In the same time, EU Commission decided to cancel the granting of 15 mln. Euro for the support the balance payments of Moldova as well as pit off for the uncertain period meeting of the Cooperation Council EU - RM.

Despite of the fact that there were some periods when Moldovan officials tried to put on the state agenda more serious relations with the EU, it was an attempt to obtain the economic help and special priorities in trade, but without clear understanding what should be the steps done by Moldova itself in order to reform its internal system. Besides, many of high ranking persons even were not interested in very radical changes of the existing system because of their own interest. But for the sake of the argument we have to mention that from the EU part there was approximately none interest on this region taking into the account the internal European discussions on the further extension to the East. The existence of the Transnistrian frozen conflict in Moldova was viewed by EU officials as something not important for them since it is far away from their borders. And last but not least the presence of the Russian troops and the acceptance of this space a "natural" for Russian interests was a reason not to interfere in the region.

Chapter II
The EU-Moldova Relationships during the Communist governance: the time of missed opportunities

In May 2001, after early parliamentary elections and an incoherent to some degree foreign policy, the European dimension of Moldova's foreign policy started to come back gradually to the top of its external relations agenda. The starting point of this surprising in that time return to the pro-EU rhetoric could be largely considered the establishment by the President Vladimir Voronin, in November 2002, of the National Commission for European Integration, aimed at the elaboration of the European Integration Strategy of the Republic of Moldova.

Few days after its fifth enlargement wave in May 2004, the EU launched the European Neighbourhood Policy which articulates a revised policy approach towards sixteen countries in the EU neighbourhood. The ENP is a response to the extension of the EU's borders and to the limits of this extension. As the EU cannot enlarge *ad infinitum*, while its enlargement already brought it closer to potentially unstable regions, the ENP attempts in normative terms: to develop a friendly neighbourhood and a zone of prosperity with the EU neighbours; to avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe; and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union[6].

The main vehicle for taking the ENP forward is the Action Plans, documents which come to set the frame in short and medium run for the dialogue between the EU and its neighbours in a variety of fields.

The Republic of Moldova met the EU initiative towards its neighbourhood with mixed feelings. On one side, Moldova welcomed the EU intention to deepen its relations with neighbouring countries, but on the other side it was more or less disappointed as the new Neighbourhood Policy of the EU was not considering a clear European perspective

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[5] Valeriu Gheorghiu, "Moldova on the way to the European Union: Distance covered and next steps to be done," Institute for Public Policy,
  In: http://www.ipp.md/public/biblioteca/83/en/MoldovaWayEU.pdf.
[6] European Commission, "Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours," 11 March 2003, European Commission,
  In: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/world/enp/pdf/com03_ 104_en.pdf.

for Moldova. Another important reason for these reticent attitudes was the inclusion of Moldova at the same level with states without a European vocation.

Despite these attitudes, the EU's initiative towards its neighbourhood brought in Moldova new hopes with regard to its future European destiny. Although the ENP is not offering a membership perspective, Moldovan authorities conceived this initiative as an additional way of co-operation with the EU and as "a bridge towards the following stage – association and integration into the EU"[7]. The head of Moldovan diplomacy Andrei Stratan expressed the view that "once Moldova fulfils the tasks outlined in the (EU-Moldova Action Plan), it would acquire a more advanced status in relations with EU, and Chişinău's aspirations to become an associated member might become quite realistic"[8]. Although, this has been stated later, the negotiation process on the EU-Moldova Action Plan began with similar hopes. The EU and Moldova negotiated the Action Plan during four rounds of negotiations held in January, February and June 2004[9].

On 9 December 2004, European Commission launched the EU-Moldova Action Plan, together with other six similar documents for Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Tunisia, and Ukraine. Already on 22 February 2005, at the seventh meeting of EU-Moldova Co-operation Council, held in Brussels, Jean Asselborn, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Immigration of Luxembourg, on behalf of the Council, and Vasile Tarlev Prime Minister of Moldova signed the EU-Moldova Action Plan[10].

Shortly after the signing the EUMAP, the EU started to show that it was serious when promised a strong commitment to support the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. In March 2005 the Council appointed an EU Special Representative (EUSR) for Moldova, whose mandate was primarily linked with the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict. Since October 2005 the EU started to participate as an observer to the negotiation process for the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict in the so-called "Five-Plus-Two" format (Evolutia..., 2009: 168). Following the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) in October, the official opening ceremony of the EUBAM took place on 1 December 2005. The EUBAM works very closely with the EUSR for Moldova and aims at preventing smuggling, trafficking, and customs fraud, by providing advice and training to improve the capacity of the Moldovan and Ukrainian border and customs services. The EUBAM was offered a two year mandate, which was extended in 2007 for another two years (Evolutia..., 2009: 169).

In May 2006 Moldova was accepted as a member of the South East Europe Co-operation Process (SEECP), seen by Moldovan authorities as an additional way get involved within the processes occurring in the region covered by this regional organisation and as a tool opening up new perspectives in relations between Moldova and the EU.

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[7] Valeriu Gheorghiu, "Moldova on the way to the European Union: Distance covered and next steps to be done," Institute for Public Policy, in: http://www.ipp.md/public/biblioteca/83/en/MoldovaWayEU.pdf.

[8] ADEPT, *Governance and Democracy in Moldova*, # 30, 33, 2004, ADEPT, In: http://www.e-democracy.md/en/e-journal/2004.shtml.

[9] For details: Sergiu Buşcaneanu, "How Far is the European Neighbourhood Policy a Substantial Offer for Moldova", August 2006, ADEPT,
In: http://www.e-democracy.md/files/enp-moldova.pdf.

[10] MFAEI, "Reuniunea a VII a Consiliului de Cooperare Republica Moldova – Uniunea Europeană," Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration,
In: http://www.mfa.md/Ro/Comunicate/2005-02-24ReuniuneaConsiliuluiCooperareRM_UE.htm.

The following important event marking the EU-Moldova political contacts was President Vladimir Voronin official visit to Brussels on 5-6 December 2007. The President's visit to Brussels aimed to totalize the results of co-operation with the EU in the past years and to make clear the further co-operation possibilities with EU institutions. Although Voronin stressed that he did not come to Brussels to negotiate Moldova's perspective to join the EU, observers said that the visit of the Moldovan President to EU institutions aimed to assure that Moldova continues to be dedicated to its European course and to persuade European officials to allow Chisinau to succeed to a new qualitative relationship with the EU.

When President Voronin just arrived in Brussels on 5 December 2007, European Commission released a new Communication titled "A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy"[11]. The document, among others, answered the question regarding the future EU-Moldova relations, but on a short term. It recommended a roll-over of the EUMAP for one year along with similar documents for Ukraine and Israel, which were to reach the end of their term in early 2008.

Shortly, on 14 January 2008, President Vladimir Voronin was on another formal visit to Brussels. The meeting with European Commission President José Manuel Barroso was the main one from Voronin's visit agenda. According to Commission's functionaries, the meeting between Voronin and Barroso had rather a protocol nature. As the European Commission President could not receive the Moldovan leader during the last visit to Brussels on 5-6 December 2007, the meeting of the two officials was postponed for January 2008.

Prior to the visit to Brussels, President Voronin has told journalists that "Moldova will not extend the implementation deadline of [EUMAP] after February 2008, when the term is over". However, the conviction that a perspective of advancing to a different type of contractual relation with the EU will be shaping for Moldova after February 2008, when the three year period established initially for the implementation of the EUMAP ended, was exaggerated. José Manuel Barroso reconfirmed the 5 December 2007 proposal by the European Commission launched via the Communication „A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy" to extend the EUMAP implementation term. In spite of Moldova's accomplishments regarding the EUMAP implementation stressed by Barroso at a news conference after meeting Vladimir Voronin, the European official concluded that the EUMAP potential was not fully exploited and, hence, it must be kept in place as a guiding tool for EU-Moldova day to day work.

Finally, Mrs. Benita Ferrero Waldner, European Commissioner for Foreign Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, was on a formal visit to Chişinău on 14-15 February 2008. In her meetings with Moldovan officials, Ferrero Waldner has reaffirmed what was said in December 2007 and January 2008 that the EU will consider the possibility to sign a new agreement with Moldova only "after the complete implementation" of the EUMAP. Nor in December 2007 the announcement of this possibility was new, as the EUMAP stipulates such a perspective. While on a visit to the Moldova State University, Waldner added that she is sure of the willingness of both sides to promote their relations at a higher level and hopes that the future ENP progress report on Moldova to be released by the European Commission in April 2008 will allow such an evolution.

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[11] European Commission, "Communication from the Commission A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy," 05/12/2007, COM(2007) 774 final, European Commission, In: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com07_774_en.pdf.

Benita Ferrero Waldner has praised Moldovan authorities for the success in implementing the EUMAP, but signalled problematical fields which require more efforts. The problematical areas signalled by the European Commissioner are those that EU-Moldova co-operation bodies and the European Commission have earlier indicated[12]. Also, Waldner reiterated the need of effectively enforcing the laws adopted during the implementation of the EUMAP. In turn, President Voronin has assured that Moldova will implement the new regulations and will organised the 2009 parliamentary elections, which he described as "the first and perhaps the most important test for Moldova," in a democratic, transparent and free way.

The double standards applied by Voronin administration and the ambiguity in the relations with the EU made the Union to adopt the policy of small steps towards Moldova, a tool which does not oblige to anything unless the target country starts to correspond to the European norms and values, a prerequisite for future accession.

Chapter III
Moldova-EU relations in the light of 2009 Parliamentary elections

The Communist governance proved its ambiguity in the relations to the EU soon after the launching of the Eastern Partnership. The Eastern Partnership (EaP) is a project which was initiated by the European Union (EU), presented by the foreign minister of Poland with assistance from Sweden at a the EU's General Affairs and External Relations Council in Brussels on 26 May 2008 and inaugurated in Prague on 7 May 2009 (Daily Telegraph, 2008). The EaP is meant to complement the Northern Dimension and the Union for the Mediterranean by providing an institutionalized forum for discussing visa agreements, free trade deals and strategic partnership agreements with the EU's eastern neighbours, while avoiding the controversial topic of accession to the European Union. Its geographical scope is to consist of Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine (Barents Observer, 2008).

Russia has voiced concerns over the Eastern Partnership, seeing it as an attempt to expand the EU's "sphere of influence" in the quest for hydrocarbons. Russia has also accused the EU of putting undue pressure on Belarus by suggesting it might be marginalized if it follows Russia in recognising the independence of the Georgian breakaway regions South Ossetia and Abkhazia. "Is this promoting democracy or is it blackmail? It's about pulling countries from the positions they want to take as sovereign states", Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov has asked (EU Observer, 2009).

Following the "Big Brother" rhetoric, on February 27, in an interview with Russia's "Kommersant" newspaper, Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin, the chairman of the Communist Party, rejected the country's participation in the European Union's proposed Eastern Partnership program.

Asked what he expects from the EU "Eastern Partnership", where Moldova is incorporated together with Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus, Voronin called it a plot to "surround Russia" and to create "a new Commonwealth of Independent States." "This [Eastern Partnership] is similar to the CIS-2. Why should we create another CIS under the control of the EU? It looks like a ring around Russia. We are still working in the program for the south-eastern Balkans. This is constructive work"[13]. He told the daily that Moldova is more advanced in its European integration than three of the

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[12] See for instance 2.3.1.2 EU-Moldova Action Plan.
[13] "Kommersant" from 27.02.2009.

program's other full members, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Challenged with the question that points that the "Eastern Partnership" provides financial assistance, Voronin replied "this is candy, which in such cases is distributed" (EU Observer, 2009).

In a more moderate tone, Marian Lupu, at that time the Chairman of Parliament, has said his country should have a different status than the other five Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in the European Union's Eastern Partnership program. Talking to RFE/RL's Moldovan service, Marian Lupu, said that Moldova is "more advanced" in its European integration than Armenia or Azerbaijan and should not wait for EU admission until those countries are ready. He said all six CIS members (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) could not be expected to move toward the EU at the same speed and that Moldova will be ready much sooner than others[14].

In the eve of Moldova's parliamentary elections scheduled for April 5, 2009, the Party of Communists was looking for Moscow's support which was promised in exchange of anti-EU and anti-NATO rhetoric as well.

Violent street protests and a brutal government crackdown followed parliamentary elections on April 07, 2009, after the anti-Communist opposition claimed the vote was rigged. Russia asked the European Union and Romania to guarantee the sovereignty of its ally Moldova after Voronin, accused neighbouring Romania of stoking a coup attempt after demonstrators ransacked parliament during post-election protests and waved EU and Romanian flags from his offices.

Moldova imposed a visa regime on Romania, expelled its ambassador and denied entry to more than 19 Romanian journalists. It said the measures were needed because Romania is threatening its sovereignty, a charge that Bucharest dismissed. The EU urged Moldova to drop the punitive measures it took against Romania and to respect constitutional freedoms after at least hundreds people were arrested in riots and some died. The European Commission said the bloc recognised the Moldovan sovereignty. "While understanding the complexity of the Moldovan-Romanian relations, we call on the government of Moldova to resume normal relations with Romania,"the foreign ministers of France, the Czech Republic and Sweden said in a joint statement[15].

In Moscow, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, said he was "deeply disturbed" by the flags and slogans during the riots in Chisinau, because they showed the demonstrators "were obsessed with the idea of destroying Moldovan statehood". "We hope that the EU and the Romanian leadership, which publicly condemned the violence, will take action to ensure that Romanian flags and Romanian slogans are not used as the cover for undermining Moldovan statehood," Mr Lavrov told the state-run RIA news agency[16].

A rerun of the legislative elections on 29 July saw the ousting of the communist government by a coalition of four opposition parties, calling themselves the "Alliance for European Integration" (AEI). Two consecutive attempts by the new parliament to elect the new president failed, however, and renewed elections are in principle scheduled to take place in the course of 2010. EU integration is the AEI's declared top priority and the new Moldovan prime minister and foreign affairs minister flew to Brussels on their first diplomatic trip. They pledged adherence to democratic reforms and asked for increasing EU assistance. The EU is eager to proceed with its new initiative adopted in May, the

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[14] "Moldova Unhappy With EU's Eastern Partnership Offer", in: http://www.rferl.org/content/Moldova_Unhappy_With_EUs_Eastern_Partnership_Offer/1516575.html

[15] "Moscow warns EU over Moldova", in: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/moscow-warns-eu-over-moldova-1666848.html

[16] *Ibidem*

Eastern Partnership, but Moldova's EU integration efforts have been put largely on hold since the April ballot. The former EU Commissioner for the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Ferrero-Waldner, therefore, went to Moldova at the end of November to urge the new government to stick to its reform programme and to stress that the first priority is to start negotiations on a new association agreement[17].

Despite the rhetoric, relations with the EU are of secondary concern at this point, since Moldova is coping simultaneously with a political and economic crisis. The widespread fraud and abuses witnessed under the previous government during the elections exposed a series of weaknesses in Moldova's democratic system. The new government will need to continue focusing on reforming the law enforcement agencies and the judiciary, showing its continued commitment to fight corruption and to reform the media landscape. The new government's effectiveness may be hampered by the current political crisis, but these reforms must be carried out if Moldova is to take its relations with the EU to the next level.

In addition, most of the new government's recent efforts have gone towards securing much needed macro-financial assistance. Indeed, the former government had covered up the disastrous state of Moldova's economy during the electoral period. The European Commission promised to accelerate the disbursement of macro-financial support. The IMF also agreed to disburse a $590 million loan over the next three years. Moldova currently holds talks with Russia to secure a $500 million loan, initially promised to the outgoing communists. Still, one of the first priorities of the new government was to normalise relations with Romania, which severely deteriorated during the April election campaign. The EU repeatedly pointed out that a normalisation of bilateral relations with Romania was a pre-condition for further deepening of Moldova's relations with the EU. The new government proceeded to lift the visa restrictions for Romanian citizens, which were introduced in the aftermath of the April elections and offered an official apology to Romania. The long-awaited local border traffic treaty was also signed and two additional Romanian consulates were opened in Moldova.

The present Moldovan government has won the cautious political support of the EU and is hoping to find ways to ensure Moscow's endorsement to avoid a further destabilization.

Conclusions

Since 1991 the incoherence in foreign policy of subsequent Moldovan Governments made the EU to be reticent towards Moldova. EU-Moldova PCA and TACIS program have been seen in those circumstances as adequate instruments to manage the EU-Moldova relations. Though there were cases when particular Moldovan Governments attempted to develop a more solid vision on relations with the EU, political crises, followed by deceptions of Moldovan citizens, brought to an end such attempts. These were additional arguments for the EU that it did not make a mistake when it offered to Moldova nothing more than few incentives embedded in a "partnership and co-operation" appealing formula.

Increasing interest of the EU in its neighbourhood, as a result of its enlargement to the East and South in 2004, along with other external and domestic factors linked with the resolution process of the Transnistrian conflict, made both Parties more willing to advance

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[17] George Dura, "On track. Moldova wants EU integration, but needs to do its homework first", In: http://www.ceps.eu/

their bilateral relations. The ENP and EUMAP are the direct result of this will. The new partnership perspectives, EU incentives in a broad policy areas and increased financial assistance, all as elements of the EU soft power and attractiveness, did what hardly could be predicted in 2001, when Party of Communists took over power. Having in mind the experience since EUMAP has been put in place, some would be optimistic about the European perspective of Moldova, while others definitely would not share the same optimism. Indeed, EUMAP could be viewed, with all problems related to its implementation, as a modernization and Europeanization effort.

Following new elections in July, a new government was formed. Shortly after the government was formed, in October, the EU Troika - under the leadership of Minister for Foreign Affairs Carl Bildt - visited Chisinau and held preliminary discussions on the new government's EU policy. The Moldovan government has presented ambitious targets for the process of forging closer ties with the EU. The launch of negotiations on a new Association Agreement is scheduled on 12 January 2010, but moves towards further visa liberalisation and a deep and comprehensive free trade area with the EU will largely depend on the sustainability and operability of the new government

Annex I
The EU-Moldova bilateral trade
European *Union bilateral trade with Moldova represents only 0.1 per cent of total trade, but it is growing and the EU is encouraging closer economic ties.*

Bilateral trade between the EU and Moldova has shown an increasing trend in the last 5 years, except for a decline in 2005 due to a fall in exports of steel products. In 2008 the total turnover of trade with Moldova reached EUR 2.5 billion. The growth of bilateral trade was slower than in the previous years and imports from Moldova increased by 2.7% and exports to Moldova by 14.1% compared to 2007. The EU is Moldova's most important trading partner with a 50% share of its external trade.. Despite continuous growth, Moldova's exports to the EU remain rather limited and non-diversified. In it is expected that the autonomous trade preferences that the EU has extended to Moldova at the beginning of 2008 will lead to a further diversification of exports and as a result stimulate economic growth in Moldova.

Trade in goods
EU good exports to Moldova 2008: EUR 1.7 billion
EU goods imports from Moldova 2007: EUR 748 million
Trade in services
EU services exports to Moldova 2006: EUR 171 million
EU services imports from Moldova 2006: EUR 141 million
Autonomous Trade Preferences for Moldova
In the ENP Action Plan for Moldova the EU agreed to consider granting Moldova Additional Autonomous Trade Preferences (ATPs) beyond the GSP+ preferences, provided that some substantive progress was made in the area of customs control. In January 2008 the Council adopted Regulation (EC) No 55/2008 on ATPs for Moldova (as amended by Reg. (EC) 1210/2008) by giving unlimited and duty free access to the EU market for all products originating in Moldova, except for certain agricultural products. To avoid having overlapping systems of preferences, Moldova was removed from the list of GSP beneficiaries.

Multilateral context

Moldova has been a Member of the WTO since 26 July 2001. Moldova is also a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) since 1994. The CIS does not have supranational powers, but promotes cooperation in various fields. Moldova is also a party to the amended and enlarged Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), which entered into force on 26 July 2007. Moldova has concluded 16 agreements on market access within the CIS and the Pact on Stability in South-Eastern Europe

Future deeper trade relations

Article 4 of the PCA states that the parties shall examine jointly whether circumstances allow the start of negotiations on the establishment of an FTA. In light of the progress Moldova has made in the field of structural reforms and economic development the Commission has launched an FTA feasibility study to get an updated view on the possibilities for developing future deeper trade relations through an FTA. In line with the EU's Eastern Partnership Strategy the objective is to start negotiations on a deep and comprehensive FTA as a core element of an Association Agreement if and when Moldova is deemed to be ready and certain conditions are fulfilled.

Source: http://www.eubusiness.com/europe/moldova/moldova-eu-trade

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INTEGRATION OF BALKAN, THE ALBANIAN CASE

Klajdi GJONDEDAJ [*]

Abstract. *Albania is of course one of the most unique cases in Eastern Europe not only for its size and location, but also for his legacy in economic development and many other features as well. Without denying the similarities with other former communist countries, Albania has pursued his way of economic transformation to a market economy. The economic transformation previously followed by the stabilization program that was implemented from 1992 show the real possibility of this country to abandon its long isolation and to create a new democratic society and a new market economy. Possibility of sustainable growth, after solving some problems of post-emergency.*

Albania is seriously involved in this historical transformation and has a real chance to enter Europe, to which it belongs. The problem that arises is the cost and benefits for the integration process of being full membership of the European Union. This research aims to present the current situation and the strong influence of the past, giving a frame of progress steps. The advantages and disadvantages of Albania, the similarities and specificities of the model, as well as political, institutional constraints and the mentality. Therefore aims to analyze the path of Albania into European structures in recent years, and examines the progress made by the process of Stabilization Association, European Programme aid and the continue of reforming the country to get closer to the Copenhagen criteria.

The progress of Albania is affected by the EU, and then Albania has changed attitude towards policymaking. The Balkan region and Albania are part of the European map, but it depends on finding solutions that work within the country to push the negotiations and to consolidate a future membership in the European family. The process of integration of Albania into the European Union is a matter of will, which is not only Albania as a single country, but for the entire of all Balkan countries. The European perspective may make a miracle in the Balkans and thus transform Balkan societies. Albania is divided also in two important role, in hard politic (USA) and in soft politic (EU), that makes the life in themselves complicated. From December 2010, Albania realize the first goal from European Union, a free movement in schengen space that will open in letter a "hope window" for Albanian citizenship.

From June to November 1991, the European Community assumed the responsibility to act in first person in the conflicted states of the Balkans, using economic pressure and influencing the recognition of the proclaimed independence, with the objective to promote the resolution of problems by the breakup of Yugoslavia. But without success[1]. For five months revere agreed ceasefires twelve, all violated, and

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[*] Student of master University of Siena, Italy. E-mail: gjondedaj@gmail.com

[1] Lack of internal politics, lack of understanding of the true nature of the conflict, and institutional complexity of negotiating a European imposed was turning into a European union with a common foreign security policy. For more details; *Unfinished Peace. Report of the International*

discussed four peace plans, all failed[2]. The conclusion of the Dayton Agreement, 21 November 1995, a sign the Order of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a start of a new phase: reconstruction of the entire region in material and political issues. Negotiations are held in the United States and led by Washington, was the proof of the secondary role of the European Union had played in the decision making process.

After the Rome Conference of 18 February had consolidated the Dayton Agreement[3], the regional approach was the first strategy developed by the EU towards the Balkans after the dissolution of former Yugoslavia. The bottom line was his aim to encourage cooperation between Member States of the region between them and their neighbors, including all the EU so that he could not repeat what happened in 1991. The regional approach was addressed to those Countries for which the council had not adopted the negotiating directives for an agreement of association and was based on two pillars: (1) the conclusion of contractual relations with the EU; (2) the promise of significant financial assistance. With regard to the first, we propose the signing of bilateral agreements contain predominantly first-generation[4] economic trade, for the export from Balkan to the community market and to exercise a political dialogue in order to promote relations of "good neighbor".

In this period we have the 4th enlargement Austria, Finland, Sweden as a full member. Meanwhile, the concepts developed for the enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe began to be used so well in the Balkan context, marking a development of the European perspective to these countries.

The Stabilisation Association process was presented as a very ambitious regional approach to stabilizing the region, since the post-conflict environment is still felt. It was a contractual agreement between Brussels and the reference countries Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia. So, Brussels offer was the gradual development of contractual relationships for new generation (as foregone by the regional approach), with the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs) cured like the "Europe agreements" adopted first by the countries of Central Eastern Europe. The relevant negotiations could be started but only if the country had complied the conditions and if it had been shown to have the necessary administrative capacity, political and economic to implement the commitments that we assumed[5]. This was the most important "new entry" of the Stabilisation Association process that represented a first concrete step towards a possible future accession to the EU.

Commission on the Balkans, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C 1996. European Union was fragile as the recently concluded Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), which pressed Bonn to the sale of the mark. In return, the Germans demanded, among other things, the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia

[2] The European community has organized two peace conferences: the first at The Hague from September 1991 to August 1992 and the second, along with the United Nations in Geneva from September 1992 to December 1995

[3] Cfr. Il Documento SEC (96) 252 del 14.02.1996, *Le prospettive di sviluppo della cooperazione regionale per i Paesi sorti dalla dissoluzione della ex.Jugoslavia e I mezzi della Comunità per favorire la cooperazione*. Cfr. anche le conclusioni del CAG del 26.02.1996

[4] The first generation of agreements are cooperative agreements with content primarily economic and commercial. The second generation, are the Association Agreements, that the transposition of the *acquis communautaire*, and reflect a higher maturity of the interested countries.

[5] In June 1999, however, the European Union considered that the conditions for start SAA negotiations existed only for Macedonia and Albania. Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and especially the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would have to wait

The relations between Albania and the Community European Union (as it was the European Union until 1992 before the Treaty of Maastricht), started in 1991 with the first diplomatic relations between Albania and 45 European Economic Community. In 1992, Albania signed the Agreement of Trade and Cooperation with UE[6]. In 1999 the European Commission proposed a new initiative for the countries of Western Balkans, including Albania: Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). The Stabilisation and Association Process required; (1) The process of stabilization and association agreements, with a view to EU membership, as soon as they fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria; The development of economic relations and trade with the region and inside; (2) The development of economic and financial aid already available; (3) Assistance for democratization, civil society, to education and to institutional development; (4) The cooperation in justice and home affairs; (5) The development of political dialogue.

The SAP consists of two phases that have to do with the implementation of document, which is the main SAA. The first stage has to do with the evaluation of conditions (economic, social, legislative and political) of the country and the preparation of administrative structures. The first phase of the SAP begins when the state is interested in doing a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU and closes with the publication of a study by the European Commission regarding the determination of conditions for initiating negotiations. At the end of this study, the European Commission takes a position with the country concerned and its ability to perform the obligations of the Agreement. The second phase includes the process of negotiations on the conclusion and implementations are effective. After signing the agreement which settled respect for democratic principles and functioning of the single market, the country SAA negotiations are especially important at this stage because they determine the conditions under which will determine the trade relations between the signatory countries of the EU. SAA negotiations are especially important at this stage because they determine the conditions under which will determine the trade relations between the signatory countries of the EU. After the signing of which is established in respect for democratic principles and operation of the single market, the signatory country and the EU begin to gradually to free market[7]. A fresh positive development for the future Balkans agenda came in November 2004 when the new European Commission, headed by Jose Manuel Barroso, moved the Western Balkans (SAP) countries form DG External Relations to DG Enlargement, an important act of support, interest, and attention that the EU is paying to these countries.

The relations between Albania and the EU have entered a new phase with the signing of the Stabilisation and Association June 12, 2006. Analyzing this highlight the path delay of Albania and obstacles found during this location, political, economic and social taken in this process and, finally, the EU's influence in the stabilization of domestic policy and the contribution of liberal democracy.

The integration of Albania in European Union is process that start early which is in itself a direct lobbying to European Union member states in all institutional levels and not only through diplomatic Ambassador or body, to ensure support them. Also, recent years have been added also for a lobbying effort, or Public relation, with indirect character, for the promotion of Albania (achievements and changes that have occurred in the country in recent years), culture, history, tradition, etc, to bring it more close to

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[6] Ministry of European Integration Albania, http://www.mie.gov.al

[7] Ministry of Integration in Albania, *Albanian and European Union*, Tirana 2006; for more details visit: www.mie.gov.al.

European citizens, to know Albanian better, aiming to increase economic exchanges, trade, human, tourism, cultural, academic, etc.

Integration of Albania in the European Union is a process and as such, concluded the country's full membership in the EU. Visa liberalization[8] marks a step Albania important to achieving the final goal and at the same time a certain moment in its relationship with the EU. With regard to how the case influenced the liberalization in support of the citizens to the process, it is another issues. In connection with that enjoys the support of EU membership process, underline without fear that Albania enjoys greater support than in any other European country involved in this process currently, but even before. The support of Albanian citizens in this process is 96-97% per cent. This is for many reasons, not only for visa liberalization. It is true that the liberalization of the visa is a decision with specific consequences in the lives of citizens and the possibility that effect direct their movement in the Schengen area, but this is only one element of the process and even the question of support also constitutes and is only one element of the process. The process in its entirety is very complex, and for nearly 20 years in all developing country is designed in view integration as a priority in Euro-Atlantic structures. Currently, the first priority of Albanian foreign policy is membership in the European Union. From the standpoint of state interests, no doubt that the most vulnerable to this process would be Albania's neighboring countries, EU member simultaneously, such as Italy and Greece. It is natural that the developments in Albania have greater sensitivity to Italy and Greece. I think unequivocally that Albania enjoyed their support, (also other countries) in the case of membership in NATO and also believe in EU membership. The issue of EU membership is slightly different compared with membership in NATO, because the process is somewhat technical. But ultimately the decision would again be a political decision. Also, when talking about support to Albania, it should be seen as a support for the region and the process of integration of all Western Balkan countries.

As emphasized even more up the process of integration is also a technical process even political and it is very important that this be kept in mind throughout the process. Countries involved in this process, including Albania, should keep in mind this fact very well in developing policies and strategies of their own. Being a technical process that means it has a set of standards that must be adopt, so that for them will be translated into reform and domestic work to prepare and what to bring in their levels. That makes the place, applicant in the main actor in this process, which means that it is the responsibility of his choice or how fast and good wishes to approach the EU according to the reforms undertaken to achieve the standards. Also, being at the same time a political process, is worth it, I said above, that the decision would ultimately be a political decision and will also depend on more generalized climate within the EU. At the Thessaloniki Summit (June 2003), it was confirmed that the Union's policy towards Western Balkans, would constitute exactly the Stabilisation and Association Process. Now Union was offered to Western Balkan countries a clear European prospective as well as a concrete agenda for realizing this objective. Also, the Thessaloniki Summit included a new element to the framework of processes European integration was the assessment of individual countries,

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[8] Albania meet the conditions for liberalization of the visa, now this process is to last and has made significant progress in the performance of visa-free travel zone "Schengen". From, December 15 Albanian citizenship can travel in Schengen area, but the European Union will monitor the behavior of Albanians and the violation of schengern-rules involves the suspension of the free-visa regime for Albania.

according to merit respective[9]. Progress towards the EU of those countries will not be done in the block form, as will individual approach may be more efficient in terms of deep reforms that these countries should take[10]. Integration by avoid the merits of each country and holding hostage the enlargement process by any country, or under the grouping of countries, which share a similar problem, threatening the stability, security and economic development in the region and EU European. The Balkans countries have the same problems, so they are in concurrence for same sectors that needs to build to approach standards. This situation limits the Western Balkans to cooperate with themselves because of historical problems. But, in the same time the challenges and the competition is the best way to integrate Balkan to Copenhagen criteria. If the EU will not "organize" the Balkan countries in competition and will just guarantee ad hoc a "potential candidate", the European Union will lose credibility. Jose Manuel Barroso has said: "Enlargements have not been brake on integration, but a *motor* for it". Leaving the Balkans out of EU could seriously harm the European project itself. Therefore the European perspective may make miracles in the Balkan and thus transform Balkan society, Albanian included.

Key dates in Albania's path towards the EU:

15 December 2010:
Albania part of Schengen
27 May 2010:
The European Commission adopted a proposal enabling citizens of Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina to travel to Schengen countries without needing a short-term visa.
15 April 2010:
Albania delivers replies to the Commission's Questionnaire.
28 April 2009:
Albania submits its application for EU membership.
1 April 2009:
Entry into force the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA).
June 2008:
The European Commission presents a road map identifying specific requirements for visa liberalisation with Albania.
March 2008:
Visa liberalization dialogue launched.
18 February 2008:
Council decision on a revised European partnership for Albania
22 January 2008:
Albania and the EC sign the Financing Agreement for the instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) 2007 National Programe.
January 2008:
The visa facilitation agreement enters into force.
18 October 2007:
Albania signs the IPA Framework Agreement.

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[9] The principles of "own merits" and "catch up" will be applied, in parallel with the regional approach, which remains an essential element of EU policy towards the region.

[10] Interview taken by Klajdi Gjondedaj from Shpresa Kureta, MAP Coordinator, Departament of NATO, ex Ambassador to Austria (*The integration in Albania, technical and political issues)* 01 September 2010.

September 2007:
Signature of a visa facilitation, agreement between Albania and the EU.

May 2007:
Adoption of the Multi-Annual Indicative Planning Document (MIPD) or Albania under the IPA.

January 2007:
Entry into force of the new instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA).

December 2006:
Entry into force of the Interim Agreement.

June 2006:
Signature of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) at the General Affairs and External Relations Council in Luxembourg.

May 2006:
Entry into force of the EC-Albania readmission agreement.

January 2006 :
Council decision on a revised European Partnership for Albania.

June 2004:
Council decision on a first European Partnership for Albania.

June 2003:
Thessaloniki European Council the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) is confirmed as the EU policy for the Western Balkans. The EU perspective for these countries is confirmed (countries participating in the SAP are eligible for EU accession and may join the EU once they are ready).

January 2003:
Commission President Prodi officially launches the negotiations for a SAA between the EU and Albania.

October 2002:
Negotiating Directives for the negotiation of a SAA with Albania are adopted in October.

Year 2001:
The Commission recommends the undertaking of negotiations on SAA with Albania. The Goeteborg European Council invites the Commission to present draft negotiating directives for the negotiation of a SAA.

Year 2001:
First year of the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) programme specifically designed for the Stabilisation and Association Process countries.

November 2000:
Zagreb Summit launches the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) for five countries of South-Eastern Europe, including Albania.

June 2000:
Feira European Council states that all the SAP countries are "potential candidates" for EU membership.

Year 2000:
Extension of duty-free access to EU market for products from Albania.

Year 1999:
Albania benefits from Autonomous Trade Preferences with the EU.

Year 1999:
The EU proposes the new Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) for five countries of South-Eastern Europe, including Albania.

Year 1997:
Regional Approach. The EU Council of Ministers establishes political and economic conditionality for the development of bilateral relations.
Year 1992:
Trade and Co-operation Agreement between the EU and Albania. Albania becomes eligible for funding under the EU's Phare programme.

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TRANSCRIPTS OF THE CIVIL STATUS PURCHASED FROM THE FOREIGN LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN THE STATE ON THE BIHOR COUNTY CIVIL RECORDS

Constantin Vasile ȚOCA*, Ioana Maria Clara BOIȚ**

Abstract. *The paper analyzes the theoretical dimension of the transcripts of civil status certificates obtained from the foreign local public authorities in the civil status registers. In order to do this analysis we made use of the concept delimitation, the transposition of international law, treaties, and, as a practical dimension, we realized a case study in Bihor County.*

Keywords: *Transcripts of Civil Status Certificates, Case Study, Over Authenticate, the Hague Apostille, International Treaties, Institutions*

The objective of the paper *Transcript of the Civil Status Certificates Purchased from the Local Authorities in the Foreign Civil Status registered in Bihor county*, is to capture national and international legislation on marriage and birth certificates, transcripts for Romanian citizens who are on foreign soil by customizing the records in the registers of civil status that run its activity in the Bihor county area.

The civil status documents of Romanian citizens, prepared by the foreign authorities, have power in the country only if they are entered or transcribed in the Romanian civil status registers.

The transcript of certificates and statements of the civil status is carried out with the approval of the mayor of the administrative unit of the place of residence of the applicant, with the prior approval of the County Public Community Service of the Records of People.

The Romanian citizen is obliged, within 6 months after returning home from abroad or from the receipt of the certificate or statement of civil status, to require the transcription.

To provide a conceptual dimension of the phenomenon of civil status certificates transcripts, we will define the key concepts from The Hague Apostil, legalization, treaties or bilateral agreements on legal assistance in civil status matters, which provide the relief of apostil or legalization.

The Apostil is actually a square stamp (of 9 cm), identical in all Member States of the Hague Convention and applied directly on the notarized document or an extension of this (Official Gazette, Part I no. 408 of 1999, art. 4).

The Hague Apostil can be written in the official language of the issuing authority. The words contained in its contents may be given in a second language. The title will be

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* Assistant Professor, PhD, Department of European Studies and International Relations, Faculty of History, Geography and International Relations, University of Oradea, Romania. E-mail: toca@igri.ro

** Advisor, Department of Public Records Bihor County, Romania. E-mail: almaria18@yahoo.com

given in French: «Apostille - Convention de la Haye du 5 Octobre 1961» (Official Gazette No. 408 of 1999).

For international recognition, the civil status documents, i.e. birth and marriage certificates, after the apostil is applied by the Prefecture, is translated into the language of the country of destination by an authorized translator, including the certificate, then legalized by a public notary, and finally the certified translation with the apostil is legalized by the competent tribunal.

The legalization is the procedure by which a state adds the reliability of documents issued within its territory, practically confirming their authenticity.

The official documents prepared or certified by a foreign authority may be used only if the Romanian courts are over-legalized, by administrative hierarchy and further diplomatic or consular offices of Romania, to ensure they are such signature and seal of authenticity (Law no. 105 of 1992).

The legalization through administrative channels is subjected to the procedure established by the State of origin of the document, followed by the performed legalization by the Romanian diplomatic mission or consular office of the State of origin or by the diplomatic or consular office of the State of origin in Romania and, in both cases, by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The exemption from legalization is permitted under the law, of an international agreement to which Romania is party or on the basis of reciprocity.

The legalization of documents issued or certified by the Romanian courts is made by the Romanian authorities, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in that order.

Countries with which Romania has concluded bilateral treaties or conventions on legal assistance in civil status matters, which foresee the exemption of apostil or legalization:

Poland

" Art. 6   Validity of documents

1. The documents emanating from courts or authorities of either contracting part, provided with the official seal and signature of the person entitled, may be used in the other contracting part without the need for legalization. This applies also to certified copies, extracts and translations of such documents.

2. The documents drawn up in a contracting part by individuals whose signature has been authenticated may be used in the other contracting part without the need for legalization.

3. The documents referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, on the territory of the other contracting part, the same probative force as of the same acts of the latter contracting part".

(Official Gazette no. 158/17.04.2000)

Hungary

"Art. 13

Validity of documents

1. The documents that were drawn up and certified by a state body or by an official in one of the contracting parts, within their competence, as determined by the laws in force and provided with the official seal are valid in the other contracting part without further certification. This is true also for signatures that are certified under the laws of one of the contracting part.

2. The documents that on the territory of a contracting part are regarded as official acts are considered also on the territory of other contracting parts as having evidential value of the official acts". (Decree no. 505 published in the BO no. 2 of 17 January 1959).

In order to give an accurate representation of the transcription phenomenon we will try to appeal to case studies regarding the transcription in the Romanian civil status registers of civil status certificates purchased from local public authorities from abroad.

In the case of transcription of recorded documents to the foreign local authorities it will be taken all the data as mentioned in the civil status issued by the foreign authorities, after verifying the local authorities when the situation requires that the registration was not wrong. (The Common Circular of the National Inspectorate of People's Account of Bucharest no. 38031 of 2007).

Thus, the transcription of civil status certificates issued by foreign authorities is the identical copy of the Romanian civil status.

In the transcription activity of civil status certificates issued by foreign authorities, situations arose due to the inconsistency under European law and even global, the exact copy of the foreign certificate of civil status in the Romanian civil status registers.

There have been cases when there were not followed some Romanian legal provisions but the transcribing upon the law was made and cases when data were taken from the foreign certificate according to the Romanian provisions and the transcribed document was not the faithful copy of the foreign one.

Both choices were made in collaboration with the worker from the Directorate for People Account of the County with that of the Department of Records of Persons and Administration of Data Base Bucharest, choices that have been made for the benefit of persons who have requested the transcript or their holders.

In the direction of transcription of foreign birth certificates in the Romanian birth records we will analyze the way in which the surname of the child will be established. The registration of the child's birth outside the marriage and unrecognized by the biologic father, the registration of the child born in the marriage.

When registering a child born in Romania, the parents can choose between several variants regarding the name that the child will carry:

a) when the parents have the same surname, then the child will carry the name of his parents

b) if the parents do not have common family names, the child will bear the surname of one parent, or their last name together, established by an agreement between them, declared to the civil status officer (Official Gazette Part I, no. 23.12. 2003, Art 62.)

Under the Spanish law, the surname of the child will be the father's first name reunited with the mother's first name.

The duplicity principle of surnames implies that both names should be inserted under the Spanish system of identification of persons (General Directorate of Registers of Notaries). Do not forget that in Spain both spouses retain their name when they married.

Due to migration and registration of children born to foreigners in Spain, under the Spanish law and not the national law of the new born there is an instruction by the national government, that the children will be registered under a single name, the common name of parents.

There were cases when, in Spain, the child's name has been registered under the Spanish law, even if the parents were married and had the same surname, that of the

husband. In the birth certificate issued by the Spanish local authorities, the new born had two names: the common name of parents doubled.

Thus, if the note of the Directorate for People of Bihor County would have been that that the birth certificate to be transcribed as a true copy of the original certificate, as the national law and instructions provide, the child would have had the same civil status data in both countries, practically the same identity, but it would not have had the same name with the parents: their common name.

The note of the transcription of the certificate in the Romanian civil status with a single name, the common name of the parents was for the benefit of the claimants in Romania, but the child will no longer have any concordance between the Romanian civil status and the foreign ones.

Another situation encountered in the civil registration certificates purchased from the local authorities from abroad is the legal difference concerning the registration of minors outside of marriage and not recognized by the father from Romania comparative to Poland.

In Romania, a child born outside the marriage and unrecognized by the father at birth is recorded with the mother's name and the column referring to the "father" is not filled (The General Directorate of Records of Notaries).

In Poland, the special national law provides that any child should have both mother and father at birth registration, so if parents are not married and the father does not recognize the child, at the heading "name of father" it will be written the mother's and at the "surname of father" it will be entered a common name of the mother's native country (the Law on civil status, 42, passage 2, Poland).

We can discuss here about the legal difference between the two countries regarding the registration of children born out of wedlock and not recognized by the father as a consequence of the religion in the two countries. Both are Christian countries, Romania is a country where the official religion is Orthodox, and in Poland the official religion is Catholic. Thus, the permissiveness of religion in the development of XX and XXI centuries of civilization believe that this difference led to the approach of a birth of a minor.

On the territory of the Bihor county was a case in 2009, when to the transcription file of a minor of Poland was annexed the declaration of the mother that the child is born out of wedlock and was not recognized by the father at birth. In her statement was also specified the Polish law, by which she was required that in the child's birth certificate to pass a fictitious name for his father. The mother required that at the heading "name and first name of father" not to enter anything once with its transcription in the Romanian birth records.

The Civil Status Law and instructions of the Directorate for People and Database Administration does not regulate this situation, if the father is taken or not in the Romanian civil status.

At the transcript of the birth certificate in Poland, under "full name of father" was completed under the certificate issued by the Polish authorities, in the Romanian birth acts the child being registered with father. Therefore, the mother will have to submit to a court action to deny paternity. Only thus she will have full authority over the child until the age of majority.

If the child born in Romania during the marriage has as father the mother's husband (in the Official Gazette. Part I of 23.12.2003, art. 53) in the Western Europe the specific legislation does not provide this.

There have been instances, however, due to migration of Romanians in Europe, the wives have left abroad to work and the husbands have remained in the country, the marriage has been affected by this separation and the wife have entered into cohabitation,

the divorce not being pronounced into the country or abroad. From those cohabitations resulted children which at the registration in the foreign documents of civil status had as father the mother's partner not her husband.

Another cause of these births confirms the fact that in the declaration of birth is not obligatory the presentation of the marriage certificate of parents.

At the transcription of these certificates, there appears again an issue in approaching the situation. If transcription were done according to Romanian legislation, there would be a concordance between the child's civil status certificates, but would have violated the Family Code provisions relating to the child's father.

The Transcript was made according to the instructions of the National Inspectorate for People and Methodology no. 1 of 1997.

Thus, the Romanian civil status documents of the child are consistent with the foreign ones, the child having in the birth certificates registered the same father, the biological father and the one who legally recognized him, even if it could not comply with the Family Code in Romania.

In order to highlight the defining elements of foreign marriage certificates of the Romanian civil status registers we will analyze: the marriage registration certificates containing particle "-ne" / "-us", the Italian marriage registration certificates, certificates of marriage registration in Arab countries, the transcription of certificates of marriage in Arab countries.

In Hungary, at marriage, the spouses may choose changing the name by marriage, namely by taking by the wife the husband's surname, in modified form. Romanian citizens who marry in Hungary can choose from the legal modes of wearing the name in Romania, without being able to choose the version with the particle "-us" and where the marriage will apply to the Hungarian law, the transcription of the Hungarian marriage certificate in the Romanian civil status registers will not be taken over this particle (INEP Joint Circular no. 579 064 2009).

Under the old law of marital status in Hungary, after the marriage, in the marriage certificate under "spouse's name after marriage" was entered the family name chosen by this from the options he had (his surname, the surname of his wife or the names altogether) and his name, and under the heading "wife's name after marriage" was written her husband's surname as well as his name, followed by the "- us" particle. In translation, at the registration of the certificate the heading "wife's name after marriage" should be completed as follows: the wife of ... (name and surname of the husband).

While waiting for the legislation to regulate this issue both in Hungary and in Romania there were problems with the registration of the Romanian civil status registers of such certificates or statements of the foreign marriage documents.

Now in Romania after there were sent the instructions on the procedure and the certified transcript of such certificates or statements relating to the Hungarian birth documents they have in box "name of wife after marriage" the name and surname the wife chose, followed by the particle "us", this procedure has become a simple one for the officers of civil status in the country and the workers inside the County Public Services Records of People.

In Italy, at marriage, the spouses may choose for a name change by marriage, by the assumption that the wife takes the husband's surname, in modified form, each being obliged to keep their name at birth. The Romanian citizens who marry in Italy can not choose between the legal ways of wearing the name in Romania, without being able to choose as the wife takes the surname of her husband.

In accordance with a current consolidated doctrine and jurisprudence the possibility for the wife to add the husband's surname "is a pure ability". As consequence, the Italian marriage certificates are issued with the heading "name after marriage" blank. At marriage the wife keeps the family name at birth, but may, on request, in the official documents, apart from her birth name to appear and write "married to XY".

At the conclusion of marriage it will be applied the Italian law and at the transcription of the Italian marriage certificate in the Romanian civil registers a statement will be given by the couple regarding the name they will have after the marriage. They can choose an option related to the specific Romanian law: they can keep a maiden name, take the name of one or other of them or joint their names (Official Gazette. Part I of 23.12.2003, art. 27).

For a case study of transcripts of marriage certificates, the marriage is the term used in the law in two ways: the legal act of marriage is the ending for those who want to get married, in the second sense, it is a legal situation, in principle permanent, of those married (Florica Chipea, 2001), with the marriage of two people, they become family, the marriage relationship expands their relationships (A. Giddens, 2001).

Marriage is defined as the "a union freely consented between a man and a woman, done according to law, in order to start a family and regulated by mandatory rules of law." (Filipescu, IP, 2000).

The Romanian Civil Code, just like in European societies recognize only monogamy as a form of marital union.

At the marriage registration certificates from the Arab countries we could see the difference in law, religion, and social life of families.

In the certificates of marriage is mentioned the fact that a man can be the at the first marriage or may still have 1-3 wives. This is a form of marriage called polygamies, being practiced only by a few societies, being sustained only by a few religions: Mormon sect and Islam (which allows marriage up to four women). (F. Chipea). Simultaneously, in these certificates are specified the reasons why the wife can get a divorce. These are the cases where the wife is justified in order to apply for divorce (1):

- If the husband refuses to pay alimony for six months and when his compulsion to do this is impossible; also if the husband fails to fulfill his obligations to his wife for six months and making him to fulfill them is impossible;

- Improper conduct and the establishment of dangerous associations or links by the husband in such a way that it becomes impossible for the wife to continue the marriage

- Where a husband suffers from refractory disease, so that the married life continues to prove dangerous for the wife;

- If the husband suffers from mental alienation, in situations in which the cancellation of marriage is not possible from the religious point of view;

- Where the husband refuses to comply with the request to submit to the court of not to hire out to any type of profession that is at odds with the family life, with his wife's interest and reputation;

- in case of the conviction of the husband to a term of imprisonment of at least five years or if the spouse is not entitled to pay a fine and therefore will be closed for at least five years and if this is an enforceable sentence;

- Any kind of addiction of the husband, such as vicious, harmful, which according to court is one that causes damage to the foundations of family life and that could draw the impossibility of continuing the family life;

- If the husband chooses to avoid or abandon the family life often missing for a period of six consecutive months without giving any reason or excuse to make reasonable judgments;

- Direct condemnation of the husband for an offense which in the opinion of the court is at odds with the reputation and dignity of the family welfare and other parties involved, except that the court has the responsibility to take a decision regarding the wife's status and the common right;

- If the husband is sterile and the wife can not become pregnant after a period of five years;

- If the husband disappears and can not be found after six months when his wife filed for divorce;

- If the husband marries another woman without his wife's consent or if in the opinion of the court, he does not treat his wives equally.

Another major difference between the certificates in Islamic countries in comparison to the Romanian and European in general, is that in the Arab certificates of marriage is specified the dowry received by the bride. An example of dowry can be that of the volume of the Koran and 150 gold coins. These will be payable as soon as his wife will express this desire (2). It follows that the groom buys the bride, the moment he receives the dowry when is actually her payment. These marriage certificates also include the data essential for their transcription in the Romanian civil status registers, such as name, surname, the name after marriage, parents full name, date of birth, citizenship and nationality, so there is no problem to their legal transcription.

The transcript of birth certificates from abroad in the Bihor county area

The large number of transcriptions of birth certificates is due to families' immigration from outside the European Community across the EU for safer jobs and better remuneration. The countries that have provided employment visa without a very large selection of immigrants are more preferred, they settling in these countries (Jacques Barou). Also, the states that have offered a greater number of employment visas have been chosen by the Romanian competition to fill a job making it smaller and more easily managed in these countries.

The data regarding the number of transcripts of the birth certificates in the Romanian civil status registers at the local authorities on the Bihor county area were provided by the Department for People of Bihar County, the Civil Service.

The number of transcripts of the birth certificates in the romanian civil status registers at the local authorities on the bihor county   **Table 1**

No. crt.	Country	Year 2006	Year 2007	Year 2008	Year 2009
1.	England	1	4	2	4
2.	Australia	1	1	2	2
3.	Austria	7	7	10	6
4.	Argentina	-	-	-	1
5.	Albania	-	-	-	2
6.	Belgium	2	13	4	10
7	Brazil	-	1	-	1
8	Canada	3	5	9	5
9	Czech republic	-	3	1	1
10.	Ciprus	-	-	1	-
11.	Denmark	-	-	-	1

No. crt.	Country	Year 2006	Year 2007	Year 2008	Year 2009
12.	Switzerland	-	-	1	-
13.	France	26	32	27	28
14.	Gabon	-	-	1	-
15.	Germany	9	3	2	2
16.	Greece	2	3	-	1
17.	Ireland	5	7	11	11
18.	Israel	2	2	8	1
19.	Italy	66	123	82	70
20.	Japan	2	-	-	2
21.	Moldavia	6	12	8	7
22.	Norway	1	-	-	-
23.	Holland	2	-	-	1
24.	Portugal	2	1	1	-
25.	Poland	-	-	1	1
26.	Russia	-	1	-	1
27.	Serbia	2	1	1	-
28.	Slovakia	2	3	-	5
29.	Spain	82	125	125	97
30.	U.s.a.	6	14	18	18
31.	Scottland	-	-	1	-
32.	Hungary	68	79	92	109
33.	Ukraine	-	1	-	-
34.	Tunisia	-	2	-	-

Source: the Department for People of Bihar County, the Civil Service

The transcript of marriage certificates from abroad in the Bihor county area

The Romanians who have gone abroad or have preferred to formalize their relations in Romania, left either at an age when they were already married in the country and had families here, as proof that there are far fewer transcripts of marriage certificates records in the Romanian civil status than births.

Also the countries issuing marriage certificates transcribed to local public authorities in Bihor county are more in number than those issuing the birth certificates of Romanian citizens.

As an example we have the table with the data about the number of transcripts of marriage certificates from Bihor county and the list of the countries issuing the transcribed certificates offered by the Directorate for People of Bihor county, civil service status:

The number of transcripts of marriage certificates from Bihor county   **Table 2**

No. crt	Country	Year 2006	Year 2007	Year 2008	Year 2009
1.	Albania	-	-	2	-
2.	England	-	2	4	1
3.	Australia	1	1	-	-
4.	Austria	16	12	12	6
5.	South africa	-	1	-	-
6.	Belgium	1	-	2	-
7.	Brazil	-	1	-	1
8.	Ciprus	-	1	-	1
9.	Canada	-	-	5	1
10.	Cehia	3	-	1	1

No. crt	Country	Year 2006	Year 2007	Year 2008	Year 2009
11.	Croatia	1	-	-	-
12.	Denmark	1	3	3	2
13.	Egipt	1	-	2	1
14.	Switzerland	2	2	1	-
15.	France	5	4	5	3
16.	Germany	25	23	10	11
17.	Greece	1	1	-	1
18.	Ireland	-	2	1	1
19.	Israel	4	7	6	1
20.	Italy	13	39	25	24
21.	Japan	-	-	-	1
22.	Jamaica	-	-	-	2
23.	Latwia	-	-	-	1
24.	Mauritius	-	-	1	-
25.	Malta	1	-	-	-
26.	Moldavia	2	8	5	4
27.	Mexico	-	2	-	-
28.	Norway	1	1	-	-
29.	Holland	1	-	-	1
30.	Pakistan	-	-	3	-
31.	Poland	-	1	1	-
32.	Russia	-	3	-	1
33.	Serbia	2	1	-	-
34.	Slovakia	2	5	2	-
35.	Slovenia	1	-	-	1
36.	Spain	8	12	10	7
37.	U.s.a.	10	18	24	16
38.	Sweden	1	-	-	-
39.	Hungary	63	42	28	45
40.	Ukraine	-	1	-	1
41.	Thailand	1	1	-	-
42.	Turkey	-	-	-	1
43.	Venezuela	1	-	-	1
Total		**168**	**194**	**153**	**59**

Source: the Department for People of Bihar County, the Civil Service

Studying the table below with the birth certificates of civil status registers transcribed in the Romanian Bihor county through the history of transcripts since 2004, we see that the top five countries where were born the most Romanian citizens are Spain, Italy, France, Hungary and the U.S.. Analyzing the number of certificates reprinted in the last four years we can conclude the following: the phenomenon of migration of Romanians abroad has increased especially after 2002, with free circulation within the Schengen area for Romanians. Currently, the phenomenon of temporary departure to work abroad is approximately three times more intense than in 2002. Many have preferred countries that have not required a lot of strange rules for citizens who provided the easiest and most jobs for immigrants.

Italy and Spain are two of the favorite destinations of Romanians, where there is access to the labor market, much better paid than in Romania.

Hungary is a neighbor of Romania and of the Bihor county, so that in our county there are a large number of Romanian citizens of Hungarian nationality. So many have established their residence in Hungary, where they founded and had families and children. However, because of the health system in Romania increasingly weak and because in Bihor county there is no private maternity many women prefer to receive medical care and give birth in clinics near the Hungarian border with Romania. This results in an increasing number of requests for birth certificates transcription of Hungary in Romanian civil status registers from local authorities in the county of Bihor.

From the perspective of the history of transcripts from 2004 we can observe the evolution of the number of cases of transcription of foreign marriage certificates. The countries in which got married the most Romanian citizens are: Austria, Germany, Italy, Spain, USA and Hungary. The following graph reflects the number of cases of transcription marriage certificates received from the states listed above in the last four years: the Romanian citizens from the county of Bihar had as migration destination countries from the Austro - Hungarian space, Latin and of course the United States of America, the land of dreams for many Romanian and especially for many young people who dream of a perfect country, with extraordinary work places and a dream life.

We can say that the Romanian citizens of Hungarian nationality preferred Austria, Germany and Hungary, not least, is the second homeland for them, probably knowing the state language and migration as well as close to home, from a distance of tens to hundreds of kilometers.

Spain, France and Italy are countries chosen by the Romanian citizens because the official language is easy to learn, the resemblance between the Latin countries and thus they were able to settle down and start a family much easier.

Once with the registration of certificates issued by foreign local authorities in Romanian civil status registers we have seen a number of similarities and differences between the Romanian legislation on civil status and various European countries or Arab law.

In the following table we have exemplified how to make the registration of birth of a child born outside marriage and not recognized by the father in Romania, as a Orthodox, and Spain and Poland, the Catholic countries but with a different geographic position and influence.

Registering the birth of a child born outside marriage and unrecognized by the father   **Table 3**

Poland	*Spain*	*Romania*
In Poland the official religion is Catholicism. In Poland, a country in North - Eastern Europe because of religious concepts is not allowed to register the child with a natural father, the little acts have included the full name of mother and father's full name, even though the heading "name and father's name" belongs to his mother's name and a fictitious name chosen by the parent or one who declares the birth.	In Spain the official religion is Catholicism. Even if it's still a Catholic country, Spain, a country in Western Europe, is more permissive legally on birth registration of a child unrecognized by the father. Under "name and surname of the father" it would remain blank, the child being only with the mother.	In Romania the official religion is Orthodox. Romania is a Central - Eastern state of Europe, with both Western and Eastern influences.. The legislation on birth registration allows a child born outside marriage to be registered without a father, being completed only under "the name and surname of the mother.". And the column regarding the farher will remain blank.

Romania differs from the two countries because the official religion of the state. Spain and Poland are similar in that they have same official religion, Catholicism. Romania is a former communist state like Poland, the same Russian influence; however, the legislation on child registration is much like that of Spain. Thus due to religious concepts, but also cultural and political influences, there is a huge difference in how the three states see the position in society of a child born outside marriage and not recognized by the father.

Here appear the issues regarding the transcript of birth certificates purchased from the foreign local authorities in the Romanian civil status registers.

Studying the legislation on civil status of the three countries, we could see that Romania is much closer to the West, being more permissive from the legally point of view of children and unmarried couples also. Like Spain, allows to single mothers to register their child and their name and Poland, through the specific civil status law restricts somehow the maternal authority over the child until the age of majority because both parents are responsible in front of the law for the child. Under these circumstances, we can be proud of our permissive national legislation and its shortcomings because it aligns with trends in Western and will not remain connected to East.

In the following table we have several models of registration of marriages in different states, compared with the record of marriage in Romania, covering some similarities and differences.

Patterns of marriage and the women's statute after marriage, in various countries around the world

Table 4

Italy	*Hungary*	*Arab countries*	*Romania*
Italy is a country located in Southern Europe, having as the official religion Catholicism. According to Italian law, the wife's posibility to add to marriage her husband's surname "is a pure act". As a follow, the Italian marriage certificates are issued with the heading "name after marriage" blank. At marriage the wife keeps the family name at birth, but may, on request, in the official documents, apart from her birth name to appear and write "married to XY". (Common Circular DEPABD no. 2034989 of 2010)	Hungary is a country in central Europe, the official religion is Catholicism. The old law of marital status in Hungary provided that at the conclusion of marriage, in the marriage certificate under "spouse's name after marriage" should be entered the last name whom he chose according to law and his name and under the heading "wife's name after marriage" to be passed to the husband's surname as well as his surname, followed by the "- us." particle.	In Arab countries Islam is the official religion. According to the Koran, that reflects very much provisions in the legislation of these countries, the wife has a special status within the family. The man can be married to more women, more than four. He buys them each one, paying them each a dowry, which is stipulated in the marriage certificate.	Romania is a Central - Eastern state in Europe, with the official religion Orthodox. In the Romanian legislation on marriage, the wife can keep her family name at birth but may also acquire the surname of her husband. Also the couple can have their reunited family names.

Romania differs from the three states by religion. Italy and Hungary are the countries with official Catholic religion and the Arab states are Muslim.

However, the first states are Christian, unlike the Arab states, which are Muslim. The four examples of registration of marriage in civil status registers in the news we see similarities between the modern Christian states, however, there still remain some

differences. Thus, even if Italy and Hungary are both Catholic countries, looked different the wife's position in society.

In Italy, at marriage, the woman's name is not changed, she remains known in the society with the name at birth. The spouse has his own choice to present the wife of XY or not.

Hungary has long looked different the position of woman once married. Thus, the woman acquired the status of the wife of XY at marriage, the family name and surname of the birth certificates disappeared in the marriage certificates.

Romania has never hindered the woman once married. She may choose to wear her name at birth or acquire her husband's name on marriage but never loses her surname upon marriage, change of surname is only through administrative ways.

The Arab countries are run by the laws of the Koran, their holy book. In these countries the woman has a special status at birth. Thus, the husband must buy his wife, paying her a certain dowry. Also in the certificate of marriage is stated the reason why the wife can get a divorce, not having as many freedoms as her husband. The form of marriage is different from the Christian, here a man can have multiple wives, more than four and in the marriage certificate each wife is mentioned.

These differences lead to undue the civil state officers once with transcribing of these certificates but luckily, both the situation of Hungary and Italy was governed either by their own laws or instructions received by the employees of civil status in Romania.

People who have worked abroad have a specific profile attitude: they are more critical regarding the situation in Romania, but also are more optimistic about the future. They come with higher aspirations, which promote both social criticism on the state of the locality where they live, and critique of current social status in Romania.

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NOTA 1: Reasons taken from the transcribed marriage certificate with the note of DEP Bihor of the called I.T., Romanian citizen - and the named N.A.S.M., Iranian citizen.

NOTA 2: Reasons taken from the transcribed marriage certificate with the note of DEP Bihor of the called I.T., Romanian citizen - and the named N.A.S.M., Iranian citizen.

IV. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION

Viktoriya BOKOCH (Ujgorod) ⇔ *Foreign Investment Cooperation of Zakarpattya with the States of the Carpathian Euroregion*

Alessandro TORELLO (Siena) ⇔ *Cross-Border Cooperation Between Austria, Italy and Slovenia: Multimodal Transport and Sustainable Development*

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Mircea BRIE (Oradea), **István POLGÁR** (Oradea) ⇔ *Dual Citizenship Granted to Hungarian Ethnics. Context and Arguments*

Calin-Mircea POPA (Bucharest) ⇔ *The Spread of Romanian Televison in Some of the Romanian Communities from the Border Regions of the Neighbouring Countries*

FOREIGN INVESTMENT COOPERATION OF ZAKARPATTYA WITH THE STATES OF THE CARPATHIAN EUROREGION

*Viktoriya BOKOCH**

Abstract. *This scientific article deals with analysis of the advantages coming from the region's geopolitical location and its impact on foreign investment co-operation with the states of the Carpathian Euroregion. It investigates tendencies as direct and portfolio foreign investments into the economy of Zakarpattya by the types of economic activity. It has analyzed the influence of the world financial crisis of 2008 on the volumes of foreign investments as well as it has outlined the strategic guidelines for foreign investment co-operation at regional and local levels.*

Introduction

Zakarpatska oblast is the youngest region of Ukraine. It was joined to Ukraine as its administrative-territorial entity on the 22nd of January 1946. By its administrative-territorial division it consists of 13 districts, 5 towns of regional subordinance, 11 municipal councils, 19 urban-type settlement councils and 307 village councils. The town of Uzhhorod is its regional centre.

Zakarpatska oblast is located in the western part of Ukraine. It borders on Lvivska and Ivano-Frankivska oblasts on the north-east and the south-east, while on the north west, west and the south – the region's borders coincide with the state borders of Ukraine with total length of 467.3 km, including with Poland – 33.4 km, Slovakia – 98.5 km, Hungary – 130.0 km and Romania – 205.4 km. There are 19 border checkpoints with the neighbouring states in the oblast. The unique geopolitical position of the region on the crossroads of international transport, economic, trade and cultural routes favours development and further deepening of intestate co-operation, including in the field of foreign investments and assigns a significant part to the region within Ukraine's integration into European structures. The total area of Zakarpattya makes up 12,800 km^2 or 2.1% territory of Ukraine and it is one of the smallest oblasts of the Western region occupying 11.6% its territory. About 80% territory of the oblast is covered by mountains. Woods is the greatest wealth of the region covering over a half of its area. The species composition of forests consists of beech, fur, spruce, oak, plane and ash trees. The annual logging makes up about one million m^3.

The region's stock of mineral and raw materials consists of over 220 deposits of about 30 types of minerals, including rock-salt, kaolin, marble, polymetals, alunites,

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[*] Teaching Assistant, PhD., Faculty of Administrative Science and International Relations, National University of Ujgorod, Ukraine, E-mail: viktoriya-bokoch@mail.ru

perlits, zeolites, liparites and barium sulphates. The soil in the region is considered to be medium fertile ones with shallow humus horizon and high acidity.

Such types of economic activity are essential for the oblast economy as logging and wood processing, food and light industries, mechanical engineering, health and resort services, tourism and agriculture.

Production infrastructure of Zakarpattya is represented by a complex transport network that includes railway, automobile, air and pipeline transportations. Thus, two highways of national significance (Kyiv–Chop highway and Mukachevo–Rohatyn regional motorway) and the 5th Cretan Transport Corridor (Lisbon-Trieste-Ljubljana-Budapest-Kyiv-Volgograd) pass through the territory of the region.

Foreign economic trade of Zakarpattya develops dynamically: companies of the region co-operate with business entities from over 100 countries worldwide. The oblast is attractive for investments. There are enterprises of such world-known companies working in the region as CJSC Eurocar, Groklin-Carpaty Ltd., Yadzaki-Ukraine Ltd., Jabil Circuit Ukraine Limited and etc. Substantial investment inflows were realized into mechanical engineering companies of wood processing, food production and beverage industry. Substantial investment volumes are coming from the neighbouring countries that form the basis for such integration structure as the Carpathian Euroregion.

Zakarpattya has all preconditions for development of energy industry based on water-power potential of rivers, particularly owing to the international river Tisza along the mid-channel of which the borders with Romania and partially with Hungary go.

According to the data of the National Ukrainian Population Census (2001) there are over 100 nationalities resident in the oblast, including 80.5 % – Ukrainians, 12.1% – Hungarians, 2.6 % – Romanians, 2.5 % – Russians. The Romanian national community is mainly concentrated in rural border areas of Tyachivskyy and Rakhivskyy districts.

The ***methodological background*** is based on the techniques of economic researches: the dialectic method for cognition of processes and phenomena in their interrelation and development, economic statistical and comparative assessments.

The ***overall goal*** of the ***research*** is to summarize scientific, theoretical and practical principles of foreign investment co-operation in the border region with adjacent states of the Carpathian Euroregion as well as to identify strategic guidelines at regional and local levels.

The scientific article consists of an introduction and the main part containing the research results covering specific features of foreign economic co-operation of Zakarpattya with the adjacent countries at the present stage.

The research results
1. Foreign investment co-operation of Zakarpattya with the states of the EU
The neighbouring countries have significant impact on foreign economic co-operation including on investment activity of the region a part of territories of which form the Carpathian Euroregion. The neighbouring countries with territories adjacent to Zakarpattya are EU member states after the enlargement wave of 2004 (Poland, Slovakia, Hungary) and the last accession wave (Romania since 2007).

The region's foreign economic activity has become more intense in both investments and trade in goods/services under conditions of the EU enlargement to the East except for 2009, the year when the world financial crisis achieved its peak that had negative effect on macroeconomic performance of social and economic development in

the majority of countries worldwide including Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Zakarpatska oblast in particular (table 1).

After emerging in the USA in 2008, the world financial crisis influenced substantially the GDP reducing of the last EU accession states under analysis as well as of Ukraine in 2009 as seen from the data of Table 1.

It is worth to mention that the recent world financial crisis had negative effect also on the economies of many other countries worldwide, however to a lesser degree. Particularly, the gross domestic product (GDP) of the Great Britain reduced by 4.9% in 2009 as against 2008, in the USA – by 2.4%, Italy – by 5.0 %, while in Ukraine – by 15.2%. A similar tendency as evidenced by the indicators analyzed in Table 1 is typical for Zakarpatska oblast as well, as reducing of GRP was 9.2% in 2009 as against 2008. As far as the author is concerned, this will have negative effect on foreign trade and investment activity in service industry of Zakarpatska oblast with the countries under analysis. Thus, as against 2008 foreign trade in goods of Zakarpatska oblast with countries worldwide reduced by 23.4 % or $ 285.6 million US in 2009, including with Poland – by 26.2 % or 13.7 million, Slovakia – by 35.8% or 36.7 million, with Hungary – by 30.8 % or 188.3 million, and with Romania vice versa this indicator has increased by 7.3 % or $ 1.1 million US [2, p. 221].

GDP in the EU states adjacent to Zakarpatska oblast, including Ukraine* *(billion USD, according to purchasing power parity (PPP) of 2005)*   **Table 1**

Countries under analysis	2000	2004	2007	2008	2009	2009, % till:		
						2004	2007	2008
Poland	452.0	507.7	596.8	626.6	637.3	125.5	106.8	101.7
Romania	153.8	195.0	232.9	250.0	232.2	119.1	99.7	92.9
Slovakia	68.5	81.6	104.5	110.9	105.8	129.7	101.2	95.4
Hungary	138.9	165.2	179.5	180.7	169.2	102.4	94.3	93.6
Ukraine	181.2	256.0	304.8	311.8	264.4	103.3	86.7	84.8
including, Zakarpatska oblast**	...	5.3	10.5	13.2	10.8	203.7	102.9	81.8

*Calculated according to the source: [1, p. 547, 548; 2, p. 32]
**According to Gross Regional Product, billion UAH.

The situation is similar with import. Thus, import of goods to Zakarpatska oblast from the countries worldwide has reduced by 51.1% or $ 913.2 million US, including with Poland – by 59.2% or $ 26.8 million US, Slovakia – by 73.4 % or $76.3 million US, with Hungary – by 74.1 % or $303.5 million US, and with Romania – by 27.7% or $ 3.8 million US [2, p. 222].

The researches have proved that the recessionary tendencies are also inherent to foreign trade in services of the region with countries worldwide and the neighbouring countries adjacent to Zakarpatska oblast. We should also notice that foreign trade in goods is in large excess over foreign trade in services. Particularly, if the export of goods from the region to the countries where Zakarpatska oblast exports its goods to has made up $ 935.0 million US and import – $ 952.9 million US, than export and import of services correspondingly just $ 43.7 and 25.7 million US. The same tendency is inherent to the trade in goods and services with the states under analysis bordering on Zakarpatska oblast [2, p. 221, 222, 233, 234].

Investment co-operation is a type of international economic relations aimed at efficient redistribution of investment resources among countries and utilizing of benefits from participation within international distribution of labour based on forming of advanced technological production methods. The basic types of investments being redistributed are the real investments (long-term investments mainly into material production for building of complex scientific and capital-intensive facilities), financial investments (financial and crediting activity of relevant international institutions, including with securities) and the intellectual investments (training of highly qualified human resources, transfer of know-how and best practices, licenses, carrying out joint scientific, research and engineering works and etc.) [3, p. 636].

The world financial crisis of 2008 has influenced the situation within direct foreign investments in the context of investing countries as well (Table 2).

Direct foreign investments to Zakarpatska oblast by investing states*(by beginning of the year; thousand USD)   **Table 2**

In general, including the group of countries under analysis	2008	2009	2010	2010, % to:	
				2008	2009
Total	345329	356377	354960	102.8	99.6
Europe	239510	232661	242557	101.3	104.3
including, Poland	29556	33122	32930	111.4	99.4
Romania	531	1698	1871	352.3	110.2
Slovakia	13565	11222	10476	77.2	93.3
Hungary	32274	34672	32906	102.0	94.9
Total for the group of countries under analysis	*75926*	*80714*	*78183*	*103.0*	*96.,9*
Romania, % to the group of countries analyzed	0.7	2.1	2.4	x	X
The group of countries analyzed, % to:					
Countries of the world	22.0	22.6	22.0	x	X
Europe	31.7	34.7	32.2	X	X

*Calculated according to the source: [2, p. 238].

The research materials grouped in Table 2 evidence, *firstly,* that the four neighbouring EU member states bordering on Zakarpatska oblast realize substantial investments into the economy of the region. Particularly, their share within total investment volumes made up 22.0% in 2010, and within that of the countries of Europe – 32.2%.

Secondly, direct foreign investments from the countries worldwide had growth trend till 2008, and with the countries of Europe this tendency was inherent even till 2010, except for Poland, Slovakia and Hungary.

Direct foreign investments into Zakarpatska oblast by types of economic activity*(by beginning of the year; thousand USD)   **Table 3**

Types of economic activity	Sections of the Classifier of economic activity types	2008	2009	2010	2010, % to:	
					2008	2009
Total		345329	356377	354960	102.8	99.6
Material production sectors						
including, agriculture, hunting, forestry	A	3020	3018	2438	80.7	80.7
industry (mining and processing)	C, D	279426	293675	293623	105.1	99.9
Total:		282446	296693	296061	104.8	99.,8
Service sector						
Services related to agriculture, hunting and forestry	A	1350	1386	772	57.2	55.7
Building	F	3825	2720	2702	70.6	99.3
Trade; repairs of cars, household facilities and personal demand items	G	13327	14101	11037	82.8	78.3
Hotels and restaurants	H	9292	9167	9297	100.1	101.4
Transport and communications	I	15317	14036	17456	114.0	124.4
Financial activity	J	147	145	143	97.3	98.6
Real estate transactions, rent, engineering, services to enterprises	K	13987	13006	16534	118.2	127.1
Education	M	7	5	5	71.4	100.0
Health care and social assistance	N	4953	5360	248	5.0	4.6
Provision of public and individual services, activity in the sphere of culture and sports	O	678	758	705	104.0	93.0
Total:		62883	59684	58899	93.7	98.7
Service sector to the total volume of direct foreign investments		22.1	16.7	16.6	X	X

*Calculated according to the source: [2, p.240].

Thirdly, direct foreign investments to Zakarpatska oblast from Romania were growing over the period under analysis, but their volumes are much lower than the total amount of investments from Poland, Slovakia and Hungary.

Investments into the sphere of material production prevail among direct foreign investments into the economy of Zakarpattya (Table 3).

The analysis of the direct foreign investments into Zakarpatska oblast by types of economic activities has shown, *firstly*, that their major part is directed to sections C and D (Classification of economic activity types) – mining and processing industries as the most

attractive ones for foreign investors. At the same time, section A is less attractive, i.e. agriculture, forestry and hunting as they reduced by 19.3% in 2010 as against 2008 and 2009.

Portfolio foreign investments in Zakarpatska oblast by economic activity types* *(by beginning of the year; thousand USD)*   **Table 4**

Types of economic activity	Sections of the Classifier of economic activity types	2008	2009	2010	2010, % to:	
					2008	2009
Total		962	1451	1439	149,6	99.2
Material production sectors						
including, agriculture, hunting, forestry	A	1	-	0	-	-
industry (mining and processing)	C, D	702	952	905	128.9	95.1
Total:		703	952	905	128.9	95.1
Service sector						
Services related to agriculture, hunting and forestry	F	9	8	8	88.9	100.0
Building	G	130	454	470	361.5	103.5
Trade; repairs of cars, household facilities and personal demand items	H	2	5	5	250.0	100.0
Hotels and restaurants	I	3	2	2	66.7	100.0
Transport and communications	K	95	36	36	37.9	100.0
Financial activity	N	20	14	13	65.0	92.9
Real estate transactions, rent, engineering, services to enterprises		259	519	534	206.2	102.9
Education		26.9	35.8	37.1	X	X

* Calculated according to the source: [2, p.242, 243].

        Secondly, there are many fewer direct foreign investments in service sector that have downward tendency. Particularly, $62.9 million US (22.1% total direct foreign investments) were invested into the service sector of the oblast economy by the beginning of 2008, in 2009 – $59.7 million US (16.7 %), while in 2010 – $58.9 million US (16.6 %).
        Thus, there is no capital investment boom observed in Zakarpatska oblast that was inherent to the adjacent EU member states of the two last enlargement waves. An investment boom should be attended by increase in investments into development of the economic complex during the period of economic growth and favourable investment climate for investors. In the meantime, the research has shown (Table 1) that Ukraine, including Zakarpatska oblast was characterized by sizeable decline in gross domestic and regional products in 2009 that threw back both the country and its region under analysis to far lower positions as against the period of 2004-2008. Furthermore, Ukraine still goes through the transformation crisis by its gross domestic product it did not managed to

achieve the level of 1990, while Poland, Hungary and Slovakia as well as Romania have surpassed the basic level (1990) in several years.

The essence of foreign investments being realized by foreign investors (states, companies, banks, entrepreneurs) lies in their structure. Within organizational and functional context there are two basic forms of foreign capital investments: direct and portfolio. Direct investments are aimed to purchase for total ownership or controlling interest in foreign economic entity through founding of new enterprises and companies or acquisition of an existing one; portfolio – in the form of securities acquisition of enterprises, companies and other economic entities by an investor to earn extra profits (that does not secure him/her powers of control over these economic entities [3, p. 632].

As evidenced by our research there are minor volumes of portfolio foreign investments by types of economic activity in the economy of Zakarpatska oblast (Table 4).

The researches carried out and grouped in Table 4, evidence, *firstly*, that the biggest share of portfolio foreign investments according to the types of economic activity falls on the industry, while their share in service sector made up 26.9% at the beginning of 2008, at the beginning of 2010 – 37.1%. *Secondly,* while downward trend as to such investments was typical for material production sector at the beginning of 2010, they have growing tendency in service sector.

Portfolio foreign investments into the economy of Zakarpatska oblast by investing states[*] *(by beginning of the year; thousand USD)*   **Table 5**

In general, including the group of countries under analysis	2008	2009	2010	2010, % to:	
				2008	2009
Total	962	1451	1439	149.6	99.2
Europe	419	1215	1218	290.6	100.2
including, Poland	5	5	5	100.0	100.0
Romania	-	11	11	-	100.0
Slovakia	5	5	5	100.0	100.0
Hungary	80	487	498	622.5	102,2
Total for the group of countries under analysis	*90*	*508*	*519*	*576.7*	*102.2*
Romania, % to the group of countries analyzed	-	2,2	2,1	X	X
The group of countries analyzed, % to:					
Countries of the world	9,4	35,0	36,1	X	X
Europe	21,5	41,8	42,6	X	x

* Calculated according to the source: [2, p. 244].

At the same time, the comparative analysis of indicators within tables 3 and 4 has shown that the direct to portfolio investments ratio made up 112 to 1 or $ 58.9 million to $0.5 million US by the beginning of 2010. While the USA experience has shown that direct investments surpassed portfolio investments by 12% in 1980, and in 1990 – they were less by 19%. The outrunning growth of portfolio investments can be explained, on the one hand, by the fact that more often they are organized and located abroad by institutions that do not possess sizeable financial resources and extensive information on the state of the global security market (trust and insurance companies, pension capital funds, banks and other financial institutions), and on the other – portfolio investments are

partially used not just to secure extra profit source but for penetration into branches monopolized, large and the largest corporations [3, p. 633].

Further, researches evidence that while direct foreign investments into the region's economy originated from 49 countries worldwide at the beginning of 2010, including 33 European countries, portfolio investments came from 24 and 16 states correspondingly. Table 5 describes portfolio foreign investments to Zakarpatska oblast by investing states.

The portfolio foreign investments into the economy of Zakarpatska oblast as the figures of Table 5 show are mainly realized by the states of Europe. At the beginning of 2008 the share of countries in the group under analysis equaled 21.5% ($90,000 US), while at the beginning of 2010 – 42.6 % ($519,000 US), and as compared to the countries worldwide correspondingly 9.4 and 36.1%. Hungary is the biggest investor among the countries from the group analyzed. Romania's share was only 2.1% portfolio foreign investments in the group of the adjacent countries at the beginning of 2010.

As it is pointed out in the Strategy of Cross-Border Co-operation "Carpathians 2004-2011" the territories of Ukraine belonging to the Carpathian Euroregion will play a specific role and, particularly, Zakarpatska oblast that can become a pilot region for development of possible co-operation mechanisms and forms, including within foreign investments in the service sector, between Ukraine and the European Union. In 2004, Zakarpatska oblast was awarded de facto the status of a region on the EU's external border, i.e. a territory adjacent to regions of Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Poland benefiting from substantial financial assistance of the EU's structural funds as their development level is lower than 75% average European level [4, p. 3, 4].

Zakarpatska oblast is a depressed region as against the industrially developed regions of Ukraine and border regions of the neighbouring EU member states, except for Poland. The reason to this lies in the insufficient level of foreign investments attracting, above all into the service sector. Thus, a significant strategic task for Zakarpatska oblast is to reduce negative effect of its peripheral location to the EU and Ukraine on social and economic development of the region as well as to utilize extensively the benefits related to the process of the EU enlargement. It is expedient to use co-operation at all levels (local, regional, implementation of national state programmes and coordination of programmes at different levels) for further support of foreign investment co-operation of Zakarpattya with the states of the Carpathian Euroregion in long-term perspective.

2. The nationally affined ethnic groups as an important factor for investment co-operation

Ethnic affinity of people inhabiting border areas mostly speaking one or more languages of the neighbouring countries and with a fairly high level of interpersonal contacts, affinity of social psychological and cultural elements form the prerequisites for co-operation in social terms. These factors are crucial in the process of cross-border co-operation in the field of investments. The western regions play a special role in development of frontier investment co-operation of Ukraine. Zakarpatska oblast has a specific position in the Ukrainian Carpathians much more impacted by cross-border co-operation factors than other regions. This process is based on the available objective conditions of both border and cross-border investment co-operation. Furthermore, such attributes also play a significant role as the share of integration infrastructure, relatively high level of market culture shown by inhabitants of the region that are largely driven by the factors of the behavioural stereotype, economic information and economic experienced gained of people the densely populating the border areas of the Ukrainian

Carpathians. It is worth noting that population of the Romanian ethnic group resides mainly in Chernivetska (12.5 %) and Zakarpatska (2.6 % total population) oblasts. Moreover, 7.3% population of the Moldavian ethnic group lives within the territory of only Chernivetska oblast in the Carpathian region.

Surveys of indigenous population (Ukrainians) and of the Romanian ethnic group on the visa regimes introduced in the second half of the first decade of the XXI century is of special academic interest. Thus, particularly 47.9 % respondents – Romanians believe that nothing has changed in the recent period and 16.7 % - that this problem has worsened the situation, while among Ukrainians these responses were correspondingly 41.9 and 3.2%. The attitude of both indigenous population and Romanians to intermarriages has generated scientific interest as well. Thus, specifically 80% respondents (Romanians) treat such marriages positively, while among Ukrainians – 65.7%. About 12.5% Romanian respondents have shown negative attitude towards intermarriages, while among Ukrainians - 3.2% [5, p. 34].

Nowadays, at the Governmental level much attention is paid to the search of a national idea that would consolidate various population strata and ethnic groups. Thus, it is extremely important to study attitudes of the Romanian national community towards the content and essence of the idea that would consolidate the society in Ukraine in the process of political and economic transformations. In the course of survey 60% Romanian respondents of the region and 39% Ukrainians tend towards the idea of building a welfare state and towards the society of social justice – 10.0 and 15.4% correspondingly.

Despite the formidable difficulties caused by the transformation processes as well as the latest global financial crisis most of respondent believe in a better future, hope for improving of social feeling. It is a remarkable fact, the share of persons willing to see Ukraine as the EU member state makes up 6.3% among Romanian respondents and 45.2% – among Ukrainians, while as a part of the renewed Soviet Union – correspondingly 10.4 and 3.2%. Fellowship with the USA and the NATO is supported by 14.6% Romanian respondents and 6.5% Ukrainians. Finally, 25% respondents from the Romanian ethnic group and 19.4% Ukrainians wish to see the country as a neutral state.

The research results have revealed the multi-valued assessments of social and economic situation by the respondents in the areas of their residence. Both Ukrainian and Romanian respondents and the respondents altogether developed an unequivocal opinion that the objective conditions and factors have caused a range of social and economic problems in Zakarpatska oblast that became even more acute under the impact of the latest global financial crisis. Thus, the earlier hidden partial unemployment has become wide-scale and undoubtedly touched upon the national ethnic groups, including the Romanian one.

According to residents of different nationalities: 32.3% Ukrainians and 35.4% Romanians consider the social and economic situation as mean and among respondents altogether - 60 %; while as very bad - correspondingly 67.7, 17.0 and 29.7%. Furthermore, 87.1% Ukrainians, 72.9% Romanians and 80.1% respondents altogether believe in the opportunities for social and economic improvements in the areas (index "mean + very good") in a short term. However, these expectations have not been justified due to economic instability, negative impact of the latest global financial crisis and other factors that is reflected on the investment climate of Ukraine. Investment co-operation of Romania and Ukraine, including with Zakarpatska oblast is insufficient. On the contrary, much closer investment co-operation is observed among indigenous population of Hungary and Slovakia as well as ethnic groups living in Zakarpattya. Therefore, such co-

operation should rely on the experiences of interregional co-operation with the states of the Carpathian Euroregion, particularly with Poland, Slovakia and Hungary.

Conclusions

In order to secure efficient foreign investment co-operation with the states of the Carpathian Euroregion, Zakarpattya must utilize its unique geopolitical location on the crossroads of international transport, economic, trade and cultural routes that assigns a significant part to the region within integration of Ukraine to European structures. The world financial crisis of 2008 had negative effect on the gross domestic products of the neighbouring states in 2009 the same as in Ukraine including on the gross regional product of Zakarpatska oblast. A similar tendency is typical for the majority of industrially advanced countries.

The researches carried out evidence minor investments (22.1% at the beginning of 2008 and 16.6% at the beginning of 2010) into service sector of Zakarpatska oblast among the direct foreign investments according to economic activity types. Moreover, their share in the service sector has downward trend typical for the main types of economic activity in the service sector since 2008.

The researches show that the market of portfolio foreign investments of Zakarpatska oblast by types of economic activity is insufficiently developed; as such investments are many fewer than direct foreign investments.

Taking into account experience of the USA and many other industrially advanced countries it is expedient to develop foreign investment co-operation, particularly in service sector with the states of the Carpathian Euroregion, and foremost with Romania, Slovakia and Poland.

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CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION BETWEEN AUSTRIA, ITALY AND SLOVENIA: MULTIMODAL TRANSPORT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Alessandro TORELLO[*]

Abstract. *In this article I will examine the importance of cross-border cooperation concerning transport and infrastructure improvement. In particular, I will focus on multimodal transport development and alternative transport solutions in the Northern Adriatic region and Austria. I will stress fluvial and maritime transport opportunities, such as Short Sea Shipping (SSS), in order to reduce pollution levels due to traffic congestion and terrestrial freight abuse.*

Cooperation along Border Regions as a Solution to Ensure Stability

The integration process has allowed European countries to be part of one single market, but not only that. It has also been a fundamental step to making European people feel closer to each other, to spread out the perception of multicultural citizenship.

Thanks to the perspectives and the process of enlargement of the EEC first and the EU later, it seems that the sense of conflict and cultural division among countries and communities has been progressively reduced, even though evident socio-economic differences persist.

Cross-border Cooperation is a strategy adopted to facilitate economic transformation along the borders as well as a means of preventing potential local tensions.

The aim of economic growth and enlarging the areas of mutual exchange of goods and human capital between neighboring countries can be achieved by establishing areas of political stability.

With wider Europe and its long-term commitment to support local and regional initiatives of cross-border cooperation, the EU has expressed a will to avoid future divisions between East and West and North and South. This is to be achieved through comprehensive cooperation agendas that transcend political, economic and cultural dividing lines and that address socioeconomic disparities, political tensions and potential conflicts of interest[1].

Furthermore, the EU advocates a complex approach to regional development and cooperation in order to promote a sense of solidarity and socioeconomic cohesion. […] Local and regional cross-border cooperation and other forms of societal interaction between states are seen as important aspects of EU integration and have acquired considerable political significance as a mechanism for deepening relations with non-EU neighbors[2].

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[*] University of Siena, Italy. E-mail: alex3tr@hotmail.com
[1] See: J. W. Scott, "EU Enlargement, Region Building and Shifting Borders of Inclusion and Exclusion", Ashgate, Aldershot, 2006, p. 3.
[2] Ibid., p. 20.

However inside the 27-country EU a considerable number of areas along the borders have shown strong local identities, highlighting social, economic, cultural and moreover linguistic differences.

A strong sense of being part of a specific community has often been seen as a limit to cooperating efficiently, especially in those areas where history left its influence, such as in the case of the border region between Italy and Slovenia.

The effect of "them and us" categories may seriously hamper the process of creating areas belonging to different countries able to elaborate conjoint projects and development programs.

Therefore the process of building up cross-border regions can simultaneously be based on inclusion and exclusion dynamics.

In order to maintain a socioeconomic balance along borders, many elements must be considered, from social categories to the actions of local and central government.

Cross-border cooperation and governance have been playing a key role in the continuing integration and enlargement process since the Nineties.

In addition, we should bear in mind that every border has its own characteristics, its own history and socioeconomic problems to be solved, so that a specific inspection of every area is required.

Borders have become progressively more divergent from each other, especially as a consequence of globalization and the existence of one single European market.

The growing institutionalization of interest on borders is connected in various ways with globalization – the acceleration of trans-nationalizing tendencies over recent decades and reactions to these tendencies. In Western, and increasingly Eastern, Europe it is also linked more specifically to the integration and proposed enlargements – the "deepening and widening" – of the European Union. The upsurge of interest spans politics, economics and culture; it is linked to issues of immigration and citizenship, law and disorder, ecological disaster and environmental regulation, and national, regional and other identities[3].

Multimodal Transport and Cross-border Cooperation

The economic development of European regions, especially the least privileged, is essentially based on the expansion of the necessary transport infrastructure. Advanced transport networks are a precondition for boosting business, as well as for facilitating movements of goods and workers.

With reference to cross-border cooperation, solid and efficient transport networks will assure a stable integration of national markets, increasing the possibility of new trade perspectives along borders. Without a doubt, infrastructures are not exclusively functional for trade and commerce, the population living on border regions will unquestionably benefit from faster connections, reduction of traffic congestion and the consequent lowering pollution levels.

In the EU-27, the multimodal transport system, thanks to over 70,000 km of maritime coasts as well as of numerous fluvial corridors, will be the answer to combining economic development, flexible transport infrastructures and environmental protection. In addition, multimodal platforms will be modernized by the improvement of railway networks.

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[3] See: L. O'Dowd, "The Changing Significance of European borders", in Anderson J., O'Dowd L., Wilson T. M., "New Borders for a Changing Europe: Cross-border Cooperation and Governance", Frank Cass, London, 2003, p. 2.

In order to guarantee the optimum efficiency of transport infrastructures for promoting regional development, attention should be paid to improving the connectivity of landlocked, insular and outermost territories to the TEN-T projects. In this respect, the development of secondary links, with a focus on inter-modality and sustainable transport, will help. In particular, harbours and airports should be connected to their hinterland[4].

The issue of multimodal transport[5] has been raised and discussed several times over the last ten years inside the EU. There are solid reasons for this.

First of all a transport system based on multi-modality will ensure the efficient use of different methods of transferring and delivering goods: rail, road, air and inland waterways.

Secondly multimodal transport is essential for reducing the level of congestion of roads and above all the problem of bottlenecks. In addition, multimodal transport is a valid means to overcome the problem of lack of infrastructures still limiting the movement of goods in many countries, especially in some regions of Italy and in former Yugoslavia.

With the transport boom outstripping economic growth, the persistence and indeed the very size of a number of bottlenecks on the main international routes is posing a major problem for the transport system in Europe. Whether located on the outskirts of conurbations or at natural barriers or borders, these bottlenecks affect all modes of transport. Unless infrastructure is interconnected and free of bottlenecks, to allow the physical movement of goods and persons, the internal market and the territorial cohesion of the Union will not be fully realized[6].

Thirdly, the combination of road and railway transport plus the development of Motorways of the Sea[7] would mean faster deliveries in the retail markets and more coordination among forwarding agencies, enterprises and retail markets.

The principal objectives of the Motorways of the Sea projects can be summed up as follows: directing and converging freight flows on sea-based logistical routes and reducing road congestion by means of intermodal transport. Four main corridors have been considered and they should be activated as fundamental maritime routes by the end

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[4] See: "Guideline: Making Europe and its regions more attractive places in which to invest and work", in Council Decision No. 702 of 6 October 2006 on Community Strategic Guidelines on Cohesion, Official Journal of the European Union L 291/16, 21.10.2006.

[5] Multimodal transport is specifically defined as carriage of goods by two or more modes of transport. Intermodal transport and Combined transport are key words linked with Multimodal transport. Intermodal transport is the movement of goods in one and the same loading unit or road vehicle, which uses successively two or more modes of transport without handling the goods themselves in changing modes. By extension, the term intermodality has been used to describe a system of transport whereby two or more modes of transport are used to transport the same loading unit or truck in an integrated manner, without loading or unloading, in a [door to door] transport chain. Combined transport is intermodal transport where the major part of the European journey is by rail, inland waterways or sea and any initial and/or final legs carried out by road are as short as possible. For more details on definitions see: "Terminology on Combined Transport", document prepared by the United Nations and Economic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE), the European Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT) and the European Commission (EC), New York and Geneva, 2001, available on: http://www.unece.org/trans/wp24/documents/term.pdf.

[6] See: White Paper: European transport policy for 2010: time to decide, COM (2001) 370 final, submitted by the Commission on 12 September 2001, p. 49.

[7] In 2004 the Council and the European Parliament, through the Article 12a of the Decision No. 884/2004/EC of 29th April 2004 (amending Decision No 1692/96/EC on Community guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network), adopted a revision of the Trans-European Transport Networks (TEN-T), including the Motorways of the Sea projects.

of 2010: 1) Motorway of the Baltic Sea, linking the Baltic Sea Member States with Member States in Central and Western Europe; 2) Motorway of the Sea of Western Europe, from Portugal and Spain via the Atlantic Arc up to the North Sea and the Irish Sea; 3) Motorway of the Sea of South-eastern Europe, connecting the Adriatic Sea to the Ionian Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, including Cyprus. This corridor would be vital for the expansion of the main Italian, Slovenian and Croatian harbors in Northern Adriatic Sea; 4) Motorway of the Sea of South-western Europe, connecting Spain, France, Italy and Malta. This corridor is linked with the Motorway of the Sea of South-eastern Europe and it includes possible connections with the Black Sea.

In particular, the development of the Motorways of the Sea will bring about a new type of organization of transport in Europe, more sustainable and more commercially efficient than the one-modal transport solution based on the unique combination of trucks and roads. Thanks to the Motorways of the Sea, maritime transport resources will be increasingly utilized and improved. More than ever, making use of sea corridors will mean reducing transport costs as s consequence of scale economies.

Fourthly, multimodal transport is the ideal solution for protecting the environment, as it will lead to the reduction of carbon dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions. Taking as many trucks as possible off congested roads will cut the level of pollution and greenhouse gas emissions[8]. However this goal has not been attained. During the period 1999 – 2005 the growth of road transport was significant in the EU-15. In 1999 almost 11,000 million tons of goods were transported by truck and in 2005 the quantity of goods rose to 13,688 million tons. This means an increase of nearly 25% in six years.

Comparing rail transport with road transport in 2004 and in 2005, it is evident that railway networks in the EU are not adequately utilized. In 2004 in the EU-25, 1,489 million tons were transported by freight train against 15,202 million tons by truck. One year later the amount shipped by train decreased of 2% (1,466 million tons), while goods transported by road rose by 3% (15,711 million tons).

Member States should invest more in railway infrastructures and railroad terminals. Especially for new Member States, it is necessary to improve their national railway networks and to create better connections with neighboring countries.

Regarding Italy, Austria and Slovenia, figures about transport of goods confirm the EU trend, i.e. trucks are the main option for transport. The volume of goods shipped by trucks increased during the period 2003 – 2006 in all three countries. A significant yearly growth of road transport was registered during 2005 – 2006 in Austria (a 25% increase, from 288 million tons to 358) and Slovenia (a 22% increase, from 12.6 million tons to 15.4).

Road transport figures in Italy are high, in keeping with other industrialized EU countries. In 2006, in Germany the volume of goods transported by truck was 2,919 million tons, while in Spain it was 2,387 million tons, in France 2,181 and in the United Kingdom 1,903.

However, Germany showed interest in multi-modality, as during 2006 346 million tons of goods (equal to nearly a third of all rail shipments in the EU-15) were delivered by rail and 243 million tons by inland waterway transport[9].

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[8] The level of carbon dioxide emission from road transport is generally estimated as at least four times the level of railroad transport. This data is sufficient to realize how important implementing a combined system of transport (road plus railway) would be. An interesting analysis regarding CO2 emission can be read in the report "Transport and climate change" issued in 2007 by the UK Commission for Integrated Transport to the British Government. See: http://www.cfit.gov.uk/docs/2007/climatechange/pdf/2007climatechange.pdf, pp. 23-27.

[9] See: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/transport/data/main_tables.

Fifthly, in order to improve multi-modality, it is mainly necessary to increase the number of harbours, road terminals and railway terminals, as points of transshipment - loading and unloading goods. The presence of terminals with the function of hubs in strategic geographic areas will consequently create a capillary network of points (spokes) to deliver and exchange goods locally.

Therefore, a "hub and spoke" transport system will allow the proliferation of loading/unloading spots and it facilitates door-to-door delivery, reducing the need of transporting goods by trucks over long distances.

Sixthly, the use of "groupage"[10] loading system and shipping goods through 20-foot ISO containers (also called TEUs)[11] and 40-foot ISO containers[12] might be the key solution in order to improve intermodal transport. These types of containers can be fitted both on trailers of trucks and on train wagons with bulkheads. The handling of containers is safe and fast by using fork-lift trucks and special types of cranes along quays, such as: overhead travelling cranes and portal cranes (also called "gantry cranes"). A special version of the portal crane is the "Portainer" crane, specifically designed for ship-to-shore transfer of containers.

Besides, building modern railway terminals and road terminals inside harbours as well as rapid access roads to reach loading/unloading spots along quays means significant improvement of maritime logistics. In fact, once containers have reached the harbour by train or truck, they can be easily loaded and unloaded on shipping vessels, especially "lo-lo" vessels (lift on – lift off). This category of boats is designed to stock up and drop off containers with the use of fork-lift trucks and cranes. Lo-lo solution is in contrast to "ro-ro" vessels (roll on – roll off). "Ro-ro" vessels are instead planned to carry wheeled cargo like cars, trucks, trailer trucks and in general vehicles which can be driven on and off the vessel on their own wheels. The "ro-ro" vessels make use of built in ramps so that wheeled cargo can be easily "rolled on(to)" and "rolled off" the ship's cargo hold, without requiring the presence of cranes and fork-lift trucks.

Last but not least, sea transport has shown a steady growth since 1997 in the EU-15, from 2,887 million tons in 1997 to 3,037 in 2001, to 3,545 in 2006.

Constant increase of sea transport is evident analyzing figures for EU-25 since 2004 as well.

Concerning Italy, Slovenia and Croatia (as an official EU candidate), positive trends can also be confirmed for these countries since 2001.

In conclusion we have to consider that road transport has been absolutely predominant in the EU for decades and today we are paying for all the negative consequences of not implementing efficient strategies in order to develop alternative

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[10] The groupage loading system is a method of shipping goods based on the collection of materials from different clients and firms in order to successively deliver the merchandise as one single shipment of assorted and mixed goods.

[11] TEU (Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit) is a 20-foot ISO container which is used as a statistical measure of traffic flows and trade volume.

[12] Both types of containers are considered the standard dimensions for intercontinental (Ocean and maritime) freight as well as ideal for transport of goods by truck. The standard dimensions are the following: length 20 feet (6.058 metres) – 40 feet (12.192 metres); width 8 feet (2.438 metres); height 8.5' feet (2.591 metres) or 9.5' (2.896 metres). The Rating (maximum permissible weight of a container – i.e. tare mass plus the contents) of a 20-foot container is 24,000 kgs. (52,900 lbs.) and of a 40-foot is 30,480 kgs. (67,200 lbs.).

modes of transport: traffic congestion; air pollution; noise; road accidents; high insurance costs for shipping goods.

Therefore urgent measures are indispensable to reduce road transport in favor of alternative modes (rail, sea, inland navigation), in order to allow sustainable development and environmental protection.

Two Examples of Alternative Modes of Transport: Fluvial Transport in Austria and Short Sea Shipping (SSS)

The expansion of fluvial transport along with sea transport is vital for the accomplishment of advanced multimodality. Together with rail and short sea shipping, inland waterway transport can contribute to the sustainability of the transport system, as recommended by the White Paper. In the context of a liberalised inland navigation market, the European Commission aims at promoting and strengthening the competitive position of inland waterway transport, in particular by enhancing its integration into multi-modal supply chains. […] Inland navigation has the best performance in terms of external costs, in particular pollution and safety (2 ½ times better than road), and has a huge capacity to deploy[13].

In fact, Inland Waterway Transport (IWT) has several advantages compared to road and rail transport.

First of all, the level of energy consumption to dispatch large volumes of goods is moderate. Flatboats are generally an economical transport means, in terms of fuel and maintenance. These vessels require a low-input of energy and they can be loaded with several types of goods. In addition, the amount of goods transported by fluvial vessels is considerable. A flatboat carrying 3.7 thousand tons is equal to 93 railroad wagons (40-ton wagons) or 148 fully loaded trucks (25-ton trucks).

Secondly, flatboats can navigate in relatively shallow waters. Thanks to flat hulls, flatboats can transport goods throughout the entire year, unless sudden drought occurs. Fluvial vessels can be also used as floating warehouses.

Thirdly, small capital assets are necessary to improve and to maintain infrastructures, or even better to create new ports or loading/unloading points along rivers.

Fourthly, fluvial transport is safer than road and rail transport. The risk of accidents is inferior. Fluvial transport is increasingly used to deliver dangerous goods, as it is considered one of the safest modes of transport. In the Netherlands, where inland waterway transport is used to dispatch over 300 million tons per year, the number of accidents is extremely low. Recently, new vessels have been built with double hulls, in order to ensure more stability and solidity.

In conclusion, fewer accidents, less noise, fewer emissions, low capital expenditure requirements and low energy consumption combined with a high mass-transport capacity enable inland waterway transport to contribute to the environmentally friendly and economically effective management of part of the increase in freight transport volumes in the Danube corridor[14].

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[13] See: Communication from the Commission on the Promotion of Inland Watwerway Transport "NAIADES", An integrated European Action Programme for Inland Waterway Transport, COM(2006) 6 final of 17.1.2006, pp. 2-3.

[14] For details about advantages and possibilities of inland waterway transport on the Danube, see: http://www.donauschifffahrt.info/en/public_relations/advantages_of_inland_waterway_transport/ capacity.

However, nowadays inland waterways are not still sufficiently utilized, e.g. only 10 - 15% of the capacity of the Danube is used. Fluvial transport on the Danube has to overcome some obstacles.

Firstly, some sections of the Danube are in poor condition and navigation can therefore be difficult.

Secondly, Inland Waterway Transport depends on water levels, so during some months of the year navigation can be limited.

Thirdly, despite its cost efficiency, fluvial transport has often been considered as a disadvantageous means of transport because of its low speed.

In consequence of these impediments to fluvial transport on the Austrian Danube, a 200-million euro project called "The Integrated River Engineering Project on the Danube to the East of Vienna" was launched in 2002.

It was co-financed by the EU from the budget of the Transeuropean Transport Networks, with the purpose of improving navigation on the Danube, from Vienna to the Slovak border.

The project focused on river bed stabilization, in order to stop erosion, along with environmental protection. The goal was to combine safe conditions of navigation at low water levels with "ecological hydro-engineering measures"[15].

Austria, due to its geographical position, has obviously no access to international sea water, however it has developed an interesting and efficient inland waterways transport system along the Danube (329 km)[16]. Since 1997 an average of 10 million tons of goods per year have been transported through inland waterway transport[17]. After a notable growth from 1997 until 2002, the volume of goods shipped by fluvial transport decreased in 2003. However a remarkable increase has been registered since 2007.

Austrian navigation policy on the Danube will be based on the National Action Plan (NAP) until 2015. The NAP concentrates on modernization of inland navigation infrastructures in order to transform Austrian Danube ports in multimodal logistic centers and into transshipment hubs between rail, road and fluvial transport modes[18]. It is also

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[15] See: http://www.donau.bmvit.gv.at/en/project.

[16] Inland waterway transport plays an important role for the transport of goods in Europe. More than 37,000 kilometers of waterways connect hundreds of cities and industrial regions. Some 20 out of 27 Member States have inland waterways, 12 of which have an interconnected waterway networks. The potential for increasing the modal share of inland waterway transport is, however, significant. Compared to other modes of transport which are often confronted with congestion and capacity problems, inland waterway transport is characterized by its reliability, its low environmental impact and its major capacity for increased exploitation. Inland waterway transport is a competitive alternative to road and rail transport. In particular; it offers an environment friendly alternative in terms of both energy consumption and noise and gas emissions. Its energy consumption per km/ton of transported goods is approximately 17% of that of road transport and 50% of rail transport. Its noise and gaseous emissions are modest. In addition, inland waterway transport ensures a high degree of safety, in particular when it comes to the transportation of dangerous goods. Finally it contributes to the decongestion of the overloaded road network in densely populated regions. According to recent studies, the total external costs of inland navigation (in terms of accidents, congestion, noise emissions, air pollution and other environmental impacts) are seven times lower than those of road transport. See: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/inland/index_en.htm.

[17] Source: Eurostat and Statistik Austria. Figures on inland waterways are available at: http://www.statistik.at/web_en/statistics/transport/inland_waterways/index.html.

[18] Concerning NAP and development of Austrian ports, see: Federal Ministry of Transport, Innovation and Technology (bmvit) of Austria, "National Action Plan Danube Navigation", Overview of

considered essential to remove bottlenecks on the Austrian section of the Danube and to create favorable conditions to attract and to facilitate the presence of industrial settlements along the Danube. The cost for implementing the NAP initiatives is estimated at around 270 million euro. The NAP will be essentially based on the objectives of two EU programs:

1) The NAIADES program (Navigation and Inland Waterway Action and Development in Europe)[19], which was adopted by the European Commission on 17 January 2006 for the promotion of inland navigation in the EU. The NAIADES Action Programme is intended for the period 2006–2013 and focuses on five strategic areas for a comprehensive Inland Waterway Transport (IWT) policy: market, fleet, jobs and skills, image and infrastructure[20].

2) The PLATINA project[21], which was launched by the European Commission on 2 June 2008, is a platform for the implementation of the five strategic areas of the NAIADES program. It focuses on: improving market conditions and further penetration into containerized cargo markets or new market niches (e.g. waste and recycling, transport of vehicles, dangerous goods); modernizing fleets and using modern technologies, especially research on the reduction of fuel consumption[22]; developing human capital (education and training, making use of the ESF - European Social Fund); strengthening the image of inland navigation[23]; and improving infrastructure and eliminating bottlenecks[24].

Measures, February 2006, available at: http://www.donauschifffahrt.info/fileadmin/ group_upload/7/OEffentlichkeit/NAP/nap_folder_en.pdf, pp. 4-6.

[19] For further details about NAIADES, see: Communication from the Commission on the Promotion of Inland Watwerway Transport "NAIADES": An integrated European action program for Inland Waterway Transport, COM(2006) 6 final of 17.1.2006; and Communication from the Commission, First progress report on the implementation of the NAIADES Action Programme for the promotion of inland waterway transport, COM(2007) 770 final of 5.12.2007.

[20] See: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/inland/promotion/naiades_en.htm.

[21] PLATINA marks an important step in the Commission's strategy to promote inland navigation in Europe, which was initiated by the publication of the NAIADES action program in the year 2006. PLATINA is a Coordination Action funded by the European Union (DG TREN) under the 7th Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration activities (RTD) [http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7]. The core consortium is formed by Via donau (Austria) as coordinator, Voies navigables de France (France), Bundesverband der Deutschen Binnenschiffahrt (Germany), Promotie Binnenvaart Vlaanderen (Belgium) and the Rijkswaterstaat Centre for Transport and Navigation (The Netherlands). All in all, 22 institutions from nine European countries are involved as project partners in PLATINA. This unique set-up will allow PLATINA to create the momentum necessary for the realization of selected NAIADES actions. See: http://www.naiades.info/platina/page.php?id=1.

[22] The introduction of technologies to further reduce fuel consumption and harmful emissions from new and existing vessels, e.g. hydrodynamics, improved propulsion, fuel-efficiency, filtering, will allow inland shipping to maintain its high standards. Research into commercially viable non-carbon fuels, e.g. hydrogen fuel cells, and zero-emission engines should also be pursued. The use of biofuels, especially biodiesel, should be exploited. Adapting vessels' design and standards to the conditions of particular rivers should be considered. See: COM(2006) 6 final, pp. 6-7.

[23] Improving the image of inland navigation is a joint responsibility of the industry, politics and administrations at national and European level. Promotion activities aimed at logistics decision-makers could be supported and coordinated to establish a consistent and positive image of inland navigation and to pave the way for a rebalanced transport system. Ibid., p. 8.

[24] Even though the larger part of the waterway network has ample free capacities, several bottlenecks caused by limited draught, bridge clearance and lock dimensions hinder its full utilization and reduce the competitiveness of inland waterway transport. Ibid., p. 9.

Through full accomplishment of the NAP, Austria should be able to increase the volume of goods dispatched by fluvial transport by 100-110% by 2015, from the current 11-12 million tons up to 25 million tons.

Regarding Austrian ports, Vienna, due to its location, is a strategic harbor for transshipment and distribution of goods in Austria as well as for shipments to/from North Sea and the Black Sea.

Thanks to its 7,000-TEU container terminal, in 2007 freight transshipment was equal to 5.5 million tons and movement of containers was 323,000 TEU[25]. These figures are quite significant for a fluvial port. Other Austrian fluvial ports on the Danube are: Mierka Donauhafen Krems (71 km far from Vienna), which is equipped with a modern trimodal logistic centre; Linz (2,500-TEU container terminal); and Enns (5,000-TEU container terminal)[26].

Short Sea Shipping and Coastal shipping are the movement of goods, cargoes and passengers by sea between European harbors or between European ports and non-EU ports with a coastline in the enclosed seas bordering Europe. Therefore, Short Sea Shipping is relevant to: domestic maritime transport, including cabotage[27] towards islands and Motorways of the Sea; maritime traffic between Member States of the EU, including Iceland and Norway; maritime traffic between community ports and non-EU ports that border the Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea; feeder service, i.e. short transport lines to and from the deep-sea[28]; and sea-river shipping[29].

Short Sea Shipping is considered to be one of the least polluting means of transport, as it reduces carbon dioxide and nitrogen dioxide emissions by up to 80% and 35% respectively. SSS can be considered the most environmentally friendly mode of transport, with comparatively low external costs and high energy efficiency. Shipping is also a comparatively safe mode of transport, with infrastructure costs which are much lower than for land transport[30].

SSS is currently implemented with the aim of reducing traffic congestion. At the same time in the near future it will be able to promote pioneering intermodal transport networks and an innovative modal shift for goods transport.

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[25] See: Port of Vienna, Wiener Hafen Group Data and Facts for 2007, available at: http://www.wienerhafen.com/en_index1.htm.

[26] See: http://www.hafen.co.at (Austrian ports); http://www.mierka.com (Mierka port); http://www.ennshafen.at (Enns port).

[27] Cabotage is the right to operate sea, air, or other transport services within a particular territory. Restriction of the operation of sea, air, or other transport services within or into a particular country to that country's own transport services. Origin - mid 19th century - from French "caboter" (sail along a coast), or perhaps from Spanish "cabo" (cape, headland). See: Oxford English Dictionary.

[28] Feeder service is the SSS service which connects at least two ports in order for the freight (generally containers) to be consolidated or redistributed to or from a deep-sea service in one of these ports. By extension, this concept may be used for inland transport services. See: "Terminology on Combined Transport", document prepared by UN/ECE, ECMT and EC, 2001.

[29] For further details about SSS, see: http://www.freightbywater.org/content/shortseashipping and http://www.shortsea.it/Home/eng/index.htm.

[30] See: Communication from the Commission to European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, "Communication and action plan with a view to establishing a European maritime transport space without barriers", COM(2009) 10 final of 21.1.2009, p. 3.

In fact, SSS is not only an alternative to road transport, but it can also be seen as an integrated transport network which aims to improve the efficiency of logistics and to reduce transport costs.

European Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT), with Recommendations on Short Sea Shipping of 5 June 2000, focused on the importance of SSS as an alternative transport mode along with the improvement of transshipment points.

By integrating short sea shipping with combined transport, the aim is to include maritime shipping as a type of transport in multimodal traffic flows. It will thus be possible for the combined transport sector to achieve the modal shift from road to alternative environmentally-friendly transport modes - in this case, the waterborne transport chain - on a wider scale. Ports - as interfaces - are particularly important for the integration of short sea shipping with combined transport modes. For combined transport, ports are major transshipment points at which road, rail and river and sea traffic converge. […] Land and river access is increasingly a key factor in the competitiveness of seaports. If short sea shipping is to be integrated with combined transport, it is vital that rail and river infrastructure links and where necessary for access to ports, road infrastructure links, be improved[31].

Vessels using SSS routes have full seagoing capability though they are also able to navigate inland waterway networks, so that transshipment at coastal ports can be avoided. Short-sea and coastal shipping are based on the concept of carrying freight door-to-door, or factory to factory, much like in road transport. This is accomplished through the use of fast, modern ships and intermodal transport in collection and delivery. Short-sea shipping transit time is generally only slightly longer than road transport. Moreover, the costs can be considerably lower - up to 25 percent. Short-sea and coastal shipping advantages include: a cost-saving when compared to road transport; reliable transit times; environmental benefits; and flexibility (with the option to use 300 European inland and coastal ports)[32].

According to the White Paper for the European Transport policy for 2010, the Short Sea Shipping can play in curbing the growth of heavy goods vehicle traffic, rebalancing the modal split and bypassing land bottlenecks. The development of Short Sea Shipping can also help to reduce the growth of road transport, restore the balance between modes of transport, bypass bottlenecks and contribute to sustainable development and safety[33]. Short Sea Shipping is supposed to fulfill the European sustainable transport policy, especially the purpose of the Commission relevant to the need to build up coordination centers for SSS along the coast of every EU member state.

However, SSS still has to face - and obviously to overcome - several obstacles before being fully operative. The Communications COM (1999) 317 final, and COM(2004) 453 final, enumerated the limits to development of SSS (bottlenecks), as follows: it has not yet reached full integration in the intermodal door-to-door supply chain; it has not yet fully shed its past image of an old-fashioned industry; it involves complex administrative procedures; and it requires high port efficiency and services[34]. Therefore,

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[31] European Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT), CEMT/CM (2000)3/Final, Sustainable Development: Recommendations on Short Sea Shipping of 5 June 2000. The document was approved by the Council of Ministers on 30-31 May 2000 in Prague, p. 2.

[32] Ibid.

[33] See: http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l24258.htm.

[34] See: The Development of Short Sea Shipping in Europe: A Dynamic Alternative in a Sustainable Transport Chain - Second Two-yearly Progress Report, COM (1999) 317 final, 29.6.1999 and Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Region on Short Sea Shipping

the image of SSS as an efficient means of delivering goods should be spread not only among potential customers (i.e. enterprises, forwarding agencies and transport companies), but it should also involve local authorities and institutions, especially those with competence in maritime regions.

In 2004 – 2006 period, SSS accounted for over 60% of total EU-27 maritime goods transport, totalling nearly 2 billion tonnes.

In 2006, The North Sea and the Mediterranean took the largest shares of SSS by the EU-27 countries, with 28.1% (599 million tonnes), and 26.3% (560 million tonnes), respectively. Liquid bulk[35] (including liquefied gas, crude oil and oil products) played a predominant role in SSS (almost 50% of total cargo weight). In France, Italy, the Netherlands and Malta in particular, it accounted for over 55% of total cargo. In all the maritime regions, liquid bulk was the largest SSS cargo, both leaving and entering EU-27 ports[36].

Liquid bulk is generally transported by SSS vessels, as SSS has been shown to be safer than road transport for dangerous goods, such as liquefied gas, petrol and chemical substances.

The priority of maritime transport safety and prevention of accidents has been highlighted by the EU through 3rd Maritime Safety Package and COM(2009) 8 final on "Strategic goals and recommendations for the EU's maritime transport policy".

Since the Erika accident (December 1999) and the Prestige accident (November 2002), the EU has introduced legislation in order to strengthen the level of maritime safety. Preventing accidental pollution and environmental disaster by ships has become a priority in the EU over the last ten years.

SSS has gradually increased in the EU area since 2000. In the period 2000 – 2006, in the EU-15 area, shipment of goods through SSS rose by approximately 3% per year. In 2000, in the EU-15 1,505 million tonnes of goods were shipped by SSS, reaching 1,802 tonnes in 2006. Including new Member States (EU-27), during 2004 and 2005, SSS experienced a positive annual average growth of 4.5%, from 1,810 million tonnes to 1,892. In brief, the success of SSS depends on three key points.

First of all, the enlargement of the network of door-to-door Short Sea Shipping, also making use of fluvial networks. The EU institutions should finance projects to build new maritime and fluvial ports, in an attempt to start up a capillary network of loading/unloading points and to promote the door-to-door SSS. The combination of Motorways of the Sea and fluvial transport would be an excellent formula to decrease road traffic congestion. It is necessary to replace the current road door-to-door system, or at least road transport should be used exclusively for the final part of every single shipment (only a few kilometers to reach final destinations, i.e. consignee). Unfortunately, SSS is limited by its incapacity of penetrating very far inland waterways. In fact, given the

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[SEC(2004) 875], COM(2004) 453 final, 2.7.2004, p. 3. Another useful document relevant to SSS and its implementation inside EU territory is Communication from the Commission on the Development of Short Sea Shipping in Europe – Prospects and Challenges, COM(95) 317 final, 5.7.1995.

[35] Bulk cargo refers to unpackaged cargo which can be classified as liquid or dry. Liquid bulk is utilized to transport liquid commodities such as: petrol, liquid natural gas, chemicals, acids, oil. Dry bulk is used to ship solid materials, such as: coal, wood, cement, iron, copper, bauxite, various metals and scrap metals, fertilizer, grain, sand, salt.

[36] See: G. Amerini, "Short Sea Shipping of Goods 2000 – 2006", in Statistics in Focus, Transport, 2/2008, Eurostat, p. 1, available on: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-08-002/EN/KS-SF-08-002-EN.PDF.

extensive inland waterway networks in Central and Eastern Europe, short sea shipping and inland waterway transport throughout Europe could become a much more attractive option if they could be integrated and use inland waterways without hindrance[37].

Secondly, the development of essential harbor infrastructures for SSS transport systems in order to facilitate cargo handling operations, such as: improving the technology of overhead travelling cranes and portal cranes or increasing the number of cranes; enlarging berths and areas to load and unload containers (vessel-train or vessel-truck); building up modern and logistically efficient railroad terminals inside ports. Therefore, modern infrastructures must be realized in every European harbor with the purpose of implementing rapid techniques to load and unload docked vessels. In addition, logistics, handling and all administrative services provided by harbor authorities, have to be clearly based on quality and economic efficiency. In order to fulfill these economic criteria, professional and highly-skilled personnel are a fundamental prerequisite, as harbor authorities can play a central role in incorporating ports in logistics and transport networks.

Thirdly, the implementation of new administrative services in order to reduce the complexity of documents required to deliver goods by maritime transport. As inside the EU territory there is no customs check, especially the import and export procedures to ship outside EU area should be simplified, for instance shipments from EU ports to Northern African harbors or Middle Eastern coasts. The implementation of an e-Customs system (New Computerised Transit System – NCTS) and paperless administrative customs procedures will lead to transferring administrative and customs information electronically. Besides, the electronic customs system will have important advantages, such as: reducing customs clearance costs and times; improving the exchange of information and the flow of data among EU customs authorities (departments and agencies) of Member States, so that more accurate customs controls and inspections will be achievable; harmonizing customs procedures between Member States and "enabling economic operators to use one single interface to lodge electronic customs declaration, even if the customs procedure is carried out in another Member State[38].

Furthermore, the chance of SSS to supplant road transport may vary according to a range of factors linked with the social and economic conditions of each country, for example: legislation of the country; infrastructures (road network and railway development); investment in technology; influence and pressure of motor companies or petrol lobbies on local and central governments; presence of active green and ecologist political parties.

Last but not least, we should pay attention to the location of a country. Several geographical factors can influence the growth of maritime traffic, including the development of SSS, for instance: kilometers of coasts. Italy and Croatia can take advantage of this; access to international sea-water. Slovenia might face limited access to

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[37] European Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT), CEMT/CM(2000)3/Final, p. 4.

[38] See: Decision No. 70/2008/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 January 2008 "on a paperless environment for customs and trade". The Decision is relevant to the electronic customs system and the decrease of paper-format customs documents. Article 1 of the Decision No. 70/2008/EC states that: The Commission and the Member States shall set up secure, integrated, interoperable and accessible electronic customs systems for the exchange of data contained in customs declarations, documents accompanying customs declarations and certificates and the exchange of other relevant information. The Commission and the Member States shall provide the structure and means for the operation of those electronic customs systems.

international sea-water in consequence of the unsettled question with Croatia concerning the border in Piran Bay; geological coastal conformation (for example, the presence of cliffs in Ireland and Brittany or fjords in Norway).

With reference to the Adriatic coasts SSS will permit the development of regions and areas along the coasts, such as the province of Ravenna, the coast around the city of Chioggia in Italy, as well as the port of Koper in Slovenia and the whole Croatian coastline, from Rijeka up to Dubrovnik. In addition, SSS will allow for the growth and increase the importance of main harbors in the Northern part of the Adriatic Sea (Venice, Monfalcone, Trieste, Koper and Rijeka) for the traffic of goods from Central Europe to South-eastern Mediterranean countries.

Besides, countries like Austria, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia, having no coasts and no access to the sea, would benefit from the proximity of Northern Adriatic harbors.

These EU member States might open up new potential markets in the Eastern Mediterranean area, such as Cyprus, Israel, Lebanon, or in Middle Eastern regions, instead of moving and delivering goods by maritime transport exclusively from the major harbors of Northern Europe (for example Rotterdam, Antwerpen and Hamburg).

In Slovenia intermodal transport and SSS is progressively growing, but it is still undersized. Slovenian maritime traffic is concentrated in the harbor of Koper. A remarkable increase in volume of goods was registered during the period 2000 - 2008, especially in vehicles (+ 246%) and containers (+ 325%)[39].

The port of Koper needs to be expanded. In particular services and infrastructures for ro-ro vessels and a new efficient container terminal should be developed. The project for the construction of a third pier housing a modern ro-ro and container terminal has been approved. The third pier will be realized in the coming years (2010-2012) in order to build up an advanced intermodal terminal useful for SSS. This project is vital for the modernization of the harbor of Koper.

It should allow Koper to increase its role as a maritime hub in the Northern part of the Adriatic Sea for products like fruit, vegetables, livestock, timber and moreover cars. Today the car terminal in Koper is one of the largest and most modern in the Mediterranean, so investments have to be directed to keeping the car terminal competitive and efficient. Currently, the Koper container and ro-ro terminal has regular connections with the main hubs ports in the Mediterranean sea, such as: Gioia Tauro, Malta, Piraeus, Haifa and Taranto. The Port of Koper has also scheduled a weekly ro-ro/multipurpose connection with the harbour of Ravenna. The ship-owner is Grimaldi Lines[40].

In order to encourage the growth of intermodality and the efficiency of the Port of Koper, another Slovenian priority is making the new railway line between Koper and the city of Divača fully operational as well.

However Slovenia has to face another negative aspect limiting the growth of its maritime economy and the development of SSS. Slovenia has not opened its own Short-Sea Promotion Centre (SPC) yet and it has not taken part in the European Short-sea Network (ESN) either. SPCs were opened by several EU Member States (Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Holland, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the UK) and no-EU Countries (Croatia, Norway, Turkey) in order: to provide information about SSS advantages among

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[39] See: Port of Koper (Luka Koper), http://www.luka-kp.si.
[40] For additional details concerning ro-ro services and connections in the Adriatic Sea, see: http://www.shortsea.it.

forwarding agents, shipping agents and potential users; to analyze problems limiting the SSS; to encourage cooperation between institutions and private enterprises, promoting partnerships between Member States to develop new SSS connections; and to strengthen cooperation between Europe and its bordering countries.

Slovenia should follow other EU member states in order to promote short sea shipping and sea motorways as the easy way to overcome the dependence to access Europe and to increase the awareness of short sea shipping as an economically viable and environmentally friendly mode of transport[41].

Concerning Adriatic Italian harbors, during 2006 in terms of SSS, Trieste was the main Italian harbor and it was the 9th in the EU-27 rank. It accounted for 1.5% (37.5 million tonnes) of all SSS of the EU-27 harbors (2.5 billion tonnes)[42].

In 2007 and 2008, total movement of goods in Trieste harbor was respectively 46.11 million tons (of which 37.26 liquid bulk) and 48.27 million tons (of which 34.76 liquid bulk), i.e. a 4,7% growth in one year[43].

In 2006, Ravenna was the 5th most important SSS European harbor for dry bulk cargo, after Rotterdam, Riga, Amsterdam and London. In Ravenna 11.1 million tons of dry bulk cargo were shipped during 2006, just 2.4 million tons less than Rotterdam (13.5 million tons).

In 2006, total movement of goods (liquid bulk, dry bulk, containers and ro-ro) at Ravenna port was 26.77 million tons[44].

Venice is another important Adriatic port. During the period 2002 - 2008, the overall movement of goods was around 30 million tons each year.

Important growth was registered in traffic of containers (TEUs), from 262,337 in 2002 to 379,072 in 2008, i.e. an increase of 45% in six years[45].

In order to make a brief comparison between container traffic in Northern Europe and the Adriatic Sea, in 2008 Rotterdam, Hamburg and Antwerp harbors registered respectively 10.8 million TEUs, 9.7 million TEUs and 8.6 million TEUs[46].

A small Adriatic port with possibilities of development, thanks to its strategic position, is Monfalcone. The movement of goods was nearly 3 million tons in 2008 and the volume of container traffic is still limited (1,584 TEUs in 2008 and 1,519 TEUs in 2007)[47], nevertheless this port can be extremely helpful to implement an effective SSS network in the Northern Adriatic.

Analyzing SSS figures for the period 2004 – 2005, SSS showed positive trends in Slovenia and Italy. In Italy SSS rose by 3.8% (from 310 million tonnes to 322) and in Slovenia by 5.7% (from 6.9 million tonnes to 7.3).

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[41] See: B. Beškovnik, "Importance of Short Sea Shipping and Sea Motorways in the European and Slovenian Transport Policy", in Journal of Maritime Studies (Pomorstvo), Vol. 20, No. 1, Faculty of Maritime Studies, University of Rijeka, 2006, pp.32-33.

[42] Source: G. Amerini, p. 8.

[43] See: Trieste Port Authority (Autorità Portuale di Trieste, Ufficio Statistica), http://www.porto.trieste.it.

[44] See: Ravenna Port Authority (Autorità Portuale di Ravenna), http://www.port.ravenna.it.

[45] See: Venice Port Authority (Autorità Portuale di Venezia, Direzione Pianificazione, Strategia e Sviluppo - Area Studi e Progetti), http://www.port.venice.it.

[46] The world rank in terms of container traffic is led by the harbors of Singapore (29.9 million TEUs), Shangai (27.9 million TEUs) and Hong Kong (21.4 million TEUs). Source: "Containerisation International" Review, http://www.ci-online.co.uk.

[47] See: Azienda Speciale per il Porto di Monfalcone, http://www.porto.monfalcone.gorizia.it.

However, in Italy the positive trend ended in 2006, as SSS decreased to 308 million tonnes. The reduction is mainly linked to the decrease in demand for containers.

Slovenia has experienced noticeable increases in SSS since the new Millennium. In 2001, 5.4 million tonnes were shipped using SSS and in 2006 the amount rose up to 8.7 million, with an increase of over 60% in 5 years.

In 2006, Italy utilized SSS to deliver 42.5 million tonnes of containers, 32.2 of ro-ro units, 42.6 of dry bulk and moreover 172.9 million tonnes of liquid bulk. These figures indicate once again that liquid bulk is the predominant type of cargo shipped by SSS in the majority of the EU Countries.

Regarding Slovenia, in 2006 SSS was used to ship 1.9 million tonnes of containers, 3.9 of dry bulk and 2 million of liquid bulk.[48]

During the period 2004 – 2006, Slovenia shows growth in container transit in terms of TEUs (20-foot ISO containers), while in Italy SSS of containers is steady or slightly decreasing (from 4.39 million in 2004 to 4.1 million in 2006).

Concerning a brief outlook on fleets (in gross tons), Slovenia has a very limited fleet in comparison with Italy and Croatia.

The Slovenian fleet is only 2,000 gross tons, while the Italian and Croatian ones are respectively 12,571,000 and 1,157,000 gross tons[49].

Regarding Croatia, in 2008 SSS was mainly based on feedering. As a matter of fact, all big Croatian ports (Rijeka, Ploče, Split and Zadar) were connected with hub terminals of the central Mediterranean by means of feeder lines. Feeder lines have thus been operating between Croatian ports of Rijeka, Ploče, Split and Zadar, and Gioa Tauro, Malta and Taranto[50].

An interesting project called the "Adriatic 3S Project" has been recently elaborated in order to promote SSS. This project involves Croatia and Italy and it will be based on the improvement of maritime infrastructures and services in both countries.

Conclusion

Powerful cooperation among the main harbors along the coast of the Upper Adriatic Sea will be vital for the implementation of new strategies and policies in order to create an efficient area of trade, along with a well-organized network of intermodal transport.

The UE should support more effective investments and projects regarding collaboration and assistance between port authorities, institutions, forwarding agencies and any other stakeholder involved in the expansion of the Northern Adriatic maritime traffic network.

On 17 April 2009, the Presidents of Maritime Authorities of the harbors of Trieste, Venice, Ravenna and Koper gathered in Venice, with the purpose of enhancing infrastructures and maritime trade in the Northern Adriatic. They signed the agreement "Articulating the North Adriatic Multi-port Gateway" within the European maritime transport strategy.

Thanks to cooperation and synergies between the four Adriatic ports, an important single Northern Adriatic interregional hub may be created, both for movement of goods

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[48] See: G. Amerini, p. 6.

[49] For further details on maritime transport and fleets, see: UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), "Review of Maritime Transport 2007", Annex III (a), New York and Geneva, 2007, pp. 143-147, available on: http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/rmt2007_en.pdf.

[50] See: European Shortsea Network, "Annual Report 2008", p. 7, available on: http://www.shortsea.info. For further details see also: http://www.shortsea.hr.

and passengers. In fact, this agreement is part of the EU strategy in order to implement interregional harbor networks.

Therefore, the Multiport Gateway plan will also integrate minor Adriatic ports, such as Monfalcone, Chioggia (close to Venice) and Porto Nogaro (province of Udine). The port of Rijeka may also take part in the agreement, once Croatia joins the EU[51].

In particular, with the support of the European Commission, the Adriatic Maritime Authorities of Trieste, Venice, Ravenna and Koper aim: to improve the intermodal transport (rail-ship) in the Italian regions Emilia-Romagna, Veneto and Friuli Venezia Giulia as well as in Slovenian cross-border regions and along the Slovenian coast (mainly Koper). Therefore, the Slovenian railway network must be enhanced rapidly, especially the Koper – Divača connection; to harmonize administrative procedures and customs clearance operations. A single IT system and a "single window" to facilitate the exchange of information must be implemented; and to develop the Adriatic-Baltic corridor, according to the TEN strategy[52].

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[51] The Port of Rijeka is vital for the economy of Croatia, as this country imports and exports large volumes of goods through the harbor of Rijeka. This port is fundamental for goods in transit from Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Austria and Italy as well. The expansion of the port will largely depend on the Zagreb – Rijeka motorway, "as skeleton of Croatian road and traffic network". In fact, the harbor is located in the centre of the city, so lack of roads and adequate transport infrastructures have always hindered the competitiveness and the growth of the Port of Rijeka. For further details concerning the development of the Port of Rijeka, see: Č. Dundović, B. Hlača, "New Concept of the Container terminal in the Port of Rijeka", in Journal of Maritime Studies (Pomorstvo), Vol. 21, No. 2, University of Rijeka, December 2007, pp. 51-68, available at: http://www.pfri.hr/pomorstvo/2007/02/05_dundovic_hlaca.pdf. Additional information regarding traffic flows and enhancement of the Port of Rijeka can be found in Portal of Scientific Journals of Croatia (Hrčak - Portal znanstvenih časopisa Republike Hrvatske), http://hrcak.srce.hr./search/?q=rijeka+port.

[52] Autorità Portuale di Ravenna, "Comunicato Stampa" of 6 February 2009 and "Accordo dei porti del Nord Adriatico: 4 banchine per un solo sistema portuale" of 17 April 2009, available at: http://www.port.venice.it.

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EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY AND THE GEORGIAN-ABKHAZ CONFLICT: EUROPEAN UNION'S APPROACH

Adriana POPESCU [*]

Abstract. *The South Caucasus is the region situated at European Union's periphery that shelters challenging frozen conflicts. As a bridge between Europe and Asia, the region becomes relevant to EU's economic and security interests. The Georgian-Abkhaz ethnic conflict is a test-case for the EU's tackling methods especially those that endeavour to over-extend its matrix of cooperation and conditionality over its external borders. EU assumes a degree of responsibility for its neighbourhood through the European Neighbourhood Policy's instruments, offering incentives to both parties of the conflict that are making a difference in the domestic and external dynamic of it. The European institutions perform now political tasks that address the vicinity's complex situation balancing between democratic incentives and the commitments required. There are no EU membership perspectives hitherto for the neighbours but there is a great share in the EU's market and an exclusive opportunity to take part in European programmes.*

Keywords: *EU, periphery, European Neighbourhood Policy, frozen conflict, conditionality, Europeanization, partnership, soft power*

Introduction

Eurasia – the vastness from Lisbon to Vladivostok, one of the most important geopolitical axes, gains importance through the South Caucasus of this plateau which is characterized by the existence of an anarchic region from a political point of view but with a great relevance on the international system's stage. This region is portrayed by the persistence of numerous frozen conflicts, disputes specific to weak, failed states that are in political decline, economic recession, states that ultimately can become real sources of violent and cross-border threats (McPherson, Wood, 2004: 56). It must be acknowledged the fact that the attribute "frozen" does not refer to the process of solving the conflict but relates to the situation itself, to the inertia of the frame in which the conflict is developing and progressing. The Caucasus is often compared with the European Balkans, a true ethnic, political mosaic characterized by a real vacuum of power. The Georgian-Abkhaz conflict is one of the many ethnic and political conflicts with great consequences on the international relations, developing between a presidential republic with the capital at Tbilisi and an autonomous republic with the capital at Sukhumi. The conflict consists of the Abkhazia's demand of autonomy, independence which in the international relations' field is the equivalent of secession (Goldstein, Pevehouse, 2008: 241).

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[*] Master student, Departament of International Relations in European Studies, University of Oradea, Romania

The South Caucasus, the region that shelters the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, is situated at the European Union's *periphery*, right in it's immediately neighbourhood categorized frequently by economic and social inequalities or severe differences. Talking about periphery inevitably we can bring into discussion the problem of the external frontiers of EU. The frontiers represent barriers, buffer zones against external threats and exclusion outlines that can be tackling with the development of some cooperation networks that will determine the nascent of a neighbourhood that offers the possibility of launching a whole series of positive trans-national policies. The *European Neighbourhood Policy* (ENP) is addressed to the promotion of regional and cross-border cooperation initiating *partnerships* at the EU's external frontiers in order to compensate the potential harmful long or short term effects of the exclusion of neighbours (Communication, 2004: 6-10).

The concept of *neighbourhood* can be understood as a compromise that has a certain odd nature involving feelings like belonging and externality, being able to avow that the neighbourhood can embody in a certain way "the closest abroad" (Brosse, Maron, 2007: 19). The South Caucasus did not represent an objective for the *ENP Wider Europe* – "a zone of prosperity and friendly neighbourhood – a circle of friends – with whom the EU will share close, peaceful and cooperative relations" (Communication, 2003: 4) – but the three states of this region were saved by the *European Security Strategy* from December 2003. Following the pass of the "Security Strategy" EU begins to play a global role taking new missions, responsibilities on the stage of the international community: "The violent or frozen conflicts, which also persist on our borders, threaten regional stability... It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed... Our task it is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union... with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations... It is in our interest that enlargement should not create new dividing lines in Europe" (European Security Strategy, 2003: 4-8). Hence, in 2004 Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia became members of the ENP. From this moment on the problem of neighbourhood is approached from a security point of view, the South Caucasus representing the vicinity that sends out noteworthy cross-border challenges. The Union's technique is based on the neighbours' democratisation, the Union presenting itself as a pole of attraction but one which resorts to imposing conditions and which stakes on predictable adaptation. In fact, EU demonstrates that what in the past was considered impossible today this can be transformed in reality (Møller, 2008: 8).

1. The Georgian-Abkhaz conflict

The Georgian-Abkhaz conflict is an ethnic one in the framework of which it is notable that every side has plausible arguments. The Abkhazians resort to their historic existence as kingdom from the 18th century, their settle down in the Abkhaz territory as aboriginal ethnics falling under the Ottoman influence in comparison with the Persian influence suffered by the Georgians (Wright, Goldenberg, Schofield, 1996: 193). Under the tsar regime, in the 19th century, Abkhazia becomes a complete part of Georgia and as a result mother country for the ethnic Georgians. The dividing element remains however the ethnicity. Various times the Abkhazians resorted to language and cultural differences complaining about aggressive policies of Georgian assimilation especially in the '30s (Mardirossian, 2007: 290-291). In what concerns this conflict religion does not represent a factor of separation: even if the Abkhazians are Sunni Muslims and the Georgians are Orthodox Christians, the Abkhazians does not legitimate their demands through religion. The conflict with the Georgians is not biased by claiming a religious identity or some

theological principles (Cornell, 1998: 49). The main factor remains the ethnicity, the exaggerated hostility towards the other group seen as enemy. The conflict is gaining in parallel a political significance while in discussion are brought questions like sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity.

In sustaining the nationalist points of view each side tries to find conceivable arguments. Georgia emphasises the legitimacy of the pre-soviet period when Abkhazia was entirely a part of the Georgian territory while Abkhazia claims the soviet period when it had the status of autonomous republic (Wright, Goldenberg, Schofield, 1996: 195). The integration in February 1931 of Abkhazia in the Socialist Soviet Republic of Georgia (1921) offers an incontestable argument to Georgia by which from that moment on Abkhazia is an indivisible part of the Georgian territory. The Georgian nationalism has in fact as core purpose the definitely overlie of political frontiers with those ethnic ones. The Soviet Union's dissolution brought to the Georgian state the desired independence (9 April 1991) and, on the other hand, carried an internal political decline characterized by: exacerbated nationalism expressed through the cancellation of the South Ossetian status of autonomy; military confrontations; a civil war against the sustainers of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a nationalist leader; Abkhazia's unilateral declaration of independence (23 July 1992) and the definitive loss of this region on 30 September 1993 (Calvocoressi, 2003: 76-77). From now on the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict becomes a frozen one despite the multilateral attempts of resolving it, being branded violent through the years by various humanitarian crises.

Georgia remains a country characterized by internal erosions, the conflict with Abkhazia not being the only problem of Tbilisi's authorities: the secession of South Ossetia, the transformation of the Ajaria region in some sort of state in state and the presence of anti-Georgian revolts in the Javakheti region (where the ethnic majority is formed by Armenians) are lining out a climate of permanent tension (Blockmans, Lazowski, 2006: 584-585).

2. The European approach of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict

At the European level – EU being a special intergovernmental organization – Georgia is considered to be a state with full sovereignty and territorial integrity. Under such considerations, the EU's approach of the Georgian-Abkhaz frozen conflict is based on the *process of Europeanization* that has two instruments of synergy: objective changes (e.g. economic liberalization) and subjective changes (e.g. common sharing of new values, principles) (Emerson, 2004: 2). The European strategy is founded on normative diffusion. It is easy to draw up the normative European values taking into consideration that these are strongly related with the democracy's domain: rule of law, human rights and fundamental liberties, multilevel governance, multilateralism, frontiers' mobility, anti-militarism (Emerson, 2004: 3).

The Union appeals to the instruments of the ENP in dealing with this conflict staking on the well-known concept of *sticks and carrot*. EU is developing a cross-border cooperation at the same with the development of the promise that the neighbours can achieve at some point an advantageous status in the organization based on the acceptance of the European standards. In terms of the security of the Community's external borders it is applied a traditional geopolitical paradigm: *the cosmopolitan security*. This can be understood as a process of defending citizens reckoning upon the principles of human rights respect, the protection of civil society, offer of economic assistance, enhancing regional cooperation. After all, EU is seeing the conflict as an ancestral rivalry for power

between ethnic communities and as a result is promoting diplomatic means of dealing with it (Siani Davies, 2003: 32, 38).

2.1. The first European assignments

At this point, EU is resorting to the concept of *negotiated peace*, monitoring the region, trying to internalize the conflict. The sharpening of the problem is increased by the Russia's claiming of some vital interest in its nearest vicinity. Furthermore, the cessation of hostilities takes place through the concluding of the "Moscow Agreement" (14 May 1994), a success that gives Russia a dual role in the conflict: co-mediator and participant, being able to ascertain the entrance of Georgia into the Commonwealth of Independent States and the opening of some military bases on the Georgian territory (Danilov, 1999).

In what concerns the Union, it is true that at the beginning it did not had a clear strategy for the South Caucasus but it has been involved in the conflict from its start off. Even if not as a unique entity at least the Union was present through its members: Great Britain, France as permanent members in the United Nations Security Council, other member states send personnel in the *United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia*. Unfortunately, from 1992 to 1999, the voice of the Union was divided between the Union from the *Group of Friends* (France, Great Britain, Germany, USA and Russia) (MacFarlane, 1999) and the Union that was giving financial assistance through the programmes of the European Commission. Secondly, we remember that no sooner than Maastricht the *Common Foreign and Security Policy* was institutionalized and that in the same period the Union was more focused on the Balkan's matters of its own territory. However, the strengthening of EU's external dimension, of its defence dimension, determines a much more profound involvement of it in the region of the conflict. In addition, the European innovation is based on the proposal of a "Stability Pact for the South Caucasus" (Coppieters, 2004: 18-19). Why this pact was not accomplished can be explained through the fact that it could be carried out only after closing a political agreement establishing the status of each participant in the conflict. There was no kind of such agreements at that time thus the expected Pact was repealed.

2.2. European Union's conditionality approach

Despite all the shortcomings the situation is saved by the "Partnership and Cooperation Agreements". The *Partnership and Cooperation Agreement* is an "entry-level" accord which aim is not EU membership but the enhancement of the relations between the contractors through mutual cooperation (Cremona, Melona, 2007: 11). Such an agreement was signed between the Union and Georgia and entered into force on 1 July 1999. The partnership itself promotes political dialogue, the strengthening of Georgian democracy, economic development, liberal economy and legislative, economic, financial, social, cultural and technological cooperation. The agreement was institutionalized through the creation of some implementation bodies: the Cooperation Council at a ministerial level formed by representatives from the Council of the European Union, the European Commission, the Georgian government and a series of Cooperation Committees (Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, 1999: 23-26). The *Partnership and Cooperation Agreement* is the communitarian approach of promoting negotiated peace, bringing the political actors to the table of overtures and monitoring the area, the agreement being in fact a contract between EU and Georgia with shared rights and obligations.

Georgia becomes important for the Union for various reasons either geopolitical (energy axis) or humanitarian. What determined the raise of the level of involvement in the conflict is represented by the Georgian domestic situation. 2003 is the year of grace. In

November 2003, after the *Rose Revolution*, the authoritarian leader Edward Shevardnadze resigned and the new government under Mikhail Saakashvili began the consolidation of the Georgian state (Lynch, 2006: 23-25, 27-31). The democratization of the state could not be abandoned by the Union so this is getting more and more implicated in the area, an engagement based on a policy of integration from a regional point of view, the emphasis being put on the regional identity. EU intuited well that the closeness of ethnic communities at regional level was much more valuable than a centralized proximity at national level. This new policy is advanced by the appointment on 7 July 2003 by the Council of an *EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus* in the person of the Finnish diplomat Heikki Talvitie. He was followed in 2006 by the Swedish ambassador Peter Semneby. Both were responsible for the development of contacts with governments, parliaments, judicial and civil societies of the former soviet states and primarily to assist at the conflict resolution process and to facilitate the negotiation's mechanisms (Council Decision 449, 2010: 1).

Between 2003 and 2006 EU used its new instruments and capabilities under the auspices of the *European Security and Defence Policy*. Much more concerned about settle the conflict through humanitarian assistance and judicial reforms in order to ease the implementation of future European decisions, EU sets up the first civilian mission in the frame of the European Defence Policy, a mission regarding the rule of law. As a result, on 16 July 2004 is established the *EU Mission Rule of Law in Georgia*, EUJUST Themis (Council Joint Action, 2004: 1-4). The main objectives of this mission which was compound of 8 European experts leaded by the judge Sylvie Pantz regarded: ensuring stability; horizontal governmental strategy for reforming the judicial criminal system; deepening the control and supervision of borders; enhancing security; abolishment of death penalty; intensifying regional and international cooperation (Council Joint Action, 2004: 1-4). The mission which had a budget of € 2.050.000 was finished on 14 July 2005 (Council Joint Action, 2004: 1-4). EUJUST Themis qualified itself as a civilian operation which improved EU's role on the international stage, having much more political features than the other European Commission's programmes. In addition, the European involvement in the cessation of the Georgian-Abkhaz hostilities was based even on the creation on 1 September 2005 of the *EU Special Representative Border Support Team for the South Caucasus* (Council Joint Action, 2006: 1-3). The ending of the OSCE mission "Border Monitoring Operation in Georgia" determined the Union to send experts in border management in order to offer training to the Georgian authorities in attempting to de-escalate tensions at the borders with Abkhazia and even Russia (Lynch, 2006: 65). After closing this kind of missions, EU did not withdraw from the region. Instead it continued to improve its instruments offered by the ENP for Georgia especially those for solving the conflict with the Abkhazians.

On 14 November 2006, for a period of 5 years, is decided and adopted an *Action Plan* that forecasts the fulfilment of some democratic targets – democratisation, political cooperation, economic integration – and which is developed on *8 priority axes*: rule of law; improvement of the business and investment climate and of the privatisation process; sustainable economic development, poverty reduction and social-economic cohesion; cooperation regarding the sectors of justice, freedom, security and integrated border management; regional cooperation; peaceful settlement of internal conflicts; cooperation in the field of foreign policy and security; transport and energy (ENP Action Plan, 2006: 4-12). The priority axis number 6 resorts to possible measures of solving the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict but these are measures without a solid character referring only to:

strengthening the negotiation's mechanisms, confidence building initiatives, increasing the role of the EU Special Representative, demilitarization, multilateral collaboration by including the Georgian problem in the political dialogue EU-Russia. On the other hand, it must be stressed the fact that Georgia is the only country in the ENP that has its intrastate conflicts as a priority axis in its *Action Plan*.

The *Action Plan* is monitored by the European Commission through annual reports, by the Georgian government and by organizations of the civil society but the legitimate monitoring belongs to the Commission's documents. The *Action Plan* is more likely a compromise, a negotiated document that ascertains a particular nuance of property in the neighbourhood (Overhauss, Maull, Harnisch, 2006: 10). The reforming and developing policies required are considered at Community level "sovereign responsibility" (Cremona, Melona, 2007: 25). In other words, the Union does not behave as a hegemon that imposes new norms and rules but it is moreover a partner that holds the enforcement of communitarian norms. Georgia proved itself to be a country that willingly opted for the developing and deepening of cooperation for the integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures. The *conditionality* used in the ENP does not grant EU membership perspectives but tries to draw up a plan on long term for the legislative implementation of the EU's acquis of the internal market (Blockmans, Lazowski, 2006: 49). Beside conditionality, influence or persuasion EU resorts to the mechanism of the *normative passive imposition* (Cremona, Melona, 2007: 33). Put differently, the Union will continue to develop relations of cooperation only when the norms regarding the rule of law of an agreement are considered to be completely fulfilled.

2.3. European Union's soft assistance

In 1999-2004, EU financed with € 110 million the *Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States Programme* (TACIS) based on institutional, social and rehabilitation reforms implemented through regional programmes like: the *Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia* (TRACECA) and the *Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe* (INOGATE) (Commission Delegation in Georgia). 2007 was marked by the enhancement of the ENP by the creation of the *European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument* (ENPI) with a budget of € 12 billion for 2007-2013 (Regulation, 2006: 4-13). This is in fact another dimension of the communitarian involvement in the conflict namely by rehabilitating the civil society and the humanitarian sector hardly wronged by violent hostilities. The rehabilitation of the conflict zone is done through access to programmes and projects like: TACIS, the *Food Security Programme*, the *EU Humanitarian Office*, the *European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights*, the *Macro-Financial Assistance*, the *Rapid Reaction Mechanism*, the *Donors Conference* (€ 132 million in 2008), the *Instrument for Stability* (a flexible tool of dealing with political instability, migration, asylum, visas), Twinning (public administration), *Technical Assistance and Information Exchange* (TAIEX), SWAP (sector based projects) (ENP Country Strategy Paper Georgia: 16-18).

In what concerns supporting refugees, internal displaced persons, especially from regions like Gali, Zugdidi, Ochamchira, Tkvacheli or from Abkhazia the aid is based on the *Reconstruction Relief and Rehabilitation Programme*, the *Decentralized Cooperation Programme* or the *Confidence Building Programme* (Commission Delegation in Georgia).

3. Reaction to previous challenges

EU proved concern towards the Russian-Georgian war from August 2008. On brief, the European reaction was a unitary and compact one. On 15 September 2008 was

decided the *EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia* (EUMM), a civilian mission that was deployed on 1 October 2008. Having as goal the monitoring of the completion of the agreements from 12 August, respectively 8 September 2008, EUMM looked mainly for the withdrawing of Russian and Georgian troops, the respect of human rights and liberties and the protection of minorities. The EUMM is an autonomous, civilian mission without executive authority. However, coordinated by the German ambassador Hansjörg Haber, the mission covers the entire Georgian territory therefore even South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Council Joint Action, 2008: 1-6). European states are taking part especially with personnel in this mission with a mandate of 1 year extended twice, in 2009 and in 2010 up until 14 September 2011 (Council Decision 452, 2010: 1-5).

The Russian unilateral recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states (26 August 2008) reinforces the necessity of a European neighbourhood policy in a region constrained by a conflict of interests that results in the conversion of a pro-European Georgia into a "risk country" (Verluise, 2008). For that reason we can assert that the *Eastern Partnership* launched on 7 May 2009 at the Prague Summit represents a vital mark in the new European policy towards this Eastern region taking into account the fact that after the Summit in a certain degree we can talk about a Russia left without the energy-economic "veto". Consequently, being the only "neutral" international actor in the region – the United Nations decided to finish its Observatory Mission in June 2009 – EU must accomplish the Rose Revolution's expectations. Georgia is an important neighbour, is a country with energy transit potential and represents a barrier against a possible wave of terrorism being one of the most noteworthy test-case for EU.

4. Conclusions

Georgia emerges as a country that depends more upon the external context of the international community. We can assert that Georgia is reliant in a certain measure on the involvement of foreign actors because, excepting the domestic situation, it is an important geopolitical player in the Caucasus region. Georgia is a peaceful country that does not have any external claims in its vicinity. Beside the fact that it is an enclave, Georgia sees its security threatened. The erosion of this is developing much more inside its borders. In this situation, Georgia seems caught in a geopolitical circle from which it can not escape from the influence of its neighbours but it can not let go to Abkhazia.

The Georgian-Abkhaz conflict develops in a hostile atmosphere. We saw that it is an ethnic, political, territorial, economic conflict but definitely it is not a religious one. The dispute regards two different nationalist concepts: the Georgian exacerbated nationalism faced with the Abkhazian claims for independence. For that reason, both sides need support in order to restore a post-conflict situation pretty disastrous. Georgia is not already a true democratic model but is on an ascending rode of reconstruction, the Georgian aspirations being pro-European.

EU asserts itself by getting involved in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict as a normative entrepreneur that promotes a decisional matrix that takes into consideration the actual estate of affairs (Goldstein, Pevehouse, 2008: 172-173). The success of imposing its *civilising mission* assumed as a pattern of quasi-perfect peace remains questionable knowing that EU does not completely enter the territory of a universal policeman, role held in this moment by the United Nations. Considering it to be *a community of security* EU bets on *a peace through interdependence* (Miroiu, Ungureanu, 2006: 243-244) resorting to its *soft power*. The *soft power* consists in EU's capacity of influencing the others to wish what it has, promoting the co-opting technique (Nye, 2003: 8). The

persuasion used by the Union is a mean of this *soft power* confirmed even by the former Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, B. Ferrero-Waldner, who emphasised the importance of constant development of the communitarian soft dimension: "It is true that our principal source of power – our power of attraction – is *soft* rather than hard. But it is no less potent. If we look at the likely shape of the world in 50 years, the ability to deploy considerable soft power will be vital... Diplomacy requires carrots as well as sticks, whether we are talking about weapons of mass destruction or promoting stability and prosperity in our neighbourhood... Our soft power promotes stability, prosperity, democracy and human rights, delivering concrete results in the fight to eradicate poverty and in achieving sustainable development" (Ferrero-Waldner, 2006). On the other hand, the *hard power* at European level based on means more or less coercive remains still reduced to the conditionality policy. Both dimensions of power are found implemented in the South Caucasus region especially in the resolution process of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict.

The EU's involvement must be considered – on the certainties encompassed – only on long term otherwise we can easily fall in the trap of declining the role of the Union as an important actor in the conflict. In addition, we must take into account the fact that the difference between the European policies and those of the other actors resorts in the fact that even if the fight for regional power can be found at communitarian level this fight does not lead any policy but instead becomes subordinated to a complex network of institutional and interdependent nodes. The Community's force lies in the instruments of foreign policy which are capable to steer democratic norms, values, standards over its frontiers. The recognition of EU as an actor supposes the reference to EU through its impact had on others (Buzan, Wæver, 2003: 33). As a result, if EU is considered a power then it gains this status regardless all ambiguities related to its political situation. For that reason, EU's involvement appears valuable knowing that EU manages to intervene not only economically but even politically, the emphasis being put more and more on the region and not on the states as individual actors. Moreover, European Commission's *Progress Report* from May 2010 sustains the improvement of the Georgian-Abkhaz situation by the maintenance of a climate of stability.

Overall, EU in its attempt to protect its external borders forwards a process of controlling a destabilized periphery. The efforts are focused and are based on the instruments developed especially by the ENP. EU seems that does not undertake something in order to implement democracy in its neighbourhood more likely EU deploys itself as a rod of attraction from all points of view.

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THE SPECIALIZATION OF LABOR JURISDICTION THROUGH AUTONOMOUS BODIES IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN BRITAIN

Lavinia ONICA-CHIPEA [*]

Abstract. *This paper presents the most important aspects which confer the labor jurisdiction in the UK the quality of specialized jurisdiction. The experience, especially the results, can and should be an important milestone for the Romanian legislator, in the attempt to create a specialized labor jurisdiction in the Romanian legal system too.*

Keywords: *Jurisdiction, UK, Romanian, Tribunals, Judicial System*

1. General considerations on the specialization of labor jurisdiction through autonomous bodies

Specialized courts are modern forms of employment litigation which in recent years have gained an ever wider audience. The advantage of these jurisdictions is that they submit the dispute to some relevant factors that have specialized training recognized and can, therefore, provide maximum accuracy and efficiency that gives solutions. Specialized courts may be, in turn, of two kinds, namely: organ specialized in labor jurisdiction existing in German and English systems of law enforcement jurisdiction and that the work included in the judicial system of common law, found in systems as in France, Italy, Poland.

2. The history of labor regulations in the UK jurisdiction

The origins of legal regulations on labor jurisdiction in Britain are linked to the affirmation of union workers, the economic, social and political plan (Călinoiu, 1998: 52, 53). A century ago, members of trade unions were recognized certain immunities, including damage caused as a result of economic effects of strikes and pickets during the conduct of strikes have also become legal.

The laws regarding employment in 1980 and 1982 established a balance between rights and responsibilities in industrial relations. Thus, Act 1980 empowers the government to support greater use by secret ballot elections for trade unions and provide a code of practice intended to promote good industrial relations. Also it was limited the right to install pickets from their job and was restricted to secondary action, such as sympathy strikes.

Act 1982 increased the compensation for unlawfully dismissed workers, union members or non-members and introduced compensation from government funds for certain categories of workers redundant. Also included were considered illegal clauses in certain contracts, that the operation would discriminate against members of trade unions

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[*] PhD Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Humanities, University of Oradea, Romania.

and workers who lacked this quality. Union position of complete immunity from any action was removed, however, matters referred retain immunity, but only actions in support of a term regarded as lawful.

Unions Law in 1984 was promoted by the government in order to strengthen the democracy among unions. Under its provisions, all voting members of the main trade union executive committees will be elected by secret ballot. It also provided legal immunity to those unions call strike or industrial action that triggers without such a procedure is approved by a majority.

3. The Dispute Settlement Mechanism

3.1. *Employment tribunals*

Called "industrial tribunals" in 1998 pending ERDRA, employment tribunals (or courts for industrial relations work in Northern Ireland) were established in 1964 in order to address employee appeals against the plans set by the Industrial Training Act (Deakin, Morris, 2005: 76). In 1965 their jurisdiction was extended to cover new claims for statutory redundancy payments newly introduced. Industrial Relations Act 1971 gave courts a central role in the area of labor disputes by introducing safeguards against illegal dismissal and thus their jurisdiction was extended progressively to a wide range of employment issues. Of all actions to the courts work, occupy the largest share those involving appeals against dismissal illegal (33% of applications in 2003-2004), also a significant amount of request to these courts aim complaints about unauthorized deductions income (approximately 18% of applications in 2003-2004) (Employment Tribunals Service, 2004: 4).

Employment tribunals jurisdiction extends also to the statutory rights can be exercised against the union in relation to discipline, exclusion or expulsion from membership. However the work jurisdiction of the courts was always excluded collective disputes, whose solution belongs to specific organs of conciliation and arbitration.

Employment tribunals have no power to mandatory. Thus, they may return to work have an employee illegally fired, although that provision is mandatory. Penalty against an employer who refuses to apply such a provision is additional compensation paid to the plaintiff. Also, employment tribunals are not competent to rule on financial issues, so if a prize has not been paid, the applicant may appeal to a tribunal complaint territorial.

Between 2003-2004 a total of 115,000 applications to the courts work, 68% have come to be resolved, either because they have been resolved by conciliation (It offers home) or by withdrawal, for example as a result of a private understanding.
 The constitution and procedure followed in the courts of work are governed by ETA in 1996 and by statutory regulations. In England and Wales there are 21 employment offices of the courts but hearings may be held in temporary locations. From April 1996 the administrative support for tribunals work and EAT (Employment Appeal Tribunal) is provided by the service employment tribunals (ETS), an executive agency of the Department of Trade and Industry.

Unlike ordinary courts, employment tribunals have a tripartite structure (Leş, 2002: 346-347). Their president is a professional lawyer (barrister or solicitor), which was described at least seven years and is appointed by the Lord Chancellor, he is assisted by two assessors appointed by the Secretary of State in matters of employment, trade unions proposal and employers. While the President is to control the conduct of the whole

procedure, assessors they can intervene and vote on which it expresses is equal to the President, in all cases. Also, when dealing with their position is independent, they do not action as representatives of their organizations.

In practice, most decisions are taken unanimously. Before 1993, presidents of courts could hear cases without the participation assessor only in limited circumstances, such as temporary problems. After 1993, Turer extended the jurisdiction of the president, including for example cases of unauthorized deductions from payments, insolvency, employer rights, etc. Even if the settlement of cases by the president alone determines substantial savings, to relieve system using members' experience, which in many instances is significant.

Referral to employment tribunals are conducted, usually within three months from the date on which the incident occurred, although in some cases can be accepted and applications outside that period.

Employment tribunal secretary send a copy of the complaint received employer, who shall have 28 days to reply whether they intend to dismiss the complaint and if so what are the reasons invoked. Procedure, whereby the parties are actually encouraged to try to resolve their internal problems first by is borrowed from ACAS, the conciliation officers have a duty which, for most applications, seek to promote understanding between parties without the need for a court hearing.

As I mentioned, one of the cases are settled by conciliation through ACAS or withdrawal. Arrangements made under the auspices of the conciliation officer and recorded in a form suitable unable to reach a court hearing. Turer 1993 introduced a "compromise agreement" as a new mechanism to achieve reconciliation. To be effective, the applicant must have received "independent advice" on a qualified lawyer, able to assume a possible failure. ERDRA 1998 extended provisions to mean that counsel must come to a "relevant independent advisor", a category that includes well as lawyers, officers, employees or officials of independent trade union members, whose union gave written competent to give advice, or even people who work in counseling (whether employees or volunteers) that the center has certified or approved. If these people are employed, or those acting for the employer, or an employers' association may not have that quality.

Preliminary issues such as whether the tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the case, can be determined from an examination before the hearing and whether such application can be stopped at this point.

The possibility that the court in determining whether or not a party to request a deposit, and especially its value must be taken into account the means available to that party. If requested the deposit is not paid within 21 days and asked no extension of time nor granted the request and the response will be rejected.

If the complaint is upheld, the court sets a date for hearing the parties will have to present evidence.

Discussions are usually public, but the possibility exists that, for example, at the request of the Ministry, discussions take place in secret whenever necessary in the interest of national security. Also, the court itself may decide that public debate is not whether the evidence consists of information whose disclosure would cause substantial damage to the parties, in particular employer.

The president of the tribunal may give guidance on any issue that arises in connection with the proceedings, including requiring a party to give information, to require disclosure and inspection of documents, assisting witnesses and produce

documents (Deakin, Morris, 2005: 80). Also, the chairman or tribunal shall seek to avoid formality in the proceedings taking place, not bound by any rule of evidence relating to the administration. Investigation, hearing persons who appear in court, that witness will be made as President considers appropriate to clarify some aspects of the case.

As I mentioned, parties to the proceedings may be represented by a person of their choice. He stands as important to flatten the differences between the representation of employees and employers in proceedings before the tribunal. In 1987, the Courts Report of Labor Justice stresses that: "If individual disputes arising in relation to employment (employment), the employee is usually in a position lower than the employer. An employer corporation will normally have a personnel department and most likely hired a lawyer with considerable experience in court proceedings. It is possible that the employer is more capable than the staff to communicate with the court office to find witnesses to produce evidence necessary. Also, if you need to deal with external legal representative employer is more capable and allow it. "

Finally, the reasons must be presented in the proceedings before the tribunal. They have shown, in general, orally and in writing but if a party so requests or if written reasons are required by the EAT. Written reasons must contain problems tribunal or chairman has identified as relevant for application, if identified problems have not been determined and why the law applicable to the case, etc.. If a party wishes to make a call to EAT, it must do so 42 days from the date on which written reasons were sent to the parties or the date on which the written record of the trial was sent to the parties.

Courts may order payment of compensation and restoration of rights of the parties (e.g the employee back into work has been dismissed without good reason). Proceedings before employment tribunals are free, so cost does not imply parties unless they are represented by lawyers.

3. 2. *Employment Appeal Tribunal*

The labor court decisions may be appealed before a tripartite parties EAT (Employment Appeal Tribunal) but only questions of law, considering the facts were finally established in the first instance (Călinoiu, 1998: 54). EAT was established under the Employment Protection Act (1975), replacing the National Industrial Relations Court (Nirca) created by Industrial Relations Act of 1971.

EAT has limited original jurisdiction under EPLLCR TIGER 1999 and 2004. That court has the same powers as the High Court, on receipt and examination of witnesses, document production and analysis of problems and incidents with jurisdiction. In solving a call, EAT may determine if the problem itself and to submit the same or another employment tribunal differently constituted to decide in light of current legislation.

EAT has a location in London although it may carry on business anywhere. As I mentioned, like employment tribunals, EAT has a tripartite structure, consisting of a judge and members who are not lawyers with special knowledge or experience in industrial relations, but representatives of employers and workers. Members are appointed by the Queen on the recommendation of Secretary of State in matters of employment and chancery. A call is normally heard by a judge and two members appointed, which although it gives the legal issues may even vote against the judge. The judge may hear the case only when it is provisional issues and can normally hear the appeal only if it is the original decision was taken in the absence of members appointed tribunal president.

It appears that the number of appeals is relatively small compared with French practice. EAT decisions have force of judicial precedent although labor courts tend to

grant them this value. In England and Wales, EAT decisions may form, with the latter's authority, subject to appeal before the Court of Appeal (Leş, 2002: 344) or an appeal to the Lords.

3.3. *Reform employment tribunals*

Reforms of labor dispute resolution system to the English had different purposes, one of which refers to reducing the number of cases referred to the courts work, by encouraging parties to resolve disputes through alternative means.

ERDRA Act of 1998 began this process, first giving power of a home to prepare the scheme, which was to be subject to approval by the Secretary of State for employment, in order to resolve disputes through arbitration illegal dismissals. Thus, ACAS shall appoint an arbitrator from a panel of persons chosen for their practical knowledge and experience to work on work discipline and dismissal. Recourse to arbitration is voluntary but excludes recourse to an employment tribunal in this matter. Arbitration aims to answer the question whether the dismissal was lawful or unlawful, the judge can request assistance with a legal adviser appointed by ACAS, if disputed issue is related laws. The parties must cooperate fully with the referee process for the process to complete. Once the arbitration decision may be appealed to the employment tribunal, which may invalidate or how often the procedure or the decision itself are considered to have caused or will cause an injustice to the complainant (Deakin, Morris, 2005: 85). Awards held in private and their decisions are confidential, although ACAS may publish general information, summary, without identifying individual cases

Employers are required by law to establish procedures for resolving labor disputes, as pre-submission stage before an employment conflict. Failure procedures for resolving conflicts at work may constitute grounds for rejecting complaints by courts seized. Failure of internal procedures may reduce by up to 50% of compensation that may be granted by an employment tribunal.

Employers are obliged to inform employees on appropriate procedures for resolving conflicts at work, these provisions constitute a necessary component of individual employment contracts or written of information that employers must provide employees within two months after birth ratios work.

Employees and their employers should make every endeavor to resolve labor disputes to be submitted to an employment tribunal. In the first instance, the parties shall attempt by informal conflict resolution through discussion between the employee and his supervisor. If conflict is not resolved in this way, then the formal procedure will be initiated to resolve the conflict.

EA 2002 establishes two types of statutory appeal procedure (GSP) that is a standard procedure applicable to most cases and procedure as applicable in limited circumstances. An appeal is defined as an employee complaint against the action expressed by the employer or the action that it plans to conduct against him. This may relate to: complaints about payment of wages, discriminatory treatment in relation to what is applied by virtue of his membership of the union, illegal dismissal, etc.

The first step of the standard GSP requires the employee to submit the complaint in writing and send the original or a copy of the employer.

The employer must invite the employee to attend a meeting, for joint discussion of the contents of the appeal (the second step of the procedure). Employees are entitled to be accompanied at these meetings by a colleague or a representative of the union. With the

consent of the employer, employees may be accompanied by representatives of the Citizens Advice Bureau.

If employees are dissatisfied with the measures which were adopted by the employer to settle labor disputes, they have the right to appeal its decision through a letter presenting arguments in this position (third step). Resolution employer is following this final stage, representing the procedure required to resolve the conflict in the workplace.

Modified two-step procedure applies where the employee no longer has that status and the employer is not aware about the injustice caused to the employee before termination of employment or has experienced this but is not standard procedure was started or terminated before the last working day of his employee. Procedure that is so designed to be applied in situations where there is no employment relationship between the two sides, and they have no interest in following the standard procedure, with a common understanding on this issue. Thus, as the procedure has two steps: the first step the employee must submit a written statement or dissatisfaction and send a copy of her employer, the second step requires the employer to make answer in writing and a copy of the response be sent to the employee.

GSP where applicable, the time limit for submitting a complaint employment tribunal is three months from the day that would have expired in specified circumstances. Submitting a request under the GSP is one of the prohibited procedures in two situations, namely: the procedure did not start due to a threat or harassment against a party and that, call the procedure that would not be done without revealing information contrary to the interests of national security.

Based on those matters, concluded that the doctrine remains to consider to what extent the new procedures will be established or contrary impulses will hinder what should be the primary objective of conflict resolution work correctly.

3.4. *Government agencies with responsibilities in the field of labor relations*

Institutions about which we still speak, although government funded, it operates independently.

A. *ACAS (Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service)*

ACAS arbitration service includes counseling and conciliation and performs many functions in the area of labor relations.

State involvement in the processes of conciliation and arbitration dates from the Conciliation Act, 1896. Yet for decades, this function was fulfilled by the Government department charged with responsibility for employment issues. In 1975, on the basis of the Employment Protection Act was set up home in urgent need of creating an independent body for this area.

The service is led by a tripartite board consisting of a chairman and nine members, three of which are appointed by the TUG, three by the CBI and the three are totally separate and independent legal organization. Although ACAS is required to submit annually a report on its activities to the Secretary of State expressly gives its status of independence from ministerial direction.

Service tasks are numerous and are expressed in various forms and assumptions. An important task of his home becomes manifest in an attempt to achieve reconciliation by the parties who have submitted their dispute resolution by an employment tribunal. Conciliation process involves assisting the parties to clarify any misunderstandings and to try to reach consensus, but the terms remain in understanding liability of the parties. Thus,

the Secretary of the tribunal's work sends home a copy of the application to the court, reply or any other relevant documents. In this situation, ACAS tries conciliation officer or on the initiative of a party or on its own initiative to achieve reconciliation of the parties. In general, there is a period longer or shorter it can attempt conciliation parties of 13 or 7 weeks respectively. Parties may refuse to cooperate in the conciliation process, although their service is free and for talks with the conciliation officer are confidential.

Benefits of resolving conflict by withdrawing the conciliation stage are undeniable for both system itself, such as reducing the costs of process and especially for parties, confidentiality, ability to determine terms of understanding themselves, etc.

Another important task of the institution relate to conciliation in collective disputes. In this regard, ACAS facilitates union disputes by conciliation or at the request of the parties, either on its own initiative. The procedure is conducted in such a situation is voluntary, meaning that allows parties to withdraw at any stage of its deployment. Before offering their services at home you need to consider the desirability of encouraging parties to use means available for negotiation or understanding of the problems are inconsistent. Based on the finding that a relatively large percentage of all complaints resulted in conciliation agreement, the doctrine (Deakin, Morris, 2005: 94) makes a suggestive comparison between the success rates of collective conciliation and reconciliation of the individual concerned. Thus, if the collective conciliation, the parties realize that competition is more expensive alternative, the reconciliation of individual based on whether they have to get over conciliation and to seek redress before a court.

Where conciliation procedure that has been exhausted and failed or did not seem to succeed, ACAS may appoint a mediator, independent expert to try to resolve the dispute. However, this can be done at the request of one or more parties and they all must agree to it. Conciliation differs from mediation in that a mediator may make recommendations to the parties himself, although the parties remain responsible to resolve details of any agreement. Parties reach agreement after mediation is not binding unless the parties have expressly indicated their plans.

Arbitration may be conducted by a person called home, regardless of service or arbitrary by the Central Committee (CAC). The parties agreed deadline for arbitration and the arbitrator's terms of reference. Deployment cost is borne by the ACAS procedure, but the parties shall pay their own costs themselves, and the losing party may be ordered to pay payment. For this reason, legal representation is rare and normally it requires the consent of the arbitrator. The decision may be published if so decides ACAS and the parties agree to it.

Another ACAS's task is to provide counseling and information services. In this regard, ACAS provides advice on issues of industrial relations between employers and their associations, workers and unions, even by telephone or personal visits. If at a time until all services offered in this regard by ACAS were free to charge different fees for this institution exercising its statutory functions. Under its statutory powers, ACAS can perform research on any question relating to industrial relations in general or in particular.

Also, ACAS is empowered to formulate codes of good practice, to promote and improve industrial relations, which will be submitted to the Secretary of State and Parliament. ACAS has a responsibility to appoint independent experts, which are meant to report any complaints about violations of the principle of equal pay for equal work, the employment tribunal application.

B. *Central Arbitration Committee (CAC) was established by the Employment Protection*

Act 1975, as an independent arbitration body in industrial relations. It is a direct descendant of Industrial Court (Industrial Court), created in 1989.

The CAC is composed of a chairman, deputy chairman and other members appointed by the Secretary of State, all persons with experience in industrial relations, some with experience as representatives of employers and others as representatives of workers. Its chairman is currently president of the court. However, for recognition or non-recognition procedures of the CAC is required to form only a tripartite panel, headed by its chairman or a deputy and a member whose experience is as a representative of employers and one member whose experience is as representative of workers.

Together as a voluntary arbitration body, the CAC has jurisdiction to hear and complaints arising from failure by employers of the obligation to disclose information on the procedure of collective bargaining. Thus, in all areas of its jurisdiction, the CAC seeks to adopt a flexible approach in solving problems. Decisions are taken by majority and that majority unless the panel chairman.

Parties may appoint representatives, but there is no requirement to use lawyers.

C. *The certificate officer* is an independent officer with a statutory responsability, performing a wide range of functions related to the trade unions and the employers' associations. He is nominated by the State Secretary after an ACAS consulting. Within its functions the maintaining of the lists with the trade unions and the employers' associations, ensuring that they agree to the fullfiling of the duties they are given; the solving of the claims reffering to the trade unions elections, insuring the surveilance of the procedeengs reffering to the trade unions political funds and supervising their functioning. In 1993 the officer was granted controversed powers of investigation of the trade unions financial business.

The proceeding in front of the certificate officer is relatively simple, the officer investigating himself the inquiries he considers appropriate for the case, giving the claimant and the trade union the opportunity to present the case at the hearing. The certificate officer pays the expenses of the claimant and of the witness for assisting to the hearings, if they do not pay the legal costs. If the officer sustains an application, he must give a statement and if this is considered improper an "order of inforcement" will be given, which will request the sindicates to take the specific steps in order to correct the declared failure or to refrain from specific acts in future. The orders of inforcement can be consolidated as if they were the court's orders, making the trade union able to contemplate the event without expressing its consent. Each can appeal against the certificate officer's decision to EAT.

D. *The Commission for equal opportunities (EOC), The Commission for rasial equality (CRE), The Commission for the rifhts of the disabeled persons (DRC)* have the competence to eliminate the discrimination and to promote equal opportunities in their jurisdictions. These commissions have been created through Sex Discrimination Act (1975), Race relations Act (1976) and Disability Rights Commission Act (1999) and each consists of 15 members appointed by the State Secretary.

The decisions emitted by the institutions mentioned above are equally submitted to the judiciary control, a fact which generated considerable constraints on their activities.

3. Conclusions

Labor Jurisdiction English law system is so specialized jurisdiction, individual conflict resolution work being carried out by independent bodies that employment tribunals competent in first instance and Court of Appeals for the employment (Employment Appeal Tribunal), which resolves appeals but only for matters of law, declared against the decisions of the tribunal.

Specialized courts have a tripartite structure is composed of a professional a lawyer (barrister or solicitor), which was described at least seven years, as chairman of the tribunal and that a professional judge, if the Court of Appeal for employment issues and judges, representatives of employers and workers. We believe that emphasis should be here given assessor deliberative role as participants in labor disputes to courts, a role which it must be established and legal assistance to participate in panels that address labor cases, the Romanian legal system. We agree with the doctrinal opinion (Ţiclea, 2007: 962; Ştefănescu, 2007: 732) which considers that the Romanian majority vote of those participating in advisory dispute resolution procedure is insufficient and unjustified work and examples of comparative law joins these arguments.

One of the most important reforms of the system for resolving labor disputes in the UK in mind, as I said reducing the number of cases referred to the courts work, by encouraging parties to resolve disputes through alternative means. Mentioned laws establish both informal procedures established by the parties of employment, the employer generally hilly and official procedures, even with the participation of government institutions, and Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service. The important role given amicable settlement of disagreements arose between the parties employment relationship is considered a milestone for Romanian legislature, which will need to consider the approach begun but unfinished work of specialized jurisdiction, including experiences of comparative law.

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DUAL CITIZENSHIP GRANTED TO HUNGARIAN ETHNICS. CONTEXT AND ARGUMENTS

Mircea BRIE[*] **István POLGÁR**[**]

Abstract: *Citizenship represents the permanent legal and political relationship that exists between the state and the individual. Citizenship is often defined in terms of legislation and accompanying political debates, far from the realities experienced by citizens.*
Due to the lack of uniformity between laws of different countries regarding the criteria for granting citizenship, an individual can be found in a position to have more than one citizenship or in a position where his/her right to citizenship is denied. We are facing a citizenship conflict that bears the concept of multi-nationality or even of statelessness.

Keywords: *citizenship, society, Romania, Hungary, perception*

The concept of "citizenship" is characterized by a great complexity, with a three-dimensional valence and it basically refers to the issue of belonging to a community. The first dimension of this concept is focused on the legal status as defined by the civil, political and social rights. As legal and political status, the citizenship is a set of rights and freedoms that the state grants to its citizens, a balance between rights and duties, a civil contract between the state and the individual – as a subject of law, legal rules that define membership to a political body, the citizen's loyalty toward the state that protects him and grants him civic rights, access to public life and civic participation (O'Byrne, 2003: 5-10).

In this context, the citizen is a legal person, free to act in accordance with the law and entitled to claim protection of the law.

The second dimension involves the possession by the citizens of a status of political agent, participating actively in the activity of political institutions of the political society. Not least, the notion of "citizen" makes reference to membership of a political community that provides a distinct source of identity (Heater, 2004 188-191).

How T. H. Marshall[1] sees citizenship is fully conventional. First, he states that citizenship comes as a status attached to those community members possessing full rights, equals in terms of rights and liberties resulting from it. Marshall adds that different societies will assign different rights and different responsibilities to the citizen status, as there is no universal principle that may determine those rights and responsibilities which are particularly required by the citizenship, in general. It is the very fact that Marshall

[*] PhD., Lecturer, Department of International Relations and European Studies, Faculty of History, Geography and International Relations, University of Oradea, Romania. E-mail: briedri@hotmail.com

[**] PhD., Lecturer, Department of International Relations and European Studies, Faculty of History, Geography and International Relations, University of Oradea, Romania. E-mail: isti_polgi@yahoo.com

[1] Thomas Humphrey Marshall (1893-1981), English sociologist, known for his essay collection on citizenship and social classes

goes beyond the conventional idea, i.e. the membership of a community is predominantly a political matter, that it contributes greatly to the study of citizenship. He identifies three distinct parts or elements of citizenship: civil rights, political rights and social rights (Beşteliu, 1997: 147).

The most important aspect of Marshall's theory on citizenship might be that he addresses directly and explicitly the issue of the relationship between citizenship and social class. Marshall notes that the development of modern citizenship institutions has coincided with the rise of capitalism. He regards this as an anomaly because, while capitalism creates class inequality between individuals, citizenship is a status that allows its possessors to enjoy same rights and responsibilities. Therefore, Marshall concludes that "it is natural to expect that the impact of citizenship on the social class would take the form of a conflict between opposite principles". The description of this relationship is particularly convincing as Marshall succeeds in explaining the apparently opposite effects without falling in contradiction (Barbalet, 1998: 22).

Mobility of individuals and development of societies lead to the concept of "multiple citizenship", allowing people to be citizens of more than one country simultaneously (Tilly, 1996: 14-17). Each state is competent to establish, by national law, conditions for granting citizenship. The effects of citizenship as compared to other countries from the international community may be limited by norms of international law.

Citizenship becomes even more complicated because, in time, a number of features will arise, such it is the case of "dual citizenship" - the legal situation in which a person possesses at the same time citizenships of two different states (http://www.euroavocatura.ro: 2011). This brings us to the main concept of this paper, with a note that we will address this concept at a much more pragmatic level.

The basic principle of nationalism is the fact that each nation must create a nation-state, which, as its name says, must encompass the entire nation. In theory, this principle might work, but it is difficult to implement. The so-called nation-states created after World War I and the fall of the great European empires, especially the Austro-Hungarian Empire, failed to meet this principle. The interdependence of the various ethnic communities living within the empire prevented them from reaching their objective, namely to create a nation-state for each community. The emergence of minorities in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe created room for revisionist policies and proliferation of ethnic nationalism, which is based on cultural mobilization. This is the particular distinction between the one who belongs to the community, and the one who does not correspond to common features of language, religion and culture.

After losing much of its territory, the new Hungarian state made a priority from protecting "Hungarians from everywhere". Currently, when the period of aggressive nationalism has faded away, the protection of Hungarians in other countries relates to providing facilities for maintaining living contact with the Hungarian state, but especially to prevent assimilation. In 2010, the Hungarian government adopted the law granting dual citizenship to Hungarians in other countries, who could prove their Hungarian ancestry and who spoke the Hungarian language. This was an addition to the law on benefits granted to ethnic Hungarians living in neighboring countries of Hungary, adopted in 2001. Initially it included some important benefits for ethnic Hungarians, such as employment opportunities, social services and public health insurance.

The attempt to protect the ethnic Hungarians was seen as a counterbalance to the troubled history that the Hungarian community has had. At the same time, it was perceived as an attempt to preserve the cultural identity intact. This discussion may seem

outdated already, in the context of EU enlargement to the east and at a time when it is believed that the nationalist discourse has been put behind.

Is dual citizenship a right, or a privilege granted to Hungarians in other countries? The protection issue of Hungarians from everywhere raises both nationalist reactions, and political responses. This paper addresses the politicization of these nationalist reactions within both Hungarian domestic politics, and domestic politics in countries that have a significant Hungarian minority. In addition, the integration of this situation in the unifying context of the European Union must also be addressed.

Hungarian Status Law, the precursor of dual citizenship

The efforts to protect the Hungarian community from everywhere are explained by the specific of the Hungarian community. The extent of this community living outside Hungary's borders is "unusually high, even for Europe"; about a quarter of the ethnic Hungarians total live in Hungary's neighboring states (Kovacs, Toth Kin, 2009: 159). Most ethnic Hungarians live in Romania (about 1.7 million), in Slovakia, (about 600,000), in Ukraine (about 135,000) and in Serbia (about 350 thousand) (http://news.bbc.co.uk: 2011). Thus, given the size of ethnic Hungarian community, its protection is regarded as a priority for the Hungarian authorities in Budapest. The irredentism that had manifested in public discourse, even up toward the '90s, was considered a possible solution to prevent assimilation of Hungarians living in the neighboring countries. But the prospect of accession to the European Union has mitigated these claims, and the desire for action in favor of minorities turned into a political initiative, called the Hungarian Status Law (Stewart, 2009: 14). It was adopted in 2001, despite heated political debates and international protests (Kovacs, Toth Kin, 2009: 155).

The result of this law was the introduction of a specific certificate for ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia, Romania, Ukraine, Slovenia, Serbia and Croatia.

The Hungarian Status Law defines a number of cultural, economic and political objectives. At the cultural level, the law aims to preserve the national identity of Hungarians beyond the borders, while at the economic level, the law plans to improve their living standards. These objectives are framed in the ambiguous idea of "unification of the Hungarian nation" (Stewart, 2009: 15). The problem with the initiative lies in the reaffirmation of ethnic nationalism, based entirely on sharing a language and a religion common to all Hungarians. In a time when Hungary's neighboring states were focused on measures to protect minorities in the context of EU accession, the Hungarian state has reignited a debate of almost an irredentist nature. Furthermore, although it was a law that practically affected citizens of neighboring countries, the status law was a unilateral movement from Hungary to create "a cross-border form of citizenship" (Malloy, 2008: 75). Although not offering direct citizenship, the benefits and privileges enjoyed by holders of this card were initially offered to create a sense of belonging to the Hungarian nation.

Following protests of neighboring states, the law was amended in June 2003. The benefits related to social security, public health services and access to employment were canceled. The amendment to the law stipulates that any benefits will be the result of bilateral agreements between the home country and Hungary. However, they maintained some privileges of Hungarian communities granted in the state of residence, namely providing funding for organizations working to promote the Hungarian language and culture, and tradition of Hungarian identity (Krupper, 2010: 159).

In conclusion, at a symbolic level, the premises of Hungarian citizenship had already existed for ethnic Hungarians living in neighboring states. The Hungarian status

law can thus be considered a precursor of dual citizenship law because it establishes the symbolism of Hungarian citizenship and it institutionalizes it through an official document. However, there was a felt need to strengthen the links between the community from across the borders and the community from the "mother land". These links refer to granting the Hungarian citizenship. The initiative started in 2004, but not even this one was accomplished without protests and objections from both the international space, and the domestic political environment in Hungary.

Adoption and implementation of the law granting dual citizenship

From 1 January 2011, ethnic Hungarians living in other countries can apply for Hungarian citizenship by a simplified procedure, described in the law adopted on 26 May 2010. The law liberalizes the application procedure for Hungarian citizenship as it eliminates the criterion for granting permanent residence in Hungary as a prerequisite to granting citizenship (Szymanowska, 2011). But the right to Hungarian citizenship law is not coupled with the possibility to vote in internal elections in Hungary.

At a first glance, this law seems to be just another move to stimulate the Hungarian community within neighboring Hungarian surroundings. However, the support and preservation of ethnic Hungarians' identity in other countries has been on the political agenda of the Fidesz Party that has recently won elections in the neighboring country. This move was supported by the rightwing Hungarian electorate, thereby decreasing support for the Jobbik Nationalist Party from 17% during the previous election to 7% (Szymanowska, 2011). The Fidesz Party's strategy was therefore to incorporate in their agenda an initiative to boost Hungarian identity and this happened in accordance with a political scenario designed to ensure popular support for electoral victory. In fact, this was the first legislative draft voted by the new Hungarian parliament by an overwhelming majority (http://www.evz.ro[, 2010]). The law entered in force on 20 August, the National Day of Hungary. Thus, the new Hungarian government played the ethnic nationalism card, calling symbolism, history, and emotion in order to keep the Hungarian nation alive, a nation wronged throughout history and in order to contribute to shaping the myth of Hungarian pan-nationalism.

International reactions caused problems for the Hungarian government. Romania, Serbia and Croatia reacted calmly to Hungary's decision. In the case of Romania, this is understandable because Romania has a similar law for Moldovan citizens. It is important to add that the lack of reaction from Romania, however, was predictable, according to an analysis published in The Guardian or the Wall Street Journal. "Since Bucharest, too, handed over discreetly thousands of passports to ethnic Romanians in the Republic of Moldova, which to be clear is not an EU member, Romania will not make much fuss of the dual citizenship law in Hungary" (Traynor, 2011), writes The Guardian. Moreover, the Hungarian Deputy Prime-Minister stated that the Hungarian law is shaped almost entirely following the Romanian law: "Following the Romanian model, we will grant citizenship on a fast-track pace" (http://www.adevarul.ro[, 2010]).

The Hungarian government has thus fended any criticism coming from the European Union by claiming similarity to the Romanian law. Although the Hungarian citizenship for the Hungarian ethnic minority within Romania and Slovakia remains symbolic, as both countries are members of the European Union (Slovakia is also a member of the Schengen area), the communities from Serbia and Ukraine might get Hungarian citizenship because of the possibility of moving freely throughout Europe. Neither Serbia, nor Ukraine had objections to enforcing the law (Szymanowska, 2011).

According to some estimates, during the first three weeks of January about 8,000 applications were recorded in Romania.

Dual citizenship: right or privilege?

Dual citizenship has been interpreted as a step towards a post-national opening of multiple identities and their free movement. Why was the Hungarians' motivation for such a law built on nationalist bases, though? To prove this point it suffices to study the incipit of the amendment for dual citizenship that regulates Hungarian citizenship. It invokes the Hungarian constitution which stipulates that: "The Republic of Hungary has a sense of responsibility for the fate of Hungarians living outside the borders and will promote and strengthen their relations with Hungary". Maintaining relations with Hungary and preserving the Hungarian identity are the reasons for this amendment (http://www.allampolgarsag.gov.hu [2010]). The need to protect the Hungarian identity is achieved though by even the members of the very Hungarian ethnic community, given the known homogeneity of the Hungarian minorities living in countries neighboring Hungary.

Although the current tendency is to disengage citizenship from ethnicity by promoting a civic nationalism based on civic values and on political community, the Hungarian law carries out the opposed operation. The dual citizenship law seeks to combine dual citizenship with ethnicity. Reaffirming the ethnic component in granting citizenship is demonstrated by a statement of the Deputy Prime Minister who claims that the Hungarian nation is subject to assimilation, and the assimilation process can be stopped only by granting citizenship. The same official stated that "the Hungarian nation is a nation with public rights ever since St. Stephen", thus reiterating the myth of the Hungarian nation that transcends the centuries. The problem with this type of statements is that it arouses nationalist sentiments, sentiments that took 90 years to temper. Hungarians who became minorities in the newly created states from Central Europe after World War I had a choice between either the new state citizenship, or relocating to Hungary and, consequently, acquiring the Hungarian citizenship (Kovacs, Toth Kin, 2009: 161-163). Of course, the frontiers of those times were borders separating nations and they were closed. Today, the borders are open, and the discussion shifted to conversing them to links and not divisions. For this reason, the Hungarian law for dual citizenship is not viable in the unifying context of the European Union and in the post-national developments. Besides, the European Union promotes diversity and multilingualism in favor of homogenization and assimilation of minority ethnic communities.

According to the opponents of this law, Hungary must accept that the Hungarians abroad are citizens of other states, and protecting the Hungarian minority must be done within the efforts to strengthen individual and collective rights from the states of residence (Kovacs, Toth Kin, 2009: 161-163). It is thus a new dilemma that is arising: the new Hungarian citizens might consider themselves members of a diaspora, or members of a minority community that has already been enjoying full rights in the state of residence. The success of the initiative affirms the need of the Hungarian minorities, both from the EU Member States, and from Serbia, Croatia and Ukraine, to institutionalize this cultural identity and not necessarily the benefits of obtaining Hungarian citizenship. In addition to this, a fact that demonstrates the Hungarian-Slovak dispute is the discourse on cultural identity and on ethnic nationalism, seen strictly in terms of belonging to a homogeneous community based on culture, language, religion, history. Therefore, granting dual citizenship to Hungarians from "everywhere" could be considered a right in terms of reaffirming the cultural identity of ethnic Hungarians. Although the contemporary society

has proven that the cultural identity does not need a clear label reading "citizen" to be used before the name of ethnicity, the specificity of Hungarian ethnic nationalism requires the assertion of this right.

Granting the right to vote by changing the Hungarian Constitution can turn this right into a privilege, but it would generate a series of internal and external problems. The internal problems would be justified by the fact that those citizens who do not reside in Hungary, and thus they are not directly affected by the outcome of the vote, can influence the outcome of the Hungarian parliamentary elections. On the other hand, the external feedback can generate a new conflict with neighboring countries, especially with Slovakia that proved quite inflexible in dealing with this situation.

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Citizenship represents the permanent legal and political relationship that exists between the state and the individual. Citizenship is often defined in terms of legislation and accompanying political debates, far from the realities experienced by citizens.

The citizen quality must be redefined in the post-socialist context, where it escapes from all definitions given by political elites, mainly because of their inability to guarantee the social rights expected by the citizens.

Due to the lack of uniformity between laws of different countries regarding the criteria for granting citizenship, an individual can be found in a position to have more than one citizenship or in a position where his/her right to citizenship is denied. We are facing a citizenship conflict that bears the concept of multi-nationality or even of statelessness.

Multi-nationality or better said dual citizenship or rather dual statelessness result from obtaining a new citizenship without losing the one of the state of origin.

In conclusion, it should be reiterated that the issue of dual citizenship was raised politically, becoming a useful electoral strategy of the party led by the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orban. Similarly, the Slovak response was political, to problem of cultural identity. Although nationalism was stained with political reactions and intervention, it can be thus proved how viable are the debates on national identity within an increasing talk of post-national state evolution inside the European Union.

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THE SPREAD OF ROMANIAN TELEVISON IN SOME OF THE ROMANIAN COMMUNITIES FROM THE BORDER REGIONS OF THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

Calin-Mircea POPA[*]

Abstract. *In border regions from three neighboring countries, Hungary, Serbia and Republic of Moldavia, we find important Romanian communities that own in their households, TV equipment, some of which are very performant. This television equipment's allows them to a wide variety of TV programs in their mother language (Romanian) that are broadcasted in these countries. A couple of Romanian TV cable companies, came in their support by offering packages of TV satellite dishes so they can have a better reception of TV programs broadcasted in Romania. The two large operators that extended their business abroad, are RCS&RDS through satellite TV DIGI TV, and Romtelecom, with Dolce TV.*

Keywords: *border regions, Romanian TV, mother language, TV cable companies*

1. Community from Hungary

A decade ago, according to data of last census in the neighboring country, the Romanian population was approximately of 8000 persons. But in 2001, there were 7995 Romanians (Erdeli, 2005: 168). The persons that declared their mother language Romanian, was higher - 8.482.

The majority of Romanians that live in Hungary, are in small towns from counties that are on the border with Romania: Bekes, Hajdu-Bihar, Csongrad and Szabolcs-Szatmar-Bereg. The location where we find large communities of Romanians, are around the town of Gyula. This small towns are Micherechi (1.385 inhabitants), Chitighaz (660), Gyula (500), Aletea (201) and others. In Budapest, the nations capital, according to official data, we find around 1205 Romanians (Crasta, 2002).

Lately, there is an interesting phenomena linked to the Romanians from Hungary, which has a spreading tendency. This phenomena is supported by some inside sources of the Romanian community, who says that off the record, the real number of Romanians in Hungary is up to 20.000, maybe even 25.000 persons.

The inside sources, accredit the idea that not all communities have a long history, some of them are formed recently. The explanation for this is, on one hand, the large number of mixt marriage between Romanians and Hungarians, made it possible for them to adapt and live in Hungary. On the other hand, maybe not as significant as the last one, the number of compatriots that decided to settle in the villages on the Romanian-Hungarian border.

[*] Doctoral student, Faculty of Geography, University of Bucharest, Deputy General Director of National TV, teacher at 59th School „Dimitrie Sturdza" Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: calinmircea.popa@yahoo.com

After Romania joined the EU, the fact that we were able to travel in the member states without a visa, gave the possibility to hundreds of Romanian families to settle across the border in villages near the Romanian-Hungarian border. Many Romanians, that live in towns set along the national road that connects the towns of Arad, Chisineu Cris, Salonta, Oradea, Săcuieni, Valea lui Mihai, Carei, Satu Mare, bought houses in the neighboring country, being attracted by the low prices on the Hungarian real estate market. Currently, they commute to their jobs in Romania through the border crossing points from Turnu - Battonya, Vărsand - Gyula, Salonta - Mehkerek, Bors - Artand, Săcuieni - Letavertes, Valea lui Mihai - Nyrabrany or Petea - Csengersima.

To serve as a proof, in villages along European route E79, between Berettyoujfalu and Debrecen, we can see tens of houses that have on their roofs a dish to receive Romanian programs. The satellite dish, on the roofs are branded from cable operators RCS&RDS (Digi TV) and Romtelecom (Dolce TV). In the 2001 census, in none of the villages between the two cites were registered at the that time Romanian persons.

A similar situation, we find in the other direction, in settlements found south of E60, between Oradea and Budapest. We conducted a case study among few Romanian families that settled recently here, in one of the cities along this route Biharkeresztes, from Hajdu-Bihar county.

1.1. Case study: city of Biharkeresztes, Hajdu-Bihar county
The city of Biharkeresztes is located 5 km after entering Hungary, through Bors-Artand customs. This is less than 20 km from Oradea, capital of Bihor county, Romania, located on the left side of European routes E60 and E79 (photo 1).

Photo 1. Entry point form Biharkeresztes and Artand, Hungary (2011)

The settlement is located in a plain area, at approximately 100 m above sea level. According to the census from 2001, the city had a population of 4.237 inhabitants, the majority being Hungarian. In 2001, Biharkeresztes was not listed among the places that have Romanian community[126], despite its close location to the Romanian border. Nowadays, in the City Hall records (photo 2) are listed about 157 Romanian families[127].

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[126] For example, if we look at the table that includes all Romanian population from Hungary, based on settlements, according to the 2001 census, we find places like Darvas, where we have only one Romanian family, Csorvas where we find two families. We can add Nagyleta with three families, Crestor with four, Zsaka with six and so on. Biharkeresztes does not appear in records, therefore according to the cited document, here there was no inhabitant of Romanian nationality.

[127] Statistical Yearbook of Hungary, 2009.

Photo 2. Biharkeresztes City Hall (2011)

According to the questions in a survey addressed to twenty persons from the community, we found out more that 90% of the families that recently moved in Biharkeresztes, are from Oradea or from the metropolitan area of Oradea. The family members that were subject of the case study say that they moved in the Hungarian city, recently, after the two states joined the European Union. (Hungary, 1st of May 2004 and Romania 1st of January 2007).

The survey had two sets of questions. First of them was about the reason of choosing a new home in the neighboring country, but also facts about the job, distance and estimated travel time to the job. The reasons are the following, ordered by their importance:
- 95% of the respond that the real estate prices are much lower in Hungary than in Oradea;
- Other reasons: mixed marriage, speaking fluently Hungarian, high standard of cleanliness;
- distance to work, generally it's not more than 25 km (this is the distance between Biharkeresztes to down town Oradea);
- 70% of the answers - the distance from home to work, most of the times is done with the private car;
- traveling time; usually it's not longer than one hour, including with the time spent crossing the border;
- 70% answered, that their job is in Oradea or at companies located along the route between the border and the town (the rest of the answers, pointed out as a main activity agriculture, in the new home town);

The second set of questions was related to the quality of services that the inhabitants have at their disposal.

In terms of access to Romanian TV programs, the TV habit of the recently settled Romanians, the answers showed the following:
- Romanian TV programs: none offered by the local cable company;
- local or national TV programs, in Romanian language, for the Romanian community in Hungary: M1 and M2 (programs 1 and 2 of Hungarian national TV, Magyar Televizio)[128], with the help of Regional Studio from Szeged (Romanian Editorial);

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[128] Channel 1 of Hungarian National TV, brodcasts every Wensday, from 3 p.m, a show in Romanian, called „Our Screen", produced in the romanian speaking editorial, of the Regional

-   TV channels received from Romania through satellite dish : between 40 and 60, according to the specification's of the equipment and the price of the channel package purchased;
-   televise habits: - working days: 2-4 hours in the evening;
                      - weekends, in the morning and the evening, between three and five hours.

Favorite TV programs:
   - Men - news (Pro TV, TVR 1)
        - sport (Sport.ro, Eurosport, Digisport)
        - movies (Pro TV, Pro Cinema, AXN, HBO)
        - science (Discovery, National Geographic, Viasat Explorer);
   - Women – movies (Diva Universal, AXN, HBO, Acasă TV)
          - entertainment (Antena 1, Pro TV)
          - news (TVR 1, Pro TV, Realitatea TV).

Satellite dish used: Digi TV (from Romanian cable operator RCS-RDS) and Dolce TV (Romtelecom) (photo 3 and 4);

Photo 3. Housedhold equipped with Dolce TV (Romtelecom) to receive Romanian channels (Biharkeresztes, Hungary, 2011)

Photo 4. Group of three households, inhabited by Romanians, on a street in Biharkeresztes, all equipped with satellite dish so they can watch Romanian channels.

Szeged Studio. The show, with a space of time of 26 minutes, is rerunned every Friday, on channel 2 of the Hungarian National TV, at 11.40 a.m. The date of 29th of April 2011, marks 29 years since a TV show in Romanian was broadcasted on the hungarian national television.

2. Community from Timok Valley (Serbia)

According to official data, currently in Serbia live about one hundred thousand Romanians. The communities are located in two regions, on both sides of the Danube river. In Voivodina, north of the Danube, the records show 29.604 persons that speak Romanian, and 30.520 Romanians. In the Central-East Serbia, south of the Danube river and East of Morava water course, all the way up to the Romanian and Bulgarian border, there is a large Romanian community, with 59.729 persons that speak Romanian and 44.110 Romanians. Timor region, has currently a population over 700.000 inhabitants (Erdeli, 2005: 168-175).

Scientists, linguists, geography, historians and members of local communities, say that there are more then 200.000 Romanians. They back-up this fact, with records from the 19th century, when there were around 150.000 Romanians in the region. (a tenth part of the country's total population, respectively the majority of the population in the area).

This argument is supported by the positive population growth in time, among „timoceni" Romanian communities. Also the fact that during the last 150 years, there isn't an increase migration, meaning the Romanians to leave Serbia, strengthens the argument above. According to the 2002 census, we can add the Vlachos, Romanian speaking persons, that are around 40.000 to the total of the Romanian population in Serbia.

Their membership to the Romanian population, was, for a long time denied by the government of Former Yugoslavia. Only in 2007, their membership was acknowledged by the authorities form Belgrade, once they founded the National Council of Romanian National Minorities from Serbia. The elements that were able to help and demonstrate the Romanian origins of Vlachos were the language, the costumes and the folk.

2.1. Case study: Negotin city, Krajina region

According to the data of 2002 census, in Negotin, Krajina region, from the total of 43.551 inhabitants, 7% are Romanian (about 3000 inhabitants). Their main occupation is agriculture, but many families have their support from various family members, that work abroad, in different Western European countries.

In 2006, a crew of journalists from National TV, traveled on site, to document about the works that were made at the Orthodox Church in town. The church was build for the Romanian orthodox population from the area. (photo 5 and 6).

Photo 5. Romanian community, Negotin, Serbia (2006)

With this occasion, we are able to find out that the Romanian population from Negotin, can access TV Channels in Romanian, with home made satellite dish. Some of this are hand made and some made in specialized workshops from the area, belonging to Romanian local entrepreneurs. In this way, for seven hours during every week, the population of Voivodina region, can watch Romanian channels, broadcasted by TV studio of Novi Sad 2[129]. Most of the satellite dishes mentioned above, are pointed to Romania and in this way, the people can receive signal and watch the shows broadcasted by Romanian National TV (TVR) from the regional studio in Timisoara. Also through this way, they can capture the signal of other private Romanian TV stations, that have their high range antennas, placed in many locations from Banat - in Timisoara, Resita, Jimbolia and Sannicolau Mare. Therefore, from border regions of Serbia, they can watch Pro TV, Antena 1, Prima TV and National TV.

In march 2009, the Romanian association "Victoria" (Victory), launched a local TV station, called "Victoria". Therefore, in the last 3 years, many more Romanians from Eastern Serbia, have access to TV programs in theirs mother language. The Victoria TV station, has every day a 3 hour programme, broadcasted in the afternoon and in the evening.

We have to mention, that recently, the communications company RCS&RDS, expanded their business in some of the border regions of Serbia and it appears that they won't stop here. Hence, the ones that live in these regions, will be able to access easily Romanian TV programs, with the help of Digi TV dish.

Photo 6. Romanian community, Negotin, Serbia (2006)

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[4] The main TV show broadcasts every evening at 6.30 p.m.

3. Community of Bessarabia

The population from Bessarabia, in its main, is part of the unitary character of Romanian people. Former Bessarabia is now Republic of Moldavia. In 1995, its population was 4.40 millions, and in 2004, 4.20 millions. The population of Moldavia, is much alike as the population of Eastern Romania (Historical N-E province Moldavia). The Romanian population prevails in the central regions of the Republic of Moldavia, to be more specific in the North-Eastern part of the Central Moldavian Plateau. This are is around, the nation's capital, Chisinau city. We also can add the whole lower basin of Nistru river (Erdeli, 2005: 165-166). (Fig.1).

There are a total of 18 TV stations in the Republic of Moldavia, of which five are Romanian and they broadcast from our country: Pro TV, Realitatea TV, National TV, N24 Plus and Favorit TV.

Beside these, there are 8 Moldavian TV stations, that broadcast in Moldavian and five channels that broadcast exclusively in Russian or Ukrainian.

In terms of national coverage in Moldavia, among the Romanian TV stations, Pro TV is the leader, covering more than half of the country and 60% of the population. But if we look at a hierarchy regarding the territorial and demographic coverage of the 18 TV stations, Pro TV is only half way, on the 9th place. Even though when it comes to nationwide coverage, Pro TV is number nine, but due to its very attractive TV shows, it overcomes the coverage shortcoming being second when it comes to audience (rating). Its number 1 opponent is a private Moldavian TV, called "Prime" During a day, on average, 9 out of 100 Moldavian viewers, watch one of the TV programs on Pro TV.[130]

In the evening, when we have prime-time (between 19.00 and 23.00), the average ratio of Moldavians who prefer the TV programs of Pro TV is 11 to 100 habitants (it maintains its second position). Pro TV has its glory moments, when it is number one in preferences. Every evening, between 20.00 and 23.00, when it is broadcasted "Pro TV Chisinau News", the Romanian TV station from Bucharest, becomes leader of audience, among the urban population that is over 15 years old. In Chisinau, Pro TV is has it's leadership every night for one hour, from 20.00 to 21.00, during Pro TV Chisinau News, after which private TV station "Prime", takes the lead in the audience.

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[5] Data is provided by IMAS institute for Pro TV; it represents the audience of Pro TV in may 2011. The sample for IMAS, to gather the measurements in the neighbouring country, is made out of 1130 person, with an age over 15 years, from Chisinau and 33 other cities.

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V. EVENTS

International conference **"Ethnicity, Confession and Intercultural Dialogue at the European Union Eastern Border"** ***02-05 June 2011, Oradea, Romania***

This international event was organised by the Faculty of History, Geography and International Relations, at the University of Oradea, Romania and it was financed through the Jean Monnet project no. 176197-LLP-1-2010-1-RO-AJM-MO. The project coordinator was Mircea Brie, PhD., Senior Lecturer and the Head of the International Relations and European Studies Department, housed within the Faculty of History, Geography and International Relations. Like all the events organised by the aforementioned Faculty, this conference enjoyed the support from the Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debrecen, "Jean Monnet European Center of Excellence", represented by Professor Ioan Horga, PhD.

The theme "Ethnicity, Confession and Intercultural Dialogue at the European Union Eastern Border" is among the most current issues that have been addressed by scholars and researchers within the European Union and not only. Attendants came from EU member-states, from neighbouring countries that have entered cross-border cooperation programmes with Romania, and not least, from countries of residence of scholars who have an interest on this topic, i.e. Chernivtsi – Ukraine, Balti – Moldova, Chisinev – Moldova, Glasgow – UK, Miskolc – Hungary, Tirnovo – Bulgaria, Cahul-Moldova, Padova – Italy, Durban – South Africa, Calcutta – India, Alicante – Spain, Bath – UK, Vancouver – Canada, Leiden – The Netherlands and of course, Romania.

The conference was organised around three workshops: 1. *Minority and majority in the eastern European area*; 2. *The phenomenon of migration and managing inter-ethnic relations in Europe* and 3. *Ethno-confessional realities in the Romanian area: historical perspectives*. The political integration of ethnic minorities is one of the most challenging

tasks facing the countries of post-communist Europe. The roads to political representation in the mainstream political process are numerous, diverse and not always smooth. National identity factors are tilting the balance as individual and perceived collective well-being have an influence on personal attitudes towards nations and ethnic groups. The European space has been facing ethnic conflicts (not always latent) and geopolitical interests. There is talk nowadays about dual citizenship granted to the Hungarians nationals living outside Hungary. Would these new benefits prevent assimilation? And if we add the context of the European Union enlargement to the east at a time when one could consider the nationalist discourse as being out-dated, what would be the outcome of trying to prevent assimilation? Where would the national identity end in the context of the EU enlargement? Legal rights for the minorities, ethnic-groups, nationals, migration, intercultural dialogue, confessions and "Europeanization" process would be the main ingredients of this international conference.

The event ended with a field trip: a visit to churches of various confessions in Oradea, Romania (Jewish, Roman and Greek Catholic, Protestant - Baptist, Reformed, Lutheran, Orthodox, to name a few).

Given the success of this event, it was agreed that similar conferences would be hosted on related topics each year.

Daniela BLAGA: msdanielablaga@gmail.com
University of Oradaea

Projet Jean Monnet. Module européen (2010-2013)
Le leadership politique et le développement organisationnel de l'Union Européenne

Ce projet à financement européen est dirigé par Mme Cristina-Maria Dogot, maître assistant et docteur en sciences politiques avec une thèse sur l'idée fédérale européenne, titulaire des cours sur *l'Histoire de la construction européenne*, *Institutions européennes*, *Fédéralisme européen*, *Politique européenne de compétitivité et développement*. De son équipe fait part également Ioan Horga, Professeur Jean Monnet à l'Université d'Oradea depuis 2002, directeur de la Chaire Jean Monnet. Il donne des cours sur la *Politique de voisinage de l'Union européenne* ; *Développement régionale* etc. et dirige des thèses de doctorat sur les problèmes des frontières de l'Est et de la sécurité européenne. Professeur Ioan Horga est aussi Directeur de l'Institute d'Études euro-régionales Oradea-Debrecen (www.iser.rdsor.ro) et l'éditeur de la revue EUROLIMES, spécialisée dans l'étude des problèmes des frontières.

La raison du projet est dérivé du constat que l'UE est devenue un acteur politique essentiel dans le système des relations internationales, ce qui nécessite la connaissance, par les étudiants de la Études européenne et relations internationales, de l'importance des instruments politiques et du leadership politique de l'UE, tant dans son aspect collectif que dans ses formes individuelles, au niveau général et régional.

L'**objectif** principal du projet est d'organiser des nouveaux cours, qui approfondiront les connaissances des étudiants sur la question de l'intégration politique européenne et contribueront à la spécialisation des étudiants sur la question de l'unité politique de l'UE et de l'organisation administrative et politique de l'UE.

Les deux nouveaux cours proposé dans ce projet sont soutenus par les deux membres de l'équipe, Cristina Dogot soutenant les cours intitulé « Le leadership politique et le développement organisationnel de l'Union Européenne », et Professeur Ioan Horga le cours sur « Les acteurs politiques de l'UE. Les régions, acteurs politiques d'une nouvelle Europe » ; et sont destinés aux étudiants niveau master Sécurité Européenne

D'autre coté, dans le cadre du projet a été prévue l'organisation des conférences, dont une est déjà réalisé la fin de mars 2011, avec l'appui de l'Institute d'Études Euro-régionales Oradea-Debrecen, ayant le titre « Leaders of the Borders, Borders of the Leaders ». La conférence a réuni des spécialistes de plusieurs pays (Albanie, France, Belgique, Italie, Allemagne, Macédoine, Slovaquie, Hongrie, Turquie, Ukraine) et de quelques universités de Roumanie.

La conférence est débutée avec un événement très spécial, l'attribution de la distinction *Doctor Honoris Causa* au Professeur Enrique Banús, de l'Université Catalogne de Barcelone, Président de l'Association d'Étude des Communautés Européennes, un des plus importants collaborateurs du Département d'Études européennes et relations internationales. Deux conférences plénières ont suivi à cette cérémonie, conférences données par M. Paolo Magagnotti, le directeur du Centre d'Études européennes Alcide De Gasperi de Timişoara, qui s'est appuyé sur concept assez rarement utilisé, la micro-diplomatie, et M. Philippe Mioche, Directeur du Master d'Études européennes d'Université de Provence, Aix-en-Provence, qui a fait une histoire des frontières de l'Europe.

Les trois sections de la conférence ont suivi les rapports d'entre le leadership politique et le problème des frontières en Europe de trois perspectives différentes : la Guerre froide, le processus de l'intégration européenne et la période postcommuniste. Le

fondement de cette structure de la conférence est bien important : une période assez courte à l'échelle historique, celle d'après la deuxième guerre mondiale jusqu'aujourd'hui, a connu des changements des frontières ayant du fondement différent et qui ont bouleversé la vie des États et des peuples européens. Selon le temps et l'espace où ont eu lieu, ces changements peuvent être considérées soit positives que négatives : positives si on considère le processus de l'intégration européenne et la dissolution des frontières intérieures de l'Union, négative si les modifications ont été réalisées par des actions agressives. Il faut ainsi souligner une caractéristique de la Guerre Froide, à savoir le développement parallèle d'un conflit idéologique et du processus de l'intégration européenne (donc dissolution des certaines frontières) comme une île pacifiste et d'innovation économique et politique. La période d'après la fin de la Guerre Froide sera, malheureusement, assez riche en événements qui ont déterminé des changements des frontières, et le cas de l'ancienne Yougoslavie et plus que significatif, même si d'autre coté l'adhésion à l'UE des certaines des anciennes pays communistes a déterminé.

Pour l'année prochaine est prévue une table ronde, qui réunira des étudiants de plusieurs facultés de l'Université d'Oradea et des fonctionnaires publics locaux, et pour la dernière année du projet une autre conférence, concernant l'évolution du processus de la construction européenne après le Traité de Lisbonne.

Cristina Maria DOGOT: dogot@igri.ro
University of Oradaea

VI. HONOURED PERSONALITY

TO UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR DOCTOR ENRIQUE BANÚS IRUSTA ON THE OCCASION OF AWARDING THE DOCTOR HONORIS CAUSA DEGREE OF UNIVERSITY OF ORADEA

LAUDATIO

To Professor Enrique BANÚS IRUSTA, PhD. on the occasion of granting the title of *Doctor Honoris Causa* of the University of Oradea

Perhaps each of you sharing with us today such a solemn moment agrees that the exceptional moments of our lives are scarce, in spite of our longing for them. We believe that it would not be wrong to say that a particular aspect of our existence is the continuous quest, whether conscious or not, for these exceptional moments that give us the source for our will and determination to continue our projects and that stay with us as permanent landmarks, which never lose either beauty or strength, no matter how much time would pass by. It is the precise aspect of our life and personality that contains, paraphrasing the philosopher Simone Weil, **the strength and the grace** to capture from everything that surrounds us exactly those elements which are necessary to self-development, to self-address questions, to understand, to create, to give. Only that, to achieve these moments of grace, it is not enough for this side of our life to simply exist, but we also need our life to intersect with a particular person or a particular event that often creates the emerging point of such moment of the exceptional. But then again, this is a necessary but not sufficient requirement, because we also need to make use of our ability to recognize an opportunity and to make the most of it, to take advantage in the noblest sense of the word of what it can offer for our existence to unfold or to change as we would like for it to do.

Eugene Ionesco stated in his *Journal* that we are the results of the situations we encounter and of the people we meet. While this statement may be the subject of an entire philosophy of existence, with pro's and con's, we would rather believe that the great writer was right. We would also state that we cannot ignore our influence on events and on the people with whom we have crossed paths if we consider the numerous exceptional personalities and the great variety of exceptional events that we encounter during our academic career.

Such a moment was the meeting with Professor Enrique Banús Irusta, at both personal and professional levels and not only for myself but also for the team I represent, namely of the Department of International Relations and European Studies within the Faculty of History, Geography and International Relations. The first moment of this meeting was the seventh edition of a renowned scientific event of great relevance for all those interested in European issues, namely the Congress of European Culture in Pamplona, a scientific event held in the spring of 2004 by the Honourable Professor and Europeanist Enrique Banús Irusta. Thus it began a long-term collaboration between Professor Enrique Banús Irusta with the members of the Department of European Studies

and International Relations. The following year Professor Banús Irusta attended an international seminar held in Oradea, followed by his participation in various conferences of the Jean Monnet Action, held in Brussels, a conference in Poland, in 2007 and one in Cluj, Romania, in 2009. Beyond such participation in joint events that have always created and fostered opportunities to discuss new joint projects addressing current European issues, Professor Enrique Banús Irusta has become one of the most active collaborators of *Eurolimes*, a journal published by the Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debrecen within the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, and one of the most important external collaborators of our department.

We should, however, share with you who Professor Enrique Banús Irusta is, so that you could have a comprehensive image of the exceptional nature that is to be found within an academic and scientific cooperation intertwined with human relations, as well.

Professor Enrique Banús Irusta completes his academic studies within the area of Literature at the Universities of Bonn and Aquisgrain (Aachen), the early years of his academic career being related to the German space, where he teaches before he returns to Spain, in 1988, within the Universities of Aquisgrain, Cologne, Bonn and Paderborn. Between 1988 and 2007 he works as a professor within the University of Navarra, teaching courses of Comparative European Literature; this period is one of maximum implication at institutional level in the European issues. In this respect it is to be noted that between 1989 and 2007 Professor Enrique Banús Irusta has the sequence of the following positions: Director of the European Documentation Centre of the University of Navarra, Director of Center for European Studies of the same university and on numerous occasions between 1990 and 1997, President of Organizing Committee of the European Culture Congress. Also, Professor and the Europeanists Enrique Banús Irusta was a member of the team of experts on Intercultural Dialogue within the General Directorate for Education and Culture of the European Commission. As of 2008, Professor Enrique Banús Irusta becomes a member of the *European Community Studies Association-Spain* and is elected for 2009-2010 as the International President of the European Communities Study Association, "the premier scholarly and professional association focusing on the European Union, the ongoing integration process, and transatlantic relations". Currently, Professor Enrique Banús Irusta is Dean of the Faculty of Humanities from the International University of Catalonia and the Director of Charlemagne Institute for European Studies within the International University of Catalonia (Barcelona), "a part of the University dedicated exclusively to study, research and dialogue on the state of Europe".

Although very involved in activities of a rather institutional-administrative nature, Professor Enrique Banús Irusta has always found time for the activity that is probably the closest to his heart, i.e. teaching and teaching he does with a full-fledged passion! Thus, in over thirty years of academic career, entire generations of students from different cultures have benefited from the scholar qualities of Professor Enrique Banús Irusta and have been introduced to various aspects of the European culture, some of them finding, following this intersection, the direction of scientific and professional direction.

Professor Enrique Banús's concerns for European affairs, and especially for the European culture, will push him to undertake permanent action not only by means of various institutions where, as mentioned, he served in the highest positions, but also by means of scientific activity, both as single author and as editor or co-author.

If we were limited to a quantitative approach, the name of Professor Enrique Banús Irusta would be associated with twenty books and one hundred and thirteen articles.

Such statistics, however, speak about the prolific author Enrique Banús Irusta, but not about his scientific interests or his research directions that he has pursued, reflecting his interdisciplinary approach of European or international issues. Because it was very difficult to pick only one title, we have tried to make a summary of research topics undertaken by the Europeanists Enrique Banús Irusta: studies of European literature and European comparative literature; women's image in the history of European literature; Herder's philosophy; European identity; European cultural identity; European citizenship; European cultural heritage; European intercultural dialogue; European cultural relations; European cultural borders; the place of culture within European politics, the Christian foundation of the European Constitution; the Christian foundations of European literature; culture and social imaginary in Spain; Spain and European integration issues; the principle of subsidiarity; the European economy issues; impacts of globalization; recession and its effects.

It is very difficult to catch in a few-minutes speech the Europeanist's characteristics and significance of writing, the humanist and man of culture who Enrique BanúsIrusta really is. But even after this brief observation, which you might consider superficial, of Enrique Banús's writings it is very difficult to appreciate what first recommends the Professor and Europeanist Enrique Banus Irusta, his highly intense institutional activism or his scientific activity? Which of the two aspects of his professional life lays the foundation for the other? In what concerns us, we believe that these two aspects are intrinsic to each other and they are the way of being of Professor Enrique Banus Irusta, a way of being based on the work of a lone researcher, a man of letters, but also of an activist permanently serving not only students or European citizens, but the human being in both his universality and his humanity, in the service of European culture, but through this job to a humanism that transcends national borders and even those of cultures and mentalities. And if we were to paraphrase another Europeanist that has imprinted with his effervescence of his verb on the idea of European unity, Denis de Rougemont, who believed that the duty of a theorist is to link between thought and action, to not allow the gap between theoretical thinking and practical action, Professor Enrique Banús Irusta is the Europeanist that demonstrated that he "*is thinking with the hands"*, putting ideas to work through the institutions where he worked, led or represented.

In 2003, Professor Enrique Banús Irusta was awarded a Jean Monnet Chair ad personam in "European Culture," by the European University Council, a distinction granted by the European Commission to scholars who make significant contributions to European culture in the academic field on both national and international levels. Such as the rules of the European Commission specify, "ad personam Jean Monnet Chairs are reserved for distinguished Jean Monnet Chairs who deliver evidence of a high-level international teaching and publication record (that was achieved, at least in part, outside their country of residence) and/or professors with a distinguished background as former high-level practitioners in the field of European integration".

Perhaps after having received such a distinction one may be believe that all other things will come naturally, that for the recipient it is time to slowdown, to relax, to rest. It is not the case of Professor and Europeanist militant Enrique Banus Irusta, for whom the receiving of such distinction meant assuming his duty to permanently reconfirm his merit that has already been recognized; the activity carried out by Professor Enrique Banús Irusta in the last decade is an undeniable proof of this desire to reward through hard work, through more activism, through more militancy, the reward of another work, another activism, another militancy, all having been already proven. The University of Oradea, through the Department of European Studies and International Relations housed within

the Faculty of History, Geography and International Relations have had both the chance and the honour to enjoy Professor Enrique Banus's partnership in a period when this specialization was new, a period in which the support of a specialist was more than required for us to take the next step with confidence.

Today, the University of Oradea wishes to express the deepest admiration for all the work carried out by Professor Enrique Banús Irusta in supporting the European culture, and thus the idea of European unity. Also, the University of Oradea wishes to express its gratitude towards Professor Enrique Banús Irusta for his support and trust that he has provided us with boundless generosity and kindness. It is for certain that the time has not allowed us to remind in this too-fast presentation all accomplishments belonging to the Professor, the Europeanist and the man of culture that Enrique Banús Irusta is. Surely that both time and also our clumsiness or a certain shyness in front of the strength and talent of Enrique Banús Irusta - The Man turned us unable to bring out all his qualities and merits; we apologize for this not so much to him, but especially to you, our distinguished guests. We are nevertheless positive that we were able to present aspects of the work and personality of Enrique Banús Irusta – The Scholar, as much as needed in order to convince you that our gesture of admiration and professional gratitude of today is a natural one.

We do therefore consider the proposal submitted by the Faculty of History, Geography and International Relations, i.e. to grant the title of Doctor Honoris Causa to the one of the most distinguished current Europeanists, as of our capacity to both recognize human values and to assume the European values in their generality, especially the cultural ones.

Thus, following the decision of the University of Oradea Senate, Professor Enrique Banús Irusta has been included in the gallery of Oradea professors and assumed as a European value and it is a great honour to grant him the title of Doctor Honoris Causa of our university. Professor Banús Irusta, please receive our deepest consideration, admiration and gratitude! We are deeply convinced that our collaboration will continue and reach new levels!

Oradea, 31 March 2011   Prof. Ioan HORGA, PhD.

VII. BOOK REVIEWS

Volume 10, No. 1, 2010 of the *Romanian Journal of European Affairs* published under the auspices of European Institute of Romania contains articles signed by Annette Freyberg-Inan, Octavian Manea and Iulia Serafimescu, Daniela Irrera, Clara Darabont, Agnes Nicolescu, Neculai – Cristian Şurubaru.

In the article of Annette Freyberg –Inan, *Equity as the missing link: the values of the European Union, the author* talks about the concept of liberalism in economy and makes its critics. The author militates for an equitable distribution of the wealth of European society. Although, the author considers that the welfare of the society is better preserved in social-democratic governance, she considers that both systems should focus on equity. The author makes a critic of the European integration that "has suffered from a normative imbalance in favor of aggregate prosperity and external competitiveness and in disfavor of internal solidarity and democracy".

Octavian Manea and Iulia Serafimescu, the article *Disquietude on the Eastern Flank: Awaiting Alliance Response* look at some of the alarm signals coming from the countries of NATO's Eastern Flank, "trying to explain the feeling of insecurity perceived by the states in the region as well as the options available to the Euro-Atlantic community in order to engage in a much – needed process of strategic reassurance". The author consider that making concession to Russia will cause more insecurity in the Eastern flank. The Eastern flank should be consolidated and thus a positive attitude towards Russia is desirable. The alliance should not be asymetric, the security should be offered to equal extent to everybody, says the author.

In the article *EU and civil society: the case of NGOs in peace missions and humanitarian intervention*, Daniela Irrera talks about the role of NGOs in European politics. European Union constitutes itself as an arena characterized by different levels of government and different actors. The author talks about the civil society actors who choose to rely on the mediation of national policy. In the field of security interventions, the role of NGOs is increasing. NGOs started to support the missions of ONU in 1990.

Clara Darabont in the article *Are contemporary wars "new"?* considers that "the change in state's powers and attributions is central to the change in warfare". The politics of states involved in war started to change and warfare are also influenced of globalization. It is important for Romania to start thinking globally.

Agnes Nicolescu writes the article *Changes in Romania's foreign policy from the perspective of NATO and EU membership.* The author identifies the Romanian political goals after the entrance in NATO and European Union. The entrance in EU means for Romania to adjust to European security policy. Romania should give attention to Black Sea region as means to bring closer Central and Eastern Europe and to continue the dialogue with Russia and Turkey "in order to contribute to maximizing the cooperation instruments offered by Black Sea Strategy". The author considers that European politics

has to build more consistent relations with Russia and with other European countries and Romania should set its objectives in foreign policy according to EU politics.

Neculai-Cristian Şurubaru in the article *Between hammers and anvils. The socialization of European Permanent Representatives: Romania and Bulgaria – A comparative case study* asserts that permanent representation of Romania and Bulgaria implement the European politics into the national sphere. The author consider that „Specific for the Bulgarian representatives is their slow pace in acquiring the formal and informal procedures of the committee, while the Romanian diplomats have a different relation with their Ministry of Foreign Affairs". In both countries national politics is on the base of their politics.

Volume 10 No.2, June 2010 edited by European Institute of Romania contains articles signed by Clive H. Church and David Phinnemore, Irina Maria Găman, Scott Nicholas Romaniuk, Adriana Berbec, Mircea Micu, Victor Negrescu and Ionuţ Constantin Trăistaru.

Clive H. Church and David Phinnemore in the article *Understanding the treaty of Lisbon* say that „The article assesses the status, structure and style of the treaty and its contents, highlighting its provisions on values and rights, powers and policies, institutional changes, democratization and enhanced external activity". According to the author the European Union will be „a body based on history, principles, values, treaties and the specific powers and functions conferred on it by the member states".

The author Irina Maria Găman, in the article *La libéralisation des marchée de l'électricité et du gaz naturel au niveau européen – Enjeux et défis actuels* considers that liberalizing the markets of electricity and of gase is a challenge for majority of the states members of the European Union. The author underlines the necessity of having an internal energetical market of the European Union.

In the article *Not so wide, Europe: Reconsidering the normative power of the EU in European Foreign Policy*, Scott Nicholas Romaniuk, analizes the concept of „normative power Europe", by focusing on the efficacity of European Neighbourhood Policy in the case of Belarus and Ukraine.

In the article of Adriana Berbec, *Reassesing European Union Limits: What role for the new Regional Partnerships*, the author considers that EU will continue to extend in other countries which are European, but which do not fulfill Copenhagen criteria. Proximmity policy, considers the author, is the way of cooperating with the neighbours without offering them, for the moment, the possibility to adhere to European Community.

Mircea Micu in the article *Romanian Security in an evolving European context* states as a conclusion that "It is clear that Romania's territorial defence concern is satisfactorily addressed within a NATO/US framework only. Nevertheless, Romania's expectations regarding a more spirited EU involvement in its Eastern/ Black Sea neighborhood are not necessarily linked to EU's physical potential, but rely mostly on the political will needed to generate a coherent, unified EU stance towards this particular geographical area".

In the article of Victor Negrescu*, L'opérationnalisation en Roumanie de l'acquis communautaire dans le domaine de la cooperation pour le développement* considers that the European integration of Romania meant the adoption of the aims of European Union in the field of cooperation and national attributions. It is important for the Romanian state to assert a national strategy and to adopt European mechanisms in this field.

The two volumes of *Romanian Journal of European Affairs* are worth reading as they approach different topics of European Politics. The elaborated approaches of the authors make

the reader aware of the necessity of adopting new solutions for our country in its relations with NATO and European Union. In the same time, the volumes identify the future directions of evolution of the European Union.

Anca Oltean,
University of Oradea,
Email: olteananca@hotmail.com

Eurolimes, *vol. 11, Leaders of the Borders, Borders of the Leaders*, *The Journal of the Institute for Euroregional Studies* "Jean Monnet" Centre of Excellence, Spring 2011 Edition, 232 p., Oradea University Press, ISSN: 1841-9259

This latest issue of Eurolimes is titled "Leaders of the Borders, Borders of the Leaders" and brings together the works presented at the conference with the same name, held between 31 March and 2 April 2011. The issue of political leadership has been increasingly present in the public space. Researchers within the field of Humanities have been trying to give frameworks for various socio-political situations when political leaders prove to be influential and/or are known to have had a decisive role in settling certain situations. If it were not for the mass-media, the political leader would remain only a notion with which people would not be so familiar. Nowadays political leadership is intertwined with prime-time television, with high-rate newspaper journalism, and with whatever else our highly technologized era supposes. Political leadership is not a new field of study; it has been as old as Plato and Aristotle, as Hobbes and Locke, as Machiavelli and authoritarian regimes. The issue of political leadership was approached now from a diachronic vantage point, with some synchronic angles, the articles spanning in the direction of a systematic collection of life history data that can help generate an important evidence base from which to evaluate political policy and practice over the long term. The decision-making ability is seen in contrast to the capacity to lead and to make spot-on decisions and therefore, it all comes down to who the person within the political leader really is.

The two main issues addressed by the articles are of the utmost importance to the contemporary society: political leadership and European frontiers. The period covered by the articles are centred around the Cold War, i.e. before and after the Cold War, with an eye on the variable that the process of the European construction was and with a particular focus on the shifting of borders and frontiers.

The Journal is constructed around three central themes. In the first section, Florin ABRAHAM (Bucharest); Valentina GÎDEA and Lucian Bogdan (Cluj-Napoca); Anca OLTEAN (Oradea); and Ljiljana Manic, Nada Torlak and Natasa Simeunovic Bajic (Belgrade) examine the "Political leadership and the borders of Europe during the Cold War". Florin Abraham, in his article titled "Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Romania's Eastern Neighbourhood", analyses the issue of Romania's eastern neighbourhood in the period between 1945 and 1965 from the perspective of Gheorghiu-Dej's power interests. The research follows three main directions: the way in which neighbourhood is conceived from the perspective of the communist ideology; the geopolitical consequences of the neighbourhood relation between Romania and the USSR; and aspects of the diplomatic

relations. Gheorghiu-Dej was an adept of *realpolitik*, of prudence, in order to avoid any situation that could endanger his political position.

"American diplomats […] constantly warned of the security risks to Western Europe and the U.S., once Eastern Europe succumbed entirely to totalitarian rule" reads Valentina Gîdea and Lucian Bogdan's article, "From Consensus to Mutual Distrust and Back: The Shifting Boundaries of Free Europe in the Twentieth Century". The concept of a "Free Europe" was reviewed as it has evolved throughout the 20th century, with its ups and downs – ranging from the first realistic plans for devising a continental edifice, continuing through the bleakest moments of Europe's history, when liberty was under siege and had all but receded from the Easternmost part of the continent.

Anca OLTEAN studies the migration phenomenon of the European Jews, with an emphasis on their emigration from Romania and subsequent immigration to Israel. The Romanian communist state tried to assimilate the minorities and to erase all differences. Emigration was allowed after WW II, but the Jews who immigrated to Israel were stripped from their properties and lost their jobs when they announced their decision to leave Romania. The diplomatic relations between Romania and Israel were influenced by the emigration problem of the Romanian Jews. The persecutions of Zionist leaders in Romania together with the periods when emigration was prevented were moments of tension in the Romanian – Israeli relations.

"The Balkan region has a tendency to produce more history than it can consume" (Winston Churchill) is the motto with which Ljiljana Manic, Nada Torlak, and Natasa Simeunovic Bajic opened their argument in "Tito, Yugoslavia, and the "Third Way": Understanding Physical and Symbolic Borders". Tito's image as a liberator, statesman and a party leader was the reason the Yugoslav people saw him as the stalwart of the Republic. It is also what led him to be named president for life in 1974. Yugoslavia's political, economic, and cultural position during the Cold War are explained, together with the relation between the youth, born after Tito's death, and his personality that seems to be imprinted on the younger generation.

Section two, titled "United Europe, Europe of the leaders: European borders from 6 to (+)27" houses five studies carried out by Radu Carp (Bucharest), Helga Zichner and Bettina Bruns (Leipzig), Andreea Crina Horea (Cluj-Napoca), Licia Bagini (Poitiers), and Denis Rolland (Strasbourg). Radu Carp, in his paper "Modernisation envers secularisme? La transformation de la Turquie ante portas", looks into the many issues related to the role of religion in society, either Islam or Christianity.

Helga Zichner and Bettina Bruns (Leipzig), "Within a "Ring of Secure Third Countries": Regional and Local Effects of the Extraterritorial Engagement of the European Union in Belarus, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova", argue that the production of internal security (with the EU) and the production of secure milieus outside its own territory (within third countries) are closely interconnected and pursued in heterogeneous policy fields e.g. migration policy, education policy and the policy of welfare promotion

Andreea Crina Horea, "Europe's Gordian Knot – Germany", analyses the European enlargement process from Germany's vantage point and its involvement in shaping the policies of the European Communities, regarding economy, security, unique market and Eastern enlargement and also likes and dislikes from Germany's neighbours towards the German state.

Licia Bagini studies the High-Adige/South Tyrol region, providing an interesting illustration of the links between "territory and identity" among various linguistic

communities, the largest of which being the German speaking and Ladino populations. How then does the notion of borders apply to the High-Adige/ South Tyrol? Are these borders internal or external; geographical, cultural or economic? In this context should we then leave aside the notion of the borders of the Nation State and approach the High-Adige/South Tyrol rather from a "Euroregions" perspective? These are a few questions that Licia Bagini attempted to answer in her work "Quelles Frontières pour le Trentin-Haut Adige/Südtirol?".

Denis Rolland studies the Council of Europe and the political role that this institution could play ("Le Conseil de l'Europe en 2010: une vieille institution pour un projet moderne ? Éléments de réflexion et d'historiographie").

Section three houses five articles with the common theme of "The place of the leaders after the end of the Cold War: the disappearance/appearance of the borders". Péter Reményi studies the case of the IEBL and the Republika Srpska of Bosnia-Herzegovina; Monica Oproiu visits the violent transformation of borders in former Yugoslavia and the case of Slobodan Milosevic; Giulia Prelz Oltramonti studies "Borders, Boundaries, Ceasefire Lines and de facto Borders: The Impact of Mobility Policies", while Mihály Tömöri presents a most interesting "Case Study of Shopping Tourism in Debrecen and Oradea". Adriana Popescu and Ludovic Nica close this section with their study on regionalism in a Europe without borders that addresses issues regarding the County of Bihor.

Section four houses the Focus Study done by Erhard Busek (Wien) on "Moving borders", who addresses the timelessness of frontiers, borders, language and means of communication in the new era of today.

The Journal closes with a section containing book reviews and a few words about the authors who published in this issue of Eurolimes.

All studies span in the direction of political leadership, before and after the Cold War, attempting to take on as many vantage points as possible. The novelty of this issue is its attempt to approach old issues in a new manner. This Journal is useful for the general reader, students of Humanities, or the researcher within European Studies or International Relations.

Daniela BLAGA
University of Oradea,
Email: msdanielablaga@gmail.com

Політологічні та соціологічні студії (Political and Sociological Studies), TOM IX, Political Regionalism and Regional Studies: Empirical and theoretical aspects. ISBN 978-966-399-266-2, p. 575

Published in 2010, the volume is divided into four chapters: from the definition of the regionalism, passing thru the Ukraine regionalism, European Regionalism ending with Global Regionalism. All the articles reflect the opinion of well established researchers from Ukraine.

The first chapter is entitled *Regional Studies: Theoretical, Historical and Political Dimensions.* The articles are written by Miroslava Lendiel, Serhej Adamovych, Ihor Melnychuk, Maksym Iarmystyi, Marian Tokar, Andriy Kruglashov. The articles present different approaches from different point of view of regionalism and the effects of regionalism in Ukraine.

The second chapter *Ukraine regional development: looking for efficient paradigm*, present the development of Ukraine thru the process of regionalization in the contemporary era. The authors are Natalia Rotar, Anatoly Kruglashov, Aliona Hlyvko, Mykola Guitor, Oleksii Kolesnykov, Volodymyr Demidov, Nataliya Nechayeva-Yuriychuk, Roman Martiniuk, Vasyl Buslenko, Vasyl Veren'ko, Olga Brusilovska, Alina Zadorognya, Olena Kutsova, Oksana Dokash, Yuriy Yurijchuk, Oleh Mushekevych and Veronika Kruglashova. Some of the articles have a common base; here I'm referring to the elections from 1999 till 2006 and how the people reacted to the elections. We can se that from the first elections in 1999 till now, people voted first by impression and then continued voting by from a different point of view more democratic, even if the system is recognized as having some problems. The Chernivtsy Oblast is considered, in an article, the future of the Ukraine election system. Reducing dirty technologies in the election campaign may enhance the processes of circulation, recruiting elite and new developing new form of politics. An article presents the regional peculiarities of Ukraine in the elections process and fact that those can be consider a resource, but is to be considered an advantage and not the whole scheme of election in the election plan. The 2002 election opened a new era of political life in Ukraine, because the elections influence the party system development and regional political life. Thanks to the 2004 political reform Ukraine is parliamentary presidential state, and some author ask them self's if this reform was necessary and if it will be effective, because in Ukraine the party system is influenced by the regional context.

The third chapter *Regional Aspects of Political Transformations in Eastern Europe* takes the regional development from Ukraine to the whole Eastern Europe. The authors are: Vira Burdiak, Evhenia Yuriychuk, Okasana Pavliuk, Teofil Rendyuk, Viktor Petrov, Tetiana Fedorchak, Roman Garat, Pavlo Molochko, Ihor Polishchuk, Lyudmyla Prokopets, Roman Kalytchak, Adriy Semenovych, Ihor Moroz, Vadym Pintsak, Anatoliy Lysiuk, Ihor Nedokus, Galyna Osadtsa, Sophia Kirshenblat. The main concern revolves around the development of post-soviet countries in the context of current regionalization. Articles reflect vectors of Romanian, Russian, Bulgarian, Polish, Belarusian, Greek foreign policy and even those of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Chapter IV, *Regional and global: Interdependence and Dissimilarity,* tackles contemporary international topics such as USA foreign policy in the context of Middle Eastern conflicts, immigration, and multiethnic development. The last articles of this chapter take a turn looking into geopolitical factors that concern the Danube as a shipping route and the Black Sea as an important security reagion, The authors: Oleksiy Kandyuk, Anatoliy Khudoliy, Taras Lupul, Oksana Yarosh, Iryna Petrova, Maksym Petrov, Vasyl Zemlyuk, Nataliya Strelchuk, Nataliya Rotar bring their own unique perspectives upon pressing issues such as those mentioned before.

As a personal note on the subject of the volume, the articles enlisted here are a solid building block for anyone that wishes to undertake a study of Ukraine and it's political system from a regional point of view. The book goes beyond that, bordering the regional policy to that of globalization. By extension such topics as regional security and development are present in the book, but also influences from neighboring countries and global powers.

István POLGÁR,
University of Oradea,
Email: isti_polgi@yahoo.com

Studia Universitates Babeş-Bolyai, Studia Europaea, Volume 55 (2010) No. 1

Since 1996, the academic journal **Studia Europaea**, issued by the Faculty of European Studies, has been representing an open arena for promoting research endeavours. The journal is refereed by international specialists and officially acknowledged by the Romanian National University Research Council (CNCSIS). The publication's area of concern is in falling in line with the multidisciplinary profile of the Faculty of European Studies. Consequently, the studies reflect several areas of scientific research (political science, international relations, law, economics, anthropology, information and communication technology), focusing however, on present-day concerns of European integration.

Recent literature on great powers and/or empires in world history shows not only the conventional aspects of military and economic power. They pay attention to new factors that usually were neglected, like the argument of cultural cohesion, cross-border migration, innovation and systems of governance. Many studies include the history of non-European powers and try to present an analytical view of global development through many centuries.

More than fifteen years after engaging in the endeavors of giving a political and security muscle to the already powerful economic European Union, there is still a good deal of work to be done. Most of the institutions necessary for carrying out the security and defense tasks are already at work and still the European Union is rather shy in undertaking such responsibilities. Will the Treaty of Lisbon be able to strengthen the authority of European Union in a very sensitive and highly important area for its respectability as an effective actor on the world stage?

The approach of the European Union external border has been made through an analysis of the concepts of external border from the point of view of official documents and the concepts introduced by authors and specialists in the field and through an attempt to seize certain types of symbolic and ideological borders. Beyond physical border - irrespective of the conceptual approach from whose perspective it is analyzed whether within European Union border – there can be identified other types of "borders". We consider these borders symbolic and ideological, as they are not palpable more often than not. From Europeanism to nationalism, from ethno-religious identities to social chasm, this wide range of approaches on symbolic and ideological borders may continue in the context of new fight against terrorism or of the implementation of an efficient European neighborhood policy.

Ernesto de Martino recognized nowadays as the father of Italian modern anthropology has dreamt a dream, which was to become true after his departure from the living. He has dreamt a dream of a culturally and geographical united Europe in which the cultural South would be appreciated for its intrinsic folks gems.

The common idea is that culture does play a role in the European integration only (at least) when article 128 (now 151) is included into the Treaty with the Maastricht Treaty. A while ago, actions of cultural field on the basis of intergovernmental agreements were given. But the relations between the European integration project and culture are impressively more relevant. On the other hand, a Common Market, as established in the founding treaties is based on a culture and at the same time improving a culture. A political project like the European Communities realized via an economic instrument has inevitably cultural consequences.

The post-communist Romania will confront many changes, both in ideological as in functional fields. If ideological changes were shown as normal by a very large part of the population, the organizational changes would be often more difficult to realize. It is the case of adopting and application of the subsidiary, although the modifications turn out to be more and more visible, and the process of the European integration should be considered as a catalyst of the administrative structures evolution in the direction of decentralization and a stimulus for the people to assume more civic responsibility.

The local development strategy represents a participative tool that involves the entire community and whose goal is to provide the economical development. In most of the cases, local development strategy is a long-term step, being a future community projection. This vision of the community, related with its future development must be shared with all relevant actors at a local level and transposed in a set of specific objectives and a clear action plan.

The strategy of local development involves sometimes implementation of an information system. There are some real benefits of a real implementation of an information system in a state institution of higher education. Information systems have to be developed and integrated architecture framework that is designed to incorporate the dedicated information systems for educational, administrative, research management software systems and an e-learning platform. The interdisciplinary perspective specific to European studies sustains a proficient organizational solution, which combines efficient IT strategies with organizational management perspectives.

Senior as well as junior academics from Europe and from the United States have found in Studia Europaea a way of expressing their preoccupations by publishing academic articles that have focused on the European experience and perspectives in various fields of social science. **In my opinion** Studea Europaea is one of the few

Romanian publications committed to European studies; therefore it plays a significant role within the Romanian scientific community.

Suzana MAHD
University of Oradea,
Email: suzana_azzam@yahoo.com

Ioan HORGA, Iordan Gh. BARBULESCU, Adrian IVAN, Mykolia PALINCHAK, Istvan SULI-ZAKAR, Regional and Cohesion Policy – Insights into the role of the Partnership Principle in the New Policy Design, 2011, 311 p., Debrecen University Press and Oradea University Press, ISBN: 978-606-10-0449-2

Regional development is the main challenge for all states within Central and Eastern Europe following their accession to the European Union. Territorial cooperation is an efficient means for the balanced integration of the EU territories aiming to modernize the regions that lack economic and social development. "With the major goal of promoting economic, social and territorial cohesion, the EU's economic development policy supports the efforts by each Member State of mitigating the interregional disparities through transfer of financial resources to the backward regions." (Foreword) Multi-level governance supposes the regional and the local authorities working together to design and implement programs for cohesion and development. The initiative of the Committee of the Regions (CoR) to start a "large debate forum" about the "involvement of the sub-national authorities" was welcomed by all stakeholders, from local and regional levels to the business community, civil society and academic field.

The Institute for Euroregional Studies (IERS), "Jean Monnet" European Centre of Excellence of the Universities of Oradea and Debrecen has engaged in the debate. In December 2009 IERS was the only Romanian institution and one of the very few within Central and Eastern Europe that expressed a point of view on the White Paper of MLG of the CoR. IERS took the extra step in organizing, as part of the second stage of the debate, a conference titled "Regional Development and Territorial Cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe in the context of the White Paper of Multilevel Governance of the Committee of Regions (20-21 May 2010)". IERS enjoyed the support of "Altiero Spinelli" Centre for the Study of European Governance of Babes Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca, of the Academic Club for European Studies of the National School for Political and Administrative Studies in Bucharest, of "Alcide de Gasperi" Centre for European Studies of the Western University in Timisoara, and of the National University of Ushorod.

This book brings together all works presented at the conference and is centred on two major themes: *Regional Development: Performances and Perspectives*, and *Territorial Cooperation and CoR White Paper on Multilevel Governance*.

The first theme, *Regional Development: Performances and Perspectives*, contains studies addressing the role of the nation in communitarian-related debates, as well as in the process of regionalization, aiming to clarify such divergences as the dichotomy

between solidarity and individualism in the modern society (Nicolae Paun). Papers signed by authors such as Ilosvai; Castro-Conde; Bargaoanu and Dascalu; Unita; Mezo, Barta and Kozma; Iov; Penzes; Kincso; Molnar; Nistor and Sipos; Nemeti, address issues ranging from state-of-the-art ICT, the potential for enhancing democratic credential of the EU post-Lisbon Treaty, insights into the role of the Partnership Principle, or a possible east-European model of regionalization, to the changes in the system of deconcentrated public administration in Hungary, or the administrative reform and regional development in the context of Croatia's EU accession, or even the potential for transnational cluster development in EU macro-regions.

The second theme, *Territorial Cooperation and CoR White Paper on Multilevel Governance*, contains studies centred on the issue of the new spatial dimension of the European Union and brings together authors like Suli-Zakar and Tomori; Horga and Gyula; Silasi and Magagnotti; Serzhanova; Pop; Buangi Conde; Soproni; Chirodea; Huszthy; Balogh; Gal and Brie; Szabo; Popoviciu; Stoica; and Nemes. The subjects span from MLG, governmental centralization, immediate self-governing, cross-border organization, subsidiarity principle and White Paper on MLG, data protection supervision, ENPI CBC Programmes, to teaching cross-border language as a tool, or the European media conglomerates on the communication market, along with standard of product and advertising, the role of regional networks in MLG, the frontier workers and the cross-border cooperation, or the role of e-participation in the process of territorial planning.

This book incorporates and at the same time addresses renowned specialists within the field of Euroregional studies, scholars, young researchers, doctoral students and experts from public and private institutions, with interests in reflecting the new spatial framework in the full modelling process within Central and Eastern Europe, in view of the current double effect: globalization and Europeanization.

Daniela BLAGA
University of Oradea,
Email: msdanielablaga@gmail.com

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
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
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
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
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
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
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